

## **The Influence of European Integration Process outside EU borders**

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### **Abstract**

The present study makes a step further in Europeanization research by advancing a theoretical framework that examines the influence of the European integration process on domestic developments of different groups of non-member states. It includes the major variables highlighted in Europeanization literature and the works on democratic transition of EU outsiders, particularly from the post-communist space and addresses the questions of how and why the European integration process influences domestic changes outside its borders. It provides a classification of possible mechanisms and outcomes of the Europeanization process according to the potential variation of the type of EU involvement, depending on the extent and nature of EU pressure and the clearness of EU level policies, and the degree of domestic engagement in implementing European requirements. The work examines not only the cases of direct and indirect EU involvement, but also the potential theoretical instruments and outcomes of Europeanization in cases where the stimulus – European Union – is missing from the picture.

Key words: - Europeanization of non-member states, European integration, democratization, domestic transformations.

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## **Introduction**

In the last decades, there has been a growing scholarly interest in examining the impact of European integration process on domestic developments of non-member states. Although most of the studies dealing with the outsiders usually do not refer to the concept of Europeanization, they nevertheless constitute an important part of the emerging Europeanization literature. Their major contribution is the broadening of the scope of Europeanization research by investigating the character and the degree of European level influence (usually operationalized as EU influence) on domestic changes of European club's outsiders.

Depending on the research questions that scholars address in their works, there can be distinguished several major categories of outsiders. The first group deals with the so-called EU 'adaptive outsiders,' specifically European Free Trade Association EFTA countries that came closer to Europe in order to avoid the negative externalities of European integration process. The second group includes post-communist candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Malta and Cyprus. Scholars have been investigating the impact of EU enlargement conditionality policy on successful domestic transformations of candidate states towards democracy and market economy.

After the recent 2004 enlargement and the new developments of EU external policies, scholarly research interests have expanded to examine EU involvement in domestic changes of its neighboring countries - associated states from Western Balkans and countries within the framework of European Neighborhood Policy ENP.

However, at present the literature on the influence of European integration process on non-member states lacks a theoretical framework that would allow a comparison between different groups of outsiders. With the exception of studies on CEE candidates, which achieved during the last years a certain level of theoretical sophistication, the Europeanization literature fails to provide a theoretical approach towards EU non-member states that would examine both the character and the degree of EU involvement in domestic transformations, as well as internal factors that would explain the resistance to or acceptance of EU requirements.

So far, a large part of literature on EU outsiders has been merely concerned with the study of the direct EU influence within the different legal frameworks, such as Association Agreements AA with CEE countries, Stabilization and Association Agreements SAA in the case of Western Balkans, or European

Neighborhood Policy ENP that applies to new EU neighbors. Yet, the analysis of the indirect EU influence on domestic transformations, such as the change of internal opportunity structure, the shaping of domestic actors' preferences, or the more voluntarily adjustment of outsiders to EU rules and practices remains mainly unexplored.

The present study addresses this limitation of Europeanization literature by advancing a theoretical framework that allows the analysis of the influence of European integration process on domestic developments of different groups of non-member states. It includes the major variables highlighted in Europeanization literature and the works on democratic transition of EU outsiders, particularly from the post-communist space and provides a comprehensive classification of mechanisms of Europeanization process outside EU borders and discusses the potential outcomes of Brussels' influence on domestic changes.

The paper has the following structure. The first part presents an overview of the literature on the interaction between the international processes and actors and domestic developments, shifting later to the studies of European level influence on internal transformations of EU outsiders. After the clarification of the shortcomings of Europeanization literature on non-member states, the work presents a new theoretical framework built on International Relations IR and Comparative Politics CP accounts, such as diffusion theory and policy transfer, literature on external dimensions of domestic developments, Europeanization studies and democratization theories.

Although the examined empirical findings are limited to European continent, the study advances a theoretical approach that analyzes possible mechanisms and outcomes of Europeanization process in the case of no European level involvement, which empirically can occur outside the European space.

### **The interaction between European and domestic processes and actors**

The study of the European influence on non- EU members, similar to other Europeanization literature, brings into theoretical analysis the relationship between the international system and domestic ones and joins the larger debate that aims at bridging IR and CP approaches. Thus, a starting point of the present work is the clarification of major theoretical arguments on the influence of external factors on national and sub-national structures and actors.

One of the approaches that tackle the confluence of international and domestic variables in explaining domestic transformations is diffusion theory. A common definition of diffusion from natural sciences refers to the spread of something from an epicenter across space. In social sciences, diffusion model comes to explain the spread or the dissemination of certain policies and practices within a population or social system. (Strang 1991; Strang and Soule 1998; Eyestone 1977). The major argument of this approach is that traits and practices developed in a particular population, state, or international organization (epicenter) spread to other places and influence the choices of their counterparts and neighbors.

However, the application of diffusion concept to social sciences raises several major problems. First, there is a conceptual problem of scholars in dealing with diffusion. Some researchers perceive diffusion as a process, a mechanism of dissemination of policies and practices from one place to another. Diffusion in this sense takes different forms, such as contagion, demonstration effect, imitation, emulation, policy transfer, bandwagoning, etc. By contrast, another group of scholars understands and operationalize diffusion as an outcome rather than a process. The terms used to describe diffusion in this case are convergence, homogeneity, waves, isomorphism, etc.

Second, while identifying diffusion with a process of “uncoordinated interdependence,” the nature of interdependence implied by the majority of studies is largely undetermined. (Elkins and Simmons 2005, 37-38) Most of the literature is not powerful enough in explaining the specific way in which changes occur at domestic level as a result of international influence and what factors (both external and internal) determine the emergence of one or another outcomes.

What scholars tend to agree on is that for obtaining the broader picture of international influence on national and sub-national developments the research design should include both external and domestic factors, as none of the two groups can explain on its own the occurring changes. (Jacoby 2006)

The research on the external dimension of domestic transformations has advanced different classifications of channels of outside influence on internal structures. So, for example, Whitehead’s work (1996) represents a pioneering approach that brings together various mechanisms of external influence. The scholar advances three main “linkage processes” that characterize the international dimensions of democratization in Europe and Americas: contagion, control, and consent. While the first two headings deal merely with international level factors, the third one takes into account the

developments from domestic level that affect the success of international influence on democratic consolidation. It envisages that external actors and developments offer their support to reform-oriented internal forces (both societal and political actors) that share common grounds with international democracy-promoters in order to assure the successful implementation of external policies and practices.

Following a similar reasoning, Jacoby (2006) advanced the “coalitional approach” to external influence. The scholar presents three modes of international influence on post-communist transformations: inspiration (a flow of ideas from outside to inside), subsidy (material and political benefits), and substitution (direct imposition of foreign services and templates, with the most aggressive form of military occupation). While analyzing the empirical success or failure of each of the three modes of external influence, the author argues that foreign inspiration and subsidies have proved to work best in cases where there existed an implicit partnership, a coalition strategy with domestic actors, specifically with post-communist reformers. Coalition approach, an alternative to substitution, emphasizes the need of external support for ‘minority traditions’ and like-minded domestic actors in order to achieve a higher probability of successful and long-lasting implementation of liberal-democratic reforms.

The works on European influence on domestic changes of EU outsiders engage into the debate on external dimension of internal transformations and provide new theoretical and empirical findings on the subject. There can be distinguished three subfields of this literature based on the examined research questions. The first one includes studies that focus merely on the analysis of European level variables. The main research objectives are the investigation of the character and the degree of EU involvement in post-communist developments. This type of literature analyzes the specific EU policies towards non-member states: enlargement conditionality (Grabbe 2001, 2005; Smith 2003, 2005a; Grabbe 2003; Spendzharova 2003; Jacoby 1999; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2006); relations with Western Balkans (Vachudová 2003; Pippa 2004; Bechev 2006; Demetropoulos 2002); ENP (Tulmets 2005; Kelley 2006; Smith 2005b; Emerson and Noutcheva 2004); ‘partial integration’ agreements with EFTA states (Gstöhl 2002; Vahl and Grolimund 2006; Archer 2005; Eliassen and Sitter 2003); or EU external relations and EU external governance (Börzel and Risse 2004; Lavenex 2004; Smith 1998; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2006; Farrell 2005; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Kubicek 2003). Another group of literature explores the domestic factors that mediate European Union’s influence or the conditions that determine the acceptance or resistance to European level influence, such as the

number of veto players, the type of government and domestic resonance of EU norms and values, institutional patterns, cultural and historical legacies, etc. (Brusis 2002; Vachudová 2005; Schimmelfennig 2005b). Finally, fewer studies aim at investigating the specific mechanisms of European level influence on domestic systems and the possible outcomes, such as convergence, approximation, learning, etc. (Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2003; Sverdrup 2000; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Jacoby 2004; Vachudová 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a; Johnson 2006; Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006; Schimmelfennig 2007)

Two major lines of reasoning dominate the theoretical approaches towards the study of EU impact on domestic changes in non-member states. The first one builds on rationalist accounts and argues that the power of European influence derives from its direct pressure through material and political benefits provided by EU. In this context, the Europeanization literature on candidate states argues that the combination of EU membership perspective with intermediary rewards was the central element of EU leverage in successful implementation of democratic and market economy reforms in CEE candidate countries. EU incentives provided technical and financial support to domestic reformers and political legitimacy for like-minded national actors. The lack of full membership promise, the major instrument of EU external leverage, decreases substantially EU bargaining power and the acceptance of EU requirements by domestic utility-maximizing actors, as it is the case of European Neighborhood Policy. (Kelley 2006)

An alternative reasoning builds on constructivist understanding of the normative power of European Union. So, EU constitutive liberal-democratic values and ‘ways of doing things’ can be ‘exported’ outside EU official boundaries through mechanisms of socialization and persuasion, depending on their attractiveness to domestic political and societal actors and their historical and cultural heritage. (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a; Epstein 2006) Most of research designs on EU leverage on outsiders include both lines of theoretical reasoning, examining both rational and ideational mechanisms. (Johnson 2006; Jacoby 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a; Kelley 2004a; Schimmelfennig 2007; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004).

In an original attempt to describe the relationship between European and domestic level processes and actors, Jacoby offered a classification of modes and outcomes of emulation by CEE elites of Western models of policy-making and institutional design. Based on two main variables: the degree of external pressure (more or less voluntarily) and the degree of faithfulness in replication (faithful or

approximate), the scholar suggests four possible ways of emulation: copies, templates, patches, and thresholds. (2004, 6) Concomitantly, the possible outcomes of emulation depend, in Jacoby's view, on the density of external rules and the number of policy sector actors (both operationalized as low and high). Four different outcomes are presented, with an illustration of empirical evidence from different policy domains: homesteading (consumer's protection), scaffolding (regional policy), continuous learning (health care), and open struggle (agriculture, civilian control of military). (idem, 10)

Although a number of studies provide a comparative systematized analysis of the mechanisms and channels of EU level influence on its outsiders, few of them attempt to specify potential results of this process and to provide a classification of the broad variety of outcomes of EU involvement in domestic transformations.

### **Limitations of literature on EU external leverage**

At present, the literature on the Europeanization of non-member states does not offer a theoretical framework designed for a comparative analysis of different groups of EU outsiders. Several important factors are responsible for this state of affairs.

First, the analysis of European integration influence on domestic transformations of non-member states represents an emerging subfield of Europeanization research. It is only recently that the focus from the case studies of 'adaptive outsiders' and CEE candidate states started to shift further from European borders, including the new Southern and Eastern neighbors from Western Balkans, Mediterranean region, or former Soviet republics. Thus, the conceptualization of the character and the degree of EU influence outside its territorial boundaries is an evolving process.

Second, the expansion of Europeanization research outside EU states faces serious difficulties, similar but more complex than in the case of studies on member states. The promotion of different EU policies towards various groups of outsiders represents one of the obstacles in providing a research design that would offer a working classification of EU level variables. Likewise, the diversity of intervening domestic level factors and conditions that determine the resistance to or the acceptance of European practices and 'ways of doing things' causes troubles in advancing a comparative framework for different groups of non-member states. Also, a major problem is the distinction between EU level influence and the involvement of other international actors and processes. This is merely the case of post-communist countries, where there is a big variety of international actors involved in the transition

process, both from European and international level. Because European Union, along with other European institutions (CoE, OSCE), NATO, or international actors (USA, IMF, WB) have a similar philosophy of democracy and market economy reforms, scholars face a considerable obstacle in finding the specific influence of one or another actor.

Finally, the existing literature on the EU external influence on non-member states does not provide a clear answer to the questions of how and why EU influences domestic changes outside its borders, but in most of the cases limits itself at a binary analysis of whether or not EU impact is present during domestic transformations.

### **A new framework of Europeanization of non-member states**

Being aware of the limitations of Europeanization research outside EU member states, the present study advances a new theoretical approach for the analysis of the mechanisms and the outcomes of European level influence outside its official borders. Expanding the application of the major existing hypothesis on EU involvement in domestic transformations, the work contributes to external influence literature and Europeanization studies by advancing a research framework that examines the influence of European integration process on domestic transformations of non-member states. The working definition of Europeanization used in the present work is the domestic reaction to European integration process. Although the primary focus of the empirical analysis is on European countries, I suggest that this theoretical framework can be also applied to explain EU external leverage on other outsiders.

The research design covers the analysis of the two groups of independent variables: European level factors and domestic variables for providing a systematized picture of the mechanisms of EU level influence on domestic changes outside its boundaries and potential outcomes of Europeanization process. It examines the dominant constraints and incentives that shape the vectors of domestic change as a result of Europeanization process. Two groups of variables are included in the theoretical framework: variables from European level and domestic one. Following the combination of the two major explanatory factors: the extent of EU involvement, on the one hand and the level of domestic engagement in accepting or resisting EU pressure, the study suggests some major mechanisms and outcomes of the influence of European Union on domestic transformations. Thus, the present theoretical framework not only investigates the presence or absence of EU influence, but it addresses the limitation of Europeanization literature by examining how and why a specific type of EU influence occurs.

## **EU as an atomic system**

The logic of diffusion theory about the spread of traits and practices from an epicenter to other places and their influence on choices of their counterparts and neighbors is helpful in providing a broad picture about the interdependence between European and national levels.

Figure 1 offers an original representation of EU and of the countries it interacts with as an atomic system, allowing for a better understanding of the degree of both direct and indirect EU level influence on domestic developments in different groups of states. It addresses the question of how and what kind of EU power is exercised on domestic developments in the context of other poles of influence (epicenters) on European continent particularly and across the globe in general.

*European Community as a nucleus.* We start with the idea that European Community represents the nucleus of the depicted atomic system. EC is the epicenter of institutions and practices of European type liberal democracies. During the Cold War period, the European Communities have represented an attraction pole of prosperous market economy development and of liberal-democratic principles, first of all for Western European countries. The European Union was one of the major actors that after the collapse of the Soviet empire have set the foundations of the New Europe in the historical *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* from 1990, among other European and international institutions (CoE, OSCE or NATO). (Schimmelfennig 2005a) Individual freedoms and human rights, liberal-democratic principles, as well as conflict settlement by peaceful means have been declared the constituent norms of the new European continent. Since then the European Union has been the major promoter of these fundamental norms of the New Europe and has been perceived as the nucleus of the family of European democratic states.

Although liberal democratic and market economy principles have been promoted by other regional organizations (such as CoE or OSCE), as well as international ones (NATO, IMF, WB), it is EU's merit to bundle together the influence of different regional and international actors and to sustain it over time through its unique conditionality instrument. The research on external influence of international actors (IAs) on domestic transformations has mostly pointed out the weakness of IAs to support successful domestic transformations. So, for example, the studies of democratization process in Latin America, Africa, or Asia show that external forces were regarded as having a negative or 'at best indifferent' impact on democratic consolidation. (Whitehead 2001b) Concomitantly, the influence of international organizations such as IMF or WB, which apply some specific conditionality policies in

their relations with domestic actors, is also a weak one merely because they do not ‘tip’ the political elites in favor of domestic reformation according to their guidelines (Haggard and Webb 1994, 5). In this context, the European Union presents a unique case of its involvement in democratic consolidation across the European continent. EU conditionality policy, specifically its membership perspective, has been described as having a strong positive influence on successful transition and consolidation of liberal democratic principles in the case of its southern enlargement (Spain, Portugal, and Greece) and of CEE candidate states. (Whitehead 2001b) The unique combination of intermediary incentives with the final reward of granting full association to the European club of states makes EU membership superior to any other membership perspectives of regional or international organizations. The strong EU level direct influence on domestic arenas is determined by extensive requirements of internal transformations according to EU rules of the game and a greater pooling of sovereignty as compared to other IO. (Vachudová 2005, 7) In the light of the European studies debate whether European Union’s influence on domestic transformations is a positive or a negative factor, the present work agrees with the studies that argue that EU has had a significant positive contribution on the promotion of democratic and market economy reforms on its (aspiring) candidate states, particularly in the case of the post-communist space.

Concomitant to the exercise of a direct EU power there is a strong indirect influence from the EU level on domestic change towards liberal democracy and market economy because the Union has been perceived as an epicenter of skills and knowledge expertise, committed to refine and improve its practices. Therefore, European Union presents a unique example for countries in search of a successful model of democratic and market economy transformations, specifically across the European continent. As Di Maggio and Powel pointed out in their study from 1983, states tend to model themselves after similar political and economic structures they identify as being more legitimate and/or successful. (idem, 152)

Finally, the sum of total formal and informal norms and practices developed at EU level create a specific type of democracy and market economy promotion according to the ‘EU way of doing things.’ There can be distinguished a specific type of ‘European democracy’ as compared to other versions of democracy, such as American, Russian, Asian, etc, which is an essential element of European Union’s identity. (Kopstein 2006; Tertrais 2006; Kelley 2004b) For example, in the area of human rights a distinctive element of EU model as compared to the American one is the opposition to the death penalty and the stress of social and economic rights, while in democracy promotion the difference

between the US and EU is the focus of the latter on the establishment of political associations both in political and civil sectors. (Börzel and Risse 2004, 30) Also, EU's approach towards democracy promotion is based on 'soft power' and 'soft security,' as opposed to American military interventionism in promoting its democratic model. It prefers tools such as positive (incentive-based) or negative (suspension) conditionality, political dialogue, capacity-building, persuasion and learning as opposed to direct appliance of military force. Last, but not least, the regional cooperation approach that EU adopts in its relations with non-European third countries, even in some cases when some groups of states do not perceive themselves as being part of a 'region,' (e.g. Mediterranean or Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries) is also a distinctive EU feature. (Grugel 2004, 607-608) In this case, European Union tends to promote its own model of regional integration, characterized by a more enhanced cooperation that goes beyond the free trade areas and the pooling of sovereignty in favor of strong supranational institutions.

***The structure of European Union's atomic system.*** In figure 1 different groups of states are represented in different layers or 'shells' depending on their atomic orbitals – distances from the EC epicenter. The first shell is composed by EU member states, which form the tight-binded electronic cloud. They are characterized by a small orbital and European Community exercises a strong magnetic force on them through direct and indirect influence on their domestic developments.

The second layer of EU atomic system is represented by EU candidate states. They have a longer distance from the EU atomic nucleus and are partially binded to European Community through diverse Association Agreements. Although the attraction force of EU nucleus is lower in this case, it is still strong enough for European Union to exercise substantial active leverage through its accession conditionality policy combined with intermediary incentives and the final reward of EU membership. At the same time, the European Union exercises an indirect influence on domestic changes of credible candidate states by virtue of its existence and its way of doing things. European level norms and practices emanated from the EU nucleus are believed to have an intrinsic value, regardless of the material incentives provided by the EU.

The attraction force that European Community has exercised on third countries has been especially high in the case of newly emerging European states from the former Socialist camp. EU has been perceived as a 'guru' of successful domestic transformations after the disintegration of the Soviet system. This group of countries has claimed to have more legal grounds (geographic criteria for EU

joining)<sup>1</sup> as well as moral ones ('return to Europe' argument: sharing European history and being part of European civilization) to join the European club of states.

The next cloud of countries from the EU atomic system is represented by the nearly free states, comprising European outsiders that are binded to the European nucleus through some specific agreements within such frameworks as EFTA or ENP. Although being characterized as nearly-free, they still can have an impact on the working of the European system through the production of some weak periodic perturbation or disturbance to the European club of states, due to their political or economic instability or security threats. The term 'nearly binded states' describes well the relationship between the European Community and this group of outsiders. The strong EU conditionality policy, combined with material and political rewards, as in the case of candidate states, is missing in the agreements signed with these outsiders. That is why the European Union has a lower degree of direct pressure on their domestic transformations.

However, being a direct EU neighbor or having declared their European aspirations, these countries tend to adopt EU *acquis communautaire* either to avoid the negative externalities of European integration process or to ensure an anticipatory adjustment to EU regulations so that one day they can be regarded as credible potential EU candidates. So, for example, after the signing of European Economic Area EEA in 1992 between the EU and most of EFTA countries, West European non-member states had to adopt a significant part of EU legislation, particularly economic *acquis*, in order to be able to join EU internal market and overcome the negative consequences of European integration. In their turn, most of East European and South Caucasian neighboring countries engage in an anticipatory adjustment to EU level regulations, using the existing EU Action Plans as a starting point, in order to express in practice their European aspirations and in hope that one day they would be considered as potential EU candidates, both on the grounds of satisfying geographical criteria for EU accession and complying to EU *acquis communautaire* as a result of their domestic transformations.

As compared to the previous two layers of EU atomic system, the EC attraction force in this case is not so much determined by the direct EU pressure on domestic change. It is rather the indirect influence of European integration process that brings these outsiders closer to Europe. By virtue of its existence, EU has been perceived as a model of successful transformation towards a stable society where democracy,

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<sup>1</sup> Article O of Treaty of Maastricht from 1992 claims that any European state that respects EU principles can apply for EU membership (The Maastricht Treaty. Treaty on European Union, 15)

human rights, rule of law, market economy, and peaceful conflict resolution are well-established principles safeguarded by European level institutions. In the case of European countries from the former Socialist camp, joining Europe has been interpreted as being recognized as belonging to Europe and representing a European state. Moreover, EU membership perspective has been identified as an ultimate indicator of the escape from Russian domination in the region.

Finally, there is another group of states that can be related to EU system. These can be identified with free or non-integrating electrons in an atomic system because of several reasons. First of all, EU conditionality policy has been much weaker with regard to non-European outsiders, such as Mediterranean region, African Caribbean Pacific group or Asia and Latin America (ALA). In most of the cases EU political conditionality, aimed at promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (Copenhagen criteria) is much weaker than in other cases because its major positive instruments are usually limited to EU market access through preferential trade agreements. This carrot, of course, is much smaller than the one of obtaining full EU membership that can be applied by EU in relations to European non-member states.

Concomitantly, because of the ‘soft’ nature of EU power in its external relations and its ‘positive approach’ of ‘managed compliance’ through open and constructive dialogue (Börzel and Risse 2004, 8), the sticks that the EU can use in relations with third states are also weaker. They are limited usually to the potential suspension clause of an agreement (e.g. Cotonou agreement for ACP or Mediterranean agreements) or the ‘appropriate measures’ that can be taken by the partners of the agreement in case of the violation of an agreement (the case of New Independent States NIS). Therefore, the European Community can exercise a very limited or no direct force at all on domestic transformations of its non-European outsiders, which gives these states a greater degree of freedom in their relations with the EU.

As regarding the indirect EU influence on domestic changes of this group of states, it is mostly limited to cases of voluntary adjustment to EU institutional templates and practices, lesson drawing and inspiration from EU rules during the process of domestic transformations.

***Other atomic systems.*** Apart from the nature of EU regulations and domestic factors mentioned above, the degree of attractiveness of EU institutions and ‘way of doing things’ depends also on some international level factors, such as the existence of other poles of attraction. For example, the figure 1 can be expanded as to represent the structures of the atomic systems around other epicenters across the

world that emanate different institutions and practices than EC. These epicenters can represent an international organization (such as NATO) or an international actor in the form of a single state (e.g. the USA, Russia, or China).

The relationship between EU level institutional templates and practices and the ones promoted by other atomic nuclei determines also the degree of influence the EU can have on different groups of states represented in figure 1 as different shells. So, in the case of the USA and NATO, because of the similarity of norms and practice between these epicenters and the EC, both EU member and non-member states do not perceive them as alternative systems. By contrast, in most of the cases NATO membership and good relations with the US are seen as coming hand in hand with European integration, or even as a criteria of judging on the readiness of a country to join the EU.

A completely different phenomenon can be observed in the case of the relationship between the Russian pole of attraction and the EC. The historical and cultural legacies that Russian empire and later USSR had on Central and East European states, Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as smaller orbitals of most of these countries from Russian nucleus as compared to the distance from EC epicenter represent an important factor of EU impact on domestic transformations of post-Soviet countries. Concomitantly, the institutional templates and practices emanated by the two epicenters differ radically. By contrast to European model, based on liberal democracy and market economy, Russian Federation tends to promote its own, 'Russian type democracy' and economic reforms, which are believed to be the proper ones for political and economic development of former Soviet republics (Romanovich 2004; Emerson and Noutcheva 2004) . The unique paradigm of Russian-style democracy has reasserted itself especially during Putin era with the powerful executive at its head, without any serious challenges to his power and firmly in control of the state's political, economic, and security developments. Therefore, particularly in the case of European neighboring states from NIS, Russian factor represents an important element of determining the attractiveness or the repulsion of EU model and the potential perturbations that can appear in the nearly-free states shell or among the free electrons of the EU atomic system.

### **EU level variables**

Two major factors from the EU level are brought into the theoretical equation following the discussed above scholarly contributions to Europeanization studies. These are the nature and degree of EU pressure and the degree of clearness of Union's requirements.

*The nature and the degree of EU pressure.* First of all, the mechanisms and outcomes of Europeanization process highly depend on the nature and the degree of EU pressure or the power that European Union possess in influencing domestic changes. Scholars have stressed the importance of distinguishing between two different types: direct and indirect pressure emanated from Brussels, which determine different mechanisms and outcomes of Europeanization process. (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005b; Vachudová 2005, 2001, 2006; Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006) Both of the cases can be present in member states and outsiders, but indirect EU pressure is more influential than the direct one in the case of non-EU countries. Addressing the difference between direct and indirect European level influence in the candidate states from Central and Eastern Europe and, later on, from the Balkans, Vachudova put forwards two theoretical models: active EU leverage and passive EU leverage. The passive leverage refers to the attraction of EU membership perspective for domestic political forces of credible candidate countries. The passive leverage is associated with the time period between 1989 and 1994, when there was no direct EU influence on CEE states. However, once the EU has set down its explicit conditionality policy, from 1995 on the active leverage became dominant in driving the process of Europeanization of applicant states (Vachudová 2001, 4-5).

An important factor that determines the extent of EU pressure is represented by the material and political incentives that EU can offer as carrots in order to stimulate the domestic actors to follow its rules. Two different categories of rewards can be used by European Union:

1. *intermediary rewards*– tipping political elites in order to achieve the implementation of its demands by granting them material (financial and technical assistance) and political (legitimacy) benefits; (Vachudová 2005, 139)
2. *final reward* – granting full EU membership perspective.

The present theoretical framework examines the nature of EU force by operationalizing it as direct and indirect EU pressure. The degree of EU pressure is measured as high, medium, low, and no pressure. The most illustrative case of a direct and a high level of EU pressure is EU conditionality towards member and applicant states on the full adoption of its *acquis communautaire*. In this case the Europeanization process is EU-driven and the strict conditionality of the EU follows the logic of ‘you must eat everything.’ (Jacoby 2004, 215) At the opposite pole, when at a certain starting point there is no pressure at all from EU side, be it direct or indirect, then the Europeanization process can be described as domestically driven, depending on the specific internal factors and conditions.

*The clarity of EU policies.* The degree of clearness of EU requirements represents another important factor in determining the mechanisms and the outcomes of Europeanization process. In order to observe a high direct EU pressure on non-member states, EU policies should be determinate, that is unambiguously designed and holding a binding power. (Franck 1990, 52-83; Legro 1997, 34; Schimmelfennig and Schweltnus 2006, 5) Some scholars have referred to it as the ‘density’ of the rules or the extent of EU demands (Jacoby 2004, 9-10).

So, the way EU frames its requirements largely determines the success of domestic transformations. The clarity of EU policies directly influences EU power and the type of involvement in the process of domestic change. A clearly formulated EU policy that has a compulsory character excludes the uncertainty of a potential manipulation of European level stipulations both by the Union and by domestic actors. For example, the introduction of EU conditionality policy for its CEE candidates in the second half of 1990’s with a clear stipulation of the requirements that had to be implemented made EU membership perspective a more credible one and ruled out the uncertainty that eventually it might not be granted. It also helped the process of domestic change by not only pointing out the fields that must be transformed, but also the specific paths through which it should be achieved, the most demonstrative example being the legislative and institutional harmonization.

Also, a high degree of clearness gives more bargaining power to the EU and a more active involvement in observing the implementation of its requirements. Having set some determinate rules of the game and nominating the responsible domestic players, the EU has the privilege in supervising the process of internal change and giving the required guidance when needed. A clearly formulated stipulation also eases the process of monitoring and benchmarking and the final judgment on whether or not a specific country has successfully completed the implementation of EU policies.

By contrast, a weakly determined EU policy with a feeble or missing binding power leaves room for uncertainty and different interpretations about the possible ways of its implementation or, even worse, the questioning of the necessity of its implementation at all. A low degree of clearness and binding power characterizes EU conditionality policy in the field of social policy and direct tax coordination, where a soft law applies and there is no Community legal instrument to secure their successful implementation.

Three cases of the determinacy of EU requirements are distinguished in the present theoretical framework:

- *well specified*, which means a clear and unambiguous stipulation of EU requirements, easy to monitor and to measure the final implementation;
- *less specified*, when EU demands are ‘lighter,’ difficult to follow and to measure and leave place for different interpretations;
- *vague*, when they are not clearly expressed and, consequently, understood by domestic actors, without a specified bottom line of their implementation

### **Domestic level variables**

The literature on external influence on domestic factor suggests that in order to have a clearer picture of the interaction between European and national/sub-national levels one should examine both the external (European) factors and domestic ones. (Jacoby 2006; Whitehead 2001a, 1996) In their turn, most Europeanization studies have pointed out, the mechanism and the final outcome of Europeanization process depend merely on the freedom of national discretion in domestic implementation of EU level institutional templates and practices. (Börzel 2005; Haverland 2000; Héritier and Knill 2001; Radaelli 2000, 2003).

There is little systematic research carried out with regard to domestic level factors that determine the freedom of domestic discretion during the process of transformation under the influence of European integration. Therefore, in order to distinguish the main internal factors that have to be brought into the theoretical framework, the present study focuses on the analysis of the two major theoretical approaches that determine *the degree of domestic engagement in the Europeanization process* – the major independent variable from domestic level. The success or failure of EU involvement in the process of domestic transformations largely depends on the willingness or the degree of discretion of domestic elites to accept or resist European policies.

First of all, following the *instrumentalist approach*, domestic political elites – the key internal actor – would tend to maximize their benefits (political or material ones) during the internal changes occurring as a result of European integration process. The cost-benefit analysis of political leadership would depend, however on the number of veto players (Börzel and Risse 2003; Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001; Vachudová 2005; Jacoby 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005a) in the domestic

arena and the specific political and societal groups they represent (e.g. political parties, interest groups, electorate, etc.) Concomitantly, internal institutional templates of decision-making (Börzel and Risse 2003; Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001) such as the federal-unitary structure of a state, electoral rule, the structure of a party system, etc. represent another important factor in determining the strategic behavior of political elites, Vachudova also argues the importance of the type of government: liberal or illiberal in determining the level of commitment of national leadership. So, she suggests that a liberal government, devoted to democratic principles of decision-making, is more committed to implement EU level policies and it is more constrained, therefore, in its strategic behavior, while the opposite is true about an illiberal, authoritarian-type government. (Vachudová 2005, 81)

Second of all, the *constructivist approach* advances several sociological factors that influence the degree of domestic engagement to transform according to EU level institutions and practices. Coming from the historical institutionalisms, one of the major variables in determining the attraction and the commitment to European norms and practices is represented by specific historical and institutional legacies from previous regimes. (Vachudová 2005) Especially in the case of the post-socialist countries, this is an important factor that explains the preference of European norms and templates over other practices, such as Russian ones, for example. Likewise, the ‘closeness to Europe,’ understood as the resonance of norms and values that define the domestic culture with the European ones is a major sociological factor that determines the domestic reaction to European integration process. (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Schimmelfennig 2005a) The more national and sub-national actors identify themselves as ‘belonging to Europe,’ stressing historical and cultural arguments, the more committed the political leadership would be in its engagement to transform according to EU level policies, having the EU as a “reference point” for national level political activity (Vachudová 2005, 37).

Thus, the *goodness of fit* (Börzel and Risse 2003; Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001) between the European and domestic level with regard to the nature of institutional templates, historical and cultural legacies, as well as the domestic resonance with European norms and values influence both the EU involvement as well as the degree of domestic engagement in carrying out reforms according to Brussels’ requirements.

The present framework of analysis does not aim at distinguishing between a pure instrumentalist and ideational logic of domestic action in case of different combinations of domestic and EU level

variables. In order to be able to make a stronger claim whether a rationalist or idealist behavior dominates domestic author's behavior one needs a deeper analysis of domestic level factors, which is not a primary objective of this theoretical framework. Yet, it does specify cases when one of the two logics is the most probable one, therefore examining both lines of theoretical reasoning.

### **The mechanisms and outcomes of Europeanization process**

After determining the major variables from European and domestic levels, the next step is identifying and examining the major mechanisms of Europeanization process, illustrated in table 1. Some important aspects of the advanced theoretical reasoning have to be clarified at this stage. First of all, the research design does not specify the causality of Europeanization process, because it considers that these mechanisms can function in both cases of top-down or bottom-up-down Europeanization process, depending on the examined policy-domains and country cases. Second of all, it is a complex approach that manages to capture the dynamics of domestic change under the influence of European integration process, as compared to other existing theoretical frameworks. It does so by including in the framework of analysis European and domestic factors that are not constant. It examines the variation of these factors over space and time that results in different mechanisms and outcomes of Europeanization process.

Finally, although most of the examples used to describe the diverse instruments of EU level involvement and the potential results of domestic transformations are among European countries, the presented examines possible theoretical mechanisms and outcomes of Europeanization process in the case of non-European states with a variation in EU level variable: the case of no EU involvement. Some of the described pathways and outcomes can very much be present outside the European continent, although at this stage no specific empirical examples are brought into the analysis.

Table 1 aims at bringing some 'order' in the 'disorderly' field of Europeanization research by examining the potential mechanisms and outcomes of domestic changes under the influence of European integration process. As already mentioned above, it presents a framework of analysis aims to capture the instruments and results of Europeanization beyond EU member or candidate states, by including into the picture outsiders, both European and non-European countries.

The table is built on two major variables: the type of EU involvement, measured as direct, indirect, and no involvement, and the degree of domestic engagement, operationalized as committed, resembling,

tolerant, and uncommitted. The kind of EU involvement in domestic transformations depends on the degree of EU pressure, or the power of European Union to influence domestic changes, and on the clarity of EU policies. The extent of domestic engagement, in its turn, depends merely on the degree of domestic resistance or opposition towards EU institutional templates and practices, in general, and EU policies designed for different national and sub-national actors in particular, depending on the mentioned-above domestic factors.

We start our analysis with the examination of the four possible mechanisms of Europeanization in the case of the existence of a direct EU involvement. The first and the most successful instrument of Europeanization is *active coercion* (1). It is called ‘active’ because there is a high degree of direct and self-conscious EU level pressure on domestic changes. The high level of Union’s demands is combined with well specified regulations emanated from Brussels that define the rules of the game of domestic changes. As a result, if these variables meet a low degree of opposition towards European policies and, thus, a high degree of domestic engagement, then the mechanism to be applied would be an *active coercion* or *duplicate*. The internal actors are limited in influencing the schedule, timing and principles of domestic changes, therefore not being able to engage in a benefit-maximizing game. Yet, they still can be driven by rationalist accounts regarding the intermediate and final incentives that EU conditionality offers to credible candidate states.

Some of the best empirical cases that exemplify the working of this mechanism are legislative harmonization and the adoption of EU institutional templates by domestic actors both in EU member states and EU candidate states (through EU accession conditionality). These are the most studied cases in Europeanization research, mainly because of the easiness of determining the importance of European factor in domestic transformations. The successful application of the mechanism of active coercion leads to the final outcome of active convergence. This can be considered as the positive pole of Europeanization outcomes, being a consequence of ‘eating the whole meal’ of EU policies that determines in most of the cases the duplication of EU level institutional designs and practices at domestic level.

The second mode of EU level influence on domestic changes is *threshold following* (2). Not always EU requirements have a high degree of clarity, with well-specified limits and procedures of implementation. The complex nature of EU requirements often does not make them open to quantitative indicators on which the final EU judgment on their fulfillment can be made. Thus, in most

of the cases European level policies come in the form of thresholds, when only a minimum set of requirements is specified by Brussels for domestic changes of its member states or for outsiders (conditionality policy).

As a result of less specified European policies and lower monitoring capacity, despite the high or medium level EU pressure, domestic leadership obtains a certain degree of freedom in its actions and it is most likely to resemble EU standards rather than fully commit itself to carry out domestic transformations according to EU rules of the game. Because European Union is a ‘confusing model’ (Grabbe 2001, 1028) it leaves room for different interpretations of the less or vaguely specified EU policies, resulting in an active approximation instead of active convergence. Political conditionality represents a good example for the study of the threshold mode of Europeanization. Brussels’ clauses concerning transformations in such fields like democracy, human rights and the rule of law are not well specified and lack a clear description of the steps that have to be undertaken in order to fulfill the implementation of EU demands. What counts as meeting the criteria of the implementation of EU regulations depends from case to case, from a specific policy area to a particular country, because EU lacks institutional templates to measure the compliance with its requirements.

Some specific empirical examples of the thresholds method of Europeanization are represented by minority policies in EU conditionality towards CEE (Schimmelfennig and Schweltnus 2006) or the requirements set for parties from candidate states or other outsiders to join the European Parliament’s groups as a member or as an observer. Also it can be used to describe the working of EU external governance, based on a minimum set of EU requirements and using ‘soft’ instruments of implementation, such as the case of ENP (Kelley 2006) .

*Broad inspiration* (3) characterizes the method of European level involvement in domestic transformations in the case of a low EU pressure and vaguely specified EC policies, on the one hand, and a low degree of domestic engagement, on the other hand. The reduced power of Brussels to influence directly the process of domestic transformations together with vaguely defined EU requirements offers domestic elites a large degree of tolerance regarding the speed and the extent of the implementation of Union’s demands. Lacking specific guidelines on how to reach EC standards, national leadership engages in a socialization process by using the experience of European club of states as a broad inspiration for drawing and implementing successful domestic reforms.

The outcome of this instrument of Europeanization would be learning through familiarization with EU members' ways of dealing with these policy areas and socialization within the EU framework, either at inter-governmental or transnational levels. The empirical cases where a low EU pressure is present and policy requirements and vaguely defined are the fields of EU acquis in social policy (Falkner 1998) and direct tax coordination (Radaelli 2001), as well as the health care domain in the case of CEE (Jacoby 2005). These are fields in which European Community has not developed a single, harmonized model of institutional templates and practices that can be provided as a guideline for domestic reformation. As compared to the mechanism of thresholds, the broad inspiration offers even a larger degree of freedom to domestic elite's behavior, which can result in the adoption of more opportunist strategies of domestic change aimed at enhancing the benefits of political elites.

The last and the most radical mode of EU influence on domestic transformations in the case of direct EU pressure is *substitution* (4) (Jacoby 2006). A high degree of discrepancy between institutional templates and practices emanated from the EU level and the domestic ones and a small or missing minority of internal actors in favor of EU policies can determine the lack of commitment of national elites to reform according to EU requirements. Two different scenarios are possible. First, in extreme cases characterized by a high European level pressure and well specified requirements, Brussels may choose a military intervention/occupation to implement its policies. This method, however, is rather uncommon for EU external policies, which are based on soft power. The second scenario is a more moderate one and does not endanger national sovereignty. In this case EU can influence domestic transformations according to its demands through the provision of direct external services and practices with no or very limited domestic involvement. (Schimmelfennig 2005a, 7)

After clarifying the possible mechanisms and outcomes of Europeanization in the case of a direct involvement of Brussels, we now turn our attention to the study of cases when the direct EU pressure is missing and, thus, a more voluntary domestic reaction is to be expected. The European Community and the individual systems of its member states represent passive models of successful democratic and economic development by the simple nature of their existence. Therefore, domestic actors can choose to adopt or to follow certain EU templates and practices fully voluntarily but driven by a perceived necessity to change: either as a result of regime change or as a dissatisfaction with the existing internal policies, or the coercion might be driven by the 'feeling of pressure' (Vachudová 2006, 127) to adopt EU policies.

The first possible mechanism of Europeanization in this case is *passive coercion* (5). The instrument of passive coercion is applicable to the cases when there is a high indirect EU pressure combined with well-specified EU policies and a high degree of domestic engagement. The outcome of this kind of EU influence on domestic change is passive convergence. A specific feature of all the mechanisms in the case of indirect EU involvement is the absence of EU level rewards – an important stimulus for assuring a faster and more successful implementation of European policies.

Applying the theoretical reasoning on indirect coercive policy transfer of Dolowitz and Marsh (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000) to Europeanization research, the present framework of analysis argues that passive coercion can occur in cases when a certain country can feel the necessity of adopting EU level policies. This can happen in a situation when there are strong trade relations between the two parties and EU is an important marketplace for an outside state, as well as in cases when indirect coercion is perceived as minimizing the effects of negative externalities of European integration process, especially among the direct neighbors of European Union. An empirical example of the working of passive coercion is the case of ‘adaptive outsiders’ - European Free Trade Association EFTA countries, after 1995 EU enlargement specifically Norway and Switzerland. (Kux and Sverdrup 2000; Mach, Häusermann, and Papadopoulos 2003). After the signing of European Economic Area EEA in 1992 between the EU and most of EFTA countries, West European non-member states had to adopt a significant part of EU’s *acquis communautaire*, particularly in the economic field, for adhering to EU internal market and avoiding the negative externalities of European integration process.

Similarly, passive coercion can occur in cases when EC and an outside state have a common interest in working together and harmonizing their policies or if a country perceives the need to follow up with international and, more specifically, European regional policy developments. The case of Central and East European countries during the period of ‘passive leverage,’ until the signing of Association agreements, represents a good example of passive coercion that illustrates the listed above argument. Driven by their strong desire to be perceived as credible candidate states and obtain the EU membership perspective, CEE states engaged in an ‘anticipatory adjustment’ to EU policies by implementing some parts of EU *acquis* before being officially asked to do so by Brussels. (Grabbe 2003) Particularly Hungary, Poland, and Czech Republic acted rapidly with the aim of establishing national level institutions and practices that would make them ‘EU-compatible’ (Schimmelfennig and Schwellnus 2006, 201) . Nowadays a similar process is to be observed in the case of East European neighboring states, when governments of Ukraine, Moldova, or Georgia, declare their willingness and

the necessity of adopting partly or fully EU *acquis* as a pre-emptive step to comply to EU requirements in order to be perceived as potential EU candidates and receive a more enhanced EU agreement that would contain the provision of EU membership perspective. However, at the moment this seems to be merely a rhetorical and to a lesser extent a practical action.

A second instrument of Europeanization that occurs in the case of indirect EU involvement is *guidance* (6). When there is a high or medium level of indirect EU pressure or the ‘feeling of pressure,’ as in the cases discussed in the passive coercion approach, and in policy areas where EU standards are well or less specified, national leadership can choose to engage itself in a partial rather than full compliance to EU requirements. The nature of the outcomes of the threshold and guidance mechanisms of Europeanization is the same, the former being active approximation, while the latter – passive approximation. Although there is no direct pressure to comply with Union’s requirements, national political elites refer to EC as a model of functional democracy and market economy. Therefore, outsiders, especially post-communist countries, have looked at specific EU policy domains for guidance for successful internal reformation. At the same time, domestic political elites of aspiring candidate states can refer to EU institutional templates and practices in an anticipatory step of ‘coming closer to Europe’ during their drive towards EU membership. The relationship between the EU and the domestic level can have the form of intergovernmental or transnational linkages (e.g. party cooperation), EU expert advices (mostly through personal contacts of national elites with European officials and politicians), path-dependency on looking for guidance from an individual EU member states (e.g. Greece and Cyprus, Romania and France, Poland and Germany, etc.). An outsider state can also search for guidance from a country that is perceived to be an exemplar with attestable expertise in a certain policy domain (e.g. Sweden as a model of social-democratic state, Germany – inflation control, etc.). (Rose 1993, 107-108) Because there is no direct EU level conditionality to determine the time and the extent of policy implementation, outsiders have more freedom to adapt EU norms and practices to domestic contexts.

Finally, in the presence of a low indirect EU pressure and in policy domains where EU standards are less specified or even vague, the domestic leadership will have a greater margin of tolerance in implementing EU policies and the result would be a lower degree of political elites’ engagement in the process of full compliance to EU requirements. The most probable instrument of Europeanization would be *lesson drawing*. However, even if the ruling elites can choose a low level of engagement in implementing EU standards and the power of Brussels to influence the reformation process is low, the

Union can still have a significant impact on domestic structures. By the nature of its existence and as a result of the flow of ideas between the European and national levels within the EU environment, EU can influence indirectly domestic transformations through changes in domestic beliefs and expectations and, thus, through changes in domestic actor's preferences, hence contributing to policy-oriented learning (Börzel and Risse 2003; Checkel 1999; Liebert 2003; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; Radaelli 1997) . The change in domestic beliefs system can lead to the reshaping of domestic opportunity structure by encouraging internal minorities that attach importance to European norms and practices and favor democratic and market economy changes. Since the first years of transition in the post-communist European states, European Union became a symbolic point of reference for successful democratization. It has been a valuable source of moral support for political forces through its identification with liberal-democratic and market economy values and the pro-European political elites linked the prospects for the new democratic society with the ideal of EU membership perspective. (Legro 1997, 62).

For example, EU has exercised a significant influence, though indirect, on the fostering of an open pluralist political arena and on the rights of different minorities within this arena, as well as on increasing the political competition both in the case of CEE and EEN. The interaction between European representatives and the domestic actors, specifically opposition leaders in case of authoritarian and illiberal regimes from post-communist space (Slovakia during Mečiar regime, Romania during Iliescu, Serbia during Milošević rule, or Belarus under Lukashenko) took the form of meetings, conferences, or trainings, as well as financial assistance for organizing such events.<sup>2</sup> This interaction helped to increase the electoral campaign and electoral results of opposition parties and their closer collaboration with the supreme goal of 'rejoining Europe,' culminating with the dismissal of illiberal governments. (Haggard and Webb 1994, 18-19)

At the same time, the indirect communication between Brussels and domestic public via independent media channels and opposition forces helped to increase public understanding about political leadership's policies regarding European Community by offering alternative information to that provided by governing elites. (Haggard and Webb 1994, 20)

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<sup>2</sup> The most active organizations in providing informational and financial assistance to political parties and civic societies from post-communist space have been the German political foundations (in particular Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Foundation and Friedrich Naumann Foundation) (Zaborowski 2005, 25-26) , British Council, The East-West Institute, etc.

Yet, in a more diffuse way of EU indirect influence on domestic political developments, the European Union has also provided incentives for political elites to engage in a strategic learning as a result of the opportunities that were perceived to be offered by coming closer to EU and even obtaining EU membership perspective (e.g. material and political incentives). So, for example, most of political parties were learning from their European counterparts about the content of their political programs and governing agendas for successful implementation of democratic and market economy reforms.

Regarding the box (8) and (12) of the table 1, one can see that no Europeanization process can take place in the case of no or indirect EU involvement and uncommitted domestic elites.

Lastly, let us examine what can happen when the stimulus of Europeanization – European Union – is missing at all. The ideal cases when one can definitely argue that there cannot be any direct or indirect EU influence on any domestic polity, politics, and policies would be outside the European continent, further away from the EC nucleus, among the so called ‘free states’ from the EU atomic system (figure 1). However, in the present research I limit myself at the level of theoretical reasoning about possible mechanisms and outcomes of Europeanization process in the case of no European level involvement. My decision is based on the argument that the empirical study of non-European outsiders can bring more problems to the proposed Europeanization approach because of an increased risk of over- or under-determination of research design. Too many extra variables come into play when analyzing domestic factors that can influence internal transformations as a reaction to European integration process. Thus, the empirical finding of a variation of outcomes in EU members and non-European outsiders can be the effect of other factors that vary between EU states and non-members, such as the nature of the political system or the level of socio-economic development, and not a consequence of the EU factor. (Haverland 2005, 8)

So, the box (9) stands for the *passive coercion* that can occur in the case of no EU involvement but high degree of domestic engagement to fully comply to EU institutional templates and practices. The domestic elites of an outsider can make an absolute moral choice to commit themselves fully voluntarily to comply with EU policies (copying or duplicating them) and carry on internal transformations following EU rules of the game. The instrument of passive coercion can function both in the case of rational calculations (dissatisfaction with the existing domestic policies and the perception that complying with EU standards can make domestic actors and systems better of) or ideational (the view of EU norms and practices as having an intrinsic value, regardless of material

incentives). As in the previous cases of active and passive coercion, one of the requirements from the EU level for it to take place is a high degree of clearness of EU policies (e.g. EU *acquis*). With regard to domestic factors that can favor the outcome of passive convergence in the case of no EU involvement is no (or low number of) veto players and a liberal democratic type of government, as well as a significant degree of resonance with European norms and values (e.g. religious, cultural, linguistic in the case of Central and Latin America).

*Synthesis* (10) builds on theories of policy transfer and implies the process of borrowing certain elements of European level institutional design and policies and their combination with the domestic context factors with the final outcome of the creation of a 'new whole.' (Rose 1993, 30) This is specifically characteristic for newly emerging democracies in search for successful models of democratic societies. An outside state can choose to resemble the well or less specified EU level policies by borrowing electoral laws or types of government from EU member states, or some specific actors, like political parties, can borrow elements of ideological doctrines of EU member parties in the process of creating their own political profiles. What is important again to note is that this type of mechanism and outcome of Europeanization occurs in the case of the lack of any European level involvement, such as the share of experience, advice, or transnational linkages between the European and domestic levels.

At last, in the case of a significant level of tolerance of domestic leadership regarding the implementation of less or vaguely specified EU standards in the absence of EU involvement, the Europeanization process can occur through *lesson-drawing*. It can result in positive learning (following successful European level policies and processes, both from EC and individual EU members) or negative learning (gathering knowledge from the negative experience of EC and its member states while dealing with a certain policy domain). The outcome can also be a simple use of information gathered within the European club of states to simply repackage the existing domestic policies. (Dolowitz 2003, 103)

## **Conclusions**

Starting with the recognition of theoretical limitations of the Europeanization literature on non-EU member states, the present study makes a step further in addressing the questions of how and why European integration process influences domestic changes outside its borders. It proposes an original theoretical framework for analyzing EU involvement in on domestic transformations of non-member states that combines variables from European and domestic levels in an attempt to bring more ‘order’ to the ‘disorderly’ field of Europeanization research. The possible mechanisms and outcomes of Europeanization process are derived from the potential variation of the type of EU involvement, depending on the extent and nature of EU pressure and the clearness of EU level policies, and the degree of domestic engagement in implementing European requirements (conditional on such domestic factors as the number of veto players, the type of government, and the ‘closeness to Europe’).


The originality of the theoretical framework lies within its theoretical approach that examines not only the cases of direct and indirect EU involvement, but also the potential theoretical instruments and outcomes of Europeanization in case when the stimulus – European Union – is missing from the picture. Although it does not provide empirical examples in the case of no EU involvement, the study suggests that some of the described mechanisms and outcomes can very much be present outside the European continent. Also, another important contribution of this framework of analysis is the fact that it follows the dynamics of domestic transformations under the European level impact by examining the variation of European and domestic factors over space and time that results in different mechanisms and outcomes of Europeanization process.

The research design of the present analysis has its own limits. First of all, because of the complexity of Europeanization process, which can start either from domestic or European level, the study does not specify the causality of this process. It suggests that the proposed mechanisms and outcomes can apply both to the top-down or bottom-up-down Europeanization process, depending on the investigated policy domains and country cases.

Second of all, the analyzed empirical examples are provided from European countries only. This limitation is determined by the increased risk of over- or under-determination of the research design that would include non-European outsiders. Because countries outside the European continent vary in many other aspects from the case of EU member states, a finding of a difference in outcomes between the two groups of states can be actually the effect of another factor and not the EU.

FIGURES

Figure 1. EU as an atomic system



TABLES

Table 1. Mechanisms of Europeanization process

		<b>Type of EU involvement</b>		
		<i>Direct</i>	<i>Indirect</i>	<i>No involvement</i>
<b>Degree of Domestic engagement</b>	<i>Committed</i>	<b>(1) Active coercion (duplicate)</b> High EU pressure Well specified EU policies High domestic engagement	<b>(5) passive coercion (duplicate)</b> High EU pressure Well specified EU policies High domestic engagement	<b>(9) passive coercion (counterfactual)</b> No EU pressure Well specified EU policies High domestic engagement
	<i>Resembling</i>	<b>(2) Thresholds</b> High or medium EU pressure Less specified EU policies Medium domestic engagement	<b>(6) guidance</b> High or medium EU pressure Well or less specified EU policies Medium domestic engagement	<b>(10) synthesis</b> No EU pressure Well or less specified EU policies Medium domestic engagement
	<i>Tolerant</i>	<b>(3) Broad inspiration</b> Low EU pressure Vague EU policies Low domestic engagement	<b>(7) lesson drawing</b> Low EU pressure Less specified or vague EU policies Medium or low domestic engagement	<b>(11) lesson drawing</b> No EU pressure Less specified or vague EU policies Medium or low domestic engagement
	<i>Uncommitted</i>	<b>(4) Substitution</b> High EU pressure Well specified EU policies No domestic engagement	<b>(8) –</b>	<b>(12) –</b>

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