

Ballistic Missile Defence and US-Japan and US-UK Alliances Compared

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ABSTRACT

Japan has entered into a programme of off-the-shelf procurement and joint development of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) systems. The impact on US-Japan alliance relations is transformational. This working paper outlines the various strategies that Japan has used in the past to manage alliance ties with the US and to mitigate the alliance dilemmas of entrapment and abandonment. It then demonstrates how the technological imperatives of BMD have dictated a sea-change for Japan in its overall security strategy and closed off its options for hedging against alliance dilemmas. Japan is increasingly being forced to give up the hedging options of non-capacity, technological military autonomy, obfuscation and constitutional constraints. The result is a tighter US-Japan alliance construct and looming entrapment.

The working paper then compares the situation of Japan's attempted management in BMD with that of the UK and Europe more widely. It argues that the UK faces a similar set of risks of entrapment and abandonment over the issue of missile defences. However, the US's position is buttressed by various technological hedges, and most importantly the role of NATO and EU defence and security cooperation as alternative spaces to be used to manage US power in the post-Cold War period.

Keywords: Japan, UK, US, Missile Defence, EU, NATO, regionalism.

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Introduction: Japan and UK BMD challenges

Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) is now a reality for Japan's security policy and the management of US-Japan alliance relations. Japan from 2006 onwards has started to deploy the terminal phase Patriot Advance Capability (PAC)-3, and aims by 2011 to roll out the full panoply of BMD systems, consisting of sixteen PAC-3 fire units, six Aegis destroyers equipped with mid-course phase interceptors, and upgraded sensors and command and control functions. The Japanese Cabinet first officially committed to the acquisition of BMD in December 2003. Since then, BMD has begun to force major changes in Japan's national security capabilities and doctrines. BMD sits squarely at the forefront of Japan's response to 'new threats' in the revised National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) of December 2004; and it is the major procurement item in the Mid-Term Defence Programme for 2005-2009—BMD's huge costs squeezing the overall defence budget and obliging the Japan Self Defence Forces (JSDF) to tailor, and in some cases curtail, plans for continued post-Cold War restructuring and other equipment procurement around the priority attached to BMD.¹ Moreover, the JSDF, in response to the introduction of BMD and its related demands for enhanced integration of command and control systems, has embarked on a restructuring programme that enables for the first time joint tri-service operational capabilities. Furthermore, BMD's impact on Japan's defence policy has been manifested in the government's need to introduce legislation since February 2005 that begins to fundamentally redesign measures for civilian control over the military in place since the start of the post-war period.

Inevitably, Japan's acquisition of BMD has also begun to force the pace of change in alliance ties with the US. Indeed, BMD has long been the object of Japan-US bilateral planning for the future course of the alliance. Although Japan's interest in BMD dates back to the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) of the Reagan administration, US-Japan cooperation in earnest began under the Clinton administration. US-Japan bilateral studies into the feasibility of BMD from 1993 onwards were followed by the highlighting of BMD as a possible area for alliance cooperation in the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996.² Following further bilateral study and North Korea's Taepodong-1 test launch in 1998, Japan committed itself to joint technological research with the US into the feasibility of BMD in December 1998. Japan then committed itself to the introduction of BMD through the Cabinet decision of December 2003. But even though the Cabinet decision stressed that BMD would be operated on the basis of 'Japan's independent judgement', it also committed Japan to procure

the PAC-3 and Aegis BMD systems from the US, and to continue bilateral technological cooperation into the upgrading of the Aegis BMD's interceptor Standard Missile-3.³ Japan further proceeded in December 2005 to bend once again its ban on the exports of arms and military technology to enable the possible development and production of BMD systems with the US.⁴ In the meantime, successive Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (SCC) statements have reiterated the importance of bilateral cooperation on BMD, culminating in the agreements of 2005-2006, as part of the bilateral Defence Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) and US Global Posture Review (GPR), for the establishment of a Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Centre (BJOCC) at Yokota air base to collocate Japanese and US BMD command and control information systems, and for the US to deploy additional and complementary BMD assets around Japan.⁵ Japan's government, reacting to North Korea's multiple missile test launches on 5 July 2006, has since sought to accelerate joint cooperation with the US on BMD deployment.⁶

Japan's involvement in BMD is thus to set to project major changes in its own national defence policy, and has been intertwined with and occupies an increasingly central position in the evolution of US-Japan alliance cooperation. Japan in fact is perhaps the most advanced of any of the US's formal or informal alliance partners in its commitment to developing a full range of BMD systems: other bilateral partners such as Germany and Italy (Medium Extended Air Defence System, MEADS), and Israel (*Arrow*), engaged only in cooperation with the US for terminal phase systems; or the UK, Denmark and Australia, only hosting sensor components of US Missile Defence (MD); and the multilateral North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) still investigating the feasibility of both terminal and mid-course systems.

Given Japan's relatively advanced status in BMD and its increasing centrality to the future shape of the US-Japan alliance, the objective of this paper is to examine what type of dynamic BMD exerts on Japan's traditional design of its security policy and managing alliance ties. In particular it seeks to ask how BMD, when inserted into the context of US-Japan alliance, impacts upon Japan's various devices for attempting to strengthen alliance ties whilst simultaneously hedging against the alliance dilemmas of abandonment and entrapment. In turn, the paper seeks to ask what type of impact BMD as a new weapons system, accompanied by range of technological imperatives and impending political-military

decisions, is likely to have on the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy and how it may pull the US-Japan alliance in potentially radically new directions.

The paper's essential argument is that BMD poses challenges to Japan's standard practices for managing the US that are unique in the history of post-war Japanese security policy and of the alliance, and that may in the final calculation prove insurmountable. The introduction of BMD, first off, exacerbates Japan's existing strategic alliance dilemmas of abandonment and most especially entrapment. However, BMD's challenge is made especially intense because the technological demands of the system establish political-military parameters for alliance cooperation that make it difficult for Japan to exercise, or shut down entirely, its traditional hedging options. The final outcome is that, despite the most ingenious efforts of Japan's defence policy-making community to find means to maintain strategic leeway, Japan's perceived strategic vulnerabilities and the non-efficacy of its usual hedging options, mean that BMD is working to corral Japanese security policy onto a trajectory that points to ever enhanced and exclusive dependence on the US.

This paper analyses Japan's efforts to manage the US in the area of BMD in three stages. The first stage provides a brief overview historically and more recently of developments in US-Japan alliance relations, Japan's defence policy and its preferred options in managing alliance dilemmas. This is necessary to provide the contextual background in order to understand the potential impact of BMD in affecting the efficacy of these options and in altering the trajectory of its security policy. The section outlines a number of instances where Japanese policy-makers in the post-war period—and in particular during the process of the upgrading of the alliance's functions during the revision of the US-Japan Guidelines for Defence Cooperation in the late-1990s and again during the DPRI recently concluded in 2006—have viewed the tightening and loosening of alliance ties as posing the concomitant risks of abandonment and entrapment. It distils from these instances a number of key hedging options that Japan has used singularly, in conjunction, and in one-off fashion or repeatedly, according to the prevailing international situation and status of alliance politics, in order to manage abandonment and entrapment. These can be classified as: 'evade and temporise'; 'acquiesce and stand aside'; 'emphasise domestic political and constitutional restraints'; 'obfuscate and delimit'; 'add or withhold military capability'; 'seek a like-minded regional partner or partners'; 'commit and partially retract'; and 'intimate non-cooperation'.

The second stage of the paper then details the characteristics and impact of Japan's current BMD projects on its individual national security policy and bilateral alliance cooperation. This section of the paper outlines the types of BMD technology that Japan is set to acquire, how BMD establishes new forms of alliance linkages with the US, and how these compound risks of abandonment and entrapment. It also demonstrates how at the same time engagement in BMD has begun to systematically close down the range of hedging options outlined above that Japan has attempted to exercise in other areas of alliance cooperation to date. Most especially, BMD can be seen to be eroding Japan's traditional capacity to resist entrapment in regional contingencies involving China, and to resist entrapment in global contingencies outside Japan's own region. Moreover, BMD is pushing hard against Japan's prohibition on the exercise of the right of collective self-defence, thereby opening up a veritable near 'Pandora's Box' in alliance cooperation and fundamentally transforming the nature of the bilateral alliance relationship.

The third stage of the paper, then seeks to add a comparative edge to assessing the degree of Japan's capacity and efficacy in managing the US over BMD by examining the parallel case of the UK's flirtation with missile defence. The UK is a pertinent case for comparison, despite the fact that it has not committed to BMD in the same way as Japan. This is because the UK arguably stands right now as the prime US 'special relationship' and military partner in Europe, just as Japan stands as such, or at least faces increasing expectations as such from the US, in the East Asia region. Thus both face similar demands for new alliance cooperation and similar alliance dilemmas in deciding how far and in what ways as junior alliance partners they should accommodate US demands, even if both start at far different degrees of current military cooperation with the US.

This section adopts a similar approach to the first two, initially outlining the types of alliance dilemmas and options used to manage alliance relations with the US and then by examining what types of new dilemmas US MD plans now pose for the status of the alliance. It argues that the UK has indeed in the past and in the contemporary period attempted to use many of the devices employed by Japan and also with some considerable success. It also draws a comparison with Japan by demonstrating how the UK's policy options are also becoming restricted by the technological and political-military choices posed by MD. Nevertheless, it concludes that UK security policy has probably been impacted upon by BMD less than Japan due to the fact that the international and regional environment makes its strategic

abandonment and entrapment dilemmas less severe, and that it has a wider range of still functioning hedging options. In this way, it is possible to draw the lesson that regardless of the skills and experience of policy-makers in hedging, the key variable in determining success in managing the US are the range of options available and the ability to exercise these by exploiting or creating a more fluid international and regional environment less dominated by the US's strategic influence.

Japanese security policy: abandonment, entrapment and hedging options.

Japan's security policy-making community—principally located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan Defence Agency (JDA) and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War periods has long faced the twin risks of abandonment and entrapment, in part accepting these as the inevitable cost of alignment and then alliance with the US superpower. Nevertheless, Japanese policy-makers have demonstrated remarkable ingenuity in devising and exercising hedging options in order to attempt to alleviate these alliance dilemmas. These options have been useful in preserving a degree of autonomy in Japan's security policy and moderating US demands.

Cold War entrapment and abandonment

Japan's principal alliance anxieties during the Cold War revolved around entrapment perhaps more than abandonment. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru's negotiation of the 1951 US-Japan Security Treaty provided Japan with a de facto guarantee of US military protection from Soviet communism and opened the way for special economic dispensations, in return for Japan's provision of bases for the US to project power in East Asia. The 1951 security treaty was notable for its lopsided nature: lacking any explicit commitment on the US's part to defend Japan (although Yoshida was always confident that the presence of US bases was a sufficient trip wire deterrent), and any obligation for Japan to defend the US in a collective self-defence arrangement, despite the treaty acknowledging Japan's possession of this defensive right under the UN Charter. Prime Ministers Hatoyama Ichirō and Kishi Nobusuke then sought over time to persuade the US to accept the removal of the unequal provisions relating to Japan by offering to inject a greater degree of mutuality into the treaty. Kishi's negotiations for the revised US-Japan Security Treaty of 1960 set out more clearly Japan's and the US's security responsibilities towards each other. Article 5 provided an explicit guarantee by stating that any attack on the territory of Japan was recognised as an attack on

both treaty partners. Article 6 of the treaty pledged that Japan, in order to contribute to its own security, would supply bases to the US for the maintenance of security in Far East.

Japan was able to forge through the original and revised security treaties with the US a security relationship with the US, the asymmetrical nature of which has been seen to function for Japan's overall security interests. However, Japan's conclusion of these treaties was also accompanied by considerable concerns over the accompanying risks of entrapment, and of the need to preserve over the longer term as much strategic autonomy as possible. Throughout the course of the Cold War, Japanese policy-makers were aware that implicit within the logic of strategic alignment with the US was the risk that Japan could become a proxy target in conventional or nuclear conflict with the USSR. In addition, Japanese policy-makers were aware that beyond acting as part of the US-inspired defensive perimeter for the containment of communism, there was the constant risk that the US might push for Japan to become a more direct actor in the Cold War struggle outside its own territory in areas such as the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, or even Southeast Asia.

Japan was presented with such risks a number of times during the Cold War. In the negotiations in the running up to the original and revised treaties, sections of the US policy community demonstrated a persistent interest in encouraging Japan to participate in a genuine collective self-defence arrangement. Japan was envisaged as a key member of a collective self-defence mechanism on a multilateral or regional basis, modelled along the lines of NATO or the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), which would have obliged it to assist militarily both the US and other US-aligned states. Or at the very least, Japan was envisaged as exercising the right of collective self-defence to come to the sole and direct assistance of the US as its treaty partner through the despatch of the JSDF to defend US territory.

Following on from security treaty revision and throughout the rest of the Cold War, Japan continued to face risks of entrapment in wider US designs for its security partners in East Asia. Japan in the late 1960s was certainly prepared to provide diplomatic and economic assistance to South Vietnam, but feared possible suggestions that Japan might provide military support in the same way as the US's other regional allies Australia and South Korea. Similarly, Japan was presented with the enhanced risks of entrapment, when, as the price of the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administration in 1972, it was obliged in the November

1969 communiqué between Prime Minister Satō Eisaku and President Richard Nixon to acknowledge that South Korea and Taiwan were respectively essential and important factors for the security of Japan—the US thus extracting from Japan the hint of a potential security guarantee for these two US treaty partners.

During the early 1970s, Japan's entrapment fears then abated with the US's pursuit of détente with the USSR and rapprochement with China. Instead, Japanese anxieties swung towards possible abandonment by the US as a security treaty partner as a result of bilateral economic frictions and the apparent limitations to US military hegemony in the region, the latter represented by fears that the US might seek to withdraw its ground troop presence from South Korea.

In the late 1970s and 1980s, Japan's strategic interests converged more closely with those of the US in seeking to meet the enhanced and common threat of the USSR military build-up around Japan. Japanese policy-makers' concerns about abandonment were assuaged in this period, and Japan and the US began to discover a more robust division of labour with the alliance. Japan expanded its national military capabilities in order to assist the US in fulfilling its obligations under Article 5 of the security treaty. Japan's military build-up was encouraged by the US because it was seen to provide a more solid defensive platform from which the US could project power under Article 6 of the treaty. Japan also embarked on the first steps toward the direct coordination of their respective military roles through the formulation of the 1978 Defence Guidelines. These guidelines outlined areas for bilateral cooperation relating to Japan's immediate defence under Article 5 of the security treaty (including tactical planning, joint exercises and logistical support) and for cooperation in regional contingencies in the Far East under Article 6 (including sea lane patrol). This increased pace of bilateral cooperation in the 1980s led Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō to refer publicly to the relationship as an 'alliance' in 1981.

Japanese Cold War hedging strategies

Japan was thus presented with a number of instances of potential entrapment and occasionally also abandonment during the Cold War period. In turn, Japanese policy-makers fashioned a number of skilful responses to these risks, often utilised individually or in combination.

Japan's response to the risk of being press-ganged into US projects to activate its allies for regional security took several forms. Firstly, Japan sought to *evade and temporise* on possible requests from the US for security assistance, as in the case of Yoshida's gradualistic resistance to suggestions for Japanese rearmament at the time of the conclusion of the security treaty; and Satō's resolve for Japan to maintain a relatively low profile in the midst of the Vietnam War.⁷ Secondly, Japan was prepared to *acquiesce and stand aside* in instances where the US saw its own security interests at stakes, and hoped for minimal security cooperation from Japan, but was not overly expectant that even when it pushed Japan hard that it would provoke a useful response. Japan thus acquiesced in the US's campaign in Vietnam and remained largely silent on the use of bases in Japan for prosecution of the war as the US did not push Japan for any further active commitment.

Thirdly, Japanese policy-makers *emphasised domestic political and constitutional constraints* on their ability to act in support of the US. Yoshida famously argued with US negotiators that it would be counterproductive for Japan to attempt large-scale rearmament in the immediate post-war period as it would only serve to destabilise Japan economically and as a reliable aligned state. The premiership of Yoshida also saw Japan's ban on the exercise of the right of collective-self defence from 1954 onwards. Japan's government asserted that although Japan as a sovereign nation possessed the right under Article 7 of the UN Charter, it could not exercise that right because it would exceed interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan that limited the use of force to minimum necessary for self-defence. Japan's policy-makers held doggedly to this position throughout the Cold War, thus creating a major obstacle to US ambitions for Japan to participate in a collective-self defence mechanism.

Fourthly, though, Japan, if pressed hard by its US ally in certain instances, was able to fall back on attempts to *obfuscate and delimit* its security obligations. For instance, although Kishi was keen to ensure greater mutuality in the revised treaty befitting Japan's major power status, he hedged against entrapment by gaining US assent to drop plans for the geographical scope of Article 6 of the treaty to be designated as the Asia-Pacific and to accept the less extensive designation of the Far East, as in the original treaty. Kishi was then able in Diet interpellations in February 1960 to delimit the scope of US-Japan security cooperation by stating that while the Far East was not necessarily a clearly defined geographical region to which the treaty could be restricted, it broadly included the area north of the Philippines and surrounding Japan (*Nihon no shūhen*), and the areas under the control of South Korea and

Taiwan. Likewise, although Satō was hard-pressed by the US to bargain Okinawa reversion for a commitment to the security of South Korea and Taiwan, Japan's policy-makers were cautious in the 1969 communiqué and thereafter never to provide the US with any explicit pledge to participate directly in a regional security arrangement to support these US aligned states.

Fifthly, Japanese policy-makers hedged against entrapment through *withholding military capability*. Prime Minister Yoshida and his successors were aware that they would face periodic expectations from the US for Japan to participate in collective self-defence arrangements on a regional bilateral or multilateral basis, and that this would entail pressures for the build-up of its military forces, and in particular large ground forces designed for expeditionary purposes to complement US naval and air force power projection capacity in the region. However, Japanese policy-makers in the early Cold War period steadfastly refused to develop the type of military capabilities that the US desired for collective self-defence functions. Japan accepted Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) from the US from 1953 onwards, but did not use this to build up large expeditionary ground forces that could become the object of US demands for cooperation. Instead, Japan attempted to retain relatively balanced ground, air and naval forces, and most crucially key indigenous defence production technologies, so as to hedge against 'satellisation' and dependence on the US.

In the latter stages of the Cold War, and with the convergence of Japanese and US strategic interest, Japan did develop military forces more complementary with those of the US. The JSDF's acquisition of large numbers of interceptors and anti-submarine warfare capabilities to provide defence for US offensive power projection meant that even as Japan's military became more capable it was increasingly skewed to the point that it could not defend Japanese territory independently. Nevertheless, even at this stage, Japan's policy-makers sought to retain a degree of military autonomy by ensuring that Japan's military forces whilst complementary with those of the US remained essentially separate. Japan avoided the integration of the JSDF command structures and joint operations with the US. Moreover, even as Japan entered into cooperation with the US into the development of weaponry, such as the FS-X fighter, it continued to emphasise the importance of an indigenous defence production base for leading edge military technologies.⁸

Sixthly, Japan if pushed even further by the US to provide a more specific agreement on security cooperation, then adopted tactics of *commit and partially retract* so as to in an ex-post facto fashion limits commitments on security. Japan's incremental and 'two steps forward one step back' approach to the expansion of its security responsibilities is general evidence of this hedging option. A more particular example was the 1978 Defence Guidelines, where Japan committed itself to more specific security cooperation with the US in line with Article 5 and 6, but then showed enthusiasm for following up on Article 5 of the Guidelines affecting its own immediate defence, and carefully avoided any in-depth studies into Article 6-type regional contingencies that spelled the possibility of entrapment.

Seventhly, Japan in certain instances, where it perceived the risks and costs of entrapment as overly jeopardising its fundamental security interests, preserved the option of *intimating non-cooperation*. Kishi succeeded in negotiating in Article 4 of the revised security treaty and in the exchange of notes afterwards the US pledge to consult on combat operations from bases in Japan apart from those operations conducted under Article 5. Japanese policy-makers regard this as providing them with a final veto over US military operations from Japan, although in fact they have never dared to use the veto for fear of alienating the US. Nevertheless, for Japan, the right to refuse cooperation under the security treaty has served as one latent means by which to rein in US military operations from its territory and thereby in the last instance limit entrapment.

In instances of fears of abandonment, Japan employed the reverse of the above options as well as additional options. In the period of détente, Japan moved to hedge against abandonment through the *addition of military capacity*. The National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) of 1976 set out Japan's defence doctrine alongside the military force structure necessary to achieve them. It emphasised a qualitative defence build-up of Japan's national military capabilities as an implicit demonstration of efforts to relieve the defensive burdens of the US. It also stressed explicitly that Japan would maintain forces sufficient to defend itself in the first instance from direct aggression, but that if this proved impossible it would seek US support. Japan thus began to develop a military doctrine that suggested tighter alliance ties with the US. Similarly, Japan in this period hedged against abandonment by seeking a *like-minded regional partner* to counter US plans. This perhaps surprisingly came in the guise of South Korea: the governments of Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo and President

Park Chung-Hee forming a tacit partnership to exert political pressure individually on the Carter administration to reverse its decision.⁹

Post-Cold War abandonment and entrapment on a regional and global scale

Japan's post-Cold War security dilemmas have again revolved principally around fears of entrapment, although the spectre of abandonment has also been raised in certain instances. Moreover, it is clear that the twin alliance dilemmas have at times been more intense than during the Cold War period as US alliance expectations have increased with the opening up of new arenas for potential cooperation beyond East Asia and now extending globally.

As is well known, the foundations of the US-Japan alliance have been challenged with the end of the Cold War: the demise of the Soviet Union removing the common threat and dynamic for security cooperation in the 1980s, and the US and Japan searching for means to reorient the alliance to deal with the newly fluid international in the East Asia region and new threats in the form of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and transnational terrorism.

Japan on the regional level initially confronted the risk of abandonment in the wake of the first North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994-1995. Despite shared concerns about North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programme, Japan found itself politically hesitant and military incapable to respond to US requests for active support in the applying military pressure on North Korea. Japanese policy-makers were unable to respond due to their previous reluctance to investigate specific bilateral military cooperation for Article-6 type regional contingencies under the 1978 Defence Guidelines.¹⁰ The alliance's difficulties were then compounded by the rising domestic opposition to the size of the burden of US bases in Okinawa in 1995. The fear of Japanese policy-makers regarding abandonment in this period were summed up by the then Director of MOFA's Foreign Policy Bureau, Tanaka Hitoshi:

If there is chaos on the Korean Peninsula, its impact will definitely extend to Japan. In the event of an emergency situation on the Korean Peninsula, Japan for its security is largely reliant upon the US, but if it is said that Japan has not maintained sufficient cooperative relations with the US, then will the US consider Japan to be a country worth protecting?¹¹

However, during the period of the second North Korean nuclear crisis from 2002 onward Japan has experienced the converse fears of entrapment, as well continued concerns over abandonment. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō's administration, although again sharing anxieties over the North's nuclear programme and ballistic missiles, sought for much of its tenure to engage North Korea in order to demonstrate to the US the importance of a diplomatic solution and avert a military confrontation. Ironically, Japan's engagement strategy to alleviate the risks of entrapment was in large part constructed by Tanaka Hitoshi, in his new position as Director General of the Asia and Oceania Bureau. But with the failure of Koizumi's diplomacy to secure a decisive breakthrough in bilateral relations, the deterioration of US-North Korea ties, the failure of the Six-Party Talks, and the North's missile test of July 2006, Japan's attention has again turned back to the need to line up closely with the US and avoid any possibility of abandonment.

In the meantime, the looming military challenge from China has raised further questions about the future direction of the alliance. Japan's preferred approach to dealing with China is clearly to redouble its efforts at diplomatic and economic engagement. Nevertheless, the Taiwan Straits crises of 1995-1996, and bilateral disputes over the Senkaku Isles and gas fields in the East China Sea, have demonstrated to Japanese policy-makers the possibility that China is increasingly willing to project military power in the region in pursuit of its national interests. Japanese policy-makers have concluded that in order to constrain the bilateral security dilemma with China that they have need of a strengthened US-Japan alliance, but this also carries its own twin entrapment and abandonment dilemmas. On the one hand, Japan by moving closer to the US risks becoming caught in the middle of Sino-US strategic competition in the region and military entrapment in US strategy vis-à-vis China. On the other, if Japan becomes overly close to the US, then it leaves itself exposed to the possibility of Sino-US rapprochement and its abandonment as a principal ally in East Asia. Japan was provided with a portent of this by the Clinton administration's close relationship with China at the end of the 1990s, and talk of 'Japan passing'.

Japan's general response to the post-Cold War strategic environment in the East Asia region has indeed been to strengthen the US-Japan alliance. It accomplished this firstly through the issuance of a revised NDPO in November 1995. The revised NDPO stressed the need for stronger US-Japan alliance cooperation and inserted a new clause to state that if a situation impacting national peace and security should arise in areas surrounding Japan (*shūhen*), then

Japan should now seek to deal with the situation in cooperation with the US and the United Nations (UN). Japan and the US then instigated between 1996 and 1997 a revision of the bilateral Defence Guidelines. The revised Guidelines specified for the first time the extent of Japanese logistical support for the US in the event of a regional contingency, thereby switching the emphasis of the security treat from Article 5 to Article 6. Japan subsequently created the legal framework for the implementation of the revised Defence Guidelines in the 1999 *Shūhen Jitaihō*.

Japan's alliance dilemmas vis-à-vis the US in the post-Cold War period have been exacerbated by the shifting focus of potential alliance cooperation not just away from Japan itself to the East Asia, but now beyond to respond to global contingencies. Japan first faced the combined risks of entrapment and abandonment in the Gulf War of 1990-1991, when the US and international coalition presented Japan with demands for a 'human contribution' to the war effort. Japan's failure to respond due to its own constitutional and political restrictions initiated questioning about the *raison d'être* of the alliance that was to reverberate through to the first North Korean nuclear crisis.

Japan has faced its most severe risks of abandonment and especially entrapment, however, since the advent of the George W. Bush administration, the event of 9/11 and the ensuing 'war on terror'. Japan's policy-makers clearly share to a certain degree the concerns of their US counterparts over trans-national terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. At the same time, Japanese policy-makers perceive that their ability to respond to US expectations for military support in the Afghan campaign and in Iraq is a crucial test for the solidarity and durability of US-Japan alliance ties. Japanese policy-makers in responding to the US expectation for military support in Iraq, in particular, have articulated a position which demonstrates that they view the despatch of the JSDF as a means to shore up political confidence in the alliance so as to avoid the prospect of abandonment over the resurgent North Korean threat. Hence, Japan since 9/11 has responded to US expectations for military support through the passing in October 2001 of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) enabling the despatch of the JSDF to the Indian Ocean area to provide logistical support for the US-led war effort in Afghanistan; and then the passing in July 2003 of the Iraqi Reconstruction Law enabling the despatch of the JSDF on non-combat reconstruction missions in southern Iraq.¹²

Japanese participation in these US-led multinational coalitions in the Afghan and Iraq conflicts is, though, only a portend of future alliance demands to be placed upon Japan, with concomitant enhanced risks of entrapment and abandonment. These enhanced risks are generated by a deep shift in US strategy for managing its bilateral alliance partnerships. The Bush administration has, and most especially since 9/11, been seeking to activate its regional alliances to function now for global security as well. The US emphasised this shift in the Quadrennial Defense Reviews of 2001 and 2005 and *National Security Strategy* of 2002 and *National Defense Strategy* of 2005. The aim is to move from ‘threat-based’ regional alliances to ‘capabilities-based’ global alliances that are capable of generating flexible coalitions with interoperable military assets for missions in the ‘arc of instability’ stretching from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. In addition, the US’s GPR of 2004 made it clear that bases provided by regional alliances should be integrated into US strategy for ‘surging’ and global deployments of its forward forces.

The specific implications for Japan of new US strategic thinking and the GPR has been the increasing, and perhaps painful, recognition that in order to remain indispensable as an ally and to maintain political and strategic leverage over the US, that it needs to continue to move beyond the changes in alliance cooperation made in the 1990s and in the immediate post-9/11 period, and further restructure the alliance to respond to both regional and global contingencies. Japan from 2004 was presented with requests from the US for the integration of the of the 5th US Air Force (USAF) Command at Yokota to be integrated with the command functions of the 13th USAF headquartered in Guam, a key base for long-range bombers and tanker aircraft deployed to the Middle East. The US further requested that the US Army I Corps, a rapid deployment force covering the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, should be relocated from Washington State to Army Camp Zama in Kanagawa. The ramification of this was that Japan would essentially serve as a frontline command post for US global power projection to as far away as the Middle East.¹³

Japan has eventually responded to many of these demands. In the February 2005 SCC Joint Statement, Japan and the US placed emphasis on both the regional and now global common strategic objectives of the alliance. In the conclusion of the DPRI in May 2005, Japan accepted the hosting of the US Army I Corps. Japan appears simultaneously to have begun to back up these statements with specific military planning. The revised NDPG and new MTDP of 2004, in addition to stressing responses to regional instability, focussed upon the need for

Japan to consider the importance of the security of the area ‘spreading from the Middle East to East Asia’, thereby indicating Japan’s mapping of its own security interests onto the US’s ‘arc of instability’. Japan in the NDPG and MTDP subsequently indicated its intent to shape its arms forces and capabilities to meet this new agenda. The NDPG seeks to convert the JSDF from a force largely still structured to fight Cold War adversaries to become one that is ‘multifunctional, flexible and effective’. This is to be done by reducing the numbers of JSDF main battle tanks, frigates and interceptors, and placing emphasis instead on more mobile rapid-reaction GSDF units, on MSDF amphibious and BMD systems, and on ASDF long range transports—in short a new focus on power projection for ‘international peace cooperation’ including US-led multinational operations.

Japanese post-Cold War hedging tactics

The pace and scope of the transformation of the US-Japan alliance has certainly accelerated in the post-Cold War period, thereby increasing the perils of entrapment and even continued abandonment as the US continually raises the bar for Japan’s performance as a credible alliance partner. Nonetheless, it is not the case that Japanese policy-makers have sold strategic autonomy to the degree that it might appear at first sight, and in fact many of the traditional hedging strategies have been implemented.

Japan has continued to *evade and temporise* at key junctures. For instance, even though Koizumi expressed early on his ‘understanding’ for the US-led invasion of Iraq, and the Iraqi Reconstruction Law was passed shortly afterwards in July 2003, the Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) was not despatched until January 2004, ostensibly because Japan was seeking the safest ‘non-combat’ zone possible in southern Iraq. In the same fashion, Japanese policy-makers initially sought to duck the issue of the US’s GPR, stating in November 2004 that these would be ‘difficult to accept’ (*ukeire wa konnan*), clearly cognisant that the base realignments would make overly explicit the functioning of US bases in Japan for contingencies beyond the scope of the security treaty.¹⁴ Likewise, even after the conclusion of the DPRI, Japanese policy-makers have continued to foot drag on further changes in the alliance. The Pentagon and JDA’s expectation had been for a new partial revision of the Defence Guidelines to move on to specifying not just the types of logistical cooperation that Japan can provide to the US, but also the specific airstrips, harbours and civilian facilities to be made available. There were also hopes for drafting of permanent law to establish the scope for US-Japan alliance cooperation beyond East Asia and in line with the SCC statement, and

thus avoid the ad hoc and limited nature of the ATSMML and Iraqi Reconstruction Law.¹⁵ However, MOFA soon reined in the enthusiasm of the military security planners and the Japanese government has proceeded to sit on these proposals.¹⁶

An emphasis on *domestic political and constitutional restrictions* has remained an important means for Japan to avoid entrapment. Japan maintained the strict ban on the exercise of the right of collective self defence in devising the revised Defence Guidelines, even if meant resorting to extreme and at times seemingly preposterous constitutional hair-splitting. For instance, the government insisted that it was possible even in the midst of regional military conflict to fix a line between combat zones involving US deployments and non-combat zones for supporting JSDF logistical deployments, and thus that there was no risk of the JSDF becoming sucked into a conflict and the exercise of collective self-defence.¹⁷ Similarly, Japan maintained the ban on collective self defence in the despatch to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, arguing that the JSDF was despatched for non-combat missions and legitimised by UN resolutions.

Japan even after making key commitments in the alliance over the last decade has still continued to *obfuscate and delimit*. Japanese policy-makers have certainly found it difficult to maintain a minimal interpretation of the geographical scope of the US-Japan security treaty even though the letter of the treaty itself has remained unchanged. The US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security of 1996 referred to the alliance for the first time as covering the Asia-Pacific region, and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō reiterated this in the Diet the same month, the interpretation of the treaty thus exceeding Kishi's delimitation to the Far East in 1960. Moreover, the 2005 SCC Joint Statement's referral to common global strategic objectives has stretched the limitations of the treaty, and the DPRI's acceptance of the relocation of the US Army Corps I has marked a de facto breaching of the interpretations of the scope of the US-Japan security treaty and US bases as covering only Japan and the Far East. However, Japanese policy-makers have been able to continue through linguistic artifices to obfuscate the actual scope of US-Japan military cooperation under the treaty. The Japanese government's definition of 'the areas surrounding Japan' in the 1999 *Shūhen Jitaihō* as based on 'situational need' rather than strict geographical demarcations introduces a crucial element of strategic ambiguity into the scope of the US-Japan security treaty, with the particular advantage of leaving vague Taiwan and China as an objective of the alliance. Japan's hedging over Taiwan, moreover, has continued into the recently concluded DPRI.

Despite the insertion of Taiwan into the 2005 SCC Joint Statement as a common strategic objective of the alliance, Japan has made no more of an explicit commitment to Taiwan than at the time of the 1969 Satō-Nixon communiqué.

Japan has further delimited its security responsibilities in the Indian Ocean and Iraq by using the device of establishing separate laws for each JSDF despatch, each providing a different operational mandate and each with a limited timeframe renewable by Diet approval, thus limiting the possibility of open-ended missions and entrapment. The choice of ‘non-combat’ zones in the Indian Ocean and in southern Iraq has also limited the risks of the JSDF becoming sucked into actual fighting.

Another choice option for Japan to hedge against entrapment has been to *withhold certain key military capabilities* from the bilateral alliance and US-led coalitions, thereby limiting the risks of being co-opted into combat duties. Japan’s government delayed despatching the MSDF’s Aegis destroyers to the Indian Ocean until later in 2001 due to the fear that their interoperable systems would lead to US requests for their to be used as substitutes for US assets. Similarly, in Iraq the JSDF were provided with sufficient equipment to protect themselves, but not the type of weaponry that would mean they could become the object of US requests to assist active combat operations. Conversely, though, Japan has sought to counter abandonment by where necessary adding complementary capabilities that the US will see as vital to select in its inventory when drawing up allies for future ‘coalition of the willing’. Japan’s new power projection capabilities under the 2005-2009 MTDP provide it with useful complementary capabilities such as long range transports, amphibious ships, and rapid reaction forces. These may provide Japan with a crucial and its own preferred non-combat niche role, meaning that it is near the forefront of any future coalitions, but also meaning that it is not obliged to take on more risky ground deployment tasks as in the case of allies with lesser capabilities.

Finally, Japan has shown continued propensity to *commit and partially retract*, and to *intimate non-cooperation*. Japan has demonstrated the former and its ability to still frustrate US expectations in the DPRI process. It is striking that in the final intense phases of bilateral negotiations in late 2005 and early 2006 Japan switched its emphasis almost solely to reducing the US base burden on Okinawa. The US was singularly unsuccessful in subsequent SCC meetings in October 2005 and May 2006 in extracting from Japan any further talk of

common global strategic objectives, or specification of activities that it might undertake to combat terrorism. This led US policy-makers to label the DPRI as more of a ‘real estate’ negotiation over bases, rather than a negotiation amongst allies with genuine new strategic objectives in a post-September 11 world.¹⁸

Japan’s has again used reference to its potential veto over US military action from US bases to intimate non-cooperation with the US and obviate entrapment. In the run-up to the announcement of the revised Guidelines, Japanese policy-makers were careful to explain to an admittedly rather incredulous media and public, given doubts about the ability of the Japanese government to stand up to US pressure, that they retained the option to say ‘no’ to US requests for the use of bases. Moreover, in the wake of the DPRI, Japan appears to have extracted a new agreement from the US on the use of bases beyond the traditional scope of the security treaty. This stresses that base usage cannot be countenanced in cases where this is judged to have no relationship to the security of the Far East, and in cases where US activities outside the Far East would deplete the ability of the US to contribute to the security of the region.¹⁹

Japan and Ballistic Missile Defence

Japan’s security policy in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras can be seen to have proceeded along a trajectory that has made for increasingly tight alliance ties and strategic convergence, but in the course of which Japanese policy-makers have twisted and turned in their search for a series of hedging options to limit abandonment and entrapment. The latest and arguably greatest challenge for Japanese policy-makers is now the question of how to moderate the impact of BMD on its security dilemmas in the region and the concomitant alliance dilemmas vis-à-vis the US. In order to understand the nature and growing severity of these dilemmas, it is first essential to detail more closely Japan’s involvement in BMD and the characteristics of BMD technology that pose unprecedented demands for alliance cooperation with the US.

Japan’s BMD systems and alliance cooperation

As noted in the introduction, Japan’s flirtation with missile defence stretches back to the agreement of Prime Nakasone Yasuhiro’s administration in 1986 to participate in the ‘Star Wars’ Strategic Defence Initiative. This agreement became the basis for Strategic Defence Initiative Office (SDIO) and US and Japanese private defence contractors to conduct a joint

study on Western Pacific Missile Architecture (WESTPAC) between 1989 and 1993. In the meantime, Japanese government interest in BMD continued to be driven by the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies globally and in East Asia. Japan, partly in reaction to the experience of the Gulf War during which the US employed the *Patriot* system (if highly unsuccessfully) to intercept Iraqi missiles, and partly in reaction to North Korea's test launches of Nodong-1 missiles in May 1990 and May 1993, initiated the upgrade of its existing *Patriot* surface-to-air missile (SAM) system to the PAC-2 anti-ballistic missile system, and currently has twenty four PAC-2 batteries.

In September 1993, Japan and the US established a under the SCC a Theatre Missile Defence Working Group (TMDWG). In June 1994, the US put forward direct proposals for bilateral collaboration in TMD development, leading to the establishment, again under the SCC, of a Bilateral Study on Ballistic Missile Defence (BSBMD) to investigate the technological feasibility of BMD systems. In total, between 1995 and 1998, the government devoted ¥560 million to study costs for BMD, as well as commissioning private Japanese defence contractors to investigate key technologies. Japan's government, though, for various reasons outlined below, remained reticent about fully committing itself to cooperation with the US into BMD development. Japan's commitment to joint BMD research was eventually assured by the 'Taepondong-shock' of August 1998. Japan's government approved joint research with the US in December 1998, and then signed an exchange of notes on research with the US in August 1999. Japan and the US then embarked on a joint research programme into four key BMD interceptor missile technologies: infrared seekers in missile nose cones; the protection of infrared seekers from heat generated in-flight; the Kinetic Kill Vehicle for the destruction of ballistic missiles; and the second stage rocket motor of the interceptor missile.

Japanese policy-makers from 1999 onwards were at pains to stress that Japan-US cooperation on BMD remained purely at the research stage, and that further government deliberations would be necessary before moving to the stages of actual development and then deployment of a system. Japan originally envisaged that the BMD joint research phase would be completed in 2003-2004, but delays in the US testing programmes and the reconfiguration of missile defence programmes by the new Bush administration pushed this projected date back to 2006. The then JDA Director General Ishiba proved to an enthusiastic proponent, stating in December 2002 after a meeting with US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld that Japan was studying BMD with an 'eye toward a future move to development and deployment'.²⁰

But Ishiba was rebuked by both the then Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo and Koizumi for these comments.²¹

However, Japan's government in the end has adopted a faster schedule than envisaged for the deployment of a BMD system. Set against the background of the renewed North Korean nuclear crisis, Prime Minister Koizumi stated in May 2003 that Japan might 'accelerate consideration' of its participation in a joint BMD programme with the US. In December 2003, Japan then announced that it would procure the off-the-shelf BMD system from the US, whilst continuing to investigate the joint development with the US of future BMD technology.

Japan in line with the December 2003 decision is set to acquire upper and lower tier BMD systems. The upper tier system is the Maritime Self Defence Force's (MSDF) sea-based Aegis BMD, now termed under the Bush administration the Sea-Based Midcourse System (SMD), and originally termed by both the Navy Theatre Wide Defence (NTWD). The Aegis BMD system carries the advantage of being sea mobile and having a large defended territorial footprint of up to 2,000 kilometres in diameter against a 1,000km medium-range ballistic missile such as North Korea's Nodong. Its platform is the Aegis War-Fighting System (AWS) Kongō-class destroyer. Its interceptor missile is an upgraded SM-3. For sensors, the Aegis system employs an upgraded SPY-1B/D phased array radar to detect and track missile trajectories and provide on-board cueing for interceptor missile launches. The AWS is to be supplemented by Japan's upgrading of the FPS-3UG (Enhanced Capability) ground-based radar and the development of a new FPS-XX ground-based radar. The AWS and SPY-1B/D can be supplemented by Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) and E-2C surveillance aircraft equipped with infrared search and tracking (IRST).

However, space-based infrared sensors and the early warning tactical information that they provide in the detection of heat plumes from missiles in their boost phases and in calculating their exact launch point, are essential if a truly effective BMD system is to be constructed. The upgraded SPY-1B/D and FPS-3UG and the new FPS-XX function mainly to detect missile launches from post-boost and mid-course phases onwards that pass through their effective field of range. Hence, infrared space-based sensors and their ability to detect at the earliest possible time the launch point of missiles are invaluable in minimising the area for Japanese radars to search and maximise the time available for it to do so. US Defence

Support Programme (DSP) satellites, and the US Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High and Low (recently renamed the Space Surveillance and Tracking System) are uniquely capable of providing this infrared early warning and off-board cueing. Given that a 1,000 kilometre-range ballistic missile has a boost phase lasting 70 to 110 seconds, and a total flight time of less than ten minutes, access to this infrared sensor information should greatly enhance the probability to successfully cue up the interceptor missiles.

Japan's upper tier Aegis system is to be reinforced by the Air Self Defence Force's (ASDF) lower tier PAC-3, intended to intercept missiles in their terminal phase, and now termed by the US as the Terminal Defence Segment (TDS). PAC-3 has a smaller defended footprint, but its layering with the NTWD system offers an enhanced probability of preventing leakage in a missile shield. In addition, the JDA Director General even indicated in May 2004 that Japan might cooperate with the US into laser technologies for boost phase intercept (BPI) BMD systems—BPI carrying the advantage that it may destroy missiles when they are slowest travelling and large enough to easily detect, and that the warhead material from the missile should fall back over the territory over which it was launched from.²²

The ASDF from 2007 will establish a mobile tactical data distribution system to feed information from the MSDF Aegis sensors to ASDF radar sites in Akita, Niigata, Kyoto, Shimane, Yamaguchi and Nagasaki. The command and control functions of the Aegis and PAC-3 systems will then be integrated through an upgrade of its existing Base Air Defence Ground Environment (BADGE) to create the Japan Air Defence Ground Environment (JADGE), and necessitating bringing the MSDF and ASDF BMD assets under the control ASDF Air Defence Command (ADC); the first time that the two services have engaged in joint operations. Japan will procure the upgraded AWS, SPY-1B/D, and SM-3 missile from the US. In the meantime, Japan and the US will continue their joint programme into interceptor missile technologies.

Japan's decision to take the plunge for BMD was motivated by a range of factors. Japan increasingly perceives North Korea's force of up to 100 Nodong missiles as a clear and present danger. Japan's total vulnerability to ballistic missile attack and the North's potential willingness to use these weapons against Japan was dramatically emphasised by the 1998 Taepodong-1 launch. Japanese policy-makers are also clearly concerned over the long term by China's ballistic missile capabilities, and even by Russia's residual missile force in the

region. Japan's lack of retaliatory capacity and its argument that BMD systems are purely defensive in nature, means that BMD is seen as offering a means to counter the missile threat and to fit its exclusively defence-oriented policy. Japan also possesses many of the platforms for BMD: already deploying four AWS destroyers, with two more planned for the current MTDP, and PAC-2 missile batteries for upgrading.

Koizumi's government seems finally tipped in favour of the early procurement of BMD for two reasons. Firstly, US testing of SMD systems appears to have progressed relatively smoothly, and then PAC-3 systems were argued to have worked effectively during the Iraq war. Secondly, Japan seems to have been sold on BMD by US arguments that the systems could be procured more cheaply than previously thought. Joint development of the Aegis/SMD/NTWD system was originally estimated at nearly ¥1 trillion (US\$8.35 billion), but the cost of fitting out four AWS destroyers for NTWD is now estimated at ¥100 billion (US\$830.5 million); although the total cost of the BMD programme, including NTWD, PAC-3 and upgrades to the JADGE was still calculated by the JDA as ¥1.3 trillion.²³ Thirdly, the US made it clear to its by late 2002 that it would move ahead with the deployment of its own MD systems, and allies would need to follow if they wished to establish full cooperative relations.

Finally, Japan's acquisition of BMD capabilities is complemented by the US's deployment of its own MD systems in and around Japan. The US in the wake of North Korea's 2006 missile tests has deployed twenty four fire units around its bases in Okinawa.²⁴ The US Navy's Seventh Fleet has deployed at least three AWS cruisers based Yokosuka on missile surveillance and tracking in the Sea of Japan; and from early 2006 has been considering the deployment of the *USS Shiloh* AWS cruiser to Japan, one of its most capable MD assets equipped with the upgraded SM-3 missile. The US will further deploy an X-Band Radar at the ASDF's base at Shakiri in Aomori Prefecture from 2006.

Japanese abandonment and entrapment resulting from BMD

For Japan, the introduction of BMD has posed some risks of abandonment. This was especially so during the Clinton administration, which insisted on a distinction between Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) designed to defend US forward deployed forces, and National Missile Defence (NMD) designed to defend only the US homeland. The concomitant anxiety of Japanese policy-makers was that the US's ability to utilise new

technologies such as missile defence for its exclusive protection could lead to the de-coupling of Japanese and US security interests, so raising the prospect of abandonment (see Kato article). However, since the Bush administration's removal of the the TMD-NMD distinction to emphasise the creation of a multi-layered system designed to defend the US and possibly extendable to allies, this anxiety has been reduced. The US's deployment of MD is now seen to make it a more implacable ally that is less likely to be intimidated by missile strikes against itself or an attempt by an adversary to use asymmetric pressure in order to target allies with missiles and detach these from alliance ties.

Nevertheless, even in the transition to the Bush administration, Japanese fears of abandonment in relation to missile defence have not entirely disappeared. In particular, and as will be further elucidated below, Japan's dependence on bilateral technological cooperation with the US for the deployment of BMD has meant that it has been faced with the choice of either following the US in each stage of progression of the BMD project or to face the prospect of the US dropping plans for cooperation and thereby undoing all of Japan's BMD efforts to date. This type of scenario was very much behind Japan's being 'bounced' into finally committing to BMD in 2003, fearing that if it not remain close to the US as it advanced with missile defence deployments that it would be abandoned as an ally in this field of bilateral cooperation.

Japan's principal fear, though, as always, has been the risks of entrapment resulting from close bilateral cooperation with the US on BMD, especially due to the fashion in which BMD closes down many of its traditional hedging strategies against this eventuality. In turn, Japan's alliance dilemmas vis-à-vis the US generated by BMD, are themselves compounded by BMD's generation of security dilemmas in East Asia which force ever greater reliance on the US-Japan alliance. Japan's existing security dilemma vis-à-vis North Korea is well known. Japan's participation in BMD, although not likely to stimulate the North's already on-going missile programme which is so vital to its diplomatic and military campaign to break out of its international isolation, is also unlikely to curb the North's build-up of its missile forces, and this is despite opinions which see BMD as a means to convince the North of the futility of threatening Japan and the US.

Instead, the principal security dilemma that BMD is likely to exacerbate for Japan is that vis-à-vis China. Chinese policy-makers are concerned that Japan's development of a BMD

system developed in conjunction with the US could lead to the negation of its nuclear deterrent by providing Japan with both a 'spear' and 'shield'. The spear of the US extended nuclear deterrent would be complemented by a BMD shield, allowing Japan deterrence by both punishment and denial vis-à-vis China. Chinese fears might in part be justified as the Aegis BMD system may have some residual or 'break out' capabilities to defend against its inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and certainly the US regards the Aegis/SMD component of its missile defence as part of a defensive shield against ICBMs.²⁵ China in all likelihood though could overcome the negation of its strategic nuclear arsenal through the employment of countermeasures and development of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) to overwhelm any BMD system.

China's concerns extend also to the Japan's possible countering of its tactical ballistic missiles and involvement in the Taiwan issue. China's worst case scenario would be Japan's deployment either individually or in conjunction with the US of its sea-mobile NTWD system to defend Taiwan in a future crisis situation. In particular, China would fear the formation of a quasi-alliance amongst the US, Japan and Taiwan. For if the US were to sell AWS and BMD technology to Taiwan, this could result in all three powers being equipped with fully interoperable equipment, so smoothing the way for three-way military cooperation.

Japan's reluctance to become embroiled directly in a Taiwan Straits crisis makes this an unlikely scenario except in circumstances of a full scale conflict. Far more likely is that Japan would utilise its BMD system to defend US forces operating in a Taiwan Straits crisis from bases in Japan; an action that would complicate any attempts by China to intimidate US forces in the region short of initiating a war also against Japan. China can ultimately overcome any BMD system through increasing production of its missiles; a process that is relatively cheap and likely to saturate and overcome any defence. Therefore, Japan's interest in BMD, although not initiating the process, carries the risk of accelerating China's upgrading of its nuclear and conventional ballistic missile capabilities and generating further momentum for a regional arms race.

Japan's participation in BMD, although adding a degree of defensive capability, at the same time looks set to complicate its security dilemmas with North Korea and especially China, and emphasises for Japanese policy-makers the extreme caution needed in managing the project and entrapment risks with the US. However, BMD by the very nature of the

technological and political-military decisions that it imposes on Japan undercuts hedging options to manage these risks.

Firstly, Japan's ability to *evade and temporise* is a limited option under participation in BMD. Japan during the uncertainties of the Clinton administration certainly practiced a type of wait and see option before committing itself to any specific project or architecture that might mean it entering into BMD on terms that overly strategically disadvantaged it against the US. Japanese policy-makers held to their scheme of breaking decisions about BMD into the stages of research, development, production and deployment, contrasting with the US two-stage process of development and deployment, thus attempting to reserve the right to work to Japan's own schedule and take considered political decisions at stage. Japan has persevered with this scheme during the Bush administration as well—for instance, still insisting, despite agreeing to joint development with the US of the SM-3 interceptor in 2006, that a further decision is still necessary on actual production. Nevertheless, despite Japan's subtle hedging to buy time in the BMD project, in the end, as seen above, it was effectively 'bounced' into the project by the US unilateral decision to move ahead with MD deployment, obliging Japan to follow.

Moreover, once the BMD system is actually deployed, there will clearly be no opportunity for temporisation in its operation. In past regional and global contingencies, Japan has been able to work through its convoluted decision-making processes to take a decision on the necessary action. In certain cases, this has taken weeks or months, and even Koizumi's unprecedented swift response to 9/11 took a matter of days. By contrast, BMD's timeframe of less than ten minutes being available to launch missile interceptors, means that Japanese policy-makers and military commanders will have to respond in real-time and nearly instantaneously to missile attacks and participation in a conflict that may spell an active commitment to military cooperation with the US.

Secondly, Japan's capacity to *emphasise domestic political and constitutional restrictions* will be severely hampered by BMD. Clearly the tight timeframes of BMD mean there is no scope to plead the need for consultation with domestic opinion in responding to a launch. Japanese policy-makers also face increasing pressure resulting from BMD for the breach on the prohibition on collective self-defence. BMD systems demand the free flow of sensor information not only from the US side, but also reverse flows from the Japanese to US side,

in order to function effectively. The US, for instance, in April 2004, requesting that Japan make available sensor information from its FPS-3UG radar stations for US Navy missile defence assets.²⁶ From 2005 onwards Japan and the US began joint training for the exchange of information on missile tracking between their respective AWS ships.²⁷ Japan and the US carried out a similar exercise in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises in July 2004. The agreement in the SCC Joint Statement of May 2006 to establish BJOCC is further designed to promote bilateral information sharing.

Japan's government maintains that this information exchange will not necessarily conflict with existing prohibitions on collective self-defence as it may be classified as routine information-gathering that is not directed specifically for the exercise of the use of force in support of an ally.²⁸ Its policy-makers also hope that a technological solution can be worked out which means that, even though Japanese and US command functions will be physically collocated at BJOCC, personnel will be housed in separate facilities and that any data which conflicts with the collective self defence interpretation can be sifted out of the exchange system. This demonstrates the extraordinary lengths that Japan is prepared to go to in order to preserve its collective self-defence option, but as they admit the operation of such a system and its technological components are 'still under study'.²⁹

Moreover, Japan will also find it increasingly hard to hold the line on collective self defence due to the changed nature of US missile defence programmes. The Bush administration's incorporation of all missile systems into one multi-layered global system raises questions as to whether Japan's Aegis system with its possible 'break out' capabilities against ICBMS launched from East Asia against the US could thus be viewed as functioning for purposes of collective self-defence. If Japan were to engage in BPI missile defences, then this would further strengthen the collective self defence argument, as it would be near impossible to determine if missiles shot down over their launch sites were targeted at Japan or the US.

Thirdly, Japan's ability to *obfuscate and delimit* is thrown into doubt by BMD. As noted above, Japan will be highly dependent on the US for space-based sensor information to maximise the effectiveness of the BMD system, or it will be left with a highly weapons system that will only sub-optimally without the cooperation of its ally. Japan's dependency was first shown by the Taepodong-1 test of 1998, when, in spite of its Aegis destroyers managing to detect part of the flight path of the missile, ultimately it had to rely on

information passed from US satellites on the final impact point. The JDA was again embarrassed in July 2006, when the US reportedly used its satellite information to point out to the Japanese government that the Taepondong-2 exploded only 1.5 kilometres from its launch pad over North Korea's own territorial waters 400-600 kilometres away in the Sea of Japan as originally estimated by Japanese officials.³⁰ Japan's continued dependence on US ascendancy in sensor information for BMD, its major weapons project this decade, therefore means that its entire security strategy must be geared even further to the general appeasement of its US ally if it wishes to defend itself.³¹

Moreover, BMD's technological nature means that Japan's policy-makers will no longer be able to employ the type of ambiguity found in the revised Defence Guidelines in order to obfuscate the true extent of their military support for the US. The short time frame involved for a BMD system to respond to a missile launch means that there will be no time for Japan's political leaders to debate decisions on interceptor launches. Instead, Japan's government will have to provide JSDF commanders in the field with clear rules of engagement to deal with a range of pre-planned scenarios that would commit Japan to a conflict. All of this necessitates increased Japanese planning for regional contingencies, much of which will inevitably involve closer coordination with the US and revealing to it in more definite terms the types of scenarios that would trigger Japanese military support for its ally. Japan's preparation for these rules of engagement has already involved softening of the principle of civilian control over the military with the February 2005 legislation to amend the Defence Agency Establishment Law. This legislation enables the Director General of the JDA to mobilise the JSDF to launch interceptors only with the approval of the Prime Minister (rather than in consultation with the Cabinet's National Security Council as mandated under the present law). In other situations, where there is no time to consult even with the Prime Minister, the Director General is entitled to mobilise JSDF interceptor launches in accordance with pre-planned scenarios.³² This thus gives a more free-ranging role to commanders in the field, and greater potential for them to offer support to the US.

BMD also threatens to transgress Japan's previous attempts to limit the geographical scope of its commitments to the US under the security treaty to the defence of Japan and the Far East. The US Navy's Aegis cruisers have been engaged in a pattern of patrols that suggests their principal role is to gather data to support US MD systems for homeland defence.³³ Similarly, the US has made it apparent that the deployment of an X-Band radar in Shikiri is part of a

range of forward-deployed sensors that are integrated with ground-based terminal phase MD for defence of the US mainland.³⁴ In this way, Japan has further lost its ability to delimit the scope of the security treaty, it functioning now not only for global contingencies as far as the Middle East but also for the defence of US territory.

Fourthly, Japan's ability to *withhold or add capability* to hedge against entrapment looks to be increasingly denuded by the technological demands of BMD. In the past, as noted earlier in the paper, Japan has denied the US the opportunity to seek to integrate it into international or collective self-defence coalitions simply by avoiding the procurement of suitable or interoperable expeditionary capabilities that would make it an object of such a request or expose it to highly risky conflicts. BMD threatens to change this calculation as Japan now possesses a sea-mobile weapons system which has a range of defensive power of close to 2,000 kilometres. It is thus likely to face increasing calls for the US to add this weaponry to the inventory of ad hoc coalitions. The enhanced possibility for demands for deployment in contingencies involving Taiwan has already been discussed. Japan has also been given warnings of the shape of things to come through the US's pressure for it to deploy the fully interoperable Aegis destroyers in the Indian Ocean post-9/11, and may face calls in the future for projecting a defensive shield over US offensive power projection in other theatres such as the Middle East. Hence, the simple lesson for Japan is that possession of capability spells expanded US demands and the possibility of entrapment.³⁵

Japanese policy-makers lack as well the ability to hedge against entrapment through adding autonomous capacity that would counter-balance dependence on the US in BMD. Japan has plumped in the first instance to purchase an off-the-shelf interceptor system from the US with black-boxed technology. Japan's early disadvantage in BMD technologies will thus be further entrenched. The joint programme with the US for the upgrade to the SM-3 interceptor missile offers some prospect for Japan to maintain indigenous capabilities to contribute to BMD, especially in infrared sensors and rocket technology. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries eventually managed also to secure agreement for licensed production of the upgraded PAC-3 interceptor missile from Lockheed-Martin, despite the Japanese government having initially gone ahead and agreed to procure the system without such an agreement.³⁶ Upgrades to the JADGE system will further provide technological upgrade possibilities for Japanese defence contractors.³⁷ Japanese policy-makers have also struggled to try to strengthen sensor capabilities. Japan's indigenous optical and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite

capabilities, introduced after the Taepodong-1 test, will assist Japan to detect preparations for North Korean missile launches. The new FPS-XX radar should also assist in supplementing Aegis radars, and Japan since September 2005 has also been working on the development of IRST systems with the US. All the same, as the July missile tests demonstrated, Japan remains dependent on US infrared technologies and is unlikely to be able to add these to its capabilities in the future.

Hence, the general prognosis is that Japan's defence industry, already under pressure due to declining defence budgets and economies of scale to develop leading edge military technologies, is most likely to end up as the sub-contractor in BMD for US corporations. Clearly, Japan's participation in BMD offers opportunities for technological innovation that would have been unavailable if it stepped aside from the project. Indeed, many Japanese defence contractors are relatively content with this situation as it offers the prospects of some technology transfer from the US, an increase in orders and practice in joint production. The breach on the arms export rules to the US for the BMD also offer an opening to the further weakening of restrictions in the future that might pave the way to greater international cooperation with US and non-European contracts.³⁸ But Japan's participation in BMD is far from providing it with an autonomous set of BMD technologies and only increases its need to depend on the US for the functioning of its largest defensive system.

Finally, Japan looks barred from exercising any type of *commit and partially retract* option. Japan has already pledged itself to the deployment of BMD and restructured its entire procurement budget and JSDF operational system to accommodate this new weapons system. Once in operation, moreover, as pointed out before, the decision-making process on the system's use will be so rapid and so devolved as to make retraction impractical in the onset of conflict.

UK-US alliance management and missile defence

Japan's management of its alliance dilemmas vis-à-vis the US makes an interesting comparison with the UK-US alliance in revealing common options for hedging, degrees of success in hedging, and the conditions which explain the reasons for the choice of particular hedging options and their relative effectiveness.

Great Britain/theUK in seeking since the late nineteenth century to manage its relative and then absolute decline as a hegemonic power has been obliged increasingly to rely on the relationship with the ascending US.³⁹ The UK in the post-war period has assumed the position of a junior alliance partner and predicated much of its international position upon its so-called 'special relationship' with the US. The utilisation of this special relationship has been designed to enable the UK to play a 'bridging role' between the US and the Europe. The UK attempts to project a position of being uniquely placed to interpret US policy for European allies and to mediate between the US and Europe, thereby enhancing its indispensability to the US as an ally and bolstering its overall international position. However, this special relationship and bridging role, regardless of doubts about its actual utility in achieving the UK's general international objectives, involves latent hazards to UK security policy of abandonment and entrapment. On the one hand, the UK risks being left dangerously exposed if the US or European strategic interests diverge from those of the UK, but on the other, the UK risks entrapment in cases where the US seeks active assistance in conflict situations.⁴⁰

The history of US-UK relations certainly contains instances of actual abandonment as in the US's refusal to back UK-France military action during the Suez Crisis of 1956. The UK was also presented with the threat of abandonment in the run-up to the 1982 Falklands War, although the US finally swung its full diplomatic, intelligence and logistic weight behind the UK war effort. But throughout most of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, abandonment has been a minor dilemma for US-UK relations. Moreover, the UK has countered the risk of abandonment through *adding capabilities* that at the very least make it a useful coalition partner both in terms of providing military support and diplomatic legitimisation in US-led operations, such as the 1990-1991 Gulf War.

Instead, for the UK, as for Japan, the prevalent alliance dilemma has been one of US expectations for strategic convergence, enhanced military demands, and subsequent entrapment. The UK faced similar risks to the US's East Asian allies during the Vietnam War, with the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson requesting active UK military support for the war effort. However, the government of Harold Wilson countered these requests by *emphasising domestic political and international constraints*, arguing that the UK public would not accept involvement in the war, and that the UK was overstretched already in providing security for Southeast Asia due to counter-insurgency operations in Malaysia.⁴¹

Fast-forwarding to the current conflict in Iraq, the UK has further hedged as far as possible against military entrapment by seeking to *delimit* its deployment of forces to the south of Iraq, where the security situation has been relatively stable. The UK has also sought to organise its own *like-minded coalition* in Iraq to counter military dependence on the US: ensuring that in the run-up to the occupation of Iraq it gathered under its command the most capable non-US coalition forces which could then be deployed in UK-style reconstruction activities.

Therefore, the UK has employed many of the same tactics as Japan to attempt to obviate abandonment and entrapment vis-à-vis the US. In turn, US plans for missile defence throughout the latter Cold War and post-Cold War periods, have posed similar alliance dilemmas for the UK as for Japan, and elicited similar hedging responses.

During the later stages of the Cold War, and the US proposals for the *Sentinel* and *Safeguard* in the 1960s and 1970s, anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence systems raised UK concerns over abandonment and entrapment. UK policy-makers viewed abandonment as occurring as a result of the US acquiring the ability to defend itself but not its allies with ABM systems, thereby undermining deterrence, and rendering the UK's independent nuclear deterrent as further irrelevant in the Cold War strategic balance. Conversely, ABM systems raised the prospect of entrapment in a nuclear struggle, as their influence on the strategic balance between the US and USSR was uncertain. Hence, the UK welcomed the 1972 ABM Treaty, which limited the ABM systems of the two superpowers to the defence of their key command functions and thereby strengthened deterrence, as restoring strategic stability and as the cornerstone of arms control for the rest of the Cold War period.⁴²

The UK's option of *standing aside and acquiescing* was repeated during the Reagan administration's SDI. Although the SDI proposal initially renewed fears of decoupling and abandonment, the fact that the US made it clear that SDI would be extended to allies moderated these concerns. Instead, the possibility of entrapment was raised, as SDI looked initially to undermine the Cold War nuclear balance. The UK's government eventual response was to treat SDI as a *fait accompli*, to acquiesce and to join with the US in its technological development, in the hope of influencing US policy and of deriving technological spin-offs that would add general capacity to hedge against dependence on the US.

In the contemporary period, the revival of missile defence plans under the Clinton and Bush administration has raised familiar UK alliance dilemmas. The Clinton administration's distinction between TMD and NMD revived concerns over decoupling and abandonment. However, the Clinton administration's general lack of enthusiasm for pushing ahead with missile defence also lessened UK policy-makers apprehensions of the immediate strategic repercussions. The advent of the Bush administration, however, has intensified UK dilemmas.

The Bush administration has followed up on a plan first intimated by the Clinton administration to request that the UK agree to the upgrading and use of the Fylingdales radar site in North Yorkshire. This site has been in existence since the 1960s, with radar equipment paid for and provided by the US, and manned by Royal Air Force personnel (RAF). The site is part of the US Ballistic Missile and Early Warning System (BMEWS), and sends information to the missile warning cell at High Wycombe and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) in Colorado. Similar BMEWS facilities are located in Thule in Greenland and Clear in Alaska, although these are manned by US personnel. Fylingdales was first upgraded between 1987 and 1992 as part of a general modernisation of the BMEWS chain, with the installation of Solid State Phased Array Radars (SSPAR). The UK government met roughly thirty per cent of the £170 million cost. Fylingdales has been used in support of the US and UK nuclear deterrents to date, but the Bush administration sought to extend its use to the support of MD active missile defences. In response to a formal US government request in December 2002, the UK government agreed in February 2003 to a US\$111 million upgrade carried out by Boeing, probably to install a phased array X-Band radar, in order to utilise Fylingdales as 'vital building block' for missile defence.⁴³ In June 2003, the then British Secretary of Defence, Geoff Hoon, announced in the House of Commons that the UK and US had signed a Framework Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on MD. It is also thought that the Bush administration interest in UK participation in MD will also extend to the existing US National Security Agency signals intelligence site at RAF Menwith Hill in North Yorkshire. In March 1997, the UK government announced that Menwith Hill would become the European Ground Relay Station for SBIRS, and thus it may also become a key component of the US's global sensor systems for MD.⁴⁴ There have even been rumours that the US might consider asking the UK to host MD interceptors.⁴⁵

The UK policy community has continued to show a degree of scepticism towards US MD plans. Similar to the US other's NATO allies, questions are raised about the differential level of threat (measured not just in capabilities but also intentions) facing the US and Europe necessary to justify MD deployment; the impact of MD on nuclear strategic stability; its technological and cost effectiveness; and the opportunity costs imposed for pursuing other means to deal with missile threats, including non-proliferation, passive defences, and the continuing role of deterrence.⁴⁶ In terms of specific alliance dilemmas, since the US bracketed its 2002 proposals for the upgrading of Fylingdales with an offer to extend MD to the UK, concerns over abandonment have further abated. Instead, entrapment has become the principal concern for the UK. The UK's acceptance of MD sensor capabilities closely integrated into the US's global MD system is thought (in something of a rerun of the debates over the basing of cruise missiles in the UK in the 1980s) to enhance the UK's chances of becoming a possible target for attack by a 'rogue state' aiming to challenge the US. Moreover, even if MD has been accepted by Russia and China as a reality since the Bush administration, it is also felt that the UK's frontline role in MD would enhance its probability of targeting by these states in the future.⁴⁷ Furthermore, there are concerns that the US's predilection for bilateral approaches towards allies such as the UK could drive a wedge between the UK and its partners in NATO and the European Union, thus exposing the UK's international position and forcing it into greater dependence on the US.

The House of Commons clearly articulated the difficulty of the UK's position vis-à-vis predicted US demands on missile defence in the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Report of 1999:

The UK is not simply a bystander with regards to NMD. For the implementation of the first phase of NMD to work, facilities at RAF Fylingdales will need to be upgraded, and this cannot happen without the UK government's assent. This puts the Government in a different position to many of our EU partners and NATO allies, who will not be asked to make similar decisions. The uniquely close nature of the US-UK relationship in the security field exacerbates the complex and sensitive nature of the Government's response to NMD. A UK refusal to allow the upgrading of facilities at Fylingdales would be unprecedented and prove very testing for the alliance.... A decision by a US administration to seek permission to upgrade Fylingdales, having given formal notice of its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, would present the UK Government with an acute dilemma.... A decision by the UK to refuse a US President—possibly a newly elected President committed to implementing NMD as essential to the security of the USA—would have profound consequences for UK/US relations.⁴⁸

The UK has sought to manage its entrapment alliance dilemma with US, and preserve the special relationship which appears to be at stake in MD, through a number of options. Firstly, the UK has initially at times resorted to mild *evade and temporise* tactics. Prior to the 2002 request from the Bush administration, the UK intimated that it might look favourably on a possible request for the upgrading of Fylingdales, but stressed that no decision would be made until it saw firm proposals, thereby avoiding adding any momentum to the process.⁴⁹ The UK has ultimately been obliged, if not to *stand aside* given its integration into MD, to at least *acquiesce* in Bush administration proposals. The UK has been able to do so for a variety of reasons relating to the relative severity of entrapment. The perceived vital importance of the alliance means that the UK is not willing to make this a make or break issue, and it has recognised that even though Russia and China dislike the US MD plans they are unlikely to challenge the US or its allies. In the case of fears of ‘rogue states’, the UK’s existing ‘independent’ deterrent capabilities are deemed sufficient to dissuade an asymmetric attack. The UK relative traditions and comfort in close strategic alliance with the US on issue of countering nuclear threats and intelligence sharing also provide confidence to its policy-makers that bilateral cooperation on MD will not pose undue risks.

In addition, the UK retains certain hedging options to at least moderate the impact of MD cooperation with the US on MD. The UK may be able to *add capabilities* to its military technological base. The 2003 MOU between the US and UK provides a basis for UK defence contractors to participate in MD. On July 18 2003, the UK established a UK Missile Defence Centre (MDC) to conduct joint research on MD, and the same month Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems signed an MOU on developing missile defence solutions. The US clearly remains the leading partner in MD technological research, but the size of UK defence contractors and their skills in working with US partners may succeed in extracting some technological advantages that moderate dependence on the US. In particular, the UK is believed to have some comparative advantages in radar sensors and countermeasures for anti-ballistic missile systems due to its development of the *Chevaline* upgrade to Polaris missile in the 1960s and 1970s. The UK, although it is unlikely to exercise it, also retains the option of *intimating refusal* to US MD proposals, through its control of sensor facilities at Fylingdales, and need to grant permission for any change in the use of Menwith Hill. Finally, the UK may be able to cushion the impact of MD by exploiting ties with NATO and EU partners, and thus build a *like-mind regional coalition*. The UK has attempted to activate NATO partners to consider the possibilities of missile defences, and it seems to have contributed to the 2002

NATO Prague Summit's decision to launch studies into the feasibility of NATO TMD capabilities. The UK looks set to respond more to the bilateral pull of the US, and the US has used the bilateral approach to also pull other useful MD allies to its side as with its request to Denmark to allow the use of the Thule Greenland radar sites. However, if the UK and European allies can use NATO as regional vehicle to prepare a European form of missile defence and pull the US into this, then it may serve at least to influence US deployments.

Conclusion

Japan has spent much of the post-war period gradually moving closer to the US strategically, but also exercising where possible a range of hedging options to enable it to slow or even divert from this course. Japan's participation in BMD is now closing down these options. Japan's security trajectory is moving towards the increased likelihood of entrapment in US regional and global strategy, as Japanese possession of fully interoperable BMD capabilities with defensive power projection enhance pressure for deployments in the service of the alliance in East Asia and beyond. Japan is also becoming a forward base for US MD. Its policy-makers are finding it progressively more difficult to hedge through strategies to *evade and temporise, emphasise domestic political and constitutional restraints, obfuscate and delimit, withhold or add capability*, and to *commit and retract*. Japanese policy-makers will certainly continue to hedge to their utmost ability, but given their nation's strategic situation in relation to North Korea and China their chances of maintaining strategic autonomy are questionable. In short, BMD may be the bilateral project which finally overwhelms Japan's reticence to commit itself to a full (and definitely junior) military partnership with the US.

The UK, if compared to Japan, presents some startling similarities. It too faces predominately dilemmas of entrapment, although these are generated by its basing role rather than active participation in the development of its own BMD system as yet. The UK has attempted to employ similar strategies of evasion and temporisation in order not to let the MD issue damage the alliance. In the final outcome, the UK has acquiesced in US MD plans, but tried to retain some purchase over its ally and maintain its own strategic autonomy through *intimations of non-cooperation, adding capability*, and dealing with a *like-minded regional coalition*.

The degree of comparative success of Japan and the UK in managing the US in missile defence is open to question. Arguably Japan is set to lose considerable strategic autonomy

and appears to have few new options for managing alliance ties, as alliance ties tighten increasingly. The UK perhaps has more options, especially due to the presence of regional allies, and in any case it is more relaxed in submitting to MD plans as it faces less immediate recriminations from the international system. Japan, by contrast faces the more present and immediate threat from North Korea and China, thereby heightening its security and alliance dilemmas. This means that commitment to missile defence has perhaps heavier immediate strategic consequences for Japan than it does for the UK. On the other hand, though, it might be the case that the UK is more easily resigned to MD and entrapment because it has been inured to entrapment by the US for the last fifty years.

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