On February 19th 2025 I delivered a presentation on my new book to my own department at the University of Warwick. The talk was entitled, 'Policing the Epistemic Line between Uses and Abuses of Mathematical Market Models', and it was based on some of the key analytical insights from my recent book, False Prophets of Economics ImperialismLink opens in a new window. I ran through a number of arguments about the multi-dimensional nature of economics imperialism as I see it, exploring the difference between treating mathematical market models only as a gateway for thought experiments and assuming that the solution to the system of equations on which mathematical market models are based itself contains empirical content. The former would seem to be where the acceptable limits of the use of mathematical market models within the social sciences are positioned in an epistemic sense, whereas the latter is much more questionable. All instances of economics imperialism are founded on an ontological transposition, through which a social phenomenon is stripped of its context-specific meaning so that it can be reimagined as a market pricing problem. Some very notable thought experiments have been facilitated in this way, so it is by no means an illegitimate epistemic move in its own right. However, it is often then claimed that the logical working through of the implications of adopting certain mathematical structures produces findings that are the functional equivalent of carefully considered and context specific fieldwork which attempts to tease out the contingencies of any social situation. By engaging in an epistemological reordering of this nature, the most vocal economics imperialists are able to say that if there is no difference epistemically between these two types of argument, then the findings from their purely mathematical objects can displace all alternative ways of conducting social science research. Neither of these, however, is a valid claim.