The 89th Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association

University of Warwick
10-12 July 2015
Dear Delegate

Welcome to the Joint Session 2015 at Warwick University! I am delighted Warwick is hosting the Joint Session. This year marks the 50th anniversary of the University, and the third time that the Joint Session has been at Warwick. I hope the talks in the various sessions and the social programme will be equally enjoyable and stimulating.

A large number of people have worked hard to make this conference possible. In particular, I would like to thank Lea Salje (Managing Editor of the Aristotelian Society), Matthew Soteriou (Editor of the Aristotelian Society), Jane Gray (event manager), Alfonso Anaya (conference assistant), and Johannes Roessler (local organizer). Donna McIntyre, Sarah Taylor and Oliver Cooper provided invaluable assistance in managing the conference finances. Massimo Renzo helped with liaising with the publishers. Marilyn Bah (Estates) drew the bespoke floor plans (see the inside of the back cover of this programme). We are also very grateful to Oxford University Press for sponsoring the wine reception after the Inaugural Address.

If you have any questions don’t hesitate to ask one of our ‘graduate volunteers’, identifiable by their red name badges. Many thanks to them for volunteering!

We managed to secure late opening hours for the bar (for details see the schedule below). However, they reserve the right to close earlier in the (surely unlikely) event of insufficient demand.

Professor Matt Nudds
Head of Department
Department of Philosophy
University of Warwick

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Programme

Publishers’ stands are in the Science Concourse throughout the conference.

All the plenary talks, the postgraduate sessions and some open sessions are in lecture theatres or seminar rooms adjacent to the Science Concourse. The rest of the open sessions are in Social Sciences (a stone’s throw from the Science Concourse).

Friday 10 July

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<td>13.00 – 14.30</td>
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<td><em>The Doors Of Perception And The Artist Within</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Catherine Wilson</td>
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<td>19.00 – 20.00</td>
<td>Wine Reception, sponsored by OUP</td>
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<td>Social Sciences</td>
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<td>Floor, Rootes Bldg.)</td>
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<td>19.00 – 1.00</td>
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## Saturday 11 July

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<tr>
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<td>9.00 – 12.00</td>
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<td><em>Hegel's Critique of Kant</em></td>
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<td><em>The Moral Significance of Admiration</em></td>
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<td>Linda Zagzebski &amp; Terence Irwin</td>
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<td>Symposium III</td>
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<td><em>Columnar Higher-Order Vagueness</em></td>
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<td>Susanne Bobzien &amp; Rosanna Keefe</td>
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<td>13.00 – 14.00</td>
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<td><em>Continuancehood</em></td>
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<td>Helen Steward &amp; Bill Brewer</td>
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<td>19.00 – 1.00</td>
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* An opportunity to find out more about the Society for Women in Philosophy from executive committee member Charlotte Knowles. Membership forms will be available.
### Sunday 12 July

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<td>16.30 – 17.00</td>
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* Adrian Moore and Lucy O’Brien will be jointly taking over the editorship of *MIND* from October 2015. This is an opportunity to meet them, to hear about their vision for the journal, and to have an informal exchange of ideas about all aspects of the journal.
Postgraduate Sessions

Theoretical Session, Saturday 14.00 – 16.00

14.00 – 14.30 Naomi Thompson (Hamburg)
Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation

14.30 – 15.00 Matthew McKeever (St Andrews)
Non-Rigid Demonstratives

15.00 – 15.30 Robert Edward Pezet (Leeds)
The Dead Past Dilemma

15.30 – 16.00 Casper Storm Hansen (Aberdeen)
Conventional Truths and Absolute Facts

Normative Session, Saturday 14.00 – 16.00

14.00 – 14.30 Alex Kaiserman (Oxford)
Partial Liability

14.30 – 15.00 Mona Simion (Leuven)
No Epistemic Norm for Action

15.00 – 15.30 Nathan Robert Howard (USC)
Rationally Non-motivating Practical Beliefs

15.30 – 16.00 James Kirkpatrick (Oxford)
A Cautionary Tale Against Generic Amelioration
# OPEN SESSIONS I (SATURDAY)

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<td>Natalie Ashton, Feminist Epistemology as Mainstream</td>
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<td>Perceptual Experience</td>
<td>Anne Siegetsleitner, Susan Stebbing and the Vienna Circle on Moral Philosophy</td>
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<td>Sciences B2.01</td>
<td>Sidra Shahid, Arendt and Phenomenological Description</td>
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<td>18.00-18.30</td>
<td>Communication Sciences B2.04/05</td>
<td>Emily Thomas, Catherine Cockburn and David Lewis: On Modal Realism and Contingent Laws</td>
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<td>16.30-17.00</td>
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<td>Hemdat Lerman, On the Fine-Graininess of the Ways Things Are Presented in Experience</td>
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<td>Kataryna Samoilova, Is Cognitive Penetration Ever Good?</td>
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<td>Alisa Mandrigin, Multisensory Awareness and Bayesian Accounts of Perception</td>
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<td>Daniel Morgan, Indexical Attitudes and Action: Filling in an Orthodoxy</td>
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<td>Epistemo Social Sciences S0.08</td>
<td>Jonathan Payton, Omissions, Agency, and Causal Powers</td>
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<td>Johanna Marie Thoma, Temptation, Regret, and Risk-Taking</td>
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<td>David Egan, Rehabilitating Austin: A Critical Appraisal of Grice's Criticism</td>
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Abstracts

The Inaugural Address (L3)

Friday 10 July 17.00 – 19.00, chaired by Adrian Moore (Oxford)

Catherine Wilson (York)

The Doors Of Perception And The Artist Within

This paper discusses the significance for the philosophy of perception and aesthetics of certain productions of the ‘offline brain.’ These are experienced in hypnagogic and other trance states and in disease- or drug-induced hallucination. They bear a similarity to other visual patterns in nature, and reappear in human artistry, especially of the craft type. The reasons behind these resonances are explored, along with the question why we are disposed to find geometrical complexity and ‘supercolouration’ beautiful. The paper concludes with a plea on behalf of neuroaesthetics, but with a caution or two.

Symposium I: Hegel's Critique of Kant (L4)

Saturday 11 July 9.00 – 10.45, chaired by David James (Warwick)

Stephen Houlgate (Warwick)

Hegel’s Critique of Kant

In this essay I argue that Hegel criticizes Kant for failing to carry out a thorough critique of the categories of thought. In Hegel’s view, Kant merely limits the validity of the categories to objects of possible experience, but he does not challenge the way in which the ‘understanding’ (Verstand) conceives of those categories and other concepts. Indeed, for Hegel, Kant’s limitation of the validity of the categories itself presupposes the sharp distinctions, drawn by understanding, between concepts such as ‘form’ and ‘matter’ or ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’. I note that Hegel does not do complete justice to Kant’s concept of the ‘thing in itself’ or to his conception of ‘critique’, but that his criticism of Kant is nonetheless correct.

Karl Ameriks (Notre Dame)

Some Persistent Presumptions of Hegelian Anti-Subjectivism

Like many other recent Hegelian accounts, Stephen Houlgate’s severe critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy contends that, in contrast to Hegel, Kant’s Critical system, especially because of its doctrine of transcendental idealism, presupposes a subjectivist and therefore inadequate position. On the basis of a moderate interpretation of Kant’s idealism and his general Critical procedure, I defend Kant from the charge of subjectivism, and also give an account of how subjectivist interpretations in general can arise from a series of understandable misunderstandings of difficult passages in Kant’s first Critique.

Symposium II: The Moral Significance of Admiration (L5)

Saturday 11 July 9.00 – 10.45, chaired by Fabienne Peter (Warwick)
Linda Zagzebski (Oklahoma)
*Admiration and the Admirable*

The category of the admirable has received little attention in the history of philosophy, even among virtue ethicists. I don’t think we can understand the admirable without investigating the emotion of admiration. I have argued that admiration is an emotion in which the object is "seen as admirable," and which motivates us to emulate the admired person in the relevant respect. Our judgments of admirability can be distorted by the malfunction of our disposition to admiration. We all know many ways in which admiration misfires when people admire someone who is not admirable. In this paper I focus on a different kind of mistake, one in which there is resistance to moving from admiring to emulating someone admirable. I think that Aristotle’s zelos is in between admiration and envy, and it points us to a predictable line of deviation from admiration to the path of envy, spite, and ressentiment. I think these are mistakes to which people in the modern age are particularly prone.

Terence Irwin (Oxford)
*Ni admirari? Uses and abuses of admiration*

**Symposium III: Columnar Higher-Order Vagueness (L3)**

Saturday 11 July 11.15 – 13.00, chaired by Iam Rumfitt (Birmingham)

Susanne Bobzien (Oxford)
*Columnar higher-order vagueness or Vagueness is higher-order vagueness*

Most descriptions of higher-order vagueness in terms of traditional modal logic generate so-called higher-order vagueness paradoxes. The one that doesn’t (Williamson’s) is problematic otherwise. Consequently, the present trend is toward more complex, non-standard theories. However, there is no need for this.

In this paper I introduce a theory of higher-order vagueness that is paradox-free and can be expressed in the first-order extension of a normal modal system that is complete w.r.t. single domain Kripke-frame semantics. This is the system QS4M+BF+FIN. It corresponds to the class of transitive, reflexive and final frames. With borderlineness (unclarity, indeterminacy) defined logically as usual, it then follows that something is borderline precisely when it is higher-order borderline and that a predicate is vague precisely when it is higher-order vague.

I propose that objections that there must be clear borderline cases ensue from the confusion of two notions of borderlineness: one associated with genuine higher-order vagueness, the other employed to sort objects into categories – and that the higher-order vagueness paradoxes result from superimposing the second notion onto the first. Lastly I address some further potential objections.

Rosanna Keefe (Sheffield)
*Modelling higher-order vagueness: columns, borderlines and boundaries*

According to Columnar Higher-Order Vagueness (CHOV), all orders of vagueness coincide: any borderline case is a borderline borderline case and a
third-order borderline case etc. Bobzien has worked out many details of such a theory and modals it with a modal logic closely related to S4. I take up a range of questions about the framework and argue that it is not suitable for modelling the structure of vagueness and higher-order vagueness.

Symposium IV: Continuanthood (L3)

Saturday 11 July, 20.00 – 21.45, chaired by Naomi Eilan (Warwick)

Helen Steward (Leeds)
*What is a Continuant?*

In this paper, I explore the question what a continuant is, in the context of a very interesting suggestion recently made by Rowland Stout, as part of his attempt to develop a coherent ontology of processes. Stout claims that a continuant is best thought of as something that primarily has its properties at a time, rather than atemporally – and that on this construal, processes should count as continuants. While accepting that Stout is onto something here, I reject his suggestion that we should accept that processes are both occurrents *and* continuants; nothing, I argue, can truly occur or happen (unless it is instantaneous), which does not have temporal parts. I make an alternative suggestion as to how one might deal with the peculiar status of processes without jettisoning a very natural account of occurrence; and assess the consequences for the category of continuant.

Bill Brewer (KCL)
*Exclusive Individuals*

I agree with a great deal in Helen’s paper. I am especially sympathetic to her suggestion that we gain metaphysical illumination by considering various ways in which we arrive at ideas of certain kinds of individuals by abstraction from those of more basic kinds. My aim is to pursue that suggestion by exploring the proposal that a grounding node in this form of abstraction may be characterized by Exclusivity in spatial location. Helen claims that we arrives at our ideas of specific events and processes by different modes of abstraction in cases where a more basic persisting individual undergoes some kind of change. I argue that the most basic individuals in this hierarchy of abstraction are enduring substances that occupy their spatial location exclusively at all times: no two such substances are ever precisely colocated.

Symposium V: Belief and Degrees of Belief (L3)

Sunday 12 July 9.00 – 10.45, chaired by Walter Dean (Warwick)

Hannes Leitgeb (Munich)
*The Humean Thesis on Belief*

This paper suggests a bridge principle for (rational) all-or-nothing belief and degrees of belief to the effect that belief corresponds to stably high degree of belief. Different ways of making this Humean thesis on belief precise are discussed, and one of them is shown to stand out by unifying the others. The resulting version of the thesis proves to be fruitful in entailing the logical closure
of belief, the Lockean thesis on belief, and coherence between decision-making based on all-or-nothing beliefs and on degrees of belief.

Richard Pettigrew (Bristol)

_Pluralism about Belief States_

With his Humean thesis on belief, Leitgeb seeks to say how beliefs and credences ought to interact with one another [Leitgeb, ta]. To argue for this thesis, he enumerates the roles beliefs must play and the properties they must have if they are to play them, together with norms that beliefs and credences intuitively must satisfy. He then argues that beliefs can play these roles and satisfy these norms if, and only if, they are related to credences in the way set out in the Humean thesis. I begin by raising questions about the roles that Leitgeb takes beliefs to play and the properties he thinks they must have if they are to play them successfully. After that, I question the assumption that, if there are categorical doxastic states at all, then there is just one kind of them — to wit, beliefs — such that the states of that kind must play all of these roles and conform to all of these norms. Instead, I will suggest, if there are categorical doxastic states, there may be many different kinds of such state such that, for each kind, the states of that type play some of the roles Leitgeb takes belief to play and each of which satisfies some of the norms he lists. As I will argue, the usual reasons for positing categorical doxastic states alongside credences all tell equally in favour of accepting a plurality of kinds of them. This is the thesis I dub _pluralism about belief states_.

_Symposium VI: The Morality of Defensive Harm (L3)_

_Sunday 12 July 17.00 – 18.45, chaired by Kimberley Brownlee (Warwick)_

Jonathan Quong (USC)

_Rights Against Harm_

Some philosophers defend the fact-relative view of moral rights against harm: Whether B infringes A’s right not to be harmed by φ-ing depends on what will in fact occur if B φ’-s. B’s knowledge of, or evidence about, the exact consequences of her φ-ing are irrelevant to the question of whether her φ-ing constitutes an infringement of A’s right not to be harmed by B. In this paper I argue that the fact-relative view of moral rights is mistaken, and I argue for an alternative view whereby our rights against harm depend on what we can reasonably demand of others. I illustrate the importance of this conclusion with a discussion of liability to defensive harm.

Helen Frowe (Stockholm)

_Claims Rights, Duties and Lesser-Evil Justifications_

This paper explores the relationship between a person’s claim right not to be harmed and the duties this claim confers on others. I argue that we should reject Jonathan Quong’s evidence-based account of this relationship, which holds that an agent A’s possession of a claim against B is partly determined by whether it would be reasonable for A to demand B’s compliance with a correlative duty. When B’s evidence is that demanding compliance would not be reasonable, A cannot have a claim against B. I suggest that some of the putatively problematic cases that Quong identifies can be resolved by plausibly
narrowing the scope of the right not to be harmed. I also argue that Quong’s view leads to implausible conclusions, and his account of what happens to A’s claim in the face of lesser-evil justifications is inconsistent with his broader view. I then defend the view that agents are required, and not merely permitted, to act on lesser-evil justifications. I further argue that A may not defend herself against the infliction of harms that are justified on lesser-evil grounds. However, she may defend herself in cases where B is only evidentially, and not objectively, justified in harming her.

Postgraduate Sessions

Theoretical Session (L4)

Saturday 14.00 – 16.00, chaired by Matthew Soteriou (Warwick)

14.00. Naomi Thompson (Hamburg)
Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation
Attempts to elucidate grounding are often made by connecting grounding to metaphysical explanation, but the notion of metaphysical explanation is itself opaque, and has received very little attention in the literature. We can characterise metaphysical explanation by appealing to our ordinary (or scientific) conception of explanation, but this reveals a tension between three theses: that grounding relations are objective and mind-independent; that there are pragmatic elements to metaphysical explanation; and that grounding and metaphysical explanation share a close connection. Holding fixed the mind-independence of grounding, I show that neither horn of the resultant dilemma can be blunted. The friend of grounding must either abandon the objectivity and mind-independence of grounding, or find another way out of the dilemma.

14.30. Matthew McKeever (St Andrews)
Non-Rigid Demonstratives
Kaplan (1977) argues that demonstratives are directly referential singular terms. While the exact nature of direct reference is contested, it's at least clear that a necessary condition for an expression's being such is that it be rigid: that it, relative to a given context, denote the same object relative to all points of evaluation such as world and time. I'll argue that it's false that demonstratives are always directly referential singular terms by presenting a case involving a seemingly true sentence containing a demonstrative only predicted to be in fact true provided the demonstrative is functioning non-rigidly. I will then go on, having considered and replied to some objections, to note the consequences this has for two important debates in the philosophy of language, that concerning the character/content distinction, and that concerning the nature of acquaintance.

15.00. Robert Edward Pezet (Leeds)
The Dead Past Dilemma
This paper outlines a temporal levels structure for understanding various metaphysical theses in the philosophy of time. Employing that structure, it then goes on to explain a dilemma that threatens the temporal collapse of the growing-block thesis to its meta-temporal level. This relies on the acceptance of a productive form of causation that explains why specific additions to the growing-block occur. The result is that any reasonable growing-block theory will collapse into a version of presentism or eternalism where the number of existents only grows over time. Finally, it uses this result to suggest that the recent permanentism-temporaryism debate is orthogonal to the debate over whether there are past, present, or future existents. As a consequence, it is claimed that the success of the former debate ought not to impact on our interest in the latter.

15.30. Casper Storm Hansen (Aberdeen)

Conventional Truths and Absolute Facts

I offer a solution to the Liar Paradox based on the premise that language is conventional. For a sentence to be true is that the actual world is among those possible worlds for which it has been conventionally and implicitly agreed that it is appropriate (in a certain idealized sense) to utter the sentence in question. That account of truth leaves no room for a sentence being true if and only if it isn’t. So the Liar cannot be such a sentence. It is, however, consistent with it that there are strings of words that seem to form a precise indicative sentence but for which we in fact have no precise convention, i.e. no agreement among the members of a language community that for any possible world determines whether the sentence is appropriately assertible in that world. I argue that that is the status of the Liar. I also give an account of what it is that can make a sentence defective in this way while at the same time appear to have clear truth conditions.

Normative Session (L5)

Saturday 14.00 – 16.00, chaired by Rory Madden (UCL)

14.00. Alex Kaiserman (Oxford)

Partial Liability

In most cases, liability in the law is all-or-nothing – a defendant either is or is not liable for a harm. By contrast, I argue that a defendant can be partially liable for a harm, to a degree equal to the degree to which her breach of duty causally contributed to the harm. I develop a novel metaphysics of causal contribution in a probabilistic framework and use it to illuminate an important tension between the punitive and compensatory roles of damages in tort law and some conceptual and normative difficulties with joint enterprise doctrine in criminal law.

14.30. Mona Simion (Leuven)

No Epistemic Norm for Action

One central debate in recent literature on epistemic normativity concerns the epistemic norm for action. This paper argues that this debate is afflicted by a category mistake: strictly speaking, there is no such thing as an epistemic norm
for action. To this effect, I introduce a distinction between epistemic norms and norms with epistemic content; I argue that, while it is plausible that norms of the latter type will govern action in general, epistemic norms will only govern actions characteristically associated with delivering epistemic goods.

15.00 Nathan Robert Howard (USC)
*Rationally Non-motivating Practical Beliefs*

Suppose that some judgments, like I should dance, are practical in the sense that, other things being equal, they motivate those who hold them. That is, suppose that motivational internalism is true of a range of judgments. These judgments’ practicality requires explanation. Such explanations tend to diverge on the attitude said to constitute practical judgment. Non-cognitivists advert to desire-like or otherwise non-cognitive attitudes; cognitivists advert to beliefs, sometimes ex- plaining, as Scanlon, Korsgaard, and Smith do, their motivating character through rational-motivational norms. These norms typically hold that if an agent’s belief is a practical judgment, then either she is appropriately motivated by the belief or she is irrational.

This paper cautions against the use of rational norms to explain practicality. It argues that if practical judgments are beliefs, then rationally non-motivating practical beliefs are possible, which are counterexamples to said norms. Indeed, practical beliefs of a certain kind cannot be the subject of rational norms aimed at explaining their motivating character, or so I argue.

I conclude by arguing that belief provides an impoverished model of practical judgment. The aforementioned counterexamples exist in the gap between an agent’s beliefs and her entire cognitive state. Given that two agents who share identical beliefs can differ in the information they grasp, and, hence, in their cognitive state, belief ascriptions under-specify an aspect of cognition essential to genuine practical judgment.

15.30. James Kirkpatrick (Oxford)
*A Cautionary Tale Against Generic Amelioration*

Recent empirical psychological studies implicate social generic sentences—generic sentences involving social generic noun phrases—in the transmission of social prejudice (Leslie forthcoming). In an attempt to mitigate these pernicious effects, Sarah-Jane Leslie (forthcoming; 2014) and Sally Haslanger (2011) argue that we ought to revise our linguistic practices concerning social generics. In particular, they claim that reducing the frequency with which social generics are uttered may alleviate their role in the transmission of social prejudice. Call this proposal Generic Amelioration. This paper argues that this strategy is unlikely to successfully combat the spread of social prejudice. Two such consideration are given. First, Generic Amelioration requires unworkably extreme revisions to our current linguistic practices. Second, it is unclear whether Generic Amelioration would have the positive effects which Leslie and Haslanger predict. This is not to say that careful consideration should not be given to reducing the harmful effects of generics. Rather, more empirical work must be done before Generic Amelioration can be endorsed.
Open Sessions I (Saturday)

Society for Women in Philosophy (Sciences B2.01)

Saturday 16.30 – 18.30, chaired by Charlotte Knowles (Birkbeck)

16.30. Natalie Ashton
Feminist Epistemology as Mainstream
Mainstream epistemologists don’t tend to discuss feminist epistemologies. They often don’t mention them in introductory courses or textbooks, and they almost invariably don’t take themselves to work on them. This is probably due to a suspicion that ‘feminist’ epistemologies are clouded by political motivations. In this paper I will argue that this suspicion is misguided – a number of ‘mainstream’ epistemologists (specifically, hinge epistemologists), are in fact doing work which is entirely compatible with feminist epistemologies, and the extra ingredient required to turn a hinge epistemology into a feminist epistemology needn’t involve political motivations.

17.00. Anne Siegetsleitner
Susan Stebbing and the Vienna Circle on Moral Philosophy
Susan Stebbing, who is rarely mentioned in the history of analytic philosophy, was a prominent figure in the Unity of Science movement and maintained relationships with leading members of the Vienna Circle. This paper compares Stebbing’s conception of moral philosophy to those of Carnap, Neurath, and Schlick. At first glance, the conceptions of moral philosophy held by Stebbing and the Vienna Circle differ widely, as Stebbing rejects the logical empiricist standard view of moral philosophy generally ascribed to the Vienna Circle. What we now call normative or substantial ethics – and what is ruled out by the standard view – is an essential part of moral philosophy in Stebbing’s conception. A closer look reveals, however, that Schlick shares this view. He practiced normative and applied ethics on a eudaimonistic basis. The discrepancies further diminish once more general questions are addressed. Stebbing, Carnap, Neurath and Schlick endorse the perspective of scientific humanism. They are convinced that it is the task of humanity itself to improve human life conditions and that science is one of the most valuable means to this improvement. Therefore, Stebbing is close to the Vienna Circle in her conception of moral philosophy once the Vienna Circle is no longer reduced to a general rejection of normative ethics, and scientific humanism is taken into account. New insights may be gained by reconsidering the Ethical Movement.

17.30. Sidra Shahid
Arendt and Phenomenological Description
In this paper, I will address Hannah Arendt’s contribution to classical phenomenology. One of the central precepts of phenomenology is a methodological commitment to description: instead of explaining phenomena, classical phenomenologists are concerned with exhibiting the underlying structures that constitute phenomena. At first glance, Arendt’s political thought seems to depart significantly from description. Instead of giving a pure description of structures that constitute a common world, Arendt opts for a
seemingly value-laden and normatively charged account involving concepts such as justice, freedom, and human dignity. Furthermore, her work seems to lack an explicit focus on central topics in phenomenology – e.g. intentionality, subjectivity, and embodiment – and the phenomenological method, which key phenomenologists such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty were at pains to elaborate (Moran 2000). This, among other reasons, has led to the view that Arendt’s work is too idiosyncratic to be considered properly phenomenological. In this paper, I will challenge this assumption. Focusing on Arendt’s notion of sensus communis, which she examines both descriptively and normatively, I will argue that far from lacking any nexus to classical phenomenology, Arendt both engages with the phenomenological tradition, and also points to one of its central limitations. In the phenomenological examination of political life, a purely descriptive approach is ultimately untenable.

18.00. Emily Thomas
*Catharine Cockburn and David Lewis: On Modal Realism and Contingent Laws*
The early modern philosopher Catharine Cockburn advances two unusual (and unappreciated) metaphysical views: there may be a plurality of created worlds; and natural and moral laws are contingent. In doing so, Cockburn anticipate aspects of David Lewis’ twentieth century metaphysical system. This paper argues that Cockburn’s neglected views are important. These views demonstrate Cockburn’s intellectual independence from her peers; this matters because her independence has been questioned by scholars. Further, I argue that these views provide further evidence of Cockburn’s Platonism, and it is this that gives rise to the prima facie coincidental resemblance between the work of Cockburn and Lewis, both of whom are making heavy use of the Platonic principle of plenitude.

**Perceptual Experience (Sciences B2.02)**

Saturday 16.30 – 18.30, chaired by Bill Brewer (KCL)

**16.30. Hemdat Lerman (Warwick)**
*On the Fine-graininess of the Ways Things are Presented in Experience*
Most philosophers of perception nowadays would say that in visual experience objects are presented to us as being certain ways, where what they mean is that the objects are presented as having certain colours, shapes, sizes, locations, etc., or as having certain apparent colours, shapes, sizes, locations, etc. The standard view, among these philosophers, is that it is unquestionable that, generally, objects are presented as having very fine-grained properties – at least as fine-grained as our ability to discriminate colour, shape, size, etc., in the given circumstances. My aim in this talk is to cast doubt on this standard view. I start by suggesting an explanation of why it is so natural to think that the standard view is correct. I then go on to question the assumptions which, according to this explanation, lead to the standard view.

**17.00. Kateryna Samoilova (Tübingen)**
*Is Cognitive Penetration ever Good?*
Cognitive penetration, the influence on perception by non-perceptual mental states, has recently been argued to lead to both bad and good epistemic results. I examine whether cognitive penetration can indeed be epistemically good. I argue that the existing examples of good cognitive penetration either come with hefty assumptions about the content of perceptual experience, or require a rather different and potentially less interesting notion of cognitive penetration.

17.30. Alisa Mandrigin (Warwick)
*Multisensory Awareness and Bayesian Accounts of Perception*

There is a philosophical puzzle about the nature of perceptual experience, prompted by recent empirical work indicating that different sensory systems interact with and influence one another. The philosophical puzzle is this: do we have multimodal perceptual experiences; or, instead, do the sensory systems just modulate one another, resulting in modality-specific perceptual experiences only?

Evidence of interactions between the sensory systems is not, by itself, enough to answer the question. There might be a number of different reasons for thinking that we have multimodal perceptual experiences. Here I consider whether experimental results put forward in support of the Bayesian model of cue integration provide us with such a reason.

18.00. Holger Thiel (CEU)
*How to be a Holist about Phenomenal Consciousness*

I understand phenomenal consciousness as an integrated whole and thus holistic in terms of a functional dependence system. A phenomenal functional dependence system is one in which a determinate of one determinable phenomenal property instantiated by one sensory state is functionally dependent upon a set of determinates of determinable phenomenal properties instantiated by other sensory states, where functional dependence is such that if the set of phenomenal determinates upon which the dependent phenomenal determinate depends stays invariant, then so does the dependent phenomenal determinate.

**Agency (Sciences B2.03)**

Saturday 16.30 – 18.30, chaired by Alexander Geddes (UCL)

16.30. Daniel Morgan (UCL)
*Indexical Attitudes and Action: Filling in an Orthodoxy*

Indexical attitudes are attitudes expressible using indexical terms like “I” or “now”. At least since the 1970’s, the claim that indexical attitudes play a particularly important role in the explanation of action has had the status of orthodoxy. Is this orthodoxy a crucial insight? Or a dogma? The orthodox claim was supported by examples like the following one. A subject knows, about themselves, that they are being pursued by a bear. However, they do not have knowledge that they would express using the term “I”. They are thinking about themselves in some other way — e.g. “as NN”. As a result, they fail to act. Then the penny drops. They realize that they are NN and they take appropriate bear--
evasive action (See Perry 1979). On one view, such examples illustrate nothing more than the point that action explanations are sensitive not just to what things are being thought about, but also to how those things are being thought about. This point is important, but it has nothing to do with indexical attitudes in particular. (See Cappelen and Dever 2013). In this talk, I propose that the examples illustrate something stronger, thereby providing the orthodox view with the argumentative support it needs. I use Cappelen and Dever’s arguments for the unimportance of indexicality in action explanation as a source of discipline on my own proposal.

17.00. Jonathan D. Payton (Toronto)
*Omissions, Agency, and Causal Powers*
Maria Alvarez has recently defended an account of agency as a causal power, particularly a power to cause changes to the position or movement of one’s own body. She claims that such an account rules intentional omissions out of the category of actions. In this short paper I defend the status of intentional omissions as actions on a causal-power view of agency. First, I argue that we can sometimes perform an omission by moving our bodies, so some intentional omissions are already actions by Alvarez’s lights. Second, I argue that we can sometimes act by keeping our bodies still. This shows that if agency is a causal power, it is a power one can exercise by preventing changes to the position or movement of one’s own body. Finally, I argue that those omissions not already accommodated by Alvarez’s official view – i.e., those which don’t consist in bodily movements – are accommodated by the revised view: to intentionally omit to move in such-and-such a way is not simply to fail to cause a certain kind of movement; it is to exert causal control by preventing that kind of movement. A plausible view of agency as a causal power accommodates intentional omissions.

17.30. Johanna Marie Thoma (Toronto)
*Temptation, Regret, and Risk-Taking*
The anticipation and avoidance of future regret is often said to play a crucial role in how agents can achieve diachronic control over their actions. For instance, Michael Bratman claims that the anticipation of regret should rationally convince an agent not to give in to temptations, or temporary shifts in judgement. I present a common class of temptation case that resists this analysis, namely temptations to take risks. When the consequences of our actions are uncertain, we cannot be certain whether, or how much we will regret our actions. I argue that Bratman’s arguments do not apply to these cases. Yet, most of our choices involve an element of risk. And thus these cases undermine Bratman’s arguments for diachronic control, and present a challenge to the literature on diachronic rationality more generally.

18.00. Peter Fossey (Warwick)
*Practical Reasoning in the Background*
Is deciding what to do itself an action? The idea that it might be appears to present difficulties for a simple and familiar version of the Humean theory of motivation, according to which all actions are performed for desire-based reasons. If deciding what to do is an action, then the subject must perform an action in order to take the desire-based reason into consideration and thereby
act on it. If so, then the Humean theory is committed to the existence of actions which are not explained by desire-based reasons. Denying that deciding what to do is an action yields an unusual and objectionable picture of human agency. I argue that we do not view deciding what to do as necessarily an action, though in some cases it may be. This allows the Humean view to escape the dilemma.

**Communication (Sciences B2.04/05)**

Saturday 16.30 – 18.30, chaired by Guy Longworth (Warwick)

16.30. David Egan (Chicago)
*Rehabilitating Austin: A Critical Appraisal of Grice’s Criticism*
Grice’s mechanism of the cancellation of conversational implicatures purports to undermine Austin’s maxim of ‘No modification without aberration’. However, Grice’s conception of cancellation does not account for the fact that an explicit cancellation must be uttered, and that its utterance involves further implicatures that undermine the attempted cancellation. What Grice calls explicit cancellations are better understood as utterances that resolve ambiguities, and hence apply only in cases where there exists an ambiguity that needs resolving. If Grice’s work does not undermine Austin, we are in a position to reassess an approach to the philosophy of language that has been unduly neglected in the last half-century.

17.00. Zsolt Bátori (Budapest)
*Photographic illocutionary acts and photographic deception*
The philosophy of pictorial communication has advanced through ideas and theories of various philosophical traditions, relying on diverse research methodologies. A long forgotten advancement in the philosophy of visual communication has been recently revived, suggesting that the theory of speech acts can be successfully extended and developed for explaining the communicative processes involved in understanding and interpreting pictures and other visual phenomena. In my talk I consider how we may account for photographic deception with the help of the theory of pictorial illocutionary acts. I argue that although the basic conceptual tools of a theory of pictorial illocutionary acts have long been available to us, very little actual progress has been made to turn this theory into an account of practical explanatory power. Using photographic deception as an example I explain how the theory of pictorial illocutionary acts may be extended specifically to photographic illocutionary acts, and I also show how this theory accounts for various types of photographic deception.

17.30. Christoph Kelp (Leuwen)
*The C Account of Assertion: A Negative Result*
According to what Williamson labels ‘the C account’ of assertion, there is one and only one rule that is constitutive of assertion. This rule, ‘the C rule’, states that one must assert p only if p has property C. This paper argues that the C account is incompatible with any C that is factive and any C such that C is both entailed by knowledge and consistent.
18.00. Tom Dougherty (Cambridge)
Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication
Can a mere intention to consent be sufficient for morally valid consent? Or is communication required as well? Arguments that appeal to intuitions about cases of uncommunicated consent have proved unable to resolve this debate. So to move forward the debate, I develop a new line of argument that exploits the fact that both consent and promise are moral powers by which we alter which rights are in play. In the first strand of my argument, I argue that the view that promises require communication coheres poorly with the view that consent does not. In the second strand of my argument, I ask why promises must be communicated, and argue that the same rationale applies in the case of consent.

Epistemology (Social Sciences S0.08)

Saturday 16.30 – 18.30, chaired by Quassim Cassam (Warwick)

16.30. Richard Dietz (Tokyo)
Evidential Support and Aboutness
Sentence questions that are truth-conditionally equivalent may differ in what they are about, in other words, they may differ in subject matter (Lewis, Yablo)—e.g., consider examples like Is this a zebra/Is this a zebra and not a cleverly disguised mule or Are all ravens black?/Do all non-black things fail to be ravens?, which are about different issues. Standard theories of evidential support (Is this hypothesis confirmed by the given evidence?) leave aside questions of aboutness as irrelevant. In this talk, I argue that subject matter does matter for questions of evidential support. Adopting Stephen Yablo’s theory of structured propositions (2014), I discuss some options of making evidential support sensitive to subject matter.

17.00. Guido Melchior (Graz)
Knowing and Checking: Where Sensitivity Really Matters
Nozick’s sensitivity account of knowledge has been criticized for two main reasons. First, we can easily find examples of insensitive knowledge. Second, knowledge-closure is a highly plausible principle, but knowledge is not closed under known entailment on Nozick’s account. I will show that ‘sensitivity’ is a useful notion, but it shouldn’t be applied primarily to knowledge. I will argue that sensitivity is not necessary for knowledge, but it is for checking. None of the two intuitive problems for sensitivity accounts of knowledge arises for sensitivity accounts of checking. Moreover, safety might be sufficient for knowing, but it is not sufficient for checking. The established distinction between knowing and checking can be utilized in order to explain puzzles about knowledge such as the puzzle about Moorean reasoning.

17.30. Alexander Jackson (Boise State University)
Useful Knowledge-Ascriptions
Epistemologists have recently been exercised by the apparent variability of our knowledge-ascriptions. The lottery and preface paradoxes, and cases involving shifting practical interests, seem to support some kind of ‘shifty’ theory of
knowledge. But which shifty theory—contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invarianism (SSI) or truth-relativism? I attack this question by investigating the ‘adaptive’ way for computationally limited agents to think and talk. I do so in three stages. The first stage explores the idea that it is computationally efficient to make decisions based on full occurrent beliefs where possible, but to switch to using an occurrent partial belief when necessary. The second stage considers how it is adaptive for such agents to assess beliefs. It would not be useful to attribute knowledge in the way SSI or contextualism mandate. The third stage claims that our metaphysical theory should legitimize the adaptive way of thinking and talking about knowledge, and mentions two possible approaches: truth-relativism and Kit Fine’s (2001) “non-factualism” about a subject-matter.

18.00. Brian Ball (Oxford)
Knowledge, Safety, and Questions
Safety-based theories of knowledge face a difficulty surrounding necessary truths: roughly, the problem is that no subject could have easily falsely believed such a proposition; and so, failing to predict that ill-grounded beliefs in such propositions do not constitute knowledge, standard safety theories are therefore less informative than one might have hoped. Some have suggested that the appropriate response is to note that the subjects in the cases at issue could have easily believed some related false proposition; but they have given no indication what makes a proposition related. In this paper, I suggest a resolution to this issue, proposing that a belief is safe iff its subject could not easily have believed some false answer to the same question.

Our Unsociable Sociability (Social Sciences S0.09)

Saturday 16.30 – 18.30, chaired by Kimberley Brownlee (Warwick)

16.30. Sara Protasi (Yale)
Envy as a Civic Emotion
The idea that love is an opposite and remedy to envy is rooted in theological Christian tradition, but present also in other traditions, and has deep ramifications in the philosophical treatment of envy. One such ramifications can be found in Martha Nussbaum’s proposal that love is a remedy to the kind of envy that can destabilize society, what Rawls called “general envy”. According to Rawls, envy motivates one to deprive others of what they have, even at a personal cost for oneself, thus being detrimental to individual and collective well-being. Nussbaum proposes love as an antidote to envy, but I argue that love is compatible with envy. Love and envy are two sides of the same coin—what Kant called “unsociable sociability” of human nature. Both attitudes stem from our tendency to associate with similar others, and the desire for being acknowledged as worthy of esteem. They both involve the desire of being selected as uniquely valuable, of standing out in a crowd as the coolest, most attractive individual. Once we accept that envy is the dark side of love, we come to see that love is the luminous side of envy, and that there is a kind of envy that can contribute to human flourishing. I call it emulative envy, a notion that is
present, but underdeveloped in Rawls’ own account. I present my own empirically supported view of it and show the positive role it can play in society.

17.00. Rachelle Bascara (Birkbeck)
*A Theory of Oppression*

Only Ann Cudd offers a unified theory of oppression, but her account fails precisely for the reason that I. M. Young warned us about, namely, it fails to capture all forms of oppression. I show how Cudd’s theory fails and amend it. I then turn to Philip Pettit’s theory of domination, relate it to Cudd’s amended version, and transform it into a new republican theory of oppression, by introducing the notion of a social group.

According to Pettit, domination occurs when an agent has the capacity to interfere, on an arbitrary basis, over the choices of another agent. But because the type of social group we have does not have agency, we cannot simply replace the term “agent” with “social group.” I thus invoke a dialectical relationship between individuals and their group membership.

A further disanalogy between Cudd’s and my theory of oppression is that Cudd requires harm to occur, whereas, for Pettit, mere capacity for harm is sufficient. The group aspect of oppression allows us to escape this dilemma. For in saying that the capacity for arbitrary interference must be exercised, it does not follow that everyone in the group exercises the capacity. I thus say that Group A oppresses Group B if and only if individuals in Group A have the capacity to interfere with individuals in Group B, by virtue of their respective group memberships, and some individuals in Group A actually exercise the capacity, resulting in harm in some individuals in Group B.

17.30. Katherine Hawley (St Andrews)
*Speaking under Duress*

Paradigmatically, an assertion is a freely-offered expression of the speaker’s beliefs. Less paradigmatically, but pretty frequently, people feel under pressure to speak rather than remain silent, or to say one thing rather than another. In this paper, I briefly note a number of ways in which speech can occur under duress, and consider the consequences of such duress for speaker, audience, and speech act; I juxtapose discussions of coercion in ethics with discussions of assertion in philosophy of language. The paper is primarily intended to raise some thought-provoking questions, and does not attempt to answer many of these.

18.00. Boudewijn de Bruin (Groningen)
*Self-fulfilling Testimonial Injustice*

The concept of testimonial injustice, due to Miranda Fricker (2007), captures cases where structural prejudices about a person’s social identity lead people to assign lower credibility to her utterances. On Fricker’s account, these prejudices have to be false. This paper considers testimonial injustice arising out of negative beliefs about people’s social identity that are become *self-fulfillingly* true in the presence of so-called *identity threats* studied in psychology. An example is sexist male behaviour (an identity threat) negatively influencing mathematical performance in women, lowering their ‘mathematical credibility’ (Koch et al. 1995).
Atrocity and Debate

When a disaster or atrocity happens (like a terrorist attack or a high school massacre), it is common to respond by tying the atrocity to larger political or moral debate. This response to atrocities almost invariably generates the complaint that it is too early to debate such larger questions while ‘the bodies are still warm’. The topic of this paper is this meta-debate about atrocity and debate. We want to clarify what might be behind this common complaint, and to assess its validity. There is much discussion about the nature of practical, collective and political deliberation but little about the (appropriate) timing of deliberation. We will critically examine different readings of the complaint. One reading is epistemic: debate is said to be too early because many factual issues still need to be resolved. A second reading relates to the nature of deliberation itself: deliberation itself might be biased if it begins in too close proximity to a tragedy. Finally, the complaint might be made on ethical grounds. To initiate a debate too early after a tragedy would compromise the emotions due at this time, namely grief and might even be said to be disrespectful to the victims. Finally, given that ordinary citizens are most likely to become politically engaged with the broader issues in the context of disaster than in a cool hour, we will consider a political argument in favour of early deliberation.

The Function of Morality: A Misjudged Option for Moral Naturalism

This paper defends a version of moral naturalism called “functionalist moral naturalism.” Several very distinguished philosophers have defended this view. All versions of functionalist moral naturalism hold the Basic Thesis that the function of morality is to impartially promote the well-being (or interests) of persons. In this brief essay, I argue for two refinements on the Basic Thesis: (1) that morality should be understood as a set of capacities for forming moral judgments and acting in accordance with moral norms, not as any particular moral norm; and (2) that impartiality should be understood as promoting the similar interests of all persons.

In Defence of Elective Forgiveness

Philosophers have proposed accounts of forgiveness where the victim is warranted in forgiving only if the wrongdoer makes amends for the wrong done. According to such an account, forgiveness is made rational by the wrongdoer apologizing. But this account creates a puzzle because it seems to make cases of elective forgiveness (where there is no apology or repentance) unjustified. Charles Griswold, for example, takes this position and argues that forgiveness is always conditional on the wrongdoer taking some necessary steps to earn forgiveness. In the absence of these steps, forgiveness is either unintelligible or unjustified. My aim in this paper is to argue that elective forgiveness can be intelligible and justified. I shall first examine why philosophers have argued that
unconditional forgiveness is problematic. I shall then consider accounts in the literature (Garrard and McNaughton; Pettigrove) which claim that forgiveness is not the sort of thing that requires apology. Finally I propose an alternative account which I believe is well placed to explain why elective forgiveness is both intelligible and justified. I suggest that there are justificatory features of a situation, such as generosity and strong community support, which can make unconditional forgiveness intelligible and justified. Such reasons are not the type of reasons that automatically generate moral obligations. As a result, my account can make sense of the fact that forgiveness is essentially an elective phenomenon.

18.00. Nora Grigore (Austin)
*The Difficulty of Accounting for Supererogation*

If one accepts the existence of supererogatory action (i.e. that there are morally good, altruistic deeds that cannot be required and one cannot be blamable for omitting them), then one accepts that there are morally good, even morally excellent actions that cannot be required from us. The focus of my research is not providing an answer to the question 'why would someone be allowed to omit to do something obviously good?'. Instead, I am offering an explanation for why this question seems to be so difficult to answer. My claim is that the question itself is conceptually framed in a manner that makes a plausible theoretical account for supererogation very difficult to achieve. I will follow the difficulties in accounting for supererogation in Thomas Nagel (1986), Joseph Raz (1975) and Susan Wolf (1982).

**Autonomy and Responsibility (Social Sciences S0.13)**

Saturday 16:30 – 18:30, chaired by Helen Steward (Leeds)

16.30. Christopher Mills (UCL)
*Are Relational Accounts of Autonomy Redundant?*

Relationalism is the claim that social and relational environmental factors facilitate autonomous agency and may play a further compositional role in determining autonomous agency. In its strongest form, relationalism suggests that autonomy is a condition of persons solely constituted by the presence of absence of social relations persons find themselves in. This view has come to dominate the debate over personal autonomy in the past two decades and is often characterised as the best chance of moving past the long-held orthodoxy of personal autonomy as an internal sense of motivational control. In this paper I critically assess three of the most prominent arguments for relationalism. The first is that personal autonomy has a necessary interrelational aspect. I show this claim to be trivially true. The second argument is that the traditional reliance of non-relational accounts on the core concept of authenticity is flawed. I show this claim to be semantically mistaken. The final argument is that the relationship between authentic internal motivation and autonomy is doomed to remain an open question, leaving us no alternative but to accept that autonomy is purely a social concept. I show this claim to be false. I conclude that relationalism is not wholly mistaken but instead redundant.
17.00. Florian Demont-Biaggi (Zurich)

Responsible Through Self-Control? A Response to Hieronymi

It is natural to think that responsibility somehow involves self-control, for our intentional actions are open to moral assessment; if we cannot control ourselves, such assessments seem futile. Pamela Hieronymi has argued against this view, rejecting the idea that responsibility requires self-control. She employs a notion of control which makes self-control analogous to the control we exercise over ordinary things. Against this, it will be argued that there is an alternative conception of control. This alternative conception will then be shown to be immune to Hieronymi’s attack. The claim against Hieronymi is, therefore, that intentional actions are indeed open to the moral assessments characteristic of responsibility, because we can control our intentional actions.

17.30. Thomas Schramme (Hamburg)

Determining Oneself and Determining One’s Self

Abstract: In this essay, I exploit an ambiguity in the concept of self-determination. Self-determination can mean to determine oneself in choices and actions or to determine one’s self. The second kind of self-determination leads to our capacity to imagine alternative selves of ourselves, which are to be actualized. This creates the basis for a normative conception of self-determination, i.e. a conception that incorporates the aspect of a right or good way to determine oneself. I defend this normative interpretation of self-determination.

18.00. Benjamin Matheson (Manchester)

The Collapse of Historicism

Many compatibilists hold that an agent’s moral responsibility is sensitive to her history. So-called ‘historicism’ is motivated by manipulation cases that seem to show that non-historicism is false. Design cases seem, however, to show that historicism is also false. John Martin Fischer (2011) has recently argued that design cases are not, in fact, a threat to compatibilism. In this paper I investigate the implications that Fischer’s response to these cases has for historicism. I argue that it implies a methodological commitment that is at odds with a methodological commitment required to motivate historicism. I then argue that historicism collapses into source incompatibilism.

Metaphysics I (Social Sciences S0.17)

Saturday 16.30 – 18.30, chaired by Thomas Crowther (Warwick)

16.30. Sandy Berkovski (Bilkent)

The Possibility of Metaphysical Explanation

A major factor motivating metaphysics of ground is to provide explanations: a fact X is grounded in a fact Y when Y explains X. As often emphasised, the kind of explanation in question is non-causal and metaphysical. That explanations can be non-causal is a commonplace in many, possibly all, accounts of explanation. The ground theorists, however, insist that the grounding relation exhibits a distinct kind of metaphysical explanation. The first claim I make is that some of the typical examples offered by ground theorists exhibit a familiar
unification model of explanation. The question remains whether ground metaphysics can profitably deploy that explanatory model. I argue that this is unlikely. First, ground is supposed to explain the less fundamental reality precisely because it is more fundamental. Yet this fundamentality, whatever we make of it, plays no role in the explanatory model above. Instead, its key notion is that of generality. Secondly, according to the unification explanation in the examples examined earlier, the explanatory power of ground depends on theories of conceptual use. So it is misleading to speak of facts themselves explaining other facts. They can only do so in conjunction with the theories advanced by thinking subjects. I finish by addressing the distinction made by grounding theorists between objective and subjective explanations. I argue that the distinction, if cogent at all, cannot be used in defending metaphysical explanation.

17.00. Umut Baysan (Glasgow)
Emergentism and Meta-Ontology
In this paper, I explore the meta-ontological commitments of emergentism. For this, I take emergentism to be the view that mental properties are dependent-yet-fundamental properties. I consider two opposing meta-ontological views: the fundamentalist ontology and the ontology of levels. I evaluate an argument by Barnes (2012) that emergentism should be formulated within the fundamentalist ontology. I argue against this proposal by Barnes, and show that emergent properties could exist within either meta-ontological framework. Then I show that meta-ontology does not make a difference regarding the causal problems that are associated with emergentism. Such problems are either easily avoidable, or not avoidable under any meta-ontological view.

17.30. Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (Athens)
Explanatory Progress
The traditional philosophical theory of explanation has focussed on answering the “what is an explanation” question and on developing normative models of an ideal successful explanation; explanatory progress was implicitly deemed possible insofar as the real-world explanations approached the ideal model. In the recent literature an alternative view of explanatory pluralism has been suggested and conceptualized further in terms of explanatory games. This paper proposes a procedural, multidimensional view as the appropriate normative stance and shows how explanatory progress is possible, even within the premises of a pluralistic account.

18.00. Paul Giladi (Sheffield)
Diagnosing and Overcoming the Fourth Dogma of Empiricism
My aim in this paper is to offer a diagnosis of what I call the ‘Fourth Dogma of Empiricism’. By the ‘Fourth Dogma of Empiricism’, I mean mainstream analytic philosophy’s tendency to conceive of Ockham’s Principle of Parsimony from a Quinean perspective. In what follows, I shall argue that the fourth dogma of empiricism lies at the basis of positions such as eliminativism and nominalism, and thereby serves as a compelling explanation for why positions such as emergentism and realism about universals are often met with great suspicion by some philosophers. I contend that this dogma of empiricism is philosophically pernicious and that one ought to re-conceive of the Principle of Parsimony in
less restrictive and more inclusive manners.

**Metaphysics II (Social Sciences S0.18)**

Saturday 16.30 – 18.00, chaired by Maarten Steenhagen (UCL)

16.30. Elselijn Kingma (Southampton)
*The Metaphysics of Pregnancy*
What is the metaphysical relationship between a pregnant organism and the foetus that inhabits it? In this paper I present a prima facie argument that foetuses and their earlier forms are not properly characterised as being *inside* a pregnant woman, but as *part of* a pregnant woman. In other terms, foetuses and the organisms pregnant with them relate not as content and container, but as part and whole. Second, I argue that this raises a dilemma: either we must accept the counterintuitive conclusion that human organisms start at birth, or the equally counterintuitive conclusion that human organisms can be part of other human organisms.

17.00. Todd Moody (Saint Joseph’s)
*C-theory and Life Boundaries*
Barry Dainton's "C-Theory of identity of the self is summarized and applied to questions concerning the boundaries of the life of persons. Personhood is typically understood to entail certain developed mental capacities, referred to as "sapience." The C-theoretic conception of the self is the ongoing capacity for experience, which exists well before sapience and may exist after sapience is no longer present. I propose that a person be understood as a self with either the capacity or the potential for sapience, where "potential" is analyzed as the capacity for a capacity. This extends the boundary of personhood back to the onset of sentience, at the earliest. It doesn't extend beyond the permanent loss of the capacity for sapience, however. Other considerations related to the end-of-life boundary are briefly discussed.

17.30. Robert Gallagher (Beirut)
*A Disturbing Model in Met. Iota*
Aristotle says in the Metaphysics that all things are either contraries or composed from the contraries of the genos of which they are members. Those contraries are the "one" (to *hen*) and its privation: in colours, white and black. Aristotle speaks of a process of alteration of "the changing thing" from one contrary to the other in a genos, metamorphosing successively into each intermediate between (cf.I.7.1057a19-26). Members of a genos can be assigned, and ordered by, a “number” (cf.I.2.1053b32-5), which I argue represents the proportions of the contraries of which they are composed. With his model, Aristotle accounts for all members of a genos with the forms of the two contraries. Aristotle says that the sort of analysis that he applies to colours and other genē must also apply to substance (cf. 1054a8-9, 11-13). A mathematical representation of Aristotle’s theory is presented, and objections are considered and laid to rest.
Open Sessions II (Sunday morning)

Irrationality (Sciences B2.01)

Sunday 11.15 – 13.15, chaired by Katherine Meadowcroft (Glasgow)

11.15. Cristina Borgoni (Graz)
*Pluralism about Dissonance Cases and the Contradictory-belief View*
In a dissonance case, the individual sincerely and with conviction assents to P while her overall behavior suggests that she believes that not-P. Dissonance cases gave rise to a lively debate about how to interpret the dissonant individual's psychology. In this talk, I defend two theses. I first propose a pluralist view of dissonance cases. The view draws from an interpretational principle, according to which the basic psychological phenomenon underlying the explicit dissonance is what identifies the psychology of the dissonant person. I then argue that the contradictory-belief view is a successful interpretation of some different cases.

11.45. Ema Sullivan-Bisset (Birmingham)
*Unimpaired Abduction to Alien Abduction: Lessons on Delusion Formation*
I argue that an investigation into alien abduction beliefs can inform and support my preferred version of the one-factor account of delusion formation. I argue that the formation and maintenance of alien abduction beliefs can be explained by a one-factor account, and that the one-factor account can explain alien abduction beliefs in the same way that it explains other delusions. If alien abduction belief can be explained by a one-factor account, so too I argue, can (other) monothematic delusions, since there are no differences between alien abduction belief and monothematic delusions which indicate the need for additional explanatory factors. My conclusion is that the delusion formation debate—specifically, a defence of the one-factor account—can be helpfully informed by an investigation into alien abduction belief, a much under-discussed case in the literature on delusion formation.

12.15. Christoph Michel (Stuttgart)
*Attitudes, Norms of Rationality and Mental Explanation*
So-called rationality constraints, do or, as some assume, should govern psychological explanation. So, it is common practice in philosophy and psychology that behavior is to be explained by “rationalizing” it. This way, rationality constraints get to govern mental explanation and in addition, they shape the way we conceive of the nature of belief and preference. The foundations of these assumption deserve to be clarified and revisited. Rationalization methodology faces two general questions: First, can rationalization always give adequate explanations? Norms of rationality might very easily distort our picture of what happens. Also, we might think twice before eliminating irrationality. Second, a rationalizer needs to fix the norms of rationality which are supposed to serve as the measure of attitude attribution. Otherwise, rationalization will remain a methodology with no method or an inadequate one. As shown, logicism, situated rationality and Bayesianism point in different ways. I shall develop a perspective for rethinking the nature of
attitudes and rationality. Results from psychology suggest that for both, context-sensitivity arises as a requirement. That points to a constructionist rather than dispositionalist or functionalist view of attitudes.

12.45. Anneli Jefferson (KCL)

*Medicalization of Mental Illness – Treading the Line between the Trivialization of Psychiatry and Scientific Discovery*

Recently, there has been a flurry of books and papers warning of out-of-control medicalization in psychiatry. In this paper, I address the question when medicalization is problematic, arguing that this is the case when it lacks scientific credibility or is harmful in its effect. I then provide some criteria for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable cases of medicalization I argue that both scientific and moral criteria need to be applied in coming to a judgment about specific cases of medicalization. Thus, antipsychiatrists are correct in claiming that mental illnesses are problems in living, but incorrect in assuming that medicalization has no basis in scientific facts.

**Thought (Sciences B2.02)**

Sunday 11.15 – 12.45, chaired by Paul Giladi (Sheffield)

11.15. Thomas Lockhart (Auburn)

*Re-examining Frege’s Anti-psychologism*

Frege insists that we must always “separate sharply the psychological from the logical”. But according to Frege’s Predicament (advanced by Matthias Haase), Frege’s separation between the psychological and the logical is too sharp, leaving Frege no room to elucidate how logical laws can come to have normative bearing on our psychological activities of thinking and judging. I argue that Frege’s Predicament is not a challenge to Frege but simply an articulation of the very psychologism he rejects: a position which refuses to admit a perspective from which to study our thoughts other than the perspective available to the psychological logician.

11.45. Nikolay Milkov (Paderborn)

*Aesthetic Gestures: Essay in Frege-Wittgenstein Theory of Art*

Frege’s conception of works of art was scarcely discussed in the literature. This is a pity since, as we are going to see in this paper, his innovative philosophy of language also outlined a fruitful aesthetic theory. In short, it holds that only complete sentences express thought. Sentences of literature are only “mock thoughts”. The early Wittgenstein adopted this conception and later developed it further. In the 1930s and 1940s he claimed that works of art can convey thoughts. These thoughts, however, do not model the world of facts but can only shape the style of our life: successful (gelungene) works of art are gestures that show life directions. In this sense, artists “have something to teach”.

12.15. Piotr Szalek (Lublin)

*The Identity Theory of Truth, Idealism and Pragmatism*

The paper examines difficulties with the coherency of McDowell’s proposal with regards to his concept of facts in the context of the identity theory of truth. It
reconstructs and analyses the relation between thoughts and facts as a crucial element of his ‘factive’ interpretation of (conceptualised) experience as a condition of its ‘openness’ to the world. The paper closely follows a line of the argument proposed by Dodd (1995) and Thorton (2004), and it substantiates their claims by showing how the relation between thoughts and facts turns out to be a serious difficulty for McDowell’s notion of experience. The paper finally offers an outline of a possible proto-pragmatic solution for this difficulty.

Self-Knowledge (Sciences B2.04/05)

Sunday 11.15 – 13.15, chaired by Hemdat Lerman (Warwick)

11.15. Jesús Vega Encabo (Madrid)
Active Self-knowers
Robert Brandom has developed the pragmatist tradition along Kantian lines. His Kantian pragmatism encourages us to focus on judgments and intentional actions as things which we are responsible for, as expressions of commitment and exercises of authority. Creatures capable of responsible judgment and action are self-conscious creatures that exhibit, in Kantian terms, a distinctive synthetic unity of apperception and, in Hegelian terms, a particular way of self-transformation. Sapient beings are then creatures that are capable of taking themselves as actively engaged in the shaping of their own attitudes. Kant urged us to view this sort of engagement as a kind of critical and active self-knowledge that is authoritative and the precondition of our responsible doings. In this paper, I will present a model of self-knowledge that seeks to account for the special unity in our constellation of commitments in terms of a kind of practical self-knowledge derived from how we responsibly shape those commitments and transform ourselves. This model is also in a position to account for the sort of default entitlement that makes our self-ascriptions authoritative.

11.45. Bernhard Salow (MIT)
Access and Transparency
An important question in contemporary epistemology is whether an agent who knows that \( p \), is also thereby in a position to know that she knows that \( p \). We show that a “transparency” account of introspection, which maintains that we learn about our attitudes towards a proposition by reflecting not on ourselves but rather on that very proposition, supports an affirmative answer. This is all the more significant because our way of articulating the transparency account is compatible with an “externalist” or “reliabilist” conception of knowledge commonly thought to make knowledge iteration principles particularly problematic.

12.15. Istvan Zardaj (Oxford Brookes)
Action and Practical Knowledge
The aim of the paper is to show that some recent accounts of what practical knowledge is encounter a difficulty when trying to reconcile Anscombe’s view that practical knowledge is non-observational and non-inferential knowledge of one’s own intentional actions with an account of actions according to which their
identity depends on their results or their successful execution. My suggestion is that this is one more reason against accepting such views about the identity of actions. I will briefly introduce what Anscombe says about practical knowledge, and then illustrate two ways in which her view that practical knowledge is non-observational and non-inferential knowledge can be taken to need modification and qualification. I think that once we follow any of these two ways of reasoning we will have to accept that practical knowledge without observation is unattainable. Hence we would be better off by removing the assumptions regarding the metaphysics of action that lead to these problematic routes of reasoning in the first place.

12.45. Uwe Peters (KCL)
Against The Transparency Method
Many philosophers hold that we can come to know whether we believe p by determining whether p is the case. This is also known as the transparency method. I argue that the transparency method can’t lead to self-knowledge of beliefs, for it is part of having a concept of one’s own belief that one refrains from the transition that the method is thought to involve.

Formal Epistemology (Social Sciences S0.08)
Sunday 11.15 – 13.15, chaired by Chris Meyns (Cambridge)

11.15. Jonathan Payne (IP London)
Chance-credence Norms in an Infinite Setting
Ever since Lewis’s statement of the Principal Principle, there has been much discussion of various chance-credence norms and their relationship to various views about the nature of chance. However, these discussions have invariably made the assumption that our credences—in particular, our credences about chances—are distributed over a finite number of propositions. In this paper I will argue that (a) it is essential that we consider the infinite case, since such a setting is not just possible, but best models our actual credences, and (b) the finiteness assumption has played a crucial role in some arguments, so that it is very important that the infinite case be considered.

11.45. Pavel Janda (Bristol)
Reflection Principle and Epistemic Utility of Future Contingents
We will argue that epistemic utility theory (EUT) combined with some semantics for future contingents creates a clash between epistemic principles. The clash happens between Conditionalization and minimization of inaccuracy. The credence that minimizes an agent's inaccuracy is not the one obtained by Conditionalization. Subsequently, we will propose a solution to the problem.

12.15. Murali Ramachandran (Witwatersrand)
Williamson on Higher-order Luminosity
I begin this talk by showing how Williamson’s strategy for refuting higher-order luminosity principles forces one to deny either the transparency of, what I am convinced are, transparent propositions, or the general validity of epistemic
closure. I sketch an independent motivation for restricting the closure principle, and gesture towards some surprising benefits.

12.45. Thomas Raleigh (NTNU)

*An Argument for Permissivism from Blindspots and Safespots*

I provide a novel argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on ‘Safespot’ and ‘Blindspot’ propositions – i.e. a proposition that is guaranteed to be true, or guaranteed to be false, provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on the following, very plausible principle: If S knows that her believing p would bound to be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. I briefly consider and reject one possible motivation for denying this principle.

**Normative Reasons (Social Sciences S0.09)**

Sunday 11.15 – 13.15, chaired by Joseph Cunningham (Warwick)

11.15. Charles Cote-Bouchard (KCL)

*Why Reasons are Probably not in the Head*

What are reasons? What is their ontological status? The two main sides of this debate are mentalism and non-mentalism. The former claims that reasons are mental states and the latter denies that they are. The goal of this paper is to show that mentalism is probably false. First, I argue that normative reasons have to be ontologically unified. Because of the special connection between epistemic reasons and other reasons, epistemic and non-epistemic reasons cannot have different ontological statuses. This, I argue, favours non-mentalism over mentalism about normative reasons. Second, I claim that this ontological unity also extends to normative and explanatory reasons because there is also a special connection between epistemic reasons and explanatory reasons. Finally, I suggest that the ontological unity probably extends to motivating reasons as well. Therefore, I conclude that reasons are probably not in the head.

11.45. Euan Karl Hans Metz (Reading/Southampton)

*A Good Reason to Reject the Reasons as Evidence Thesis*

Much recent work in normativity concerns the nature of normative reasons. A recent, novel attempt has been made to analyse reasons for belief and action in terms of evidence that one ought to so believe or act. I offer some prima facie motivation for this view. I then show that the analysis faces counterexamples from cases in which an agent has evidence that he ought to φ, but that he has no reason to φ due to a false belief. I consider fixing this problem by disambiguating the concept of a reason into subjective and objective reasons, thus accommodating the gap between appearance and reality. I argue that, supposing that this is a bona fide distinction, it turns out not to help vindicate the analysis. This provides us with a good reason to reject the reasons as evidence thesis.

12.15. Víctor Verdejo (UCL)

*Normative Desire*
According to a widespread, roughly Humean consensus, desires and other volitive or conative attitudes seem as such to be free from any normative constraint of rationality. However, some plausible normative principles for coherent desires, which parallel principles for coherent belief, can be used to make a case for a distinctive kind of conative normativity. I consider several objections to one of this principles and reply to them. Conative normativity is, I suggest in closing, an instance of a broader and arguably fundamental class of horizontal normativity whose source is coherence.

12.45. Sameer Bajaj (Arizona)
*Why Normative Reason Won’t Come from Deliberative Indispensability*
One challenge to moral realism argues that belief in realist moral facts is unjustified because such facts do not figure in the best explanation of moral judgment. An important line of response to this challenge argues that belief in realist normative facts is justified not by their explanatory role, but by their indispensable role in practical reasoning or deliberation. Focusing primarily on David Enoch’s recent work, I argue that this response cannot explain why belief in realist normative facts is justified without either (a) begging the question or (b) undermining the claim that belief in realist normative facts is practically indispensable.

**Political Philosophy (Social Sciences S0.10)**

Sunday 11.15 – 12.45, chaired by Hannah Carnegy (UCL)

11.15. Adina Preda (Limerick)
*Can there be Positive Human Rights?*
This paper challenges a common objection to the idea that positive rights, such as socio-economic or welfare rights, can be general or pre-institutional, i.e. held by all persons against all others. According to the ‘claimability’ objection put forward by Onora O’Neill (O’Neill, 1996, 2005) positive rights cannot be general because they cannot have correlative duties since positive duties cannot be general.

To this end, I first clarify what ‘held by all against all’ means and I suggest that it is best interpreted as ‘held against all collectively’. Next, I explain that the claimability objection, if levelled once again against this interpretation, confuses *claimability* with *enforceability*. In other words, the fact that violators of human rights may be difficult to identify and perhaps held responsible does not make rights un-claimable. There is thus no reason why there cannot be human rights to socio-economic goods although this paper does not establish that there are any.

11.45. Emanuela Ceva (Pavia)
*How is Political Corruption Unjust? A Relational Approach*
Political corruption occurs when institutional actors, entrusted with the public power either to make or to implement public rules, make a distorted use of that power and bend such rules to pursue a partisan agenda. In so doing, they make an illegitimate use of their entrusted public power. Commonly we regard such a use as wrong. But, exactly, what *kind* of wrong does this form of corruption
imply? Could we say in any meaningful sense that political corruption is an injustice rather than a more generic moral wrong? To understand the sense in which political corruption is wrong *qua* unjust has important implications concerning the state’s legitimate and required response to this form of corruption through the use of its coercive power. One possible way to understand the injustice of corruption consists in deriving such an understanding from a theory of the public order. On this basis, for example, liberals and republicans have presented very different stories. I suggest that a general account that encompasses both of these specific stories is possible and I develop it as an instance of relational injustice. The relational injustice of political corruption consists in a violation of the dignity of citizens as potential makers of valid claims who entertain, in this capacity, relations of mutual accountability, which political corruption disrupts. Both liberals and republicans may recognize this account as underpinning their different moral qualms towards political corruption. This leaves us with a richer, overarching account of the wrong of political corruption capable of guiding the state’s action across different accounts of the public order.

12.15 Michael Robillard (Connecticut)
*Intervening on Behalf of Future Persons*

Justification for war is often assumed to be grounded in the rights of individual persons. More specifically though, such justification is assumed to be grounded in the rights of presently-existing persons. Given this assumption, we may ask, could a state ever justifiably intervene on behalf of future persons? If we think the answer to this question is ‘yes’, then we discover that a version of Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem (NIP) arises. For if the justification for intervention is to prevent harms from befalling future persons, then, in successfully intervening, we would necessarily bring about a world where those same future persons do not exist. If we however do believe that justification for these kinds of interventions is still possible, then, I argue, such justification must necessarily accord with one of the main proposed solutions to the NIP. In this paper, I argue that a person-based effects account of liability and an impersonal effects solution to the NIP, a position endorsed by Jeff McMahan, cannot coherently hang together. Rather, contra McMahan, I contend that the only plausible account for such future intervention cases is a person-based effects account for both liability and for the NIP.

**Causation and Explanation (Social Sciences S0.13)**

Sunday 11.15 – 13.15, chaired by Barnaby Walker (Warwick)

11.15. Alison Fernandes (Columbia)
*A Deliberative Account of Causation*

Why should we care about causal relations? Because we need them for effective deliberation. According to the deliberative account I defend, causation captures the evidential relations we use in deliberation when we decide on one thing in order to achieve another. Roughly, a causes b *if and only if* an agent’s deciding on a for the sake of b (in proper deliberation) is good evidence of b. Causation is then useful because it directs us to decisions that are evidence of
good outcomes. The account is explanatory while avoiding a number of troubling consequences. Firstly, it builds off an epistemic characterisation of deliberation, and so avoids circularity concerns. Secondly, it uses counterfactuals and objective evidential relations, and so does not lead to mind-dependence. Thirdly, since deliberation can interrupt correlations to the past, the account does not imply backwards causation. A deliberative account also combines fruitfully with reductive metaphysical approaches—it can justify them, while using resources from the reduction to explain causal asymmetry.

11.45. Justin Hannegan (Kenrick-Glenon Seminary)
Thomistic Final Causation and Contemporary Dispositional Essentialism
Most contemporary philosophers dismiss final causation as a metaphysically redundant posit, which Newton decisively eliminated from the modern understanding of nature—along with the rest of Aristotelian physics. In this paper, I challenge the consensus. I argue that the ontology of contemporary dispositional essentialism contains a version of Thomistic final causation, called “natural inclination.” I begin the paper with an analysis of natural inclination. I show that its defining features are directedness and determinative influence. Thomistic natural inclination is a non-conscious, non-deliberative intention whose directedness to an intentional object determines an efficient cause to the production of that object. I go on to demonstrate that dispositions, as characterized by dispositional essentialism, instantiate natural inclination’s defining features. Dispositions are directed to their manifestations, and this directedness determines an efficient cause (the disposition’s stimulus) to the production of an effect (the disposition’s manifestation). If dispositional essentialism is true, therefore, a version of Thomistic final causation exists. It is a necessary feature of every disposition. I go on to show that Thomistic natural inclination, as present within the ontology of dispositional essentialism, easily survives the most common objections to final causation. Such Thomistic natural inclination does not bestow mental properties upon individuals that lack minds; it does not involve backwards causation; and it does not conflict with mechanical explanation. Final causation, therefore, may have a foothold in contemporary metaphysics. It deserves our attention and serious consideration.

12.15. Esa Diaz-Leon (Barcelona)
Grounding and the Explanatory Gap
The thesis of physicalism is usually put in terms of physical truths or facts determining, or grounding, all truths or facts. There has been a lot of interest recently in trying to understand the nature of this relation of grounding or metaphysical dependence. According to many authors, grounding is an explanatory relation, that is, the grounds (or explanans) explain what is grounded (or explanandum). For instance, Kit Fine (2012), among others, has argued that if the physical grounds the mental, then this implies that there cannot be an explanatory gap between the physical and the mental. In this paper, I want to argue that the claim that grounding is an explanatory relation, and therefore, grounding is incompatible with an explanatory gap, is unmotivated.
12.45. Milena Ivanova (Munich)
*Poincaré’s Aesthetics of Science*
This paper offers the first systematic analysis of Poincaré’s understanding of beauty in science. In particular, the paper examines the epistemic significance Poincaré attributes to aesthetic judgement by reconstructing and analysing his arguments on simplicity and unity in science. I offer a consistent reconstruction of Poincaré’s account and argue that while Poincaré treats simplicity as a heuristic aid which leads to more unified theories, he takes unity to be a regulative ideal and the ultimate goal of science. In conclusion, I show how this argument offers new insights into resolving the debate concerning Poincaré’s alleged defence of selective scientific realism.

**Metaphysics III (Social Sciences S0.17)**

Sunday 11.15 – 13.15, chaired by Giulia Felappi (KCL)

11.15. Casey McCoy (San Diego)
*Metaphysics of Models and Scientific Epistemology*
It has been argued that the epistemological justification of metaphysics depends on conceiving the practice of metaphysics as modeling and on the methodological resources of science, in particular abductive reasoning. I raise an important unmet epistemological challenge to the aims of metaphysics—truth, fundamentality, and generality. In particular I claim that the appraisal of the (non-empirical) structure of metaphysical models cannot be inferred from its consistency with non-empirical structure present in scientific models, as only the empirical structure of such models can be justifiably inferred to refer veridically to the world. I suggest that there are two routes for the would be metaphysical modeler. If truth is to remain an important goal of metaphysics, some justifiable form of non-empirical confirmation must be brought forth in order for abductive reasoning to be applicable. The alternative is for metaphysicians to give up on the pursuit of distinctly metaphysical truths, perhaps in favor of the investigation of consistency between metaphysical models and (possible) scientific models.

12.15. Daniel Kodaj (Oxford)
*Masks, Subtotalities, and the Strict Conditional Analysis of Dispositions*
Subtotality states are states that exhaust the contents of a certain spatiotemporal region without exhausting the whole history of the world. The paper argues that admitting such states into ontology has important ramifications in the metaphysics of dispositions. Specifically, the traditional conditional analysis of dispositions in terms of subjunctive conditionals can be replaced by an analysis in terms of strict conditionals. The resulting theory is completely immune to masks and antidotes and promises to solve other stock puzzles for the conditional analysis of dispositions.

12.45. Michael Traynor (St. Andrews)
*Causal Independence and Near-indiscernibility in the Case against PII*
Cross (2009) identifies a gap in Adams’s (1979) argument from the possibility of almost-indiscernibles to the possibility of symmetrical universes, and attempts to bridge that gap by interpolating – or perhaps rather, making explicit – the
assumption that Adams’s almost-indiscernibles are enjoy a degree of causal independence. In what follows, I’ll argue that Cross’s proposal fails. Section 1 introduces Adams’s case, and the gap that Cross identifies. In Section 2, I’ll show that Cross’s proposal bridges the gap in Adams’s argument at the cost of making almost-indiscernibility – the most salient feature of Adams’s case – irrelevant to the argument; as such, Adams’s case is rendered ineffective for the purpose of convincing anyone apt to doubt the possibility of Black’s case. Then, in Section 3, I draw on a similar thought experiment, due to Leibniz, to help explain away the force with which Adams’s has led philosophers to the possibility of symmetrical universes.

12.45. Graeme A. Forbes (Kent)
Ground Rules for the Open Future
I distinguish between two senses in which the future is open – alethic openness and ontological openness. I show that they are logically independent. I argue that we have reason to be interested in ontological openness because it allows us to understand time as a change from propositions being indirectly grounded to being directly grounded.

Philosophy of Logic (Social Sciences S0.18)

Sunday 11.15 – 13.15, chaired by Corine Besson (Sussex)

11.15 Sergi Oms (Barcelona)
The Notion of Paradox
According to the traditional view a paradox is an apparently valid argument such that its premisses are apparently acceptable and its conclusion is apparently unacceptable. This paper wants to show that this definition is not even extensionally appropriate; it's too narrow. I will discuss two more proposals, (i) one based on the logical form of the paradoxes and (ii) another one based on the notion of not rationally supporting. I will show that both views fail to give an acceptable account of what a paradox is. Finally, I will present my characterization of the notion of a paradox, based on (ii), that I think is more adequate.

11.45. Demetra Christopoulou (Athens & Patras)
On Quine’s Wolf
This paper deals with Quine’s objection concerning the status of 2nd order logic as logic. Quine claimed that 2nd order logic is a wolf (set theory) in sheep’s clothing (logic) because it has strong ontological commitments to sets or properties. Some logicians have attempted to defend 2nd order logic against Quine. The paper takes under consideration three kinds of defense of 2nd order logic: Boolos’ attempt to translate it in 1st order plural logic, the ways some logicians try to neutralize the use of quantifiers and some attempts to determine the semantic role of predicates in an ontologically innocent manner. Then it suggests that predicates should be taken to connote functions from particulars to truth values. It claims that such functions are not necessarily mathematical notions so epistemic priority of 2nd order logic is not at risk. Then it defends the
view that the account of predicates in question offers an effective tool to defend 2nd order quantification against Quine’s worries.

12.15. Elisa Paganini (Milan)
Vague Objects within Classical Logic and Standard Mereology, and without Weatherson (2003) argues that whoever accepts classical logic, standard mereology and the difference between vague objects and any others, should conclude that there are no vague objects. Barnes and Williams (2009) claim that a supporter of vague objects who accepts classical logic and standard mereology should recognize that the existence of vague objects implies indeterminate identity. I contend that whoever maintains classical logic, standard mereology and the difference between vague objects and any others, is not forced to conclude with Weatherson that there are no vague objects; nor is she compelled to revise her point of view according to Barnes and Williams’s proposal and to accept that the existence of vague objects implies indeterminate identity.

12.45. Nikk Effingham (Birmingham)
The Grandfather Paradox
Ludovicianism about time travel is the view that logical space includes possible worlds at which time travel occurs but no worlds where we bring about a Grandfather Paradox. This paper argues that Ludovicianism is an odd approach to take to Paradoxes in general. It then argues that there are no motivations for it. In light of the oddness of the approach, and the lack of motivation, Ludovicianism has a problem that belies its popularity.

Open Sessions III (Sunday afternoon)

Emotions (Sciences B2.01)
Sunday 14.30 – 16.30, chaired by Lea Salje (UCL)

14.30. Bill Wringe (Bilkent)
Ambivalence for Cognitivists: A Lesson from Chrysippus?
The phenomenon of ambivalence – where we experience two conflicting emotional responses to the same object, person or state of affairs – has sometimes been thought to pose a problem for cognitive theories of emotion. I shall argue that a cognitivist can account for this phenomenon without retreating from the view that emotions involve fully-fledged evaluative judgments. To do so, I shall draw on the ideas of the Stoic Chrysippus. It is central to the Chrysippean account I offer that emotions involve two kinds of judgment: one about the object of emotion, and one about the subject’s response.

15.00. Mary Carman (Witwatersrand)
The Frightening’s not Always Fearful; or, an Examination of the Formal Object of Emotion
Part of our understanding of emotions as intentional states is that they are about particular objects at which they are targeted. It is generally accepted that it is in virtue of some formal object that the particular object is the object of the emotion it is. For instance, it is in virtue of being dangerous or frightening that a snake or an upcoming exam are both particular objects of my fear. Despite the centrality of the formal object in many accounts of emotion, there is not much clarity as to what the formal object is and what role it actually plays. In this paper, I defend one of the roles given to the formal object, that of individuating emotions. In doing so, I provide clarification of the formal object which can be used to examine its role in the intentionality of emotions. I end by briefly describing how my understanding of the formal object could contribute to debates about emotional justification of emotional judgements.

15.30. Matthew Bennet (Essex)  
*Guilt and the Limits of Responsibility in End-of-life Care*  
Many accounts of guilt have maintained that guilt is either always or paradigmatically felt about an immoral act or omission for which the bearer of guilt believes she is responsible. I will call this the responsibility principle. My aim is to recount a counterexample that undermines this principle, and to suggest an alternative account of that counterexample. Many family carers feel guilt when they believe they are no longer capable of sufficiently caring for a terminally-ill loved one. In such cases carers do not believe they are responsible for a wrongdoing, but nonetheless feel guilty. I will argue that the responsibility principle cannot accommodate carer guilt, and that carer guilt should instead be understood as emotional distress that accompanies the belief that what I ought to do is beyond the limits of what I can do.

16.00. Alexandria Boyle (Cambridge)  
*In Defence of Intentionalism about Moods*  
I argue that moods are intentional, and should be seen as modifications to existing intentional states, combined with dispositions to form new intentional states. Using this characterisation of moods, I defend weak intentionalism about moods – the thesis that the phenomenal character of moods supervenes on their intentional nature. I argue that this view is phenomenologically and empirically well supported, and defend it against objections made by Kind (2014). I argue that the denial of weak intentionalism is particularly implausible since it requires taking seriously the possibility of mood qualia inversion. As such, I conclude that weak intentionalism about moods is true.

**The Epistemology of Testimony (Sciences B2.02)**

Sunday 14.30 – 16.30 chaired by Ed Nettel (UCL)

14.30. Stephen Wright (Oxford)  
*Circular Testimony*  
According to internalist theories of testimony, beliefs based on testimony are justified by the reasons a listener uses to rationalise her belief in what the speaker says. In this paper, I identify a distinctive type of testimonial situation,
which I call circular testimony and argue that the possibility of circular testimony establishes the incompleteness of internalist theories of testimony.

15.00. Dan O’Brien (Oxford Brookes)
*More Testimony and Lies*

In ‘Testimony and Lies’ (2007) I argue that lies can be used to pass on knowledge. I focus upon cases that involve a speaker’s devious manipulation of another’s irrational or prejudiced thought. I now call these cases of “engineered knowledge”. Aware of Othello’s pathological jealousy, Iago lies to him that he has seen Cassio wiping his face with a handkerchief in order that Othello comes to know that Desdesmona’s handkerchief is missing. Here I shall revisit engineered knowledge and consider how it relates to issues concerning the epistemic basing relation and safety.

15.30. Kenneth Boyd (Dalhousie)
*Testifying Understanding*

While it is widely accepted that knowledge can be transmitted from speaker to hearer via testimony, it has been argued that understanding cannot be transmitted via testimony. This is because understanding requires a kind of “grasping” that it necessarily internal and effortful. I argue here that there are kinds of understanding that can be transmitted through testimony: easy understanding (e.g. understanding simple and mundane information) and understanding that is easy for someone (e.g. understanding information that is in one’s area of expertise). In both of these cases one can exercise the required “grasping” at the level of information processing instead of the level of inference. As a result, while difficult understanding cannot, perhaps, be transmitted through testimony, this failure of transmission is only a product of the complexity of information or one’s unfamiliarity with it, and not a product of the epistemic relationship of understanding.

16.00. Brent Madison (UAE)
*Internalism in the Epistemology of Testimony Redux*

In general, epistemic internalists hold that an individual’s justification for a belief depends upon her reflectively accessible reasons for thinking that the belief is true. Applying this to the epistemology of testimony, a hearer’s justification for beliefs acquired through testimony depends upon reflectively accessible reasons to think that the speaker’s testimony is true. A consequence of internalism is that subjects that are alike with respect to their reflectively accessible reasons are alike with respect to what they have justification to believe. Testimony should be thought no different: hearers that are alike with respect to reflectively accessible reasons to think that a speaker’s testimony is true are alike with respect to their justification for beliefs based upon that testimony. But it has been recently argued that this view faces powerful counterexamples (Wright, 2015).

So the central question is this: assuming that a hearer can acquire justification to believe a proposition through the testimony of a speaker, can epistemic internalism provide the resources to explain how such justification is possible? My aim in this paper is to address these counterexamples, and in so doing, defend epistemic internalist accounts of testimony.
Philosophy of Psychology (Sciences B2.04/05)

Sunday 14.30 – 16.00, chaired by Christoph Hoerl (Warwick)

14.30. Jan Westerhoff (Oxford)
*The Bayesian Brain and the Veil of Perception*
Recent research (Friston, Hohwy) has developed the idea of considering the
brain as a device for prediction error minimization, arguing that its primary
function is to minimize the discrepancy between the sensory input predicted on
the basis of the world model the brain has generated and the sensory input it in
fact receives. This approach then attempts to explain key functions of the brain,
such as perception, action, and attention in terms of prediction error
minimization. A concept central to this theory is that of a virtual model produced
by the brain in which all our cognitive life takes place. In this paper I examine
some rather unintuitive consequences of the idea of living in a virtual model and
discuss whether they are sufficiently problematic to reject the notion of such a
model altogether.

15.00. Markus Schlosser (UC Dublin)
*Embodied Cognition and Temporally Extended Agency*
According to radical versions of embodied and enactive approaches in cognitive
science, human cognition and agency can be explained without the ascription of
representational mental states. According to a standard reply, embodied and
enactive accounts can explain at best instances of cognition and agency that
are not “representation-hungry”. The two main types of such representation-
hungry phenomena that have been discussed are reasoning about the absent
and the abstract. Proponents of the embodied and enactive approach argue
that their views can account for those phenomena, opponents deny this. I will
suggest, here, that there is another representation-hungry phenomenon that
has been overlooked or neglected: temporally extended planning agency. Even
if we assume that guidance by the absent and the abstract can be explained by
embodied and enactive accounts, it remains, as I will argue, very difficult to see
how such views could possibly explain temporally extended planning agency.
Further, I will suggest that this raises a serious challenge for more modest
versions of the embodied and enactive approach as well.

15.30. Toni Gomila (Balearic Islands)
*False Belief Attribution in Infants? An Account from the Second Person*
The last decade has seen a wealth of new experiments claimed to show false
belief ascription in infants, but we want to propose a revised interpretation of the
evidence. First, we will argue that some of the experimental paradigms reveal
dynamical patterns of sensory-motor integration. Second, we will discuss the
dominant, empiricist and nativist strategies to deal with the evidence. Third, we
will argue that this evidence is congruent with an interactivist account of mental
state ascription, which proposes that mental attribution starts in ontogeny from a
second-person perspective. From this point of view, what is interpreted as false
belief attribution turns out to be a case of epistemic tracking, which neither
requires attribution of full-blown propositional contents, nor a representational
conception of beliefs as internal states. Finally, we will point out why false belief
reasoning, understood as propositional attitude attribution, appears in the third year of life.

16.00. Frank Esken (University of Salzburg)
*Teleological Reasoning vs Mentalizing in Children’s Theory of Mind*

A dominant view on understanding intentional actions is based on the assumption that our naive psychology for predicting and explaining behaviour is based on mind reading abilities (theory of mind). In my talk I will distinguish between objective and subjective reasons for intentional actions (and in this follow e.g. Perner & Roessler 2010) and argue that to understand something about reasons on a very basic level, i.e. to understand that sentient beings act for reasons, I don’t need to take into account unobservable “internal” mental states. To understand for example that someone is trying to reach the bus, I only need to understand what the goal of his behaviour is—his goal is to catch the (publicly perceivable) bus—and what is appropriate to do in his situation to reach this goal; I don’t have to understand anything about his subjective reasons as given by the contents of his mental states. I argue that failure to distinguish objective from subjective reasons leads to an over-intellectualization of our everyday explanations of others’ actions and of young children’s mindreading abilities when we ascribe basic forms of understanding intentional actions to them.

**Knowledge and Action (Social Sciences 50.08)**

Sunday 14.30 – 16.30, chaired by Lucy O’Brien (UCL)

14.30. Robin McKenna (Vienna)
*Assertion, Action and Context*

A common objection to both contextualism and relativism about knowledge ascriptions is that they threaten knowledge norms of assertion and action. Consequently, if there is good reason to accept knowledge norms of assertion or action, there is good reason to reject both contextualism and relativism. In this paper we argue that neither contextualism nor relativism threaten knowledge norms of assertion or action.

15.00. Jacques-Henri Vollet (Geneva)
*Acting on Knowledge and Familiar Contexts*

Here are two plausible claims about knowledge. 1) Whether a subject knows that p does not depend on the importance of being right on p. 2) It is rationally permissible to act on what one knows. If these claims are true, then it is rationally permissible to act on what one knows not matter the stakes on being right. Some philosophers have put forth pairs of cases that seem to contradict this conclusion. In some low stakes cases, a subject seems to know that p and is rational act on p, whereas in the high stakes version of the case, it seems that the subject should act as if not p and take the _safe_ option. I will argue that one can account for these cases while maintaining the idea that the subject does know p in the high stakes case and that it is rational for him to act on p. What explains that the subject should avoid the risky option is that this option involves an unfamiliar context, and in this type of context it is rational for the
subject to doubt what he should do. Therefore, the subject has a strong reason to avoid this situation.

15.30. Joshua Habgood-Coote (St. Andrews)
*The Generality Problem for Intellectualism*

Intellectualists claim that knowing how to do something is a species of propositional knowledge. The most popular version of this theory, which has its origin in Stanley and Williamson’s 2001 article, claims that for S to know how to V just for S to know that some way w is a way in which she herself can V. In this paper, I show that the appeal to ways of acting in this account gives rise to a Generality problem, analogous to Reliabilist accounts of justification or knowledge. I begin by sketching the structure of a generality problem by considering the generality problem for Reliabilism. I go on to show that Stanley and Williamson’s Intellectualism – together with some plausible assumptions about the nature of ways of acting – provides us with all the ingredients for a Generality problem. In the final section I consider some responses to this problem, and argue that none are satisfactory.

16.00. Rachel Elizabeth Fraser (Oxford)
*Practical Adequacy and Transformative Experience*

The apparatus provided by decision theory can look to provide a useful tool for epistemologists seeking to precisify the ideology used in accounts of pragmatic encroachment. But availing oneself of such apparatus comes with risks. Prospects for one’s account of knowledge become beholden to the question of how to solve abstruse puzzles such as those posed by the Pasadena Game in formal epistemology (Hajek and Nover, 2004). Paul has recently argued that similar problems are posed for decision theory by the more quotidian phenomenon of transformative experiences such as (she claims) having children (Paul, 2014). I trace the implications of these puzzles in normative decision theory for the ideology of pragmatic encroachment.

**Virtues (Social Sciences S0.09)**

Sunday 14.30 – 16.30, chaired by Johannes Roessler (Warwick)

14.30. Kei Udone (Reading)
*Agency, Virtue and Reliability in Hume’s Epistemology*

This paper presents an interpretation of Hume’s externalist epistemology as emphasising “epistemic virtues”: intellectual character traits of a person, such as “sagacity.” There are many versions of the externalist interpretation of Hume’s epistemology. Helen Beebee (2006) suggests that Hume’s position is a form of “process reliabilism,” according to which, knowledge is true belief produced by reliable cognitive processes. However, the sorts of processes regarded as reliable are largely mechanistic or impersonal. I argue that the process-reliabilist interpretation neglects Hume’s virtue-theoretic approach to knowledge, an approach that places considerable emphasis on intellectual virtues. Beebee’s interpretation is that the principle of “custom” is a reliable cognitive mechanism that constantly yields true beliefs provided that it functions...
properly. In contrast with this view, I propose the interpretation that custom provides justification, or positive epistemic status, of one’s belief only if it is construed as acquired “coping skills” individuated by one’s environment.

15.00. Robert Lockie (West London)
*Mixed Virtue Epistemology and the Problem of Fundamental Axiological Disunity*
A basic question for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’ – a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism. Virtues approaches so-conceived (‘mixed’ virtue theories) are opposed; while virtues approaches conceived otherwise (strong virtues responsibilism, strong virtues reliabilism) are argued to offer us no advance on internalism and externalism respectively. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology are specifically opposed.

15.30. Ian Church (St Louis)
*Intellectual Humility: What You Ignorant Halfwits Need to Know*
Intellectual humility has become an increasingly important and vibrant area of philosophical and scientific research. As such, understanding what intellectual humility is has becoming increasingly important. In this paper, I suggest that it is the virtue of accurately tracking what one could non-culpably take to be the positive epistemic status of one’s own beliefs. I argued that the seminal account of intellectual humility—the Roberts and Wood account—faces some serious worries, and I (humbly) suggested that perhaps my own account might serve as a better starting place for understanding this virtue. While recent empirical research suggest that intellectual humility might be a multifaceted and multi-layered virtue—with moral dimensions, interpersonal dimensions, intrapersonal dimensions, etc.—I will be exploring a fundamentally doxastic account of intellectual humility. Whatever social or moral dimensions the virtue of intellectual humility might have, I will (humbly) suggest that it needs to be built upon or understood within this basic, doxastic account.

16.00. Matthew Dennis (Warwick)
*Nietzsche on Virtue: A Historical Clue to Four Substantive Puzzles*
After surveying how contemporary virtue ethicists have striven to make sense of Nietzsche’s position on virtue, this paper proposes that we can make significant steps towards solving the puzzles they encounter by understanding virtue as ‘empowering activity’. Furthermore, I will show that Nietzsche found precedent for such a conception of virtue in Spinoza, as is attested to in several Nachlass notes in the late 1880s on this theme. I will also explore how Spinoza’s more systematic account of how virtue is connected with power can shed light on how Nietzsche views this connection, while exploring how both thinkers differ strikingly in what they view constitutes an empowering activity.

**Ethics II (Social Sciences S0.10)**

Sunday 14.30 – 16.30, chaired by Sara Protasi (Yale/ Puget Sound)
14.30. Sophie-Grace Chappell (Open University)

*Moral Education in the Protagoras*

Plato's Protagoras is an aporetic dialogue. It poses a dilemma between two alternatives, Protagoras' inarticulate humanism, and Socrates' articulate but ultimately inhumane view. Protagoras is the spokesman for a tradition of humane classical education who cannot make the benefits of that education entirely clear to a sceptical and rationalist critic like Socrates. Socrates presses Protagoras to defend his views from the ground up; but Protagoras' mode of rationality is too embedded and embodied in a particular form of life for that foundationalist project to be even intelligible to him. Plato's own views are only implicit in the Protagoras, but a number of pointers suggest that he himself is doing no more than exploring these two alternatives, and that ultimately he finds both unacceptable.

15.00. Kazutaka Inamura (Hirosaki)

* Aristotle's Methods of Ethics*

This paper considers how Aristotle develops his methods of ethics from the Eudemian Ethics [EE] to the Nicomachean Ethics [NE]. Although recent studies doubt the use of dialectics for formulating the first principles of ethics especially in NE, the present paper argues that he offers another type of argument that refers to what is more accessible to our perceptive faculty in order to formulate the more abstract concept of ethical values. The paper also points out an important difference concerning the formulation of argument by showing that EE makes inductive arguments for clarifying ethical concepts while NE draws analogies between ethical concepts and other objects. The paper then concludes that the NE's analogical arguments are more developed and appropriate for ethical enquiry than are the EE's inductive ones.

15.30. Alice Pnheir Walla (Cork)

*Kant's Anti-Eudaimonism as an Error Theory of Moral Motivation*

Kant's criticism of heteronomous theories is part of a central task of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. Only a moral theory which does not presuppose any material incentives for its normative force, that is, which relies on a purely formal principle, can account for the unconditional character of morality. In this paper I explore the distinction between heteronomy and eudaimonism and argue that Kant provides an error theory of eudaimonist theories: while conscientious moral agents must regard themselves as acting from the motive of duty, eudaimonist theories lead them to believe that the selfcontentment they experience as a result from their compliance with duty is the real motive of their conduct. Eudaimonism is therefore a theory about moral motivation, while heteronomy refers specifically to the metaethical question of the normative source of morality.

16.00. Jennifer Lockhart (Auburn)

*What is Kant's Antinomy of Practical Reason?*

In this paper I consider Kant's antinomy of practical reason—his claim that practical reason's deployment of the concept of the highest good leads to an apparent "conflict of reason with itself" (226, 5:107). I argue that one standard understanding of the antinomy is unsatisfying because the "conflict" of reason
can be resolved in a straightforward way. I propose a second interpretation of the antimony that presents the apparent conflict of reason as considerably less tractable.

Values and Attitudes (Social Sciences S0.13)

Sunday 14.30 – 16.30, chaired by Naomi Eilan (Warwick)

14.30. Garret Cullity (Adelaide)
*Reason and Fit*
According to the “fitting response” tradition of thinking about value, good things are those that are fit for favourable responses and bad things those that are fit for unfavourable ones. We can also have reasons to make favourable or unfavourable responses. What, then, is the relation between reasons and fit? One answer is: identity. But that answer faces several problems, including the “wrong kind of reasons” problem. We can avoid those problems by distinguishing the fitness- and reasons-relations. But it seems unsatisfactory simply to treat these as two separate primitives. This paper explores the prospects for treating fitness relations as more primitive than normative reasons, and explaining the latter in terms of the former.

15.00. Christos Kyriacou (Cyprus)
*Understanding how Open Question Arguments Operate*
In spite of the general consensus about the importance of Moorean open question arguments’ (OQA), no one has so far provided any linguistic explanation *how* exactly competent speakers of English (and other natural languages) come to have these powerful ‘open feel’ semantic intuitions that render the argument prima facie compelling.
In this paper I sketch a psycholinguistic explanation of what renders Moore-style OQAs so intuitive both to many seasoned metanormativists and philosophical neophytes that addresses what I call ‘the question of semantic origin’ and ‘the question of semantic universality’. The psycholinguistic explanation unfolds in five cautious steps and is a functional-phenomenological explanation. That is, functional because it explains from the third-person, objective behavioural perspective how the OQA *operates* and phenomenological because it explains from the first-person, subjective qualitative perspective how the operation of the OQA *feels* for the speaker.

15.30. Hasko von Kriegstein (Toronto)
*Pro-attitudes and Well-being*
This paper suggests a novel way of capturing the thought (associated with subjectivism about well-being) that our lives go better for us when the objects of our pro-attitudes obtain. This Subjectivist Thesis (ST) is widely accepted. It is also widely acknowledged that there are a number of ways in which ST needs to be restricted. The view put forward in this paper is that the obtaining of the object of a pro-attitude makes its subject better off to the degree to which said pro-attitude involves either hedonic tone or conative commitment. It is shown that this view elegantly accounts for the restrictions needed to make ST plausible.
16.00. Yonatan Shemmer (Sheffield)
*Expressivism and Fundamental Normative Disagreement*

In this paper I argue against two expressivist accounts of normative disagreement and offer an alternative account. I explain the desiderata for an account of normative disagreement and argue that both Gibbard and Ridge's accounts fail to satisfy these desiderata. I then trace the problem with both of their accounts to the attempt to analyse judgements about disagreement as descriptive judgments. I argue that the best hope for a successful expressivist account of normative disagreement involves understanding judgements about disagreements as normative judgements. In other words, the best hope for an expressivist account of disagreement is to see claims about normative disagreement not only as descriptions of the relation between the non-cognitive attitudes of those who disagree but rather, also, as expressions of approval of an effort of the two parties to re-evaluate their normative attitudes.

**Semantics (Social Sciences S0.17)**

Sunday 14.30 – 16.30, chaired by Corine Besson (Sussex)

14.30. Giulia Felappi (KCL)
*‘That’-clauses and the Argument from Identity*

Complement clauses introduced by a ‘that’, which typically occur in sentences like Olga believes that Cicero is smart It is true that Cicero is smart, are usually called ‘that’-clauses. It is no exaggeration to say that for the past two thousand years in philosophy (Boh 1993) we almost all took for granted (TT) ‘that’-clauses are singular terms. There is no uncontroversial definition of singular term, but for our purposes an intuitive grasp of the notion should suffice: singular terms are, roughly, those syntactic units that purport to denote one thing. TT is taken to be the face-value theory (Salmon 1983; Schiffer 2003): arguably, in That Cicero is smart is certain, the ‘that’-clause arguably seems to denote the object to which the predicate is applied. In this paper, I will deal with what I take to be both the most neglected and the strongest reason to reject TT, which is the datum that ‘that’-clauses do not behave like singular terms in identity statements. I will present an argument to the effect that ‘that’-clauses are not singular terms and I will show that none of the possible attempts at resisting it seems promising.

15.00. Nicholas Shackel (Cardiff)
*Scope or Focus*

A standard way to express a norm is as a normatively modal conditional. The problems that arise from this have been widely discussed in terms of the scope of the modal operator. In this paper I contend that speaking of scope fails to address the underlying feature of interest adequately. It addresses the issue only indirectly by talking about syntax and captures only the extent to which the feature of interest determines valid and invalid inferences. I propose that we need to speak of normative focus: a feature of the normative relation itself. Normative focus is itself a formal feature and it is for that reason that, expressing something of its nature in terms of the logic of modal operators, we
have mistakenly thought it can be entirely expressed in those terms. It cannot be so expressed because it is something more fine-grained and richer than can be expressed by the logic of modal operators; indeed, it is that greater complexity that explains the failures of scope I demonstrate. So, I recommend that rather than continuing the attempt to countenance the issues of interest primarily in terms of scope we should speak in terms of the focus of normative relations.

15.30. Rachel Katharine Sterken (Oslo)
*Generics, Kind-predication and Context*

This paper presents evidence that generics are context-sensitive and argues that the context-sensitivity displayed by generics is incompatible with a certain thesis about their logical forms—namely, that they are kind-predications (cf. Liebesman (2011) Koslilcki (1999), Carlson (1977), Cohen (2012)). The paper contends that a kind-predication analysis is incompatible with context-sensitivity. Thus, given that there is strong evidence that generics are context-sensitive, there is good reason to reject a kind-predication analysis of generics.

16.00. Gabriel Oak Rabin (NYU Abu Dhabi)
*The Meta-semantic Dilemma for Two-dimensional Semantics*

I argue that Two-Dimensional Semantics, as developed in Chalmers [2006b,a], Jackson [1998, 2010] founders on a dilemma. The theory claims that, when evaluated at the actual world, primary/Aintensions coincide with secondary/C-intensions (the coincidence thesis). It also claims that primary/A-intensions are narrow contents (the narrow content thesis). Both claims cannot be true. If primary/Aintensions coincide with secondary/C-intensions, then primary/A-intensions must be meta-linguistic. If they are meta-linguistic, they are not fit to play the role of narrow content. Two-Dimensional Semanticists must give up one of these two foundational theses.

**Philosophy of Mathematics (Social Sciences S0.18)**

Sunday 14.30 – 16.00, chaired by Josephine Salverda (UCL)

14.30. Graham White (Queen Mary)
*Mathematical Practice and the Metaphysics of Mathematics*

We start with Wright (1983, pp. 29f.), who remarks that Frege’s reduction of directions to sets of parallel lines is based on a bi-equivalence, which Frege chooses to orient in one way rather than another. We argue that this point can be applied more generally in the philosophy of mathematics, in particular to the question of structuralism, and that philosophical positions on structuralism can be classified according to the way they orient the biequivalence that two mathematical objects are isomorphic iff they have the same structure. We consider, as an example, Joyal’s theory of combinatorial species, and show how this amounts to a reorientation of the structuralist biequivalence: we then conclude with some remarks on the metaphysical import of this analysis.

15.00. Alexander Paseau
*What was a Matrix? A Structuralist Look at 19th-century Algebra*
Matrices were first introduced in mathematics in the 19th century. 19th-century mathematicians' definition of a matrix had a geometric component, a component which remains part of today's elementary conception of a matrix. And yet the most plausible candidates for playing the role of a matrix are not geometric entities. Are we to conclude that matrices thus conceived do not exist? As a consequence, did 19th-century discussion of matrices suffer from referential failure? My aim in this talk is to answer these questions and to draw some morals about how to interpret past mathematics from this historical case study.

15.30. Monica Ugaglia (Pisa)
Existence and Conceivability in Aristotle: Are Straight Lines Infinitely Extendible?
At the end of Ph. III 7 Aristotle claims that not only physicists but also mathematicians will not be penalized by his own extremely reductive conception of the infinite. Such a conception implies, in particular, that the actual infinite does not exist, in any form, and that the potential infinite exists only in relation to processes that tend to a finite limit. Translated into crude mathematical terms, this means that in Aristotle's system there are neither actually infinite straight lines, nor finite lines that are infinitely extendible. How can nonetheless the mathematician operate in such an inhospitable world? The answer lies in the availability of the procedure of infinite "converse increasing" (στρομμένη πρόσθεσις), as Aristotle calls it.
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Rosemary Crawley  Cambridge University Press
Sam Clarke University of Warwick
Sameer Bajaj University of Arizona
Sandy Berkovski Bilkent University
Sandy Goldberg Northwestern University
Sara Protasi Yale University/University of Puget Sound
Sarah Campbell Rowman & Littlefield
Sarah Sawyer University of Sussex
Sarah Scutts Oxford University Press
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