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Abstract

Over the past decade, diaspora mobilization has become of increasing interest to International Relations scholars who study terrorism, civil wars and transnational social movements and networks. Nevertheless, an important area remains under-researched: conditions, causal mechanisms and processes of diaspora mobilization vis-a-vis emerging states, especially in a comparative perspective. This article asks why diaspora entrepreneurs in liberal states pursue the sovereignty goals of their original homelands through the institutional channels of their host-states, through transnational channels or use a dual-pronged approach. Empirically, the article focuses on a comparison between the Albanian, Armenian and Palestinian diasporas in the UK and their links to the emerging states of Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh and Palestine. Two variables act together to explain differences in mobilization patterns: the host-state’s foreign policy stance towards the homeland’s sovereignty goal; and diaspora positionality, the relative power diaspora entrepreneurs perceive as deriving from their social positions in a transnational space between host-state and homeland. If a host-state’s foreign policy stance is closed towards the sovereignty goal, but diaspora entrepreneurs experience their positionality as relatively strong vis-a-vis the host-state, they are more likely to mobilize through host-state channels, as in the Armenian case. If the foreign policy stance is closed towards the sovereignty goal, but the diaspora positionality is weak, activists are more likely to pursue transnational channels, as in the Palestinian case. If the foreign policy stance is open towards the sovereignty goal, but the diaspora positionality is weak, entrepreneurs are likely to engage with both channels, as in the Albanian case.
Introduction

Diaspora mobilization is becoming of increasing interest to International Relations scholarship. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington (2001), Madrid (2004), London (2005) and New York (2010) propelled counter-terrorism literature exploring connections between diasporas and terrorist groups (Hoffmann et al. 2007). Scholars are discovering how diasporas influence civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Kaldor 2001; Shain 2002; Adamson 2006, 2013; Smith and Stares 2007). Others demonstrate how diaspora research expands the boundaries of constructivism and liberalism (Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Shain and Barth 2003; Shain 2007). Yet others demonstrate parallels between the mobilization of diasporas and transnational advocacy networks, to which an influential IR literature has paid attention since the late 1990s (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999).

Theorizing has largely not tried to unpack the causal processes for diaspora mobilization as jointly affected by conditions in the host-land and original homeland, especially in a comparative perspective. Most studies focus on the practices of conflict-generated diasporas – Albanian, Armenian, Croatian, Ethiopian, Jewish, Palestinian, Tamil, Somali – that affect developing countries (Scheffer 2003; Shain 2002; Shain and Barth 2007; Lyons and Mandaville 2012). With few exceptions (Smith and Stares 2007; Adamson and Demetriou 2009, Adamson 2013), the modes, conditions and causal mechanisms of diaspora mobilization are yet to be identified.

This article explores why and how diaspora entrepreneurs pursue sovereignty-based claims through state-based or transnational channels\(^1\). During periods of violence in the original homeland, mobilization takes place in liberal states, but its

\(^1\) “Diaspora entrepreneur” is a formal or informal leader who actively makes claims on behalf of a “diaspora” and mobilizes material or symbolic resources for their original homeland.
mobilization modes vary. Some diaspora entrepreneurs pursue homeland-oriented claims primarily through host-state channels, mostly using moderate practices such as lobbying and fostering links with civil society. Others use transnational channels, where they engage with organized migration and other networks and international NGOs, and use both moderate and radical practices. Some use both channels.

Diasporas are likely to remain involved with homeland politics when new states emerge, because, as Sheffer 2003 points out, the nationalist struggle continues. The Armenian, Albanian, and Palestinian diasporas in the UK – connected to Nagorno-Karabakh, Kosovo, and the Palestinian territories, respectively – mobilized differently during periods of violence in the homeland. Armenian diaspora entrepreneurs pursued their homeland’s sovereignty goal primarily through state-based channels, Palestinians used predominantly transnational channels, and Albanians used both. This variance presents a puzzle. The UK is a liberal democracy that actively promotes multicultural rights and allows citizenship on an inclusive basis. It has historically harbored political exiles from all parts of the globe, allowing them to pursue political activism. Diaspora entrepreneurs presumably operate in a liberal institutional environment conducive to pursuing homeland-oriented claims through state-based channels and moderate means. Yet the three diasporas mobilized differently.

Based on comparative observations, the explanation I offer integrates state-centric and transnationalism logics. I argue that two variables act to explain the different mobilization patterns: the host-state’s foreign policy stance towards the homeland’s sovereignty goal, and diaspora positionality, the relative power diaspora entrepreneurs perceive as deriving from their social positions in a transnational space between host-state and homeland. If a host-state’s foreign policy stance is closed
towards the sovereignty goal, but diaspora entrepreneurs experience their positionality as relatively strong vis-à-vis the host-state, they are more likely to mobilize through host-state channels, as in the Armenian case. If the foreign policy stance is closed towards the sovereignty goal but the diaspora positionality is relatively weak, activists are more likely to pursue transnational channels, as in the Palestinian case. If the foreign policy stance is open towards the sovereignty goal, but the diaspora positionality is relatively weak, entrepreneurs are likely to engage with both channels, as in the Albanian case. In sum, relatively weak diaspora positionality towards the host-state is conducive to engagement with transnational channels, but not sufficient to explain the variation in outcomes. Diaspora positionality and foreign policy stances need to be considered together.

IR efforts on diasporas as transnational actors, state-centric approaches on foreign policy lobbying, and migration incorporation regimes have largely proceeded in isolation from each other. These analytical frameworks need to be integrated to capture how specific contextual factors shape migrants’ transnational activism. I follow how two variables – foreign policy stance and diaspora positionality – intersect to produce modes and processes of diaspora mobilization. These findings in turn expand IR theory on diaspora mobilization.

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state borders and that has succeeded over time to: 1) sustain a collective national, cultural or religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and 2) display an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity through a developed internal organizational framework and transnational links’ (2007: 497; see also Ragazzi 2009).

I limit the term’s scope to ethnonational collectivities outside territories adjacent to the homeland, what Anderson (1998) calls ‘long-distance nationalists.’ Since diasporas are not monolithic, but often include competing groups, I use ‘diaspora’ for social collectivities and ‘diaspora entrepreneur’ for individual and institutional activists who make claims on behalf of their original homelands.

In recent years, several scholars on diaspora politics have drawn theoretical leverage from works on transnational activism. These constructivist accounts show that human rights activists use liberal values to draw transnational support from friendly states, international organizations and NGOs to pressure their own states through ‘boomerang’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and ‘spiral’ (Risse et al. 1999) effects to adopt domestic change in their homeland. Activists mobilize across borders when global and local opportunity structures open (Sikkink 2005). They reframe local issues to appeal to global actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999; Bob 2005; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Tarrow 2005) and use ‘brokerage’ to connect networks into larger ones (McAdam et al. 2001).

Diaspora politics is similar to that of transnational social movements in some aspects. Diaspora entrepreneurs can act on global and local opportunity structures (Wayland 2004; Smith and Stares 2007; Adamson 2013), reframe issues during foreign policy lobbying (Shain 2002, Adamson 2013), and use ‘transnational brokerage’ to connect smaller networks into larger ones (Adamson 2013) and the
Internet to advance their political goals (Bernal 2006; Brinkerhoff 2009, Nagel and Staeheli 2010). But their ethnonational or religiously based character emphasizes particularistic tendencies and thicker connections to other kin and original homelands even when claiming to promote liberal values (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003; Kozlowski 2005; Koinova 2009, Lyons and Mandaville 2010). Countries of origin can appeal to diasporas to create national campaigns on foreign soil (Haegel and Peretz 2005; Ragazzi 2009; Varadarjan 2010; Waterbury 2010). With its supranational institutions and policies the European Union can open opportunities to build transnational identities (Kastroyano 2007), and mobilize kin across Europe. Some Muslim groups in Europe have already advanced political claims on behalf of a global Ummah and Sharia law (Mandaville 2007; Adamson 2009). Such connections are very much facilitated by social exchanges in a “transnational field” in which diasporas operate beyond the nation-state (Basch et al. 1994; Appadurai 1996; Faist 2000; Glick-Shiller 2001; Levitt 2001; Vertovec 2009).

A World Bank study demonstrated that civil wars are likely to be perpetuated when rebels enjoy support from large, affluent US-based diasporas (Collier and Hoeffler 2000). These wars resist resolution, since rebels consider diasporas financial resources (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Kaldor 2001: Fair 2005; Adamson 2013). Diasporas may resist conflict resolution because homeland conflicts help them maintain their identities and institutions in a foreign land (Shain 2002). But they can also act as peacemakers, participate in peace processes and reframe conflict-generated identities (Smith and Stares 2007; Lyons and Mandaville 2012).

Studies in these areas consider transnational political exchanges and the degree to which diasporas are territorialized, claiming that transnational diaspora politics can be deterritorialized in some aspects yet anchored in territory in others.
This distinction is especially relevant to conflict-generated diasporas, which can be mobilized in transnational processes but remain territorialized via specific goals tied to a homeland territory (Lyons 2006). Diaspora activists act as ‘rooted cosmopolitans’ embedded in social contexts (Tarrow 2005). They may form a global political movement around shared goals, but act with the logic of ‘division of labor’ in segments of their network (Lyons and Mandaville 2010). Arab Americans and British Arabs, for example, who face long-term tensions between their host-states and original home-states in the Middle-East, formulate their claims in a larger transnational context, but often organize their outreach work in specific neighborhoods (Nagel and Staeheli, 2010). Here diaspora embeddedness in a certain context is further addressed with the concept of ‘positionality’.

**State-centric Approaches to Diaspora Mobilization**

State-centric theoretical approaches capture institutional and policy variation, not their implications for transnational diaspora politics. Traditional foreign policy accounts assert that diaspora entrepreneurs mobilize foreign policy lobbying through state institutions, party systems, and trade unions. An old, politically unified, organizationally strong, partly assimilated diaspora, active in foreign policy issues and keen on alliances with other interest groups, is likely to lobby successfully (Shain 1998, 2002; Tololyan 2000; Scheffer 2003; Rubenzer 2008). Lobbying is also likely to be successful if the host-state and diasporic foreign policy interests converge (Haney and Vanderbush 1999). Host-states can even experience ‘policy capture’ by diasporas, and intervene in conflicts abroad if the diaspora has strong ties with the homeland (Shain 1998; Moore 2002; Mearsheimer and Walt 2006).

Other state-centric approaches assert that migrants’ behavior is conditioned by
the host-state’s incorporation regimes. How citizenship is acquired – on the basis of *jus soli* (inclusive) or *jus sanguinis* (exclusive) – is central to the discussion, but other institutional arrangements such as political representational structures and multicultural vs. assimilation policies matter as well (Joppke 1999; Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Modood et al. 2006). A few studies have followed migrants’ integration and homeland-oriented claims. On the basis of his study in Switzerland and France, Ireland argued that if institutional arrangements contribute to the isolation of migrants in the host-state, diasporas are likely to make more homeland-oriented claims (Ireland 1994). Such claims can be shaped by the conjuncture of incorporation regimes, migrants’ collective identities, and homeland influences (Koopmans and Statham 2001). These studies account for important factors affecting diaspora mobilization, but do not consider the host-land’s foreign policy stance or the processes linking these factors to modes of diaspora mobilization.

Statist approaches provide good comparisons across nation-states, but cannot explain divergent patterns of mobilization. This article focuses on diaspora mobilization within one state, the UK, where the incorporation regime and citizenship are the same. Hence, other reasons must explain the different modes of mobilization.

**Characteristics of This Study**

Emerging states are a subset of polities experiencing contested sovereignty. Nagorno-Karabakh, Kosovo, and the Palestinian territories, for example, are polities with history in territorial self-determination or secessionism, where some local institution-building and seeking international recognition have already taken place. In contrast to secessionist movements in weak states, where institutional decay is conducive to engagement with violent channels (Ganguli 1996), political
entrepreneurs in emerging states explicitly need major states and international organizations to endorse their potential domestic and international sovereignty. One can expect such entrepreneurs to have incentives to engage their diasporas heavily with peaceful lobbying states. It then becomes interesting to explain why and how diaspora entrepreneurs mobilize through different channels. Institutions in the UK are strong, so the reasons for the modes of diaspora mobilization should lie elsewhere.

I limit the scope of this study to violent episodes during the emergence of new states. Such episodes are considered more likely than non-violent ones to trigger radicalization in diaspora circles. The violent periods examined are 1991-1998 and 1998-1999 for Kosovo, 1991-1994 for Nagorno-Karabakh, and 2000-2012 for the Palestinian territories. After curtailing Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989, the Serbian nationalist regime intimidated political and civic activists on a daily basis. In 1998 the violence reached a new phase with a civilian massacre in the Drenica region, and further ‘ethnic cleansing’ occurred in 1998 and 1999. The violence in Nagorno-Karabakh took place during the 1991-1994 Armenia-Azerbaijan war. Armenia de facto won that war, which ended with a ceasefire, but no truce established a peace accord. With regard to Palestine, the second intifada erupted after the 2000 failure of the Camp David negotiations to resolve Palestinian statehood. Unlike the largely nonviolent first intifada, the second saw the rise of popularity of the militant Islamist group Hamas. Alongside other groups, Hamas used suicide bombing as a strategy against Israel, and was designated a terrorist organization by the US and EU. Hamas won elections in the Gaza Strip in 2006, leading to Israel, the US, and the EU boycotting the Palestinian Authority, to sustained tensions between Fatah and Hamas, and a split between a Fatah-based rule in the West Bank, and a Hamas-based rule in the Gaza Strip. Violent interactions culminated in the Israeli bombing of Hamas.
This study uses a most-similar systems design to capture differences in modes of diaspora mobilization. This design allows elimination of competing explanations for variation on the dependent variable. As discussed further, variables such as the conflict-generated origin of these diasporas, linkages to emerging states, organizational level in the host-country, and migrants’ integration regime can be held relatively constant. I complement this design with the process-tracing method, allowing the examination of processes that link dependent with independent variables (see George and Bennett 2004).

I select the three cases on a control variable – ‘diaspora linkages to emerging states’. Albanian, Armenian, and Palestinian diaspora entrepreneurs are linked to the emerging states of Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Palestinian territories by their continuous involvement in pursuing statehood claims. Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence from former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union respectively in 1991. The emerging statehood of Nagorno-Karabakh is considered irredentist as well, since it has been strongly associated with Armenia’s 1991 independence movement. The 1948 War for Israeli independence displaced 711,000 Palestinians (UNRWA 1950), and so was called “Nakbah”, i.e. “catastrophe,” by the Palestinians. Over the decades, 4.7 million Palestinian refugees became eligible for UNRWA services (UNRWA 2010). A process considering Palestinian claims to statehood started with the 1993 Oslo Accords, but has remained unresolved despite repeated negotiations and the November 29, 2012 recognition of non-member state status for Palestine at the UN General Assembly.

Other factors control for similarity across cases. These diasporas are all

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2 On most-similar and most-different systems design see Przeworski and Teune 1982.
conflict-generated and subject to the same incorporation regime. The UK has had traditionally one of the most liberal regimes in Europe, where acquisition of citizenship is acquired on a *jus soli* basis, and where multiculturalism has been the state’s strategy to integrate migrants (Joppke 1999, Howard 2009). After the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks in New York and the 7/7/2005 attacks in London, some scholars suggested that multiculturalism has contributed to home-grown terrorism (Hoffman et al., 2007). Migration became securitized and multiculturalism became under attack, especially after the Conservative-led coalition government of David Cameron took power in 2010. Given that most of the data for this project were gathered prior to this point, changes in multicultural strategies are not relevant for this study.

The diasporas’ presences in the UK are relatively small and concentrated in London. Armenians in the UK number no more than 20,000 and live in London and Manchester (CIAI 2007/2008). Palestinians number around 40,000 and are more scattered around the country (Nabulsi 2006: 258). Nevertheless, their London-based politically mobilized elites are ‘in more intense contact with the region than any other [Palestinian] diaspora’, since London puts the issue on the public agenda with the presence of close to 100 Palestinian journalists (Safieh 2010: 273). Albanians are largely concentrated in London. They numbered around 340 people in 1991 but increased drastically to several hundred thousand by 1996 due to a new wave of migration (IOM 2008; Dauti 2009).

The dependent variable is ‘*modes of diaspora mobilization*’. Under this term I understand claims and practices of diaspora entrepreneurs pursued primarily through *state-based* or *transnational* channels, or both through a *dual-pronged* approach. Channeling claims through host-state institutions takes place alongside what McAdam
et al. (2001) call ‘contained contention’, using ‘well established means of claim making’ in episodic, public, and collective interactions with other claim makers, often governments. Adapting these ideas to diaspora politics, I consider that diaspora entrepreneurs use state-based channels when they engage with nonviolent rhetoric, petitions, demonstrations, media and Internet public documents, and lobbying for policies and legislation to advance their claims. Pursuing claims through transnational channels is close to what McAdam et al. call ‘transgressive contention’: episodic, public, collective interactions in which at least some of the parties are newly identified political actors, and which use innovative collective action, adopting means that are ‘either unprecedented or forbidden’ (2001:7-8). I claim that under this mode diaspora entrepreneurs use some moderate practices where they can engage with transnationally organized migrant and other networks, as well as international NGOs, but they can also expand their practices to boycotts, violent demonstrations, recruitment of fighters, arms purchases and fund-raising for overt or covert extreme agendas. Under the third mobilization mode, a dual-pronged approach, diaspora entrepreneurs focus on both channels. They can use state-based channels to amend minor aspects of the host-state’s foreign policy, and transnational channels to challenge the state peacefully or directly aid warfare in the homeland.

This study operates with two independent variables – host-state foreign policy stance and diaspora positionality. *Foreign policy stance* is the position host-state institutions take on the sovereignty goal of the original homeland. It has two nominal values: ‘open’ and ‘closed’. Existing states are usually averse to creation of new states from the territory of officially recognized states. Nevertheless, some which do not support officially the formation of new states can still de facto maintain a more or less open attitude.
Diaspora positionality designates diaspora entrepreneurs’ perceptions about the relative strength of their social positions derived from linkages to the host-land and homeland. The literature notes that transnational diaspora networks can be embedded in both host-lands and homelands, but does not discuss how this embeddedness takes place. Positionality addresses the fact that some diaspora entrepreneurs are more embedded in the context of the host-land than others. Also, some positions are more influential than others (Sheppard 2002). Power is derived not only from material resources but from the social position entrepreneurs perceive themselves as occupying in a transnational space linking host-land and homeland. Social positions can be in host-state networks, institutions of the original homeland, and transnational migrant and other networks interlinked with it.

It is helpful to understand positionality by juxtaposing it to closely related concepts. Positionality is different from ‘social status’ in that it captures respondents’ subjective assessments about their transnational social position, not objective measurements of education, income, occupational prestige, and race (Goldman et al. 2002). Positionality indicates relative strength between host-land and homeland, not an absolute position vis-à-vis a host-land, as an inquiry on ‘social status’ would do.3 It also differs from a ‘position’ in network analysis, in which positions of power command high ‘centrality’ or thick interconnectedness with other parts of the network, while weaker positions are less connected and more marginal. Such measurements are objective as they capture the number of ties and relationships between nodes. Positionality captures subjective attitudes towards relative power derived from social contacts embedded more in one territory than in another.

The positionality variable has two nominal values: ‘relative strength’ and

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3 On social network analysis see the influential work of Freeman 1979; Bonacich 1991; and Borgatti and Everett 1997 (also Carrington et al. 2005).
‘relative weakness’. I operationalize positionality on elements which cluster in interviewees’ narratives with regard to how powerful they see their social positions vis-à-vis a host-land vs. homeland. The narratives of a variety of diaspora entrepreneurs with often competing political agendas indicate underlying agreement about whether they consider that they derive more power from their host-land or homeland social positions. In this study the coding is inductively based on three factors which occur as common denominators in these narratives: 1) proximity to the majority’s religion and race, 2) participation in host-land institutions, and 3) linkages to the original homeland. Relative strength indicates perceptions about relative closeness to the majority religion and race, some participation in host-state and institutions, and minor communal and institutional linkages to the homeland. Relative weakness indicates greater identity-based social distance from the majority, little participation in host-state institutions, and closer linkages to networks and institutions connected to the homeland.

Why is diaspora positionality operationalized in the dichotomous terms relatively strong or weak? Could a diaspora not be strong or weak vis-à-vis both host-land and homeland? Certainly, migrants who have assimilated into their host-lands and retained minimal connections to their original homelands could be considered weak against both host-land and homeland. But they are rarely mobilized. Also, individuals from well-organized diasporas could be relatively strong against both. But these few are not the majority of formal and informal diaspora entrepreneurs of the larger diaspora. In this study diaspora positionality is also operationalized in dichotomous terms because the narratives of interviewees evolved around the “relatively strong” and “relatively weak” options.

The analysis is based on more than 45 semi-structured interviews I conducted
with diaspora entrepreneurs from all three diasporas, civil society activists, scholars, lobbyists, and state officials in London during summer 2009 and spring 2010. I used snowball sampling to select the interviewees, focusing on those who could provide experience and knowledge about formal and informal leadership in diaspora activism, specifically to address the violent episodes in the countries of origin discussed before. 20 interviews were conducted with regard to the Albanians, 15 regarding the Palestinians, and 10 regarding the Armenians. Among the core group of interviewed were diaspora entrepreneurs who made claims on behalf of the emerging state. To weight explanations, interviewees were asked overarching questions from scholarship on diasporas and conflicts, foreign policy lobbying, transnational social movements, and incorporation regimes. Open-ended questions were asked at the end of the interviews. I also did participant observation in London of two diaspora events related to the Palestinians, and one related to the Albanians, and relied extensively on secondary reports.

**Competing Explanations**

I draw on three competing explanations for why diaspora entrepreneurs pursue homeland-oriented claims through state-based or transnational channels: diaspora organizational level, migrants’ integration regimes, and duration of conflicts.

Scholarship on diasporas and conflicts considers that an old, well institutionalized diaspora is likely to be more politically active in lobbying than a new one. It does not make predictions about transnational activism. Findings are usually derived from US-based political realities, and do not capture the UK situation well. In the early 1990s, when the violence in Nagorno-Karabakh erupted, Armenians had church-based organizations and three competing diasporic parties. These
organizations were disunited and weak. The Palestinian diaspora had built organizations such as the Association for the Palestinian Community, Palestinian Land Society, and student and women unions. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was present as well (Nabulsi 2006; Safieh 2010). These organizations were also weak and disunited. The PLO weakened especially in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords that established the Palestinian Authorities. The Albanian diaspora was new and disorganized, though before 1990 some left- and right-wing political associations among British citizens were interested in Albania (Gjonca 2009). Some of the studied diasporas were more organized than others, but their organizational weaknesses were similar and could not account for why their entrepreneurs used different channels to mobilize.

The migration integration thesis does not explain this difference either, since all three diasporas enjoyed a certain degree of integration with their host-society. The Armenian diaspora was well integrated, with citizenship rights and high social status, but a latecomer to electoral politics. It engaged a Labour Party representative only in the 2010 general elections.\footnote{Ara Iskanderian was elected to the Council of the London Borough of Ealing (ACCC 2010).} Large parts of the Kosovo Albanian diaspora had an integrationist approach as well. Many were educated middle-class citizens prior to their arrival in Britain, and sought further educational opportunities after the government granted them Exceptional Leave to Remain in the country in 1996 (CDS 2002:26; Kostovicova 2003). A large segment of the Palestinian diaspora became completely integrated into British society. This group migrated primarily from the West Bank in the 1970s and became part of a professional middle class with a strong presence in business and academia (Nabulsi 2006; A1).

Integration has been problematic for segments in two of these diasporas. The
Albanian and Palestinian communities have large groups of undocumented migrants and shadow networks that span borders. The phenomena are not necessarily alike, but both create obstacles to integration. Albanians were almost unknown in the UK in the mid-1990s, but by 2000 the media associated them with an Albanian mafia supplying heroin to Europe (O’Kane 2000). The Palestinians’ situation was complicated by challenges to documentation for residency, especially among those from the camps and Lebanon (Nabulsi 2006: 258). Some consciously opted out of opportunities to acquire citizenship, more concerned with right of return than integration into the host-land. It is understandable that entrepreneurs from this segment of the Palestinian diaspora would choose not to lobby through state institutions, but less why the business and academic communities have engaged primarily in ad hoc activism oriented towards the media and transnational civil society.

A third possible explanation for differences in mobilization builds on the theoretical proposition that diaspora networks are simultaneously active in different contexts. Literature here does not address what conditions prompt diaspora entrepreneurs to pursue homeland-oriented claims through which channels. Nevertheless, I derive a plausible implication from this theory about how conflict duration creates path-dependencies that channel mobilization into transnational channels. Intractable conflicts develop material, functional, and symbolic entrenchments that solidify a conflict’s boundaries and limit the maneuverability of negotiators over time (Hassner 2006/07). In this sense, if diaspora entrepreneurs could not effect policy change for a long period, and traditionally organized through transnational channels, they would continue to do so.

This argument offers only a partial explanation. All three groups had grievances and conflicts with their states dating to the early twentieth century, but the
Palestinian conflict had a far longer span of violence than the others. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict originated during the British Mandate over the Palestinian territories (1917-1948), the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the 1948 creation of the State of Israel, and the displacement of refugees from the 1948 and 1967 wars. The conflict over Kosovo emerged in 1912-13, after the Albanian state incorporated only half the Albanian population and left the rest in adjacent territories, including Kosovo. The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is rooted in Joseph Stalin’s 1923 decision to create an autonomous region under Azerbaijan administrative control. During the Cold War the conflicts in Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh were largely suppressed by the communist governments; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continued with different degrees of violence.

There are some challenges to this explanation, if we look comparatively. A critical juncture that disrupted existing path-dependent transnational processes in the Palestinian case was the 1993 Oslo Accords, which shifted the center of gravity from the previous active diaspora-based PLO to the limited Palestinian Authorities based in the Palestinian territories. The absence of an exile-based authority opened opportunities for contingent decision-making, including more engagement with the host-state. It is also unclear why, if the violent conflicts in Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh were reinvigorated in 1989, Kosovo but not Armenian activists organized predominantly through transnational channels.

**Conjuncture of Foreign Policy Stance and Diaspora Positionality**

I argue that the two variables - foreign policy stance and diaspora positionality - act together to explain why diaspora entrepreneurs engage with different modes of mobilization. If a foreign policy stance is closed towards the sovereignty goal, but
diaspora entrepreneurs perceive themselves as having relatively strong positionality vis-à-vis the host-state, they are likely to pursue homeland-oriented claims through state-based channels, as in the Armenian case. If the foreign policy stance is closed towards the sovereignty goal, and entrepreneurs consider their positionality relatively weak towards the host-state, they will engage predominantly with transnational channels, as in the Palestinian case during the researched period and the Albanian case in phase 1 (1989-1997). If the foreign policy stance is open towards the homeland sovereignty goal, but the entrepreneurs perceive their positionality as relatively weak, they will use both state-based and transnational channels, as in the Albanian case in phase 2 (1997-1999). These relationships are demonstrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2 Here

The blank fourth quadrant of the figure is worth noting. A case to fill the quadrant would resemble the Jewish diaspora in the UK, with a relatively strong positionality and open host-state foreign policy. However, an open foreign policy stance is rare. Also, the Jewish diaspora is connected to an emerging state, but as a dominant not a subordinate group, which makes it not comparable for the present study.

It is also worth considering whether the causal arrow could be reversed – whether diaspora engagement through transnational channels and often radical activities might shape the host-state’s foreign policy stance and keep it closed. This claim can be rejected on two grounds. States usually formulate policies towards other states, not towards diasporas considered their own citizens. Citizens who engage in violence are subject to law enforcement. Also, while there could be aversion among
policy makers to engage with diasporas with radical elements, diasporas are not monolithic. If there is a possible opening in host-state institutions and policies, moderate diaspora entrepreneurs are likely to engage with lobbying. As demonstrated shortly, the Albanian case provides a good example.

*Mobilization through State-based Channels: The Armenian Diaspora*

The UK’s foreign policy interests were closed towards the sovereignty of Nagorno-Karabakh during the Armenia-Azerbaijan war (1991-1994). After Armenia declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 – almost concurrently with Nagorno-Karabakh – a number of Western powers, but not the UK, established diplomatic offices in Armenia. Britain’s first ambassador to Armenia, David Miller, took the post in 1995 after the ceasefire established a permanent truce (George 2009: 212). The British government officially maintained a neutral stance, but some diaspora entrepreneurs claimed it tacitly supported Azerbaijan (A2 2009), and that British Petroleum investments in Azerbaijani oil deposits were at the core of government policy and media support heavily tilted towards Azerbaijan (George 2009: 213). Why then would Armenian diaspora entrepreneurs engage with lobbying and other moderate practices rather than transnational channels and transgressive contention?

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Diaspora entrepreneurs considered their positionality relatively strong for several reasons. The Armenian diaspora is partly assimilated into British society (Walker 2009.ix). Armenians maintain cultural identity through various associations, but consider this identity complementary to that of British citizen, not exclusive
(Ohanian 2009). Some activists mentioned that their social distance from the majority is relatively small due to similarities in race and Christian religion. Moreover, Armenians pride themselves on a history of cultural integration, including Armenian-language classes in institutions of higher learning as of the 1920s (George 2009:67-69). Despite an influx of Armenian refugees from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Gulf War in the early 1990s, middle-class status and little knowledge among the British public of refugee engagement with shadow economies allowed Armenians to enjoy a good media reputation compared to other diaspora groups. Moreover, their identification with community and institutions in the secessionist region was minimal. Links between Britain and Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh were severed during the Cold War. Numerous interviewees suggested that the UK-based Armenian diaspora harbored only an image of these regions, since the diaspora originated from descendants of the 1915 Armenian genocide who emigrated predominantly from Cyprus and Iran, not Armenia or Nagorno-Karabakh.

A combination of a closed foreign policy and relatively strong diaspora positionality resulted in pursuing homeland-oriented claims primarily through host-state channels. The mechanism linking the two variables with the outcome is coalition-building between diaspora entrepreneurs and individuals within host-state institutions interested in the sovereignty goal. Levy and Murphy define coalitions as ‘collaborative means-oriented arrangements that permit distinct organizational entities to pool resources in order to affect change’ (Tarrow 2005:164).

Diaspora entrepreneurs aspired to build relationships with the upper chamber of the British Parliament, the House of Lords. The House has weak powers to initiate legislation or oversee government, but has traditionally had important judicial responsibilities and functioned as the court of last resort until the inauguration of a
UK Supreme Court in October 2009. It was considered open to lobbying on issues of international justice.

During the 1991-1994 warfare the most influential Armenian political organization on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict became the British-Armenian All-Party Parliamentary Group (BAAPPG). Established in February 1992 on the initiative of Lord Shannon with the assistance of Odette Bazil, a British-Armenian activist with origins from Iran, the BAAPPG lobbied for Nagorno-Karabakh and became a focal point linking activities of civil society groups and the newly appointed Armenian ambassador to the UK, Armen Sarkissian. Seeking collaboration from all parliamentary groups was necessary, since a government “has no friends, but interests” (A3 2009).

Two personalities stand out from BAAPPG. Executive secretary Bazil recruited parliamentarians and organized visits to conflict areas in Nagorno-Karabakh. Baroness Caroline Cox, passionate about Christianity and humanitarianism, became an avid supporter of the cause, conducted more than 13 field visits, and systematically reported on the ground. Cox performed what Adamson (2009) calls ‘transnational brokerage’, linking domestic and international networks with no prior connectivity. She was an important source of information from Karabakh, giving public talks that ‘woke up the consciousness of parliamentarians’ and the larger Armenian diaspora, which had little access to information from Karabakh (Bazil 2009; Ohanian 2009).

Linked closely to the BAAPPG and Baroness Cox were diaspora groups that targeted media and other civic channels to raise humanitarian awareness. In January 1993 five MPs and Misak Ohanian, chair of the new Armenian Rights Group (ARG), wrote letters to the Guardian to express disappointment with biased media coverage and insist that the government put a ‘freeze on all economic and political assistance to
Azerbaijan’ (George 2009: 221; Ohanian 1993). Active on behalf of the refugees, the ARG inaugurated a series of public meetings and in early 1994 organized a campaign against British Petroleum, considered to aid the government’s ‘tacit support in an illegal scheme to supply Azerbaijan with military backing’ for which the Azeris would ‘pay with oil’ (ARG 1994). The Armenian Church and Community Council (ACCC) also held public meetings, sent delegations to visit Nagorno-Karabakh, and delivered humanitarian aid, including IT equipment (Sarkissian 2010). Focused primarily on recognition of the Armenian genocide, the ACCC also reached out to the Federation of Armenian Associations in Europe to increase European visibility of the Karabakh issue.

Like other Armenian communities worldwide, diaspora entrepreneurs in Britain viewed the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict through their own traumatic identity, entrenched in the Armenian genocide. They extrapolated historical experiences into the present, arguing that international intervention – including by Britain – was necessary to prevent a new slaughter of Armenians. The conflict was also sometimes framed in religious terms between Christianity and Islam. Cox conducted activities in Nagorno-Karabakh under the auspices of Christian Solidarity International and Christian Solidarity Worldwide (Cox 2009). Some voices in the diaspora argued publicly that the conflict was not religious (ARG 1993). But a template of a text distributed to individual diaspora members to protest to British Petroleum clearly demonstrates that the framing was used for political purposes:

‘Dear Sir,

Christians and people of goodwill throughout the world are concerned about the consequences of BP’s investments in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is now waging a brutal war against the Armenian civilians of Nagorno Karabakh. The horrible Azeri attacks against the Armenian citizens are reminiscent of the genocide of Armenia in Turkey. Please call on Azerbaijan to end immediately the
blockade and start implementing a cease-fire.

Yours faithfully

Signature, Date.'

The coalition remained in place as long as local warfare continued. Nagorno-Karabakh became of less concern after the 1994 ceasefire, but recognition of the Armenian genocide persisted.

Mobilization through Transnational Channels and Dual-pronged Approach: The Albanian Diaspora

Since diaspora positionality remains in general relatively static over time, shifts in outcome are well demonstrated through the more dynamic foreign policy stances in the Albanian diaspora case. Here the foreign policy stances were closed (until 1997) and open (1997-1999).

The Conservative government of John Major (1990-1997) was opposed to secessionism. Along with other Western governments, it adhered to a statist principle postulating non-intervention in state territorial jurisdiction, and considered Milosevic a peace-broker in the Balkans after the 1995 Dayton Accords ended the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. When his Labour government came to power in 1997, Tony Blair deliberately set himself apart from his predecessor’s failure to adequately address the humanitarian disasters in Bosnia-Herzegovina and championed morality and humanitarianism in international affairs. In his 1999 speech on Global Development, considered a milestone of liberal interventionist discourse at the time, Blair argued in support of international intervention in Kosovo: ‘This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values’ (quoted in Daddow 2009: 551). Kosovo became a test of strength for Blair and his government. Blair ultimately
emerged as a driving force for NATO’s 1999 military intervention in support of the Kosovo Albanians (Vickers 2000:55-70).

In the early 1990s Kosovo Albanians in the UK experienced their positionality vis-à-vis the host-state as relatively weak for several reasons. First, they were an unknown group due to their minimal presence in the early 1990s. Although their numbers grew rapidly throughout the decade, these were refugees from Milosevic’s oppression in Kosovo or economic immigrants from poverty-stricken Albania (Destani 2009). Many were students and middle-class urban-dwellers, but their status decreased as migrants in a new society. Distance from the majority existed also on the basis of their predominantly Muslim religion. Because the Albanians repeatedly associated themselves with the dictum of Albanian nationalist intellectual Pashko Vasa that ‘Albanianness is the religion of Albanians’, their affiliations were not elevated to a major distinguishing marker. Nevertheless, the media – rightly or wrongly – associated them with an international mafia, trafficking, and other illicit activities. Furthermore, Albanians from Albania proper claimed Kosovo heritage to take advantage of the 1996 policy granting Exceptional Leave to Remain for Kosovars only (CDS 2002:26; Kostovicova 2003). The discovery of these manipulations added to the entire community’s poor reputation.

In contrast to the Armenian one, the Kosovo Albanian diaspora was strongly interconnected with homeland-based migration and other networks. Even if living physically in the UK, diaspora entrepreneurs – many recent refugees – were embedded in transnational networks linked to secessionist Kosovo, and derived their social power from them, not from the host-state. The Kosovo Information Center (KIC), which emerged in 1992 to organize diaspora activists, was a direct extension of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). Former students from the highly nationalist
Prishtina University and other refugees gathered in 1990 to ‘do something for the homeland’, but the KIC formed only with the approval of LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova (A4 2009). Coordination of activities remained tightly linked to the original homeland.

A closed foreign policy stance and relatively weak diaspora positionality resulted in limited lobbying and predominantly transnational channels until 1997. Initially, the British Foreign Office dismissed most Kosovar claims (Pettifer 2005). Since the Conservative government was considered inaccessible, the KIC aspired to build relationships with individual MPs to support political struggles abroad. LDK activists brought Respect Party MP George Galloway and Conservative Party MP Steven Norris to Kosovo (A5 2009).

Lobbying was minimal and diaspora activism was ad hoc. Diaspora entrepreneurs did not develop standing parliamentary committees, as did the Armenian activists. A parliamentary group was established only after Kosovo’s 2008 independence and recognition. Nor did Albanian activists manage to elicit sympathy from the trade unions, as the Palestinian did. Much transnational activism centered on creating a network of shadow government institutions outside Kosovo, and the UK-based branch was to be one of these (Koinova 2012). While closer connections were built with the more numerous, politically active Albanian diasporas in Germany and Switzerland, the UK branch acted in line with the shadow government’s central policy and collected 3% income taxes from Kosovo Albanians to sponsor shadow institutions.

While maintaining transnational shadow networks and collecting remittances for shadow institutions belong to transnational channeling of homeland-oriented
claims, violence was not part of the Albanian diaspora practices. Close linkages with homeland institutions made entrepreneurs adhere to LDK’s central strategy of pursuing the conflict in nonviolent terms and seeking legitimacy for the sovereignty goal from international institutions through human rights issues.

Diaspora entrepreneurs’ strong linkages with homeland political processes became further visible in 1996-1997. Through the mechanism of ‘ethnic outbidding’ (Adamson 2013), the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), advocating an armed revolt, managed to gain power over a weakening LDK. The oscillations of KIC’s organizational existence demonstrate this shift. Formed in 1992, the KIC was closed in 1997 due to an initial split between President Rugova and Prime Minister Bukoshi, and the advent of the KLA. The center reopened in 1999, but stopped actively functioning in 2002 (A4 2009).

Almost concurrently with this shift in Kosovo politics, Tony Blair’s Labour government took power and opened its foreign policy towards the Kosovo question. But no diaspora mobilization towards a dual-pronged approach in 1997-1999 took place due to any KLA shift to increase lobbying involvement. The KLA was even more embedded than the LDK in transnational networks. According to some accounts it derived financial support from illegal ones (Paoli and Reuter 2008). Hence, it had little incentive to lobby officially. In the UK, the KLA established some weak representation. It was slow to name a leader, and when it did, young doctor Pleurat Seidiu operated incognito out of a garage in Funchley (Pettifer 2008).

The opening of the foreign policy stance enabled diaspora entrepreneurs to switch their weak lobby effort from individual MPs to the government, specifically foreign policy advisers and Foreign Secretary Robin Cook (Koinova 2013). After this shift, entrepreneurs approached policy makers twice a month to raise awareness of the
violence escalation in Kosovo. They now framed the conflict in terms of ‘necessity to avoid a belated response’ and learn from earlier policy mistakes. This mantra was well suited to Blair’s policies. A 1998 initiative of Kosovo Albanian and British intellectuals to organize MPs in the House of Commons created a massive media response (Gionca 2009). A large demonstration took place in Trafalgar Square in support of Blair and NATO’s intervention. Although community leaders attribute no major causal weight to their impact on the UK decision to support the intervention, they claim they provided inside information to policy makers when media coverage was scarce, and that their letters to the media prepared the British public to accept Blair’s course of action.

On the other hand, an open foreign policy stance allowed a diaspora with weak positionality vis-à-vis the host-state to further channel efforts into the transnational realm. Some diaspora entrepreneurs considered lobbying effort toward policy makers with an already permissive stance towards Kosovars a waste of scarce resources (A6 2009). They felt support should be rendered to the KLA, which exerted heavy pressure on LDK supporters to switch allegiance, fund its networks, and draft volunteers to fight in Kosovo. In the end, two busses of volunteer fighters, including Albanians and Kosovo Albanians, departed for Kosovo. The KLA leader’s visibility increased during the 1998-1999 warfare, when he allegedly gave media statements.

Mobilization through Transnational Channels: The Palestinian Diaspora

It is beyond the scope of this article to demonstrate the shades of British foreign policy towards the Palestinian question. In the stalled Middle East peace process, the UK government supported a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine along with other world powers, including the US. This solution has been contested yet
evolving as a likely scenario. Nevertheless, other contentious issues related to the state-building process – most notably refugee return, the Israeli building of a wall and settlements in Palestinian territories, and suicide bombings – have posed serious obstacles to state-building. Linked in a close relationship to the US and partnership with Israel, the UK for a long time did not make substantial commitments to a solution to these debates. The Labour governments of Blair and Gordon Brown demonstrated interest in connecting to Palestinian business circles, but only for practical concerns (A1 2009). Blair became an envoy in 2007 for the Middle East Quartet working to find a peaceful agreement. Only recently did Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron call Gaza a “prison camp” (Mackey 2010). Yet in the November 2012 vote for UN recognition of Palestine as a "non-member observer state," the UK abstained. It requested “certain assurances or amendments” including a commitment not to pursue “ICC jurisdiction over the Occupied Territories at this stage,” conditions Palestinian leaders found ‘unrealistic’ (BBC, 30/12/2012).

Palestinian diaspora entrepreneurs experience their positionality in the host-state as weak for a number of reasons. First, many have a weak identification with the British state. One entrepreneur argued that ‘Arabs in general behave as permanent residents of the UK, enjoy the benefits of democracy and the rule of law, but see themselves as part of the larger Arab world and are completely focused on events in Palestine’ (A7 2010). Although this stance might be somewhat exaggerated, it is indicative of specific diaspora attitudes. Second, in numerous narratives Britain is mentioned as the country that created the Palestinian problem, since it permitted the formation of Israel during its mandate. Activists remark that Britain needs to ‘take the blame’ and apologize (Nabulsi 2006: 211, 241, 242; Safieh 2010: 116). They also consider Israeli lobbying activities through the party system as blocking their access
to the host-state. Interviewees point to strong historical links between the Labour
movement and Israel affecting Blair’s foreign policy and his effectiveness as envoy in
the Middle East process, and to citizens’ socialization patterns with Israel – such as
sending children to spend time in a kibbutz – which affected generations of British,
and hence their public opinion.

These issues are aggravated by further politicization of the Islamic religion.
Unlike in the Albanian case, the Muslim religion of the Palestinians has been elevated
to a major distinguishing marker. After the 2005 terrorist attacks in London, Muslim
communities came ‘under pressure’ from the media and state (Abbas 2005), but
Palestinian and Islamic groups with radical agendas further contributed to a
dichotomization of identity. Relatively weak diaspora positionality can also be seen in
the repeated calls to revive the PLO to defend diasporic interests for communities
tightly linked across the Middle East, Europe, and America (Nabulsi 2006:41).

A restrictive foreign policy stance and weak diaspora positionality led to the
predominant channeling of homeland-oriented claims through transnational channels,
including moderate and radical practices. Durable linkages between diaspora
entrepreneurs and homeland networks facilitated mirroring of political processes from
the homeland into the host-land. By 2008 the local competition between Fatah and
Hamas had split the UK-based Palestinian community into open or tacit sympathizers
for one of two groups that rarely communicate with each other. Some interviewees
indicated that growing numbers in the diaspora were inclined to sympathize implicitly
with more radical claims following the Gaza war in 2008, due to disillusionment with
the Palestinian Authority. Despite some reconciliation between the two factions after
2011, and Hamas’ lukewarm support for the Fatah-driven Palestinian bid for upgrade of statehood status in the UN, they remain bitter rivals with very different visions of Palestine, a rivalry transnationalized in diaspora politics.

The mechanisms here connecting the independent and dependent variables are maintaining durable linkages to the homeland via humanitarian organizations; establishing durable coalitions with transnational Islamic and leftist movements; and maintaining weak coalitions with host-state political institutions and civil society.

Diaspora entrepreneurs maintained durable transnational linkages to the homeland via humanitarian charities. Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP) has functioned for 25 years and developed professional capacities to deal with humanitarian emergencies and long-term health issues in the West Bank, Gaza, and the camps in Lebanon (MAP 2010). Supported by the UK-based Palestinian business community and fund-raising events, it has lobbied British institutions to resolve a stalled status quo. It also lobbied for legislation requiring designation of the origins of produce to alert consumers about produce from the Israeli settlements in the West Bank (A8, 2009).

While MAP has enjoyed a rather favorable reputation in the diaspora community and among parliamentary observers (UK Parliament 2003), some charities were publicly questioned about their linkages to radical groups. Most notably, in 2003 the Palestinian Relief and Development Fund (Interpal) was put on the US list of organizations supporting Hamas and terrorism (US Department of Treasury 2003). In 1996, 2003, and 2008 Interpal was subject to investigations by the UK Charity Commission, but was cleared, and in July 2010 won a High Court case against the newscast Sunday Express for its allegations (OMB Watch 2009; Young 2010).

Palestinian diaspora entrepreneurs also participated in the activities of the
registered charity Viva Palestina, founded by Respect Party MP George Galloway, which actively fund-raised and organized more than 1,000 people in the diaspora and other sympathizers and 500 vehicles in humanitarian convoys to Gaza (Viva Palestina 2010). The organization’s activism was strengthened by the deadly outcome of the Israeli Gaza Flotilla Raid in May 2010. Viva Palestina created a global network of groups sympathizing with its mission to break the siege of Gaza and has organized six humanitarian convoys so far; the most recent departed from Bradford in April 2012 (Viva Palestina 2010; JC 2012).

Palestinian Return Centre, another institutional diaspora entrepreneur, is a think tank focused on research, public relations and activism with regard to refugees and their right of return (PRC 2010). The center spends significant energy to annually commemorate the Nakbah. It publishes pieces on refugee issues and provides access to data on Palestinian land and other legal documents.\(^5\) The center views itself as a civic organization to bring awareness to the international legal aspects of the right of return, ‘since political authorities are likely to sell out the refugees’, a shortcoming of the Oslo Accords (A9 2009). The center lobbies the British parliament, disseminates news to the media, including Arab channels and Al Jazeera, and expands awareness on the European level. It states no affiliation with any political party or organization (PRC 2010), but Israeli sources sometimes question this stance (GMBDR, 05/31/2010).

Groups with larger Islamic agendas have increasingly related to the Palestinian struggle, especially since the Gaza war. Some global humanitarian organizations with local branches, such as Islamic Relief and Islamic Help, have organized fund-raising campaigns for Gaza (IH 2009; IRW 2010). For them it has been a religious duty to

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\(^5\) See PRC 2010, section on books such as Abu-Sitta 2000 and Simons 2006.
provide aid and charity. Others use the Palestinian struggle to juxtapose Islam against Western oppression. Some are linked to the Pakistani community, the largest Muslim diaspora in the UK. Others aim at a global Khalifah or introduction of Sharia law, and use the Palestinian case to support their claims for states based on Islamic law, including in Palestine. Long-term Palestinian diaspora activists with secular views find this phenomenon highly problematic, since they do not consider it conducive to a final resolution to Palestinian issues – statehood and right of return.

Widespread Palestinian diaspora participation in Islamic networks is a more recent but vigorous phenomenon. Maintaining linkages with leftist movements has been a more traditional venue to channel homeland-oriented claims. During the first intifada, the PLO had connections to Marxist circles. The end of the Soviet Union weakened leftist appeals in world politics, but certain leftist groups maintain an active stance on the Palestinian issue. Most notable is the Palestinian Solidarity Campaign (PSC), a British movement with European-wide networks, which engages Palestinians in the diaspora and other nationalities and faiths. According to one of its activists, PSC focuses on lobbying the British state party system and institutions, but is more closely focused on the domestic and international trade unions. The trade unions avoided a stance on the Palestinian struggle before the second intifada, but events in Gaza made them more prone to offer unified support. The PSC also initiated the Boycott Campaign Movement in 2001 with branches in Germany and France (A10 2009). “Ban Israeli Settlement Goods,” a slogan opening its website, was a campaign to ban goods produced in Israeli settlements. A July 2010 appeal encouraged activists to remind British supermarkets such as Morrisons/Sainsbury's that they stock Israeli produce grown on ‘land that has been stolen from the Palestinians of the West Bank’

6 The UK Pakistani community has more than 658,000 people, 5.4% British-born (Pedziwiatr 2007:43).
A final group with leftist appeals and close links to the Socialist Workers Party is the global Stop the War Coalition. It was formed in Britain in 2001 to protest wars launched in the name of the global war on terrorism, but has included the longstanding Palestinian struggle in its repertoire. It organized large-scale diaspora support for demonstrations focused on Palestine, including protests against the 2008 Gaza war, the 2010 Turkish Flotilla Raids and the 8-day Israeli bombardment of Gaza in 2012.

Islamic and secular networks in Britain are often separate, especially with regard to fundraising. Nevertheless, they overlap on major occasions like the commemoration of the Nakbah, and at demonstrations that become focal points of contention. According to a government-based interviewee, Palestinians are more eager to engage through demonstrations than lobbying, since there is large media attention in London, including from the Arab channels (A11 2009). Demonstrations are viewed as a likely way to magnify international attention to their claims. Some frames for mobilization overlap between networks. A discourse emphasizing Western capitalist oppression or claims that ‘Gaza has nobody but you’ are common.

While the major part of mobilization took place through transnational channels, considering the multitude and frequency of events, and popular support, a few organizations engaged with lobbying through the host-state. Lobby groups exist in foreign policy, but act with limited capacity on the Palestinian issue. Five institutional channels of communication exist in the House of Commons: the Council for Advancement of Arab British Understanding, the Britain-Palestine All Party Parliamentary Group, and the Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Middle Eastern Councils (Safieh 2010:271). Palestinian activists often approach them by arguing that ‘peace, not process’ is necessary, and advocate that Palestinians not harbor revenge
against Israelis (Safieh 2010).

By including the Palestinian issue in the larger Arab and Middle East agendas, these institutions have weakened its appeal. According to one representative, communication between Israelis and Palestinians in these institutions needs to be enhanced; Palestinians need to put away the blame discourse and focus not only on what the British government should deliver for the Middle East, but how they can engage with domestic issues in British society and offer electoral support for politicians trying to bring change in domestic affairs (A11 2009). Similar realizations have been voiced by individuals in the Palestinian community. A participant in a public meeting of the civic organization Civitas asked: ‘How many of us asked their son to register in any British party inside Britain? Unfortunately, none. Why?’ (Nabulsi 2006:75).

The spectrum of transnational Palestinian diaspora mobilization would be incomplete without mentioning the civic transnational activism of the Oxford-based and EU-sponsored Civitas project. Between 2004 and 2006 the project facilitated a process by which ordinary refugees could ‘identify their own political and civic needs for themselves’ and recorded individual voices of refugees and exiles rather than political elites in numerous locations in the Middle East, EU, US, Canada, Africa, and Australia (Nabulsi 2006: 4-10). The initial suspicion the project encountered from local Palestinian and diaspora entrepreneurs demonstrates that civic values have not been deeply internalized by a conflict-generated diaspora despite residing in a liberal democratic society and able to participate in various NGOs.

Conclusions
Conflict-generated diasporas living in liberal states channel the sovereignty-
based claims of their original homelands through both state-based and transnational channels. The Albanian, Armenian, and Palestinian diasporas in the UK faced violence and repression in the emerging states of Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Palestinian territories. Diaspora entrepreneurs from these communities channeled their sovereignty-based claims differently, although they were exposed to the same migrant incorporation regimes and multiculturalism policies. Armenian diaspora entrepreneurs pursued their claims primarily through state-based channels, using moderate practices such as lobbying and fostering links with civil society. Palestinians pursued their claims predominantly through transnational channels, through moderate and transgressive practices. Albanians used both channels.

Accounting for these results in this article expands theory-building in several ways. With the backdrop of separately developed literatures on foreign policy lobbying, migration integration regimes and transnationalism, scholarship needs to integrate aspects of these literatures that are specifically relevant to diaspora mobilization. Here two variables – foreign policy stance and diaspora positionality – act together to explain the diasporas’ differing behaviors. Relatively weak diaspora positionality is conducive to engagement with transnational channels, but does not predict engagement through such channels only. If the host-state’s foreign policy is relatively open towards the sovereignty goal, one might expect increased use of state-based channels.

At its core, constructivist literature on the domestic incorporation of international human rights norms assumes that blocked access to state institutions motivates local human rights activists to use transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999). This study finds that transnational engagement is not driven solely by lack of institutional access. A diaspora that draws its social
support predominantly from the host-state can still prefer state-based channels, as in the Armenian case. An open foreign policy towards the sovereignty goal indeed facilitates some channeling of claims through state-based channels, but transnational channeling can take place in parallel, as in the Albanian case. Diaspora positionality matters as an additional variable for the final outcome.

How can we account for the external validity of this argument? Such validity can be sought through exploring intra-country and cross-country variation. Regarding intra-country variation, the Somali diaspora in London can offer a “plausibility probe.” All Somaliland parties are represented in the UK, and a lobby exists through an All-Party Parliamentary group for Somaliland (Hammond 2011: 172, 175). Yet the strength of their positions seems to be more durably linked to the homeland: “In many respects Somaliland resembles a ‘transnational state’ with its capital in Hargeysa but many of its citizens are outside Somaliland or in transit, and much of its economy is generated from outside the country” (Bradbury 2008, quoted in Hammond 2011:165). Their mobilization resembles that of Albanians, where open foreign policy and relatively weak positionality vis-à-vis the host-state are conducive to a dual-pronged approach.

Regarding cross-country variation, the diaspora mobilization of the same three diasporas, but in the Netherlands, could offer another ‘plausibility probe’. By contrast to the UK with its liberal migration integration regime, the Netherlands is placed in a “medium restrictive” category, according to Howard’s citizenship policy index. In the Netherlands more restrictions are placed on acquisition of citizenship (Howard 2009: 37-51) and more pressure on integration (Joppke 2010: 55). While further in-depth research is necessary in the Dutch context, preliminary research shows that the current argument could have traction. During the violent episodes studied here, the foreign
policy of the Netherlands was restrictive towards Nagorno-Karabakh and Palestine, but more open towards Kosovo. Although the organizational level of all three diasporas is much less pronounced in the Netherlands than in the UK, the patterns of mobilization seem to be similar. In the Armenian case, some transnational activism existed during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but lobbying the Dutch institutions was predominant (A12 2013). Lobbying and strong transnational activism were characteristic for the Kosovo Albanians (A13 2013). Little lobbying with strong transnational activism have been predominant among the Palestinians (A14 2013).

A combination of foreign policy stance and diaspora positionality will be important in a broader set of cases of diaspora mobilization towards emerging states, for example, on how positionality could be operationalized in the narratives of entrepreneurs in different contexts. They may organize politically more from one context than another, which is at the core of positionality.

Developing the term “diaspora positionality” in relational terms thus adds new elements to the IR literature on diaspora mobilization. It speaks to diaspora networks as both deterritorialized and embedded. The links of diaspora entrepreneurs to territories not only remap the boundaries of the state and nation, as Adamson and Demetriou (2007) argue, but carry different social weight and so influence the capabilities of entrepreneurs to affect host-state or homeland politics.

These findings raise an important question for scholarship on diasporas and conflicts: when do diasporas behave as moderate or radical actors? Moderate practices are pursued through state-based and transnational channels such as the Civitas project. Transnational channels also create a fertile ground for more transgressive practices and “grey area” activism, where diaspora entrepreneurs overtly engage with civil society and advocate particularistic claims and even radical agendas. Grey area
activism can be nonviolent, as with the extended Kosovo shadow institutions. It can include more radical Islamic and leftist agendas, as with some Palestinian organizations. Shedding light on grey area civil society organizations and creating conditions for diaspora entrepreneurs to derive more power from their links to the host-state would increase the probability of more moderate mobilization.

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Conflict-generated Diasporas and Emerging States: Pursuing Sovereignty Claims through State-based and Transnational Channels

FIGURE 1

Outcomes of Diaspora Mobilization

[Diagram showing outcomes of diaspora mobilization for Armenian, Albanian, and Palestinian groups, engaging through state-based and transnational channels.]
Conflict-generated Diasporas and Emerging States: Pursuing Sovereignty Claims through State-based and Transnational Channels

FIGURE 2

Conjuncture of Two Variables and Outcomes of Diaspora Mobilization

Foreign Policy Stance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diaspora Positionality</th>
<th>Open</th>
<th>Closed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relatively strong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-based channels</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Armenian)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational channels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Palestinian, phase 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual-pronged approach</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Albanian, phase 2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relatively weak


Conflict-generated Diasporas and Emerging States: Pursuing Sovereignty Claims through State-based and Transnational Channels

FIGURE 3

Diaspora Mobilization:

Mobilization through State-based Channels: The Armenian Case

IVs

Closed FPS

+ Relatively Strong Positionality

DV

Durable coalitions with parliament

State-based channels
Conflict-generated Diasporas and Emerging States: Pursuing Sovereignty Claims through State-based and Transnational Channels

FIGURE 4

Transnational and Dual-pronged Approach: The Albanian Case

Process 1: Transnational channels

IVs

Closed FPS

+ Relatively Weak Positionality

Durable linkages with homeland networks

Ad hoc coalitions with parliament

Transnational channels

Process 2: State-based and Transnational Channels

IV

Permissive FPS

+ Weak Positionality

Ad hoc coalitions with government

Framing: “Avoid belated response”

State-based channels

Ethnic outbidding

Expanding radical practices

Transnational channels
Conflict-generated Diasporas and Emerging States:
Pursuing Sovereignty Claims through State-based and Transnational Channels

FIGURE 5: Diaspora Mobilization:

Process Leading to Claim-making through Transnational Channels:
The Palestinian Case

IV

Durable linkages to homeland networks via humanitarian organizations

Durable coalitions with transnational Islamic movements

Durable coalitions with transnational leftist movements

Closed FPS

+ Weak Positionality

Framing:
“Peace, not process”
“Not seeking revenge”

Weak coalitions with parliament and civil society

Overlapping framing:
“Western capitalist oppression”
“Gaza has nobody but you”

DV

Transnational Channels