

Original citation:

Koinova, Maria. (2009) Why do ethnonational conflicts reach different degrees of violence? Insights from Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bulgaria during the 1990s. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Volume 15 (Number 1). pp. 84-108. ISSN 1353-7113

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
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<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537110802672412>"

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Koinova, Maria (2009) "Why Do Ethno-national Conflicts Reach Different Degrees of Violence?" *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 15 (Spring), pp. 84-108.

Article available online at:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13537110802672412?journalCode=fnep20#.VVW-PfNwYdU>

Why Do Ethno-national Conflicts Reach Different Degrees of Violence?

Insights from Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bulgaria during the 1990s

Abstract

*This article explores why ethno-national conflicts reach different degrees of ethno-national violence. It draws insights from the conflicts in Kosovo, Macedonia and Bulgaria, and the relationship between the Albanian and Turkish minorities and their respective majority-dominated governments during the 1990s. It challenges assertions by the literature that the early adoption of a constitution during the transition process and the inclusion of minorities in constitution-making assemblies could guarantee peaceful minority-majority interactions in the long run. Instead it argues that the **relative** change of constitutional minority rights status in comparison to the communist period, and **not the absolute** scope of rights granted by the new constitutions is the factor that matters for the formulation of the “new rules of the game.” Particularly constitutions which decrease minority rights status became focal points for the minority mobilization against them. Sidelined in the constitutional formation process, all three minorities challenge their constitutions. Yet they do so from within the institutions of the state (Bulgarian case), carry out clandestine activities (Kosovo case) or combine the two (Macedonian case) depending on how their status had been changed and which strategies – cooptation or coercion – the majority-dominated governments had employed to make the minorities comply with their new status. The minority actions are related in turn with low, high or middle levels of violence. This article also argues that timing and sequencing of governmental responses to minority demands matter. A timely governmental action prevents a non-territorial minority demand from expanding to become territorial. A belated governmental response to an originally non-territorial demand that had already become territorial could escalate the conflict, especially if the policy of the government fails.*

Keywords: Kosovo, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Albanians, Turks, violence, constitution, minority rights, cooptation, coercion, timing, sequencing

Introduction

Why did some conflicts in Eastern Europe turn violent while others did not after the end of communism? Over the past sixteen years research on ethno-nationalism has significantly added to a body of literature on a political phenomenon that continues to change borders and bring enormous human suffering throughout the globe. Despite the richness of a growing academic field, studies have concentrated either on the violent conflict in the former multi-national Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, or on the non-violent transformations of Czechoslovakia, the Baltic republics, Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine. Inquiries about degrees of violence in a single framework remain scarce, as do the considerations of aspects of timing and sequencing of minority-state interactions.

The purpose of this article is to address these gaps by exploring an empirical puzzle from Southeastern Europe during the 1990s. Why did the ethnic conflicts in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Kosovo (Yugoslavia) reach different degrees of ethno-national violence, if all three countries underwent transition from totalitarian rule, were made up of Christian Orthodox majorities and Muslim minorities, and had been located in a historically war-prone region? Despite tensions, the conflict in Bulgaria remained non-violent, in Macedonia violence occurred sporadically, while violence was the predominant mode of interaction in Kosovo.

I will explore three interrelated questions. First, how did changes in the constitutional status of the Turks of Bulgaria, Albanians of Macedonia and Albanians of Kosovo create new rules of the game in a transitional environment? Second, what explains the rise of minority demands or the relative acceptance of a new constitutional *status quo* by minority elites, and how did this affect the level of ethno-national violence? Third, how did the timing and sequencing of

governmental policy responses in major areas of minority politics matter for the variation in the degree of ethno-national violence?

After a brief discussion of major theories and their limitations with respect to answers of these questions, this article challenges two major assertions: that the early adoption of a constitution during the transition process and the inclusion of minorities in constitution-making assemblies could guarantee peaceful minority-majority interactions in the long run. Instead it argues that the *relative* change of minority rights compared to the communist period, and *not the absolute* scope of minority rights granted by the new constitutions, was the factor that mattered for the creation of the new “rules of the game” during the transition. I then trace how the combination of changed constitutional status and cooptation and coercion governmental strategies led to minority acceptance or rejection of the new *status quo*.¹ Cooptation of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria worked well in combination with a somewhat increased constitutional status in order to keep the level of violence low. A combination of cooptation and decreased status created a Janus-faced minority mobilization of the Albanians of Macedonia. The level of violence remained low when the minority pursued its policies through the state, but increased when it engaged in semi-clandestine activities. A combination of coercion and a drastically decreased status in Kosovo triggered the establishment of exclusively clandestine minority institutions which clashed regularly with governmental forces. Most notably, such dynamics opened opportunities for the impact of international influences, and as a result violence surged. In the final part of this article I argue that timely and well-sequenced governmental responses to non-territorial minority demands are crucial for avoiding ethno-national violence. I use evidence from semi-structured interviews, archival and secondary literature, and confine my research period to the years 1989-2001.²

The Puzzle and Major Theories

Against a backdrop of a large literature on ethno-national conflicts in transitional environments, four sets of arguments pertaining to historic, cultural and economic factors, structural explanations, democratization and ethnic conflict, and dynamic factors merit our attention here. The first set has the most difficult time explaining variations in degree of violence. Although “ancient hatreds” existed between the Serbs, Macedonians and Albanians on the one hand, and Bulgarians and Turks on the other, in a post-communist environment a “clash of civilizations” did not produce the same degrees of violence.³ The economic decline could also not account for such variation. Indeed, the minorities lived in impoverished regions compared to those of the majorities. Yet both majorities and minorities experienced drastic decline in employment, incomes and welfare after 1989 because of the pressures to introduce market reforms.⁴

One needs to be cautious in attributing too much explanatory power to structural factors. While they shape minority demands, they do not necessarily explain how the conflicts reach different degrees of violence. First, it could be argued that minority size and concentration *vis-à-vis* majorities can account for the adoption of more territorially-based minority demands, which could be conducive to more violence. This is particularly likely if minorities inhabit mountainous areas thereby limiting central control. Indeed, the Albanians of Kosovo and in Western Macedonia live in compact areas and are relatively large compared to their majorities. Unlike them, the Turkish minority in Bulgaria is smaller and lives in two major areas in the northeastern and southeastern parts of the country.⁵ Yet, if size and concentration were explanatory, it is not

clear how with the same characteristics during communism the Kosovars and Albanians of Macedonia lived more peacefully with the Serbs and Macedonians than the Turks with the Bulgarians. In the mid-1980s the Bulgarian communist regime subjected the Turks to a severe assimilation campaign and in 1989 opened the borders for around 400,000 Turks to leave the country. In a similar vein, propositions about the institutional strength of minorities living in ethno-federations and having access to institutional resources cannot account for more or less violent minority-majority interactions.⁶

A second set of arguments considers the relationship between democratization and ethnic conflict. In the early 1990s a large body of institutionalist accounts was quite optimistic about the ability of democratic practices to mitigate ethnic conflicts by such strategies as: 1) respect for minority rights in line with internationally defined standards, 2) introduction of power-sharing arrangements, 3) introduction of fair electoral rules and proportional representation, 4) maintenance of ethnic balance in military and police structures, 5) decentralization, 6) autonomy and 7) federalization.⁷ While these theories offer partial explanations about the non-violent outcome in the Bulgarian case, they fail to explain why some strategies – although employed more in the Macedonian than in the Kosovo case – failed to keep the level of violence low.

By the late 1990s some scholars countered that the above-mentioned strategies might be productive for a more mature polity, but less helpful in a transitional setting. In the absence of a strong centralized state to enforce firm rules of popular participation, the transition environment takes on an anarchical character where commitment problems and security dilemmas of both majorities and minorities abound. Fears can be exacerbated by weak or failing states lacking legitimacy and the inability to exercise control over delimited borders, by information failures and problems of credible commitment, and particularly by the inability of post-communist states

to make a commitment not to abuse their minorities.⁸ In this vein, one can understand why the different stages of statehood in our cases would shape security dilemmas. Certainly, majorities and minorities in a state that is collapsing (Yugoslavia) and that is in formation (Macedonia as of 1991) would be prone to be more fearful than those in a state that has existed within its current borders for more than four decades (Bulgaria). Yet, fears of uncommitted majorities do not always translate into a violent minority reaction, as we will see with the variation of responses in these three cases. Moreover, the power of opportunistic ethnic entrepreneurs playing the “ethnic card” and participating in “ethnic outbidding” grows exponentially in a transition environment, since their activities are constrained by nothing else but the counterclaims of other ethnic entrepreneurs.⁹ Nevertheless, elite opportunism does not necessarily lead to higher degrees of ethnic violence.

A fourth set of accounts looks into dynamic models of ethnic conflict, usually involving an external lobby actor. Brubaker argued that minorities, “nationalizing states” and kin-states are bound in a triadic nexus, where each actor closely monitors the change of stances of the other two and reacts accordingly.¹⁰ Jenne built on his ideas by delineating sequences in which the triadic relationship evolves, which are part of a “sequential game.” Once a minority receives some signals that its lobby state might be supportive, it radicalizes to obtain concessions from its host state even if the majority guarantees protection to the minority. She concludes that the external lobby actor has more power to alter the minority claim-making than the majority in the host state.¹¹ My approach builds on these ideas and further develops the discussion of timing and sequencing of policy responses, considering not any particular external actor as part of a strategic game, but external factors as intervening variables in a process dominated primarily by minority-majority interactions.

In this article I adopt Lewis Coser's definition of "ethnic conflict." He views it as a "struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals."¹² While ethnic conflict is inherent in interactions between groups in all ethnically diverse societies, it can reach different "*degrees of ethno-national violence*". This study operates with five degrees on a continuum (non-violence, threatened, episodic, extensive and internal warfare). A "non-violent" outcome indicates that the passions of the conflicting parties are pursued peacefully through the institutional channels of the state. "Threatened violence" is an outcome denoting the growth of tensions when either the minority or the government deploys verbal or physical threats and boycotts. During "episodic violence" agents of the minority or the government engage on a major occasion in physical attacks against each other group. "Extensive violence" is a more intense variant of the previous level, since significant violent attacks occur repeatedly throughout a particular year. At the extreme end of the continuum is "internal warfare." At this point actual combat takes place. Minority and majority engage in attacks against the entire community of the "other," not just against individual members of it. A graphic illustration follows.

-- TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE [Degrees of Ethno-national violence] ----

Relative Change of Constitutional Minority Rights Status

Democratization theories suggest that the early acceptance of a new constitution during the transition period creates the basis for establishing clear rules of the game and so facilitate the consolidation of democracy in the long run.¹³ The evidence of this study prompts us to revisit such ideas. All three constitutions were passed early in the transitional process (1990-1992), but

instead of paving the way for peaceful minority-majority interactions (apart from the Bulgarian case) they created focal points for ethno-nationalist mobilization *against* the new rules of the game.¹⁴ The constitutions did so by a drastic decrease in status for the Kosovo Albanians, a more moderate one for the Albanians of Macedonia, and a slight increase for the Turks of Bulgaria.

Thus, I argue that the *relative* change of constitutional minority rights early in the transition process - and *not the absolute* scope of rights granted by the new constitutions - were the basis for the minorities' disagreement or acceptance of the new rules of the game. Of particular importance for the escalation of violence in the long run was the decrease of constitutional status.¹⁵ Paradoxically, the new constitutions granted significantly less rights to the Turks of Bulgaria compared to the Albanians of Macedonia and even to the Kosovars (at least according to the Serbian façade constitution). The level of violence, however, remained low in Bulgaria, but surged in the two other cases.

Living in states with a varied understanding of ethno-national diversity, the three minorities enjoyed different constitutional status under communism. The 1971 Bulgarian Constitution which was in force until 1991, never mentioned the words “minorities” or “nationalities”, but in Article 45 (7) merely referred to “citizens of non-Bulgarian origin.”¹⁶ By contrast, the Albanians of Macedonia and Kosovo lived under the umbrella of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). They enjoyed constitutional rights within a state in which the very design – ethno-federalism – gave even small nationalities a considerable role to play.¹⁷ Under the 1974 Constitution the population was ranked according to a three-tiered system: 1) “nations” which had republics within the SFRY, 2) “nationalities” who had kin-states outside it, and 3) “ethnic groups” who had none of the above, but were ethnically different. The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia were considered “nationalities” but were positioned

differently under basic law. The Kosovo Albanians had the right to territorial autonomy, with Article 1 of the SFRY Constitution granting a “constituent” status to Province of Kosovo, alongside that of Vojvodina.¹⁸ By contrast, the Albanians living in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SRM) were never explicitly defined as a “constituent” element of the state, nor were they given collective rights as a group, but individually as “persons belonging to a nationality.”¹⁹ Thus, they did not enjoy any territorial rights. Yet, in line with the SRM constitution’s wording, the Albanians were guaranteed the same rights as the Macedonians, including the right to be proportionately represented in the legislature, fly their national flags, and have their languages and alphabets equal in status to the Macedonian.²⁰

At the end of communism the three minorities and their respective majorities had very different expectations about their own place in the liberalizing polities. The Albanians of Kosovo, who for many years had struggled for their own republic within federal Yugoslavia, expected to exercise a right of self-determination. Opposed by an equally strong force of Serbian nationalism, they confronted Serbian desires for nationalist expansion and domination. Similarly, although the Albanians of Macedonia expected more rights too, the Macedonian authorities remained fearful of rising nationalism all over federal Yugoslavia, and defended instead nationalist solutions *vis-à-vis* the formation of an independent Macedonian state in 1991. Finally, the Turks of Bulgaria, whose nationality was officially “eradicated” during the forceful assimilation campaign in the mid-1980s, had no serious intention of acquiring collective rights, but first and foremost hoped to achieve their own emancipation as a nationality through recognition of their identity. Moreover, Bulgarian nationalism, which had gained momentum and strength during the 1970s and 1980s, had by 1989 already exhausted parts of its potential and was no longer in the same aggressive phase as the Serbian and Macedonian nationalisms.

Against the backdrop of Kosovar activism to make Kosovo a federal republic within Yugoslavia, Milosevic curtailed the previously existing autonomy in 1989 by creating a new *status quo* with the 1990 Serbian and 1992 Yugoslavian constitutions. In fact, the new constitutions allowed for autonomy in Kosovo and Vojvodina and for the establishment of assemblies and executive bodies. Nevertheless, the constitution placed them under the administrative domination of the Belgrade-controlled government.²¹ Moreover, the Kosovo Assembly and the organs of the provincial government were, in practice, suspended in July 1990 and never revoked again. In early 1991, the Serbian government made Serbian the official language in Kosovo, and education began to be conducted only in Serbian. The government introduced “emergency measures” that dismissed Albanian personnel from public service jobs, including schools and hospitals.

The decrease of status was not so drastic in the case of the Albanians of Macedonia, although it took place against a backdrop of minority expectations for more rights. A focal point for resentment was the preamble of the new constitution which defined the Macedonian state as belonging to the Macedonian people alongside other nationalities, where the status of the Albanians was leveled to that of the Vlach and the Roma, who earlier had no nationality rights.²² In addition, the Macedonian Orthodox Church was explicitly mentioned by name, while the other religious denominations were defined broadly as “communities and groups,” and so rendered a second-level status.²³

Finally, the increase of constitutional status of the Turks in Bulgaria was minimal, but nevertheless fulfilled a function of meeting some minority expectations for identity recognition. In an attempt to redress the recent assimilationist past, the Bulgarian constitution prohibits “forcible assimilation” and puts it on the same footing as torture and cruel and degrading

treatment.²⁴ It also allows the expression of religious and ethnic identities, yet cautiously considering them as “ethnic” minorities, not as “national,” the latter entailing some possible demands for territory.²⁵ Although neither the Bulgarian, nor the Macedonian constitutions allowed for the territorial devolution of power, the Bulgarian constitution explicitly prohibits it.²⁶

Paradoxically, the text of the Bulgarian constitution has been the most restrictive among the three constitutions, although the level of violence has remained the lowest (“non-violent”, “threatened”). The most limiting element has been the prohibition of formation of parties on an ethnic, racial and religious basis.²⁷ Like the Macedonian constitution, the Bulgarian defined the Eastern Orthodox religion as the traditional denomination, yet downplayed the ethnic diversity factor by mentioning in very general terms other “religious institutions and communities.”²⁸ Moreover, the Bulgarian constitution speaks vaguely of “citizens whose mother-tongue is not Bulgarian” and gives them the right to “study and use their own language alongside the compulsory study of the Bulgarian language.”²⁹ By contrast, the Macedonian constitution allowed more explicitly for the education in a minority’s mother-tongue in primary and secondary education in addition to the compulsory study of Macedonian.³⁰ The Serbian constitution granted similar rights, at least in writing.³¹ Finally, unlike the Macedonian and Serbian constitutions which called for the parallel use of minority languages in self-government, the Bulgarian constitution did not.³² The scope of rights granted by the new constitutions therefore seems to be irrelevant to explain degrees of ethno-national violence.

Moreover, the same could be said for the exclusion of minorities from the constitutional formation process. This finding also challenges some of the conventional wisdom established in the democratization literature. All three minorities were represented in their respective parliaments when the constitutional changes took place, yet they did not have a real say in

defining the constitutional provisions related to their own status. Decisions were made by the dominant post-communist elites which sought to create new political space for themselves in a transitional environment. In Bulgaria, the ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) participated in some working groups of the Grand National Assembly, but could not overrule the suggestion of majority elites to prohibit the formation of political parties on an ethnic and religious basis, which eventually became a disputed constitutional provision.³³ In Macedonia, the 1991 Parliament consisted of a majority of Macedonian nationalists, and similarly gave low access to Albanian parties in drafting of the constitution. Their demands to become a constituent element of Macedonia were blocked by the outgoing regime exactly at the time when the system was opened for pluralism and they were allowed to organize politically. This took place during the last amendments of the 1990 constitution of SRM, which redefined Macedonia as a “nation-state of the Macedonian people.”³⁴ The 1991 constitution only rubber-stamped the already established *status quo*.

Acceptance or Rejection of the New *Status Quo*?

All three minorities initially challenged the new constitutions, but in the long run diverged in accepting or rejecting the *status quo*. The level of their own commitment to the state was indicated by whether they challenged the premises of statehood of the new constitutions or particular clauses thereof, and by the means they did so. Their commitment, however, was not simply a reaction to the inability of the majority to make a commitment to them, but was conditioned by the combination of a change of status and control/cooptation/coercion strategies employed by the government soon after the constitutional changes. Opening the political system to more rights for the Turks after strong abuse during communism combined with a cooptation

strategy managed to keep the level of violence in Bulgaria low. Cooptation *vis-à-vis* the Albanians of Macedonia was employed much less successfully than in the Bulgarian case, because their constitutional status was moderately degraded. This combination gave rise to a Janus-faced mobilization by the Albanians, participating in the institutions of the state, on the one hand, yet challenging them by way of clandestine activities, on the other. In the former case the level of violence remained relatively low. However, with respect to the latter violence surged to “episodic” level on several instances during the 1990s and to “internal warfare” in 2001. A combination of drastically decreased constitutional status and coercion *vis-à-vis* the Albanians of Kosovo led to large-scale clandestine minority mobilization and regular clashes with the government. This in turn laid out the foundations for the “internal warfare” of 1998-1999.

----- TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE [Causal Chains]-----

The inclusion of the Turks in the first Bulgarian parliament after years of repression paved the way for a relatively high minority commitment to the state.³⁵ Emerging out of communism as an underground movement, from a “destructive force” directed against the totalitarian regime, the MRF as a key ethnic player quickly remodeled itself as a “constructive political subject” with “tolerant behavior” which needed to build an ethno-religious identity and integrate into civil society.³⁶ Thus, even when challenging the constitution the MRF kept in focus its aim for integration. Although during the final vote of the constitution in 1991 many MRF deputies walked out of the parliament, they did so together with deputies from the emerging democratic opposition. Both protested against the political domination of the constitution by the Bulgarian

Socialist Party (BSP), and not so much against the above-mentioned restrictive clause for political party formation.³⁷

Further sporadic statements challenging the restrictive clause remained bound to rhetoric with no particular effect. In the early to mid-1990s such ideas were voiced occasionally by an important functionary within the MRF, Ibrahim Tatarli, but not by its leader, Ahmed Dogan, whose influence remained undisputable. Tatarli claimed that the Turkish minority should be granted rights in line with the Bulgarian constitution of 1947, which explicitly mentioned the existence of “national minorities” and their rights to education and development of culture.³⁸ The MRF more openly challenged the restrictive clause only in 1998 during the debate surrounding the adoption of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities.³⁹ The aggressive stance was taken by the Turkish Democratic Party (TDP), which emerged in 1992 in opposition to the MRF but nevertheless remained marginal due to its inability to officially register. Its program declaration insisted that a new Grand National Assembly be called to adopt a constitution that would not be ethno-centric and would “fit the international requirements for... multi-national states.”⁴⁰

The Bulgarian government employed a *cooptation* strategy towards the MRF during and after the adoption of the constitution. Pressured by the US and Turkey in 1990, it circumvented the restrictive constitutional provision and allowed the MRF to enter the post-communist parliaments and so become an important parliamentary force throughout the 1990s. MRF’s existence, however, could always be challenged on the basis of non-constitutionality. This indeed happened on three occasions, once in 1990 before the new constitution was adopted, and later in 1992 and 1996 on the motions of the BSP.⁴¹ However discontented the MRF was with the *status quo*, it was co-opted by this strategy. It enjoyed having a monopoly of power in the

minority realm in Bulgaria, as no other party could register on an ethnic basis.⁴² In this vein, both the Bulgarian government and the MRF capitalized on the fact that there could be no “ethnic outbidding” and that MRF’s agenda could remain moderate. The TDP, a breakaway faction from the MRF, despite its more radical agenda, failed to achieve any results, since it lacked the ability to claim itself legal and so mobilize support.

The inclusion of the Albanians in the political process in Macedonia makes one think of the possible conflict-mitigating effects of a power-sharing arrangement. Indeed, the Albanians of Macedonia were not only represented in the parliament unlike the Turks of Bulgaria, but their Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) participated in ruling coalitions with the Macedonians as of 1992. However, this inclusion can be seen not as a genuine power-sharing agreement, but rather as an enduring attempt to co-opt the Albanian elites. The results were mixed. The Albanians were given power to exercise some leverage on the level of the central state and less on the locality, but their basic claim – to become a “constituent element” of Macedonia – was consistently denied and ignored. Implications stemming from this demand – the decentralization of the state and making Albanian an official language alongside Macedonian – were seen by the authorities as a sign of disloyalty and an attempt to destabilize the state.⁴³ Instead, the Macedonian authorities argued that the new constitution was already committed to establishing a “civic” state with a high degree of protection of cultural diversity. Thus, no legal ground existed to favor one minority – i.e., the Albanians - over another.⁴⁴ Even moderate demands were regarded as covert appeals for the creation of a “Greater Albania” or “Greater Kosovo,” and so were met with a firm resistance.⁴⁵

A semi-successful *cooptation* strategy combined with adamant implementation of a constitutionally decreased status gave rise to the pursuit of a Janus-faced minority mobilization.

While the Albanians' goal remained largely the same – to become a constituent part of Macedonia – the strategies changed from pursuing demands within the channels of the state to semi-parallel and clandestine activities. Initially, challenges to the constitution took the form of boycotts, thus contributing to a “threatened level” of violence in 1990-1991. The PDP boycotted the new constitution at the last stages of its drafting, withdrew Albanians from participation in the referendum on the republic's independence and the census of 1991, and then refrained from voting on the new constitution.⁴⁶ The PDP's President Muhamed Halili went even further by threatening that if the pressure for change did not bring results, his party would consider the constitution invalid and would call for full autonomy.⁴⁷ In pursuit of this threat, in early January 1992, the PDP called an unofficial referendum in which 74 percent of Albanians voted for the territorial autonomy of Western Macedonia.⁴⁸ With strong diplomatic intervention from the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, the Council of Europe and other external actors, a violent governmental response was averted. The minority elite were discouraged from pursuing territorial autonomy, and there were no promises for international backing for constitutional changes or autonomy.

After 1992 the demand to become a constituent element of Macedonia took a back seat in comparison to demands for fundamental changes in policy areas of significance to the minority, such as higher education in the minority language, official use of minority language in legal affairs, and municipal decentralization and self-government. Thus, the governing Albanian elites aimed at using the channels of the state to elevate the status of the Albanians from the bottom-up on the policy level, since a top-down approach on the constitutional level was foreclosed. Moreover, they found an ally in the international community to pressure the Macedonian-

dominated government to implement such changes, promoted as measures for further democratization.

Despite the Albanians' participation in the structures of power, several laws and policy measures were passed with little consent from the minority. The 1996 Law on Local Self-Government, which granted important rights to municipal city councils, failed to delineate the exact limits of their responsibilities *vis-à-vis* the central authorities.⁴⁹ It also postulated that at council meetings the language of the nationalities could be "in official use" alongside Macedonian.⁵⁰ Yet, it did not elevate Albanian to the status of Macedonian either for local or central administration. Albanian parliamentary parties considered a boycott of the 1996 local elections law, which was regarded as gerrymandering districts to the detriment of the Albanian community.⁵¹ In addition, the 1996 territorial division law was considered an attempt to undermine the influence of Albanians in areas where they constituted the majority.⁵²

Inability to achieve success or reach only partial success by way of the channels of the state paved the way by 1992 for the development of more radical underground activities. They were aimed at achieving the "constituent status" goal and its implications in different policy areas, but occasionally expanded to include territorial autonomy or federalization of Macedonia. Clashes with the government over such activities most often resulted in "episodic violence." First, after the referendum on autonomy in 1992 some radical Albanian nationalists proclaimed the "Republic of Ilirida." They went much further than the official PDP by claiming that this republic should unify all Albanians of the former Yugoslavia. In the meantime, however, they stood for the federalization of Macedonia.⁵³ Their appeals remained largely bound to rhetoric at that time, and the government hesitated to employ violence. They feared a Bosnian violent scenario and wanted to prove to international powers that Macedonia was mature enough to deal

with such calls for autonomy peacefully. Yet, the referendum had indirect repercussions for the increase of violence in 1992 when a minor incident in a bazaar in the capital Skopje several months later culminated into skirmishes between police units and Albanians, leaving some Albanians dead.

Second, in 1993 several high-ranking PDP officials - among them the deputy ministers for health and defense - were arrested and accused of possession of 300 machine-guns and of planning to create the “Republic of Ilirida” and join Albania.⁵⁴ The discovery of this plot demonstrated that the PDP had an official and unofficial face. This became even more obvious in 1994 when a faction arose within the PDP, led by the radical Arben Xharefi, who at a certain point openly advocated an “armed revolt.”⁵⁵ Taking matters into their own hands, some other radical activists opened Tetovo University, which was not legally endorsed by the Macedonian authorities. Equipped with riot gear and automatic weapons the police dispersed a demonstration of more than 500 Albanians.⁵⁶ Third, using its mayors elected in municipalities in the Albanian-inhabited towns of Gostivar and Tetovo, the Democratic Party of the Albanians (DPA), which split from the PDP under Xhaferi’s leadership, raised in 1997 the Albanian and Turkish national flags over the town-halls of their cities. During this event at least two hundred people were injured, including nine policemen. Two civilians were killed and one beaten to death.⁵⁷

One needs to note that throughout the 1990s the cooptation strategy continued to work in Macedonia, but with limited results. By including radical Albanian elements in power, some years went by with no serious minority outbidding growing in Macedonia. Yet, new radical elements were encouraged by the non-resolution of the constitutional issue and found their place in the political space. We see this working with two formations. The radical DPA, which emerged in 1994-1995, won local elections in 1996, and then the general elections in 1998.

International and domestic observers feared the DPA would develop much more nationalist policies while in power. In reality, its unnatural coalition with another nationalist formation, the Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE after the elections, resulted in a pro-western orientation of policy-making and in several significant changes in the public administration, while *de facto* putting the “constituent element” goal on hold. Such an attitude opened space for the growth of another radical formation, the National Liberation Army (NLA) in 2000-2001, which claimed domestic origin but enjoyed strong support from splinters of the dismantled Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). However disputed its motivations to stage “internal warfare” in 2001, the NLA claimed that it took up arms to drastically change the Macedonian constitution and demanded the federalization of the country.

Contrary to the Bulgarian case where the majority elites circumvented the constitution in order to co-opt the Turkish minority, in Kosovo the Milosevic regime disregarded the basic law in order to further alienate the Kosovars. Its 1991-1992 *coercion* strategy included “emergency measures,” quickly curtailing self-government, educational, and associational rights. They limited the freedom of speech and subjected Albanians to daily harassment alongside economic and social marginalization and forced recruitment of males in the Yugoslav military. Thus, as early as 1992, the situation in Kosovo had completely changed from only four years earlier.

The drastic decrease of rights in combination with coercive methods facilitated the creation of a unified clandestine minority opposition, which refused to participate in state institutions and clashed regularly with governmental forces. It also became vulnerable to intervention of external factors. In June of 1990 Albanian leaders attempted to influence policy from within the state when Albanian MPs tried to block the adoption of the new Serbian constitution and proposed instead that Kosovo become a federal republic of SFRY.⁵⁸ In reaction

to the abolition of the Kosovo Assembly in September 1990, Albanian leaders went underground by adopting the clandestine “Kaçanik” constitution. This demonstrates that Kosovars still remained ideationally part of Yugoslavia, since the Kaçanik constitution reiterated that Kosovo should become a federal republic. The reformulation of the national goal took place only after SFRY republics, Macedonia included, declared independence in 1991 and there was no longer a state in which Kosovo could become a federal republic.⁵⁹ At that point the Kaçanik constitution was amended to include the goal of independence. As of 1992 the six parallel ministries and the non-functional parliament under the leadership of President Ibrahim Rugova maintained a stance that Serbia was a foreign state. It refused to participate in elections or other institutions of Yugoslavia. Instead, the shadow state tried to sustain the community by way of various networks and building offices abroad to solicit support from the diaspora and foreign governments.⁶⁰

Day-to-day hostile interactions between a coercive Serbian government and non-violent clandestine Albanian activists kept the violence in Kosovo at an “extensive” level. After a brief episode of violent demonstrations in reaction to the abolition of autonomy, the Albanian leadership realized that it had no arms to launch a sustained armed resistance. Thus, it chose non-violence as an alternative. Non-violence was also appealing to Western governments. However, in 1996-1997 a concatenation of several international factors inaugurated a power shift that helped turn the level of violence from “extensive” to “internal warfare.” The 1995 Dayton Agreement failed to consider an international solution for Kosovo. Thus, Rugova and other proponents of non-violence started losing domestic legitimacy. The year 1997 saw a breakdown of the neighboring Albanian kin-state, followed by the leaking of weapons from the military barracks and smuggling of large amounts thereof into Kosovo. Fighters, who for years found refuge in the diaspora and training camps in Albania, gained a following among those

dissatisfied with the “politics of sitting.” These fighters claimed to represent the KLA and advocated a military solution for Kosovo. By staging attacks on Serbian strongholds in Kosovo, the KLA prompted an increase of Serbian repression and the escalation of violence which reached the level of “internal warfare” in 1998.

Timing and Sequencing of Policies

While the literature on preventive diplomacy has paid attention to the timing of de-escalation of conflicts, works on ethnic conflict analysis have been lagging behind.⁶¹ By far the most elaborate model, Jenne’s earlier mentioned work on ethnic bargaining as a sequential game, elucidated how minorities increase or decrease their demands by making calculations on whether they enjoy the support of an external lobby actor or not. Here I argue that there are other timing and sequencing aspects that need to be considered when analyzing whether a conflict will turn more or less violent. First, in the previous section we have seen how the *early* adoption of a constitution is no guarantee for a trouble-free transition. Especially a constitution fixing a decreased minority status creates the foundations for a minority mobilization *against* it to be pursued by violent means.

Second, the time-span in which a government addresses a non-territorial minority demand is crucial, because it affects whether that demand will broaden to include challenges to territory. For example, it did not take long for the Bulgarian majority governments to address non-territorial demands of the Turkish minority, while it took longer for the Macedonian and Serbian governments to do so. In addition, a timely response in the Bulgarian case was conditioned by the rule of pro-Western elites, while a response was stalled in all three cases

when non-reformed communist elites were in power. Educational policy can serve as a good example.

Some of the most outspoken demands of the Turks of Bulgaria were related to the increase of educational rights in the minority language. Assimilated during communism, and aiming at maintaining an ethnic identity thereafter, the Turks needed to re-learn the Turkish language in the first place. The MRF advocated the introduction of mother-tongue education as of 1989 and pursued this demand in two stages, asking for mother-tongue education to be an elected subject and then a compulsory one. In 1989-1990 the newly formed post-communist government made vague promises that mother-tongue education would be allowed in the future. However, the Grand National Assembly – dominated at that time by communists – introduced a moratorium on minority language education and, just before its dissolution in 1991, passed a law that openly prohibited it in state schools but not in municipal ones.⁶² This move led to a widespread boycott of schools endorsed by the MRF and was followed by ethnic Turkish parents and students in an instance of “threatened violence”. Yet, when coming to power several months later the Western-oriented Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) issued a decree allowing for the opening of primary and secondary schools for mother-tongue education as an elective subject. The normative basis was fixed only in 1994, when a technocrat government came to power, which enjoyed strong parliamentary backing from the MRF.⁶³

The second MRF demand surfaced in 1995. By that time Turkish activists expressed the desire to include the mother-tongue education in the regular curriculum and to teach some subjects in Turkish. The MRF viewed the optional study as discriminatory, since parents had to explicitly express the desire of their children to study their mother-tongue. In this way Turkish was put in an unequal competition with other world languages, as children opted for English or

Russian and not for Turkish.⁶⁴ It took the MRF some four years to change this status. Initially, its demand was met with fierce resistance by the ruling BSP. On numerous occasions the BSP voiced threats in the media (“threatened” level of violence). For example, in January 1996, Minister of Education Ilcho Dimitrov, who had been also an active figure during the assimilation campaign of the 1980s, declared that Turkish schools would not be allowed to exist in Bulgaria.⁶⁵ The level of tension decreased after the 1997 early elections brought another UDF government to power. This government became receptive to pressures from the Council of Europe and the adoption of the Framework Convention on the Protection of the National Minorities related to Bulgaria’s accession into the European Union. In line with such pressures, in 1999 it introduced a law that required education in the mother-tongue.

At the first glance it looks paradoxical that it took longer for the Macedonian governments to address issues related to demands for Albanian university-level education, given the fact that Albanians were part of the governing coalitions and represented in the parliament. The cooptation mechanism mentioned before worked partially because both the Macedonian and Albanian elites in power shared a post-communist ideological past that did not predispose them to think in terms of liberal reforms in the minority rights sphere. It was true that minorities in Macedonia enjoyed many more rights than other minorities in the Balkans, as the official argument would go. Albanians alongside the Turks and the Roma had their own media outlets and were schooled in their mother-tongue. Yet, these rights were inherited from communism; they were not the achievement of the transition period. Thus, despite the actual alternation of power during elections in Macedonia throughout the 1990s, it was only in 1998 that a pro-Western (even if not a liberal coalition) came to power that was able to open the system for some reforms. In the meantime, there was a lack of adequate response to minority demands, which

facilitated the turning of a non-territorial issue of university-level education into being treated as a political issue with territorial implications on both sides.

During communism the Albanians of Macedonia used to study at the University of Prishtina in Kosovo, since both Macedonia and Kosovo were part of SFRY. After Milosevic introduced a Serbian curriculum in the university, neither the Albanians of Kosovo nor of Macedonia had a place to go. Educational exchanges with Albania developed slowly and were not considered a viable option for higher education of local Albanians. In the early 1990s the Albanians of Macedonia requested the establishment of an Albanian Pedagogical Faculty at the state Skopje University. After much contemplation, in 1994 the Macedonian government introduced an affirmative action quota for minority students to enter the state university, but they did not consider the opening of a separate faculty.⁶⁶ In the words of a high level Macedonian official, the authorities knew that this issue needed to be addressed, but they wanted to hold off as long as possible to see how much they could get away with.⁶⁷

This governmental decision was a turning point for conflict escalation. The spiral led to an “episodic” level of violence in early 1995, when the Albanians established a semi-parallel University of Tetovo. Demonstrations were put down by police violence and university leaders were imprisoned. The authorities went further by proclaiming the university “unconstitutional.” Only *after* the proclamation of Tetovo University, the Macedonian authorities decided to open the demanded pedagogical faculty (1996), but the conflict had already managed to engulf the entire Macedonian society. Ethnic Macedonian university students marched on the streets of the capital Skopje in a violent protest against the opening of the Albanian Pedagogical Faculty.

The violence in 1995 resulted in both the Macedonian government and the Albanian elites considering the university issue not simply a solution to the social need for education, but

an issue with highly nationalist implications. For this reason, the Macedonian government refused to recognize Tetovo University as a state university, believing that such a move would embolden further growth of Albanian nationalism. On their part, the Albanian elites (whether in power or in opposition) argued that the Albanians constituted 40 percent of the population in Macedonia and so were entitled to university-level education sponsored by the state in which they live. Thus, they refused to consider a registration of the university as private, a move which could have fulfilled a purely social function for minority education. In this vein, both sides resisted the proposal of the High Commissioner on the National Minorities Max van der Stoep of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to establish an international college where several disciplines would be studied in Albanian. The proposal could move forward only with the 1998 coming of the new pro-Western VMRO-DPMNE/DPA coalition in power and the 2000 adoption of a new education law allowing for the formation of private colleges and universities, including some teaching in the Albanian language. Yet, although the reforms were backed by the then-governing Albanian coalition partner, the DPA, they were fiercely resisted by the Albanian opposition PDP and Tetovo University's leadership. This was because the university had already acquired a highly nationalist significance for Albanians living in Western Macedonia. This made its final dissolution protracted and difficult.

If timing of a governmental response influences whether minority demands would radicalize in the Bulgarian and Macedonian cases, both timing and sequencing are important for radicalization in the Kosovo case. Here a belated governmental response *after* a non-territorial issue had been incorporated in a territorial minority agenda contributed to an increased level of violence. The case in point is the Education Agreement signed separately between Milosevic and Rugova in 1996 as a response to the Kosovo parallel schooling system formed in the early 1990s.

With the very formation of Kosovo shadow institutions in 1992, the Albanians merged education with territorial and political demands. The shadow schools performed both a social and political function. Concerning the former, they supplied students with knowledge and employed teachers dismissed from the state schools. Concerning the latter, they strengthened the nationalist bonds of the community. In the words of the Albanian intellectual Maliqi, the parallel schooling generated a feeling of an activity able to involve virtually everybody in Kosovo.⁶⁸ Since education activities were indisputably the most successful undertaking within the parallel structures, it was no surprise that the students and teachers attracted the regime's attention and violent actions ensued. According to the Albanian Teacher's Association, by 1994 some 3,300 teachers were detained and interrogated by the police and at least two directors of primary schools were killed. Although less regularly, also were school-children subjected to police abuse. Local educational officials methodically intimidated the population by confiscating education certificates bearing stamps of the "Republic of Kosovo" or testifying that students had completed the parallel education.⁶⁹

The so-called "Rome [Education] Agreement," mediated by the Italian Catholic group *Communita di Saint Egidio* in 1996, foresaw that Albanian students and teachers return to public schools at all levels of education, including to some buildings of Prishtina University.⁷⁰ In order to secure only the social aspects of education and avoid further politicization, the agreement addressed access to school buildings and some financial matters. It deliberately remained vague about the precarious subject of the Serbian-language curriculum, or about precise deadlines and mechanisms for its implementation.

The agreement failed not only because of its vagueness. In fact, its vagueness was a symptom of the lack of desire on both sides to address the core of the problem. The conflict was

about how education in Kosovo was to be treated as a parallel activity, not how to resolve a social issue. In this vein, the agreement was appropriated for political purposes by the two leaders who signed it. On the one side, Rugova used it to claim that Milosevic had recognized him as Kosovar's legitimate leader. Such interpretation was not entirely correct, since the text was signed separately in Prishtina and in Belgrade, and it only mentioned Rugova by personal name, but Milosevic as a political figure, i.e., president. On the other side, Milosevic used the agreement to demonstrate to the international community and mostly to US diplomats that he was ready to negotiate with the Kosovars.⁷¹ Yet, it was apparently never truly on Milosevic's mind to advance that agreement, since the implementation commission met only several times without any progress. Thus, by the end of August 1997 it became clear that the agreement would not be implemented.

The agreement did not decrease the existing level of "extensive" violence. Intimidation of Kosovars continued throughout this period. But *its failure* added to an already existing political dynamic that fueled sentiments against Rugova's strategy of non-violence. The lack of any prospects for improvement of the situation drove Albanian students into the streets. In October 1997 there were three demonstrations, and the first one turned violent. Rugova did not approve of the demonstrations in October or December, arguing that they would impede the implementation of the Education Agreement.⁷² By that time, the students had already taken matters in their own hands, and had secretly established connections with militant diaspora circles⁷³ and representatives of the KLA abroad. In the words of the student demonstration leader, Albin Kurti, the students rebelled not only against Milosevic, but also against Rugova and "the political class... who were enjoying their privileges," and against the international community which did not reward the politics of non-violence, but instead tried to silence the

students who went on the streets.⁷⁴ As a result of this shift, the entire student body started converging against the strategy of non-violence.

Conclusions

In this article I have argued that a relative change of minority constitutional status compared to the communist period and not the absolute scope of rights granted to the minorities with the new constitutions played a vital role in shaping minority acceptance or rejection of the new rules of the game. Paradoxically, the 1991 Bulgarian constitution was the most restrictive in granting minority rights, but the level of ethno-national violence in Bulgaria remained at the lowest on a continuum (“non-violent,” “threatened”), unlike in Kosovo (“extensive,” “internal warfare”), and Macedonia (predominantly “threatened” and “episodic,” but “internal warfare” in 2001). While the 1991 Macedonian and the 1990 Serbian and 1992 Yugoslavian constitutions granted many more linguistic, cultural and self-government rights, these constitutions nevertheless decreased the status of the Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia from the previous period.

The loss of constitutional status is important because it prompts scholars to revisit two types of theories. First, theories of democratization have suggested that the early adoption of constitutions during the transition process has a positive impact on the consolidation of democracy and of peaceful majority-minority interactions. If constitutions are adopted early on, but fix a constitutionally declined status of a minority, then they can turn into focal points of minority mobilization against the new rules of the game and lead to large-scale violence in the long run. Second, there is a consensus in the democratization literature that the inclusion of minorities in the development of constitutions is necessary for avoiding conflict. Such theories

become time and again relevant as new conflicts in the world (Iraq, Afghanistan) challenge constitution-makers. While inclusion of minorities in the constitution-making process is essential, this article suggests that inclusion of minorities without their actual ability to influence policy is not enough to keep the level of violence low. All three minorities participated in the parliaments that changed their constitutional status, but none of them was able to influence the decisions that affected them. Thus, in these three cases at least, the decision of the incumbent communists to raise or lower the minority status was more relevant for the outcomes of violence than the pro-forma inclusion of minorities in the political process.

Why did the minorities react so differently to the fact that they were sidelined in the constitution-making process? I argued that a combination of improved or worsened constitutional status and cooptation/coercion governmental strategies mattered. While the status of the Turks was slightly elevated and they were given a positive incentive by being included in the political process, they were co-opted, since their full-fledged political participation was reduced. MRF was registered by way of circumvention of a constitutional provision prohibiting the formation of parties on an ethnic and religious basis. This made the MRF both vulnerable to challenges to its registration *and* enjoying a monopoly of political power in the ethnic sector, since no other ethnic party could register to compete with it. The MRF's monopoly was convenient for both the Bulgarian majority and the Turkish minority, since it ruled out possibilities for ethnic outbidding. Under such circumstances, the MRF kept the level of its demands low. Splinters of the MRF that voiced more radical demands were not able to attract further support.

Cooptation as a strategy worked to a certain degree in the Macedonian case, but it was undermined by the initial decrease of status of the Albanians after 1991. The latter created the

ideational basis for minority challengers of the *status quo* to emerge even after previous challengers had been co-opted. In this vein, the PDP which initially reacted to the lack of consideration for its constitutional challenge and so launched a semi-clandestine referendum on the autonomy of Albanian-inhabited Western Macedonia in 1992 was soon co-opted by promises that it could influence decisions from within the channels of the state. Such changes took place only partially with more radical elements beginning to emerge in 1994. They inaugurated Tetovo University in 1995 and the raising of the Albanian flag on municipal buildings in Tetovo and Gostivar in 1997, with both activities resulting in serious clashes with the police. The more radical DPA was co-opted by becoming a coalition-partner in 1998, and it moderated its agenda. Finally, the NLA which emerged in late 2000-2001 made a domestic claim of constitutional changes by violent means. In this vein, the power arrangement between Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia throughout the 1990s was not so much a “power-sharing,” but rather a case of semi-successful cooptation of successive Albanian elites. The basics establishing the power-sharing, the constitution, were not consensual. As a result, the Albanians proceeded with a Janus-faced approach to the national question, leading to lower level of violence when they pursued policies within the channels of the state, and to higher levels when pursuing clandestine activities.

The drastic decrease in status of Kosovars combined with *coercion* created the basis for “extensive violence” (1989-1998). As a reaction to a drastically decreased status and coercive methods, the Kosovars developed a unified clandestine response by developing shadow state institutions and adopting a strategy of non-violence. They did the latter, because they realized they were deficient in arms and because the pro-democratic Western community supposedly supported non-violence. The segregation of the Albanians made the conflict more open to

international factors. The 1995 Dayton Agreement and the collapse of the Albanian state managed to tip the domestic balance in favor the KLA in 1996-1997, as did the failure of the Education Agreement.

The final part of this article argued that timing and sequencing aspects of governmental policy responses to minority demands should be considered more thoroughly by the ethnic conflict literature, since they can have repercussions on the level of violence. I argued that a quick governmental response to minority non-territorial demands can keep the conflict away from broadening to incorporate territorial aspects. We saw how in Bulgaria the governments allowed relatively quickly for the study of Turkish language in the public schools, thus diverting minority demands from growing. In the Macedonian example this was not the case, since the authorities deliberately put the demands for the opening of a faculty for higher education in Albanian on hold, and instead took a half-measure of increasing a minority quota in the existing higher education structure. This triggered the increase of an Albanians' demand for the creation of their own school, Tetovo University. This was not to be located in the capital Skopje, but in Tetovo in the Albanian-dominated Western Macedonia, and was to be run without the consent of the Macedonian state. As such it acquired characteristics of a semi-clandestine activity, and attracted violent encounters with the police.

I argued that a belated governmental response to a non-territorial issue which has already been incorporated into a minority territorial agenda has little chance to decrease the existing level of violence. On the contrary, should such a policy response be considered a failure by the minority, it can trigger an increase of violence. I proved this point on the case of the parallel education system in Kosovo which was incorporated into the shadow structures as early as 1992. The belated response with the 1996 Education Agreement gave some temporary hope for

improvement, but soon failed and so paved the way for violent student demonstrations. On their part, the latter aided a general political sentiment in Kosovo against the politics of non-violence.


This analysis provides support for several policy recommendations. When considering constitution-building, the drafters and their advisors need to pay attention not only to the absolute scope of rights embedded in international legislation, but carefully assess the expectations of minorities and majorities for the new period *vis-à-vis* previously enjoyed minority rights. A decrease a minority status needs to be averted. Moreover, policy makers should be careful when employing cooptation as a mechanism, which unfortunately has been gaining significance in polities with hybrid regimes throughout the world.⁷⁵ Cooptation may work well in the long run in a combination with other factors, but not with a decrease of constitutional status. Finally, governments should be aware that they need to address minority demands in a timely manner and not after a non-territorial demand has broadened to become territorial. Half-hearted belated responses can become even more counter-productive.

Why Do Ethno-national Conflicts Reach Different Degrees of Violence?

Table 1

Degrees of Ethno-national Violence

Bulgaria



Bulgaria

1989 governmental violence, expulsion and expropriation of minority property


1990-1992 nationalist demonstrations against the minority, minority boycotts of schools

1993-1994 peaceful channeling of interests

1995-1996 threats by the government and the minority

1997-2001 peaceful channeling of interests in most policy areas


Macedonia



Macedonia

- 1989 peaceful channeling of interests under the old communist system
- 1993-1994 minority and governmental threats, constitutional boycott by the minority
- 1992 violent clash between minority and government forces
- 1993 imprisonment of minority leaders
- 1994 tensions around elections and in the parliament
- 1995 minority demonstrations crushed by the police
- 1996 tensions around the inauguration of a semi-parallel university
- 1997 minority demonstrations crushed and leaders imprisoned
- 1998 tensions around the semi-parallel university
- 1999-2000 tensions related to the Kosovo crisis
- 2001 guerilla clashes with government forces

Kosovo



Kosovo

- 1989 several violent demonstrations crushed by the police
- 1990-1997 governmental violence against minority members on a daily basis
- 1998-1999 all out clashes between guerillas and governmental forces involving civilians on a large-scale basis

¹ *Coercion* refers to the use of exclusively negative sanctions. *Cooptation* refers to backing of policies with positive sanctions, which nevertheless are aimed at assimilation and neutralizing of an independent course of action.

² I do so since NATO's 1999 military intervention in Kosovo and the internal warfare in Macedonia in 2001 changed much of the majority-minority power constellation that existed during the 1990s.

³ Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 2-49.

⁴ Valerie Bunce "The Political Economy of Post-socialism." *Slavic Review*, Vol. 58 (Winter 1999), pp. 756-793; Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1995); David Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict" in David Lake and Donald Rothchild, (eds.), *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 3-33; Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, Southern America and Post-Communist Europe*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996).

⁵ The Turks of Bulgaria make up 10-11% of the total population. See CEDIME-SE, *Turks of Bulgaria*, 2000 at <http://www.greekhelsinki.gr>, and 2002 *Statistical Yearbook of the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute*. In Macedonia the Albanians were estimated to comprise 23-25% of the total population, while 90-95% of the almost 1.7 million Albanians living in Serbia were concentrated in Kosovo. See: *World Directory of Minorities* (London: Minority Rights Group International, 1997). The data from Macedonia and Kosovo are estimates, as the Albanians contested the results of a 1994 census in Macedonia, and the Kosovars did not participate in the 1991 census in Serbia.

⁶ Valerie Bunce, "Minority Politics in Ethno-federal States: Cooperation, Autonomy or Secession?" Draft Paper, 14 June, 2006; Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Mark Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Monica Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

⁷ On minority rights: Tove Mallo, *National Minority Rights in Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Patrick Thornberry and Maria Amor Martin Estebanez, *Minority Rights in Europe: A Review of the Work and*

Standards of the Council of Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub., 2004); On electoral systems and power-sharing: Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974); Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*; on decentralization, autonomy and federalization: John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993); Joseph Montville, *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990); Ruth Lapidot, *Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996).

⁸ On security dilemmas: Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence. Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000); Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict” in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993): 103-125; James D. Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict” in David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998): 107-127. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, "Civil War and the Security Dilemma" in Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); on weak states: Robert Rotberg. *When States Fail. Causes and Consequences*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).

⁹ Philippe Schmitter, “Peoples and Boundaries in the Process of Democratization” in *Festschrift for Hans-Juergen Puhle*, 2001; V.P. Gagnon “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict. The Case of Serbia” *International Security* 19, 3 (1994-1995): 132-168; Valery Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union. The Mind Aflame* (London: SAGE Publications, 1997).

¹⁰ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

¹¹ Erin Jenne, “A Bargaining Theory of Minority Demands: Explaining the Dog that Didn’t Bite in 1990s Yugoslavia”, *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 48, No. 4 (2004), pp. 729-754; Erin Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining. The Paradox of Minority Empowerment*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

¹² Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 95.

¹³ Jon Elster and Rule Slagstad eds., *Constitutionalism and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Arend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman eds. *Institutional Design in New Democracies. Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996); Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan eds., 1996.

¹⁴ The Bulgarian and Macedonian constitutions were passed in 1991, the Serbian one incorporating Kosovo - in 1990, and that of Federal Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) - in 1992.

¹⁵ Reversal of ethnic status is considered a predictor for the development of resentment among minorities, leading to the outbreak of violence. My account adds a constitutional dimension to the emotions-based argument of Rogers Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion. Lessons from Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

¹⁶ *Konstitutsia na Narodna Republika Bulgaria* [Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria] in Bulgarian (Sofia: Nauka I Izkustvo, 1971), p.25.

¹⁷ Vojin Dimitrijevic, "The 1974 Constitution as a Factor in the Collapse of Yugoslavia or as a Sign of Decaying Totalitarianism," *Working Paper* (Florence: European University Institute, 1994),p. 15.

¹⁸ *Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* (Belgrade: Yugoslovenski Pregled, 1974), p. 27.

¹⁹ Hugh Poulton, *Who Are the Macedonians?* (London: Hurst and Company, 2000), p. 122.

²⁰ Duncan Perry, "The Republic of Macedonia: Finding its Way" in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot eds., *Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 253.

²¹ For example, Article 109 (1, 4) stipulated that the provinces should enact the economic, regional and more generally the development program of the Republic of Serbia. It also required that enforcement of laws and other regulations of the Republic be entrusted to the agencies of the provinces. Further, Article 110 (2) subjected the highest legal act of the provinces, the statute, to the prior approval of the Serbian National Assembly. Only the regulation of policies concerning culture, education, official use of the minority language, public information, health and social welfare were left to the provinces in Article 109 (2). *Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 1990*. http://www.serbia-infor.com/facts/constitution_1.htm.

²² *Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991*. Preamble. http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/ml00000_.htm.

²³ These two issues were amended by the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the peace agreement which ended the 2001 warfare in Macedonia.

²⁴ *Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1991*. Article 29 (1), http://www.univ-wuerzburg.de/law/bu00000_.htm

²⁵ Ibid, Article 54 (1).

²⁶ Constitution of Bulgaria, 1991, Article 2 (1).

²⁷ Ibid, Article 11 (4).

²⁸ Constitution of Macedonia, 1991, Article 13 (3,4).

²⁹ Ibid, Article 36 (2).

³⁰ Constitution of Macedonia, 1991, Article 48 (4).

³¹ Constitution of Serbia, 1990, Article 32 (4).

³² Constitution of Macedonia, 1991, Article 48 (4); Constitution of Serbia, 1990, Article 32 (4).

³³ Michail Ivanov, Former Advisor to President Zhelyu Zhelev on Ethnic and Minority Issues, *interview with the author*, 4 November 2000, Sofia; Krassimir Kanev, Director of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, *interview with the author*, Sofia, 21 December 2000.

³⁴ Poulton, *Who are the Macedonians?* 122.

³⁵ Here comes the question how was it possible for the MRF to participate in the Grand National Assembly, if it were constitutionally not allowed to register? In its statute, the MRF claimed to be an “independent public-political organization.” Supreme Court of the Republic of Bulgaria, *Decision 636*, 20 September 1991. It did not mention that it was based within the Turkish minority, but only that it was aiming to defend the human rights of the different ethnic communities in Bulgaria. This formulation allowed the opening of legal doors for its registration, although it was widely known that the group was in fact based mainly with the Turkish minority’s constituency. After serious international pressure, the MRF was registered as a “movement” on the basis of the 1990 electoral law, which allowed for the registration of organizations and movements that were not parties to take part in the founding general elections. Hugh Poulton, *The Balkans, Minorities and States in Conflict* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1993), p. 167.

³⁶ Ahmet Dogan, “Bulgarskiat model za reshavane na maltsinstvenite problemi e naj-vazhnoto postizhenie na prehoda” [The Bulgarian Ethnic Model is the Most Important Achievement of the Transition Period] in *Tolerantnost* (Sofia: Foundation “Journalists for Tolerance”), 25 (June 1999).

³⁷ Krassimir Kanev, “From Totalitarianism to a Constitutional State” in Jacques Coenen-Huther, ed. *Bulgaria at the Crossroads* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996), p. 62.

³⁸ Ivanov, *interview*, 2000.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Turkish Democratic Party, *Program Declaration*, 1992. Archives of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, Sofia.

⁴¹ In response to MRF's first application for registration in 1990, several former communist deputies launched a court challenge to declare the movement illegal resulting in a denial for registration by the Sofia City Court. Bowing international pressure, the Supreme Court overruled this decision and paved the way for the movement's registration. In 1992 the MRF encountered problems to re-register. In a new round of decisions by different courts, the Sofia City Court denied a registration, while the Supreme Court allowed it. Ali Eminov, *Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1997). Returning to power in 1996, the Socialists inaugurated a new court challenge to MRF's "legality". This time, the Constitutional Court rejected their claim on the basis that it had already taken a decision on the same issue in 1992. Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, *Internal Information Newsletter*, 354, 19 December 1992. The Constitutional Court's judges were appointed by former President Zhelyu Zhelev, who was a former dissident and staunch supporter of the MRF.

⁴² I am grateful to Ivan Krastev, Director of the Center for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, for making this point.

⁴³ Human Rights Watch (HRW), *A Threat to "Stability": Human Rights Violations in Macedonia* (New York: Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1996), p. 24.

⁴⁴ Ljubomir Frckoski, Professor in International Law and former Minister of Interior, *interview with the author*, 15 September 2000, Skopje.

⁴⁵ International Crisis Group (ICG), *Macedonia's Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf*, 2 August 2000, p. 21, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1706>

⁴⁶ Janusz Bugajski, *Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe. A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organizations, and Parties*, (London: M.E.Sharpe, 1995), p. 124.

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 116.

⁴⁸ Sabrina Ramet, *Balkan Babel. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 235.

⁴⁹ Center for Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe, Southeastern Europe (CEDIME-SE), *Albanians of Macedonia*, April 2002, <http://www.greekhelsinki.gr>

⁵⁰ Council of Europe, *The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy*. Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional Democracy, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, June 1998), p. 16.

⁵¹ Gordana Icevska, “No More Boycotts” *War Report*, October 1996, p. 15.

⁵² ICG, *Macedonia Report: The Politics of Ethnicity and Conflict in Macedonia*, 30 October 1997, p. 13.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1701>

⁵³ Bugajski, *Ethnic Politics*, p. 116.

⁵⁴ Vladimir Ortakovski, *Minorities in the Balkans/Maltsinstvata na Balkanot* (Stip: 2th August S., 1998), p. 353; Poulton, *Who Are the Macedonians?* p. 197.

⁵⁵ Ramet, *Balkan Babel*, p. 235.

⁵⁶ HRW, *Threat to Stability*, pp. 51-52.

⁵⁷ HRW, *Macedonia: Police Violence in Macedonia*, April 1998, <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/macedonia>

⁵⁸ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo. A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), p. 346.

⁵⁹ Denisa Kostovicova, “Parallel Worlds: Response of Kosovo Albanians to Loss of Autonomy in Serbia 1989-1996”. *A Research Paper* (Keele: Keele European Research Centre, 1997), p. 31.

⁶⁰ Bujar Bukoshi, Former Prime Minister of the Government of Kosovo in Exile. *Interview with the author*, 7 October 2002, Prishtina.

⁶¹ On the concept of “preventive diplomacy” see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy. Peace-Making and Peace-Keeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992); on theoretical approaches and the concept of “mutually hurting stalemate” see I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure eds., *Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); On preventive diplomacy considering cases in the Balkans see: Bruce Jentleson ed., *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World* (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); on strategies for preventive diplomacy in ethnic conflicts see Michael Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts. A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996).

⁶² Eminov, *Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities*, 138-140; Krassimir Kanev, *email-interview with the author*, pp. 20-21 January 2001.

⁶³ Kanev, *interview*, 2001.

⁶⁴ CEDIME-SE, Turks of Bulgaria, December 1999, <http://www.greekhelsinki.gr>

⁶⁵ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee. *Human Rights in Bulgaria in 1996*. Annual Report, 1997, 10 on <http://www.bghelsinki.org/frames-obektiv.html>

⁶⁶ Poulton, *Minorities in Southeast Europe*, p. 81.

⁶⁷ Anonymous, High Ranking Macedonian governmental official, *interview with the author*, Skopje, September 2000.

⁶⁸ Kostovicova, *Parallel Worlds*, p. 43.

⁶⁹ Masha Gessen, 'The Parallel University. A Journey Through Kosovo's Secret Classrooms' *Lingua Franca* Vol. 5, No. 1 (November/December 1994), pp. 32-33.

⁷⁰ ICG, *Kosovo Spring*, 20 March 1998, 28, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1601&l=1>

⁷¹ *Ibid*, p. 28.

⁷² *Ibid*, pp. 29-30.

⁷³ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 136.

⁷⁴ Albin Kurti, Leader of the student demonstrations, *interview with the author*, Prishtina, 3 October 2002.

⁷⁵ If one considers autocratic and democratic regimes to be on the two ends of a democratization continuum, a hybrid regime takes a middle ground by demonstrating some openings towards democratization, particularly in the realm of electoral politics and institution-building. In practice such regime disregards of issues of quality of democracy such as media freedom or actual respect for minority rights. Such regimes are called "hybrid," "democracy with adjectives" or "competitive authoritarianism." On a recent publication see: Lucan A. Way and Steven Levitsky, "Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-Communist Divide" *East European Politics & Societies* 2007, Vol. 21, pp. 48-66.