African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM):
Problems And Prospects of a Regional Governance Monitor

*OKE EPIA

1. INTRODUCTION

The crisis of underdevelopment plaguing Africa has elicited many a development blueprint most of which are imposed on the continent from outside. But the failure which accompanied most if not all of these prescriptions necessitated the need to look inwards and discover an internal solution to largely an internally imposed problem.
This is where the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) comes in. As an African solution to an African malaise, NEPAD is perceived as the development blueprint that will rescue the continent out of the woods. It is therefore understandable the level of interest that the blueprint and its associated components has generated. Perhaps, the most significant of these components is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which is like the yardstick with which the success or otherwise of NEPAD would be gauged and judged.
This paper examines therefore, the APRM framework with regard to its structures, processes and methodology, as well as its chances and limitations of success. It will also seek to proffer some recommendations as suggestions to policy makers, leaders and other concerned stakeholders in the light of whatever short-comings that may be identified.
The APRM is a self-monitoring mechanism acceded to voluntarily and established with the aim of fostering the adoption of policies, standards and practices that engender and promote good governance, political stability, economic growth, sustainable development and an accelerated regional integration within the African continent to enable it take due advantage of a globalizing world.
This paper argues that if implemented faithfully with minimal draw-backs, the APRM portends a good opportunity for Africa to instill confidence in its foreign development partners which have agreed to allow the continent to take the driving seat with the NEPAD idea. The problem of implementation is identified as the fundamental hitch in the way of the mechanism even though other obstacles stand in the way of an appropriate and satisfactory peer review process within the African context.
This paper employs a multi-disciplinary approach in addressing the topic including globalization theory, bureaucracy theory, political-economy, and international relations. It explains the mandate, guiding principles and objectives of the APRM; the various stages of the review process; the structure and modalities for the review, the benefits and constraints of the mechanism. The prospects and problems of the APRM will also receive attention.

2. THE APRM: OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURES OF A REVIEW PROCESS

2.1 The Concept of Peer Review 
Before examining the APRM itself, it is needful to explain the concept of peer review. Even though it is one that has not taken on a rigorous and widely acceptable definition, its meaning and connotations appear to attract some kind of consensus especially in the practice of states and organizations in the international system.
Peer review may be described as "the systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a state by other states, with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed state improve its policy making, adopt best practices, and comply with established standards and principles." The process is normally conducted on a non-adversarial basis, and it is used when states have mutual trust for each other and share a joint confidence in the process.
The use of peer review is quite popular among international organisations. For instance, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has a system of peer review under its Trade Policy Review Mechanism, the organ mandated to monitor trade policy and practice in the Member States.2 

2.2 NEPAD, Globalisation and an African Review Process
NEPAD is a development agenda informed by decades-long prevalence of political instability and underdevelopment that have plagued the continent accentuated by its peripheral position in the global economy. The courageous acceptance of part of the blames by African leaders themselves as indicated in the NEPAD conception itself tends to signify that the days of buck-passing are over and that the continent’s leaders are set to take the bull by the horn and grab the driving seat in attempts to get it out of the doldrums. While identifying the effects of colonialism, the cold war and its aftermath as well as the dynamics of the world economic system, the NEPAD idealists also owned up to the diagnosis that the inadequacies and shortcomings of leadership in the post-independence era has been a major factor in the current state of affairs.
NEPAD is a synthesis of two separate development frameworks, the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) and the OMEGA plan for Africa, both of which were being contemplated by the precursor of the African Union (AU), the Organization for African Unity (OAU), at the turn of the millennium. The NEPAD programme emanates from the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance adopted by the OAU Summit in Lusaka-Zambia in July 2001.In that declaration, African leaders restated a shared commitment to eradicate poverty and lay the ground for sustainable development by fostering stability, peace and security, democracy, constitutional rule, upholding the rule of law and good governance. 
The urgent need to position the continent so as to be able to take its due advantage from the unstoppable hand of globalization blowing across the world was a significant factor which contributed to the conception of NEPAD. To this end, the framework made the integration of Africa into the global economy and the acceleration of the empowerment of women as some of its primary objectives. The following key principles were set out as parameters for the development process: 
• Good governance;
• African leadership and ownership; 
• People-centeredness;
• Partnership between and amongst African people;
• Regional and continental integration;
• Building the competitiveness of countries and the continent;
• New international relationships;
• Linkages of NEPAD to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other agreed development goals and targets
A three- pronged strategy was outlined as the means for achieving the objectives set out above. These include putting in place the necessary conditions for sustainable development (such as peace, security and good governance); policy reforms and increased investment in priority sectors of the economy like agriculture and infrastructure; and increased mobilization of resources through means like higher rates of domestic savings and investment, attracting foreign direct investment and increasing the continent’s share of world trade.
NEPAD as a regional response to a regional malaise places priority on the harmonization of national policies and practices in order to take advantage of the economy of scale instead of continued reliance on individual national approach. This kind of regional integration it is assumed, would enable Africa inch closer to its place in the global economy. In other words, NEPAD advocates the establishment of partnerships between and among African countries and their people.
NEPAD’s focus on good governance is premised on the thinking and rightly so, that the continent’s development partners in the West would take the clamour for aid and debt relief more seriously if the leadership gets more responsible in delivering the public good. This is the major reason why the development framework has received the support and affirmation of creditor countries and development partners like multi-lateral donor and credit agencies. In addition, the NEPAD appeal to foreign capital is also due to the realization that African domestic resources need to be mobilized and indigenous entrepreneurship increased as a basis for the demand for international involvement. 
With respect to the continent’s development partners and creditors, NEPAD has tended to create a working platform for increased cooperation between the two. At the 2002 summit of the G8, developed countries affirmed their support for enduring partnerships with developing states anchored on mutual accountability and responsibility. Specifically, the meeting adopted a G8 Africa Action Plan as a basis for support of NEPAD and agreed to establish improved working relationships with countries that are able to meet up with NEPAD commitments for good political and economic governance.
In another instance,  the Canadian Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew, was reported to have suggested that countries that do not join the peer review may receive less aid from the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized countries.3 
The link between NEPAD and the international system has been furthered strengthened by United Nations General Assembly resolution 5717 of 2002 which endorsed the development framework as the strategic basis for cooperation for UN programmes in Africa. The resolution called on the global community to rally round and organize support for the continent in line with the principles and objectives of NEPAD. Also at the 4th regional consultations of UN agencies working in Africa which held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2002, a decision was adopted for the UN system to render support to the NEPAD vision by setting up thematic clusters in sectors like governance, peace and security, and humanitarian response among others.
The place of NEPAD in the international system can be understood in the light of the influence of globalization. A regime of interdependence ensures that supranational, regional and sub-regional organizations which pursue common goals based on geographical proximity, cultural, linguistic, historical, political, economic or spiritual affinities as the case may be, relate across board in their mutual interest. (Etzioni,1977). In line with this scenario, consideration must be given to the globalization context of cooperation in world system as represented by the UN and regional organizations like the AU. Essentially, the current of social policy in a global environment is invariably affected by the inter-play of conflicting interests and positions of regional organizations within the world system and even among the membership of regional organizations themselves. As Nicola Yeates (2005) argues “regional formations are an integral part of any critical assessment of the possibilities for transformative political agency in a globalization context. Indeed, they are important in their own right as sites of political struggle and contestation over the content and direction of a social policy that is attuned to the traditions, interests, and needs of member countries and their populations.”4 Having put the discussion in a background context, focus will now shift to the African peer review process.
The APRM is a compliance barometer that monitors the adherence of African states to the core objectives and principles of NEPAD. It is a voluntary mechanism to which states accede for the purpose of allowing themselves to be reviewed by other states. According to the formulation of the APRM base document its primary purpose is to “foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practices, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building”5 
The core objectives of APRM include fostering policy dialogue among participating countries; promoting transparency; capacity – building; facilitating mutual learning process and exchange of best practices; and monitoring compliance with agreed norms and standards. 
As at time of writing, 24 of the 53-member countries of the AU have voluntarily acceded to the APRM framework. Four countries namely, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius and Rwanda have begun the process of being reviewed having administered APRM questionnaires and hosted the Country Support Mission [CSM]. The reports on Ghana and Rwanda were presented at the APR Forum held in Abuja, June this year. 
Four key areas have been identified for the peer review process. These are: democracy and   political governance; economic governance and management; corporate governance; and socio-economic development.6

2.3 Structure of the APRM
The peer review mechanism is made up of a series of country reviews, directed and supervised by a seven-member Panel of Eminent Persons which duty is primarily to ensure the integrity and credibility of the process. While the activities of the panel are coordinated by a secretariat, the country reviews are conducted by a Country Review Team which comprise of at least one member from the panel and one competent specialist for each of the four governance areas of review 
A review exercise usually takes place within 18 months of a country’s accession to the APRM after which provision is made for a periodic review which takes place every two to four years. There could also be a specially requested review by a member country for its own reasons or one instituted by participating Heads of State in response to early signs of looming political or economic crisis as a demonstration of brotherhood to the government concerned. 
The APRM Guidelines indicates the areas of responsibilities for a participating country’s government. These are: signing the APRM Memorandum of Understanding; contributing fully to the funding of the APRM; developing a national programme of action; and ensuring the participation of all stakeholders in the process.
The process begins with a preliminary phase undertaken by a Country Support Mission as a precursor to the actual peer review. Before this however, there is a visit from the APR secretariat by a Country Review Team. During this visit, a desk- based background paper on the country as well as a Country Self-Assessment (CSA) and Preliminary Programme of Action (PPoA) by the country concerned is prepared. The purpose of the visit is to secure the “widest possible range of consultations with the government, officials, political parties, parliamentarians and representatives of civil society organizations including the media, academia, trade unions, business and professional bodies”7
After the consultations a draft country report is compiled. This report will normally include an account of the applicable political, economic and corporate governance and socio-economic development commitments made in the PPoA; an identification of any weaknesses; and a recommendation on further actions that should be included in the final Programme of Action.8 
However, before any action is taken on the draft report, it is first brought to the attention of the government concerned to verify the accuracy of the information and provide it with an opportunity to respond formally. Whatever response given is appended to the visiting team’s report and then sent to the APR secretariat, the panel of eminent persons and the forum of participating heads of state and government.
What the CSA document requires is that a country to be reviewed “carefully assess its own situation through a broad participatory process led by the government that results in a programme of action with time-bound objectives to guide all stakeholders in the actions required by government, the private sector and civil society to achieve the country’s vision”9 On the strength of the CSA, the PPoA and the secretariat’s background paper, an Issues Paper will be drawn up by the secretariat which will guide the actual country review process. 
The last stage of the APRM process is a formal presentation of the country report in key structures and institutions at the regional and sub-regional levels including the Regional Economic Commission to which the country belongs, the Pan-African Parliament, and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights. In summary, the APRM will be managed in five stages as follows. 
- Study and preparation of National Programme of Action by the participating country
- Country Visit by the APR Panel mission
- Preparation of the Country Mission Team’s report
- Submission of the report to the NEPAD Heads of State Implementation Committee.
- Six months after the report has been considered by NEPAD Head of State Implementation Committee (HSGIC) the report will be released for Public and Regional consideration within Regional Parliaments and Civil Society networks.

The APRM base documents take care to make certain key points in the country report. The report must indicate for instance, the requisite will on the part of the government to take necessary decisions and measures as conceived in the PPoA; the resources required to take corrective measures; the quantum of resources the government in question can mobilize domestically; as well as the duration of the process of rectification as can be enabled with available resources and what could be mobilized in record time.
APRM Guidelines make a subtle reference to imposition of sanctions by peers on governments that refuse to mobilize the political will to initiate required changes as set out in the report. This could be in the form of putting the government involved “on notice of their collective intention to proceed with appropriate measures within a given time frame.”10 However, this is like a last resort because the guidelines stipulate that the short-coming will be sought to be addressed through constructive dialogue with the erring government as well as the provision of technical and other appropriate assistance. 

2.4 Prospects and Problems
Why should states participate in APRM? What are the motivations and gains? In attempting answers to these questions, the prospects of the process may be understood. In other words, the benefits countries stand to gain by acceding to the review are brought to light by the prospects of the process itself.
One of the gains states that sign up are expected to derive is the promise of accessibility to assistance from foreign development partners especially and support from peer partners. As the APRM guideline explains it will be “incumbent upon participating governments to provide what assistance they can, as well as to urge donor governments and agencies to also come to the assistance of the country reviewed.”11 What this means is that signing up and participating in the APRM is a prerequisite to accessing technical and financial developmental assistance from within and outside the continent. 
Another reason why states may accede to the mechanism is the possibility and perhaps, inevitability of using reports of the review as a guide for foreign investment destinations in Africa. In other words, foreign capital with little or no knowledge at all about the investment climate in African countries may have recourse to the APRM as an evaluative device to determine preferred investment and aid destinations. This would be the case if and when initial reviews enjoy technical correctness and credibility such that information as to which countries are committing themselves to good governance and favourable investment environment. This may explain why the process emphasizes the need for competent and credible reviews that are devoid of the influence of manipulation from the political class.12
The implication is that the demand for foreign investment by African states may become accepted when they sign up to APRM and thereby become eligible to receive patronage from developed countries. There is no doubt that the continent really needs investment and increased trade to help it get out of its underdevelopment difficulties. Indeed, the argument of radical scholars for more trade in place of aid for Africa can materialize if and when the pre-requisites of good governance and a convenient investment environment put in place. And this is what the APRM can achieve if properly administered.
But this is where certain fundamental questions arise. Can a credible and independent peer review framework work in Africa? What are the obstacles militating the success of the APRM?
Quite a number of research and commentary have raised doubts over the implementation of the process in the manner envisaged to bring about the benefits inherent in the framework.
First of all, the predominant involvement of governments of the states in the review process has raised a big question mark. By the APRM guidelines, even though provision has been made for the participation of civil society and other checks put in place, the fact that governments still have to drive the process threatens the credibility expected of it. And when some of these governments are led by leaders whose antecedence and penchant for misrule, undemocratic and bad governance speak loudly, there may be serious cause to worry. If a peer review process expected to disinfect the political elite of its undemocratic ethos is still government-led, it questions the transparency, accountability and capacity of the review process to transform the political leaders into democrats both in thought and action (Omoweh, 2005). Concerns have also been raised that a process predominantly controlled by government may end up producing reviews that suffer from lack of independence and credibility and eventually may become propaganda tools of the government (Kajee).
There is even the fundamental issue of controversial electoral processes on which back some of these governments rise to power. If a government comes to office through a discredited election can such a government be expected to submit itself to a sincere review that would expose its underbelly? In Nigeria, the 2003 general elections produced the current President Olusegun Obasanjo administration in controversial circumstances. According to independent reports, “both Nigeria’s federal and state elections in 2003 and local government elections in 2004 were marred by serious incidents of violence, which left scores dead and many others injured. The scale of the violence and intimidation, much of which went unreported, called into question the credibility of these elections.”13
The case of Zimbabwe is perhaps a more appropriate reference. Although she has not acceded to the APRM, could the structure be depended upon to stand up to President Robert Mugabe if his country was found wanting as is the case in recent times?
But as has been observed, the fact that the APRM is subscribed to voluntarily by countries has raised the question as to whether or not the process can garner sufficient muscle to flog states into the line of governance modules set as benchmarks envisaged for Africa to be integrated into the global economy (Verwey). The argument advanced is that the process will be bereft of the verve and driving force needed for a sustainable and result-oriented mechanism where it is opposed to elite interests which are often similar across the countries of the continent. 
The use of elite theory to explain this fearful possibility is given further clarity by Omoweh and Boom in their work on democracy in Nigeria (Omoweh, Boom, 2005). The use of the concept of blocked democracy by whereby Africa’s political elite has not made democratization its agenda in the first place talkless of democracy being hampered, enriches the argument that the priority of self interest over and above the general good by the political class would in no small measure hinder genuine efforts for any objective and credible review exercise. This is especially so because the leadership class in the continent is largely governed by one and the same intrinsic self-interest which drives the pursuit and coveting of political power for the over-riding objective of accumulation of wealth (ibid). And that when the need arises, the continent’s leaders would rise up in defence of one another as the case of Zimbabwe readily illustrates. The large-scale electoral irregularities which brought President Mugabe to the office he has held since that country gained political independence since 1980, and was greeted with a somewhat conspiratorial acquiescence by the majority of African leaders and the seemingly helplessness of the AU is a negation of the declared preparedness of the continent to promote good political governance.
As observed by Ian Taylor, “The self-interest of African elites under threat from democracy (linked surreptitiously in their eyes to notions of good governance) should not be played down. Nor should notions of solidarity and resentment at perceived ‘neo-imperialist’ interference in the affairs of fellow African countries”14
An important point needed to be made is that when a lot is placed on the laps of governments, the possibility of bureaucratic bottlenecks stalling the expedition of the process cannot be ruled out. In Nigeria for instance, the Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF) serves as the national focal point for APRM particularly as it relates to the different arms and tiers of the federal government; while the Office of the Head of Service of the federation coordinates all APRM activities within the entire public service. This seemingly large bureaucratic organogram attached to the APRM process in Nigeria is a ready obstacle in a country where red-tapism and inefficiency hold sway in the civil service.15
It has been argued that some of countries that have acceded to the peer review mechanism are ravaged by poor governance accentuated by corruption and over-centralisation of political and economic power in the hands of a few. Against this background, Herbert takes the argument a step further by saying it would be wrong to assume that these governments will be motivated by good faith in the exercise. Accordingly, “a rigorous peer review will, therefore, have to confront states that deny what is patently obvious: that the leadership knowingly violates the rules for self-enrichment”16
Herbert also makes a point about funding and logistics inadequacy as factors that could hinder the effectiveness of the peer review.17 At the first summit of the Committee of APRM participating Heads of State and Government in 2004, the leaders proposed and unanimously approved for each participating country to contribute a minimum of US$ 100,000 towards the running of the APRM as a matter of urgency.18 The question is how many of the 24 countries can make this payment? If we consider that one of the factors responsible for the failure of the defunct OAU was lack of adequate funding occasioned by non-remittance of countries’ dues then one may begin to imagine what would become the result of the APRM if funding source is hinged on the countries.
But since one may only bother about compliance with the review process with countries that have signed to the APRM, then there is nothing anyone may do about states that have refused to join the train. In other words, the voluntary nature of the process seems to be one of the undoing of the mechanism which ultimately undermines the overall objectives of NEPAD. In this regard, Kajee in explaining why some countries have failed to sign up to APRM argues that where leadership failure is prevalent, it would be detrimental for such states to submit themselves to be peer reviewed.19
Kajee also explores the point that some countries may have with-held participation from APRM because of suspicion associated with the process that it may lead to erosion of national sovereignty.20 
Another problem of the APRM is the place and role of civil society in the process. Civil society is important in the scheme of things in order to at least minimize if not totally eliminate, the possibility of government influence and manipulation in the exercise. This is due to its place as a watchdog on political leadership. This in essence gives greater credence to the reports and results of the process. Therefore, the participation of civil society in the process presents a higher chance of having a consensus of views held by the populace on the vital elements of review like governance and socio-economic growth and development. But civil society participation in the process is hampered by certain factors including lack of adequate awareness of the process itself, lack of capacity to discharge the roles expected of it, and the possibility of cooption by the governments of countries being reviewed. In Kenya however, there is an example of the influence of civil society in the process. It was reported last month that the country’s final report was rejected by experts who insisted it did not reflect the voice of the majority of Kenyans. Kenya signed on the APRM last year.21 
Another problem the monitoring process may face is the lack of access to information in many African countries. It is granted that where there is no access to information very little progress can be made with respect to any effective review. This fear has led human rights and press-related organizations to raise an alarm over the lack of access to information in many African countries. Five organisations, including the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), the International Press Institute (IPI), the Inter American Press Association (IAPA) and the World Press Freedom Committee (WPFC), have expressed this concern and how it may impede the peer review process and the objectives of NEPAD' generally. In a letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the groups draw attention to the fact that the APRM guidelines omitted the fostering of free and independent news media in African countries as a key indicator in the review process.22

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper has examined the concept of peer reviews, the APRM and its parent framework, NEPAD. Basically, it has examined the prospects and hurdles facing the implementation of the review process. Among the obstacles identified are the place and role of governments in the process, the ill-preparedness of civil society as a watchdog on leadership, the lack of unfettered access to information, the problem of funding and the problem of common interest of the leadership class in Africa.
It was argued that if properly and faithfully implemented, the APRM would go a long way in instilling confidence on NEPAD and ultimately help in helping Africa get out of the wood of underdevelopment.
In the light of the following, it is important to empower and involve the civil society as much as possible in the process while the role and influence of government be reduced substantially. Access to information is also very important in the process, thus governments of the continent should endeavour to institute freedom of information regimes in their countries. It is pertinent to state that these recommendations are offered as a stimulant to further debate on the topic.

*Oke Epia is currently rounding up a Masters degree programme in International Law and Diplomacy at the University of Lagos, Nigeria. A practicing journalist based in Lagos, his interests centre on Development and International Political Economy.

FOOTNOTES

1-( http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/1/1959679.pdf)
2-  ibid
3- Africa Recovery, Vol.16 #4, February 2003, p.10
4- Nicola Yeates, “Globalisation” and Social Policy in a Development Context: Regional Responses, Social Policy and Development Paper No. 18, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, April 2005, P. 6
5- ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism’ par. 3
6- ‘Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)’ par. 1.12
7- Guidelines for countries to prepare for and to participate in the APRM’ par. 22
8- ibid. 
9- Country Self-Assessment for the African Peer Review Mechanism’ par. 1.1.4
10- Guidelines’ par. 26
11- Guidelines to prepare for and to participate in the APRM’ par.26)
12- The African Peer Review Mechanism’ par. 4
13- Human Rights Watch, Nigeria’s 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledged Violence, 2004, p.1
14- Ian Taylor, Zimbabwe and the death of NEPAD, p.3
15- The Federal Government is currently embarking on an ambitious programme of civil service reforms
16- Ross Herbert, Becoming my brother’s keeper’ p.9
17- ibid
18-  http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/nepad/aprmcomfeb04.pdf.
19-  Ayesha Kajee quoted in ‘A Challenging Road Ahead for the Peer Review Mechanism
20- ibid
21- The East African Standard (Nairobi) September 2, 2005
22- http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/64243/

REFERENCES

Dan Omoweh, The Feasibility of African Peer Review Mechanism [APRM] in Nigeria, 2005)

Ayesha Kajee, ‘Nepad’s APRM: A Progress Report, Practical Limitations and Challenges

Nepad and Civil Society Participation in the APRM Prepared by Len Verwey

Blocked Democracy in Africa: Experiment with Democratization in Nigeria, 1999-2003, 2005

Bennett L.A, International Organisations: Principles and Issues (4th ed), New Jersey, 1977, Englewood.

Etzioni M.M, The Majority of One: Towards a Theory of Regional Compatibility, Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications 1970