“Sino-Japanese relations and Ballistic Missile Defence”

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Abstract

Since December 1998, the Japanese government has formally committed itself to undertake cooperative technological research with the US into Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). Japanese government policy-makers stress that the BMD project remains at present purely at the research stage, and that separate government decisions will be necessary before any progression towards the stages of development, production and deployment. Nevertheless, even at the research phase it is clear that both Japanese policy-makers involved with BMD and outsider commentators alike envisage a host of problems associated with the project at each potential stage of its development, and which have implications for Japan's entire security policy. The problems include the feasibility of BMD technology, cost-effectiveness evaluations, constitutional issues, and the strategic implications of BMD for its relations with the Korean Peninsula, the US, and China.

The argument of this paper is that for Japanese policy-makers the pursuit of BMD will make the security relationship with China, which has already become highly complex due to the introduction since 1997 of the revised Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation, even more fraught and hazardous. Indeed, it may be the case that BMD, to a far greater extent than the revised Guidelines, contains the potential to bring existing Sino-Japanese, Sino-US, and US-Japan security tensions to a head, with destabilising effects for each of these bilateral relationships and for regional and global security as a whole. Specifically, the paper makes this argument based on the fact that, even though the revised Guidelines have without doubt been responsible for ratcheting up security tensions amongst Japan, China and the US over the last three years and been capable of sparking conflict through the miscalculation of any of the three concerned parties, their cautious framing by Japanese policy-makers has provided Japan, the US, and to some extent China also, with sufficient room for strategic manoeuvre to allow them to ameliorate tensions and avoid final conflict scenarios if deemed necessary. However, in contrast to the uncomfortable but near tolerable *modus vivendi* offered to all sides by the revised Guidelines, it can be argued that BMD presents Japan with a qualitatively more dangerous challenge for the management of its bilateral security relations with China and the US-Japan alliance. This is because the inherent technological and military logic of BMD dictates that Japan becomes more fully integrated than ever before in US military strategy in East Asia and towards China. Taken to its extreme, and without sufficiently careful management by Japanese policy-makers, the subsequent logic of BMD could be to undermine Japan's political, diplomatic and strategic freedom and to set it on a collision course with China's perceived inviolable security interests.

Nevertheless, as indicated above, this paper also argues that the BMD issue, although it possesses a greater potential than the revised Guidelines to eliminate Japanese 'escape clauses' in managing its strategic relations with China and the US, could, if managed with the same type of dogged skill that was shown during the Guidelines review, also be turned to the perceived advantage of Japan's security. Thus, this paper seeks not only to evaluate the potential risks and advantages of BMD for Japanese security, but also how these are perceived by Japan's security policy-makers themselves and what strategies, if any, they have devised to navigate their way through these.

Key words: Japan, China, US, security, BMD, TMD, NMD

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Introduction: Japan and the strategic implications of BMD

Japan and BMD

On 25 December 1998, the National Security Council of Japan approved the initiation of co-operative technological research with the United States (US) into Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) systems.¹ This Japanese Cabinet decision was then followed on 16 August 1999 by an Exchange of Notes Concerning a Programme for Co-operative Research on Ballistic Missile Technologies between the governments of Japan and the US.² In accordance with these agreements, the Japanese government committed itself to co-operative technological research into providing a shield for Japan against ballistic missile attack, to provide initial funding in the 1999 budget of ¥16 million for general research into BMD and the modality of Japan's defence, and another ¥962 million into four key technologies associated with Japan's possible participation in the Navy Theatre Wide Defence (NTWD) component of BMD (explained in more detail below).³ In the 2000 budget, a further ¥2.05 billion was earmarked for research into these four technologies.⁴ Japan Defence Agency (JDA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and other government policy-makers stress that the BMD project remains at present purely at the research stage, and that separate government decisions will be necessary before any progression towards the stages of development, production and deployment. Nevertheless, even at the research phase it is clear that both Japanese policy-makers involved with BMD and outsider commentators alike envisage a host of problems associated with the project at each potential stage of its development, and which have implications for Japan's entire security policy.⁵

BMD (or Theatre Missile Defence [TMD] as it is still most commonly referred to in Japan and the US--much to the exasperation of Japanese government officials who wish to draw a distinction between US TMD projects, designed to protect US forces despatched to overseas theatres and allied states, from Japan's own BMD, designed with the stated intention of protecting only Japanese national territory, but which necessarily would have the near

¹ Bôeichôhen, Bôeichô Hakusho 1999, Tokyo, Ôkurashô Insatsukyoku, 1999, p. 137.
³ Bôeichô, Dandô Misairu Bôei (BMD) ni kansuru Kenkyû ni tsuite, Tokyo, 1999, p. 11.
simultaneous function of protecting US forces stationed in Japan) generates a number of concerns for Japanese policy-makers. These include questions over the technological feasibility of BMD; the final cost versus effectiveness (hiyô tai kôka) of research, development, production, and deployment; and legal and constitutional issues connected to missile defences. Nevertheless, whilst all of these issues may become crucial 'make or break' considerations for the future course of BMD, the principal focus of this paper, and indeed for Japanese policy-makers themselves, is the political, diplomatic and strategic consequences of Japan's potential participation in BMD for its overall security policy and international relations in East Asia.

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6 Japanese policy-makers and commentators have similar doubts to their US counterparts concerning the feasibility of BMD technology which involved hitting a 'bullet with a bullet', and their doubts have been reinforced by recent unsuccessful interceptor missile tests in the US, and by the fact that the deployment by adversaries of simple decoy measures may be sufficient to defeat more expensive BMD technology. The cost effectiveness of BMD is also viewed as questionable. The JDA has limited its estimates to research and not produced a costing for any eventual deployment of a BMD system. However, other estimates suggest that the entire project could cost up to US$16 billion for deployment. These costs would place considerable strain on the defence budget and severely limit the Japan Self Defence Forces' (JSDF) ability to acquire other new weapons systems. Hence, the suspicion is that the US may be using Japan as a source of funds for BMD in order to support the last remaining large scale defence project available to maintain a Cold War-style military-industrial complex. Handa Shigeru, "Muda na heiki": jeitai kara hihan sareru TMD sanka', Gunshuku Mondai, no. 230, December 1999, p. 40.

The legal and constitutional problems that Japan faces in seeking to develop BMD revolve mainly around the prohibition on the exercise of the right of collective self defence, Japan ban on the possession of weapons with power projections capabilities, the ban on the export of weapons, compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the May 1969 Diet resolution concerning the peaceful use of space. The prohibition on the right of the exercise of collective self defence complicates any Japanese attempt to develop with the US an integrated BMD command system which could be seen to serve the defence of the US in a situation deemed not be directly connected with Japan's own security. Japan's ban on weapons of power projection capacity and the export of weapons, together with compliance in the MTCR means that it has never possessed its own ballistic missile technology which could be used as a basis for research into necessary anti-ballistic missile technologies (although it could be argued that Japan's H-2 rocket could fulfil this function). Japanese policy-makers have found it particularly difficult to dodge the 1969 resolution which states that Japan's activities in space should be limited to peaceful purposes (heiwa no muokuteki ni kagiri), interpreted in the Diet as meaning non-military activities (higunji). The use of upper-tier technologies would involve military activities exo-atmospheric activities in space and appear to transgress the resolution. However, the Japanese government has justified its participation in BMD research by arguing that as it is charged with the responsibility of defending the life and property of Japanese citizens, and BMD is a purely defensive system and the only means available to it to defend against missile attack, then a BMD system would be in line with the purport of the resolution and the government would seek the indulgence of the Japanese people on this matter. In effect, the government is seeking to shift the interpretation of 'peaceful' in the resolution away from 'non-military' to 'defensive'. Asahi Shimbun, 24 December 1998, p. 2. Asagumo Shimbunsha, Bôei Handobukku 2000, p. 147.
Japan, North Korea, and BMD

The most immediate and apparent impact of BMD has been upon Japan's security policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) (hereafter referred to as North Korea). As will be outlined later in this paper, Japan had been engaged in independent research and bilateral discussions with the US over missile defences since the early 1990s. However, North Korea's test launch of a Taepodong-1 missile across Japanese airspace on 31 August 1998, and the resultant 'Taepodong-shock' which revealed the physical and psychological vulnerability of Japan to ballistic missile attack, proved to be the trigger for Japan to commit itself the following December to co-operative research on BMD. Doubts remain for many observers concerning the actual capabilities and destructive potential of North Korea's Taepodong missiles, and its ballistic missile programme can be viewed more as a terror-inducing weapon and 'irritant' to Japanese security than a true strategic threat over the long term. But it is clear that since 1998, if not before so, North Korea's ballistic missile programme has become, for large sections of the Japanese policy-making community and the Japanese population, the main public legitimisation for the advancement of BMD research. Hence, North Korea's ballistic missile programme is and will continue to be a major bilateral issue between Japan and North Korea, and the Japanese government will seek North Korea reciprocation on the issue of the restraint of its development, testing, deployment and export of missile technology, both in any future bilateral normalisation talks and in US-North Korea negotiations.

If North Korea is seen to fail to reciprocate on the missile issue in these or any other bilateral or multilateral fora, then this may act as a further spur to domestic and international pressure for Japanese participation in BMD and could lead to the further deterioration of Japan-North Korea relations, already burdened by a mass of unresolved bilateral issues. North Korea's denouncement of Japanese BMD contains a mix of ritualistic hyperbole but also the communication of probably genuine fear that, if the system were made to work with sufficient effectiveness, it could neutralise its ballistic missiles and thus its last remaining weapon of mass destruction (WMD) as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the US and its East Asian allies. For some analysts, Japan's research into BMD and indication of its potential interest in the deployment of a defensive system is seen as means to convince North Korea of the futility of seeking to develop its ballistic missile forces in the face of overwhelmingly superior Japanese
and US technology. Moreover, BMD's overt function of protecting Japan itself, but also by implication US forces stationed in Japan, would, whilst obviating concerns about collective security, demonstrate the near de facto indivisibility of US-Japan security within the national territory of Japan and thus reinforce alliance solidarity. This would act to dissuade North Korea from attempts to intimidate Japan through the launching of ballistic missile strikes against Japanese civilian or military targets rather than against US military installations in Japan, and nullify its apparent strategy following the Taepodong-1 test in August 1999 of using its missiles to target mainly Japanese security vulnerabilities, separate US and Japanese security concerns, and drive a wedge between the alliance partners. In turn, North Korea confronted with these insurmountable technical and strategic obstacles might then be cajoled into negotiating limits on its ballistic missile programme in return for other security and economic concessions from the US and its allies. However, it might also be the case that Japan's interest in BMD will have only a minimal impact upon moderating North Korea's missile programme. North Korea may persist with its missile brinkmanship due to the importance that it attaches to its missile programme as a central component of its strategy for national survival; its awareness that the Taepodong-1 threat enables it to disrupt and manipulate Japanese diplomatic and alliance policy often to its advantage; and its probable knowledge that BMD has significant technical, cost and political limitations which will delay its development and deployment over the shorter term, so buying time for it to continue to use its missile as a tool of military and diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis Japan and the US. In this instance, North Korea attachment to ballistic missiles and Japan's attachment to BMD may only escalate bilateral security tensions between Japan and North Korea and across the rest of East Asia.

**Japan, China and BMD**

North Korea and a Korean Peninsula contingency remain the most immediate concerns and public legitimisation for BMD research in Japan. But it is also clear--and of greatest relevance to the theme of this conference--that BMD carries major implications for Japan's security policy towards and international relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) (hereafter referred

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to as China), and, due to the triangular nature of the 'great power' security nexus in East Asia explained below, inevitably engenders problems for Japan's relationship with its own US alliance partner. The argument of this paper is that for Japanese policy-makers the pursuit of BMD will make the security relationship with China, which has already become highly complex due to the introduction since 1997 of the revised Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation, even more fraught and hazardous. Indeed, it may be the case that BMD, to a far greater extent than the revised Guidelines, contains the potential to bring existing Sino-Japanese, Sino-US, and US-Japan security tensions to a head, with destabilising effects for each of these bilateral relationships and for regional and global security as a whole. Specifically, the paper makes this argument based on the fact that, even though the revised Guidelines have without doubt been responsible for ratcheting up security tensions amongst Japan, China and the US over the last three years and been capable of sparking conflict through the miscalculation of any of the three concerned parties, their cautious framing by Japanese policy-makers has provided Japan, the US, and to some extent China also, with sufficient room for strategic manoeuvre to allow them to ameliorate tensions and avoid final conflict scenarios if deemed necessary. However, in contrast to the uncomfortable but near tolerable *modus vivendi* offered to all sides by the revised Guidelines, it can be argued that BMD presents Japan with a qualitatively more dangerous challenge for the management of its bilateral security relations with China and the US-Japan alliance. This is because the inherent technological and military logic of BMD dictates that Japan becomes more fully integrated than ever before in US military strategy in East Asia and towards China. Taken to its extreme, and without sufficiently careful management by Japanese policy-makers, the subsequent logic of BMD could be to undermine Japan's political, diplomatic and strategic freedom and to set it on a collision course with China's inviolable security interests.

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policy-makers themselves and what strategies, if any, they have devised to navigate their way through these.

**Plan of the paper**

In order to address these questions, the paper begins with a brief examination of the strategic context of Sino-Japanese relations from the post-war to the contemporary period. The aim of this is to demonstrate how in this period Japan's political, economic and security policy towards China has functioned largely within the asymmetric triangular framework of Sino-Japanese, US-Japan, US-China relations. In particular, utilising alliance theory, the paper reveals how Japan-US-China strategic nexus has generated for Japan an often awkward set of primary security dilemmas versus China, and secondary alliance dilemmas of abandonment and entrapment versus the US. However, the case of the revised Guidelines is then introduced to reveal the strategies Japanese policy-makers have exploited in the recent past and contemporary period in order to successfully manoeuvre between these dilemmas and achieve stable security relations with these powers. Following this, the case of BMD is then introduced and contrasted with that of the Guidelines review and past problems in Sino-Japanese relations, so as to demonstrate the ways in which it poses a quantifiably different challenge to the management of Sino-Japanese, Japan-US and US-China security ties. The paper outlines the background to the BMD project, its technological and military characteristics which generate new and potentially inescapable security dilemmas for Japan, and outlines the possibly disastrous consequences of a mismanaged BMD project for security relations in East Asia. Finally, the paper evaluates in more detail whether and how a range of Japanese policy-makers perceive the potential challenges of BMD, and, in turn, if they have developed the necessary strategies, as in past security scenarios, to negotiate its hazards. The conclusion then considers whether Japan's commitment to BMD will prove to be the occasion for the increased tensions in East Asia, or whether Japan may yet find a means to control the tensions generated by the project.
US-Japan alliance and the framework of post-war Sino-Japanese relations

Japan-US-China strategic triangle

In the post-war era, there can be no doubt that Japanese policy-makers have attempted to pursue their own distinctive bilateral agenda towards China in the dimensions of politics, economics and security. This agenda has been driven by a mix of Asianist and developmental norms, and aimed to ensure the internal stability and development of China, and its gradual reintegration into the regional and global communities. Nevertheless, at the same time and as most texts on the subject are obliged to acknowledge, it is axiomatic that the Sino-Japanese relations can rarely be divorced from developments in Japan-US relations, and, likewise, US-China relations. The US-Japan relationship has formed one of the most dominant (if not the most dominant, given the declining influence on the Japan side of the legacy of history) frameworks, or international structural factors, for understanding the evolution of Sino-Japanese relations. Dramatic short-term and long-term change in Sino-Japanese relations has often been affected by change in US-China relations, and, similarly, although perhaps more imperceptible and long-term, change in US-China ties has been affected by change in the Sino-Japanese nexus. Hence, in de facto terms, or by 'default', a triangular strategic relationship has come into existence amongst the three powers, and in particular in the post-Cold War period. There is a necessary hesitation in as yet terming this a trilateral relationship, due to the lack of 'trilateralist' norm informing the mechanics of policy-making and interaction amongst Japan, the US and China, and due to the highly asymmetric nature of the triangle. For it is clear that the Japan-US and US-China sides of the triangular are explicitly stronger than the Japan-China side, and that the US and China have at times appear to have shown greater interest in each other than in their respective relations with Japan.

The influence exerted by this triangular relationship, and especially the US-Japan side, on Sino-Japanese relations was first demonstrated in its most nascent form in the immediate post-war

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period. As is well known, despite the scepticism of key Japanese policy-makers about the threat posed to Japan by a communist China, the decision of its policy-makers to seek alignment with the US-led capitalist camp, cemented with the signing of the US-Japan security treaty and 'partial peace' of San Francisco in September 1951, ensured Japan's isolation from significant political, economic and security interaction with its giant neighbour for the next twenty one years. In turn, the eventual rebuilding of Sino-Japanese ties was also the product of developments in the Japan-US-China nexus. President Richard Nixon's seismic decision to seek rapprochement with China largely released Japan from the bilateral and international structural constraint imposed by the US-Japan side of the strategic triangle, and enabled it to seek rapid normalisation with China by September 1972.

In the post-Cold War period, the Japan-US-China triangle has continued to exert a key influence upon the pattern of Sino-Japanese relations, and become even more overt as the perceived rise of first Japanese, and then Chinese, power in East Asia relative to the US (even if the capabilities of these states are mismatched: the US possessing preponderant military and considerable economic power; Japan, great economic strength and latent military power, and China expanding military and economic strength) has obliged the policy-makers of each of these states to give somewhat greater, if not always consistent, consideration to the effect upon the third parties when framing their bilateral policies.

The triangular relationship has offered both opportunities and risks for Japan's relations with China in the 1990s and at the start of twenty first century. On the one hand, Japan’s enhanced political status within the strategic triangle presents it with a possible mediating role between the US and China in order to keep bilateral engagement efforts on track--the actualisation of Japan’s vision of its watashiyaku diplomacy between the West and Asia. Moreover, a fully functioning Japan-US-China strategic triangle might serve to co-ordinate great power diplomacy in East Asia and assist the region's transition, especially in areas such as the Korean Peninsula, from a post-Cold War to a post-globalised world. On the other hand, though, the increased influence of each of these states in the region, accompanied by a resultant 'strategic overcrowding' and new and re-

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emergent bilateral issues on all sides of the triangle, poses considerable difficulties for Japan.\(^\text{10}\)

In particular, fluctuating Sino-US tensions—marked by US concerns about China's apparent drive to achieve great power economic and military status in East Asia, and Chinese concerns about the renewal of the US's hegemonic position in the region, its perceived wavering between engagement and containment policies towards China, and its stance on the Taiwan issue—are likely to remain the principal obstacles for the smooth conduct of Sino-Japanese relations.

The first hazard is that Japan could be bypassed altogether and left powerless in the face of a Sino-US power struggle: the type of Japan 'passing', or *atamagoshi gaikô*, portended by President Bill Clinton's visit to China in June 1998, when he lavished praise on the Chinese leadership and seemed to indicate that China was becoming Japan preferred 'strategic partner' in the region.\(^\text{11}\) The second hazard is that Japan could be caught in the middle of a metaphoric, or even literal, 'tug of war' between the US and China—the most obvious scenario for this being a clash over the issue of Taiwan's independence. In this situation, Japan might be pulled dangerously onto one side or the other and enlisted in a political or military conflict for which it is not prepared and it wishes to avoid. Japan’s Asianist and developmental norms and interests mean that Japanese policy-making agents clearly wish to obviate conflict with China and to encourage the US to persist with engagement policies. Nevertheless, the strength of the bilateral attachment to the US, Japanese policy-makers' own concerns about the growing power of China, and the changing balance of pro-China and pro-Taiwan domestic constituencies in Japan make for a strong impulse to co-operate with the US policy towards China.\(^\text{12}\) Hence, from the late-1990s onwards and as the strategic triangle has increasingly taken shape, Japanese policy-makers have been forced to perform a highly precarious balancing act between the US and China on a range of issues, but most especially that of Taiwan.

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\(^{12}\) For an examination of the changing relative influence of pro-Taiwan and pro-China factions amongst Japan's policy-making elites, see Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, 'Japan's changing China policy', *Survival: The IISS Quarterly*, vol. 38, no. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 35-58; and Honzawa Jirô, *Taiwan Robî*, Tokyo, Datahouse, 1998.
Adversary and alliance security dilemmas

Indeed, the implications of the Japan-US-China strategic triangle for Japan's bilateral relations with China, and the subsequent necessity for Japan to negotiate its way through the Scylla and Charybdis-like hazards, are thrown into sharpest relief in the dimension of security and with regard to the Taiwan issue. Japan, in the same way as in the dimensions of politics and economics, has sought to develop its own distinctive and comprehensive security agenda towards China, encompassing broad economic, environmental, and human security concerns. Nevertheless, the military element of this security agenda vis-à-vis China cannot easily be separated from the US-Japan alliance and the integral position that the alliance occupies within US military strategy in East Asia. Hence, developments in the US-Japan alliance obviously impact upon Sino-Japanese security relations and govern developments also in the dimensions of politics and economics.

The problems that the US-Japan alliance generates for Sino-Japanese security relations are probably best encapsulated by alliance theory and the concept of the security dilemma. In its most basic form, the security dilemma can be said to consist of primary and secondary phases. The primary phase occurs when, under conditions of international instability or anarchy, mistrust between two or more potential adversaries leads each side to take precautionary and defensive measures against the other. Most typically, these defensive measures amongst states involve the augmentation of individual national military capabilities and the strengthening or formation of alliances. However, such actions and 'adversary games' also imply necessary risks for states. This is because the formation of a defensive alliance may actually be read by the potential adversary as an offensive measure designed to undermine its own security, thereby encouraging it to take its own defensive military and alliance countermeasures. In turn, this may only trigger further defensive measures and countermeasures, and a general upward spiralling of international tensions and insecurities. Hence, states in the primary phase are faced with the security dilemma of whether to ally or not, given the almost paradoxical situation that the formation of alliances may actually increase rather than decrease their security fears.

In tandem with the primary phase of the security dilemma concerned directly with the effect upon a state's security of alliance versus a potential adversary, the secondary phase of the security dilemma is more directly concerned with the degree to which a state can commit itself to and expect support from its own alliance partner in specific conflict interactions with the adversary; although this 'alliance game' of the secondary phase is also indirectly linked to the 'adversary game' of the primary phase, and can subsequently produce destabilising effects upon a state's security. As noted above, states may perceive the formation of an alliance as necessary in order to deter a potential adversary, but the very act of entry into an alliance creates for states the twin risks of abandonment and entrapment. Abandonment occurs when the ally of a state decides to abrogate the alliance or realign with a potential adversary. Entrapment occurs when a state is dragged into a conflict over issues that are not fully in its national interest and may be of its ally's making, but acquiesces because it values the preservation of the alliance more than the costs involved in supporting its ally's cause.

The risks of abandonment and entrapment are especially great in cases of asymmetric alliance arrangements between a state and a more powerful partner, as the latter may feel less compunction to honour its alliance promises, or to take the interests of its allied client state into consideration when framing policies towards third countries. Therefore, in the secondary phase, a state can be faced with a security dilemma of whether to move closer to or distance itself from its ally in order to minimise the risks of abandonment and entrapment. If its move closer to its ally, this then increases the chances of entrapment as a more powerful ally may then become emboldened in disputes and conflicts with an adversary. But if it distances itself from its ally, to increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis its ally and curb its actions, and thus establishes a track record of unreliability, then this increases the risks of abandonment by the ally.

The outcome of the secondary phase alliance game also feeds through into and accentuates the effects of the primary phase adversary game. The weakening of a state's commitment to an alliance can have a number of results. It may restrain a more powerful ally and encourage conciliation with a potential adversary over a particularly sensitive issue, but its may also increase the risks of abandonment, and signal to an adversary the opportunity to exploit weaknesses in the alliance and to take a more aggressive stance on the issue. Similarly, the
strengthening of a state's commitment to an alliance may reduce the risks of abandonment and act as renewed deterrence to a potential adversary. But the solidification of alliance bonds can also increase the risks of entrapment and provoke the potential adversary, reinforcing the spiral of insecurity.

According to alliance theory, the security dilemmas produced by the adversary and alliance games are largely inescapable, and the optimum strategy for a state is to grasp firmly the horns of either one, and steel itself for the likely consequences vis-à-vis potential adversaries or potential and existing allies. However, the literature also suggests that for states there is a way out from, or at the very least a means to suppress, the risks of these security dilemmas through the pursuit of a 'straddling' strategy. The strategy involves the deliberate creation by a state of ambiguity in both the adversary and alliance games, affording it with greater room for manoeuvre to be seen to be able to generally comply with, yet at the same time not irrevocably commit itself to, satisfying the differing expectations of potential adversaries and allies regarding conciliation and support in possible conflict scenarios. Hence, a state will attempt to instil in a potential adversary doubts about whether it will or will not commit itself to support an ally in a conflict, and thus leave room for conciliation with the adversary but also deprive it of the confidence that it can attempt to intimidate the state into reneging of its alliance commitments. Likewise, a state may leave vague its level of commitment to its own ally, establishing a sufficient level of trust that the ally may feel that it will be supported in the event of a conflict, but also leaving a sufficient margin of doubt that the ally will remain cautious in dealing with the adversary and seek conciliation before confrontation. As can be imagined, this 'straddling strategy' requires considerable determination on the part of the policy-makers of the state, and fine calculations about how far it can communicate its true position to both the adversary and ally. Miscalculation or miscommunication about the intentions of the state to either party could clearly set in train once again the security dilemma and a spiral of insecurity, leading to unplanned for conflicts.

Japanese security dilemmas vis-à-vis China and the US
The theoretical description of security dilemmas outlined above presents striking parallels with recent developments in security relations between Japan, China and the US. For although, as

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14 Snyder, 'The security dilemma in alliance politics', p. 482.
outlined above, Japan has continued to pursue an agenda of comprehensive security and engagement towards China, concerns about the latter's military activities have laid the ground for a new Japanese security dilemma. Japanese anxieties about the future military stance of China are well known—essentially revolving around the upgrading of its nuclear and ballistic missile WMD; its ability to threaten Japan's Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) in the South China Sea with the development of only a minimal blue water naval capacity; and its intimidating behaviour towards Taiwan. China's sensitivity and aggressive stance towards any sign of a move to Taiwanese independence was demonstrated most graphically in the run-up to the Taiwan presidential elections in March 1996, with its conduct of large-scale military exercises and ballistic missile tests in the Straits of Taiwan. The US's reaction of the despatch of the aircraft carriers, USS Independence, based Japan, and the USS Nimitz from the Persian Gulf to the waters off Taiwan may have acted to deter any escalation or miscalculation in Chinese brinkmanship at the time. However, China's resort to military intimidation towards Taiwan at frequent intervals since, as cross-straits relations ebb and flow, has only served to reinforce Japanese concerns about the Chinese willingness to resort to the use of military force to prevent a declaration of Taiwanese independence and the contravention of what the Chinese leadership perceive as their inviolable national security interests. In turn, China's stance on Taiwan poses both a direct threat to Japanese security—Chinese ballistic missiles in March 1996 landing close to Yonaguni Island in Okinawa prefecture and Japan's own territorial waters—and an indirect threat to its security—any serious deterioration in cross-strait relations capable of triggering further US intervention and instability across the entire East Asia region, with implications, noted below, for Japan's security relations with China and its US ally.15

The Japanese government's position on the Taiwan issue remains clearly in line with the Sino-Japanese joint communiqué of September 1972, which states that the PRC is the sole legal government of China and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the PRC's territory.16 Moreover, Japanese policy-makers express their desire for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue, and are content that at the very least the political and security status quo surrounding cross-strait relations should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, the outcome of Japanese concerns about the

15 Hiramatsu Shigeo, Chûgoku no Gunjiryoku, Tokyo, Bunshun Shinsho, 1999, p. 44.
looming military challenge from China has been to add impetus to its efforts to strengthen its own independent military capabilities, and, most importantly, the US-Japan alliance through the device of the revised Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation. As most commentators point out, Japanese and US policy-makers were originally and primarily motivated to undergo the revision of the Guidelines in reaction to the experience of the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994. This crisis revealed Japan's inability to respond satisfactorily to US requests for rear-end logistical support in the event of a Korean Peninsula or other regional conflict scenarios, and the essential lack of political and military operability of the alliance. The formal agreement of the US and Japanese governments in accordance with the April 1996 Joint Declaration on Security to embark on the review of the 1978 Guidelines, followed by the formulation of the revised Guidelines in September 1997, and then the final passage of related Guidelines legislation through the Japanese Diet between April and May 1999, have acted to subsequently fill in many of the gaps in the operability of the alliance and given greater confidence to both sides that the alliance can cope effectively with a Korean Peninsula contingency. In many ways, compared to the Korean Peninsula, concerns about the Taiwan issue were of secondary importance at the time that Japanese policy-makers first began to consider the necessity for a review of Guidelines following the aftermath of the North Korean nuclear crisis in the period from 1994 to 1995. Indeed, the bulk of the Joint Declaration had been prepared by November 1995 in time for President Clinton's later postponed visit to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Ōsaka. However, as various studies have made clear, the coincidence of the Taiwan Straits crisis of March 1996 with the preparation of Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and US-Japan governmental proposals for the review of the Guidelines in the run-up to the announcement of Joint Declaration of Security in April 1996, formed an increasingly influential, although, for reasons explained below, not always publicly stated, backdrop to the political and military legitimisation of the review process. Thus, even though, the initial decision to revise the Guidelines and their function may have been prompted by and predicated upon a Korean Peninsula contingency, it is also clear that since 1996 the revised Guidelines have had a growing additional, if not equal, function designed to strengthen the US-Japan alliance's deterrent potential versus China over the Taiwan issue.

In fact, as has long been patently obvious to all policy-makers and observers in the region, the US-Japan security treaty throughout its history, in both its 1951 original and 1960 revised versions, has been designed to provide the US with bases to enable it to contribute to the security of Japan and the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East, including most importantly the twin contingencies of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Straits. As is well documented, US pressure for Japanese rearmament and commitment to a security treaty was prompted by its decision on 27 June 1950 to simultaneously intervene in the Korean War and to despatch the US 7th Fleet to the Straits of Taiwan. Moreover, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, immediately following the revision of the security treaty, made it clear that its range of action in the Far East would function to defend Japan from armed attack in the area including Taiwan. Kishi gave the official Japanese definition of the scope of the Far East on 26 February 1960, stating that, whilst it was not a precisely delimited geographical region, and that the range of the US-Japan security treaty would not necessarily be restricted to it, it did broadly encompass the areas north of the Philippines and surrounding Japan (shūhen), and the areas under the control of South Korea and the ROC, interpreted as meaning Taiwan. US-Japan concerns about the security of Taiwan were also highlighted by the Joint Communiqué between President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Satô Eisaku of 21 November 1969, which stressed that, 'the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was a most important factor for the security of Japan'. It is certainly the case that Taiwan as a security issue and manifest object of the US-Japan security treaty declined in importance following the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972. The Japanese government's acknowledgement of the 'one China' principle, as noted above, could have made it possible for both sides to argue that Taiwan was now outside the legitimate control of the ROC government, and thus outside the scope of the 1960 definition of the Far East and the US-Japan security treaty. However, the decision of the Japanese and Chinese governments to essentially shelve the issue of the US-Japan security treaty and obligations to third countries in their own bilateral negotiations prior to both the 1972 Joint Communiqué and 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship meant that Taiwan remained a dormant, but still potentially explosive, issue for the Japan-China-US security nexus.

From the above discussion it is apparent that North Korea remains for the Japanese government an often deliberately poorly-disguised, or even explicit legitimisation, for the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance in line with the revised Guidelines. However, it is also clear that security contingencies involving China and Taiwan have in the past been equally explicit factors in influencing the evolution of the alliance, and that in the contemporary period they continue, at the very least, to be implicit factors. In turn, the Chinese leadership's consistent awareness that since 1951 the US-Japan security treaty has always maintained the potential function of responding to a military contingency involving China or Taiwan, has necessarily meant that they are also highly sensitive to the fact that any subsequent upgrading of the capabilities of the US-Japan alliance could be directed against China and have devastating implications for its security interests, and in particular with regard to the issue of Taiwanese independence. Hence, despite the efforts outlined below of Japanese and US policy-makers to obfuscate the issue, China has reacted with a genuine measure of anger to the 'redefinition' or 'reconfirmation' of the US-Japan alliance since 1996--berating the revised Guidelines as measures designed to allow US and Japanese intervention in China's domestic affairs in Taiwan, and intimating simultaneously that it may respond by a more rapid push towards the modernisation of its military.

The obvious outcome of Japan's decision to embark upon the Guidelines review, therefore, has been to generate a potential adversary game security dilemma between Japan and China. Japan's response in part to the perceived military threat from China of strengthening the US-Japan alliance through the revised Guidelines may have served to improve the alliance's deterrent capabilities vis-à-vis China and to have increased Japan's own immediate security. Nevertheless, as predicted by alliance theory, Japan's strengthening of its bilateral alliance with the US has also created the problem that China, in this case the potential adversary state, has indicated that it is ready to increase its own military power versus Japan and the US, and drive the spiral of insecurity ever upwards.

Similarly, the revised Guidelines have generated a potential and interrelated alliance game security dilemma of abandonment and entrapment between Japan and its US ally. This security

dilemma, as explained in the above section, occurs when the interests of allied states are normally compatible, but then called to test and perceived to diverge in crisis situations. In the case of the US-Japan alliance with regard to China and the Taiwan issue, the basic interests of the two allies can be seen to largely coincide across most short to medium term situations. Japanese and US government policy-makers alike clearly hope for a scenario in which neither China nor Taiwan is allowed to destabilise regional security. Hence, Japan and the US share the objective that China is to be discouraged from the military intimidation of Taiwan, and Taiwan from exacerbating tensions with China by any move towards declaring *de jure* independence. Moreover, both allies agree that the optimum means to achieve this objective is cross-straits dialogue, but that the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance is a necessary deterrent and insurance of last resort against the failure of China and Taiwan to resolve their differences peacefully. Japanese policy-makers, though, are also aware that in an immediate crisis situation or over the longer term the interests of Japan and the US with regard to China and Taiwan could diverge. For instance, a change of government in the US bringing a tougher stance towards China and willingness to defend Taiwan, and growing domestic pressure with the US or even Japan itself in support of Taiwan, could embolden the government of Taiwan to move towards independence, provoke conflict between China and Taiwan, and force the US to intervene. Japan would then be faced with near certain requests from the US to provide bases and logistical support for US forces in line with the revised Guidelines and the possible divergence in bilateral security interests. For it may be the case that the Japanese government and population, even though they accept the deterrent value of the US-Japan alliance as a means to constrain China in peacetime, fear that US intervention in a dispute over Taiwan and the inevitable transformation of the alliance from a deterrent into an actual war-fighting mechanism would sabotage its long term engagement strategy towards China and lead to a massive escalation of Japan-China-US hostilities. In this situation, Japan would be faced with the security dilemma of abandonment or entrapment. If the Japanese government were to refuse US requests for assistance then this would create, as in the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994, although on a far larger scale, a crisis of confidence in the alliance and probable abandonment of Japan by the US in this and other security situations. If Japan were to agree, however, then this would not only lead to a

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probable domestic crisis along the lines of the Gulf War of 1990-91, but also to its entrapment in US military strategy and a conflict which it may not deem as fully in its national interests.\(^{23}\) In fact, Japanese policy-makers were given a portend of the US's willingness to communicate to China its resolve to intervene in the Taiwan issue, without fully considering the security implications for Japan, during the crisis of March 1996. At this time, the US chose to inform Japan concerning the despatch of the carrier *USS Independence*, home-ported in Japan, to the waters off Taiwan, but not concerning the despatch of the *USS Nimitz* -- an action which had equal potential to precipitate a conflict with China close to Japanese territory.\(^{24}\) Furthermore, this alliance game for Japan is compounded by the obvious asymmetric nature of the US-Japan alliance--Japan essentially providing for the conventional defence of its own territory and US forces based in Japan in the event of a conflict, but at the same time highly dependent upon the US's extended nuclear deterrent and forward deployment to guarantee the prevention of any regional crisis which could impact upon its own security.

**Japanese escapology and hedging strategies**

The above security dilemmas generated by the revised Guidelines present considerable risks for the stability of Japan and the entire East Asia region. Moreover, having weighed up the pitfalls, it is arguable that Japan's policy-makers, if anything, are leaning towards a form of entrapment, as in the final calculation they appear to value the maintenance of the US-Japan alliance and its attendant costs far more than the costs of conflict with China. But it is also clear that Japan's policy-makers, even whilst devoting their energies to strengthening the US-Japan alliance versus China, have also shown sufficient awareness of the risks involved to attempt to leave Japan with a strategy to ameliorate and even exit from both the adversary and alliance games before they degenerate into an unwanted conflict.

Japan already has options or 'let out clause' from its alliance commitments due to its right in accordance with the exchange of notes between Prime Minister Kishi and Secretary of State Christian A Herter at the time of the revision of the security treaty to insist upon prior consultation with the US regarding the use of bases in Japan, and its concomitant, although never

exercised, ability to say 'no' outright to military actions in East Asia and beyond involving US bases in Japan. In the run-up to the announcement of the revised Guidelines, Japanese policymakers were careful to explain to an admittedly rather incredulous media and public, given doubts about the ability of the Japanese government to stand up to US pressure, that they retained this option.

Added to this, the lack of an integrated command structure between the Japanese Self Defence Forces (SDF) and US military has always meant that Japan can evade or distance itself from military co-operation with the US in other ways beyond just the provision of bases. As noted above, the US-Japan alliance, in terms of actual bilateral military co-operation, has developed in an asymmetric fashion: Japan heavily dependent upon US extended nuclear deterrence and conventional power projection capabilities in the region; and the US relying to a lesser but significant degree upon Japan to assist in the protection of its military bases and personnel stationed inside Japanese territory. During the course of the Cold War, the US and Japan continued to develop asymmetric and distinct, but nevertheless complementary, military capabilities and responsibilities which ensured that the alliance was perceived to function to the benefit of each partner. For example, Japan's purchase of E-2C early-warning aircraft and F-15 fighters in the 1980s was justified on the basis of the need to defend Japanese airspace against Soviet T-26 Backfire bombers, but in the event of a conflict would clearly have served also to defend US bases in Japan from Soviet air-strikes and to release US military units from their defensive responsibilities to concentrate on possible combat roles outside Japanese territory. Over time, these parallel but complementary 'burden sharing' roles for US and Japanese military forces can even be said to have given a type of 'balanced asymmetry' to the alliance.

However, Japan's prohibition on the exercise of the right of collective self-defence has meant that, even though in *de facto* terms Japan's military posture has worked indirectly to complement and assist in the defence of US forces, and thus fulfil the purport of the mutual security treaty, in *de jure* terms it has not been able nor needed to have developed a combined or integrated command structure with the US forces stationed in Japan. Instead, Japan and the US developed parallel command structures to co-ordinate the parallel and indirect forms of military cooperation under the security treaty. These command systems have provided Japan and the US with the potential for direct and integrated security co-operation in certain spheres of activity. For instance, the Maritime SDF (MSDF) production under license of US-designed P-3C Orion early-warning aircraft and *Aegis*-class destroyers means that its possesses military hardware with near identical command and control systems to those of the US Navy, allowing in theory for the close exchange of tactical information and for Japanese naval assets to be placed under the command of the US Seventh Fleet. In practice, though, despite the conduct of combined exercises between the MSDF and US Seventh Fleet and the subsequent one-way receipt by the MSDF of signals from US ships, no routine technical or military arrangement has been established for placing Japanese ships under US command. Likewise, Japan's Air SDF (ASDF) in the Basic Air Defence Ground Environment (BADGE) system maintains an air-defence system which, although capable of exchanging digital data with that of US Air Force (USAF), is technically and military distinct from that of the US.28

Hence, the SDF's capabilities and mission have remained exclusively under the political and military control of the Japanese government, and there is no bilateral technological linkage or military command mechanism that would inherently compel Japan to follow the US into a conflict scenario which it deemed incompatible with its national interests. Clearly, and as pacifist scholars pointed out during the height of the Cold War, there is always the probability that Japan could become the object of attack because of the presence of US bases and thereby become unintentionally embroiled in a war.29 Japan, nonetheless, has still retained the freedom to reserve its military support for the US in a conflict scenario—a freedom provided to it by the technological separation of Japanese and US military assets and command structures. Japan's

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decision to exercise this freedom in a conflict scenario would clearly involves massive political and strategic choices for the Japanese government, and carry serious implications for the continuation of the US-Japan alliance. But this relative freedom of political and military choice still remains and has not been sacrificed despite the strengthening of US-Japan security ties during and since the Cold War. The introduction of the original US-Japan Guidelines for Defence Co-operation in 1978 and initiation of combined military exercises did not lead to the integration of US and Japanese command structures. Moreover, and most crucially, in spite of the increased bilateral military co-ordination and still undefined 'mechanisms' envisaged in the revised Guidelines as a means to increase the operability of the alliance in a crisis situation, the principle of the separation of Japanese and US command structures remains in place. Consequently, Japan retains the ability to foot-drag on, or evade completely, military co-operation with the US.

The drastic political fallout from such overt non-co-operation has meant that Japan has rarely exercised the options elucidated above, and has searched for more subtle ways to temper and obfuscate its true alliance commitments. In the same way as predicted by alliance theory, Japan has followed a 'straddling strategy', known more familiarly as one of hedging, or in semi-official parlance, strategic ambiguity. Japan's hedging strategy has centred upon the by now notorious concept of *shûhen* as emphasised in the revised Guidelines. The US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security of April 1996, the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee's Guidelines text and the Japanese government's initial Guidelines bill drawn up in April 1998, all state that the revised Guidelines were now to focus upon US-Japan bilateral cooperation in cases of armed attack against Japan and in 'areas surrounding Japan' (*shûhen*). The introduction of the concept of *shûhen*, in relation to the 1960 definition of the Far East and scope of the security treaty, has already been mentioned above. The concept at this time, although not rigidly geographical *per se*, clearly did contain a strong geographical element with the specific naming of the area north of the Philippines, South Korea and areas under the control of the ROC, and this definition has

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30 The lack of an integrated command structure to implement the revised Guidelines is revealed in the JDA's Defence of Japan white paper for 1999. Despite considerable detail on preceding sections dealing with areas for US-Japan cooperation, the actual command and adjustment mechanisms for carrying out military operations in this area amounts to only half a page of vagaries about the need for an inter-governmental body to smooth cooperation. Bôeichôhen, Bôeichô Hakusho 1999, p. 211-2.

never been formally revised by the Japanese government. However, the concept of *shūhen* in the initial drafts of the revised Guidelines differed somewhat from that of 1960, describing it as 'not geographic but situational'. Government policy-makers maintain that *shūhen* still contains a geographical element in the sense that the area of action for the revised Guidelines is likely to be close to Japan. But even more significantly, they also stress Kishi's additional statements that definitions of *shūhen* are not strictly geographical in nature or always restrictive of the security treaty's range of action, and posit that it is not always possible to draw a firm geographical line to demarcate the boundaries of Japan's security interests. Thus, the government's shift of emphasis has been has enabled it to skirt around awkward re-definitions of the scope of the Far East as a means to expand the range of the security treaty, whilst at the same time leaving open the possibility for action in areas both inside and outside the existing definition of the Far East based on the idea of situational need.

The ability to keep intact the existing definition of the Far East is especially advantageous in alliance theory terms in that it means that the government can attempt to leave vague Taiwan's position as an object of the new Guidelines, and thus temper the problems of the adversary and alliance games. For on the one hand, by stressing the situational nature of *shūhen*, the Japanese government is able to avoid repeating the clear cut commitment to the security of Taiwan as it had done in 1960, but also leave some room for doubt in Chinese policy-makers' minds as to whether Japan would irrevocably devote itself to support for the US in a conflict over Taiwan. Hence, this then creates some potential room for conciliation between Japan and China over the issue, and the ability to check any uncontrollable upward spiral of insecurity. On the other hand, the situational nature of *shūhen* could also moderate the risks of the alliance game with the US. In line with the concept of situational need, Japan would still retain the ability to support the US to intervene in the Taiwan Straits if it were deemed necessary in the event of a crisis, and thereby avoid friction in the alliance and the risk of abandonment. But at the same time, Japan would also retain the ability to indicate to the US that it may not support it in a crisis in the Straits of Taiwan, if were judged not to meet the criteria of situational need, and thereby restrain the US from overly-reactive behaviour towards China and from intervening in a military crisis which would lead to the entrapment of Japan.
Hence, in many ways the introduction of the concept of situational need can be seen to be a hedging and straddling strategy intended to avoid the worst case scenarios of the adversary and alliance game. The strategy offers Japan a means to conciliate China, possibly restrain the US, and, if necessary, take a final exit strategy. Undoubtedly, Japan has been playing with fire in the pursuit of this strategy, with the smallest miscalculation or miscommunication of its position likely to damage Japan's bilateral security relations with either side. Moreover, the problems inherent with carrying out this strategy have been shown by the verbal contortions that Japanese policy-makers have been forced to into as a means to obfuscate Japanese strategy. In many ways as well, the strategy has failed to convince China and been made even more difficult by domestic Japanese suspicions. In particular, the Japanese Diet's decision to attempt to refine the definition of "shûhen" definition has placed some implicit limits upon the range of action of the security treaty. Nonetheless, the concept of "shûhen" has been instrumental in at least making the revised Guidelines a somewhat easier pill for China to swallow than any overt designation of it as threat (practically impossible in any case given Japan's posture of "senshū bōei", or exclusively oriented self-defence) and instilled in Chinese policy-makers the belief that there is still a chance that Japan may still not align itself too closely with the US, and hence that China itself has retained some room for manoeuvre in order to protect its national interests and to conciliate over regional security issues with regard to the Japan-US alliance. Furthermore, the "shûhen" concept has given Japan something of a freer hand versus the US. Japan retains some leverage over the US in terms of avoiding automatic entrapment, whilst its alliance partner can be reasonably satisfied that

32 Before the passage of the Guidelines legislation in April and May 1999, the Japanese Diet insisted upon the insertion of clauses to alter the definition of "shûhen". The original version submitted to the Diet stated that the Guidelines were designed for the purpose of deciding the steps that Japan could take in the event of a 'situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence upon Japan's peace and security'. The revised version in the actual legislation became 'situation in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence upon Japan's peace and security, and if left unaddressed could lead to a direct armed attack upon Japan'. A further clause was also inserted into the legislation stating that the steps to be taken were designed to, 'contribute to the effective operability of the US-Japan security'. Yomiuri Shimbun, 25 May 1999, p. 4 (author's translation). The aim of these measures was to attempt to impose some form of restriction upon the scope of the Guidelines by ensuring that any action undertaken would be designed to counter only situations close enough to Japan to escalate into a direct attack and thus likely not to be beyond the immediate region surrounding Japan, and which also would be limited to the accepted criteria of the operation of the US-Japan security treaty. The altered legislation, though, would not interfere strictly with the possible action of the US-Japan security treaty to cover situations involving, as the Japanese government and Diet could still interpret such situations as ones which if left unaddressed could lead to direct attack on Japan, as in the March 1996 missile tests. The Guidelines could even still be used to extend the range of the action of the US-Japan security treaty outside the East Asia region if there was sufficient preparedness to stretch the interpretation of situations which could lead to armed attack upon Japan if left unaddressed long enough or which involved states with power projection and WMD capabilities. For more details, see Bôei kenkyûjo, Higashi Ajia Senryaku Gaikan 2000, Tokyo, Ôkurashô Insatsukyoku, 2000, pp. 96-99.
when push comes to shove Japan will support it in a conflict surrounding Taiwan. The concept also offers a means to satisfy shared alliance interests over the short to medium terms with regard to preservation of the status quo in the Taiwan issue. The strategic ambiguity of the shûhen concept dampens Taiwan's confidence that it could declare independence with impunity in the certain expectation of military assistance from the US-Japan alliance, but also obliges China to hesitate in seeking to intimidate Taiwan as such actions could still bring the US-Japan alliance into play.

The difficulties for Japan of carrying out this strategy of ambiguity are legion, especially given the asymmetrical nature of the alliance which means that Japan has often to acquiesce in the final instance in the following US strategy, and the fact that the Taiwan issue may already be out of the hands of alliance policy-makers, as the growth of democracy in Taiwan threatens to generate a near inevitable clash with China over independence. But the concept of shûhen at least potentially offers an ingenious, if not entirely reliable, method to obviate boxing-in too tightly the Japan-US-China strategic interests over Taiwan and to buy all sides a measure of time and geo-strategic space to avoid blundering into an unwanted conflict. Finally, perhaps the most important point about the concept of shûhen is that it reiterates for Japanese policy-makers their long-held awareness of the need to preserve Japan's strategic freedom and to avoid being locked too firmly into US military strategy in the East Asia region. As will be demonstrated in the next section, Japan's management of the revised Guidelines is, then, in striking contrast to its more dangerous handling of BMD.

**Japanese participation in BMD**

The above sections have demonstrated the methods by which Japanese policy-makers in the process of strengthening the US-Japan alliance have generated, as well as at the same time endeavoured to alleviate, both adversary and alliance security dilemma vis-à-vis China and the US. The means available for Japan to pursue this strategy have included the drastic and unexercised option of refusing co-operation with the US; the ability to side-step total integration into US military strategy by maintaining separate US and Japanese command structures even within the structure of a strengthened alliance; and the utilisation of obfuscation and strategic
ambiguity in an attempt to 'satisfice' differing US and Chinese expectations regarding Japan's stance of support or ambivalence in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. The following sections argue, however, that BMD presents a fundamentally different form of adversary and alliance security dilemma for Japan's policy makers which cannot be easily evaded by the use of the above methods, and long-term could spell disaster for Japanese security policy and its relations with China and the US. In order to understand the enhanced challenge of BMD to Japanese policy-makers, it is first necessary to elucidate the background to the project and its technological and military implications.

**BMD systems**

BMD, or TMD in the case of identical US anti-missile defences intended for eventual deployment in the Asia-Pacific and other theatres, comprises four types of upper-tier and lower tier weapon systems based on land and sea. These BMD/TMD weapon systems are designed to use hit-to-kill missile technology (in essence, using a bullet to hit another bullet) in order to intercept and destroy incoming ballistic missiles at varying heights in their descent and re-entry phase. In the process of developing TMD systems, the US government has attempted to reach agreement with Russia that these technologies are compliant with the bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty of 1972. The ABM treaty does not prohibit the development of TMD systems, but it does prohibit the development anti-ballistic missile systems intended to defend against either side's strategic missiles. In 1997, the US and Russia adopted a joint government statement to differentiate between TMD and ABM systems, agreeing that TMD systems with interceptor velocities of more than 3 kilometres per second, and tested against ballistic missiles flying faster than 5 kilometres per second and with a range of over 3,500 kilometres, were non-compliant with the ABM treaty. The imposition of an upper threshold upon TMD capabilities is designed to ensure that these systems do not jeopardise the effectiveness of US and Russian strategic nuclear deterrent--the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) of either side typically travelling at velocities of at least 7 kilometres per hour and equipped with ranges of between 9,000-16,000 kilometres. However, as will be seen in more detail below, strong suspicions exist about the limits in practice of TMD system capabilities and their compliance with the joint
The lower-tier and less capable systems of PAC-3 and NAD are undoubtedly compatible with the ABM treaty, but research has suggested that the THAAD system, and very likely the NTW system, possess interceptor speeds of between more than 3 and 5 kilometres per second. These capabilities represent possible non-compliance with the ABM treaty and could enable the NTW system to counter the strategic ballistic missiles of Russia and other nuclear powers.

**Table 1: BMD/TMD systems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lower tier</th>
<th>Ground-based</th>
<th>PAC-3</th>
<th>Existing PAC-2 system upgraded by the adoption of new GEM missiles and improvement of radar and firing control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sea-based</td>
<td>NAD</td>
<td>Existing Aegis system upgraded by improvement of radar, firing controls and Standard Missile-2 Block IV A, and provision of ballistic missile intercept capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper tier</td>
<td>Ground-based</td>
<td>THAAD</td>
<td>Development of new large-scale mobile radar and high speed high altitude missile interceptor and firing control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sea-based</td>
<td>NTWD</td>
<td>Existing Aegis system upgraded as in NAD, and addition of LEAP ballistic missile intercept capability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The US envisages the use of lower and upper tier and ground and sea-based TMD systems in combination in order to protect its military forces overseas. The combination of upper and lower-tier systems is designed to provide mutually reinforcing layers of protection to guard against

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'leakage' in the event of major ballistic missile attack, whilst the combination of land and sea-based systems offers differing advantages in terms of mobility—the PAC-3 and THAAD systems able to be loaded on C-141 transport aircraft for rapid airlift to combat theatres, and the NAD and NTW systems taking advantage of the sea mobility of Aegis-class destroyers.\textsuperscript{35}

In addition, and integral to its TMD programme, the US has also developed sensor systems for the detection of ballistic missile launches and Battlefield Management (BM) and Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) systems to operate the response of the TMD weapons systems. THAAD systems possess ground-based radar which have some capability to detect in-coming ballistic missiles.\textsuperscript{36} However, the effectiveness of TMD systems is really dependent upon the early warning provided by space-based infra-red sensors. US Defence Support Programme (DSP) satellites detect the heat plumes from ballistic missiles launches, and then transmit this information to North American Aerospace Command (NORAD) and US Space Command (USSPACECOM). In turn, information concerning missile launches has to be transmitted on and processed through a C3I system, so that decisions and instructions concerning the response of the TMD weapons systems can be carried out in rapid timeframe. As will be seen below, Japan's need to develop also these detection and command systems may influence greatly the degree of its independence in security planning.

\textit{Japan and the development of BMD}

Japanese interest in BMD stretches back to the inception under the Reagan administration in 1983 of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) (better known as 'Star wars'), and the subsequent agreement of the Nakasone Yasuhiro administration in September 1986 to participate in SDI research. Although Japan's participation in SDI at the time was replete with problems, and the US eventually abandoned SDI after the failure of the Bush administration to transform the programme in January 1991 into the less ambitious Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), both sides maintained an interest in anti-ballistic missile technology following the end of the Cold War. Based on the 1986 US-Japan governmental agreement, the US government

\textsuperscript{35} Ballistic Missile Defence Organization, \textit{Fact Sheet: Theater High Altitude Area Defense System; Fact Sheet, Navy Theater Wide Ballistic Missile Defense Program.}

\textsuperscript{36} Yamashita Masamitsu, Takai Susumu and Iwata Shūichirō, \textit{TMD: Senikidandō Missairu Bōei}, Tokyo, TBS Buritanika, 1994, p. 205.
Strategic Defence Initiative Office (SDIO) and US and Japanese private defence contractors, including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Hitachi, Fujitsu and NEC, carried out a joint study on Western Pacific Missile Architecture (WESTPAC) from December 1989 until May 1993. Meanwhile, US and Japanese government interest in BMD technology in the post-Cold War period continued to be driven by the proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities globally and in the East Asia region—the growing missile threat illustrated by Iraq's use of Scud missiles during the Gulf War of 1990-91. Japan, partly in reaction to the experience of the Gulf War when the US used the Patriot system (if highly unsuccessfully) to intercept Iraqi missiles, and partly in reaction to North Korea's test launch of a Nodong-1 missiles in the Sea of Japan in May 1990 and May 1993, initiated the purchase from the US of an upgrade to its existing Patriot SAM missiles to the PAC-2 anti-ballistic missile system.

In September 1993, the US Secretary of Defence, Les Aspin, and Director General, Nakanishi Keisuke, agreed to establish under the bilateral Security Subcommitteee (SSC) a TMD working group, which then met twelve times from December 1993 onwards. This was followed in June 1994 by direct US government proposals for bilateral collaboration with Japan on TMD. US BMDO was reported to have presented four options to Japan. Firstly, a upper-tier NTWD and lower-tier Patriot system at a cost of US$4.5 billion, based on upgrades of existing Japanese plans to deploy four Aegis destroyers, four Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. Secondly, a NTWD and Patriot system costing US$16.3 billion, based on upgrades of the existing Japanese deployment plans already mentioned, and an additional two Aegis destroyers and new surveillance radar. Thirdly, a THAAD and Patriot system at a cost of US$8.837 US defence contractors included Raytheon, McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed, GE Aerospace, and Boeing. Japanese contractors included Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, NEC, JRC, Hitachi, and Fujitsu. The report cost US$8 million and was released in May 1994. It calculated that in the event of a North Korean missile attack upon Western Japan by six missiles, it could be expected that a Patriot system on its own would result in a 46.6 per cent leakage rate. Patriot and THAAD combined would reduce the leakage rate to 33 per cent. The report also stated that in a simulated saturation attack upon Sasebo Naval base a Patriot system on its own would intercept 66 per cent of incoming missiles, and a combined Patriot and THAAD layering would make to for almost a 100 per cent intercept. Hence, the report recommended the use of Patriot lower-tier and THAAD upper tier systems in combination. It examined also the use of Aegis-class warships for BMD.

billion; and, fourthly, a combined NTWD, THAAD and Patriot system at a cost of US$8.9 billion.\textsuperscript{39} US proposals for Japanese participation in TMD were matched by the report of the Prime Minister's Advisory Group on Defence released in September 1994, which recommended US-Japan collaboration in the development of BMD.\textsuperscript{40} The Japanese government established in the same month a specialist Bilateral Study (BS) under the SSC to investigate the technological feasibility of BMD systems, and this group instituted regular meetings from January 1995 onwards. In total between 1995 and 1998 the government devoted ¥560 million for study costs into TMD weapon systems, and sensor and C\textsuperscript{3}I systems, as well as commissioning private Japanese defence contractors to investigate key technologies to improve native BMD capabilities. However, for various reasons, some of which are explained below, the Japanese government remained reticent about committing itself to actual participation in co-operative research with the US into BMD.\textsuperscript{41} Momentum for co-operative research was eventually provided by the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security of April 1996 which stressed the importance of BMD as a means to enhance the credibility of the alliance, and then Japan's commitment to joint BMD research was assured by the North Korea missile test of August 1998. In accordance with the US-Japan exchange of notes noted at the start of this paper, Japan has agreed to undertake joint research into the key four technologies: infra-red seekers mounted in the nose-cones of interceptor missiles to detect and pursue targets; the protection of the infra-red seekers from heat generated in-flight from the atmosphere; kinetic interceptor warheads for the direct destruction of ballistic missiles; and the second-stage rocket motor of the interceptor missile.\textsuperscript{42} As Japan possesses already many of the platforms for a BMD weapons system, including AWACS and

\begin{itemize}
  \item Bôei Mondai Kondankai, \textit{Bôei no Anzen Hôshô to Bôei no Arikata: Nijû Isseiki e Mukete no Tenbô}, Tokyo, Ôkurashô Insatsu Kyoku, 1994, p. 47.
  \item For example, in mid-1995, the JDA contracted with Nissan Motors and Kawasaki Heavy Industries to develop a side thruster interceptor missile.
  \item Bôeichôhen, \textit{Bôeichô Hakusho 1999}, p. 138.
\end{itemize}
Aegis-class destroyers, the NTWD system has been chosen for research as the most cost effective option.43

Japan's BMD security dilemma versus China

Japan's original demonstration of interest in BMD research and then its actual commitment to a co-operative programme with the US has generated adversary and alliance dilemmas. Chinese policy-makers, from the near outset, and intensifying their efforts since 1995, have communicated their concerns about BMD to their Japanese counterparts using an admixture of informal and official dialogue channels. Chinese concerns essentially revolve around the dual impact of BMD upon China's strategic nuclear deterrent and the course of the Taiwan issue.

Table 2: Chinese ballistic missile capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOD name/designation</th>
<th>Chinese name/designation</th>
<th>Static/Mobile</th>
<th>Range (km)</th>
<th>CEP</th>
<th>Inventory (deployed/stockpiled)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS-4</td>
<td>DF-5</td>
<td>Static</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS-NX-5</td>
<td>JL-2</td>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>n. k.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS-X-9</td>
<td>DF-31</td>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>n. k.</td>
<td>n. k.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS-X-10</td>
<td>DF-41</td>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>n. k.</td>
<td>n. k.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS-2</td>
<td>DF-3</td>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS-3</td>
<td>DF-4</td>
<td>Static</td>
<td>4,750</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>20-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS-N-3</td>
<td>JL-1</td>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS-5</td>
<td>DF-21</td>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS-6</td>
<td>DF-15/M-9</td>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS-7</td>
<td>DF-11/M-11</td>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>n. k.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS-8</td>
<td>M-7/Project 8610</td>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>n. k.</td>
<td>n. k.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Acronyms**: CEP: Circular Error Probable; CSS: Chinese Surface-to-Surface; CSS-N: Chinese Surface-to-Surface Naval; CSS-T: Chinese Surface-to-Surface Tactical; DF: Dong Feng (East Wind); DOD: Department of Defence; ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile; IRBM: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile; JL: Julang (Great Wave); n.k.: not known; SLBM: Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile; SRBN: Short Range Ballistic Missile.

Chinese officials and neutral observers have argued that a Japanese BMD or TMD system developed in conjunction with the US would lead to the effective negation of China's nuclear deterrent by providing Japan with both a 'spear' and 'shield'. The spear of the US extended nuclear deterrent would be complemented by the shield of BMD, allowing Japan to enjoy vis-à-vis China capabilities both of deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. The evidence presented above relating to the capabilities of advanced TMD systems suggests that Chinese concerns to a certain degree may be justified. Around eighty per cent of China's strategic arsenal consists of missiles with ranges of less than 3,500 km. In accordance with US definitions used to develop TMD or BMD systems, these missiles would thus be classified as theatre weapons and within the threshold of US and Japanese NTWD system capabilities. Moreover, as noted above, NTWD systems equipped with interceptor speeds of between 3 and 5 kilometres per second would also be capable of countering China longer-range ICBMs which number only around twenty.

China may be able to overcome the possible negation by NTWD of its strategic nuclear deterrent through the employment of counter measures and the ongoing upgrade of its missile force, and in particular through the development of Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) which could provide it with the capability to saturate and overwhelm BMD systems in

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force of numbers. However, NTWD and other BMD systems would still possess the capability to negate or at the very least severely circumscribe China's other shorter range ballistic missile capabilities, unless China were to massively increase the production of these missiles so as to raise also their numbers to saturation levels.

For Chinese policy-makers, Japan's possible acquirement of an NTWD system to counter its intermediate and short range ballistic missiles would have significant ramifications for the second of its concerns over the Taiwan issue. As outlined in earlier sections, China's weapon of choice in seeking to intimidate China has been IRBMs, such as the D-15 test-fired across the Straits of Taiwan in March 1996. China's worst-case scenario would obviously be Japan's deployment either individually or in conjunction with the US of the Aegis-based and sea-mobile NTWD system to protect Taiwan in a future crisis situation. The reluctance of Japan's policy-makers to become directly embroiled in a crisis in the Straits of Taiwan means that, in all but the most dire of conflagrations which threaten Japan's own security and engender massive alliance pressure from the US, Japan would be highly unlikely to contemplate the actual deployment of a Japanese NTWD either to protect Taiwan directly or even to provide missile cover for US forces involved in a Taiwan conflict. Nevertheless, even if Japan is likely to distance itself from allowing its NTWD systems to become involved in a Taiwan crisis, and, indeed, has made it very clear that it does not wish to see any third party such as Taiwan involved in Japan-US BMD research, Chinese fears remain that Japan participation could bring BMD benefits to Taiwan and weaken China's security position. Most particularly, the concern of China appears to be that BMD technologies developed jointly under a US-Japan programme, although they could not be transferred by Japan to Taiwan due to the former's ban on arms exports, could still be transferred by the US, regardless of Japan's intentions to prevent Taiwan from participating in BMD.

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49 For instance, Nonaka Hiromu, in his first stint as Chief Cabinet Secretary, offered the emphatic assurance that no third country, including Taiwan, would be included in Japanese participation in any BMD programme, and that the system was not designed to defend Taiwan. Asahi Shim bun, 9 March 1999, p. 3.
Hence, Japan's acquisition of a BMD system and especially NTWD is perceived by China to provide it with the capacity to intervene both directly and indirectly, and individually and jointly under the US-Japan alliance, in a conflict over Taiwan and in contravention of China's most basic national security interest concerned with the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this situation, it is hardly unsurprising that the protestations of Japan's policy makers that BMD is a 'purely defensive' system confined to Japan and which poses no threat to its neighbours cut little ice with their Chinese counterparts.\textsuperscript{50} For, as commentators both inside and outside Japan have noted, a purely 'defensive' weapon such as BMD can actually appear offensive if it threatens the status quo. China's principal security goal is to prevent Taiwan from moving from de facto to de jure independence, and has concluded increasingly that military coercion may be the only means left available to it persuade Taiwan to desist. Consequently, Taiwan's access to any defensive weapon which could embolden a declaration of independence and overturn the status quo, such as a BMD system capable of countering China's ballistic missiles and main tool of military coercion, and acquired by Taiwan either through the development of its own BMD system or the extension to it of a US or Japanese system in a crisis situation, can be perceived as an offensive move and detrimental to the balance of power in the region.\textsuperscript{51} In particular, Chinese analysts seem to fear a scenario in which TMD could function to defend the forces of an external power, such as the US or Japan, attempting to intervene militarily in a Taiwan Straits crisis, and thus serve in effect to augment their offensive power.\textsuperscript{52}

The end result of concerns about the combined potential defensive and offensive roles of BMD has been is that it has only succeeded to date in raising China's suspicions about Japan's security intentions--as shown by its recent tendency to switch increasingly the direction of its rhetoric

\textsuperscript{50} The ritualistic description of BMD for Japanese policy-makers connected with MOFA and the JDA as elaborated in the Diet and various publications has been that it is a purely defensive system (junsui ni bögyo teki na shisutemu). The reliance of Japanese policy-makers upon persuasion by repetition of this phrase has become reminiscent of the use of the phrase that shûhen in the revised Guidelines was purely situational (aku made mojitai teki mono de ara).


away from the *faîte accompli* of the revised Guidelines and towards BMD and TMD—and produced a new adversary security dilemma between Japan and China. BMD has even raised misplaced Chinese concerns that Japan could pursue its own nuclear option.\(^{53}\) In turn, the BMD project, although it certainly has not initiated the process, will probably help to accelerate Chinese moves to upgrade its nuclear, ballistic missile and other conventional military capabilities, so generating a further downward spiral of insecurity.

**Japan's security dilemma versus the US**

Japan's participation in BMD has generated also a potential new alliance security dilemmas of abandonment and entrapment versus the US, and which could subsequently reinforce the adversary dilemma versus China. Japan could face the dilemma of abandonment if it were called upon by its US alliance partner to extend its NTWD system to assist US forces involved in a conflict over Taiwan; either directly under intense US pressure, or, as noted in the preceding section, most likely in an indirect fashion by providing cover against missile attacks on the perimeter of the US combat zone and in Japanese territorial waters so to avoid charges of collective self-defence. The sections above dealing with the revised Guidelines have already outlined the difficulties that Japan would experience in providing support to its ally in a Sino-US conflict over Taiwan, and if it fails to be seen to satisfy US requests for assistance in the case of extending BMD cover then this could lead another crisis of confidence in the alliance and its eventual abandonment.

The technological nature of the BMD project presents also an intense and qualitatively new challenge to Japan's policy-makers in terms of the risks of entrapment in US military strategy in East Asia. This is because Japan's attempts to develop an effective BMD system necessitate that its relies to a considerable degree upon technology and information provided by the US, which in turn necessitates tighter US-Japan military co-operation, and the erosion of Japan's strategic freedom. Matsumura Masahiro argues that Japan's lack of infra-red satellite technology and

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\(^{53}\) Chinese concerns revolve around Japan's ability having acquired BMD technology to convert this to the production of offensive missile technology and consolidate Japan's technological base for the production of nuclear capable ballistic missiles. However, BMD is highly unlikely to promote Japan's interest in nuclear weapons if it already has an effective defence against such weapons. For an analysis which actually stressed the benefits for non-nuclear proliferation in Japan's case by eschewing its own need to develop nuclear weapons, see Böeichô Böei Kenkyûjo, *Higashi Ajia Senryaku Gaikan 1998-99*, p.58.
related early-warning systems, so essential for the detection of ballistic missile launches, means it will be forced to rely upon the US for these capabilities and information, supplied via US DSP satellites and NORAD. In addition, in order to access and utilise information on missile launches, Japan will be obliged to further develop C3I systems identical to and procured from the US. As Cronin, Giarra and Green stress, the rebuilding of Japan's air defences will have to be based on Japanese acceptance of the necessity for, 'effective bilateral integration, leading inexorably to the requirement for systematic bilateral co-ordination and rationalisation of design, development, procurement, fielding, doctrine and operations'. The result of these developments would be that Japan would seek to replace its existing military command systems, which are largely distinct from and function in parallel to those of the US, and substitute instead command systems compatible with and reliant for their correct functioning upon technology and information supplied by the US. Japan's BMD and other military command systems would have to stop short of explicit integration with those of the US due to the ban on the exercise of collective self-defence, but implicitly would now assume a subsidiary position within the structure of alliance due to their dependence upon information filtered top downwards from the US.

This technological and military set up for BMD could then have considerable implications for Japan's exercise of strategic choice in a conflict situation. Japan's reliance upon US-supplied information in order to make a BMD system function would place it at a marked political and military disadvantage vis-à-vis both a potential adversary and its US ally. Japan might be unable to take an independent decision to deploy BMD in a crisis situation unless it has secured the consent of the US and has demonstrated that this action was compatible with its ally's interest. Moreover, taking Machiavellian calculations to their extremes, the US could seek to deprive Japanese policy-makers of vital information concerning missile launches which threaten Japan's security, and in this way ensure that Japan is left defenceless against an attack and thereby embroiled in a conflict on the side of the US. Finally, a scenario could be imagined in which US failure, deliberate or accidental, to provide Japan with correct information, and the rapid communication possible between the US and Japanese forces enabled by compatible C3I systems.

54 Matsumura, Nichibei Dōmei to Gunji Gijutsu, pp. 141-2.
55 Cronin, Giarra and Green, 'The alliance implications of theater missile defense', p.182.
systems, could lead to Japan deploying a TMD system in support of US forces. All of these scenarios, however, could occur in a conflict situation surrounding Taiwan and reinforce the adversary security dilemma for Japan against China

**Japan's inescapable security dilemma?**

Hence, Japan's participation in BMD research with the US in the long term and after deployment of an actual NTWD system could create a inter-linked structure of technological and strategic dependence on Japan's part, and related adversary and alliance dilemmas. The ability of Japan to escape limitations placed upon its strategic freedom in the case of BMD, and in marked contrast to the careful preservation of its strategic options under the US-Japan alliance during the previous fifty years, is doubtful. The technological logic of dependency, as dictated by BMD, can only be countered by the development of other technological options. Japan's decision since 1998 in response to the North Korea Taepodong-1 test to develop its own imagery intelligence (IMINT) satellites based on optical and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) systems will provide a Japanese capability to detect preparations for a missile launch, but not the actual launch itself.56 Indeed, even this programme sold to many LDP members as a means to lessen Japan's strategic dependency on the US may actually only end up increasing it, as Japanese indigenous production (*kokusanka*) still involved the purchase of key components from the US and reliance upon the US for the processing of satellite information.

Japan is thus faced with twin security dilemmas from which there appears to be no ready escape exit. Chinese fears of even research into the feasibility of BMD threaten to provoke an arms race, whilst the US appears to have gained the potential to exert unavoidable technological and military leverage over Japan, presenting the latter with equally unattractive scenarios of abandonment or entrapment. Japan also appears unable, given the relentless technological logic of BMD making for the integration of military command systems, to exercise its usual strategic option, as demonstrated in the revised Guidelines, of using obfuscation about its true security intentions in order to satisfy the competing expectations of the US and China. BMD possesses, then, real potential to place Japan on a disastrous and headlong path towards conflict in

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Northeast Asia. The only other option open to Japan would be to eschew co-operation with the US on BMD altogether, but domestic pressure building up in favour of BMD since 1998 and the political cost to the continuation of the alliance means that this could only be a drastic last resort.

In this situation, whereby Japan is unable to refuse co-operation with the US on BMD due to the risks of abandonment but also is aware of the risks involved in any eventual BMD deployment of entrapment in US strategy and the aggravation of China, a number of observers have speculated that Japan's optimum strategy for pushing ahead with BMD might be one of co-operation in stages with the US, in conjunction with attempts to use BMD as a means to persuade China to moderate its security behaviour, thus obviating both the alliance and adversary dilemmas. Hence, the argument runs that Japan can move through each of the stages of research, development and deployment of the different BMD systems so as to satisfy US demands for co-operation and provide for its own defence, but intimating as well at each stage that it still retains the option to cease BMD development and prevent itself being corralled into a situation of entrapment. This staged approach would simultaneously present opportunities to ameliorate tensions with China. For even though Japan would be communicating to China through its participation in BMD that it is willing to defend its security interests and that it will negotiate from a position of relative strength, the staged and characteristically Japanese incremental nature of the approach would also indicate to China that Japan's commitment to BMD is not irrevocable and that there is room for both sides to reach an accommodation on security issues. The eventual hope is that this type of Japanese approach could bring China to the negotiating table on arms control in East Asia.

In sum, then, this represents a form of elaborate 'straddling' strategy, but one which is made all the more difficult by the compulsion of BMD technology which means that Japan could be locked into US strategy and consequent alliance and adversary dilemmas before it has had the opportunity to exercise the option to steer between the path of conflicting interests over the US and China. Having laid out in terms of alliance theory the potential and qualitatively more

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complex problems that BMD presents to Japan over the medium to long terms with regard to the US and China, the task of the next and final section is to examine what is the exact perception of its policy-makers with regard to BMD, whether they are aware of all the strategic implications of the project, and whether they can conceive of such elaborate strategies to provide escape clauses and retain Japan's security options.

**Japanese policy-makers and BMD strategic considerations**

Japanese policy-makers have been criticised as lacking a true understanding of the strategic implications of BMD. Soeya Yoshihide comments that: 'In the minds of Japanese policy-makers, Japan's participation in the embryonic stages of TMD is an act of security co-operation with the US, and as such is an end in itself...There is no indication that the Japanese government has given any serious consideration to the strategic dimension of the TMD program'.  

Evidence from various secondary and primary sources, and as yet limited interviews, would seem to support this conclusion to a certain extent, but also suggest that Japan's policy-makers are not entirely unaware of the strategic problems of the project.

MOFA officials certainly demonstrate concerns that BMD engenders for Japan a potential security dilemma with regard to Japan-US and Sino-Japanese relations. Soeya's criticism of Japanese involvement in BMD as simply forming part of a larger overall project, along with the revised guidelines as described earlier, to re-build the credibility of the US-Japan alliance, and thereby ameliorate concerns about abandonment, are hard to counter.  

TMD's function as a vehicle to cement the political rather than military basis of the alliance appears to have been especially strong prior to the North Korean 'Taepodong-shock' and the consequent emergence of an immediate ballistic missile threat which could be used to legitimise Japan's taking the plunge into joint BMD research. But Japan's subsequent participation in BMD research has meant that for its policy-makers the project now serves equally as both a test of the political and military resolve of the alliance. At the same time, MOFA policy-makers also seem to be cognisant of what equates in theoretical terms to the risks of entrapment in US military strategy in the region.

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59 Hughes, *Japan's Economic Power and Security*, pp. 202-3. For one Japanese view stressing the importance of TMD as a means to strengthen confidence in the US-Japan alliance and its function across the region, see Morimoto
and the generation of adversary security dilemma with China. As stated above, China's officials have used every opportunity in direct dialogue with their Japanese counterparts to express their concerns over BMD and Taiwan, and MOFA acknowledges although strongly denies the validity of these Chinese anxieties. Moreover, MOFA officials are aware that the BMD issue cannot strictly be separated from Russian and Chinese objections to the US possible unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty, and the knock-on effect upon Japan's own role in working for international arms control--Japan in essence being seen as the US's accomplice in undermining arms control regimes. The result has been that Japan was relatively muted on the awkward issue of NMD and the ABM treaty at the Okinawa G-8 summit in July 2000. Furthermore, MOFA also realises that the conflicting international pressures on the Japanese government are complicated by domestic pressure from the LDP, the arms industry, and the general public to take steps to counter North Korea's ballistic missile programme.

MOFA's awareness of latent security dilemmas and risks with regard to participation in BMD is accompanied also by the sense of the need for a form of reserve exit strategy from the alliance and adversary games. MOFA officials stress that any Japanese decision to move ahead with BMD research and development will taken based on considerations of the feasibility and cost effectiveness of the project, and, most crucially, whether it meets Japan's own strategic and defensive needs. Hence, they argue, Japanese participation in BMD research is not simply another case of Japan 'caving in' to US pressure for bilateral defence co-operation, and any future progress towards the stages of development and deployment will be judged in accordance with whether or not the project enhances Japan's defence capabilities. On the alliance game side, then, MOFA views itself as negotiating with relative skill a pathway between satisfying US expectations for defence co-operation and limiting the risks of abandonment, but also making clear its determination not participate in and become entrapped in a BMD programme dictated at the pace of the US unless it fits with the general interests of Japanese defence policy. Similarly, on the adversary game side, MOFA also appears to believe that it can assuage Chinese concerns about the programme to some degree by repeated dialogue and persuasion in bilateral and other fora. MOFA officials may believe privately that it is a futile task given China's deep-rooted

suspicion of Japan's security intentions, and that eventually China may simply be forced to accept the BMD programme as a hard fact of Japan's defensive needs, in much the same way as the revised Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Co-operation. But the hope still remains that with sufficient effort Japan can lessen Chinese nervousness over BMD and reach some form of *modus vivendi*.

MOFA's perception of and response to the security dilemmas involved with BMD thus does not quite amount to the type of highly sophisticated 'straddling strategy' outlined in the previous section. This is because there appears to be no attempt to use BMD as a bargaining tool to bring China into arms reduction talks, and Japanese concerns are much more focussed on upgrading Japan's own defence capabilities than downgrading China's. Nevertheless, the impression is that Japanese policy-makers are at least attempting to provide themselves with some strategic leeway and to mitigate the risks of alliance and adversary games. In seeking to achieve this strategy they also appear to be employing the twin tactical devices of dogged persuasion and dialogue towards the US and Chinese sides, coupled with an incremental approach of stretching out decisions on whether to move between the stages of research, development and deployment so as to create a time-line for BMD participation which allows Japan, the US and China opportunities to reformulate their strategic and security relations and obviate potential conflict conditions amongst them. Indeed, there is some scepticism in MOFA that the US may abandon TMD in the same way as other large-scale co-operative technological projects in the past, such as SDI and the super-conductor, and that over the long term BMD may even disappear altogether as a major issue amongst Japan, the US and China. Therefore, for MOFA in the final calculation, and based on the belief that Japan can still carefully manage its alliance relations with the US and bilateral relations with China and still maintain sufficient strategic freedom to hedge its bets, there is much to be gained from participation in BMD research. As one official remarked, 'we look at BMD, see that it fits the general profile of our defence policy, and say "why not participate at least in research"'.

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60 This interpretation of Japanese BMD policy is based on an interview with a MOFA official of Deputy Vice Ministerial rank, Tokyo, 8 December 1999.
The position of the JDA on BMD matches that of MOFA to a large degree, generally subordinate as it is to MOFA on security planning issues, but also demonstrates some divergences. As is well known, the JDA is concerned that BMD may absorb too great a portion of the defence budget, and criticisms of the Japan's policy on BMD similar to those of Soeya have been expressed in the national media.\(^6^1\) For instance, JDA senior officials are quoted as stating that Japan's decision to participate in BMD research has been predicated more on the 'importance of the US-Japan alliance than the actual feasibility of the project', and that it resulted from a knee-jerk reaction to the Taepodong-shock rather than a careful analysis of the long term international environment.\(^6^2\) However, JDA officials also follow a similar line to MOFA, stressing that BMD will only proceed in accordance with Japan's defensive priorities; that Japan, regardless of the stance of the US, will retain the option of abandoning the project if it is shown not be feasible in cost or strategic terms; and that Japan will continue to persuade China that BMD is a defensive system which it need not fear, and that the Chinese government should also look at the broader picture of Sino-Japanese security co-operation and not allow BMD to unduly hamper bilateral relations.\(^6^3\)

The overall impression, therefore, is that Japan's policy-makers are not as strategically innocent as Soeya has argued, and that they do conceive of the necessity of a exit strategy from the potential risks of BMD. Nonetheless, there is also evidence to support Soeya's supposition that Japan's policy-makers may not be fully cognisant of all the implications and risks of BMD, and that their hedging strategy and related tactics could very easily come to nought. The principal difficulty of Japan attempting any hedging strategy over BMD through the use of dialogue is that once again it is a 'bottom-line' issue for China from which its security interests cannot be unbundled or compromised. Hence, as long as TMD retains the technical capability of intervention in a Taiwan Straits crisis, then it will remain a bone of contention between Japan, the US and China, threaten to bring their security interests into collision, and generate related alliance and adversary dilemmas. In this situation, the much repeated mantra of Japanese officials that BMD is a purely defensive system will fail to register with their Chinese counterparts. Even more importantly, Japan's incremental approach to TMD may fail to keep the

\(^{6^1}\) Takagi Takashi, 'Dandô misairu bôei wa gukô de aru', *Sekai*, no. 672, March 2000, p. 136.

\(^{6^2}\) *Asahi Shim bun*, 15 August 1999, p2. 6 November 1999, p. 3 [Author's translation].
window of opportunity open over the longer term for accommodation on divergent security interests. As argued in previous sections, the nature of the BMD system under research could eventually necessitate the near total integration of Japanese and US command and control functions of their respective militaries, but with the US very much enjoying a dominant position in the partnership. At the current stage of research, Japan is probably able to maintain a relatively equal status with the US and retain its strategic freedom. But, if as seems likely, Japan fails in efforts to persuade China or North Korea of the defensive nature of BMD and of the need to scale back their missile programmes, then a decision will come on whether to move towards the stage of development. It is probably at this stage, with the need for closer practical military cooperation, that Japan will reach a threshold of 'no return', the technological logic of BMD will begin to take over, and Japan will become increasingly integrated into the US military structure in the region. Hence in the case of BMD, and unlike the revised Guidelines, Japan ability to temporise, obfuscate and ultimately exercise a veto on Japan-US military co-operation may be severely circumscribed over the medium to longer terms. In this situation, any carefully constructed hedging strategy will collapse, as Japan is forced to make a choice between cooperation with the US, entrapment and an explicit adversarial relationship with China, or abandonment and an uncertain strategic relationship with China. Japan's instinct to plump for the former could then become the cause of open and disastrous conflict with its East Asian neighbour.

63 Interview with Bureau Director-level official, JDA, 9 December 1999, Tokyo.
Conclusion: Japan's BMD nightmare?

The above sections have argued that participation in BMD carries the potential to create serious and inescapable alliance and adversary security dilemmas for Japan. In contrast to the revised Guidelines which allow Japan the options to refuse, obfuscate and 'fence-sit' over the true extent of its commitment to the US-Japan alliance in a security crisis involving China, the technological logic of BMD dictates that Japan over the long-term may become wholly integrated into US military strategy and set on a collision course with China over its inviolable security interests in Taiwan. Japanese policy-makers certainly perceive many of the strategic risks involved with BMD, but perhaps do not yet fully grasp how the technological nature of the project can rapidly close off available avenues for it to temper its commitment to the US-Japan alliance and juggle its often contradictory security interests vis-à-vis the US and China.

The events of the past year indicate that both the international and domestic momentum for Japanese participation in BMD research and eventually development is building, and is consequently reducing the timeframe available for Japan to follow a hedging strategy. Despite the recent failures of tests for related National Missile Defence (NMD) technology in the US, the pressure from this quarter for joint Japan-US co-operation on TMD is unlikely to abate. The US Presidential elections in late 2000 could bring in a George W. Bush administration committed publicly (currently at least) to both NMD and TMD programmes, and, even if NMD technologies are deemed to be unfeasible or too costly, this may only lead to increased US interest in the less costly TMD versions. These technologies might even include boost-phase intercept varieties of TMD, considered to be more accurate and harder to counter, but which would also possibly need to be mounted on naval platforms deployed closer to launch sites on the Chinese coast and thus appear even more provocative as a defensive-offensive weapons system. Moreover, even though the last year has also witnessed important developments in the Korean Peninsula security situation which may contribute to calls for TMD programmes to be scaled back, the fact that North Korea has yet to offer a compromise formula on its ballistic missile programme which will satisfy the US and Japan means that there will remain significant domestic lobbies in both states for TMD and BMD. China's awareness that BMD research in Japan serves the dual-purpose of countering both North Korea and Chinese missiles means that the continuation of the programme

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64 Wilkening, Ballistic Missile Defence, p. 59-60.
will further ratchet up Sino-Japanese security relations. Indeed, the greatest concern could be that Japan's strategists in MOFA and the JDA begin to lose control of management of the BMD programme in the face of pressure from LDP factions, other political parties and the mass media. The almost hysterical nature of the reaction to the Taepodong launch in August 1998 indicates that these domestic forces could force Japanese policy on BMD in unpredictable directions which would only serve to exacerbate Sino-Japanese security tension.

In conclusion, BMD is an issue which is unlikely to go away and will only become more pressing; which could lead Japan into conflict with China and generate friction with the US; and for which Japan's policy-makers lack a strategy to finesse and deal with. Japan's policy-makers will need to exercise all their usual caution in moving from the stage of research to development if they are not to engineer at the same time a general destabilisation of the Japan-US-China security nexus and the entire security situation in Northeast Asia.