*Chapter 5. An Introspective Argument for Others’ Minds[[1]](#footnote-1).*

In this chapter, I want to consider the relation between the materials that we have gathered together so far to traditional philosophical problems of others’ minds.

Scepticism about others’ minds is a particularly nightmarish *cul de sac* for philosophical reflection to take us. It is profoundly disturbing to worry that one’s kitchen table is a figment of one’s imagination, but it is heart wrenchingly horrific to entertain the thought that one’s family could be. Nothing seems more fundamental to our sense of living meaningful and good lives than that we live meaningful and good lives with others. That we are not alone, in general, matters us more than anything else matters to us. The sceptic invites us to worry that our acceptance that we live our lives along with others is unfounded, and inexplicable.

Anil Gomes, in his recent discussion of others’ minds, helpfully sets out the distinction between two distinct ways that the sceptic might motivate their scepticism.[[2]](#footnote-2) The first is to raise a worry about the possibility of error, and the second is to raise a worry concerning sources of knowledge. He argues that it is the latter worry that is particularly troubling. I agree. Raising the possibility of error as part of a sceptical challenge that has to some extent been contained by moves in epistemology that make room for error and illusion alongside knowledge within a given domain. Knowledge does not imply psychological certainty. Knowledge does not imply knowledge that one knows. Bad cases can be disjoined from good cases. Not all possibilities are relevant to whether or not I know. The argument from illusion is far from a slam dunk. The fact that it is logically possible that my two children be replaced by sophisticated cybernauts does not undermine my ability to know that they are sad or convinced, as I talk to them, now. It is when we turn to the question “how do we know?” that one starts to get a bit queasy, and the sense that we may not know at all creeps back in.

Things come to seem very puzzling if we cannot say what the candidate sources of our knowledge that others’ minds are. Even if we were to accept that we do know that others’ minds exist, and can know what other’s are thinking, we might still worry that none of the sources at hand are plausibly seen as sources of that knowledge, and that is disturbing enough. It can make us feel that we know, magically, on the basis of nothing. So, we need to distinguish the ‘do we know?’ question from the ‘how do we know?’ question. In the case of other minds there are two further questions that are less often distinguished, but which it is also important to distinguish. There are what we can call the *existence questions*: do we know that there are others that are minded at all – and if so, how? In many cases our knowledge of another’s mind may be minimal – not going much beyond the knowledge that they have one. But there are also what we can call the *what are they thinking questions*: can we know what mental states and occurrences are taking place constitute the mental life of another, and if so, how? I may know others have minds, but do I ever know what constitute their mental lives? And if I do, how do I know?[[3]](#footnote-3)

Duddington makes this distinction in her, until recently neglected, discussion of other minds:

The recognition of the existence of another mental life could be expressed by the judgment, “This is a living being”…But even in mature experience our direct acquaintance with other minds is often limited to the bare recognition of their existence. We immediately perceive the presence of a mind, but we often fail to discern anything further with regard to it; we are directly aware that the fellow creatures we meet in the street are human beings and not walking mannekins, but we hardly see more than this.

She thinks that that we come to know the answer to the first, existence, question directly, and very early on in our development, by being presented with animated bodies that already reveal the existence of a mental life in other human beings – in contrast to inanimate objects:

We do not first know bodies and then infer that they are animated bodies; the presence of mental life is revealed to us along with the qualities of shape, colour, movement, and so on that characterise the body. This does not imply anything so absurd as the assertion that a six-months-old baby knows its mother's mind as distinct from her body; but it does imply that in so far as it is aware of its mother at all, it is aware of her as qualitatively different from the perambulator she is pushing.

The work of answering the second question – the work of knowing what people are feeling and thinking, she thinks requires discrimination and discernment. Whether we agree with Duddington or not about what is needed to answer these questions the distinction between them will prove helpful.

The problem of other minds is usually set up by means of a contrast between our own case and the case of others. Our own minds are immediately known to us through introspection. Others’ minds may be similarly known to them through introspection – but we cannot know in the same way what is going on in their minds.

To introspect is to attend to the workings of one’s own mind… No-one can directly observe what is passing in the mind of another. [Stout 1898, p.14, p.20]

Introspection, it is implied, is an excellent – immediate and direct – source of knowledge of mental facts, of mindedness. But it can give us knowledge only of *my* mentality. If we are to leverage introspection as a source of knowledge of others’ minds we are going to have to find a lever. The lever, notoriously, is usually supposed to be some form of inference by best explanation – by way of an analogy or not. Mill asks:

By what evidence do I know, or by what considerations am I led to believe… that the walking and speaking figures which I see and hear, have sensations and thoughts, or in other words, possess Minds? (1865 [1872: 243])

His answer is that as they have bodies like mine, that exhibit ‘acts, and outwards signs’ that ‘in my own case I know to be caused by feelings’. We know, in our own case, that feelings cause acts and outward signs, and by inference we can reasonably suppose that what is the case for us is the case for others.

The contemporary search for sources of knowledge of others’ minds has tended to assume that we should leave introspection behind, and conclude that it is not in the end a helpful or relevant source of others’ minds. The current trend is to turn to perception as a means of either directly, or indirectly, providing us with knowledge of “what is passing in the mind of another”. A number of philosophers have sought to challenge the contrast between the first person and third person case, and Stout’s assumption that “no-one can directly observe” what is going on in the minds of others, They argue that we see others’ minds in our seeing of their expressions in human behaviour. Such an appeal to perception as a source of knowledge of others’ mind can come as part of a strategy of showing that we have multiple sources of such knowledge: perceptions, inference, even testimony. Or it can come as part of a strategy of privileging our perceptions of others. However, both strategies – the multiple sources strategy and the direct perception strategy – displace the importance of introspection as a source of our knowledge of other minds.

The aim of this chapter is to re-institute the importance of introspective resources, albeit of a particular kind, as a source of knowledge of others’ minds. I will argue that it is in exploiting a relation that a subject stands into to themselves that a subject can – if they need to – both assure themselves of the existence of others, and that they have a way of knowing that others are minded.

Let us take epistemological scepticism about others’ minds to procced from what we can call Gomes’ antinomy, which he sets out as follows:

(S1): If you know that *p*, then there is a means by which you know that *p*.

(S2): There is no means by which one can know truths about another’s mind.

(S3): We know truths about another’s mind.

There is room to dispute (S1) in its full generality. There may be instances of *p* which must be presupposed, or instances which are ‘hinge’ propositions for which any question of means does not arise. Or one might also read ‘means by which you know’ to imply a kind of self-conscious reasoning on the part of the knowing subject that is not always necessary. We might read there being a ‘means by which you know’ in such a way that if you know *p*, by means of perceiving *p*, say, then your perceiving of *p*, is *deployed* by you as your means for knowing *p*. And we might deny that perception always functions as a source of knowledge in that way – perceiving *p* may seem to entitle a subject to her belief that *p* in a way that secures knowledge without her deploying any means to know – she knows rather by being suitably receptive. We might also claim that the means by which you know *p*, can constitute rather than ground your knowledge that *p*: the claim that you know *p* by perceiving that *p* allows that your perceiving that *p* is your

knowledge that *p*. I will assume that (S1) should be read minimally, so that ‘means by which you know’ invokes no more than the idea of there being an epistemic basis to what we know when know, and will accept it.[[4]](#footnote-4)

(S2) has provided the main arena for investigation. The investigations in this area have been fruitful. In particular, there has been significant pressure put on the inherited idea that we do not, as Stout would have it, observe what is passing in the mind of another. Much of that work has concentrated on observable expressions of emotion, with a number of philosophers arguing that we *do* perceive the minds of others – their pain and their anger – in perceiving the expressions of their emotion in their bodies and faces.[[5]](#footnote-5) They claim that, as McDowell puts it ‘one can literally perceive, in another person’s facial expression or his behaviour, that he is in pain’ (1978, p. 305).

More recently Parrott has argued that things are not quite as simple as this, and that our knowledge what others are thinking and feeling, depends on a combination of perception and inference. Mental states, he argues, do not have the kind of looks available to us in vision. Only the *expressions* of our thoughts and feelings have the kind of appearance that mean that we can see them directly, and such expressions of our thoughts and feelings are ‘existentially distinct’ from the thoughts and feelings they express. However, despite their distinctness, the expressions of the mental state do constitutively depend on the mental state itself. This dependence allows us – in the absence of being able to see the mental state itself – nevertheless to infer knowledge of the mental state from our direct knowledge of the expressions that depend upon it. We do not, on Parrot’s view, see others’ anger or sadness; rather, what we see is their expressions of their anger or sadness. If we see their popping eyes, or lowered lids, we see the expressions of their anger or sadness, and thereby come to know they are expressing anger or sadness. And if we know that someone is expressing anger or sadness, we are able to come to know that they are sad or angry. But “since, on this picture, our knowledge of the person’s mental state would be based on knowledge of a distinct fact, [the fact that they are expressing such a mental state] it would be inferential.” The source of our knowledge of their anger or sadness, then is our knowledge of those expressions of anger and sadness, along with the inference that she is angry given that she is expressing anger.

Another epistemologically very straightforward, but metaphysically contentious, way of securing direct knowledge of others’ minds is to argue that we see – and indeed hear and feel – others’ actions, and that actions are mental events. My view is that actions are indeed both psychological or ‘minded’ events, and are seen, heard and felt. First, actions are no less basic psychological phenomena than the ‘thoughts and feelings’ that tend to be referred to when we ask how we know of others’ minds.[[6]](#footnote-6) A goal directed action is an event taking place in the life a human mind. Therefore, if we directly perceive such actions we directly perceive minds in action.[[7]](#footnote-7) Second, we do perceive actions – most of the visible movements of a human animal are actions. I take the human animal’s capacity for controlled self-movement to be exercised in occurrences perceivable by their conspecifics, and other animals.

However, this is not the strategy for overcoming our sense that we do not have access to other minds that I want in the end to explore here. It will not be my primary focus for two reasons. First, because, as we will see, our philosophical anxiety about how we know the mindedness of others is, I suggest, rooted in a way of thinking about our relation to ourselves and others that survives the claim that in seeing actions we see mental events in the life a person. Second, because the claim that in seeing actions we see mental events in the life a person relies on a highly contentious combination of views in the metaphysics of action that I do not intend to argue for here. Others think that observable actions are not themselves mental events – but are rather expressions of mental events such as decisions or intentions – and thus that you do not see a mental state or event in seeing an action, but only a bodily expression of it. This position leaves room for a view, like Parrot’s, on which we know others’ minds by combining direct of perception of an expression of a mental state, with inference. A related view will take the actions we see not to be expressions of decisions and intentions – with the tight ontological dependencies such a relation implies – but only the causal results of decisions and intentions. This still leaves room for a view on which we know others’ minds by combining direct of perception of an action, understood as an effect, with an inference as to its cause. Or perhaps by formulating views of ‘indirect perception’ based on causal regularities. Yet others agree that actions are themselves mental events, but disagree that they are the observable animal movements we usually take them to be. What we see when we see animal human movements are the upshots of actions: the action is a not directly perceivable cause, or causing, of the human movements. This position again leaves room for a view on which we know others’ minds by combining direct of perception of the upshot of a mental phenomenon, with an inference to the presence of the mental phenomenon. If they are wrong, and my claims about the metaphysics of actions, and their perceivability, are defensible, then there is available to us a very simple account of the source of much our knowledge about truths that are truths concerning others’ minds. If the relevant truths of another’s mind can be that they are reaching for an apple, are eating it, are spitting out the core, and are now washing their hands, then my source of my knowledge that they are doing these things is that I can see them doing them.

Such a view of actions, if justified, would seem to meet the demands of what we called *existence questions*: do we know that there are others that are minded at all, and if so, how? If many observable human movements are observable as actions, and if actions are mental events, then we do know that others are minded, and we know through seeing them act.[[8]](#footnote-8) It might, at first seem that appeal to observation of another actions will answer the existence question but not the ‘what are they thinking’ question. It might seem that we know what they are doing but not what they are thinking and feeling about what they are doing. However, it is just not true to say that this kind of answer doesn’t provide answers to the *what are they thinking questions* as we unpacked them. If actions are indeed mental occurrences taking place in the mental life of another then, in knowing what they are doing, I do know what they are thinking, in that broad sense. Their actions may also be their thinking.[[9]](#footnote-9)

Suppose, however, that truths about bodily action were the only the truths of anothers’ mind that we could make sense of knowing. This would mean that the only ways we could answer the *what are they thinking questions* would be by answering a subset of ‘what are they overtly doing’ questions. Would this take us far enough from the unsettling anxiety we started with? Whatever we seek, in making sense of our relations to others, this does not seem to provide it. We want not only to know that, and in what way, others overt activities are minded activities, but also that, and in what way, these overt activities relate to a covert mental life in the way that we know that ours do.

Perhaps, we need not worry – perhaps if we were to have direct knowledge of others’ minds in knowing their actions we would have a rich enough resource to draw on to work out the rest of their more covert mentality. Suppose we are warranted in relying on our knowledge of the other’s actions – including the rich source of knowledge we get from the speech acts of others – not as indirect evidence of there being a mental life, but as direct evidence of events in the mental life of the subject. This might give us a decent basis from which to come to know by inference what they are thinking in more covert ways. Of course, we would have to have reason to think that the actions of the other were ontologically related, in some suitable way, to their more covert mental activity if our knowledge of their actions were to give us knowledge of their mental lives more generally. However, if, say, someone’s reaching for an apple was an expression of their wanting the apple, then in seeing someone reach for the apple, I might be able to come to know that they want the apple.

Of course, we could also combine this explanation centred around our knowledge of our actions, along with an explanation like Parrott’s of our capacity to know other’s emotional states – even though they are not directly observable – through knowing their expressions, or other forms of constitutive, manifestation. We would then be in a position to offer something like the following fuller answer to the question what of what means we have for knowing others’ minds.

1. We can know other’s mental lives as long as the mental phenomenon known is observable, or its manifestation, is observable.
2. There are observable mental phenomenon – overt actions, including speech acts, and there are mental phenomenon whose manifestation is observable – emotions, desires, feelings.
3. So, we can know other’s mental lives either by observing them, or by inferring them from their observable manifestations.

Now, in fact, I think this argument provides a robust and helpful answer to the ‘how do I know the minds of others’’ question. I think the conclusion is true, for the reasons given by the premisses. However, I also think that it does not dissolve the philosophical anxiety we started with. Once we have got as far as inculcating in ourselves the sense that we are not able to explain how it is that we are able to know the minds of others as we do, such an answer seems puzzlingly unsatisfying. It is not only that the account places limits on what we can know about others’ minds, though it does indeed place limits. On this approach, we would have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that any totally covert mental states and activities that bear no relation to overt observable mental occurrences might be unknowable to us as ordinary rational observers. But we know such limits exist, don’t we?: “she is so inscrutable, if only I knew what she thought of me.”)

I think to get an answer to the question about why the materials we have gathered together seem, on the one hand, to give us a philosophically reputable answer to the question of how we know others’ minds, but nevertheless, on the other hand, seem unsatisfying – or to leave something out, or to be not enough – we need to move our focus away from the other. We need think rather about how the other figures in our relation to ourselves.

In a paper on ‘Knowing one’s own language’, Barry Smith formulates the problem of self-knowledge in a distinctive way, against a conflict presented to us in our ordinary relations to ourselves and each other:

Common sense presents us with conflicting views on the nature of mental life, depending on whether we are thinking of the accessibility of minds to others or of their accessibility to themselves. We are left in the curious position of believing that whereas the minds of others can be displayed in observable behaviour, the contents of our own minds are a matter for private consumption. Clearly, this is nothing more than a comforting illusion. For we are just as likely as anyone else to reveal aspects of our mental lives publicly. The problem arises when we try to square this objective and outward aspect of the mental with the special way in which we know our own minds from the first‐person perspective. How can states whose natures belong partly in the public sphere be so readily available to us from the first‐person point of view? I take this to be the key problem raised by self‐knowledge. (p.391)

Smith’s framing suggests an alternative route to understanding why the means we have identified can seem unsatisfactory. There is an instability that comes from us taking introspection as the means of knowing our own minds, and observation, and inference, as the means of knowing others’ minds. How can it be that the “states whose natures belong partly in the public sphere” and are known to us through observable behaviour” are also those states that are “so readily available to us from the first‐person point of view”? So, following Smith, but switching things around the other way we might say: “how can states [and minds] so readily available to us from the first‐person point of view be states [and minds] whose natures belong partly in the public sphere? I take this to be the key problem raised by others’ minds.”

We remarked above on a widespread philosophical resistance to thinking of our bodily actions as mental events in the lives of a human animal, and with it the tendency to retract the site of the action to some covert, inner decision or intention. (There is a similar tendency to retract the site of an emotion, belief or desire to some covert activity or feeling.) I think this resistance, and the feeling that even if we did know that others’ are minded in perceiving their actions, we must even so be missing knowledge of something yet inaccessible, are two sides of the same concern. The worry ‘if I know what he is thinking in *that* way, how can it be that I know what I am thinking in *this* way, and the worry ‘if I know what I am thinking in *this* way, how can it be that I know what he is thinking in *that* way’ are the same worry. The means by which we know our own minds, and the means by which we know others’ minds seem to be so distinct in character, and separated, that if what is to be known is indeed the same, then it can seem to us that either the means by which we know our own mental states or the means by which we know the other are inadequate or puzzling. If this is right then (S2) in Gomes’ antinomy, that ‘there is no means by which one can know truths about another’s mind’ will seem compelling only to the extent that we confident of the means by which we know our own minds. Satisfying ourselves that we *do* have the means to know another’s mind will bring in its train a sense that in that case we are not sure how it is that we know how we can know our own minds.

Following Smith in setting up the problem in this way brings two things into view:

1. That at the heart of the problem of how we can know others’ minds *must be a kind of illusion.* (Smith remarks that the total privacy of our own minds is a kind of ‘comforting illusion’, but so is the transparency of others.) The instability that seems to come from us both taking introspection as a means of knowing our own minds, and observation as means of knowing others’ minds must be illusory. When we put our sober, non-sceptical, epistemologists hats on the sources discussed above seem to give us sources that enable us to know others’ minds through observation. And we do not doubt that we know our minds through an introspective capacity that is distinct.
2. That we will not dissipate or dissolve the illusion by choosing between introspection and observation as the basis means for knowing minds: we need both. The problem remains even if we focus our efforts on trying to make sense of our own minds, *per impossible,* in the same way as we take ourselves to make sense of others’ minds – if we go full observational. And it remains, if we try, *per impossible* to introspect others’ minds as we introspect our own – if we go full introspectional. Royce (quoted by Duddington) puts it particularly graphically:

If my neighbour's physical pains ever became mine, I should know them by immediate acquaintance only in so far as they were mine, and not my neighbour's. If my neighbour's states became the immediate objects of my own acquaintance, my neighbour and I would so far simply melt together, like drops in the ocean or small pools in a greater pool. The immediate acquaintance with my neighbour's states of mind would be a knowledge neither of himself as he is in distinction from me, nor of myself as I am in distinction from him. (‘Mind’, in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol viii, p. 653 (1916).

Since we can do neither of these things the best we can manage if we try is a form of imaginative projection. We either imagine ourselves observing ourselves – our own body and expressions – from over there, or we imagine ourselves introspecting – but in the position of the other. It clear that spelled out on that way such imaginative projections simply replicate the structure that gave rise to the instability. The former, enables us to imagine our minds ‘displayed in observable behaviour’ (Smith, p.?) to another, but in so doing, alienates us from the sense that our minds are immediately known to us in introspection. The latter merely imaginatively re-locates of our own introspective first person perspective into the location of the other. This may give us a way of understanding my mind as other, but does not give us a way of apprehending the other as a mind. In short, we get nowhere trying to project ourselves into the others’ head, or in trying to get out of ours.

I want to suggest that make better progress in dissolving our sense of there being a problem here if stay firmly in the first person introspective perspective and ask not ‘how can I get into the others head’ but rather how does the other get into mine in a way that makes their mindedness palpable to me, but which does not detach me from my ordinary connection to myself.

Two things have been, until recently, notably missing from analytical discussions of the problem of others’ minds.[[10]](#footnote-10) One, affective capacities of human beings tend to be ignored as potential epistemic resources by means of which might know others’ minds. Two, the way in which others’ minds figure in a person’s consciousness of *themselves*, as opposed to the way in which others’ minds figure in a person’s consciousness of their world, have played little role in making sense of the means by which we know, and about, others.

One can sometimes get the impression, from the philosophical treatment of it, that the starting point for human beings in the task of coming to know the minds of others is an exercise in observational scrutiny – of all the material objects in the world we have to develop ways of detecting those few that are minded, and learning to distinguish them from the rest. We need to sort our parents and siblings from the perambulators, cots, and bottles. However, things are quite the other way around – it is in being the object of the observational scrutiny of others that the mind of the other is impressed upon me. We do not seek out minds, they seek us out – others’ minds probe us with their attention through eye contact, verbal address, and touch, and in so doing transform our experience of ourselves.

Consider the effect of the human gaze upon us. Noticing another’s attentive look directed towards me normally transforms my relation to myself – it produces an affective and behavioural response in me that I have both interoceptive and introspective access to. And in responding to the others look in that way the other is able to immediately differentiate themselves from other objects in my consciousness – by attending to you they draw your attention to their attending. The perambulator does not impinge upon me in that way. The transaction that takes place between human beings when one falls under the attentive, often evaluative, gaze of another involves a transformation of what it is like to be the gazed at. For a self-conscious subject, capable of reflection, the form of affective self-consciousness that arises when one is the object of evaluation attention of another, provides a resource – I want to argue – that can be called upon when reflection leads one to the kind of standard epistemic anxiety that I have tried to bring out. First, it adds a further, neglected, resource by means of which we can know both of the existence of the other, and the thoughts of the other. I can know by the effects on my own self-consciousness that another mind is attending to me, and I can know what that mind is thinking by the shame, or pride, comfort or pain that comes to condition that self-conscious as attended to. The condition of my self-consciousness is of a kind brought about by an engagement with a minded subject attending to me. Second, this resource for knowing of the other has the power to dissolve the illusion. An affective form of self-consciousness which has the function of incorporating the view of another into the experience a subject has of herself is capable of subverting the illusion of their being a bifurcation of domains – the private knowable only through introspection and the public knowable through observation – that we get if we appeal only to introspection of our thoughts, actions and perceptions, and observations of others’ actions and expressions. We have identified a means by which, as we put it earlier ‘the other get into my head in a way that makes their mindedness palpable to me, but which does not detach me from my ordinary introspective connection to myself.” This form of affective self-consciousness gives us a way of defusing the specific form cognitive anxiety that comes from the supposed separation between introspection and observation – here the condition of my self-consciousness records a condition of the others’ mind. I know only too well what he thinks, I feel it in my embarrassment or our shame – often enough to seek the comforting illusion of mutual privacy.

Clarification of what precisely is being offered by the appeal to affective forms of interpersonal self-consciousness will likely be sought at this point. Is the suggestion that these forms of self-consciousness provide a means by which we know of the existence of others, and to an extent what they are thinking – that is that they provide a way of resisting Gomes’ antinomy. Our introspectively accessible forms of social self-consciousness are a means by which we know the other with the existence of the other as minded.

TBC. Notes:

Step 1: Mannekins and Perambulators.

We do not first know bodies and then infer that they are animated bodies; the presence of mental life is revealed to us along with the qualities of shape, colour, movement, and so on that characterise the body. This does not imply anything so absurd as the assertion that a six-months-old baby knows its mother's mind as distinct from her body; but it does imply that in so far as it is aware of its mother at all, it is aware of her as qualitatively different from the perambulator she is pushing. It will no doubt take the child a long time to understand in what the difference consists, but unless the fact of the difference were directly apprehended it could not behave towards its mother in the way it does.

Step 2: The argument:

1. I see another human being looking at me.
2. I feel ordinarily self-conscious
3. Ordinary self-consciousness is affective appraisal of the relation of evaluative attention of another. It discloses the other to me in my relation to myself.
4. I know that I feel ordinarily self-conscious through introspection
5. I know that the other is attending to me.

Circular or Question begging: Compare to Moore’s argument, and connect to possibility of error vs no sources of knowledge version of the problem of Others’ minds.

160. I, L. W., believe, am sure, that my friend hasn’t sawdust in his body

or in his head, even though I have no direct evidence of my senses to the

contrary. I am sure, by reason of what has been said to me, of what I

have read, and of my experience. To have doubts about it would seem to

me madness-of course, this is also in agreement with other people; but I

agree with them.

If I were to doubt that the other where a human – if I wondered if it were a mannikin or a perambulator I could assure myself that it was by noting through introspection my affective response to it.

1. I owe the suggestion that our problem is a problem of ‘others’ minds’ not a problem of ‘other minds’ to Paul Snowdon. It is not the otherness of a mind that is our concern – the possibility of alien minds, for example – it is question of the possibility and knowledge of minds like others being minds of others. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Insert ref to Gomes [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See Natalie Duddington’s ‘Our Knowledge of Other Minds’ from PAS 1919. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. How minimal is minimal? It should be read in such a way that any standard account of knowledge through perception – whether it be Byrne, Peacocke, Bonjour, Pryor, Williamson – will agree that it is true. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Refer to Joel Smith, William McNeill, Anita A. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. See O’Brien ‘Actions as prime’ and ‘I, myself, move’ [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Note that we need a story about perceiving events. Cf Soteriou. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Reference to Duddington – she distinguishes between knowing that there are self-motile creature among us and knowing that they are feeling grief, for example. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. “If le Penseur is trying to solve a chess-problem…he may experimentally move and re-move pieces on the chessboard in front of him, unpressed by an opponent or a clock. Or he may, like me, only much more efficiently, be considering alternative moves of visualised chessmen on a visualised chessboard; or he may in imagination, in some other manner, be experimentally making alternative moves. But whichever he is at this moment ‘thinly’ doing, ‘thickly’ he is trying to check and mate in four moves” and that for Ryle is a form of thinking. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. An important exception is Naomi Eilan who asks whether joint attention and the thought of another as ‘you’ gives us the materials with which to tackle the problem of other minds. Refer to Naomi and discuss. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)