

**“Europe: Regional Laboratory for a Global Polity?”**

Knud Erik Jørgensen and Ben Rosamond

CSGR Working Paper No. 71/01

May 2001

THE UNIVERSITY OF  
WARWICK



E · S · R · C  
ECONOMIC  
& SOCIAL  
RESEARCH  
COUNCIL

## **Europe: Regional Laboratory for a Global Polity?**

Knud Erik Jørgensen<sup>1</sup> and Ben Rosamond<sup>2</sup>

University of Aarhus and University of Warwick

CGGR Working Paper No. 71/01

May 2001

### **Abstract**

Considerable debate exists, in both academic and policy circles, about the utility of the European Union (EU) as a model for regional integration schemes elsewhere. While discussions of this sort remain interesting and important, they frequently run into the problem of the EU's specificity, which in turn hinders our capacity to make generalisations based upon the experience of European integration. In this paper, we think slightly differently about the relationship between the EU and the global political economy through the exploration of two distinct, but related, sets of questions. The first bundle of issues surrounds the EU's 'balance of trade' in various policy methodologies. Following Helen Wallace, we examine the ways in which the deployment of various styles of governance (including the classical 'Monnet method') have impacts upon or relate to the practices of economic governance elsewhere. The second set of questions emerge from the issue of 'actorness' in a global polity and the place that entities such as the EU might play in such a world order. In particular, we examine the politics of recognition in the global polity and a series of questions relating to the prerequisites for action in a globalised world.

Key words: European Union, governance, global, polity, recognition

*Address for correspondence:*

Dr Ben Rosamond

CSGR/PAIS, University of Warwick

Coventry, CV4 7AL, United Kingdom

---

<sup>1</sup> Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark. Editor *Reflective Approaches to European Governance* (Macmillan, 1997) and *European Approaches to Crisis Management* (Kluwer, 1997), co-editor *The Social Construction of Europe* (Sage, 2001) and *Constructing International Relations: the Next Generation* (M.E. Sharpe, 2001).

<sup>2</sup> Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK. Author *Theories of European Integration* (Macmillan, 2000), co-author *Politics: An Introduction* (Routledge, 1997), co-editor *New Regionalism(s) in the Global Political Economy* (Routledge, 2001). This paper is written with the support of the ESRC (Award number L213 252 024).

Our European model of integration is the most developed in the world. Imperfect though it still is, it nevertheless works on a continental scale. Given the necessary institutional reforms it should continue to work well after enlargement, and I believe we can make a convincing case that it would also work globally (Romano Prodi, 31 March 2000)

There is in effect now more of 'the world' in Europe than of Europe in the world (Zaki Laïdi 1998: 82-83)

Does Europe really have any collective sense of how it can and should stand up for the principles and ideas that (with American help) shaped our current destiny? Do we have in Europe any remaining value driven vision of the world? (Chris Patten 1999: 324-325)

## **Introduction**

This paper is about the European Union *and* or perhaps *in* the global polity. The choice of 'in' rather than 'and' promises to take the argument in a very particular direction<sup>3</sup>. At the risk of indulging in semantic excess, the idea of the European Union (EU) *in* the global polity invites us to think outwards from the EU. It invites us to contemplate issues such as the role of regional integration schemes in an evolving system of global governance or the capacity of organisations such as the EU to exercise 'actorness' in world politics. It might involve inverting the problem and thinking about how the development of a global polity might influence European integration or shape patterns of European governance within and among the member-states of the EU. *In* carries the connotation that we are dealing with separate spheres of action when we discuss the global polity and the EU – that one impacts upon the other or that the latter constitutes itself within the former.

*And*, we suggest, connotes something rather different. The emphasis here is on the evolving EU as part of the emerging global polity. So rather than seeing 'the global polity' or 'globalisation' as exogenous stimuli, the EU's complex system of governance might be thought of as an expression of these phenomena, albeit mediated through the relatively long-standing institutions of European integration. Instead of looking outwards, the use of *and* invites us to look inwards at the EU and to think about the shape and scope of its regime(s) of governance. The danger of not looking inwards is bound up with the peculiarly complex and *sui generis* character of the EU, something that can go missing in attempts to view the EU

---

<sup>3</sup> An earlier version of this paper was presented at a European Forum Seminar hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute, Florence. The authors are grateful to the organisers for this opportunity.

through an IPE-like lens (Wallace 1994). While there are interesting and important parallels between the reinvigoration of European integration from the mid-1980s and the growth of the so-called 'new regionalism' from the same period, it is important to remember that the EU remains formally and informally rather distinct. In formal terms the EU has greater longevity. It arose within a specific set of historical circumstances that help to account for a second aspect of its formal distinctiveness: its distinct legal-institutional design. Informally, and perhaps because of the path dependent consequences of those formal acts of legal-institutional creativity, the EU has developed into a quite distinctive regime of economic and political governance.

In our exploration of Europe's potentials as a regional laboratory for a global polity we approach the issue from two perspectives. We begin by looking 'inwards' at the EU polity comparing it with the global polity and examining Europe's 'balance of trade' in terms of policy modes of governance. In the subsequent section we think 'outwards' from the EU, analysing projections of the EU as a new type of actor in a potentially new type of world order. Our analysis addresses issue like EU's actorness, recognition politics and changing spheres of political action in a globalised world.

### **The EU polity and its modes of governance**

To what extent does the EU supply analysts with guidelines about the evolving nature of the global polity. Is it - in essence - an advance indication of the ways in which patterns of governance will change? Does the EU's complex system of governance offer a model for a putative global 'neomedievalism'? More dynamically, does the EU represent a source of ideas about complex post-national governance in a globalised era? Nowadays there seems to be widespread acknowledgement among Europeanists that the EU is better studied as an instance of a political system than as an experiment in regional integration or as an international organisation traditionally conceived. The insight here is not new (cf. Lindberg 1967; Puchala 1972), but it is a view that has come to prominence in EU studies in the past decade. To study the EU as 'integration' implied that the principal line of political cleavage within the EU could be captured by oppositions such as 'more or less integration', 'intergovernmentalism versus supranationalism' or 'nation-state versus super-state'.

However, the depth of the EU's institutionalisation and its wide-ranging issue coverage makes it clear that politics within the EU is about much else besides and that not every actor engaged in this politics has a concern with *integration* outcomes.

Beyond this basic acknowledgement that the EU is a polity of sorts lies considerable disagreement. One strategy is to argue that EU politics conforms to the timeless Lasswellian notion of politics as 'who gets what, when, how?' (Hix 1999). Consequently, the tools required for the study of the EU are more or less the tools of normal political science. This view regards the discipline of International Relations as largely moribund in this regard because it cannot conceive of the EU as a polity and is, at best useful for the investigation of the international or systemic stimuli that impact upon actors within the EU system. Alternatively the EU can be thought of as occupying several distinct levels of action at which different sorts of politics occur. Alternative disciplinary homelands will be appropriate to the analysis of each of these levels. A final view is that the 'Political Science'-'International-Relations' distinction relies on caricatures of both that miss commonalities in terms of the sociology of knowledge (Hix 1994, 1996, 1997; Hurrell and Menon 1996, Peterson 1995; Ebbinghaus 1998; Rosamond 1999b, 2000 ch. 7). Most agree though that 'EU Studies' traditionally conceived gets stuck in an insoluble *sui generis*/n = 1 problem which cannot generate anything other than primitive, descriptive social science.

These are not just squabbles amongst particular sub-disciplines. They cut to the heart of the issue of what the EU is and the extent to which it signifies something distinctive or generalisable in the global era. There is no shortage of attempts to encapsulate what the EU is. It has been variously described as a 'system of multi-level governance' (Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996), a 'confederation' (Warleigh 1998), a 'confederal consociation (Chrysochoou 1994)', a 'regime' (Breckenridge 1997), a 'political system, but not a state' (Hix 1999), 'post-sovereign, polycentric, incongruent [and] neomedieval' (Schmitter 1996), 'part of a reconfigured pattern of European governance' (Wallace 2000: 9), a 'policy-making state' (Richardson 1996), a 'regulatory state' (Majone 1996) and a system of 'liberal intergovernmentalism' (Moravcsik 1998).

Helpful as these characterisations are, any attempt to capture the essence of the EU is likely to be partial. The EU has a formal set of institutions and decision-making procedures, but the implications of action within that framework reach profoundly into the diverse national

political systems of the member states. It is fair to say, moreover, that the EU has become recently more ‘multi-actor’, ‘multi-level’ and multi-process (Cram, Dinan and Nugent 1999). Formal mechanisms have been colonised by an array of governmental and non-state actors and patterns of informal interaction have become institutionalised. New procedures have been devised to take account of the EU’s reach into new areas such as foreign and security policy and co-ordination in justice and home affairs, not to mention the realisation of monetary union amongst the majority of member states. It has been argued that the existence of informalism and ‘subterfuge’ within the EU is the very reason why it is able to escape from the gridlock one might expect a 15-country polity to possess (Héretier 1999).

With this in mind and with characteristic clarity, Helen Wallace has recently identified five distinctive ‘beasts’ with a ‘shared ecology’ that together make up the EU policy-making process (Wallace 2000: xx-xx). The first of these is the classical ‘Monnet method’ of supranational-intergovernmental partnership as described at length in most orthodox textbooks on the EU. The second is the European regulatory model of ‘negative’ market integration and harmonisation through mutual recognition rather than active (interventionist) regime-building found most obviously in the construction of the single market. The third is the game of distribution and redistribution found in EU policy areas like agriculture and structural funding, often captured by the phrase ‘multi-level governance’. The fourth, is the accumulation of technical expertise to produce agreed standards and policy norms (benchmarking). The fifth Wallace labels ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’ and is found in areas of high politics that the EU has increasingly colonised.

From the point of view of this paper, perhaps the most interesting issue arising out of Wallace’s classification is the relationship between the various co-existent EU policy modes and patterns of governance exhibited elsewhere.

Quite clearly, the Monnet or community method is very much a creation of post-war *European* integration. Furthermore, it is a policy mode that finds little obvious application elsewhere in the world. Indeed, the classical supranational-intergovernmental model of partnership and balance was an idea that came under strain within the Communities from the mid-1960s (Wallace 1996). Nevertheless, the classical community method provides the EU with its core institutions, ascribes to each powers and functions, and provides mechanisms for decision-making. It reflects, in a fundamental way, the institutional choices made in western

Europe during the 1950s. Although subsequent treaty revisions have embellished and revised the basic formulae of the Treaties of Paris (1950) and Rome (1957) in significant ways, the basic template for formal decision-making over the vast majority of policy areas covered by the EU remains intact. This has at least two implications. The first, following a historical institutionalist line of argument, is that the consequences of these institutional choices are reflected in path dependencies. Institutional purposes ‘lock in’, especially in situations where the institutions concerned are granted autonomy - and this often induces a divergence between institutional outcomes and the founding motivations of their authoritative designers. But the range of possible pathways and outcomes is circumscribed by the conditions of institutional choice. This means that new challenges or circumstances are not engaged in terms of an institutional *tabula rasa* (Pierson 1998). Moreover, secondly, the formalities built into the chosen institutional pattern have spawned around them complex and sophisticated processes, which although strictly informal have become institutionalised and thus in turn help to contribute to the longevity of the basic institutional framework (Sherrington 2000). As Peterson and Bomberg note, the EU has developed a series of decision-making norms over time that ‘govern exchanges within and between EU institutions, and define the acceptable parameters for political action by agents in decision-making’ (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 53).<sup>4</sup>

Thus from the viewpoint of the EU, one conclusion to draw is that the institutional conditions under which Europeans have encountered the challenge of ‘globalisation’ have been very distinctive and quite unlike those faced by other regions. The Monnet/community model arose out of institutional choices made in quite specific temporal, strategic and epistemic contexts. So while it is perfectly possible to argue that much recent policy innovation and formal integration has represented some sort of adjustment to global market imperatives, it is equally important to understand that European integration and the Europeanisation of economic governance might equally be thought of as playing out a set of decidedly internal logics.

For example, the initiative to complete the single market amongst the member states that arose in the mid-1980s was, in many ways, a clear attempt to realise the aspirations of the

---

<sup>4</sup> They identify the following norms as being particularly central: the use of ‘soft law’, ‘negotiated enforcement’, ‘waiting for a policy window’, ‘punctuated equilibriums’, package dealing’, ‘subsidiarity’, informal decision-making’ and ‘consensus at (almost) any cost’.

Treaty of Rome to create a common market after years of relative stagnation. To an extent the Single European Act can be read as an attempt to fulfil some of the functionalist calculus of the Communities' founders (where the achievement of a common market would be the latest stage along a route to full economic and thus political integration).<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the institutional methodology chosen was a more efficient version of the classical community method. Finally, there is a good deal of evidence to back the view that the single market programme had much to do with a renewed sense of institutional purpose within the European Commission under Jacques Delors.<sup>6</sup>

Also the encroachment of the EU into many new areas of regulation and policy competence can be explained less by the impact of external stimuli and more by the playing out of the EU's 'everyday politics'. The accumulating jurisprudence and judicial activism of the European Court of Justice is important here, as is the adroit use of Treaty provisions by the Commission to colonise new policy areas such as the environment and to gain a toe hold in others such as social policy.

All of this suggests that the EU's development and present trajectory has much to do with the resolution of internal games and the playing out of institutionally-embedded logics. It is quite clear, moreover, that the model of institutionalised integration represented by the EU has been deliberately avoided by designers of regional orders elsewhere. Even if European integration has been a stimulus to other collective endeavours both during the 1960s and in the present period (Mattli 1999), there has been little inclination globally to either (a) go beyond the construction of free trade zones or (b) create active supranational institutions. The Community method has not been a successful European export to the global polity, but it remains a significant reference point for more or less any discussion about regional integration (if only in a negative sense).

---

<sup>5</sup> If anything this highlights the significance of the epistemic foundations of the Communities. There is quite a striking similarity between the strategies employed by the institutional designers of the Communities, the models of integration being developed by economists at the time and the growth of neofunctionalist theories of political integration (see Rosamond 2000 ch. 3).

<sup>6</sup> This argument should not be pushed too far though. Powerful arguments have also been advanced to suggest that the single market project was facilitated by a neo-liberal preference convergence among the key member states (Moravcsik 1991). Others look to the development of pressures from powerful non-state corporate actors increasingly operating in transnational economic space who came to make demands for a rule-bound transnational order and to forge alliances with strategically-minded quarters of the European Commission (see Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998). Moreover, the governance of the single market conforms more readily to the regulatory policy mode.



In contrast Wallace's second policy mode, the EU regulatory model, is widely imitated. This involves the achievement of 'negative integration', that is the removal of barriers to market efficiency and factor mobility combined with the management of economic interaction through regulation rather than traditional command and control mechanisms. The literature on the regulatory state suggests that this policy mode has been historically most embedded in the governance of the American economy (Majone 1991, 1994, 1996). In contrast, twentieth century Western Europe has been characterised by an emphasis on the redistribution and stabilisation functions of the state. The growth of regulation as a policy mode in Europe coincides with (a) the growth of the EU and (b) perceptions of the need to rectify market failures in light of international competitive threats. Regulation has two primary attractions in the EU context. First, it is cheap. The EU's budget accounts for about 1.2 per cent of total Community GNP and vast swathes of the budget are used to finance the Common Agricultural Policy and structural funding – both more obviously redistributive than regulatory policies (Laffan and Shackleton 2000).<sup>7</sup> Second, regulation fits well with the dominant neo-liberal ideational framework of most European policy-makers. Also, as both Wallace and Majone note, Europeanising regulation is a potentially useful way for national policy-makers to escape rigidities in their domestic contexts.

The Communities were well suited to developing a regulatory policy mode. The single market agenda of the mid-1980s required the creation of a common market without fiscal, physical, technical or other barriers to the free movement of factors of production. This was largely an exercise in negative integration, a tendency reinforced by the establishment of the principle of 'mutual recognition'. This meant that EC-wide standardisation would not be required. Instead the reciprocal acceptance of existing national standards legislation would in itself prevent the erection of barriers to the free movement of goods (Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994). Of course, this relies upon the intercession and effective jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and, in the case of creating the momentum for the spread of regulation, an active and strategically-inclined supranational agent (the Commission) (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 69).

---

<sup>7</sup> Laffan and Shackleton cite figures from *Agenda 2000* showing that the Commission expects 'internal policies' (other than agriculture and structural funding) to continue to consume no more than around 6 per cent of the budget until 2006 (p.230).

In addition to these attractions, Armstrong and Bulmer argue that regulation forced its way onto the Communities' policy-making agenda in the 1980s as a consequence of 'contagion'. This has two senses. The first is the spread of neo-liberal notions of regulation (i.e. 'deregulation' in the sense of dismantling command and control mechanisms and 're-regulation' in terms of liberalisation under the rule of law). Most obviously this aspect has a transatlantic dimension, but it is also clear that – ironically perhaps – the British Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher was the most active and aggressive proponent amongst the member states of this new regulatory style.<sup>8</sup> The second sense of contagion relates to the global impact of deregulation in the United States from the late 1970s (Armstrong and Bulmer 1998: 9). This might be seen as an explanation for why public authorities in the west began to sponsor economic policies consistent with neoliberal globalisation, but it cannot of itself account for why in Europe regulation came to be undertaken significantly and increasingly at the macro-regional level.

Three sorts of explanation seem to prevail, two 'rationalist', one broadly 'constructivist'. The first looks to the preferences of member states and to the domestic context within which those preferences were formulated. Demands for supranational regulation come from powerful economic groups. Governments conscious of the need to maintain the support of these groups and sensitive to the benefits (in terms of autonomy) to be gained from upward delegation tend to accede to their demands. Alternatively, economic actors operating in an emergent transnational space seek rule-bound orders from pre-existing supranational authorities (Sandholz and Stone Sweet 1998). The third view argues that Europeanisation requires the discursive construction of the idea of a European economic space and of discernible 'European' economic agents. This is accomplished more often than not through the invocation of external economic imperatives that (a) render national modes of economic governance obsolescent and (b) require neo-liberal deregulatory responses (Rosamond 1999a).

Wallace's third policy mode is multi-level governance (MLG). She uses the term in its original and narrow sense to describe the redistributive politics that have emerged in the context of the EU. There has always been a redistributive aspect to the activities of the Communities. The CAP as a system of agricultural support might be best thought of as a sort

---

<sup>8</sup> This raises complex issues to do with policy transfer and lesson-drawing that cannot be dealt with here. See Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Stone 1999. On policy transfer in the EU, see Radaelli 2000.

of ‘welfare state for farmers’ and so-called structural funding is the second most expensive line item on the EU’s budget. MLG in this sense describes the breakdown of national governments’ capacity to ‘gatekeep’ the interactions between their domestic polities and supranational institutions as well as the growing politics of sub-national regionalism that emerges in this context (Marks 1993; Hooghe 1996). We are forced to expand our conception of the EU polity rather well beyond the institutional for a of Brussels and Strasbourg. This conception of MLG draws attention not simply to the role in Europeanisation played by strategic elements in the Commission, but also to their equivalents working in sub-national contexts. It gives us a very firm sense of tiered or layered governance.

In the above sense MLG would seem to be a very European creation – a consequence of particular policy innovations and the need to ensure cohesion in the context of deepening (and thus potentially displacing) market integration with little application elsewhere. However, MLG has come to be used in a more broad-ranging sense as a way of describing the EU polity as a whole. Here MLG is used as a metaphor for the non-state-centric, multi-actor and rather fluid system of governance characterised by multiple *loci* of public and private authority currently evolving in Europe (Marks, Hooghe, Blank 1996; Ebbinghaus 1998; Rosamond 2001a). It has been used to depict the EU as ‘a horizontally as well as vertically asymmetrical negotiating system.’ (Christiansen 1997). Gary Marks and his colleagues define their approach thus:

The point of departure for this multi-level governance (MLG) approach is the existence of overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments and the interaction of political actors across those levels. Member state executives, while powerful, are only one set among a variety of actors in the European polity. States are not an exclusive link between domestic politics and intergovernmental bargaining in the EU. Instead of the two level game assumptions adopted by state, MLG theorists posit a set of overarching, multi-level policy networks. The structure of political control is variable, not constant, across policy areas (Marks, Nielsen, Ray and Salk 1996: 41).

Note how MLG in this sense is not so much a description of the EU as a rival perspective to the dominant intergovernmental theories. Not only is MLG a less-state centric approach than, say, Moravscik’s liberal intergovernmentalism, but it also draws on a rather more pluralistic

and organisational conception of the state. This in turn resonates with the idea of the state as partially internationalised and permeated in the context of globalisation. In that sense MLG might be less EU-specific than at first sight.

The fourth policy mode Wallace describes as ‘policy co-ordination and benchmarking’ which she explicitly identifies as an import from the OECD (see OECD, n.d). This technique aims to spread ‘best practice’ in policy-making through the accumulation of specialist expertise. In the EU this takes places within and beyond the formal institutions where the statistical auditing of various aspects of the European economy is now a routine exercise (Lee, 2001). Benchmarking is built around the idea that it is possible to isolate those variables that contribute to the underperformance of the European economy in relation to (particularly) the United States. According to the Commission’s Competitiveness Advisory Group, the technique also aspires to find ways of transferring ‘positive’ experiences (Jacquemin and Pench, 1997). Benchmarking can operate at the macro level by exploring the issue of European competitiveness, but it is also used at the sectoral level.

The EU is well suited to this policy mode. The need for technocratic legitimacy is arguably a precondition for the development of European-level action and regulation through expertise is might be thought of as a function of pillarised, bureaucratic system (Radaelli, 1999). The key issue with benchmarking concerns its lack of formal interventionist or regulatory character. It is a policy methodology that operates at the level of the dissemination of knowledge and builds on the idea that particular deficiencies in European capitalism can be overcome through the reform of practices at both policy and enterprise level. This may indicate a broader preference for the Americanisation of the European economy and the inculcation of neo-liberal practices that displace elements of the European social model, though it might also reflect the dominance of the policy style of a particular member state – the UK – in the development of EU-level industrial policy (Lee 2001).

The final policy mode is ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’. At first sight this would appear to be another phenomenon distinctive to the EU. Wallace coins the term to describe the sort of politics arising in the context of the EU’s incursion into areas of traditional high politics, particularly monetary union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and co-operation in justice and home affairs (JHA). Regardless of the formal provisions of the TEU, the development of EMU and its subsequent enactment has relied on a delicate set of

negotiating arrangements involving national governments, finance ministries, central banks and the Commission (Dyson 1994; Dyson and Featherstone 1999). CFSP and JHA occupy separate 'pillars' of the European Union and were constructed to be altogether more intergovernmental in character than the 'core' areas of economic governance colonised by the Communities. Thus the Commission's wings are severely clipped and neither the European Parliament nor the European Court of Justice have significant input into policy-making in these areas.

Yet characterising the interactions in these areas as 'intergovernmental' in the traditional sense is rather misleading. The term suggests that the EU is best conceived of as a forum for inter-state bargaining or for the 'practice of ordinary diplomacy under conditions creating unusual opportunities for providing collective goods through highly institutionalized exchange' (Pierson 1996: 124). But close scrutiny of these policy areas reveals something rather more complex. For example a straightforward intergovernmentalist analysis would miss the emergent rules of the game in the CFSP that underwrite notable processes of organisation adaptation and socialisation (Jørgensen 1997). An intensive and complex foreign and security policy network seems to have arisen involving substantial cross-fertilisation of officials from foreign and defence ministries. Interest groups and supranational institutions do not figure, but as Forster and Wallace observe

[s]ome of the classic characteristics of European integration have...been evident in this field: the importance of socialization through working together, the proliferation of working groups as a basis for policy-making and policy implementation, the hierarchy of committees through which ministers and prime ministers set general objectives and officials struggle to translate these into detailed policies (Forster and Wallace 2000).

If anything co-operative activity in JHA has been rather more sluggish, but the tell-tale signs of intensive transgovernmentalism have begun to emerge through innovations such as the European Judicial Network (1998) and a developing policy network amongst member states' interior and justice ministries (den Boer and Wallace 2000). The potential significance of intensive transgovernmentalism may go beyond its present European homeland. True, it has

arisen in policy areas associated with deep integration, but the obvious lack of supranationalism makes this a rather more readily exportable model.<sup>9</sup>

### **Global Projections of the EU**

The acceleration in formal European integration can usually be dated to the mid-1980s and the conscious attempt to create the regulatory conditions and a timetable for the establishment of a genuine common market amongst the member states. This was followed by the provisions on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) contained in the 1992 (Maastricht) Treaty on European Union. Both of these initiatives required and were accompanied by significant growth in supranational policy competence. The idea that these recent spurts of European integration emerged in response to similar stimuli to NAFTA etc is tempting and – to a degree at least – plausible, but any suggestion of this sort has to confront the institutional longevity of what is now known as the EU. Conventional ‘regionalist’ explanations of the EU perhaps also place too great an emphasis on *external* stimuli for state action.

On the other hand, the literature on the EU addresses significant questions about the extent to which regional orders are capable of becoming coherent, actor-like entities within an emergent global polity. The question is again one that might only be applicable to the EU for similar reasons to those cited in the previous sections. However, the idea that ‘the region’ might emerge as a significant type of authoritative unit in world politics is an idea that offers a compelling challenge to a number of well-known post-Westphalian world order scenarios.

This runs into serious question of what might constitute ‘actorness’ in the global polity. If our initial presumption that the criterion for significance as an actor is bound up with those authoritative features traditionally associated with the nation-state, then we are in danger of falling into the trap of thinking that the states system can only be replaced or undermined by a system populated with entities that are institutionally-substitutable for the state (Ruggie 1998: 172-92). The problem is that ‘the notion of an international actor is wedded, as least historically to the concept of the nation, sovereignty and the broad tenets of *realpolitik*’ (Holland 1996). In that light, it is interesting to note how Europeanists have contributed to the

---

<sup>9</sup> This would be especially true in a scenario where regional elites sought to embark upon a scheme of monetary integration rather than taking an orthodox free trade area-customs union-common market-monetary union model. See Dieter 2000.

idea of what a significant post-national or supranational actor might look like. For example, Hill has attempted to conceptualise the EU's world role by making a distinction between 'actorness' and 'presence'. Presence requires a discernible EU impact upon international relations (Hill's choice of term) while the former is accomplished where a unit is clearly delimited from others, has a legal personality and possesses various structural prerequisites for action in the international arena.<sup>10</sup> This distinguishes the EU from the conventional state and its foreign policy apparatus, but leaves largely unquestioned the nature of the polity it inhabits.

This can be thought of as being analytically conservative because if the EU is thought to be a manifestation of something new or distinct, then its presence within international society should not be assessed according to the norms of the *status quo*. On the other hand, 'actorness' is not only about the objective existence of dimensions of external presence, but also about the subjective aspects embodied in the validation of a collective self by significant others (Rosamond 2000: 177; Allen and Smith 1991; Smith 1996). The importance of the subjective dimensions of the global polity serve to remind us that the conventional discourse of world politics amongst practitioners remains wedded very much to the diplomatic norms of the states system. Thus interlopers into the system, such as the EU, seeking legitimacy within that system have obvious incentives to present themselves in terms comprehensible by other units.<sup>11</sup>

Writing about developing an 'organisational approach' to the study of world politics, Friedrich Kratochwil argued that '[o]ne implication... is that we must pay attention to the way in which the system and the units are co-constitutive of each other. For example the emergence of the territorial state and the creation of the European state system occurred simultaneously. Sovereignty thus became the most important notion for both domestic and international politics' (1994: xi). Thus in many ways the EU may present itself as a challenge to the prevailing norms of the international system, but its relationship with that system will be complex and dialectical. Important questions to ask include whether the EU as a 'presence'

---

<sup>10</sup> Richard Whitman (1997) has gone some way to providing a detailed mapping of the realities of the EU's 'actorness' and presence in the international arena which together help to establish an international identity for the EU.

<sup>11</sup> This does of course represent something of a radical analytical departure taking the emphasis away from the study of the objective reality of the international system towards the analysis of norms within that system and their capacity to sustain themselves (see Shaw and Wiener 2000).

simultaneously reflects the emergence of new systemic norms and/or contributes to the normalisation of a new form of global polity?

Among these complex and dialectical relations, the issue of recognition belongs to the most fundamental. While it is an undeniable fact that the European Union has not been formally and fully recognised as a constituent entity of international society, it is equally true that the issue is much more complicated than that. Despite the lack of formal *de jure* recognition, the Union is nevertheless playing a prime role in a number of policy areas and in other policy areas a considerable role, thus enjoying *de facto* recognition across a wide spectrum of activities in the global polity. Were the European Union to become a state like other states in international society then it is likely that recognition would follow immediately. Yet member states of the EU have been very reluctant to give up representation, resulting in several cases of 'mixed competence'. Thus while the United States need not (any more) engage in international recognition politics (concerning itself) - the European Union does. However, most studies of the European Union in world politics neglect issues of recognition or register them without attributing too much importance to them (for exceptions, see Jupille and Caporaso 1996: 214-16; Bretherton and Vogler 1999). In our view this is unfortunate because recognition politics constitutes a key dimension of the EU's presence - and problems - in the global polity.

International recognition politics concerns status, symbolic or ceremonial politics, identity and, in a word, *being* an international actor. In a sense, the defining moment of a state is the moment when it is recognised by other states and thus becomes a unit in international society, consisting simply of the units of the system recognised as states by other states. When the European Union is brought into the equation, the increase of complexity is considerable. Partly because the European Union requires both 'internal' and 'external' recognition. The Union has to be recognised by its member states and without 'domestic' recognition, the Union will obviously have a hard time being recognised by others. The varying degree of domestic recognition results in a spectrum from fully recognised (for instance trade negotiations) to not at all recognised (UN Security Council). Furthermore, recognition has both a formal *de jure* dimension and a *de facto* dimension. The *de jure* dimension of recognition is of crucial importance. In Charles Taylor's words, 'the formal trappings of sovereignty - the exchange of ambassadors, a seat in the United Nations, and so on - are the paramount form of international recognition today' (Taylor 1993: 53). Yet, precisely formal recognition has proved very difficult for the European Union to achieve, in part because



Member States have been reluctant to legally transfer competence to the European Commission. Without *de jure* recognition, the Union cannot vote in international fora or sign international agreements. In turn, the Union is unable to engage in follow up activities, including compliance or non-compliance. Consequently, European institutions lack good reasons to establish capacities to handle international affairs. Nevertheless, the Commission has been very active in promoting itself as a European player, reaching a possible zenith at the UN Earth Summit in Rio when the then President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, wished to 'sit at the top table in Rio...as the leader of an essentially sovereign entity during the formal signing and concluding ceremonies' (Jupille and Caporaso 1996: 222). Concerning informal recognition, Jupille and Caporaso argue that, 'De facto recognition of the EU can result from its instrumentality for third states and from the sociality of global politics. Third parties that decided to interact with the EU implicitly confer recognition upon it' (1996: 215). One significant example of active mutual constitution at play is the 'rush to Brussels' when the Single Market project had been launched, i.e. the choice of most third states to accredit their delegation also to the European Community and not only to Belgium.

International recognition is sometimes more than an issue of formality. It can just as well be linked to identity. In Taylor's words, 'it becomes very important that we be recognised for what we are' (1993:52). So what does the European Union want to be recognised as? We begin in an *ex negativo* mode, noting that the European Union does not want to be regarded as merely a regime or simply an international organisation. In attempting to arrive at a more positive answer, we note that the Union has built up an impressive network of external representation. At the European regional level, the EU is cultivating relations with several international organisations including the Western European Union, the OSCE, NATO and the Council of Europe. This is most unusual for an international organization and hints at the Union's qualities as an international actor. At the inter-regional level, the EU is conducting dialogue-diplomacy with other regional integration organisations, including ASEAN, the GCC and the Mercosur, and a network of intercontinental dialogues like the Asia-Europe and Europe-Africa Summits has been established (Edwards and Regelsberger 1990; Piening 1997). Such bilateral relations on a continental scale hints at new forms of global politics, though it is fair to say that the significance of this new form of politics remains largely uncharted. At the global level, the EU has observer status in most UN bodies and belongs to the G8 circle. Furthermore, it is indicative that the EU has considerable shares in the creation of the WTO, is a full member of FAO and, has a *sui generis* status in the OECD. Besides

these links with international organisations, the European Commission has delegations in some 120+ third countries.<sup>12</sup> The Union thus aspires to be or become a major international player, acting on arenas provided by international organisations and, crucially in the present context, the EU has in numerous areas been *de facto* recognised as such a player.

Given that the Union has been *de facto* recognised by other actors in the international society and that the Union has a significant international presence what does the Union attempt to promote internationally? Should the Union be seen as a model? Does the Union have 'domestic' institutions that can be projected globally? Which key principles, values or visions does the Union use to inform its foreign policies? These questions can only be touched briefly yet hopefully sufficiently to suggest directions for further research. Reflecting on these matters, the present Commissioner for EU external relations, Chris Patten, does not provide any clear answers yet sounds somewhat doubtful about the likelihood of European leadership. He takes his point of departure in Europe's aspirations 'because of our history, our civilization and our self-approbation we aspire to play some role in the world. But what are we for, what do we believe, what are we prepared to do...', continuing, '...what are we prepared as a whole in Europe today to risk for the sake of decency and liberty elsewhere?' (Patten, 1999).

There are good reasons for Patten's agnosticism. After all, even if references to the EU as a model for the global polity are legion they have more often than not been rather vague, hinting at Europe's status as a security community (forgetting about Cold War security dynamics), Europe's achievements in terms of regional integration (neglecting their perhaps distinct European relevance) or under-specified European values and principles. During the Cold War, 'Europe' was often presented as a 'mediator' or 'third force', more responsible and 'civilian' than the superpowers. Plausible or not, it is in any case not a model that is relevant for the post-Cold War world. In terms of institutional projection, we have at best a mixed picture. Thus, the EU has been unable to impact upon institutional designs of international organisations like the G8, unable to influence the design of regional organisations like Mercosur, the GCC or NAFTA and similarly unable to influence key processes of regional integration such as in South East Asia. On the other hand, in terms of developing development aid policies (the entire development aid complex), or conducting UN

---

<sup>12</sup> Commission delegations in EU Member States belong to a different category.

peacekeeping operations, Europe has contributed a distinct approach and thus informed the part of the global polity that is the UN.

### **The EU and Politics in the Global Polity**

The final issue to consider is what all this means for the form of politics we should expect in a global polity? The image of changing boundaries of the political seems highly relevant for an adequate understanding of processes of globalization of politics. At least three options seem relevant:

- the disappearance of politics
- the reappearance of politics
- the appearance of global politics

It should be remembered that European integration for decades was a political project that attempted strenuously to dissociate itself from traditional (power) politics. Due to extremely bad experiences with unbound political forces during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, the launch of the integration process was informed by a desire to transform politics into 'non-politics'. Hence David Mitrany's plea for 'functional' agencies and the technocratic character of the Monnet method. In Kahler's apt words, 'For the functionalists, the enemy *was* high politics - source of Europe's bloody civil wars in this century - and the goal was political federation' (1987: 299-300). The emphasis of Monnet and Haas on processes of *engrenage* or functional spillover points in the same direction, though with some space left for politics. Hence the specific design of the political superstructure of the Euro-polity: a relatively weak parliament, an intended strong supranational (read *a*-political) institution like the European Commission, and, originally, a modest role for the Council of Ministers. The European project has thus always been political yet presented as apolitical and employing (neo-)functional means.

When analysing the possible disappearance of politics, we note the argument that international organisations and also the European Union, intended or unintended, represent de-politicized national politics. According to Kahler, 'High politics ceased to be politics...[S]trategic policy was sterilised politically and insulated bureaucratically. Ironically, that triumph of technocracy sought by many in the construction of a United Europe could be discovered instead in the

reduced sphere of high politics' (1987: 289). Thus, politics has somehow become technocratic social action, limited to persons who represent states, corporate interests or other types of interest groups, meeting in global hubs for the purpose of social management. In the case of the European Union, this process has even become squared, in the sense that first we have the transfer of politics from national spheres to the European level and then, in turn, the Union represents the member states at the level of the global polity. With the growing role of international organisations in the global polity, politics has therefore not been globalized, politics has disappeared. Besides adding to complexity, the Union does not disturb the argument because both the Union and the global polity can be regarded as instances of a global process leading to de-politicisation of social action. Politics has declined if not disappeared. Instead of public politics, we see private or corporate actors or politics has been transferred to the structural forces of the economy, i.e. to the market.

Second, the disappearance of politics option may in some sense well be true but the political has not disappeared entirely. According to one version of the argument, there are 'pockets' of political activity around in the OECD world but this type of social action has become marginalised and squeezed into the streets of Seattle or Prague. Concern about marginalized political activity can be left with the police departments of major cities around the world, serving as meeting places for the de-territorialised global polity. According to another version of the argument, if the political ever disappeared it has now reappeared, albeit in a new key. Only politics concerning socio-economic interests has disappeared, politics as such has survived or reappeared, yet because socio-economic politics has been taken off the political agenda, the political deals now with ethnic or cultural issues or, reappearing under the rubric of 'the national'. Because politics went global and became a-political, the local and national has been left to somebody else. In this way the two first options are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Both images may well be very accurate descriptions of the current state of affairs.

According to the third option, politics has neither disappeared nor reappeared. Instead, through the process of going global, it has been dispersed and has definitely assumed new forms. Politics is not what it used to be. In the words of David Held et al., "Globalization is not bringing about the death of politics. It is re-illuminating and reinvigorating the contemporary political terrain (1999: 496). The emergence of global politics is another word of saying that politics to some degree has left national boundaries behind and that also 'international politics' is no longer a fully adequate concept. In other words, politics is social action unfolding at several levels and

including different kind of actors. Politics is no more a domain reserved for national politicians or parties. Corporate actors engage in global politics just as well as global non-profit interest groups, epistemic communities, or officials employed by international organisations. In short, the increasingly important role of the global level of political deliberation is accompanied with new forms of politics, cultivated by new kinds of actors, using novel means of communication. This description is strikingly similar to one interpretation of what is going on inside the European Union, where the political has been differentiated into several levels, i.e. the multi-level governance model in which politics in the Euro-polity has been added to politics in existing polities, constituting simply European Union politics.

## **Conclusions**

At the beginning of the paper we claimed that any discussion of the EU in relation to the global polity requires a lengthy preface about the emergence of a putative 'EU polity'. Instead of arguing our case from just one perspective, we opted for two. One is to think about the EU as a polity and to explore, crudely, the 'balance of trade' of modes of governance. Drawing on Wallace's classification is helpful because we can think about the various policy modes in a global context and get some sense of what is going on within the EU polity in relation to developments in the wider world. The picture that emerges is far from one of the EU pursuing its own path dependent logic in isolation from developments in governance elsewhere. The import and export of policy styles and modes of governance is evident. To argue that the EU provides nothing in the way of a model for the global polity relies upon a rather outdated conception of how the EU operates. This view is rather distracted by the formal institutional manifestations of the EU and less attentive to the growth of less Treaty bound and more informal policy developments. The in-route gives us a decent idea of the sheer complexity of how EU policy-making is adapting itself, to both exogenous and endogenous (or path dependent) stimuli. But it also shows why the EU is a useful venue for the exploration ideas about governance as well as the practice of governance in a globalised era. The second perspective is to explore the external projection of the EU as a new type of actor in a potentially new type of world order. The presence of the EU in the latter may be constitutive of the global polity making it compulsory to include the EU in any serious discussion of the global polity. But equally, we should think about the ways in which the global polity (or for that matter the residue of the pre-global polity) impacts upon the EU.

The paper has demonstrated how the development of both the EU polity and the global polity are closely intertwined. Yet the paper also suggest that research on the global polity can benefit significantly from research on European integration. Indeed, if discussions about the global polity are largely about emergent ‘post-national’ forms of governance then debates about European integration may have prefigured these by at least 30 years. On the other hand any discussions of the European dimensions of the global polity need to take account of the awkward fact that the development of institutions of integration and economic governance have been in place and developing for a long period. So the various pressures that occasion the appearance of the ‘global polity’ do not strike the EU as a ‘green field’ site.

Finally, the appearance of both an EU polity and a ‘global polity’ is suggestive of change from established patterns of world order. It conveys a sense that world politics is becoming more ‘organised’ and, therefore, less anarchic. In terms of order this takes us away from the system of anarchy that formed the basis of the classical Westphalian system. In terms of units it implies a multiplication of numbers and types of significant actors in the system. In terms of processes, it suggests that world politics is as much about transnational, trans-societal and post-territorial relations as it is about inter-national or intergovernmental forms of interaction. The latter continue to exist, but as part of a wider and more complex web of social relations. This also means that authority is more widely dispersed and more prone to reside beyond the grasp of formal public institutions, hence the phrase ‘governance without government’. Analytically, this all suggests that we should be less state-centric and analytically more multidisciplinary. The global polity might be thought of as the political expression of economic globalisation, or, as perhaps a form of complex institutional adaptation or response where patterns of governance shift in response to changed structural realities, or, as a set of mechanisms designed to promote further globalisation or simply part and parcel of the new globalised political economy.

## References

- Allen, Dave and Smith, Mike (1990) 'Western Europe's Presence in the International Arena', *Review of International Studies* 16(1)
- Alter, Karen and Meunier-Aitsahalia, Sophie (1994) 'Judicial Politics in the European community: European Integration and the Path Breaking Cassis de Dijon Decision', *Comparative Political Studies* 24(4).
- Amin, Ash and Thrift, Nigel (1995) *Globalization, Institutions and Regional Development in Europe* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Armstrong, Kenneth A. and Bulmer, Simon (1998) *The Governance of the Single European Market* Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Axtmann, Roland (1998) *Globalization and Europe: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations*, London: Pinter.
- Bauman, Zygmunt (1998) *Globalization. The Human Consequences*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Belanyá, Belén et al. (2000) *Europe Inc. Regional and Global Restructuring and the Rise of Corporate Power*, London: Pluto Press.
- den Boer, Monica and Wallace, William (2000) 'Justice and Home Affairs: Integration through Incrementalism?', Helen Wallace, Helen and William Wallace, William (eds) *Policy-Making in the European Union* (4<sup>th</sup> edition) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Breckenridge, Robert E. (1997) 'Reassessing Regimes: the International regime aspects of the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 35(2).
- Bretherton Charlotte and John Vogler (1999) *The European Union as a Global Actor*, London: Routledge.
- Brittan, Leon (1997) *Globalization vs. Sovereignty? The European Response*, Speech given at Cambridge University, 20th February, <http://europa.eu.int/search97/cgt/>
- Brittan, Leon (1998) *Globalization vs. Sovereignty? The European Response - the 1997 Rede Lecture and Related Speeches*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Christiansen, Thomas (1997) 'Reconstructing European Space: from Territorial Politics to Multilevel Governance', in Jørgensen, Knud Erik (ed.) *Reflective Approaches to European Governance* Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Chrysochoou, Dimitris (1994) 'Democracy and Symbiosis in the European Union: Towards a Confederal Consociation', *West European Politics* 17(4).
- Cram, Laura, Dinan, Desmond and Nugent, Neill (1999) 'The Evolving European Union', in Cram, Laura, Dinan, Desmond and Nugent, Neill (eds) *Developments in the European Union* Basingstoke: Macmillan.

- Crick, Bernard (1993) *In Defence of Politics* (4<sup>th</sup> edition) (Harmondsworth: Penguin)
- Cowhey, Peter F. (1990) The International Telecommunications Regime: The Political Roots of Regimes for High Technology, *International Organization* 44: 169-199.
- Dieter, Heribert (2000) 'Monetary Regionalism: Regional Integration without Financial Crises?', *Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation Working Paper* 52/00.
- Dolowitz, David P. and Marsh, David (2000) 'Learning from abroad: the Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making', *Governance* 13(1).
- Dyson, Kenneth (1994) *Elusive Union: the Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe* London: Longman.
- Dyson, Kenneth and Featherstone, Kenneth (1999) *The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union* Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Ebbinghaus, Bernhard 'Europe through the looking glass: Comparative and Multi-Level Perspectives', *Acta Sociologica* 41(4), 1998.
- Edwards, Geoffrey and Regelsberger, Elfriede (1990) *Europe's Global Links. The European Community and Inter-Regional Cooperation*, London: Pinter.
- Forster, Anthony and Wallace, William (2000) 'Common Foreign and Security Policy: From Shadow to Substance?', in Wallace, Helen and Wallace, William (eds) *Policy-Making in the European Union* (4<sup>th</sup> edition) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gamble, Andrew and Payne, Anthony (eds) (1996) *Regionalism and World Order* Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Globalization Reflection Group (1998), *The Impact of Globalization on Statistics. Summary, Conclusion, Recommendations*, 29th May.
- Held, David and McGrew, Anthony with Goldblatt, David and Perraton, Jonathan (1999) 'Globalization', *Global Governance*, 5: 483-496.
- Héritier, Adrienne (1999) *Policy Making and Diversity in Europe: Escape from Deadlock* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hix, Simon (1994) 'The Study of the European Community: the Challenge to Comparative Politics', *West European Politics* 17(4).
- Hix, Simon (1996) 'CP, IR and the EU! A rejoinder to Hurrell and Menon', *West European Politics* 19(4).
- Hix, Simon (1998) 'The Study of the European Union II: the "New Governance Agenda and its Rival"', *Journal of European Public Policy* 5(1).
- Hix, Simon (1999) *The Political System of the European Union* Basingstoke: Macmillan.



- Holland, Martin (1996) 'European Foreign Policy Transition in theory and Practice', *International Relations* 13(3).
- Holton, Robert J. (1998) *Globalization and the Nation-state*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Hooghe, Liesbet (ed.) (1996) *Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level Governance* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hurrell, Andrew and Menon, Anand (1996) 'Politics Like Any Other? Comparative Politics, International Relations and the Study of the EU', *West European Politics* 19(2).
- Jachtenfuchs, Markus (1997) 'Conceptualizing European Governance', in Jørgensen, Knud Erik (ed.) *Reflective Approaches to European Governance* Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Jacquemin, Alexis and Pench, Lucio R. (eds) (1997) *Europe Competing in the Global Economy: Reports of the Competitiveness Advisory Group* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar)
- Jørgensen, Knud Erik (1993) EC External Relations as a Theoretical Challenge. Theories, Concepts and Trends, pp. 211-234 in Frank Pfetsch (ed.), *International Relations and Pan-Europe: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Findings*, Münster: LIT-Verlag 1993.
- Jørgensen, Knud Erik (ed.) (1997a) *Reflective Approaches to European Governance*, Basingstoke/New York: Macmillan/St. Martin's Press.
- Jørgensen, Knud Erik (1997b) 'PoCo: The Diplomatic Republic of Europe', in Knud Erik Jørgensen (ed.) *Reflective Approaches to European Governance* Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Jupille, Joseph and James A. Caporaso (1996) States, Agency, and Rules: The European Union in Global Environmental Politics, in Carolyn Rhodes (ed.) *The European Union in the World Community*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Kahler, Miles (1987) The survival of the state in European international relations, in Charles Maier (ed.) *Changing Boundaries of the Political. Essays on the evolving balance between the state and society, public and private in Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Kratochwil, Friedrich (1994) 'Preface', in Kratochwil, Friedrich and Edward D. Mansfield, Edward D. (eds) *International Organization: A Reader* New York: HarperCollins.
- Laffan, Brigid and Shackleton, Michael (2000) 'The Budget: Who Gets What, When and How?', in Wallace, Helen and Wallace, William (eds) *Policy-Making in the European Union* (4<sup>th</sup> edition) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Laïdi, Zaki (1998) *A World without Meaning: the crisis of meaning in international politics*, London: Routledge.
- Lee, Simon (2001) 'Discovering the Frontiers of Regionalism: Fostering Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Competitiveness in the European Union', in Breslin, Shaun, Hughes, Christopher, Phillips, Nicola and Rosamond, Ben (eds) *New Regionalism(s) in the Global Political Economy: Theories and Cases* London: Routledge – forthcoming.

- Le Galès, Patrick and Lequesne, Christian (eds) (1998) *Regions in Europe* London: Routledge.
- Lindberg, Leon N. (1967) 'The European Community as a Political System: Notes Towards the Construction of a Model', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 5(4).
- Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A. (1970) *Europe's Would-be Polity*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice Hall
- Maier, Charles S. (1987) *Changing Boundaries of the Political. Essays on the evolving balance between the state and society, public and private in Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Majone, Giandomenico (1991) 'Cross-National Sources of Regulatory Policy-Making in European Union and the United States', *Journal of Public Policy* 11(1).
- Majone, Giandomenico (1994) 'The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe', *West European Politics* 17(3).
- Majone, Giandomenico (1996) 'A European Regulatory State?', in Jeremy Richardson, Jeremy (ed.) *European Union: Power and Policy-Making*, London: Routledge.
- Marks, Gary (1993) 'Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the European Community', in Cafruny, Alan and Rosenthal, Glenda G. (eds) *The State of the European Community* Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993
- Marks, Gary, Hooghe, Liesbet and Blank, Kermit (1996) 'European Integration from the 1980s: State Centric v. Multi-Level Governance', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34(3).
- Marks, Gary, Nielsen, François, Ray, Leonard and Salk, Jane (1996) 'Competencies, cracks and Conflicts: Regional Mobilization in the European Union', in Marks, Gary et al *Governance in the European Union* London: Sage.
- Mattli, Walter (1999) *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Milward, Alan S. (1992) *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* London: Routledge.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1991) 'Negotiating the Single European Act', in Keohane, Robert O. and Hoffmann, Stanley (eds) *The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change* Boulder: Westview.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1998) *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* London: UCL Press.
- OECD (n.d.) 'International Benchmarking Network'  
<http://www.oecd.org/puma/mgmtres/pac/Benchmarking/links/>
- Ougaard, Morten (1999) 'Approaching the Global Polity', *Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation Working Paper* 42/99, October.

Patten, Chris (1999) *East and West : China, Power, and the Future of Asia* New York: Times Books.

Payne, Anthony (2000) 'Globalization and Modes of Regionalist Governance', in Pierre, Jon (ed.) *Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Peterson, John (1995) 'Decision-Making in the European Union: A Framework for Analysis', *Journal of European Public Policy* 2(1).

Peterson, John and Bomberg, Elizabeth (1999) *Decision-Making in the European Union* Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Pfetsch, Frank R. (n.d.) Globalization: A Threat or A Challenge for the State? paper presented at the....

Piening, Christopher (1997) *Global Europe. The European Union in World Affairs*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Pierson, Paul (1996) 'The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional Analysis', *Comparative Political Studies* 29(2).

Prodi, Romano (2000) 'Europe and Global Governance', speech to the 2<sup>nd</sup> COMECE congress, Brussels, 31 March. SPEECH/OO/115  
([http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/news/03\\_00/speech\\_00\\_15.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/03_00/speech_00_15.htm))

Puchala, Donald J. (1972) 'Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 10.

Radaelli, Claudio (1999) *Technocracy in the European Union* London: Longman.

Radaelli, Claudio (2000) 'Policy Transfer in the European Union: Institutional Isomorphism as a Source of Legitimacy', *Governance* 13(1).

Richardson, Jeremy (1996) 'Policy-making in the EU: Interests, ideas and garbage cans of primeval soup', in Jeremy Richardson (ed.) *European Union: Power and Policy-Making*, London: Routledge.

Rosamond, Ben (1999a) 'Globalization and the Social Construction of European Identities', *Journal of European Public Policy* 6(4).

Rosamond, Ben (1999b) 'Theorizing the European Union: On Disciplines, Knowledge, and Thinking Thoroughly about Integration Theory', *Current Politics and Economics in Europe* 9 (2).

Rosamond, Ben (2000) *Theories of European Integration* Basingstoke: Macmillan.

- Rosamond, Ben (2001a) 'Functions, Levels and European Governance', in Wallace, Helen (ed.) *One Europe or Several? Interlocking Dimensions of Integration*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Rosamond, Ben (2001b) 'Constructing Globalisation', in Fierke, Karin M. and Jørgensen, Knud Erik (eds.) *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation* New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Ross, George (1998) 'European Integration and Globalization', in Axtmann, Roland (ed.), *Globalization and Europe: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations* London. Pinter.
- Ruggie, John Gerard (1998) *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization* London: Routledge.
- Sandholtz, Wayne and Stone Sweet, Alec (eds) (1998) *European Integration and Supranational Governance* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sbragia, Alberta (1998) 'Institution-Building from below and above: the European Community in Global Environmental Politics', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds.) (1998) *European Integration and Supranational Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Scharpf, Fritz (1988) 'The joint decision trap: lessons from German federalism and European integration', *Public Administration* 66.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. (1996) 'Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts', in Marks, Gary et al (eds) *Governance in the European Union* London: Sage.
- Shaw, Jo and Wiener, Antje (2000) 'The Paradox of the "European Polity"', in Green Cowles, Maria and Smith, Mike (eds) *State of the European Union, Vol 5: Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sherrington, Philippa (2000) *The Council of Ministers: Political Authority in the European Union* London: Pinter.
- Smith, Mike (1996) 'The European Union as an International actor', in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.) *European Union: Power and Policy-Making* London: Routledge.
- Stone, Diane (1999) 'Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy Across Time, Space and Disciplines', *Politics* 19(1).
- Storper, Michael (1997) *The Regional World: Territorial Development in a Global Economy* New York: Guilford Press.
- Stone Sweet, Alec and Sandholtz, Wayne (1998) 'Integration, Supranational Governance, and the Institutionalization of the European Polity', in Sandholtz, Wayne and Stone Sweet, Alec (eds) *European Integration and Supranational Governance* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Taylor, Charles (1993) *Reconciling the Solitudes. Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism*, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Wallace, Helen (1996a) 'Politics and Policy in the EU: The Challenge of Governance', in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds.) *Policy-Making in the European Union* 3<sup>rd</sup> edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wallace, Helen (1996b) 'The Institutions of the EU: Experience and Experiments', in Wallace, Helen and Wallace, William (eds) *Policy-Making in the European Union* (3<sup>rd</sup> edition) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wallace, Helen (2000) 'The Institutional Setting: Five Variations on a Theme', in Wallace, Helen and Wallace, William (eds) *Policy-Making in the European Union* (4<sup>th</sup> edition) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wallace, William (1994) *Regional Integration: the West European Experience* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Wallace, William (1999) 'Europe after the Cold War', *Review of International Studies*, 32: 201-24.

Warleigh, Alex (1998) 'Better the Devil You Know? Synthetic and Confederal Understandings of European Unification', *West European Politics* 21(3).

Waters, Malcolm (1995) *Globalization (Key Ideas)* London: Routledge.

Whitman, Richard (1997) 'The International Identity of the EU: Identity as Instruments', in Landau, Alice and Whitman, Richard (eds) *Rethinking the European Union: Institutions, Interests, Identities* Basingstoke: Macmillan.