THE PROBLEM OF CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM RUSSIA

A final report from a joint project on Capital Flight From Russia undertaken by the Institute of Economics, Moscow, and The Center for the Study of International Economic Relations, University of Western Ontario, Canada.*

* An earlier version of this report was presented to a Seminar-Press Conference at the Institute of Economics, September 10, 1998. We are grateful to workshop participants for their reactions, and to Eric Yandall of CIDA (Moscow) for helpful written comments. The project on which this report is based involved comparative work on Russian and Canadian experiences with financial market regulation, but given the current interest in the issue of Capital Flight From Russia, we have chosen to focus our joint final report on this issue rather than on comparative experience.
1. Background

Capital flight is a phenomenon that has a long history, and in the 20th century it has become a frequent accompaniment to economic, social and political crises in various countries. At the beginning of the 1980s, some of Latin American countries (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, etc.) experienced foreign debt-service crises due to capital flight, so the phenomenon of capital flight became one of the most widely discussed topics for both academic researchers and policymakers.

In the 1990s capital flight attracted the attention of the IMF, the World Bank and other international organizations. Mobility of capital and growing integration of world financial markets explain this, but capital flows showed how they could destabilize an economy (as in Mexico in 1982); and could even trigger chain reactions in international markets (as in Asia in 1997).

Post-socialist states, such as Russia that borrow heavily abroad have added new features to experience with capital flight. Our research agenda has tried to measure the scale and explain the mechanisms underlying capital flight from Russia, as well as define its causes and consequences.

A group of Russian and Canadian researches from the Institute of Economics of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) and the University of Western Ontario, Canada, initiated a joint research project to investigate these issues. Massive capital flight from Russia first began right after the start of the economic transformation in the early 1990s, and is still continuing nowadays against the background of prolonged recession and growing external debt. This create a threat of the economic instability in the country, and also enhanced the risk of default. Canada does not face a similar problem: there is no capital flight and it has thus far been precluded by Canada’s robust banking system, mature national markets and
balanced public finance. To a certain extent Canadian experience could give helpful insights for Russian policymakers.

The joint project lasted from March 1997 to September 1998, and the Russian and Canadian economists involved undertook cooperative international research. Along with theoretical issues (what is and how to measure capital flight) and analysis of the Russian situation during 1992-1997 (causes, patterns, and effects of capital flight), project participants prepared recommendations for the Russian authorities as to how to prevent capital flight and to stimulate capital repatriation. Participants have also actively promoted discussions, meetings with business communities, held press interviews in Russia and Canada as well as organized press conferences at the beginning and the end of research project.

During the project participants had had contact with CIDA, the Moscow office of World Bank, managers of Russian Government Departments (External Economic Relations and Custom Inspection), Canadian Government Departments and private business (Finance Ministry, Bank of Canada, CIBC, CDIC, Ukraine Corporation). Russian discussions included representatives of the Security Council of RF, the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Russia, and experts from Russian Academy of Sciences. The participants have prepared 11 reports (the Russian side presented 6 reports and the Canadian side 5 reports) as well as published papers in Voprosy Ekonomiki, Bankovskie Uslugi (in Russian) and The World Economy (in English).

The group of Canadian economists headed by Professor John Whalley included Professors Uzi Segal, Ron Wintrobe, Dan Vincent and Terry Sicular among others. The Russian group included Professors Boris Milner, Vyacheslav Senchagov, and Dr. Natalia Smorodinskaya from the Institute of Economics of RAS and Professor Lidia Krasavina from Financial Academy of Russian Government. Academician Leonid Abalkin, Director of the
Institute of Economics of RAS headed the Russian group. The project was sponsored by the UCGF Trust Fund - a partnership of the University of Calgary and the Gorbachev Fund.

This is a report on a 2 year project which has sought to quantify and better understand the mechanisms underlying capital flight from Russia. The project was concluded in the spring/early summer of 1998, all before the onset of the recent dramatic events in Russia following the announced devaluation of late August. The report does not make recommendations aimed directly at the current situation, although the phenomena we identify are contributing factors to the intensification of present difficulties. As such, our report should be read as background to, and not prescription on the current situation.

2. What is Capital Flight, and the Scale of Capital Flight from Russia

Recent economic literature is not always clear as to what constitutes capital flight, and the vagueness of the term both hinders the development of a theory of capital flight, and facilitates the misuse of the term for political purposes. What is the difference between the movement of capital from Tokyo to New York (that we call portfolio investment) and from Mexico to Miami (that is called capital flight)? Why American or German investment in Russia is seen as “foreign investment” that provides significant capital return to investors, but the movement of private Russian capital abroad is called “capital flight”?

While the difference in the meaning of the term is subjective, its use can lead to different policy implications. We use the term capital flight to indication transfers of assets denominated in a national currency into assets denominated in a foreign currency, either at home or abroad, in ways which are not part of normal commercial transactions. Thus, assets transferred abroad into foreign bank accounts or foreign securities which go beyond normal
diversification behaviour constitute capital flight, as does activity of domestic residents in
holding or hoarding foreign currency (dollars) in place of domestic currency.

When engaging in capital flight, economic agents transfer assets by three methods:
The first is transfer of financial assets denominated in a foreign currency abroad. The second
is accumulation of financial assets denominated in a foreign currency abroad (particularly, by
non-repatriation of profits); and the third is transfer of financial assets denominated in a
national currency into financial assets denominated in a foreign currency (internal drain).
Identifying capital flight reduces to the problem of identifying that part of the transactions that
either by its origin or somehow else may be considered to be abnormal, and hence merit the
term “capital flight”.

Existing literature offers two approaches to be used in making in such identification.
The first looks at the motivation for various transaction and largely defines capital flight as an
adjustment driven by general or currency risk (not business specific risk), regardless of
whether it takes the form of an external or internal drain. The second identifies capital flight
as that abnormal outflow capital that reduces domestic investment and negatively affects
national economic development (see Appendix 1). The best known example of capital flight
is a financial panic that results in massive sell-off of financial assets denominated in a national
currency (shares, bonds, etc.) or a run on national banks. When development of abnormal
capital outflow is more gradual, we will use the term “capital leakage” instead.

Taking into consideration these methodological issues, participants in the project came
to following conclusions.

*Firstly*, capital flight in Russia largely corresponds to what is already discussed in the
literature. Capital flight from Russia does not represent normal decisions of profit
maximizing by individuals, and cannot be explained as traditional investment abroad on
diversification grounds. Moreover, capital flight from Russia leads to a clear and evident reduction in national investment.

Secondly, capital flight from Russia has been an ongoing process since the move to a market oriented economy in the early 1990s.

Thirdly, for operational purposes when discussing the Russian situation, capital flight and capital leakage are equivalent terms. The importance is not the precise meaning of these terms, but rather the effect that capital flight has had on Russian economic development.

As far as the scale of capital flight from Russia is concerned, project participants have found only partial estimates in existing literature, some of which are presented without clarification of the methodologies used in making calculations. The underlying data situation is equally problematic. It is known, for instance, that the Russian Government does not have reliable data on the volume of capital outflow in real terms. As a result, estimates of capital flight also vary significantly (see Table 1).

We have used balance of payments data of the Russian Federation that are compiled by the Bank of Russia as our starting point. The availability of detailed accounts (both for current operations and for capital and financial transactions) allows direct estimation of the scale of capital flight from Russia on the basis of motivational methodological approach. However, statistics of an international standard on the Russian balance of payments were not available at the beginning of economic reform (1992-93), so it is only possible to get approximate estimates based on official statistics of Russian exports and imports for earlier periods. In the Russian case, we have not used an alternative residual method used by the World Bank for developing countries.

Using these procedures, and according to our estimates, capital flight from Russia has run at not less than $17 billion annually since 1994 (see Table 2), and Russian residents have accumulated about $68 billion abroad between January 1, 1994 and September 30, 1997. This
sum exceeds the capital flight from Mexico for 9 years in the 1990s ($60 billion for 1979-87).
Our estimates suggest that 33 percent of this amount comprises illegal capital flight, 37 percent constitutes semi-legal, and the rest is various unformal financial operations with capital assets.

If we add to this amount the capital flight in 1992-93 (which we estimate to be within a range of $ 56-70 billion), the total capital flight comprises $125-140 billion as of September 1997 or, averaged across estimates, $133 billion (see Table 3). These figures suggest that the amount of capital flight from Russia over this period exceeds the cumulative aggregate capital flight from Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico and Peru over the period 1979-87. We would emphasize that the statistical error of estimate (especially for 1992-93) is large, and that the received estimates of capital flight over the whole period should be viewed as much as an indicator of problems with the Russian economy than as precise measures.


Though capital flight from Russia has similar features to that observed elsewhere in the world, it differs somewhat in motives, mechanisms and macroeconomic effects.

The main reason for the flight has been general political and economic instability of the country, particularly in the early transition period that was characterized by the dissolution of USSR and the imperfectly synchronized introduction of reforms. The main source of capital flight were incomes of Russian residents obtained through the shadow redistribution of budget funds and individual savings, as well as incomes originating from speculative activities. A multitude of underlying factors that have contributed to the capital flight phenomenon in Russia can be classified as follows:
High returns on exports of natural resource products during 1992-93, and the ease of using invoicing and other schemes to defer repatriation of export earnings due to weak border, customs and foreign exchange controls, and the large margin between national and world prices. A large initial stock of flight capital was built up in this period.

The large perceived social and political risk associated with maintaining wealth in Russia in a regime with frequent and seemingly arbitrary changes in economic policy. This factor is reflected in the effective dollarization of the Russian economy (see Fig.1).

The large redistribution of wealth and income which occurred in the transition period (including the effects of inflation and speculative profits made on financial markets). The effective transfer of wealth abroad through non-repatriation of foreign trade related income has become especially widespread, and has also served to conceal the origin of income or/and to evade taxes. Tariff and export tax evasion via the non-repatriation of income on trade transactions as well as income generated directly from such transactions were especially important.

The hedging of Russian corporate income against risks of recession and an adverse business environment. By an adverse business environment we mean:

- An unfavorable macroeconomic situation including economic policies on interest rates, credit availability, inflation and other macro indicators;
- Excessive tax rates faced by those who pay taxes, resulting from inefficient tax calculations and enforcement of payments;
- The problems for the Russian corporate sector in dealing with organized crime and corruption and generally an underdeveloped legal system;
- The underdevelopment of market institutions (particularly in markets for capital, land and real estate).
All the hedging systems used by Russian businesses to reduce these risks and stabilize their incomes have also generated artificial arrears (inter-enterprise, creditor and tax arrears), which have reduced current payments of taxes and wages. The result has been that the main part of current proceeds from business activities have been transferred abroad pending the resolution of these risk factors.

A high level of country credit risk (the risk of a chain of defaults that further reinforces the expectation of significant national currency depreciation). The risk of default is present at all levels of the Russian economy, covering:

- State finances (the accumulation of internal and external debt);
- Industry (inter-enterprise arrears and barter exchange, the issuance of non-monetary exchange notes (IOUs));
- Banking (the accumulation of bad debts and non-monetary exchange notes).

Our studies have found a positive correlation between risk of default and capital flight. Moreover, capital flight continues against a background of increased foreign investment (see Table 4), and the expanding capital inflow doesn't change our observation that capital outflow continues to occur in Russia under conditions of high country risk.

The multitude of channels through which capital flight can occur is a particularly important feature that distinguishes Russia from other developing and transition economies. Particularly important was that the speed with which new regulations were developed was considerably slower than the speed at which liberalization of the economy, in the sense of removing previous arrangements, actually occurred. As a result, the capital flight that has followed should be seen not so much as deliberate illegal activities by Russian asset owners and managers, but rather as a behavioral response to avoid inefficient regulation.
4. "The Internal" Capital Flight, or the Dollarization of the Russian Economy

Internal capital flight from domestic currency denominated assets to foreign currency assets is a widespread phenomenon and can be seen in many emerging market economies. For the post-socialist countries it takes the form of the so called “dollarization”, that is an active use of US dollars by residents as a means of payment (substitution of currency) and a means of saving (substitution of assets).

Internal capital flight of this form has occurred in Russia since the beginning of the reforms in the early 1990s. The intensity of such internal flight has not weakened despite subdued inflation in mid 1990s and a reduction of the purchasing power of the dollar. According to our calculations the amount of foreign currency denominated assets in Russia (cash plus deposits) is more than two thirds of national currency denominated assets in real terms.

The extent of currency substitution is reflected in the ratio of foreign currency cash to national currency cash. The extent of substitution of domestic bank deposits by foreign currency deposits can be seen in the ratio of these deposits to the M2 aggregate (a usual indicator of dollarization that is used by the IMF). Since both types of dollarization coexist together, the most representative indicator of the total level of dollarization is the ratio of foreign currency assets (cash plus deposits) to the whole money flow (broad money plus foreign currency cash), as it shown in Table 5.

The dynamics of the dollarization process during 1992-1997 shows three peaks and two troughs (see Table 5). The first and most powerful peak occurred in 1992 when the ratio of foreign currency assets to the cash money flow was 53.7 percent and over 90 percent against the M2 aggregate. The level of foreign deposits in the broad money aggregate rose up to 42.7 percent (compared with 16.7 percent in 1991). In this respect Russia was a leader
among the transition economies, apart from Lithuania (44.7 percent) and Slovenia (44.4 percent).

There was then a slowdown in internal flight in 1993, but in the next year a further jump in dollarization occurred in response to “Black Tuesday” (in October) on the Moscow Inter-bank Foreign Exchange.

In 1995, on the contrary, a sharp reduction in dollarization was observed: its level fell by 13 percent (maximum for the period of 1992-1997) due to speculative attacks on the dollar. Our data shows that in the second quarter of 1995 a unique situation occurred when flight from the dollar to the ruble amounted to $ 2.2 billion (see Fig. 1).

In 1996 and first nine months of 1997, Russian residents bought $ 14.9 billion of foreign currency cash - twice the amount of dollars purchased in the previous four years. This further surge in dollarization can be explained by political events (the presidential campaign and the health problems of President Yeltsin), as well as by distortions in the banking sector and by expectations of a ruble devaluation in 1997.

Our data indicate several key features as underlying this experience with dollarization in Russia. Firstly, the data show that since the third year of the reforms the preferences of residents regarding foreign currency assets have shifted in favor of cash, so that the inflow of foreign cash into the economy has become larger than the inflow of deposits. It were thus householders and business activities in the informal sector that determined the extent of dollarization in 1994-1997. So the ratio of foreign currency deposits to the M2 aggregate used by the IMF to represent the extent of dollarization no longer corresponds to the Russian situation.

Second, a shift of preferences in favor of cash as well as the appearance of new markets for investments denominated in rubles (stock and real estate markets) has also revealed a difference in portfolio dynamics. Table 5 shows that while the official Russian
The economy has moved towards de-dollarization during the last five years (the level of dollar deposits was continuously falling), cash substitution has nonetheless accelerated. The purchase of foreign cash by residents reversed the aggregate trend of the official economy, and high levels of dollarization were sustained during 1994-1997 (in 1997 the foreign currency component in the money flow aggregate was above 40 percent of which 27.5 percent in cash).

Third, while the scale of dollarization in Russia was initially correlated with inflation and the exchange rate, since the mid 90s these correlations have become weaker. Other factors, including speculative motives, have played a larger role. The dollarization peak in 1996-97 showed that subdued inflation and a strong national currency were not sufficient to achieve reversed substitution.

In mid 1995 Russia adopted a target zone exchange rate regime (the so called "currency corridor"), with the ruble floating within a range 5,500-6,100 Rbl. per $. At the end of 1996 the range was 5,750-6,350 Rbl, and at the end of 1997 it was 5.25-7.15 Rbl. The Russian Consumer Price Index grew by 21.8 percent in 1996 and 11 percent in 1997, below 40 percent level that is usually taken to characterize high inflation. During this time, dollarization took the shape of "hot money" reacting to every slight change in the political and economic situation (see Fig. 1).

Why did monetary stabilization in Russia not lead to de-dollarization? First, it is likely that high inflation itself had already discredited the national currency: economic agents had experienced losses in the value of ruble deposits, a collapse of financial pyramids (MMM, e.g.), bank crashes and arbitrary handling of deposits rates. The hypothesis is of a Latin American type syndrome (of deep distrust in the national currency). This is supported by the behaviour of personal savings in Russia in 1992-97: according to V.Popov holdings of ruble denominated financial assets in Russia shrank from 20 to 6-8 percent of all assets. Second, to
Russian residents the resort to dollarization seemed justified by the risk of a general default in the Russian economy, that is the risk of devaluation and political changes. Thirdly, specifically Russian factors also supported a high demand for dollars, particularly in the scale of the informal sector and the size of “shuttle” trade (unorganized imports). According to official estimates, “shuttle” traders account for around 14.5 percent of total imports and consume as much as $10-15 billion of cash annually.

Taking into consideration the scale and character of dollarization in Russia, when 40 percent of money flow are denominated in dollars and the net inflow of dollar cash into Russian economy regularly exceeds the net inflow of ruble cash, what should be done? Clearly the fundamentals of the situation need to be addressed. First, the unpredictability of the monetary substitution both for cash and deposits limits control over M2 through changes in the exchange rate within the currency corridor. This situation increases business risk and ultimately threatens economic stability. Second, the availability of large amounts of liquid financial assets, including bank deposits, reinforces speculative motives for capital flight. It increases instability and raises the risks of financial panics. Third, Russian residents continue to accumulate foreign currency (the purchase of foreign currency accounted for 21.6 percent of private consumption spending and up to 80 percent in private savings in 1997). At the same time, they reduce the holdings of ruble denominated financial assets (2.3 percent in private consumption in 1997 and 4.9 percent in 1996). This situation is unfavorable for generating real investments in the economy, since savings generated in Russia largely go to hold paper issued by foreign central banks.
5. The Negative Effects of Capital Flight from Russia

Capital flight from Russia has a number of adverse consequences for the performance of the Russian economy.

1. The loss of potential resources to financial real investment

Initially, capital flight from Russia occurred because of unfavorable investment climate (high inflation, and the absence of a clear market for inevitable funds). As a result, a significant part of potential Russian investment was accumulated abroad. Cumulative capital flight comprised perhaps a quarter of Russian GDP by 1997, the amount of external Russian debt which had been taken on (see Table 3). These are large amounts of resources that could have financed Russian investment programs, and have potentially left Russia for the longer term. Furthermore, continuing flight and dollarization prevents the accumulation of industrial investment, which supports further economic stagnation.

2. A Negative effect on the balance of payments

Data in Table 3 suggest that capital flight constitutes perhaps a quarter of Russian export income and more than four times the payments needed to service the Russian external debt. This situation negatively affects the Russian current account balance.

In 1995 and 1996 the current account balance was positive ($ 8 billion in 1995 and $ 11.6 billion in 1996). However, a negative tendency revealed itself in 1997 and capital flight became a major factor behind a potential ruble devaluation and the budget deficit.

3. Fictitious capital and the increasing risk of arrears

As flight capital moves between Russia and abroad, it hinders the accumulation of domestic savings and also attracts part of would-be investment capital. This migration also involves part of the external loans that the Russian government must borrow to restructure industry and infrastructure.
Half of the deficit of the Russian federal government is covered by external loans, and part of the credit given either to the government directly or through government guarantees does not reach its supposed destination, but is used on financial speculation and leaves Russia again as fresh flight capital. These possibilities are intensified by the multiplicity of accounts that the departments of the Ministry of Finance as well as commercial banks have. Spending through them is, in part, non-transparent.

This situation is dangerous because of the huge accumulation of unpaid debts at all levels of the economy (state, enterprises and banks). The migration of capital abroad enhances expectations both of inflation and a non-payment crisis. As a result, expectations are, to some degree, self-fulfilled, with capital flight reproducing itself and leading to further stagnation of the investment market.

4. “Hot money” as a factor in foreign exchange destabilization

Flight capital along with dollarization has led to “hot” money that quickly shifts from one currency to another, even if the asset does not leave Russia. The events at the end of 1997 that were marked by financial panic in Russia precipitated by Asian and other financial crises have revealed the dangers of speculative pressures on the ruble and Russian financial asset markets.

The exodus from Russian stock (when the price of Russian stocks) and government bond markets (while the margin on bond increased) coexisted with a large buyout of dollars (half of the annual purchases of dollars were made in the last quarter of 1997) as well as a transfer of foreign financial assets abroad. As a result, Russia has witnessed its first encounter with the more classical form of capital flight, “hot” money and destabilization of foreign exchange markets. This new form of capital flight has become an independent factor, dangerous for the longer term health of the Russian economy.

1 International investors accounted for 50 percent of domestic stock holdings, and 30 percent of bond
5. A move towards rent extraction

The unpredictability of “hot” money that flows in and out of the Russian economy also creates a monitoring problem for the Russian government, when they try to find strategic investors for important development programs. “Hot” money has a short-term speculative horizon, unlike foreign development capital which has a long-term objective. “Hot” money also extracts rents, creating pressures for subversion of budgeting practices in the state, and other undesirable outcomes.

6. What To Do About Capital Flight

As we mention in our introduction, this report is based on 2 years of work and the early drafts were completed before the dramatic events of late August to early September 1998. These events have raised debate on the issue of whether comprehensive capital controls should be introduced into Russia to combat excess financial volatility from interactions with world markets. Our report, due to these timing problems, is not addressed to these broader issues, which we leave for future work.

Our work does, however, still indicate that independently of recent events, Russia encounters a two-fold problem, capital flight of distinctive Russian form and the disruptive effects of “hot” short term money movements. The situation clearly raises policy issues as to an appropriate response.

We would begin by arguing that international experience clearly shows that capital flight cannot be prevented unless the basic reasons for the flight cease to exist. Therefore, in Russia as elsewhere, first and foremost state actions are needed to create a favorable investment climate, and to generate GDP growth sufficient to discourage the capital flight.
Particularly, as part of an improved climate, we would emphasize investment law and tax reforms, the better operation of land and real estate markets, better bank regulation (the adoption of laws that insure private deposits and prohibit the use of budget funds for spending other than that they are earmarked for, etc.). All of these background measures of wider economic policy will go some way to alleviating the problem.

At the same time, there are other measures which we think may be needed to counteract capital flight. The scale of and mobility inherent in modern capital markets casts doubt over whether a sound macroeconomic domestic situation alone may prevent speculative attacks (the financial crises in South East Asia in 1997 are an example). That is why several countries (Chile, South Korea, etc.) have used controls on international movement of capital. These controls put a break on large short-term transfers of financial assets. These controls may take the form of imposing a schedule on the repatriation of profit, limiting spot purchase of foreign currency, taxes on foreign exchange transactions or prior deposit of a part of foreign credit in national banks.

We are aware of the dangers associated with the imposition of such controls. Modern financial markets offer and constantly develop a wide spectrum of tools that allows the avoidance of government regulation. And even if controls are partially effective, they adversely affect the flow of foreign investment and deprive the country of the benefits of freer trade in factors.

Experience elsewhere shows that effectively counteracting short term speculative pressure from “hot” money can prevent heightened expectations of devaluation although this may only be temporary. The Russian success in dealing with the crisis at the end of 1997 stands in contrast to recent events. Successful actions may be either short-term (timely foreign currency intervention, temporary credit regulation) or long-term, such as stimulating domestic savings, accumulating of foreign reserves in a national bank, etc.
As far as capital outflows by legal channels (i.e. registered in the current account of balance of payments) are concerned, any additional controls over capital flows are irrelevant, and in our opinion not called for. They would deprive Russia of the benefits of internationalization and would adversely affect economic growth. Even though current external controls are imperfect, they largely satisfy international standards for prudential control (in particular, the rules for international financial and trade organizations).

Hence, in our view, the main focus of policy towards capital flight must be on increasing the effectiveness of existing controls over international trade and foreign currency, the elimination of gaps in federal legislation, and the elevation of international cooperation via exchanges of information and other agreements. We see two tasks: to enforce the current legislation and to update laws controlling the legal export of capital. Concerning these two tasks, we suggest the following actions:

1) **Rationalizing present foreign currency controls over Russian international transactions.** This includes the elimination of duplication of departmental powers (including commercial banks) of those responsible for licensing capital exports. In 1997, foreign currency controls were exercised by the following organizations: The Bank of Russia’s Principal Administration of the Foreign Currency Control, MVES, GTK, Federal Services of Foreign Currency and Export Control, Department of Tax Inspection, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economics, State Investment Corporation and private commercial banks. The adoption of clearer federal laws over capital exports, as well as resolutions concerning licensing, maintenance and taxation of legal export of assets. These regulations should be simplified.

2) **The introduction of fines for delays in repatriating revenues from exported goods.** For special complex transactions, requiring time for their setup, the payoff term should be extended. Similar actions must be taken for import advances (with a
specified delivery time) in order to reduce the number of cancelled contracts.

3) *Enhanced control over capital flows associated with barter transactions* with contract prices deviating from the world prices. Such transactions amounted up to 8% of the volume of foreign trade by Russia in recent years (including about 25% of the volume of trade with CIS countries). In addition, these transactions are highly unbalanced and are beneficial to foreign suppliers (Russian export exceeds import 5-6 times).

4) *Establishing effective legal controls over capital and goods flows inside CIS.* The integration between countries-members of the CIS (the creation of the Customs Union among Russia, BeloRussia, Khazakhstan, Kirgizstan, and from 1998 Tadzhikistan), has not only brought advantages but has also opened the doors to abuse, such as contraband operations and capital flight (using price manipulation in barter transactions, false transit/export documents). Most of the Russian border with the CIS countries (11 800 km) is transparent, and the borders of the CIS are not properly secured.

5) *The Elimination of Illegal Channels for Capital Flight.* The flight of capital from Russia is linked to illegal transactions (contraband, drug business, weapon trade, etc.) which are balance of payments accounts. This aspect of capital flight is not specific to Russia, but is part of the international problem of fighting crime. It requires interaction and information exchange among all countries. The first steps made by Russia in this direction were to sign the Vienna Convention and to become an INTERPOL member. In our view, the next steps should be to sign bilateral agreements with other countries about cooperation in currency, export and other types of control over the goods and capital flows, and to develop bilateral cooperation between the Russian Security Services and State Control Agencies and the corresponding foreign and international organizations. In particular, we recommend
cooperation with the “Control Risk Group” to find the origins of capital assets and their transfer by criminal groups, as well as GAFI in order to prevent the use of banks and other financial institutions in criminal activities.

6) **Stimulating the Return of the Run Away Capital.** Since Russian capital flight represents a loss in resources otherwise available for economic growth, we reiterate that creating a favorable investment climate in Russia to attract capital back to the country must be a first priority. Inventive schemes could be used to convert some of the Russian liabilities into equities of private Russian enterprises by selling these liabilities to the owners of flight capital on special conditions beneficial for investors as well as for the federal budget. We also believe that there should be negotiations between the Bank of Russia and the Bank of International Transactions (Swiss) about possibilities for bilateral cooperation to stimulate the return of flight capital to Russia.

7) **Initiating International Cooperation on Information Exchange and Other Devices to better track Russian Assets Abroad.** Particularly important are Russia’s negotiated international tax treaties, under which information of foreign tax authorities on foreign assets I and income thereon) of Russian assets can be shared. Such information exchanges are a shared interest with other countries with similar problems (in Latin America, for instance), and hence should be championed in international fora. Such issues should be raised as part of Russia’s negotiation accession to the World Trade Organization, and could be a lead issue in a bilateral negotiation with the EU on a free trade agreement.
Peaks and Troughs of Dollarization:

1. - buying-in of dollars under rising inflationary pressures
2. - the "black Tuesday" effect (crash of the ruble on Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange on October 11, 1994)
3. - dedollarization after the cease of practicies to finance the federal budget deficit through direct borrowings from the Bank of Russia
4. - the selloff of dollars by firms (due to liquidity shortages) and the following flight from the dollar after a speculative attack
5. - dollar stabilization following the reallocation of hot money from foreign currency transactions to ruble securities (after the introduction of target zone exchange rate regime)
6. - the "black Thursday" effect (liquidity crisis on the interbank credit market on August 17, 1995)
7. - dedollarization under the target zone regime (when dollar exchange rate dropped below its equilibrium level)
8. - flight from the ruble during the President elections in Russia
9. - flight from the ruble during Yeltsin's illness
10. - bying-in of dollars after the announcement about coming denomination and possible taxation of foreign currency purchases

Source: RF Balance of Payments Statistics (Bank of Russia)
## Table 1

### Capital Flight from Russia: Alternative Assessments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Cumulative capital outflow and/or foreign assets held by Russian residents abroad, $ bn</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Russian Authorities and Federal Departments:</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Gosduma (Committee on national security issues)</td>
<td>200 (outflow) – 1992-1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ General Prosecutor's Office</td>
<td>40-50 (illegal outflow) – as of January 1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Ministry of Internal Affaires</td>
<td>50 (illegal outflow) – as of January 1998, of which 9 – annually</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Russian Economists:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Loushin A., Sarafanov M.</td>
<td>43 (assets) – end of 1995, of which 22 are illegally exported assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Illarionov A.</td>
<td>51 (assets) – end of 1995, of which, 25 are illegally exported assets and 7 – annual illegal outflow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Grigoriev L.</td>
<td>10 – annual illegal outflow in 90's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Khodov L. (with a reference on German experts)</td>
<td>18 – annual illegal outflow in 1990-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. International Financial Organizations and Foreign Experts:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ World Bank</td>
<td>60 (assets) – end of 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ IMF and the Paris Club</td>
<td>50 (assets) – end of 1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Consulting Company &quot;Coopers and Lybrand&quot;</td>
<td>60 (assets) – end of 1996</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Export revenue arrears and uncovered import advances</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>excluding transactions with CIS countries:</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Export trade credits and import advances: a difference between offered and raised sums</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>excluding transactions with CIS countries</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Capital flight: (1)+(2)+(3)</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>excluding CIS countries:</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: *data for 1997 is for the first 9 months

**Sources:**
RF Balance of Payments Statistics (Bank of Russia),
RF System of National Accounts (Goskomstat of Russia),
International Financial Statistics (IMF)
Table 3

Capital Flight Ratios in Russia, 1992-1997

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Capital flight (annual net outflow), $ bn</td>
<td>40,0 *</td>
<td>25,5 *</td>
<td>9,0</td>
<td>12,8</td>
<td>28,2</td>
<td>18,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ exports of goods and services</td>
<td>60,0**</td>
<td>35,0**</td>
<td>11,8</td>
<td>13,8</td>
<td>27,3</td>
<td>25,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ increase of the official external debt</td>
<td>2200,0</td>
<td>510,0</td>
<td>214,0</td>
<td>155,0</td>
<td>361,5</td>
<td>361,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ increase of gross fixed capital formation</td>
<td>345,5</td>
<td>90,5</td>
<td>24,0</td>
<td>18,4</td>
<td>33,9</td>
<td>25,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Foreign assets abroad (net stock), $ bn</td>
<td>40,0</td>
<td>65,5</td>
<td>74,5</td>
<td>87,3</td>
<td>115,5</td>
<td>133,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ GDP</td>
<td>46,5</td>
<td>37,5</td>
<td>26,5</td>
<td>24,5</td>
<td>26,2</td>
<td>29,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ official external debt</td>
<td>40,0</td>
<td>63,0</td>
<td>69,0</td>
<td>75,0</td>
<td>92,5</td>
<td>103,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References:
- GDP, trillion rbl.
- gross fixed capital formation, trillion rbl.
- official external debt, $ bn
- exports of goods and services, $ bn
- current account balance, $ bn
- ratio of external debt-service payments to exports, %

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP, trillion rbl.</td>
<td>19,0</td>
<td>171,5</td>
<td>611,0</td>
<td>1630,1</td>
<td>2256,1</td>
<td>2675,0</td>
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<tr>
<td>gross fixed capital formation, trillion rbl.</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>35,0</td>
<td>133,0</td>
<td>329,4</td>
<td>461,7</td>
<td>438,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>official external debt, $ bn</td>
<td>98,8</td>
<td>103,8</td>
<td>108,0</td>
<td>116,3</td>
<td>124,1</td>
<td>129,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exports of goods and services, $ bn</td>
<td>53,6**</td>
<td>59,6**</td>
<td>76,2</td>
<td>93,2</td>
<td>103,4</td>
<td>73,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>current account balance, $ bn</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>9,3</td>
<td>8,0</td>
<td>12,1</td>
<td>3,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ratio of external debt-service payments to exports, %</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>3,9</td>
<td>7,1</td>
<td>8,6</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>6,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1 data for the first 9 months
** data only for exports of goods

Sources:
RF Balance of Payments Statistics (Bank of Russia),
RF System of National Accounts (Goskomstat of Russia),
International Financial Statistics (IMF)
Table 4


<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital flight (net outflow), $ bn</td>
<td>40,0</td>
<td>25,5</td>
<td>9,0</td>
<td>12,9</td>
<td>28,2</td>
<td>18,8</td>
<td>133,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Foreign direct investment, $bn</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>5,0</td>
<td>11,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• as % of capital flight</td>
<td>1,7</td>
<td>3,5</td>
<td>6,7</td>
<td>15,5</td>
<td>8,9</td>
<td>26,6</td>
<td>8,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Foreign portfolio investment, $bn</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>9,9</td>
<td>15,7</td>
<td>23,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of which GKO-OFZ)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(5,9)</td>
<td>(10,7)</td>
<td>(16,5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• as % of capital flight</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>35,1</td>
<td>83,5</td>
<td>17,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of which GKO-OFZ)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(20,9)</td>
<td>(56,9)</td>
<td>(12,4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Total of capital inflow (excluding loans): (1)+(2)</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>12,4</td>
<td>20,7</td>
<td>35,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• as % of capital flight</td>
<td>1,7</td>
<td>3,5</td>
<td>6,7</td>
<td>15,5</td>
<td>44,0</td>
<td>110,0</td>
<td>26,5</td>
</tr>
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Note:  
* data for 1997 is for the first 9 months

Sources:  
RF Balance of Payments Statistics (Bank of Russia),  
RF System of National Accounts (Goskomstat of Russia),  
International Financial Statistics (IMF)
Table 5

Dollarization Ratios in Russia, 1992-1997

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Foreign currency deposits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• as a share of broad money, %</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• as a share of money flow, %</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Foreign currency cash(^1)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>124.5</td>
<td>171.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($ bn)</td>
<td>(5.0)</td>
<td>(7.7)</td>
<td>(13.4)</td>
<td>(13.4)</td>
<td>(22.4)</td>
<td>(29.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ratio to $\bar{\text{OE}}$</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• as a share of money flow, %</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Foreign currency assets (cash and deposits)</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>117.5</td>
<td>196.5</td>
<td>250.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($ bn)</td>
<td>(14.0)</td>
<td>(17.4)</td>
<td>(23.9)</td>
<td>(25.3)</td>
<td>(35.3)</td>
<td>(42.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ratio to $\bar{\text{A2}}$</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• as a share to money flow, %</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References:

$\bar{\text{OE}}$ \(\text{A2}\)^3

Exchange rate (rbl/$)

<table>
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<th>415</th>
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</thead>
</table>

Notes:

* data for the first 9 months

\(^1\) Inflow to household and nonfinancial firms

\(^2\) $\bar{\text{OE}}$ - national currency cash in circulation outside the banking system

\(^3\) $\bar{\text{A2}}$ (money in circulation) includes MO as well as domestic currency assets held by residents (households and nonfinancial firms only) at settlement, current and deposit accounts in banks (according to the definition of the Bank of Russia since 1998)

\(^4\) Broad money includes M2 and foreign currency deposits in the national banking system (i.d. money plus quasi-money)

\(^5\) Money flow includes broad money and foreign currency cash

Sources:

RF Balance of Payments Statistics (Bank of Russia),
RF System of National Accounts (Goskomstat of Russia),
International Financial Statistics (IMF)
Appendix I

How to Identify and Measure Capital Flight

Prepared by N. Smorodinskaia

1. Motivational and Normative Methods for Identifying Capital Flight

There are two alternative approaches in modern Western literature to identify the capital flight phenomenon: motivational and normative.

The motivational approach concentrates attention on considering the reasons of economic agents for exporting capital. It treats capital flight as those outflows of capital that are not related to common investors' practices to diversify assets (for the purpose of minimizing portfolio risk, increasing portfolio returns by investing abroad, etc.) but are rather caused by increasing country risk (growing economic and political instability, worsening of macroeconomic fundamentals) and/or expectations of unfavorable changes in economic policies of the government (risks of nationalization, devaluation, tax increases, strengthening of capital control, etc.).

The motivational approach was originated by Charles Kindleberger in his classical work "International Short-term Capital Movements" by (New York, 1937). He defines capital flight as "abnormal" flows propelled from a country by fears of owners to lose their assets (p.158). Fifty years later, this definition was updated by M. Dooley, D. Lessard and J. Williamson, R. Dornbush, M. Deppler and M. Williamson, and others.

In the middle 80s, Dooley formalized the motivational approach by distinguishing between “normal” and “abnormal” capital outflows, the latter being considered capital flight. According to Dooley capital flight comprises all legal as well as illegal exports of assets, returns on which never come back to the country (according to official registration). The magnitude of capital flight is thus calculated as the difference between the total foreign assets

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accumulated by residents abroad, and the nonflight capital (those assets abroad that bring to
the country registered investment income):

\[ CF = \text{total foreign assets} - \text{nonflight capital} \]

The methodological advantages of motivational approach for identifying capital flight
are considered to be as follows:

• avoiding any presumptual political judgement of capital flight as an unconditionally
  negative or positive phenomenon in the national development;
• revealing the identity of the capital flight phenomena in different historical periods and
  economic systems. For instance, this approach can explain the nature of such varied
  events as the massive outflow of Jewish individual savings from the Nazi Germany in the
  30s, the panic selloff of national assets in Latin American countries in the beginning of the
  80s, and the massive leakage of incomes from Russia in the beginning of the 90s;
• evaluating more precisely potential losses of resources that a country could otherwise use
  for financing domestic investment and/or foreign debt. For example, the negative
  influence of capital flight on the country’s creditworthiness can be assessed by comparing
  the amount of capital flight with the amount of official or total external debt of the
  country;
• revealing the difference of the country risk assessments between residents and
  nonresidents in order to explain situations when capital flight is accompanied by a
  massive capital inflow into the national economy, including foreign loans (as was the case
  with Latin American countries in late 70s – early 80s, as it is the case with today's Russia

However, implementing the method of measuring capital flight suggested by Dooley is
not always feasible in practice. As empirical research shows, the extremely poor quality of
the data on transborder capital flows does not allow economists to distinguish properly between normal and abnormal parts of outflow on to basis of investors' motives³.

The *normative approach* to measuring capital flight defines it in a completely different way. Instead of the origin of the flight capital, it focuses on the macroeconomic consequences of the capital flight, i.e. the negative effect on the country’s economic development. This approach, proposed in the 80s for highly indebted developing countries, estimates capital flight as the direct deduction from the domestic savings needed for financing investment and economic growth⁴. Dooley also discusses the damage caused by capital flight to the economic potential of a country. However, he only considers the abnormal part of a capital outflow, while the normative approach treats as a loss any capital outflow from countries with high debt.

2. Narrow and Broad Measures of Capital Flight

Under the normative approach for identifying capital flight, there are two methods of measuring its size - “narrow” and “wide”.

The *narrow* definition (Cuddington, 1986) focuses on speculative capital assets (“hot money”), and is given by the sum of net short-term outflows of the nonbank private sector and the “errors and omissions” item in the balance of payments statistics. The IMF suggests that a high growth of the latter indicates an increase in hidden outflows of resources. If a normal value of the residual is observed, the excess value of the item gives an estimate of the volume of unregistered exports of assets.


A *broad* definition⁵ of capital flight covers outflows of private financial assets, including direct and portfolio investments. According to this method, the value of capital flight is determined by the total change in foreign assets (the increase in the external debt of the country plus the inflow of direct and portfolio investments by foreigners) less any change in official reserves, and deficit in the current balance of payments.

Although the broad measuring of capital flight under the normative approach is easier to implement, economists doubt its application to countries other than indebted developing countries. First, it is hard to use for developed or newly industrialized countries, not to say about transition economies, where possibilities for profitable investment are absent in the initial stage of reforms, and where capital flight needs therefore a more detailed treatment. Second, the broad definition of capital flight can lead to an overestimation of its size if the country-debtor does not experience a significant shortage of domestic savings⁶. Third, even applied to an economy with a shortage of resources, the normative approach ignores cases when the outflow of national assets takes place together with a massive capital inflow.

Given these methodological difficulties in estimating capital flight, D. Lessard and J. Williamson propose to measure capital flight as the volume of total foreign assets purchased by residents (broad definition), but narrowed according to the nature of such purchases (the motivational approach). Thus, this method provides an alternative to Dooley’s approach, but still treats flight capital as an abnormal phenomenon⁷.

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⁶ This reflects the view of R. Dornbush (see “Capital Flight: Theory, Measurement and Policy Issues.” Inter-American development Bank, Wash., 1990)

⁷ Lesard D.R., Williamson J.,1987 (see footnote 1)

To receive quantitative assessments of capital flight from Russia in 1992-1997 (see Tables 2 and 3), we had to use two different techniques for the two time periods - 1992-1993 and 1994-1997 - because of the non-availability of comparable data for the same variables in both periods.


Data for this period is taken from the RF Foreign Trade Statistics (recently officially revised) and from some expertise provided by the Bank of Russia, and produce rather non-precise estimates. We highlight the following two components of capital leakage in this period:

(1) the volume of non-returned revenues from export of goods - in the amount of $34 to 48 bn ($21-30 bn in 1992 and $13-18 bn in 1993). This estimate comes from the difference between the State Customs Committee data about the registered exports of the RF to countries outside of CIS and the Bank of Russia data about the export revenues accumulated on residents’ accounts in chartered banks.  

(2) the volume of contraband exports of goods - in the amount of $22 bn ($12 bn in 1992 and $10 bn in 1993). Here the estimation reflects the difference between the Russia's export potential (exports in 1991, when Russia was a part of USSR, is taken as a minimum) and the registered in 1992-1993 exports of goods to countries outside of CIS. These data also implies that in countries specializing on exporting fuel resources and raw materials, the pattern of exports (by group of commodities) has high inertia.

---

Thus, we estimate the cumulative sum of foreign currency profits not repatriated by Russian residents during the first two years of reforms as in - between $56 bn and $70 bn (see Table 3). We admit that the received volume of capital leakage may be well underestimated: the scales of manipulation with prices by russian exporters could be more extreme and the level of possible contraband exports could be higher. However, given the available data, these are the best estimates we are able to produce.

Capital Flight in 1994-1997
We have calculated the size of capital flight for this time period using a modified version of Cuddington’s method and raising the RF balance of payments data. In particular, we have focused on the following item in the balance of payments statistics:

(1) “Errors and Omissions” This item reflects the net change in financial demands on non-residents and provides a minimum size of the flight covering the illegal exports of assets. Table 2 illustrates that for the period 1994-1996 and nine months of 1997 this item totaled nearly $23 bn implying large scales of capital flight.

(2) “Export Revenue Arrears and Uncovered Import Advances” This item, rarely presented in the balance of payments statistics of other countries, is based on the data provided by the State Customs Committee and by various capital control bodies. It indicates debts of nonresidents for goods exported from Russia as well as missing imports in return to the import advances by residents. According to this item (see Table 2) the relevant channels of capital flight from Russia have narrowed significantly after 1992-1993, but still the outflow through these channels remains significant - $25.1 bn ($20.9 bn excluding transactions with CIS countries).

(3) A difference between the items “Offered Trade Credits and Advances” and “Raised Trade Credits and Advances” These items reflect the situation with export

credits and import advances in the sector of non-financial enterprises. A positive difference between offered and raised sums the items indicates that Russian enterprises practices to held abroad (at least temporarily) large amounts of foreign currency by delaying the in-and-out-flow repatriation payoffs. Our calculations for this difference amount to $20.1 bn cumulatively what clearly shows that Russian enterprises used legal trade practices for misuse purposes of exporting capital assets abroad.

Another channel for capital outflows from Russia - direct and portfolio investments by Russian residents abroad - amounted totally to $2.6 bn for 1994-1997, but we do not consider it to be flight capital. The portfolio investments are undertaken mainly by the Russian banking sector, and the direct investments are made by Russian enterprises (mainly by RAO Gazprom and the oil companies) for the purpose of assets diversification. By the same token, the foreign currency assets held by Russian commercial banks at current and deposit accounts in foreign banks abroad, amounting to $5.9 bn as of 01.01.97\textsuperscript{10}, should not be counted as flight capital.

Thus, according to our calculations, from 1994 onwards, hot less than $17 bn has been leaving Russia every year, allowing Russian residents to accumulate abroad an enormously great stock of assets - around $68 bn in foreign assets. At the end of 1997, these asset holdings together with the total volume of leakage in 1992-1993 created a cumulative stock of flight capital from Russia of between $125 bn to $140 bn, or $133 bn as an average figure.

APPENDIX 2

Titles of Research Papers Prepared For the Project

**Russian side**

"Economic Crisis in Nowadays Russia and the Problem of Capital Flight", "Capital Flight: Nature, Forms, Methods to Control" by Leonid Abalkin;

"Ways to Restrain Capital Flight from Russia and the World Experience" "Methods to Control Capital Flight and to Stimulate the Capital Repatriation" by Lidia Krasavina;

"Strengthening of the Ruble, the Payment-Accounting System As the Basis For Dedollarization and the Capital Repatriation to the Russian Economy" "Problems of Russian Capital Flight Estimation and Measures to Prevent Capital Flight" by Viatcheslav Sentchagov;

"Forms and Ways of Capital Flights from Russia Under Present-day Conditions" by Boris Milner;

"To the Problem of Capital Flight" by natalia Smorodinskya;

"The World Experience About Fighting Against Illegal Capital Exports" by Alexander Lukovenko

**Canadian side**

“Privatization, The Market For Corporate Control, and Capital Flight from Russia” by Ronald Wintrobe

“Capital Flight and Foreign Investment: Two Tales From China and Russia” by Terry Sicular

“Estimation of Capital Flight From Russia: Balance of Payments Approach” by Konstantin Loukine

“Punishment Schedules For Capital Flight” by Uzi Segal and Daniel R. Vincent
Appendix 3

Articles on capital flight published by the project participants