Paper for CSGR Conference: “Regionalization and the Taming of Globalization”, 
Warwick University, 26-28 October, 2005. 
[Panel Session 1 — African Regionalism 1, Thursday 27 October, 11.30-13.00.]

Civil Society and Regionalization in Southern Africa*

Fredrik Söderbaum

Department of Peace and Development Research
Göteborg University (Padrigu) 
& UNU/CRIS
E-mail: f.soderbaum@padrigu.gu.se

Abstract

Most theories of regionalism tend to neglect civil society. In contrast, this paper shows that civil societies in Southern Africa are neither powerless nor simply ‘national’ and subject to state policies. Civil society is extending its field of competence every day and increasingly engaged in various forms of regionalization activities. This paper analyses the ongoing civil society regionalization in Southern Africa that has intensified since the late 1990s, particularly in sectors such as the social economic justice and debt, trade, health, democracy and human rights, trade unions, environment, and research. Using and developing the lenses of the new regionalism approach (NRA), the paper highlights the pluralism and paradoxes within civil society as well the complex relations between civil societies and Southern African governments, on the one hand, and between civil societies and external actors (states, aid agencies and INGOs) on the other. 

1. Introduction

‘Regionalism’ has become an academic growth industry. There seems to be a never-ending number of studies dealing with most regions from a wide range of theoretical standpoints. Most of this research is refreshing and contributes to a deeper understanding of regional processes. Notwithstanding, there continues to be important gaps in the research field. One such gap is the role of civil society in the process of regionalization. In fact most theories in the field neglect civil society, due to an exaggerated concern states, markets and regional organizations. Looking at the debate, civil society regionalization does not appear to exist, or at least have very little influence on regional affairs. This is unfortunate, because as this paper will reveal, civil society is a dynamic force also on the regional level.
The first step towards better understanding of civil society regionalization is to sharpen the theoretical and conceptual framework. Contrary to some leading theorists, civil society is not simply a counter-hegemonic force in the context of globalization. There is a need to go beyond such mainly normative positions and also analyse the contradictions and power relations within civil society regionalization as well as analyse the relationship between civil society-states and civil society-external actors (states, aid agencies and INGOs). 
After the framework, the next section draws attention to the pluralism but also paradoxes of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa, highlighting the diversity of actors and sectors of cooperation but also paradoxes and conflicts of interest. The two following sections analyzes the rather complex relationships between civil societies and states, on the one hand, and civil societies and external actors on the other hand. Finally, a conclusion rounds up the chapter. 

2. Theorizing regionalization and civil society

Mainstream and rationalist schools of regionalism — such as neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and regional economic integration — have had a profound impact on the research field. Given the impressive research output of these schools of regionalism, there is in general very few studies on civil society regionalization. Interest groups were of course theorized in neofunctional theories but tend to receive less attention in more recent liberal regionalist theories. 
During the last decade a series of critical and reflectivist approaches have been developed for the study of regionalism, some of the most distinct being the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) and the World Order Approach (WOA). The critical approaches challenge the mainstream theories on a number of fronts, such as (i) research methodology; (ii) what are the key research questions; (iii) that regionalism is mainly happening in Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific; (iv) that regionalism is primarily driven through formal supranational or intergovernmental regional frameworks; (v) who are regionalizing actors (and their motives); and (vi) the outcomes and impact of regionalism. 
The NRA and the WOA share several other common features. Both approaches view economic globalization as strong and highly uneven process, and both seek to reveal power relations behind this grand process. However, and this is a crucial distinction, whereas the WOA sees today’s regionalism primarily as a manifestation of economic globalization and prevailing forms of hegemony along neoliberal principles, the NRA is more enthusiastic about the regional phenomenon, and also sees it as a political force: ‘the return of the political’. This has far-reaching consequences for the way civil society regionalization is perceived. Whereas the WOA is mainly concerned with states-led regionalist projects (and to a lesser extent, civil societies as domestic actors within particular state-society complexes), the NRA works with a triangle of regionalizing actors, broadly grouped in terms of states (governments), markets (business) and civil societies. Here it is also worth recognising that the NRA suggests that not only economic but also social and cultural regional networks and projects are anticipated to develop more quickly than the formal states-led regionalist projects (Hettne, 1999).
Some key theorists in the NRA camp, such as Björn Hettne and James Mittelman, underscore the Polanyian ideas about the political role of civil society as a means for the weak and the poor to protect themselves. They particularly refer to the counter-hegemonic and transformative role of civil society regionalization, such as the pro-democracy forces, the women’s movement, the environmentalists. This is the counter-hegemonic regionalism that the WOA laments but sees no empirical evidence of. According to Mittelman (2000: 225), ‘At the end of the day, the possibilities and limitations of transformative regionalism rest on the strength of its links to civil society.’ In a rather similar vein, Marianne Marchand draws attention to the regionalization of civil society in North America, as a counter-force against the ‘hyperliberal’ NAFTA; the former representing ‘the best of the new regionalism’ and the latter ‘the worst of the new regionalism’ in North America (Marchand, 2001).  
However, the posture of this paper is that civil societies are not necessarily contributing to counter-hegemonic or transformative regionalism. It seems that Hettne’s and Mittelman’s claims of counter-hegemonic and transformative civil society reflect their own deep dissatisfaction with neoliberal globalization and a wish to discover a response that may stand behind it. However, the picture is more complex than so, and the theory and methodology of civil society regionalism needs to be further developed in order to be able to reflect empirical outcomes rather than normative desires. Furthermore, we also need a framework which is not biased in favour of Western context and notions of civil society, but also accounts for different state forms, including the African state. 
There is a rich variety of definitions and meanings of ‘civil society’ (Scholte, 2000, 2002). Often it is loosely defined as the public realm and the associational life existing between the state and the private. From this perspective civil society is seen as an arena where different associations and interest groups can express their interests and engage with the state. Although it is not always conceptualized in this way, civil society is generally considered to be distinct from the state. Furthermore, some conceptualizations, such as for instance Hegel’s nineteenth-century definition included the market, but this contrasts with much of contemporary notions, which tend to treat civil society as a non-profit sector (Scholte, 2002: 146). 
Civil society is here defined as ‘a political space where voluntary associations deliberately seek to shape the rules that govern one or the other aspect of social life’ (Scholte, 2002: 146). It includes a rich variety of actors and voluntary associations, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations, interests groups, trade unions, social movements, faith-based organizations, academic institutions, clan and kinship circles, lobbies, youth associations, development cooperation initiatives and more. The active political orientation is an important ingredient in this definition (Scholte, 2002: 147). As a consequence, those voluntary associations that do not try to shape policies, norms or structures in society are excluded, for instance service NGOs or recreational clubs. Likewise, it excludes both profit-seeking actors as well as political parties since these have a quest for political power.
One of the major reasons why civil society in Africa is misunderstood is the fact that Western political thought has dominated the debate on the topic. A great deal of civil society research is based on the notion that civil society operates and consolidates on a ‘national’ basis (state-civil society interaction on the domestic level). This notion needs to be transcended both in order to escape the western bias and in order to accommodate the changes of world order and politics. As Scholte explains:
In earlier Lockean, Kantian, Hegelian and Gramscian formulations, ‘civil society’ related to western politics in a national context. However, talk of civil society today circulates all over the world and is sometimes applied to political practices (like kinship networks in Africa and so-called Civic Fora at the local level in Thailand) that derive largely from non-western traditions. Moreover, in contemporary politics civil society associations often operate in regional and global spheres as well as local and national arenas. Conceptions of ‘civil society’ need to be recast to reflect these changed circumstances. (Scholte, 2002: 147)   
In other words, civil society is not hermetically sealed form the external environment. On the contrary, civil society activities at different levels tend to be tightly connected. There can be competition between activities at different levels, but what happens on one level is not necessarily an obstacle to activities on another level. Instead, civil society regionalism may occur in order to achieve goals that otherwise cannot be achieved or as a means to strengthen national goals. The multiplicity of interactions between national, regional and other transnational level interactions will be further analyzed in this paper. 
Furthermore, the framework developed here seeks to transcend the conventional conceptualization and proposition (especially in Western and liberal thinking) of civil society as open, autonomous and engaging in a constructive dialogue with the state (for the mutual benefit of society as a whole). Building on critical foundation in the NRA there is instead a need to problematize civil society (as well as state action), and embrace a theoretical perspective that allows that civil society may contain within itself a series of paradoxes and conflicts. What on the surface may appear to be egalitarian ‘civil society behaviour’ may not always prove to be so in a deeper assessment. Civil society actors may be involved in complex, rather than simple and straightforward, relationships with other types of actors, which blur the distinctions between civil society actors, states, and private market actors. At the same time, it is evident that external actors play an important role in the promotion of civil societies in Africa, a powerful role that does not seem to be the case in civil societies the West (Howell, 2000). Therefore we need to devote particular attention to the links between civil societies and other regional and external actors.
In addition, what on the surface appear to be civil society is not necessarily contributing to shaping the rules that govern social life. Civil society is by no means homogenous, harmonious or automatically contributing to the common good and a democratic order, which tends to be postulated in much of western thought. The argument put forward here is that civil society activities in Africa have to be situated in the context of the nature of the post-colonial state in Africa. One of the dominating frameworks for understanding contemporary African politics is in terms of the utilization of patrimonial power rather than as the performance of legitimacy drawn from the sovereign will of the people (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, 1999). According to this perspective, African politics progresses informally between patron and client along lines of political reciprocity, is intensely personalised and is not generally exercised on behalf of the public good. Hence the exercise of personalised exchange, clientelism and corruption has been internalised and constitutes an essential operating code for politics in Africa, regardless of if we are talking about state elites, minor bureaucrats or civil society. 
The point is that structural adjustment and neoliberal reform programmes have eroded the ability of elites to use the state as a resource to supply their patronage networks. This has resulted in the deepening of corruption as office holders have sought alternative resource flows but it has also influenced the civil society industry, particularly as donors are keen to build this up as a alternative source for resources. In this sense, the civil society industry is intimately connected to the function of the state and the neopatrimonial logic. This in turn has the effect that the dramatic increase in the number and activities of NGOs and civil society organizations in Southern Africa is at least partly a reflection not of civil society as increase in democratic pluralism but rather strategic reactions by state and non-state actors to a situation where the state has been eroded and shrunk, and therefore alternative survival strategies have to constructed. 

3. Civil society regionalization in Southern Africa: evolution and paradoxes

Civil society regionalization in Southern Africa is complex and multifold. The processes are fluid, dynamic, heterogeneous, and take many different shapes, depending on who are the involved actors, their capacities and the particular nature of the sector. Regional cooperation and regional networking amongst civil society actors arise in a wide range of different fields, but are particularly evident in the fields of social and economic justice; debt and structural adjustment; trade and globalization; human rights and law; health and HIV/Aids; food security; student associations; trade unions; and regional research and education networks (Söderbaum, 2004; Prodder, 1998; Odén, 2000). Table 1 (appendix) shows a select list of regional civil society networks and organizations in Southern Africa and some of the most frequent sectors of cooperation.
There are no simple answers to why civil society cooperation arise on the regional level. Some of the motives for civil society cooperation are manifest, and relatively easy to grasp, such as: 
• creation of knowledge, discussion and learning
• policy-formulation
• collection and sharing of information
• advocacy, lobbying, coalition-building, joint monitoring
• solution and management of cross-border and common issues
• economies of scale, joint pooling of resources, rationalization of activities, and sometimes provision of funds
• capacity-building, organization-strengthening, institution-building, training and human resource development
• adherence to the norms of ‘regionalism’ and/or a ‘shared’ identity
• meeting donor demands or guidelines, and in order to attract donor funding (this dimension will be elaborated upon in detail below).

Civil society actors organize themselves in a wide range of different forms of organizations. There is no space to go into detail about the different organizational forms. Suffice it to make an analytical distinction along a continuum ranging from loose and open associations and networks, to increasingly more institutionalized and centralized organizations and projects (cf. Söderbaum, 2004). Many activities are rather loosely organized in ‘networks’ and programmes, and many of the emerging networks are interlinked, often being networks of other networks. Often rather loose and open-ended institutional and organizational structures constitute the starting point for regional cooperation and interaction. But as cooperation moves on, it may often become more organized and institutionalized. This means that one organizational form can be replaced by another when cooperation intensifies. According to the coordinator of the Eastern and Southern African Economic Justice Network: ‘the initial challenge was to build networks … and now we start to emphasize building better cooperation and agree on what it should be used for’. In some cases a loosely organized ‘network’ fulfils the needs and demands of participants while in other cases the network may gradually be strengthened. If and when participants manage to agree on a common agenda and strive towards a common goal, then the networks may get institutionalized and organized. Some networks group an extremely heterogeneous group of members, coming from a range of different backgrounds and sectors. As will be elaborated below, this is often the case of the resistance movements, whereas other networks may be grouping ‘national’ chapters and perform more functional duties. 
But there is certainly no linear process towards increased civil society regional cooperation, and certainly no linear process towards deeper institutionalization. Conflicts of interests and paradoxes appear on many different levels, within civil society in the relationships to other actors (states and external actors). For instance, there may be competition and contradictions between activities on the ‘national’ level and regional cooperation. Some NGOs have difficulty understanding what is the use of regional cooperation, ‘because we work with different national issues … there is not always something to learn’ or ‘there is not yet a common thing that brings all of us together’. As one network-builder puts it:  ‘we must emphasize … what the regional is good for and should do … the problem is that it is difficult to measure the benefit and impact of regional cooperation’.An official at the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) claims that many trade unions in Southern Africa are too weak and not radical and anti-capitalist enough, and therefore they are not very worthwhile to cooperate with. 
On the other hand, there are several examples whereby similar national experiences in fact create a common ground for evolving regional cooperation. For instance, one civil society actor argues that the experience of structural adjustment and debt is rather uniform throughout the region, which has led to a dramatic increase in regional cooperation and regional networking in Southern Africa in this field. Another representative explains that before meeting with other CSOs in the region there was no clear idea what was or could be a common interest, but there was nevertheless a feeling of ‘community’ and that the CSOs from various countries had many things in common and ‘ought to cooperate’. The same regionalizing actor argues that mutual interests are formed in the process of interaction, and ‘as we become more “regional” new challenges may come up’. It is particularly interesting to note that the attitude towards increased regional cooperation can change in the process of interaction: ‘… I think we have ‘adjusted’ to our partners … This naturally must have to happen within a network … we have a better understanding of the region today … [and are] more accommodative of what is happening in the region … I have changed, I have now a sense of being involved in the region … and [am] more aware of the region.’  Hence, we are witnessing a process of civil society cooperation, but at the same time there are conflicts of interests.
The paradoxes and conflicts within civil society are also further exaggerated by, for instance, competition for power, status and control, exclusion, personal rivalries (which is related to the nature of neopatrimonialism and African politics). More on this in the next section. It also needs saying that civil society activities may be related to various personal interests and the search for economic profit (hence actually lack the ambition to influence politics). As an example, what on surface is claimed to be civil society can in reality be more of a business strategy. The CRIAA Southern Africa-Development & Consulting (CRIAA SA-DC) is an example. The representative of this so called NGO argued the organization formed part of civil society but at the same time it wanted to be seen as a professional consultancy firm, defined in a regional fashion and riding on the wave of regionalism. Other companies are defined as non-profit organizations, for instance, the Southern African Non-Governmental Organization Network (SANGONeT), but are best understood as service providers and have no specific goal to influence norms in society. Although the label NGOs is correct they should not be seen as representatives of civil society as defined in this study. These types of more commercially oriented NGOs and consultancy firms are seldom detrimental, but there is not much that distinguishes them from ordinary business organizations. 

4. Civil societies and states: cooptation, consent, resistance 

The relationships between states (governments) and civil societies need to be problematized and nuanced. The state does not play an identical role in all societies, and the extent of its intervention in economy and society varies a great deal, resulting in different relationships between the states and civil societies. Needless to say, some CSOs do have (relative) autonomy from the state, but other CSOs have very close relationships with the state. Sometimes it is even difficult to distinguish between the two, which is closely related to the nature of the neopatrimonial African state. It is, for instance, a common strategy for governments to set up research institutes and think-tanks that more than anything else serve as extended arms or fronts for the government. They never criticize their government, but rather seek to legitimize its activities, even in situations where they are authoritarian or even illegal. In many countries in Southern Africa NGO-activities are not seldom carried out by relatives of family members of the ruling political elites. The NGO may exist for purposes of charity but questions of how their loyalty and the way these NGOs relate to the government can be of crucial importance for understanding the logic at play. 
One important example is the NGO set up by then President Chiluba to debate his (unconstitutional) third term as President. There are many other organizations that needs to be critically assessed, for instance in Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho, where many NGOs are headed by daughters/wives/relatives of the ruling elite. As Ian Taylor points out, ‘if you or anyone else was to look at a NGO in Botswana, the first thing you need to find out is: who is the head and the leading office-holders in the NGO?’ This is not the same as saying that every NGO is intertwined with the government. Even if there are strong links, this does not always stop these NGOs from criticizing the government. However, the strong links to government, often on a personal or family basis, tend to result in a very special relationship, whereby both protect one another. One example of this is Ditshwanelo, a human rights NGO in Botswana, which is headed by a daughter of the ex-foreign minister and at one point was confrontational about how the treatment of the San people, but then at the Durban conference on racism the organization kept a very low profile and said nothing about this. Afterwards this was debated in Botswana, but a widely held stance was that Ditshwanelo did not want to embarrass Botswana on the international scene.
The different relationships between governments and civil societies at the national level have created some obstacles to cooperation between civil society actors coming from different backgrounds. Some civil society organizations tend to work closely with their governments, whereas others oppose the ruling regime’s attempts at national integration and national consolidation (cf. Monga, 1999: 77). Civil society regionalism in the field of human rights is one such sector. Some participants argue for instance that the national chapter in Botswana are too close to government, which has prevented cooperation with other participants who want to take a more critical stance towards their governments. 
Several governments and intergovernmental regional organizations, such as the SADC, make proud proclamations about how good they are at involving civil societies in the process of regionalization. The SADC Treaty stipulates that:
SADC shall seek to involve fully, the people of the Region and non-governmental organisations in the process of regional integration. … SADC shall co-operate with, and support the initiatives of the peoples of the Region and non-governmental organisations, contributing to the objectives of this Treaty in the areas of co-operation in order to foster closer relations among the communities, associations and people of the Region. (SADC, 1992 §23)
The weakness is that these proclamations are fulfilled only to a very limited extent. The SADC governments are supportive only of the non-controversial and non-critical sections of civil society and the broader NGO-sector, particularly those who want the SADC governments to provide the means and strategy for regionalism. As one representative of the chambers of business stated, ‘our leaders have decided on the formation of a SADC, and therefore it is our “responsibility” to contribute to that aim…’ This is undoubtedly a rather weak foundation on which to build regional cooperation. 
There are civil society actors who organize themselves at the SADC level, for instance within the SADC Forum of NGOs. This strategy is supposed to provide access to governments and facilitate advocacy on the SADC level. The coordinator of the EJN anticipates that there will be closer discussion between governments and civil societies on a regional level in the future.The Southern African Network of Aids Service Organization (SANASO) is another example of a civil society organization that is fully determined to liaise with governments. This network has defined its field of operations to the SADC level, first and foremost because this enables them to interact and lobby governments on a clearly defined regional level. As a consequence, the SANASO participates and wants a strengthened SADC Forum of NGOs. In addition to that, at SANASO’s annual meeting in 2000 it was agreed that its objective is to get a seat or observer status in the SADC health sector coordinating unit — which if it happens would be an ‘extraordinary success’. 
Many other CSO representatives are more cautious, and anticipate that interactions between governments and civil society may or may not increase on the SADC level. One CSO representative argued that we have to ‘wait and see’; in case political cooperation within SADC becomes more important, but also more responsive to civil society than is the case today, then NGOs can quickly respond, mobilize and organize in order to be able work and relate with governments at a regional level.
As indicated above, there are significant obstacles towards better interaction and dialogue between states and civil society organizations both at the national and at the regional level. Many of the representatives of CSOs interviewed for this study felt excluded from states-led frameworks. They argue that the highly stated proclamations, for instance by SADC leaders, about the need to involve civil society is only to be seen as ‘lip-service’. In fact, many CSOs (especially in sectors such as social economic justice, debt and trade) are critical of their own governments. According to one anonymous interviewee, ‘the political elite in [our country]  … is only concerned with survival and their own self-interest, therefore there exists no systematic foreign policy … the main concern is how to mobilize aid and resources’. 
The governments refuse to interact with the more critical sections of civil society, often claiming that they are anti-state, anti-nationalist and (as will be discussed below) to a very large extent foreign-driven/funded. It is also that they tend to go against the traditional and patrimonial character of state-society relations. Hence, the more critical NGOs tend to threaten the basis of power in many African states, so state leaders either buy them off, own them, stifle them or simply crush them. 
Regarding the crushing of civil society it is a fact that important parts of factions of civil society feel harassed. The deputy secretary general of the South African Communist Party (SACP), Jeremy Cronin, is straightforward on the problems facing members of civil society in Southern Africa:
When Alec Erwin, minister of trade and industry, negotiates with Zimbabwe around the free trade issue, for example, he takes Cosatu with him. This embarrasses Robert Mugabe who has trouble finding trade unionists that have not been beaten up (Global Dialogue, October 1997: 7).
	There is a clear tendency by the SADC leaders to try to make civil society conform with top-down policies rather than promote civil societies on their own terms, or simply exclude and counteract those actors who are critical or seek change. A radical and counter-hegemonic civil society regionalism is now occurring in a range of sectors, such as social and economic justice, human rights, environment, and peace-building (Mittelman, 2000; Niemann, 2000; MacLean, 2003). One rather active CSO, the MWENGO, operates in both Eastern and Southern Africa, and seeks to promote closer links and dialogue with the SADC, as a way to access governments and facilitate advocacy. MWENGO has organized NGO meetings parallel to the SADC Summit. The fundamental problem is that many ruling regimes and the SADC as an organization refuse to interact with certain CSOs. The MWENGO has had some chances to interact but in general the states and SADC are much more exclusionary towards those groups in civil society that are not closely connected to governments or have a more critical stance. 
But the critical and radical sections of civil society must be problematized. As stated earlier in this paper, the official commitment to ‘transformation’ does not automatically make them a positive force in society. What is of interest in this section is their rather ambiguous attitude towards states. 
The Southern African Peoples’ Solidarity Network (SAPSN) has quickly become one of the key nodes in Southern Africa of the so-called ‘anti-globalization movement: ‘We hold the view that the WTO together with the IMF and World Bank are imposing capitalist-led globalisation on the people of the world, and of our region, in particular’ (SAPSN, 2001: 1; see table 2, appendix for members). The United States’s AGOA, the EU’s Cotonou agreement for the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries as well as the general insistence upon the benefits of ‘free trade’ are considered to form part of the same neoliberal paradigm, which should be resisted. According to SAPSN, Africa’s external dependency and the pressures ‘from governmental agencies in the richest industrialized countries, and their global corporations, banks and other financial organizations’ is the root of the problem of underdevelopment. But SAPSN is at the same time also critical of much of the states-driven regionalism, claiming that the Southern African states have mainly engaged in rhetorical declarations about development cooperation and integration, with few effective achievements. SAPSN proclaims that the SADC leaders are using the SADC as a self-serving ‘old boys’ club’ for mutual support ‘whenever the interests and power of the ruling elites come into conflict with the human rights, and the democratic and development aspirations of their own populations’ (SAPSN, 2000: 1). 
The SAPSN emphasizes the need for ‘Making Southern African Development Cooperation and Integration a People-centred and People-driven Regional Challenge to Globalisation’ (SAPSN, 2001). This vision implies a stronger focus on the limitations of state-steered regionalism at the same time as it makes a call for the effective participation of organized forces of civil society. But in spite of their critical stance towards the practices of states-led regionalism SAPSN maintains a rather ambiguous attitude towards the SADC governments, sometimes fiercely criticizing them, while at other times ‘call upon all the governments of Southern Africa, and the rest of Africa to stand together, and with African social forces, to resist the expansion of the scope and powers of the WTO’ (SAPSN, 2001: 2). The SAPSN’s argument seems to be that if their governments could be freed from external demands, then they would also implement a more cooperative and development-oriented regionalization strategy. This is, however, an ideological stance that is more hypothetical than real. It is also based on a somewhat inconsistent understanding of Southern African states/governments in that they are sometimes criticized for  being part of the neoliberal hegemonic bloc, whereas at other times they are believed to be part of the counter-hegemonic bloc. Still, it draws attention to the often overlooked role of external actors in the making and unmaking of regionalism in Southern Africa.

5. Promoting civil society regionalism from the outside

The role of external actors and their financial resources in ‘national’ development is well documented, whereas their impact on regionalism/regionalization is largely overlooked. The great majority of the civil society organizations operating on the regional level depend to an overwhelming extent on the promotion and funding from external actors, either government development agencies or northern NGOs. Without such external actors, civil society regionalization in Southern Africa would look very different, and also be less significant, which certainly raises questions about whose interests these activities really serve. 
It is difficult to dispute that donors have a large impact on civil society activities in Southern Africa, both on the national level and the regional level. They may, through their funds, strategies and ideas, play a positive role in the advancement of regional networking and capacity building amongst civil societies. However, donors are by no means ‘neutral’ or contributing to a ‘natural’ Southern Africa. Neither do they necessarily have a positive impact on development and democracy. On the contrary they are actively involved in the social construction of the region, and in this process their own interests and way of operation play a significant role. Hence, it is undisputed that external actors (INGOs, donors, allies in the North) have their own agenda and this certainly impacts on civil society regionalization. It may call into question how genuine these activities really are, and whose interests they serve. 
There are many, often related, explanations for the interest from donors and northern NGOs to promote civil society regionalism in Southern Africa (and elsewhere). Two of the main reasons are: (i) the emphasis on civil society actors as ‘partners’ in the development cooperation process, and (ii) the ideology of regionalism. 
The first reason is related to the fact that in the past many donors worked primarily with the state, while today there is a strong emphasis on forming ‘partnerships’ with governments, the private sector as well as with civil societies. There is a strong belief in the donor community that a strengthened civil society will contribute to a ‘pluralistic’ society and economic, political and democratic development. External actors are extremely important for the financing of civil society activities in Southern Africa, both on a national level and on the regional level. To a limited extent the local NGOs can obtain funding from providing services or from their own governments, but a large proportion of the funds for more ‘pure’ civil society activities come from donor agencies or external CSOs. In some instances it can be explained by that the external actors support forces that are not governmental or even opposed to particular regimes (e.g. USAID). 
As mentioned earlier, the increased support to NGOs is also associated with the changing nature of the neo-patrimonial state. The explosion of civil society organizations in the region and throughout much of Africa can be partly attributed to the erosion and downscaling of the state (due to neoliberal reform programmes, decay and neopatrimonial extraction that it can no longer be relied upon for resource distribution. So alternative sources of survival and resource extraction must be created, and setting up an NGO and obtain donor funds when this can no longer be received from the state. Or when also ‘respectable’ NGOs in the region are little more than covers for the Directors to extract donor resources to reward themselves financially; or use the facilities provided by the donors (phone lines, fax machines, office space, or vehicles) to opiate personal businesses. This raises critical questions about how genuine the CSO really are? The answer to such critical questions depend on an intensified debate among involved actors and academics. This paper can only give a specific theoretical perspective and some examples.
This is closely related to the consolidation of the ideology of regionalism in the donor community, especially in Europe. Sometimes regional cooperation activities have been supported for a long time, but it is interesting to observe how widespread this ideology has become during the last decade. The praise of regionalism is particularly interesting in view of the fact that there is a rather weak debate and very few studies that explain why and under what conditions these regional forms of support are contributing to welfare, development, democracy and capacity-building in the regions of Africa. The regional approach and ideology in the donor community appears to have close links to the worldwide trend of regionalism, particularly European Union integration. 
One of many problems with the way civil societies are constructed from the outside in Southern Africa is that at least many of the state donor agencies have not proved to be very effective or well-suited to support civil society activities (cf. Söderbaum, 2001c). An influential analysis by Moore and colleagues (1995: 32) shows that the way aid agencies operate are inimical to effective NGOs and networking activities. The study criticizes, for instance, that many donor agencies: (i) operate in a blueprint rather than a process mode; (ii) are relatively inflexible and prefer standard formulas, instrumental models and rules of thumb (as a result they lack sensitivity to the particular cultural and political environment and context into which the institution is to fit); and (iii) that their main objective is to achieve the main goals by which they are judged (i.e. spending large quantities of money in the short term and therefore only pay serious attention to large scale activities). 
There is also an inconsistency in the way many foreign powers and donors promote regionalism from the outside. As is well-known the major powers, donor agencies and financial institutions, such as the World Bank, USA, the EU and the Nordic countries, support policy-led and states-led market integration in Southern and Eastern Africa (Söderbaum, 2004). However, at the same time many of these donors also fund NGOs and civil society actors that are critical of such impulses. There is a somewhat more consistent ‘partnership’ between northern NGOs and their recipients. In fact, few external NGOs support economic globalization and open regionalism. As MacLean points out: 
many North-South NGO partnerships are forged on principles which do not adhere to the neo-liberal ideology and which may in fact (or in deed) be more consistent with the ideals associated with the notion of a counter-hegemonic transnational civil society. … In Southern Africa, such NGOs share with each other and their counterparts in the North a common discourse which identifies a shared commitment to promoting social change: that is, change in social as well as government structures: and change simultaneously at grass-roots, national, regional, and global levels. (MacLean, 1996: 29) 

6. Conclusion
There are many studies of contemporary regionalism, but civil society regionalism remains largely an overlooked topic. This neglect is mainly a result of an exaggerated concern with states-led and market-driven forms of regionalism in the research field. It is unfortunate and also rather surprising considering the significant research carried out on global civil society and social movements in recent decades. 
This study takes civil society seriously. Compared to the earlier versions of the NRA, for instance by Hettne and Mittelman, this paper provides a slightly different view of the dynamics of civil society regionalization. The earlier studies are correct in their emphasis on the existence of civil society regionalization as well as that there are important counter-hegemonic tendencies. However, it needs to be acknowledged that civil society regionalization is by no means necessarily counter-hegemonic. On the contrary, civil society actors are engaged in regionalization for a wide range of different reasons. There are, for instance, more pragmatic or revisionist forces in civil society regionalism, whose main concern are how they can be included, how they can influence and lobby governments and formal states-led regionalism rather than to resist or serve as a counter-hegemonic force against the establishment. These differences come out rather clearly by the way civil society actors relate to and perceive their governments. Due to the neopatrimonial logic at play in many African societies, NGOs may also be a cover for the satisfaction of personal political and economic interests (e.g. non-profit or profit consultancy firms and NGOs as well as one-man-organizations and certain charity organizations driven by elites with very close ties with governments). 
Both donor agencies and northern NGOs are extremely important for most types of civil society regionalism in Southern Africa. In fact, there would not be much civil society regionalism without these external actors. There is a rather ambiguous situation whereby many big donors, such as the EU and Nordic countries support both the hegemonic order, through neoliberal and open regionalism at the same time as they support revisionist or even counter-hegemonic forces in civil society. The NGOs and non-state donor agencies from the North are more consistent in that they often remain critical of neoliberal regionalism and mainly support revisionist and counter-hegemonic civil society organizations. Thus, there is a tendency that a series of transnational North-South counter-hegemonic partnerships are forged in fields such as social and economic justice, globalization and trade, human rights, and environment.

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Table 1. Select civil society organizations and networks in Southern Africa 
Sector	Name of organization or regional network	
Human rights and democracy	Inter-African Network for Human Rights and Development (AFRONET), Southern African Human Rights NGO Network (SAHRINGON), Human Rights Research and Documentation Trust of Southern Africa	
Media	Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC), Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), Africa Information Afrique (AIA)	
Economic development, trade, economic justice and debt	Southern African Network on Debt and Development, Jubilee 2000 Southern Africa, African Forum on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), Economic Justice Network (EJN), Ecumenical Service for Socio-economic Transformation (ESSET), Southern Africa’s Peoples Solidarity Network (SAPSN), Alternative Information and Development Center (AIDC), Southern and Eastern African Trade Information Negotiations Institute (SEATINI)	
Environment	Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF), ZERO, Enviroteach, Empowerment for African Sustainable Development (EASD), Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (WESSA)	
Health and HIV/Aids	Southern African Network of Aids Service Organizations (SANASO)	
Trade unions, students’ unions, chambers of business	Southern African Trade Union Coordination Conference (SATUCC), Southern African Business Forum, Southern African Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (SAACCI), Southern African Students’ Union (SASU) 
	
Faith-based organizations	Southern African Council of Churches (SACC), Southern African Catholic Development Association (SACDA)
	
Gender	Education of Girls and Women in Africa (EGWA), Gender, Urbanisation and Environment (GUE), Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF), Women and Law in Southern Africa, Southern African Network of Higher Educational Institutions Challenging Sexual harassment and Sexual Violence
	
Regional research networks	African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), African Energy Policy Research Network (AFREPREN), Southern African Political Economy Series (SAPES), Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA), Marine Science Cooperation Programme (MARINE), Regional Research Collaboration in Reproductive Health in Africa (REPH)	
Peace building	Ceasefire Campaign, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Centre for the study of violence and reconciliation, Centre for Conflict and Resolution (CCR)	
General/
multifunctional 	Southern African Non-Governmental Organization Network (SANGONET), SADC Council of NGOs, Reflection and Development Centre for Eastern and Southern Africa (MWENGO)	

Table 2. Member organizations of Southern African Peoples Solidarity Network (SAPSN)
Country	Organizations	
Africa	Africa Trade Network, Gender and Trade Network, Jubilee South	
Angola	Associacao para Desenvolvimento Rural de Angola (ADRA)	
Malawi	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace	
Mauritius	Lalit, All Workers Conference	
Mozambique	Groupo Divida	
Namibia	Labour Resource and Research Institute (LARRI), Namibian Economic Policy Research Institute (NEPRU)	
South Africa	Institute for Participatory Development (IPD), Ecumenical Service for Socio-economic Transformation (ESSET), South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO), Alternative Information and Development Center (AIDC), Jubilee 2000, National Education Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU), Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU), Southern Africa Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU)	
Southern Africa	Reflection and Development Centre for NGOs in Eastern and Southern Africa (MWENGO), Southern African Council of Churches (SACC), Southern and Eastern African Trade Information Negotiations Institute (SEATINI)	
Swaziland	University of Swaziland, Political Science Department, Swaziland Solidarity Network	
Uganda	Uganda Debt Network	
Zambia	Debt Project/Jubilee - 2000 Zambia	
Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD), Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)	
Source. SAPSN, aidc.org.za/sapsn/index.html (24/05/02).