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Regionalism and the Emerging World Order: Sovereignty, Autonomy, Identity

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Introduction

Two momentous events of the late 20th century have underscored both the potential and the pitfalls of regionalism in shaping world order in the new millennium. The crisis in Kosovo hastened the decline of Westphalian sovereignty in the inter-state system. The financial meltdown in Asia around mid-1997 may be viewed in a similar light with respect to sovereignty in the global economy. In Kosovo, a regional alliance, NATO, led a successful assault against sovereignty after it had paralysed the UN’s hand in the crisis. The Asian crisis, on the other hand, indicated that regional institutions (in this case ASEAN) which stick to the principle of absolute sovereignty (and its corollary, the principle of non-interference) are poorly equipped to offer security against the onslaught of globalisation.

Regionalism and regional institutions, argues this paper, are increasingly being challenged and conditioned by the sovereignty-eroding effects of globalisation and - for the lack of a better term - “humanitarian intervention”. Regionalism is becoming, and facing the pressure to become, more “intrusive” and less sovereignty-bound, in the sense of going against the norms of non-interference and non-intervention that had underpinned the Westphalian international system. Furthermore, intrusive regionalism is providing a new basis of regional identity-building, especially in Europe, but also in parts of the Third World. Where regional identity was previously defined, functionally speaking, in terms of organising collective defence against external threats, it is now being constructed on the basis of a shared commitment to intrusive action in promoting human rights and democracy.
In developing this central argument, this paper seeks to perform two functions. The first is to provide an intellectual history, albeit selective, of regionalism in world politics. The purpose of this exercise is not just to identify the main forms of regional organisation that have emerged in the post-Second World War period, but also to examine the underlying linkage between regionalism and sovereignty.¹

The second aim of the paper is to explain some of the key trends in regionalism which may have a crucial bearing on world order in the early 21st century. The discussion will focus on the changes in the traditional functions of regionalism and the emergence of what has been called “new regionalism”. The latter became a popular construct in the late 1980s and early 1990s by drawing attention to the informal, non-hegemonic, comprehensive, and multi-dimensional nature of newly-emerging regional interactions and processes.² But even with new regionalism, argues this paper, the task of redefining the theory and practice of regionalism remains incomplete. Perhaps the most significant trend in regionalism today is its ‘intrusive’ nature. No discussion of the emerging world order at the end of the 20th century can be complete without considering the cooperative and conflict-causing potential of intrusive regionalism. This will be highlighted in the final section of the paper, with particular reference to political and strategic elements of intrusive regionalism.

Sovereignty and Regionalism in the Early Post-Second World War Period

In the early part of the post-war period, the contribution of regionalism to world order was seen by most states to lie in its potential as a bulwark of sovereignty, the founding principle
of the modern state system. This was especially true of regionalism geared to conflict-control functions, as in the case of the Organization of American States, the League of Arab States and the Organisation of African Unity. At the same time, conceptions of regionalism that threatened to dilute the sovereignty of state actors found little support in the international society.

For example, some of earliest proposals about regionalism in international relations envisioned a system of geo-strategic blocs existing as the spheres of influence of the world’s leading powers, and contributing toward a global balance of power.³ Walter Lippman, for example, identified four such possible regional systems: an Atlantic system managed by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; a Russian system, a Chinese system and eventually an Indian system. Within such hegemonic regional systems, "...the preponderance of a great power was to be recognised; each small power was to accept the protection of the great power in whose region it found itself, and was to forego the right to form alliances with any extra-regional power."⁴ Winston Churchill similarly envisaged a number of regional systems as part of the proposed world organization (UN), including in Europe, Asia Minor, Scandinavia, Danubia, the Balkans and the Far East.⁵ George Liska, an academic, advised small states to develop regional groupings by "cluster[ing] around the local Great Power" and surrendering to its “stronger hands the chief responsibility for organizing regional security”.⁶ These frameworks were precursors to the superpower-led regional military alliances in the Third World.

But for the newer entrants to the international system, while regionalism was a useful foreign policy posture, this was primarily so as an instrument of protecting their sovereignty and autonomy from great power, especially superpower, meddling. Regionalism was viewed by them as a means of collective economic and political self-reliance as well.⁷ At a time when much of
Asia, Africa and the Middle East was still under colonial rule, the major Third World regional organisations such as the OAU and the Arab League functioned more as "the instrument of national independence rather than of regional integration" of the strategic or economic kind. The concern with sovereignty also ensured the ultimate rejection by the majority of Third World countries of superpower-led regional military alliances. Alliances such as the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the Inter-American Security System developed under the auspices of a US-dominated OAS were at odds with the political aspirations of a non-aligned Third World community whose members saw in them dangers to their new-found sovereignty.

While the idea of great power-led regional security organisations failed to thrive in no part of the world except in the transatlantic world, the more multipurpose regional groups such as the OAS, OAU and the Arab League had managed to secure a place within the UN system as mechanisms for the pacific settlement of disputes between states. This role had been conceded by the "universalists" (proponents of a strong and overarching UN with an exclusive role in peace and security) with some reluctance. At the San Francisco conference which drafted the UN Charter, the "regionalists" (which included representatives from Latin America and newly independent Middle Eastern states) argued that geographic neighbours would have a better understanding of local disputes and that they would also be better placed to provide prompt assistance to victims of conflict and aggression. Despite concerns that regional organizations might compete with and dilute the authority of the UN, the "universalists" (which included the great powers invested with a Security Council veto power) agreed to a compromise which gave regional organisations a secondary role in managing regional conflicts. But as long as regional
organisations remained subject to the norms of the UN-based collective security framework, they remained essentially sovereignty-bound. The primary purpose of collective security, after all, was to protect state sovereignty from external encroachment. The charter of all the major regional groupings in the world ensured their consistency with the key UN norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of states.

As the collective security role of the UN proved to be too idealistic in the post-war period, the limitations of the conflict-regulative role of regionalism also became increasingly apparent, thanks largely due to the constraints imposed by the non-interference doctrine. While regional institutions created some "islands of peace" in the international system by keeping conflicts localised and isolated from Great Power intervention, the failure of the major regional organisations, the OAS, the Arab League, and the OAU, to manage conflicts was most evident with respect to intra-state conflicts, the most common form of Third World conflict in which sovereignty issues were more salient. This failure dampened the faith of the international community in regionalism as a significant contributor of global peace.

It should be noted here that the later period of the Cold War was marked by the decline of the larger regional organizations and the emergence of smaller frameworks of regionalism exemplified by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Economic Community of West Asian States (ECOWAS), and the Contadora Group. Like their larger predecessors, these groupings were oriented toward a conflict-control role. Some of them, especially ASEAN, made an important contribution to peacemaking in regional conflicts, their role was constrained by a lack of economic, military, or political power. But these groupings also remained bound by the principle of sovereignty and non-interference.
Thus, both ASEAN and the GCC contributed to regional order not by addressing internal conflicts in their member states, but by ensuring regime security by carefully excluding any form of interference in each other’s domestic affairs.\textsuperscript{12}

In the 1960s and early 1970s, a different framework of regionalism, one with a potential to dilute sovereignty and which might enable states to overcome the security dilemma associated with it, became influential. This conception of regionalism found its most sophisticated expression in regional integration theory.\textsuperscript{13} The sovereignty-eroding potential of this form of regionalism, called integrative regionalism in this paper, was captured by Haas who defined integration as "...a process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states."\textsuperscript{14} Karl Deutsch was more explicit in recognising the potential of integrative regionalism to overcome the security dilemma. He defined regional integration as :"the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of community" and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a "long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population.\textsuperscript{15}

Integrative regionalism was operationalised through micro-regional economic organisations, with the original model provided by the European Economic Community (which later became the European Community and still later the European Union). But the fortunes of integration theory rose and fell with the EC. Integrationists were accused by their critics to have overestimated the durability and broader applicability of the conditions that had led to the creation of the EC. Critics argued, for example, that the conditions in Europe conducive to integrative regionalism after the Second World War were somewhat unique; the decline of European
nationalism was caused by the scale of war-time devastation, was but a temporary phenomenon. Integration theorists had wrongly assumed the end of ideology and the decline of nationalism in post-war Europe. This became further apparent when the EC, despite its evident success in turning age-old rivals, France and Germany into members of a permanent security community, failed to come up with a collective response to external challenges, such as the Middle East oil crisis of 1973, when Britain joined hands with the US, thereby undermining the possibility of a collective response by the EC. Moreover, its members opted for national strategies over regional collective action when faced with competition from the US in the field of technology. All this undermined the game plan of the integration theorists, who found the relationship between regional integration and transregional interdependence to be too uncertain and "turbulent", to justify the view of regional integration as an incremental or linear process. Against this backdrop, the post-war fascination about regional integration was overwhelmed by theoretical enthusiasm about international interdependence. Regional integration was pronounced as "obsolescent" because of its failure to recognize "new interdependence patterns transcending the region".\textsuperscript{16}

Outside of Europe, integrative models of regionalism fared even less well. While several subregional economic groups in the Third World sought to emulate the EEC, none succeeded in achieving a comparable level of market centralisation and trade creation. Neither could they realise the "spill-over" effect of economic cooperation in producing agreement on security issues. In general, regional economic integration in the Third World proved to be "much more rudimentary than in Europe, more obscure in purpose and uncertain in content".\textsuperscript{17} The reasons for this state of affairs had to do with a general reluctance on the part of the Third World countries to compromise on their new-found sovereignty. Regional economic groups which
proliferated in Africa and Latin America in the 1960s and 70s "founder[ed] on the reefs of distrust, non cooperation and parochial nationalism".  

The Transition from Sovereignty-Bound Regionalism

The foregoing analysis shows that none of the three main forms of regionalism in the post-Second World War period (superpower-led regional alliances, regional conflict control organisations, and regional economic groupings) was able to escape the constraint of sovereignty and instead helped to preserve its salience in the international system, with the limited exception of the EC. While West Europe accepted (but failed to carry it to its logical conclusion) the sovereignty-eroding potential of regionalism, the Third World rejected it. In this context, what could one expect from regionalism and regional institutions in the post-Cold War era?

The end of the Cold War and the emerging conditions of strategic multipolarity initially led some scholars to assume that the days of great power-led multilateral alliances created exclusively, or even largely, to deal with common external threats were substantially over. Two factors contributed to such thinking. First, the end of the Cold War generated early hopes that balance-of-power approaches to security, the chief rationale for regional alliances, would be replaced by common and cooperative regional security frameworks. The second factor had to do with the changing nature of conflict. The end of superpower rivalry saw a declining in international wars relative to intra-state conflict. Military alliances developed under the Cold War strategic framework were seen by their critics as being incapable of coping with such conflicts, with their sources lying in ethnic divisions and domestic repression. Any outside intervention in
such conflicts would entail a departure from the principle of non-interference, while the traditional military alliances had functioned on the basis of strict respect for this principle.

With the swift demise of the Warsaw Pact, the remaining Cold War regional alliance, NATO, was seen to be heading towards acute obsolescence. NATO Facing the need to justify its continued existence, NATO began to reorient itself to such non-traditional roles as regional peacekeeping. "Permanent alliances of states with on-going common interests, such as NATO", argued Samuel Huntington, “are likely to give way to ad hoc temporary coalitions assembled for particular purposes, such as...in the Gulf crisis.” While NATO was soon to prove that the forecast of its imminent demise was greatly exaggerated, it could no longer thrive in its traditional mission. In Europe as well as in the Third World, bilateral and regional collective defence mechanisms were conceding ground to more “inclusive” regional confidence-building and preventive diplomacy mechanisms, which were by their very nature sovereignty-eroding. These types of cooperation, drawn initially from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, which later became an Organisation, or OSCE), were also being advocated for Asia Pacific, Middle Eastern and Latin American regional multilateral institutions.

In the early post-Cold War era, the regulative role of regional organizations found a new appeal due to the perceived limitations and biases of the UN itself. The empowerment of regional organizations could be one way of addressing the "legitimacy-deficit" of the UN which was being seen by many as a tool of a handful of Western powers. Third World countries, it was believed, could have a greater share of decision-making power in regional groupings than at the UN. Enhancing the role of regional organization could also mitigate the overextension of the UN's resources resulting from the rapid proliferation of its peacekeeping operations. In this sense,
regionalism had the potential to help decentralize and democratize the UN system and enhance its legitimacy.  

But regional approaches to peace and security continued to suffer from a host of organizational and political problems as well as resources constraints. The absence of any collective institutional capacity for peacekeeping operations (NATO being a major exception to this, but NATO did not immediately jump into peacekeeping missions) rendered regional peacekeeping organisations hostage to the interests of outside actors or regionally-dominant powers. More importantly, even when faced with an explosion of internal conflicts, Third World countries remained reluctant to abandon the non-interference principle to permit regional intervention in internal conflicts.

While regional alliances and conflict control groupings confronted these new challenges, integrative regionalism, especially the EC, made a successful transition to a single market. But West European supranationalism faced new difficulties in developing a full-fledged monetary union and far more daunting challenges in developing a common foreign and defence policy framework. Its failure to deal effectively with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia highlighted the limits of a spill-over from low politics to issues of high politics, as envisaged by the neo-functionalists.

The revival of interest in regional economic integration in other parts of the world included ASEAN's decision in 1992 to create a regional free trade area, the OAU's signing of an African Economic Community Treaty in 1991, and the emergence of two new trade groupings in South America (the Mercosur group including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, created in 1991, and the Group of Three including Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia, established in 1994). This renewed interest in economic regionalism stemmed partly from doubts about the
future of the liberal international economic order. But old problems associated with regional integration in the developing world remained, especially the difficulty of ensuring an equitable distribution of benefits. The proposed African Economic Community Treaty would have a 34-year time frame, and the ASEAN framework was bogged down by the problem of relative gain. In general, regional economic integration among developing countries remained hostage to political and security concerns of the participating countries and their prior interest in greater integration with the global economy through inter-regional trade and investment linkages.

Moreover, the EU brand of sovereignty-freeing integrative regionalism was no longer being regarded as a possible universal model for regional integration. Outside Europe, the most important examples of regional integration resulted not so much through formal bureaucracy-driven trade liberalisation, but from a "market-driven" process of transnational production. The so-called "growth triangles" or "natural economic territories" of Northeast and Southeast Asia, in which factors of production, such as land, capital, technology and labour, for a single product could be derived from, and located within, several national territories, constituted some the clearest examples of regionalisation without regionalism. But they too did not and could not bypass state authority and regulation, as initially expected by many observers. The same could be said of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping, which emerged as the first formal inter-governmental organization dedicated to trade liberalisation in the Asia Pacific region. Espousing the principle of "soft" regionalism, APEC would be kept by its Asian members as a "consultative mechanism", rather than being developed into an "economic community". The sovereignty-bound nature of APEC would partly explain its subsequent failure to prevent and deal with the financial crisis that broke out in 1997.
Despite the continuing primacy of sovereignty in regional organisations, a number of developments in the 1980s helped to bring about a decline in its importance. Some of these changes were captured by the concept of “new regionalism”, explained in an important study by Hettne and Inotai in 1994. They distinguished between "old" and "new" regionalism on the basis of three features: the multipolar context of the latter (as opposed to the bipolar context of old regionalism); the dominant role of hegemonic actors (regionalism from "outside" and "above") in the creation of old regionalism as opposed to the "autonomous" nature of new regionalism (from "within" and "below"); and the comprehensiveness and multidimensional nature of new regionalism as opposed to the narrow and specific focus of the old. Of these, the last aspect deserves particular notice. Regionalism could no longer be associated with a set of relatively narrow security (whether as a dispute-settlement mechanism, or as a framework for defence against a common threat in the inter-state system) and economic (such as a framework of capitalist trade liberalisation) goals. For example, by the late 1970s, regionalism among the developing countries was geared to a wider menu of issues, from the protection of the environment, management of refugee flows, and protection of human rights. Many of these issue areas required a shift from sovereignty-bound thinking and approach on the part of regional organisations.

The widening scope of regionalist tasks entailed a corresponding broadening of regionalist actors. Inter-governmental policy coordination, the main traditional tool of sovereignty-bound regionalism, was being overtaken by a rapid proliferation of transnational social and cultural networks addressing human rights, democracy, environment and social justice issues. For example, the existence of a regional civil society in the Nordic region is credited with the distinctive security policies of governments in the region during the Cold War which differed
markedly from the hardline postures of the NATO alliance.\textsuperscript{31} In Southeast Asia today, protests organized by Thai NGOs against the illegal logging activities of Thai companies in neighbouring Cambodia and Burma attests to the regionalization of ecological concerns linked to an evolving regional civil society.\textsuperscript{32}

A third and perhaps more important development in regionalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the advent of new forms of identity regionalism, i.e., regionalism structured around a claim to distinctive regional norms, attributes, and aspirations. As noted earlier, some traditional forms of regionalism contributed to regional identity-building by offering collective military defence against external threats (including those from rival ideological blocs), as in the case of Europe, or common political fronts against superpower meddling, as in the case of much of the Third World. The European Community while ideologically motivated (but without a collective defence role) was backed by an additional pillar in the form of musings by visionaries like Jean Monnet about an incipient European identity (despite Bismark’s scornful dismissal of the idea of Europe). In the Third World, regional identity was expressed in such regionalist notions as the "Pan-Arabism" of Nasser, "Pan-Africanism", and the "Afro-Asianism" of Sukarno and Nehru. To some degree, all these constructs reflected supposedly ‘cultural’ similarities, but the extent of this could be greatly overstated. More accurately, they reflected, in the case of the EC, the extent of shared values (in the case of the EC) and a commitment to socialization. In the case of the Third World, regional identity reflected a proletarian solidarity of the newly independent countries brought together, despite tremendous physical and socio-cultural diversity, by their common struggle against colonialism and underdevelopment. But as the campaign against colonialism ended, these forms of identity regionalism themselves withered in the face of competitive
nationalisms, the polarising impact of the global superpower rivalry and the aggravation of territorial and political disputes stemming from artificial post-colonial boundaries. In Europe, regional identity-building faltered with superpower detente and divisions over external challenges such as the Middle East oil crisis.

The resurrection of identity regionalism in the 1980s was driven by a discourse on shared political values, rather than by a rediscovery of traditional cultural similarities or by freshly perceived external threats. As the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, both NATO and the EU projected themselves as the bastion of human rights and liberal democracy. This was highly alluring to the post-communist states of Eastern Europe. The idea of joining/rejoining the West became the key incentive for these states in aspiring for membership in these groupings.\(^\text{33}\)

Outside of Europe, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), espousing cultural affinities and a common predicament, begun to focus on a “Gulf identity”.\(^\text{34}\) In Latin America, regional cooperation came to be redefined in terms of a “South” rather than “Latin” American identity.\(^\text{35}\) But it was East Asia which provided another major arena for value-based identity regionalism. But unlike in Europe, “Asian values” were distinctly illiberal. Instead of human rights and democracy, this contract stressed such attributes as hard work, thrift, respect for authority, communitarian ethic, etc. Such values were cited not just to explain the region's economic dynamism, but also to underscore its potential to present an alternative political and economic paradigm to the West. In Southeast Asia, identity regionalism has been rooted more in traditional culture. It is behind the expansion of ASEAN under the slogan of ‘One Southeast Asia’, a project realised earlier in 1999 when Cambodia was admitted into ASEAN as its 10\(^{th}\) and most likely the last member. Such has been the appeal of identity regionalism for ASEAN\(^{36}\) that it was willing to
set aside intra-mural ideological differences (including Vietnam’s communist political system), ignored international protests to draw in the repressive regime in Myanmar (Burma) and overlooked the burdens of integrating weak polities such as Cambodia and Laos. But ASEAN regionalism has also been stressing a regional identity based on the norms of the “ASEAN Way”, which is supposed to contrast with European-style regionalism emphasizing formal bureaucratic structures and legalistic decision-making procedures. While espousing familiar and well-established multilateral principles, such as non-discrimination and transparency, the proponents of “ASEAN Way” claim to have developed some distinctive institutional characteristics and decision-making processes to organize security and economic cooperation, including an aversion to legally-binding commitments, preference for weak organizational structures, and emphasis on consensus-building. In this view, institution-building involves a cautious, pragmatic, informal, gradualist and consensus-seeking approach.

In Europe as well as in Asia, identity regionalism is having a significant impact on the geographic and institutional space of regionalism. In Europe, the process of defining regional identity and space remains contested between various institutions, including the EU, NATO, the WEU, and the OSCE. In Asia, a similar contest has taken place in between the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC whose membership includes Asian and Western states bordering on the Pacific), and the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC, whose membership excludes the Western members of APEC including Australia, Canada and the US). While APEC represents a utility-maximising and transaction-oriented approach to regional identity, Malaysian-proposed EAEC is based not only on regionalized production structures (as opposed to simple trade-based transactions), but also on cultural similarities, including the "Asianness" of its members.
The celebration of identity regionalism by its proponents notwithstanding, its potential for creating conflict and transregional discord cannot be overlooked. ASEAN’s determined pursuit of the “One Southeast Asia” concept, which resulted in it ignoring international protests about granting membership to Burma, has contributed to tensions with EU. Identity regionalism in Europe carries its own set of dangers, of which exclusionism is perhaps the most serious. As Tony Smith writes:

"were the European project is to achieve its political goals, it would also entail, not just economic exclusion, but also cultural differentiation and with it the possibility of cultural and racial exclusion. The forging of a deep continental cultural identity to support political unification may well require an ideology of European cultural exclusiveness."[37]

From Identity Regionalism to Intrusive Regionalism

The development of identity regionalism in Europe paralleled, and contributed to, another transformation in the nature of regionalism. The process of regional identity-building around market capitalism, human rights, and liberal democracy could not be meaningful unless the relevant regional groups also developed monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, both political, economic, and military. In so doing, European regionalism assumed an intrusive character. Here of course, an important distinction must be drawn between integrative regionalism (of the kind envisaged by regional integration theorists in the context of the EC/EU) and intrusive regionalism of the type most evident in the transformation of NATO. While both are subversive of the principle of sovereignty, they seek to accomplish this goal in different ways. The sovereignty-eroding potential of integrative regionalism was based on the consent and active participation of the members of the EC. Regional integration described how states could make voluntary
concessions on sovereignty in order to pursue collective goals. Instrusive regionalism could be
developed on the basis of mutual agreement. But it is also distinguished by a ultimate coercive
element. While the early development of integrative regionalism in West Europe relied on
economic interdependence, political association, and functional transactions, intrusive regionalism
relies, ultimately, on the practice of humanitarian intervention, as illustrated in the case of
NATO’s action against Serbia.

Although intrusive regionalism drew some of its conceptul justification from post-Cold
War UN humanitarian intervention missions, especially those in northern Iraq and Somalia,
credit must be given to the CSCE/OSCE as the true inventor of intrusive regionalism. Apart from
developing and implementing an extensive menu of CBMs, including provisions for transparency
and mutual surveillance that crossed the bounds of non-interference, the CSCE successfully
incorporated human rights issues into the regional confidence-building agenda, thereby setting
norms that would regulate the internal as well as external political behaviour of states. This
aspect of the OSCE also distinguished it from other major regional groupings (such as the OAS,
OAU and the Arab League), which, as mentioned earlier, had a minimal role in the regulation of
internal conflict. It was then the task of NATO, in a effort to escape obsolescence, to steal the idea
from the OSCE. But with far superior resources and a military command structure, NATO could
practice humanitarian intervention much more forcefully than the OSCE. The OSCE’s role as the
teacher of norms should not, however, be overlooked at a time of its alleged obsolescence and the
transatlantic euphoria over NATO’s “victory” over Serbia.

Outside Europe, intrusive regionalism has made more limited, but noteworthy progress. In
Asia, the fledgling ASEAN Regional Forum has developed a set of largely non-intrusive CBMs.
Neither the ARF nor any other Third World regional organisation has come even close to the truly intrusive OSCE-style CBMs. But greater progress has been made on the political front. The OAS' "Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System", provides for norms concerning the regulation of internal conflict, including collective opposition to military coups in member states. Even the highly sovereignty-bound OAU has progressively recognised the need for addressing internal conflicts, including those dealing with human rights violations, even if they militate against its doctrine of non-interference. It recently adopted a policy framework that isolates any regime that comes to office through a military coup. Southeast Asia has seen a major debate about ‘constructive intervention’ (though wholly non-military means, however) to pressure the regime in Myanmar to allow political liberalisation, although by and large, the ASEAN members have stuck to the principle of non-interference. Asia and the Middle East also remain major exceptions to the establishment of regional human rights monitoring bodies, a key form of intrusive regionalism, although ASEAN is reportedly considering proposals for such a body.

The case of ASEAN deserves special attention here because it is here that the tension between intrusive regionalism and sovereignty has been most pronounced. While sovereignty concerns prevailed over constructive intervention in the political arena, the strict observance of non-interference could not survive domestic political changes in key ASEAN member states. Thus, the downfall of the Suharto regime in Indonesia has had a demonstration effect on Malaysia, fueling demands for political reform there. The new leaders of Indonesia and the Philippines expressed support for the deposed Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia (Anwar Ibrahim), thereby demonstrating how domestic political liberalisation could lead to intrusive
foreign policy behaviour. And facing international criticism of its weak response to the economic crisis, ASEAN could not avoid compromising on its doctrine of non-interference in the economic arena. The Asian crisis brought home to the ASEAN members the dangers of the doctrine when confronting the challenges of economic globalisation. When the crisis broke out, critics of non-interference argued that had ASEAN not been so tightly bound by it, Thailand, the first ASEAN country to go under, could have been issued a more timely warning about its worsening economic condition. In the wake of the crisis, the foreign minister of Thailand argued strongly in support of a policy of “flexible engagement” (now termed “enhanced interaction”), which would allow a “peer review” of the members’ economic policies and criticism of their human rights record.45 While the political aspects of this proposal was rejected by ASEAN, the grouping has taken the first tentative steps in establishing a regional financial and macro-economic surveillance process (“ASEAN Surveillance Process”, as opposed to “ASEAN Surveillance Mechanism”, which would have been too intrusive). Moreover, ASEAN members have begun to coordinate their financial policies with an annual meeting of their finance ministers.

The advent and acceleration of intrusive regionalism could have several major implications for global peace and security. In the emerging world order, regional groupings could relate (either compete or collaborate) to each other on the basis of collective identities that are defined less in terms of cultural or political similarities and more on the functional basis of interactions and mutual interventions to manage the problems of internal strife and economic globalisation. Moreover, such interactions could involve the emergence of new regional collective security systems in Europe and Latin America. Coupled with democratisation, such interactions could lead to the development of more robust “security communities” in Southeast Asia and the Southern
Because intrusive regionalism allows for deeper interaction among states and societies, they create the basis of a more robust form of regional identity. In Europe, the norms of intrusive regionalism have created the basis of a wider democratic security community that could one day extend beyond the EU. ASEAN remains an illiberal security community, but the advent of intrusive economic regionalism, if backed by incremental democratisation, has the potential to transform ASEAN from being a club of elites to a genuine regional civil society. (It is interesting to note that the strongest champions of intrusive regionalism in ASEAN (Thailand and the Philippines) are also its most liberal polities, while the most vocal critics are the most authoritarian regimes (Myanmar and Vietnam).

Caution should, however, be expressed about the pacific effects of intrusive regionalism. In Southeast Asia, the hitherto lack of intrusive regionalism has actually promoted regional order. In the Gulf, however, deviation from the doctrine of non-interference in the post-1990 period (especially in the Qatari case) has led to a weakening of regional order. Intrusive regionalism carried out without a collective purpose and without a set of agreed norms, criteria and modalities of collective action may prove highly destabilising.

**Conclusion**

This leads to some concluding points about the changing nature of regionalism and its effects on the emerging world order. Regionalism has been a protector of sovereignty in the past, especially in the Third World. Today, globalisation and changing international norms concerning humanitarian intervention are turning regionalism from being a bulwark of sovereignty to a
building block of an intrusive world order. New forms of regional identity built around intrusive regionalism could become important stepping stones to world order in the 21st century.

Around the globe, a trend towards intrusive regionalism is developing through a variety of means. In the economic sphere, macro-economic surveillance and financial monitoring have been added to the classical trade liberalisation agenda and market-driven regional investment coordination. In the political sphere, the instruments of intrusive regionalism include the development and mutual observance of norms against human rights abuses and democratic breakdowns (as in Africa and Latin America, but not in the Middle East and Asia), the demonstration effects of democratic transitions (now applicable to Southeast Asia), the development of regional human rights bodies (again, the Middle East and Asia are exceptions here), and mechanisms of humanitarian military intervention (only NATO so far, although whether NATO will develop an out-of-area humanitarian intervention role is by no means certain).

The international community remains ambivalent about the transformation of regionalism. In the past, regionalism associated with the Great Powers was rejected by Wilsonian idealists as old-fashioned balance of power geopolitics, while the conflict control role of regional organisations was seen as undermining the principle of global collective security. Today, the advent of intrusive and identity regionalism threatens to engender new forms of instability and conflict - especially in the Third World - the former by undermining the principle of non-interference that have been the key Westphalian principle of the modern state system, and the latter by creating the prospect for greater inter-regional discord and rivalry between the North and the South.

Yet, such pessimism about regionalism may be unwarranted. Despite its limitations and
dangers, regionalism remains an important tool for promoting a range of positive values and practical approaches in responding to the economic and strategic challenges of the 21st Century. In Europe, it has become the chief promoter of human rights and democracy. The Third World countries, unable and unwilling to follow European models and practices of regionalism, nonetheless recognise its potential to foster a greater decentralisation and democratisation of global institutions and regimes. Regionalism is no longer associated with a set of relatively narrow security (whether as a legalistic dispute-settlement mechanism, or as a framework for defence against a common threat) and welfare (such as trade liberalisation) goals. The end of the Cold War and the effects of globalisation have introduced a wider range of issues and actors into the discourses and practices of regional cooperation. Intrusive regionalism promises to foster greater respect for democracy and human rights in the international system. The benefits of regionalism undergoing such transformations may well outweigh its dangers and shortcomings.
1. Definitions of regionalism vary and are usually contested. I have deliberately avoided going into the various debates and controversies surrounding the definition of regionalism. For the purpose of this paper, regionalism is defined as interaction and cooperation among a group of geographically proximate countries aimed at advancing their common political, economic and strategic interests and goals. The following considerations go with this definition. Regionalism can involve both governments and civil societies. The conception of geographic proximity is loosely defined and often subject to differing interpretations. The idea of region is rarely accepted as pre-ordained and is often contested and reconstructed through interactions. The geographic space of regions are usually identified by the members of a regional group on the basis of what is most appropriate for the pursuit of their commonly held goals. Cultural similarities may be a necessary but rarely a sufficient condition for regionalism. Similarly, shared ideology, common threat perceptions, and shared political systems and values can trigger and significantly reinforce regional cooperation, but none of these are indispensable. Finally, regionalism is often but not always expressed through a formal organisation. For recent discussions of the concept of regionalism, see: Andrew Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective", in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds., Regional Organization and International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.37-73; and Peter Katzenstein, "Regionalism in Comparative Perspective", Cooperation and Conflict, vol.31, no.2 (1996), pp.123-159.


3. The genesis of this idea could be traced, ironically, to the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance prepared by the League's committee on the Reduction of Armaments in 1923, though it was never approved by the League's membership.


7. In an earlier article, I characterised this conception of regionalism as "autonomous"
regionalism, to be contrasted with the "hegemonic" regionalism associated with the Cold War alliances. See, Amitav Acharya, "Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations", Journal of Peace Research, vol.29, no.1 (January 1992), pp. 7-21. This distinction, however, dealt primarily with the regionalism of the state; this paper also recognizes the role of transnational social movements in creating what critical theorists would call “counter-hegemonic” regional coalitions.


16. Ernst B. Haas, *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Relations, 1975). Some scholars have argued that while integration became obsolete, integration studies did not. The integrationists had substantial impact on the theory of interdependence with the two sharing a the same fundamental concern: "investigations into peaceful transnational problem-solving." As Puchala points out, integration studies remained "relevant, alive, well, and quite vibrant" because its "earlier curiosities about international collaboration via transnational processes within settings of interdependence have become central concerns of International Relations. See Donald Puchala, "The Integration Theories and the Study of International Relations", in Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds., *The Global Agenda: Issues and Studies* (New York: Random House, 1984), p.198.


23. This problem was highlighted in the ECOWAS operation in Liberia which was dominated by Nigerian troops and financial support. ECOWAS as an organization was able to provide only $3 million out of the total US 50 million operation, with remainder coming mostly from Nigeria. Nigerian dominance was resented by most of ECOMOG's French-speaking members as well as Ghana. See


26. In this context, it is necessary to distinguish regionalization from regionalism. The former refers to the emergence of transnational productionl structures within a given geographic area. In East Asia, regionalization has been defined as a form of “market-driven” regionalism in which the state only plays a facilitating role. Regionalism is a more political concept, it may or may not have a material basis in transnational production.


31. Hettne and Inotai, op.cit., p.3.

32. Amitav Acharya, Human Rights in Southeast Asia: Dilemmas of Foreign Policy, Eastern Asia Policy Papers no.11 (Toronto: University of Toronto - York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1995).


For an extensive historical background to identity regionalism in Southeast Asia, see, Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).


In an earlier paper, I defined intrusive regionalism as a framework that “calls for closer interaction among members of a regional group, including mutual receptivity to early warnings about domestic developments with transnational consequences, and cooperation against such commonly faced dangers even though such cooperation may intrude into the domestic affairs of member states.”Amitav Acharya, "Realism, Institutionalism and the Asian Economic Crisis", Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.21, no.1 (April 1999), pp.1-29.


The extent to which the principles and practices of the OSCE have been “embedded” in other European multilateral institutions, especially NATO, is described in Emanuel Adler, “Seeds of Peaceful Change: the OSCE’s Security Community-Building Model”, in Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.143-47.


Acharya, "Realism, Institutionalism and the Asian Economic Crisis", op.cit.


For a discussion of the linkage between liberal democracy and security community, with particular reference to Southeast Asia, see, Amitav Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia", in Adler and Barnett, eds., Security Communities, op.cit, pp.198-227.