

## **The truth well lost: Outline of Hegel's epistemological realism**

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My paper deals with the connection between truth and falsity as well as correctness and incorrectness in Hegel's thought. Providing a condensed account of his system in truth-theoretical perspective I proceed by way of deduction from what Hegel conceives of as the generating form of his philosophy, i. e. the Concept. The argument starts with Hegel's equation of the Idea with "pure" or "absolute truth", which might seem to constitute a piece of metaphysical dogmatism par excellence. Contrary to this impression I will argue that Hegel doesn't hypostatize ontological truth in shape of a transcendent entity subsisting on its own, but that it must be rather seen as always already lost. On the basis of pure truth's loss an account of propositional truth (correctness) can be given, according to which the truth of empirical judgements consists in the conceptual articulation of a reality which is unarticulated in itself, though conceptually articulable. In this way I will ascribe to Hegel a kind of epistemological realism and credit him with an *anomalous* identity conception of propositional truth, according to which true judgements, far from mirroring a world allegedly composed of facts, nevertheless grasp *what there is*.