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ARISTOTLE

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Whether or not we classify any of Aristotle's writings as aesthetics proper, he certainly produced the first extended philosophical studies of an art form. Most of his works on poetry have long disappeared, leaving the *Poetics* as our only souvenir of Aristotle's theory of art. For more than 600 years that work has therefore enjoyed an unmatched cultural influence, as writers followed Aristotle's rules for composing poetry, and critics followed his rules for evaluating those writers. Even when both sides distorted the *Poetics*, they learned from its fundamental principles and passed them along, and our idea of art owes that little book a great debt.

Within the history of philosophy, the *Poetics* is noteworthy as a reply to Plato's condemnation of poetry. It makes a textbook case of Aristotle's anti-Platonism: while sharing a number of assumptions with Plato, he finds crucial points at which to oppose him, and builds those points into a decisively new theory. This article will focus on the anti-Platonic argument, for at many turns in the *Poetics* we can understand what Aristotle asserts only after determining which Platonic position he means to deny.

The value of the *Poetics*, however, goes beyond its historical significance. It is both impressive and instructive to watch Aristotle pause from his argument and ruminate on what poetry is, why it exists, and how it works. He moves back and forth between criticism and theory. He writes as a philosopher and as a fan. Above all, Aristotle lets actual dramas teach him about drama. His unhurried dissections of tragedy are one more manifestation of his biologist's observant mind, and set a standard for subsequent aesthetics.

Summary

Aristotle (384–322 BC) wrote the *Poetics* in or after 335. The extant *Poetics* amounts to the first half, or Book I, of the work that Aristotle wrote, a discussion of tragedy and epic he followed with Book II (now lost) on comedy.

Like all of Aristotle's surviving writings, the *Poetics* had been his lecture notes, and contains the ellipses and digressions that suit oral presentation but confuse readers. Poor preservation has left the *Poetics* even more confusing than the rest of the corpus. Only two medieval manuscripts exist that contain the Greek text, together with two translations into Arabic and Latin. These manuscripts were the result of many stages of recopying by hand, errors creeping into every copy; possessing only two versions makes it harder to guess which variations came into the manuscript later and which ones were in the original.

So the *Poetics* can bewilder a new reader. But it is not mystical or incoherent, nor one of those ancient oddities stuffed with isolated insights. It has a structure and a line of thought, and it makes good argumentative sense as long as the reader remains focused on a few guiding questions. What is poetry? What kind of poetry is tragedy? What are tragedy's essential elements? This general set of topics subsumes the details of Aristotle's argument within his overall plan to explain the literature of his day, and its audience's experience of it.

The explanation Aristotle provides is also a commendation: tragedy not only works but works well. Tragedy begins with a poet's knowledge, delivers universal statements, and offers the virtuous adult further moral education. For all these reasons, it belongs in the city. Plato had wanted to ban it, but then Plato had advanced a number of charges against poetry that these Aristotelian claims are intended to refute: that no knowledge undergirds poetry, as poets are ignorant (Plato, *Apology* 22b–c, *Ion* 534a) and reliant on inspiration (*Ion* 534b–e, *Phaedrus* 245a), and poetry propagates falsehoods (*Republic* 337–391); that poetry cannot deliver a universal statement, given that it expresses the poet's private mind (*Protagoras* 347c–e) or represents individual dramatic characters (*Republic* 605); that poetry's inherent idiosyncrasy makes it irrational (*Republic* 605c).

The elements of Aristotle's argument appear in condensed form in his definition of tragedy, which comes near the start of the *Poetics*: "Tragedy is the mimesis of a serious and complete action of some magnitude; in language embellished in various ways in its different parts; in dramatic, not narrative form; achieving, through pity and fear, the catharsis of such passions" (*Poetics* 1449b24–28). Four of the terms in this definition carry special weight, for Aristotle will use them to establish the worth of tragedy: catharsis, mimesis, action, seriousness. The four join together to produce the argument of the *Poetics*.

Catharsis of pity and fear

Aristotle gives nothing like a theory of catharsis: the word occurs twice in what survives of the *Poetics*, once enigmatically in the definition of tragedy

and once in an irrelevant context (1455b15). But that is no reason to slight the topic. Aristotle puts catharsis at the end of his definition, and that closing clause is his customary place for stating the purpose or goal of a thing. Moreover, in *Politics* VIII he speaks of the catharsis that music and poetry bring, with the promise to say more in his work on poetry (presumably the *Poetics*). And – speaking pragmatically – the reader cannot ignore the quantity of commentary that catharsis has already inspired. Interpreters of the *Poetics* have traditionally argued for one view of catharsis or another; the new reader must at least know what the issue is.

The definition of tragedy refers to the catharsis “of such passions [*pathêmata*],” namely pity and fear and similar emotions. While that does not tell us much (and we shall see that even a claim this broad has been contested), Aristotle says enough about pity and fear to add at least a prologue to the story. Pity and fear are aroused by exactly the right presentation of characters and their adventures, which whips those emotions up to the highest pitch they can reach (*Poetics* 1453a10). This is why heroes must be decent enough to win a spectator’s pity, but not so splendid that misfortune falls on them undeserved (*ibid.*: 1452b34–36). That would disgust the audience, and moral disgust distracts from pure fear and pity.

Aristotle appears to equate the subsequent catharsis with the essential tragic pleasure that pity and fear induce (*Poetics* 1453b11). But here the text lends itself to more than one reading, for *katharsis* was used in several different contexts before Aristotle, and those contexts slanted the word’s central meaning of a ‘cleaning.’ A medical catharsis, for example, was a *purgation*, like a laxative or enema that cleaned out the digestive system. Catharsis in a more neutral context meant simply a clean-up or *clarification*. There are other senses as well, but these two provide the dominant modern paradigms for understanding catharsis.

Since the mid-nineteenth century, Aristotelian catharsis has tended to receive a medical reading. Tragedy flushes out unruly and undesirable passions by letting them flow freely until we return to an unemotional state. The terror aroused by a well-made tragedy lets us release the thousand little terrors we normally swallow back down.

This interpretation has ancient origins (e.g. Proclus, *Commentary on Plato’s Republic*). In the modern era it ensconced itself in commentaries on the *Poetics*, until it became the received view (Lear 1988). Its appeal is plain enough, for this is an attitude toward emotions encountered in the psychologizing of everyday life. “You can’t keep it bottled up inside.” But Aristotle does not take emotions to come in quantities that either get released or remain suppressed. On his view, the expression of an emotion helps to strengthen that emotion: thus people who

regularly give vent to their anger become more irascible, not less (*Nicomachean Ethics* II.1103b18). Moreover, the purgation reading presumes that everyone needs to be liberated from passion, but Aristotle's ethics calls for neither the celebration of passions nor their expurgation but their regular and well-regulated expression (*ibid.*: II.1109a25–29).

Finally, the purgation reading contradicts the spirit of something more profound that Aristotle says about *mousikê* (music and poetry) in *Politics* VIII. *Mousikê* helps educate our emotions, for songs contain accurate images of anger, courage, and other traits (*Politics* 1340a19–21). These images rouse us to emotion (1340a13); delight over the whole experience trains the soul to enjoy the sight of real-world virtue (*ibid.*: 1340a22–27). This arousal of the audience's emotions recalls what the *Poetics* says about pity and fear. If *their* arousal leads to catharsis (plus delight over the passions' excitement), and *this* arousal brings ethical habituation, then catharsis just is training or habituation. (See *Politics* 1339a18–23 on habituation.)

Training emotions has nothing to do with releasing them. Training presupposes that the emotions are here to stay, and need to be calibrated to fit the real-world situations that call them forth. On this view catharsis is a *clarification* of emotions (Golden 1976, Janko 1987, Nussbaum 1986). By rousing powerful emotions with a simpler train of events than life provides, tragedy teaches how fear and pity feel and where they are appropriate. That understanding forms part of the groundwork for ethical behavior, since Aristotle's ethics connects ethical behavior to well-trained emotions. Thus the clarification view helps harmonize Aristotle's aesthetics with his ethics.

The view also plays its part in an anti-Platonic argument. The emotions that Plato deplored are granted to exist in tragedy, but they benefit ethical action instead of subverting it. Where Plato gloomily rushed to the conclusion that tragedy's emotions overpower our capacity to reason, Aristotle presumes us able to reason about our emotions, and to make them more reasonable.

It is no objection to this view to say it implies that even virtuous adults need or profit from an ethical education. Aristotle expects adults to undergo a lifelong process of improvement in feeling and judgment. Still, a few obstacles remain for clarification. There is another passage in the *Politics* that speaks of poetic catharsis so as to make it resemble purgation. Aristotle there calls catharsis a "relief," something that makes the soul "settle down" (*Politics* 1342a7–15), and the passage is hard to explain away or reconcile with the clarification reading.

While the clarification reading is laudably cognitive in its goals, it may not be cognitive enough. If clarification is a kind of enlightenment, this reading fulfills the promise to show how poetry brings the pleasure of understanding (*Politics* 1448b13). But clarification remains enlightenment about the

emotions; and the clarification reading thereby falls short of defending poetry against Plato's attacks. A rebuttal to Plato cannot rest with justifying the passions that tragedy arouses, because Plato does not rest with condemning them. Only one strand of Plato's attack on poetry concerns its incendiary effects. Several of his dialogues (*Apology*, *Ion*, *Protagoras*) accuse poetry of error or fatal obscurity without mentioning emotions. Even *Republic* 10 mainly vilifies mimetic poetry as the imitation of appearance; pathological emotions merely compound that effect. So while clarification is the best account of a psychological catharsis, any emotionally centered interpretation is apt to limit catharsis to one part of the story of the knowledge in tragedy.

Some interpreters have consequently taken catharsis out of the emotional arena altogether. When Aristotle's definition of tragedy mentions the catharsis "of such *pathêmata*," they say, that Greek word refers not to passions but to the *incidents in the drama*. Catharsis still means the cleaning of *pathêmata*, only that process is not psychological but narratological: the incidents get tidied up by being resolved in a logical denouement to the play (Else 1957, Nehamas 1992). Coherent and significant plot structure is the goal of tragedy.

This view of catharsis remains a minority position. Nevertheless it possesses the advantage of looking in the *Poetics* for an argument about what literature knows and how it says it. And it challenges the reader who rejects it to construct some other argument for poetic knowledge that Plato would recognize as such.

Mimesis

The *Poetics* raises the question of knowledge right at the start, when speaking of mimesis. Aristotle says bluntly, "[Mimesis] is natural to people from childhood" (*Poetics* 1448b6). For Plato, image-making, imitation, and every sort of copying resemble perversions (*Sophist* 228c with 267c); Aristotle sees them as natural propensities. Then he goes further. Mimesis is natural and pleasant because it is a way of learning (*Poetics* 1448b13; cf. 1448b8), and human beings love to learn (*Metaphysics* I.1). Not content with the weaker point that still blocks aesthetic Platonism, Aristotle stakes his position to the intellectual merit of poetry.

Aristotelian mimesis captures something about acting and drawing, and in general the works that produce resemblances to be discovered. A line drawing can show a thing's contours better than the thing itself; an impersonated Boston accent is often easier to learn to detect than the real accent would be. (In this respect Henry James's story "The Real Thing" makes an Aristotelian point about art.) Mimesis brings knowledge by both getting a thing right and simplifying it.

Plato would not accept such instruction. He wants knowledge to come in the form of universal statements, the highest sort of learning. He would not deny

that the audience undergoes some process of recognition; he only laments its particularity. The painter's rendition of a bed (*Republic* 597d–598c) does not fail because the painter captured nothing about the bed, but because he captured only the look of this one bed. The imitator lacks what the user and maker have (*ibid.*: 601c–602a), knowledge of the properties of beds in general. Thus Plato locates the irrationality of poetry in its devotion to particulars, as he also does in the *Ion* (536), where poets seduce their fans away from abstract knowledge.

So far Aristotle has provided only the basis for an answer. Plato can reply: “This just proves that mimesis need not represent particulars, not that (in fact) it does not.” Aristotle has to explain why poetry is, often enough to matter, the mimesis of general properties of things. His prefatory remarks about mimesis will not generate that argument, principally because mimesis by itself does not account for all the properties of tragedy. The definition of tragedy has shown it to be one specific type of mimesis; something about poetic mimesis, rather than about mimesis *simpliciter*, will provide the ingredient that makes poetry “more philosophical than history” (*Poetics* 1451b6f).

Mimesis of action

That additional element is Aristotle's proviso that tragedy be the mimesis of an action (*Poetics* 1449b25, 36; 1450a15, b3). He insists on this claim more than on anything else in the *Poetics*; and though his arguments supply aesthetic (*ibid.*: 1450a24–29, 35–39) and ethical (*ibid.*: 1450a16–23) justifications for the primacy of action, his real motive is the argument against Plato that mimesis communicates knowledge.

Aristotle's premise, precisely put, is that tragedy represents events and not passions, somewhat as painting is more a matter of line than of color (*ibid.*: 1450b2–3). Plot, not character, is the soul of tragedy. Aristotle builds an argument about causal generalizations, or in other words, general empirically grounded statements of human behavior:

- 1 The mimesis of action amounts to plot.
- 2 A good plot therefore clearly represents an action: it restricts itself to a unified action, even if that means slighting characters and character development (*Poetics* 1450b24, 1451a31–35).
- 3 This unity consists in the right connections among the parts of a plot. Lest the spectator be put off by implausible scenes, each event must follow the other “either by necessity or probably” (*Poetics* 1451a13, 38; 1452a20). A well-made plot is consciously arranged around such causal principles (*ibid.*: 1455b1–3).
- 4 Hence a tragedy that represents action contains a general truth.

How can the unobjectionable premises (1 to 3) add up to such an un-Platonic conclusion (4)? Indeed, what must Plato's argument have been, that this unadorned reasoning could hope to unseat it? On one view (Eden 1982, Halliwell 1986), Aristotle's argument rests on a new conception of mimesis as an active process of selective presentation. Mimesis came off as shabbily as it did in Plato because he imagined it to be something passive: just as some people today think of photography as too easy to be an art, Plato reduced all mimesis to automatic mimicry, even comparing it to the act of holding a mirror up to objects (*Republic* 596d). Aristotle brings the effort back into poetry, as in his remark about plot: "A poet must be a composer of plots rather than of verses, insofar as he is a poet according to representation, and represents actions" (*Poetics* 1451b27–29; Janko translation). The words "composer" and "poet" in this passage are both translations of the Greek word *poiêtês*, "maker," and Aristotle half-puns on this literal meaning to tell poets to make their plots. Later he explicitly enjoins poets to build a play's outline (*ibid.*: 1455a34–b15). Throughout the *Poetics* he speaks of the "construction" (*sustasis*) of a plot. On the basis of such remarks one may argue that Aristotle emphasizes plot as he does in order to give the poet something to do. A plot is an object that perforce gets constructed. Hence mimesis is active.

For this argument to accomplish anything against Plato, the Platonic mimesis must happen automatically. But Plato does not quite say that it does. The *Republic's* analogy to a mirror is meant to capture the superficiality of mimesis; but superficiality and automaticity or ease are different things. Indeed, the same passage damns poets precisely for misusing their intelligence (*sophia*, *Republic* 605a), with a description of poetic composition that does not sound automatic at all (*cf.* *Sophist* 234a on the imitator's skill). Plato knows about the selection and arrangement that go into mimesis; far from respecting poetry for this activity, he sees the work as more proof of poetry's perversity, that so many can do so much to produce so little. Already the account of mimetic activity seems to have misplaced Aristotle's argument.

It further weakens that account that Aristotle himself does not take the poet's mimetic activity to suffice for the presentation of general truths. He says that tragic poets typically do *not* invent their plots (*Poetics* 1451b15): thus the merits of good plots must derive from some source besides their having been consciously worked up. We are also told that too much plot-making busy-work can lead to unbelievable and inferior plays (*ibid.*: 1454b1), so plot-construction does not invariably yield aesthetic virtue. Then again, Aristotle says that poets are not at liberty to change too many details of a traditional story (*ibid.*: 1453b22). Here too, the poet's activity becomes a secondary matter in the presentation of a good story, and the story itself rises to eclipse it.

This – not a more complex description of poetic activity – is what Plato had

overlooked. Simply calling tragedy the mimesis of *an action* establishes the possibility of its cognitive value, because Plato took dramatic poetry to be the mimesis of persons (*Republic* 393b–c, 395c–d, 396c; 605a, c–d). Dramatic characters are partial, biased perspectives on the drama’s action, so Plato’s assumption makes it easier to condemn the whole mimetic enterprise as an obsession with particulars. By turning his attention to plot, Aristotle deprives Plato of his crucial anti-dramatic premise. The *Poetics*’ insistence on plot’s supremacy over character therefore sets the stage for a defense of poetry that Plato had not imagined, against which Plato’s critique has no purchase.

Some commentators reject this emphasis on plot as the element that makes tragedy wise, on the grounds that Aristotelian mimesis is not the mimesis of universals. The object of mimesis will not, by itself, turn representation into something philosophical, since the action depicted is still an individual thing.

It is true that Aristotle does not make poetry the mimesis of a universal. But even where the objects of mimesis are not universals, they can still bring about a mimesis that presents universals. All that matters is that the mimesis of an action yields a general statement as the mimesis of a person does not, thanks to the causal principles implied by an action. An inquisitive man (such as Oedipus) hears conflicting tales of his childhood and demands to talk to more witnesses until he knows the truth: this makes sense to spectators because inquisitive people do respond with curiosity to contradictory stories, especially about important things. The causal principle makes the story plausible, and contains the tragedy’s general statement. The nature of action is thus the ground for the universal statement in the mimesis; and Aristotle’s insistence that mimesis takes action as its object underwrites his conclusion that tragedy communicates authentically philosophical knowledge.

Seriousness

When Aristotle calls the tragic action serious (*spoudaia*), he is partly harking back to his requirement that tragic characters must be *spoudaioi* (good, serious, superior) people (*Poetics* 1448a2, 1454a17). These characters’ dignity and standing ensure the importance of what they undertake and undergo.

Seriousness also means something about the type of action that can appropriately unfold in tragedy, however. The action must possess moral significance. This is not a matter of its having a moral. Some popularizations of Aristotle still go on about tragic flaws and heroes’ falls, but Aristotle has no such thoughts about tragedy. Poetic justice of that variety would ruin the catharsis, since if tragic characters found their misfortunes because of morally blameworthy traits, we might fear the same thing’s happening to us, but we would not feel the pity we reserve for victims of undeserved misfortune.

Moral significance means instead that Aristotle does not want tragedy to present meaningless suffering. He calls that variety of the tragic effect disgusting (*miarou*, *Poetics* 1452b36), while the appearance of purpose or order strikes him as “fine” (ibid.: 1452a6–10). So a tragedy has to make decent people’s bad luck the right and fitting consequence of what they have done, and yet not a punishment for their misdeeds.

Aristotle resolves this apparent contradiction by linking the bad consequences to a character’s *hamartia* (*Poetics* 1453a10). In the New Testament that troublesome word came to mean ‘sin’; in Aristotle’s time it embraced a variety of meanings and intensities, from mistake to error of judgment, from folly to self-deception, but not “tragic flaw” (Sherman, in Rorty 1992). A significant mistake (about who one’s parents are, in Oedipus’s case; in Jason’s case, about the damage Medea was capable of) sets off a train of events that end in misfortune. Of course tragedy avoids the mild manifestations of *hamartia*, for it would count as a repellent display of suffering if a minor error led to such misery. Minor errors belong to comedy (*Poetics* 1449a34), while tragedy pivots on mistakes about momentous facts. But these mistakes do not have to be shards of evil in a character’s heart.

Now we see another reason why tragic plots need to be fastened together with strong causal connections. A responsible moral agent ought to know that disasters can have ordinary beginnings, and to know how one mistake leads to another. The right tragic plot imparts that knowledge at the same time that it trains its audience’s moral sentiments.

Seriousness of action also means that luck plays a role in tragedy, for most people’s lives never contain the possibility that error will landslide into catastrophe. Really important trains of events are rare. So the tragic hero gets something wrong in a way that ordinary life does not punish. We fortunately do not always face the consequences of our actions. The unfortunate tragic hero does.

By comparison, the gravity of the tragic *characters* plays only a subsidiary role in the argument. It is true that having *spoudaioi* characters defends tragedy against the accusation of triviality. But that was not Plato’s charge. He knew that tragedy represented fine men and women: this is what he deplored, the sight of such people reduced to shameless misery. That criticism only gets answered by Aristotle’s accounts of mimesis and catharsis; given these accounts, he can find value in the seriousness of tragedy.

Aristotle and aesthetics

There is one final vague but important question: does Aristotle’s account of poetry belong in aesthetics, or is that label anachronistic? Two features of the

Poetics seem to set it at a distance from modern aesthetics. First, Aristotle openly justifies poetry by appeal to its ethical and pedagogical effects. A good tragedy hones the emotions, details the nature of life-destroying error, shows how people insist on acting. To a formalist aesthetics, these external grounds for artistic success distract from a work's intrinsically aesthetic properties.

Austere formalism does not, however, speak for all aesthetics. A milder position is more common, that works may gain aesthetic value by producing ethical or otherwise external results, as long as the works' status as art is one of the causes of those results. A painting may appropriately lead its viewers to hate slavery, as long as its aesthetic properties help to bring that effect about. In this sense Aristotle does acknowledge the status of art works. The transmission of general truths in tragedy presupposes the process of artistic mimesis. Catharsis requires that pity and fear are aroused under shielded circumstances. The ethical effects of tragedy follow from its artistic effects, and art's artfulness has not been overlooked.

In any case, this objection to the *Poetics*' status used to sound more compelling than it does now. The last twenty years have seen renewed interest in such topics as the role of art in moral education, the ethical and political content of tragedy, and other very Aristotelian matters. Modern aesthetics has changed enough to make Aristotle's concerns less old-fashioned again.

The second cause for hesitation about "aesthetics" is Aristotle's elusive reference to beauty. He uses the word "beautiful" (*kalos*) often enough in the *Poetics* – nineteen times, as a compliment for tragic plots, language, and characters – to lead one interpreter to call beauty "the master-concept of the *Poetics*" (Else 1938). And yet this master-concept goes unexplained. Only once does Aristotle make beauty a defining criterion for tragedies, when he says they must be neither too long to surpass what the memory can hold, nor too short to count as serious (*Poetics* 1451a4–15).

This passage appears to assume a definition of beauty in terms of size and proportion (and see *Metaphysics* 1078a31–b5, *Politics* 1284b8–10). So beauty is a real property of things (cf. *Metaphysics* 1072b32–35). Aristotle says much the same thing in *De Motu Animalium* (700b26–35), when distinguishing what is beautiful in itself from what is merely perceived as desirable. However, the resemblance to Hutcheson's unity-in-variety theory does not go as far as it promises. Early modern discussions of beauty mostly took it to be a univocal property, capable of being taken in without reflection. Thus Kant distinguished between the beautiful and the good on the grounds that the former is perceived directly, while 'good' always means 'good *for*' something, and must be evaluated relative to a goal.

Plato could agree with Hutcheson and Kant that beauty has a single nature in every instantiation (*Hippias Major* 294b, *Symposium* 211a–b); Aristotle's beauty

is real but equivocal. Its meaning derives from the nature of the beautiful thing in question. Aristotle tends to speak only in passing of beauty itself, but the evidence adds up to a context-dependent conception of beauty. The *Poetics* calls magnitude a necessary condition for beauty, but we know that magnitude is relative to a thing's nature (*Categories* 5b15–29); the same surely holds for order and proportion.

More explicitly, the *Rhetoric* holds that a man's beauty changes its meaning as a man ages and has different functions. The beautiful young man is one who competes athletically; the beautiful man of middle age can frighten enemies in a battle; the beautiful old man holds up against the insults of age (*Rhetoric* 1361b7–14). And in a telling passage in *Parts of Animals*, Aristotle urges his readers not to bring their prejudices about beauty to the study of zoology. All living things boast a design suited to the purpose of their sustenance and reproduction, and that is what beauty comes to (*Parts of Animals* 645a23–25).

Because beauty is a real property, Aristotle feels free to refer to it in his assessments of tragedies. But because beauty's meaning varies with the thing in question, the concept of beauty generates no conclusions about tragedy; instead one must put off using the concept until one knows what tragedy is and does. Finally, the connection between beauty and function implies that while beauty belongs in talk about poetry, it does not belong only there, or even especially there. And because beauty has nothing of its modern subjectivity, Aristotle sidesteps the stock problems of validating or defending aesthetic judgments, writing the *Poetics* as though these assessments could be made orderly and definite.

Even if Aristotle develops a philosophy of art independently of beauty, he does not belong among puritans wary of aesthetic experiences. On the contrary, his theory of tragedy grows out of such experiences, sensitively noted and respectfully analyzed. Beauty may not be an initiating concept in his theory, but in dramatic practice it will stand as the final proof that a tragedy accomplished what it set out to do.

See also Plato, Tragedy, Beauty.

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