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Publications

2006

“Voting Power and Voting Blocs”, Public Choice, 127, 3-4, May 2006, pp. (with Robert Leech).

“Voting Power in the Bretton Woods Institutions”, in Alberto Paloni and Maurizio Zanardi (eds.), The IMF, World Bank and Policy Reform, Routledge, January 2006 (with Robert Leech), ch. 1, pp 29-48.

2005

“Voting Power in the Bretton Woods Institutions”, Homo Oeconomicus, 22(4): 1-23 (2005) (with Robert Leech)

“Duverger’s Law, Penrose’s Power Index and the Unity of the United Kingdom”, Political Studies, vol. 53(3), pp. 457-476, October 2005. (with Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan).

“Power versus Weight in IMF Governance: the Possible Beneficial Implications of a United European Bloc Vote”, chapter 11, pp 251-281, in Ariel Buira (ed.), Reforming the Governance of the IMF and the World Bank, Anthem Press, September 2005 (with Robert Leech).

“Voting Power Implications of a Unified European Representation at the IMF”, Warwick Economic Research Papers, Number 720. (with Robert Leech)

“Poder de Voto en las Instituciones de Bretton Woods” (Spanish translation of “Voting Power in the Bretton Woods Institutions”, CSGR Working Paper 154/04), on website of Choike: A Portal on Southern Civil Societies, http://www.choike.org.

2004

“Voting Power and Voting Blocs”, Warwick Economic Research Papers, Number 716, July 2003. (with Robert Leech)

Computer Algorithms for Voting Power Analysis, ( www.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae), A tool to enable interested researchers to carry out voting power analysis and calculate voting power indices, remotely over the world wide web, using my/our programs. (joint with Robert Leech). Website This could be a useful resource that allows the user to find power indices for any size of voting game..

2003

"The Utility of the Voting Power Approach", European Union Politics, 4:4, pp 234-242, December, 2003.

"Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games", Management Science, vol 49, Issue 6, pp 831-838, June 2003.

"Power Indices as an Aid to Institutional Design: the Generalised Apportionment Problem", In the 22nd Yearbook on New Political Economy,
“European Governance”, 2003, edited by M. Holler, H.Kliemt, D. Schmidtchen and M. Streit.

"Qualified Majority Voting: The Effect of the Quota" In the 22nd Yearbook on New Political Economy, “European Governance”, 2003, edited by M. Holler, H.Kliemt, D. Schmidtchen and M. Streit. (with Moshé Machover)

2002

"Designing the Voting System for the Council of the EU”, Public Choice, vol. 113, 3-4, December 2002, pp.437-464.

"Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund”, Annals of Operations Research, vol.109, 2002, pp 373-395.

"An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices”, Political Studies, vol. 50, no.1, March 2002, pp.1-22.

"The Use of Colemans's Power Indices to Inform the Choice of Voting Rule with Reference to the IMF Governing Body and the EU Council of Ministers", Warwick Economic Research Papers, Number 645, July 2002.

"Computation of Power Indices", Warwick Economic Research Papers number 644.

2001

"Fair Reweighting of the Votes in the EU Council of Ministers and the Choice of Majority Requirement for Qualified Majority Voting during Successive Enlargements" CSGR Working Paper 75/01 (Later published under the title "Designing the Voting System for the Council of the EU")

"Members' Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund", CSGR Working Paper 86/01

2000

"Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games", Warwick Economic Research Paper number 579 (Published in Management Science 2003.)

1998

"Power Relations in the IMF: A Study of the Political Economy of A Priori Voting Power Using the Theory of Simple Games", CSGR Working Paper 06/98.