Chapter 22
Schopenhauer's Metaphysics and Ethics: Mapping Influences and Congruities with Feminist Philosophers

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1 Introduction

This chapter will consider the impact of the metaphysics and ethics of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) on female philosophers who were sympathetic to feminism. It might seem surprising that there is anything at all to be said on this topic, given that Schopenhauer was one of the most extreme misogynists in the history of modern philosophy, and that his views on the inferiority of women are by no means hidden. Thus, in his 1851 essay "On Women" Schopenhauer asserts not only that women differ from men in that they are unable to produce great art or become geniuses, but also that it is entirely appropriate that women's choices and their education should be restricted in ways that would be entirely inappropriate for males:

> Because at bottom women exist solely for the propagation of the species and their destiny is absorbed by this, they live generally more in the species than in the individuals, and in their hearts they take more seriously the affairs of the species than those of individuals. This imparts a certain frivolity to their entire nature and doings and a direction that is fundamentally different from that of a man …[1]

To add insult to injury, Schopenhauer also goes on to say that women belong to "the unaesthetic" sex—"undersized, narrow-shouldered, wide-hipped and short-legged"—which "could only be called the fair sex by a male intellect clouded by its sexual drive."[2]

Despite this essay and other scathing remarks about women scattered throughout his works, women philosophers, translators and biographers played a key role in promoting and popularizing Schopenhauer's metaphysical system, with some also drawing on it for their own philosophical and/or feminist ends. The extent of

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Schopenhauer's influence on women philosophers is so extensive that I have limited my detailed analysis to only two cases. The first of these—May Sinclair (1863–1946), born Mary Amelia St Clair Sinclair—described herself as an "incorrigible" idealist, but is now left out of most accounts of the history of philosophy.[3] By contrast, Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986)—my second case study—is a canonical figure. The links between her philosophical position and that of Schopenhauer are, however, under-researched and also highly surprising. Her teenage diaries reveal an early passion for Schopenhauer, traces of which remain in her later philosophical, fictional and feminist texts. Another female philosopher whom I might have focused on here is Helene von Druskowitz (1856–1918): an Austrian philosopher who published widely on philosophy, literature and music, but who spent the last twenty-seven years of her life confined to a lunatic asylum. In 1887 she published a short text on ethics which drew on Schopenhauer to argue against Kant and also free will, and she remained in dialogue with Schopenhauer throughout her writing life, including during her incarceration, developing a philosophical position that was as extreme in its misandry as was the misogyny of Schopenhauer.[4]

In an article on "Schopenhauer and British Literary Feminism," S. Pearl Brilmyer has undertaken the invaluable task of identifying literary writers in the anglophone tradition who contributed to Schopenhauer's growing reputation.[5] Her analysis includes the novelist George Eliot (Mary Ann Evans, 1819–1880) who, in 1853, was the unofficial and anonymous editor of the London periodical, the *Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review*, and commissioned and edited the key article on Schopenhauer that grounded his reputation, not only in Britain, but also around the world. Eliot was herself a Spinozist, but she did re-read Schopenhauer before embarking on her final novel, *Daniel Deronda* (1876), and elements of Schopenhauer's metaphysics have been detected in that novel.[6] Brilmyer also focuses on Olive Schreiner (1855–1920), the South African novelist and feminist theorist who, in 1885, enthusiastically wrote to the sexologist, Havelock Ellis, reveling in the coincidence between the ideas expressed in *The Story of an African Farm* (published 1883) and those of Schopenhauer. However, since the same letter makes clear that Schreiner knew nothing about Schopenhauer before writing that novel, the extent of Schopenhauer's influence is open to doubt.[7]

Less controversially, Brilmyer picks out for discussion Helen Zimmern (1846–1934) whose philosophical biography of Schopenhauer was published in 1876. This influential work was greatly admired, including by Richard Wagner who introduced her to Nietzsche (two of whose books she later translated). Zimmern registered Schopenhauer's misogyny, but offered a limited defense of it, accepting his criticism of women for their lack of an "abstract sense of justice," for example. She even excused his bias against women authors and artists on the grounds that he was intimate with "no intellectual or distinguished women"—an extremely odd claim given that his mother, Johanna Schopenhauer, was a distinguished travel writer, novelist and writer on art. As Brilmyer notes, Zimmern even interpreted some of Schopenhauer's anti-female sentiments in ways that privileged women. She noted, for example, that Schopenhauer regarded woman as "but one remove from the 'will to live.'" However, whereas Schopenhauer regarded this as a sign of

women's inferiority and lack of individuality, Zimmern glossed this claim in a more positive way, claiming that Schopenhauer recognized "the strength of instinct and keenness of intuition of the female sex, sees in it a closer manifestation of the original cause of being."[8] It was Zimmern's whitewash of Schopenhauer's views on women that contributed to the uptake of Schopenhauer by female and feminist writers, including Olive Schreiner.

2 Schopenhauer's Philosophy and Its Popularity

Profoundly influenced by the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Plato, along with Hinduism and Buddhism, Schopenhauer fits within the tradition of German Idealism, but is not straightforwardly a part of it. He can even be viewed as signaling the break-up of that tradition insofar as he privileged the physical body and its drives, instead of spirit, consciousness or, indeed, an individualized self. He regarded his writings as belonging to a single system, enbracing metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, science, logic and also epistemology. The foundational text for Schopenhauer's system—volume 1 of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* [*The World as Will and Representation*]—was published in 1818; but it was not until the *Westminster Review* article in 1853 that Schopenhauer's philosophy impacted deeply on public consciousness.[9] By that time, a second, much revised, edition of this work had been published. As is the case in the 1818 edition, in this 1844 edition Schopenhauer broke his system into four different books: Books 1 and 3 deal with "The World as Representation" (i.e. with the world as it presents itself to consciousness); and Books 2 and 4 cover "The World as Will" (Book 2 dealing with the experience that each individual has of willing, and Book 4 with Will as an impersonal energic force). Importantly, this second edition also included a second volume, comprising fifty essays, which function as addenda to the four books that make up volume 1. Further revisions were added by Schopenhauer himself in 1859, with further posthumous revisions based on Schopenhauer's manuscripts and notebooks inserted in 1988. Two extended essays on the freedom of the will had also appeared in 1841, followed in 1851 by a two-volume collection of essays, *Parerga and Paralipomena*. There are other important published works, but Schopenhauer's popular appeal largely rested on these essays, plus the original—frequently revised, and very readable—volumes of *The World as Will and Representation*.

At first sight it seems puzzling that Schopenhauer should have appealed to female and feminist writers, despite his blatant misogyny. However, as Frederick Beiser has pointed out, "after his death in 1860, Schopenhauer became *the* most important and influential philosopher in Germany until the beginning of the First World War."[10] Literary and visual artists drew on his theories, as did musicians, philosophers, psychoanalysts and those writing on evolution.[11] Indeed, his influence continued long after 1914, and persisted even after Schopenhauer's reputation became tarnished by the enthusiastic embrace of his philosophy by Hitler, Mussolini and other German and Italian fascists. Beiser links Schopenhauer's impact to the so-called "pessimism"

debate—i.e. the question of whether or not life is worth living, and whether human civilization is gradually improving over time. Schopenhauer adopted an extreme form of pessimism, asserting that individual human beings "would have been better off not existing," and that it would also be better to die than to carry on living.[12] Furthermore, he regarded "need and boredom" as "the whips" that drive human beings, and also claimed that life is an absurd "hurdy-gurdy that has already been played countless times, movement by movement, beat by beat, with insignificant variations."[13]

Schopenhauer's cynical view of human drives and civilization was part of his appeal to male *fin-de-siècle* aesthetes and theorists, and the young Beauvoir was also attracted by this aspect of his thinking. But late nineteenth-century women writers were more interested in his opposition to theism; his philosophy of art and of genius; his emphasis on sexual desire; his mysticism; and his blending of Eastern philosophical traditions with those of the West. The fact that Schopenhauer wrote, for the most part, in an easy and accessible style increased his appeal to readers who lacked formal philosophical training. As such, it is after all not that surprising that women—whose own educational prospects were severely limited in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—should have found themselves drawn towards Schopenhauer's writings: as disciples, as modifiers of his philosophy, or as outright opponents.

At the heart of Schopenhauer's system is his insistence that what drives the development of the world is Will: a potentially misleading term, since he treats Will [*Wille*] as an entirely impersonal force, deriving neither from human beings nor from some God or gods. Instead, Schopenhauer treats Will as a chaotic jumble of energies that pre-exist space and time, and which therefore cannot be individuated. It is through the struggle of these energic forces to manifest themselves as material objects that the spatio-temporal world as we (think we) know it comes into existence. Schopenhauer's doctrine of the Will displaces the "I" of the idealist philosophers from the center of the knowable world. Moreover, since Schopenhauer detects the struggles of Will in the behavior of animals and plants, as well as in the emergence and behavior of material objects, Schopenhauer also ousts the human from the center of philosophical, ethical and also scientific interest.

Schopenhauer's doctrine of the Will highlights impersonal drives which act on the body, forcing the "I" to act in ways that might turn out to be contrary to its own self-interest and even, at times, contrary to its very survival. Hence his importance for later theorists, including psychoanalysts and Nietzsche. Like Kant, Schopenhauer treated space, time and causality as grids imposed on the world by human beings, although he also emphasized the role of the brain—including the brains of animals—in ways that set him apart from Kant. Adopting the Kantian term *Ding-an-sich* (thing-in-itself) for the non-spatio-temporal reality concealed behind appearances, Schopenhauer argued—also against Kant—that certain human beings in certain privileged states of mind are capable of accessing that hidden reality. Like Plato—and, again, unlike Kant—Schopenhauer also posited universals (Ideas or essences) which exist outside space and time. These universals are what is accessed in aesthetic contemplation of the beautiful, through the creative powers of genius,

and also through the experience of the sublime. This was the aspect of his philosophy that appealed most to artists and to literary theorists, especially since—unlike Kant—Schopenhauer also provided a detailed analysis of the capacity of different art forms and different types of subject-matter to project the spectator and/or the creator out of the limitations of our everyday experience of space and time.

Schopenhauer was an avowed atheist; but he nevertheless hypothesized the reincarnation of souls and, even more strikingly, joined Plato, Plotinus, the Buddhists and the Hindus in positing a non-spatio-temporal reality in which there are pre-individualized souls that have yet to be born. For individualized humans to emerge, Will needs to manipulate the sexual desires and the "love" of one male and one female so that they come together to mate. Will, he says, acts directly on the body, with the genitalia—and especially the male genitalia—functioning as the juncture between the non-spatio-temporal and material realms.[14] It's through such drives that the species and the world as a whole unfold and survive. Schopenhauer's theories about species survival and development were taken up by theorists of biological development, leading to a proto-evolutionary theory which subjugated the needs of the individual human, animal, plant or civilization to the development of the species, the world, and also the universe as a whole.

Schopenhauer did not privilege the West in his assessment of human development and civilizations. In terms of religion, he was particularly critical of the monotheism of Christianity and Judaism, and his particular venom against the "*wicked*" optimism of the Jewish religion has been interpreted as "metaphysical anti-Judaism," and sometimes as outright anti-Semitism.[15] He did, however, explicitly draw on Hindu scriptures and Mahayana Buddhism when theorizing reincarnation, when emphasizing the illusory nature of the self, as well as in his ethics which displaces mankind from the center of concern. In stark contrast with his enthusiastic embrace of Kant's metaphysics and aesthetics, Schopenhauer ethics is aggressively anti-Kantian, privileging feeling—and, more particularly, compassion (*Mitleid*)—rather than reason, duty or obligation. Indeed, since individuality only pertains in the transitory world of space and time, Schopenhauer's ethically good man is the one who feels himself to be at one with other individuals or entities in his environment, and who therefore acts in such a way as to minimize the suffering of others—whether or not those others are human.

As well as promoting the ethically good, compassionate man, Schopenhauer also posits saints and ascetics as ideal human types. And it is when writing about these modes of exceptional virtue—as well as when theorizing "genius" and the ecstasies of beauty—that Schopenhauer's philosophy tips over into mysticism. Such exceptional human beings transcend ego-based desires and sexual needs, allowing the interests of others and of the species as a whole to outweigh self-interest. This does not, however, mean that Schopenhauer advocated suicide. On the contrary, he insisted that the intention to commit suicide simply shows that the individual is still caught up with ego-based wishes and desires, rather than with that of the impersonal Will. Instead, the supererogatory ideal is that any ego-based drives and passions should gradually wither away. Schopenhauer explicitly denies women the capacity for genius, and the logic of his position also debars them from being saints or

ascetics. Schopenhauer's women have no real ego, and their choices are simply dictated by the needs of the species; but this means that, with no ego to transcend, female human beings are always *less than normal*, rather than *supernormal*. Despite this, Schopenhauer's privilege of asceticism appealed to many late nineteenth-century women. Living during a historical period when repeated wars had reduced the marriage prospects of so many "surplus" women, Schopenhauer's emphasis on turning away from any ego-based passions and sexual needs offered a kind of consolation.

3 May Sinclair

May Sinclair was missed by Brilmyer in her account of Schopenhauer and British literary feminists, but should certainly have been included. Her diverse output includes twenty-three novels, numerous short stories, poetry, a war diary, literary criticism, translations from German, an essay in favor of women's suffrage, articles on philosophy and psychoanalysis, plus two weighty books of philosophy. Schopenhauer is mentioned in several novels, but only once in each of the two volumes on philosophy, *A Defence of Idealism* (1917) and *The New Idealism* (1922). However, as Sinclair points out in the later book, her aim was to defend Idealism against its philosophical critics, adding that she had "for years" been "satisfied with Kant and Hegel, relieved by Schopenhauer and Mr. Bradley."[16] Sinclair probably first encountered Kant, Hegel and F. H. Bradley during the one year that she spent at school—Cheltenham Ladies' College—when she was 18. In Sinclair's own copy of Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*—bequeathed to the London Library after her death in 1946—we can see her inscription, the date of purchase (1881) coinciding with her first year at school, and a long and handwritten quotation in pencil from John Watson's *Kant and his English Critics* (first published in 1881). Nine years later Sinclair invested in her own copy of Schopenhauer's *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, in German, now also in the London Library.[17] Significantly, her handwritten notes concentrate on Volume 1, Book III which relates to Schopenhauer's philosophy of art, tragedy, poetry and of genius: all topics which feature in her third, best-selling novel, *The Divine Fire* (1904).

The name Schopenhauer occurs only once in that novel, however the question of the nature of genius is central to its plot, as is also the way in which poetry and nature can provide intuitive and direct access to a hidden reality, at odds with everyday experience, as well as being contrary to the publishing practices of the literary journals. We are told that the editor of one such journal had, with "a high and noble seriousness … approached his Kant, his Hegel and his Schopenhauer in succession," whilst writing his own "Prolegomena to Æsthetics": a treatise which emphasized "the twin acts of vision and creation" and the dual worlds "of Nature and the Idea."[18] Despite declaring that the artist "leaps at a bound into the very heart of the Absolute"—a goal that can be "attained only by the sacrifice of his individuality"—the editor is corrupted by the publishing industry, and betrays his own

Schopenhauerian ideals as he callously swindles and exploits the young, working-class male "genius" whom he discovers. The editor's rarefied aesthetic ideals are ironized in the text; but its overall narrative is nevertheless framed by the Schopenhauerian assumption that to be a genius it is necessary to sacrifice one's own sexual wants and physical needs to the "divine fire" that uses the male genius as its mouthpiece.

This theme of sexual renunciation and artistic sublimation runs through numerous novels and short stories by Sinclair, including her semi-autobiographical *Bildungsroman, Mary Olivier: A Life*, published 1919, which includes three explicit references to Schopenhauer. As the heroine's life unfolds we see how Mary's energies are diverted away from her own desires as an individual, and how she takes pleasure in accessing a realm in which there is no individualized self. This non-individuated realm is accessed through the experience of beauty in nature and, more particularly, when a "queer, white light" triggers feelings of ecstasy and of happiness. Feeling "cheated" by Kant—and, more particularly, his ethics—Mary Olivier turns to Schopenhauer:

> There was Schopenhauer, though. *He* didn't cheat you. There was "*reine Anschauung*," pure perception; it happened when you looked at beautiful things. Beautiful things were crystal; you looked through them and saw Reality. You saw God. While the crystal flash lasted "*Wille und Vorstellung*," the Will and the Idea, were not divided as they are in life; they were one. That was why beautiful things made you happy.[19]

What Mary Olivier is describing here is a moment of ecstasy when the individual's own desires are subsumed into a more universal and impersonal force—Schopenhauer's "Will"—which provides access to a reality which is beyond space and time, and also beyond individuation. For Schopenhauer, it was only the male genius and the male aesthete who can access this realm. Sinclair's narrator relies on Schopenhauer, whilst silently correcting the sexual bias concealed in his account of aesthetic pleasure. Beauty transports Mary in a Schopenhauerian flash of light; she also finds happiness in the writing of poetry, in ways that further modify Schopenhauer's bias against women of genius.

A similar message runs through Sinclair's later novel, *Arnold Waterlow: A Life* (1924), which reprises many of the same themes, but focussed around a male central character. Despite the change of gender, the novel also draws strongly on aspects of May Sinclair's own life. Arnold comes to learn about philosophy through an older man who "reads great, deep books in German. Kant and Hegel and Schopenhauer and von Hartmann": all books by authors which May Sinclair herself owned.[20] Much of the narrative is taken up with Arnold's engagement with Spinoza and Hegel, but Schopenhauer is also on call as Arnold confronts grief, sorrow and anguish. The novel also includes a character called Mary Unwin—a thinly disguised double of the middle-aged May Sinclair—who leads Arnold towards the semi-mystical and Schopenhauerian *dénouement* of the novel in which Arnold attempts to "give up himself," and strip himself of his own will, "save the bare Will to know Reality." Arnold waits "in the darkness, effortless and still" until "he was aware of Its coming, It had come." The narrator then comments that Arnold's own will "had been set free," and that his own individual will has been taken over by an "It": "the

Self of self, the secret, mysterious Will within his will. Where It was, there could be no more grief."[21] What is at stake in this passage from *Arnold Waterlow* is Schopenhauer's notion of an impersonal Will as the force that drives our unconscious desires, and also the psychoanalytic notion of the Id (in German, the word is *Es*, which translates literally as "It"), as opposed to the psychoanalytic notion of the ego (in German *Ich*, which translates literally as "I").

Sinclair's mystical tendencies do not only derive from her enthusiasm for Schopenhauer. Indeed, her first (pseudonymous) publication was a book of poetry that reveals an interest in Hindu philosophy. The spellings of proper names in that book, together with the early publication date (1886), suggest that Sinclair came to Hindu thought not through Schopenhauer, but via the translations of the *Vedas* by Max Müller.[22] Her interest in Hindu thought did, however, persist through her writing life, and links with her passion for Schopenhauer which seems to have been particularly intense during the period when Sinclair was deeply involved, in a practical as well as theoretical way, with the Medico-Psychological Clinic of London, the first psychotherapeutic organization in Great Britain.[23] Sinclair helped fund the clinic, was on its organizational Board and, in 1914, even travelled with some of its members in a small Ambulance Unit to the Belgian Front Line. In Sinclair's impressionistic *A Journal of Impressions in Belgium*, written from the Front, we find the same ecstatic experiences of "light" and of "beauty" that we find in *Mary Olivier*, *Arnold Waterlow* and other short stories and novels.[24] The ecstatic passages in the *Journal* are troubling, especially when we register the role that Schopenhauer's philosophy played in the contemporary war fever—Hitler wore out the copy of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* which he carried in his knapsack throughout his time in the trenches in World War I, and similar passages on light on beauty can be found in the notebooks of the German expressionist painter, Franz Marc, during the short time he spent at the front before his death.[25]

Sinclair's Schopenhauerian commitments reveal themselves in the *Journal* in four ways. I have already registered the first of these: the aesthetic mysticism. Second, there are passages that explore the loss of individuality and the "contagious ecstasy" of war, and which fit with Schopenhauer's account of the universal *Wille* in which the individual's own will is transcended.[26] Third, Sinclair's desire to nurse and comfort the Belgian refugees aligns with Schopenhauer's anti-Kantian ethics that stresses compassion and empathy.[27] Fourth, Sinclair emphasizes her overwhelming "love" for a dying Flemish soldier who had been allocated to her care, and who had to be abandoned when the Ambulance Unit flees Ghent. Sinclair's overwhelming—and apparently crazy—desire to return to the war zone in order to comfort him fits with Schopenhauer's advocacy of supererogatory saintliness in which the unindividuated Will displaces the desires, wants and needs of the individualized human, leading him to saintly and ascetic actions that threaten his very existence as a living human being.[28] For Schopenhauer, the saintly man is, like the genius, paradigmatically male; Sinclair's *Journal* seems designed to show that Schopenhauer was mistaken when he gendered *Wille* in that way.

How central Schopenhauer was to Sinclair's thinking during the war years can be gleaned from a lengthy manuscript on psychoanalysis, "The Way of Sublimation",

which remained unpublished when dementia and Parkinson's disease put an end to Sinclair's career as a writer and philosopher around 1927.[29] The manuscript exists in various type-written and handwritten versions, but in the two most complete versions, the analyses of Jung's and Freud's theories are sandwiched between admiring references to Schopenhauer and Hartmann. Together, they are credited with being the only philosophers who prefigured the psychoanalytic account of the unconscious. Thus, towards the start of the manuscript we are told that Schopenhauer was the only one of the "great system builders of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries … who thought *close* to life and brought forth one idea with enough vitality in it to last into the twentieth century." Expressing some reservations about Schopenhauer's pessimism and the overall "logic" of his writings, Sinclair enthuses over Schopenhauer's "immense sincerity," and claims that "his conception of the World as Will has passed almost unchanged into the living thought of our own time." Sinclair then positions herself as a "humble disciple" of Hartmann and his Schopenhauerian "philosophy of the unconscious." Noting how her own academic mentor in philosophy had "coldly snubbed" her admiration for Hartmann, Sinclair declares herself "avenged" on those who sought to deflect her away from "the New Psychology in which the Unconscious has come into its own." Broadly supportive of Jung, as opposed to Freud—both of whom are discussed in detail in the manuscript—Sinclair remarks that it is impossible to get away from "the eternal, indestructible Libido":

> I use this word (so repulsive to the Idealist) in Jung's sense of Creative Energy, in which it is equivalent to the Will to Live in Schopenhauer and Hartmann, the "need" or "want" of Samuel Butler, the Life-Force, or *élan vital* of Bergson, and, even to the Puritanic, void of all offence. Sublimation itself is the striving of the Libido towards manifestation in higher and higher forms. The history of evolution and Its history.[30]

The capitalization of the word "It" suggests that Sinclair is equating the libido with the "*Es*", Id or Unconscious. For Sinclair, it is Schopenhauer—and his follower and modifier, Hartmann—which gives her access to the basics of Freud's and Jung's systems. Sinclair also makes it clear that she thinks Freud is wrong to equate the drives of the unconscious with repressed and sublimated sexuality. Instead, she aligns herself with Jung insofar as she treats all culture and all evolutionary developments as emerging from creative energies that use the individual as a means of expression of a fundamental Creative Energy or Life Force.

Schopenhauer and Hartmann are once again mentioned towards the close of the manuscript, but now Schopenhauer is accused of leaving us with "an irreconcilable Dualism, with no gangway from the Unconscious to the Conscious, from *Wille* to *Vorstellung*." In addition, Hartmann is charged (somewhat conventionally) with "pessimism," and with having made "the Unconscious prior and superior to the Conscious." Sinclair then goes on to insist that everything that is in our unconscious "is only a forgetting, a *lapsed consciousness*." This means, she argues, that "what we call *the* Unconscious, with a big U, presupposes Consciousness as its indispensable forerunner and condition." She then adds that what drives human and cosmic development forward is not only the Will-to-Life/the Unconscious "seeking to become what it is not, but *seeking to become what it once was*, and still is behind the

play of appearances."[31] Thus, in the final pages of this manuscript we see Sinclair trying to combine psychoanalytic notions of repressed memories—leading to hysteria, neurosis and trauma—with a Schopenhauerian and also Platonic understanding of a timeless reality, prior to all individuality. Similar themes are evident in some of her late novels in which sexual repression, hysteria and "shell shock" (or what we now call "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder") are key to the narrative structure. These concerns are implicitly there in her early fiction as well—the breakdown and alcoholism of her own bankrupt father having given her plenty of opportunities to observe mental illness at an early age.

The same thematics surface also in Sinclair's occasional writings on the woman question. Thus, for example, in 1912 Sinclair authored a forty-six-page pamphlet, *Feminism*, which was published by the *Women Writers' Suffrage League*. This essay was an extended response to a letter to *The Times* of 8 March 1912 by Sir Almroth Wright, the respected British bacteriologist and immunologist, on the topic of "Militant Hysteria". Wright had argued against women's right to vote, pointing to the "serious and long-continued mental disorders" which afflict women when they are deflected from their biological roles of mating and bearing children. Insisting that "the women's movement" is afflicted with hysteria and neurosis, he advocated sending overseas the half a million single women who had been unable to find a suitable mate. Finding a suitable husband would be the cure for their militancy. Sinclair's response roundly dismisses Wright's suggestion that "for a woman there is only one kind of alternative between frustration and fulfilment of the Life-Force, and that is—hysteria, neurosis, and the detestable manifestations of degeneracy."[32] Women, she insists, are just as capable of transmuting repressed sexual energies into cultural productions as are men. And here again we can detect the underlying Schopenhauerian framework, as she mentions "the artist, the enthusiast, the visionary" and—"leaving the saints out of the discussion"—"certain moments of heightened vision and sensation" in which what is experienced is "exaltation" as the world is "transfigured" through beauty. Much of the pamphlet appeals to economic arguments, insisting on women's right to earn an economic wage, and objecting to Wright's insinuations that advocating wages for women will force surplus unmarried women to turn to prostitution. Her argument combines Schopenhauer with proto-psychoanalytic assumptions, whilst simultaneously setting out to correct Schopenhauer's anti-female biases. Sinclair's militant women can also act as intermediaries for Will/the Unconscious/the universal Life Force to push humanity and culture forwards, through the processes of sublimation.

4 Simone de Beauvoir

In later life Beauvoir insisted that she was no philosopher, and was merely a literary writer who relied on the framework of existential phenomenology developed by her long-term lover and authorial collaborator, Jean-Paul Sartre.[33] Such a claim is seriously misleading, however. Beauvoir not only acted as an unofficial editor for and

constant consultant on Sartre's writings, including *Being and Nothingness* (1943), she also developed a distinctive philosophical position of her own. In tracking the differences between the two philosophers, Beauvoir's teenage diaries from 1926–27 are particularly useful, since they provide a detailed account of her reading and studies as a philosophy student in the years prior to her meeting with Sartre.[34] And there we discover, remarkably enough, the 19-year-old Beauvoir's passion for Schopenhauer. Thus, her fourth notebook of April 1927 is prefaced by quotations from six authors. The one from Schopenhauer reads: '"We blow out a soap-bubble as long and as large as possible, although with perfect certainty that it will burst."'[35] In addition to this prefacing quotation, Beauvoir's diary entries on May 9th, 1927, comprise thirteen—sometimes lengthy—quotations from Schopenhauer, all taken from volume 1 of *The World as Will and Representation*. The majority of these extracts are from Book 4 of that volume which focuses on Will as an impersonal energic force; but there is also a quotation from Book 2 which compares the development of character to water that "remains water," whether it manifests itself as a still lake, as a fountain or as a waterfall, plus a further quotation from Book 3 which describes existence as a "constant suffering." Most of the quotations focus on the nature of time, on boredom as a drive, and death as the end of an illusory (purely physiological) stage of existence, and on pleasure as deferred pain.[36] Although the quotations are provided without comment, four days later the young Beauvoir sets out her determination to "Write 'essays [*essais*] on life' that would not be novelistic, but rather philosophical, by linking them vaguely with fiction." She is clearly still thinking of Schopenhauer at this point, since she adds: "Schopenhauer's fourth book contains the most beautiful pages that I have ever read! The definition of time, of the present is splendid, and problems are posed in such and direct a human way!"[37]

We cannot tell from her diary entries whether or not Beauvoir was aware of Schopenhauer's unflattering views of women writers and intellectuals. She was, however, clearly thinking about Schopenhauer in relation to sexual desire and marriage, as illustrated by the notebook entry of May 6th, 1927—only a few days before she writes out the thirteen Schopenhauer quotations. Beauvoir feels herself torn between two potential love objects: her older cousin Jacques—who had been the object of Simone's romantic feelings since she was eight years old—and a much more recent acquaintance, Charles Barbier, a philosophy student.[38] Beauvoir clearly assumes that her future life would be spent with Jacques; but seeing Barbier walking towards her, and talking to him "about myself, philosophy, and literature," Beauvoir says everything else faded into the background, and that "for an instant, I held a completely new life in my hands" as she imagined the possibility of a new love:

> I *saw* myself between his and Jacques's love. Well really! I was not chained to the past. A new passion was blossoming in me. … For an instant it was. Still a bit even now, my life is no longer a traced path where, from the point I have already reached, I can discover everything and have nothing more to do than to place one foot after another. It is an unmarked trail that my walking alone will create. I am thinking back to Baruzi's class and Schopenhauer: empirical characteristic, intelligible characteristic. Yes, it is only by free decision and thanks to the interplay of circumstance that the true self is discovered. … [F]or

> me a choice is never made, but constantly in the making; it is repeated every time I become conscious of it; this is quite true! Well, this morning I chose Barbier. The horror of the definitive choice is that we engage not only the self of today but also that of tomorrow. And that is why marriage is fundamentally immoral.[39]

Beauvoir explicitly links her choice of love object to a recent lecture at the Sorbonne by Jean Baruzi on Schopenhauer's account of human character. And then, in the very next diary entry, she proceeds to copy out the passages—including the passage about character—from Schopenhauer's text.[40] The Barbier passage is remarkable for the way in which it foreshadows some aspects of the account of human freedom and self-becoming that Beauvoir would later develop in her existentialist ethics and her fiction. We can see here the impact of Schopenhauer on Beauvoir, but also clues to how their positions would later diverge. When Schopenhauer says that water will remain water—and one's character will remain one's character—however it manifests itself in the empirical world, he is treating the human being in this world as a puppet, with its agency dictated from a pre-given essence or "intelligible characteristic." Beauvoir draws on Schopenhauer, but emphasizes the responsibility of the empirical self in making each choice. For her, it is the actions that we take in the here-and-now that will enable us to "discover" one's true character, but that character is never determined in advance as Beauvoir would later make clear in *The Ethics of Ambiguity* (1947).[41]

Further evidence of Schopenhauer's influence on the young Beauvoir can be found in the first draft of Beauvoir's first novel, *She Came to Stay* (*L'Invitée*), which incorporates many autobiographical elements.[42] It includes two opening chapters which her publishers rejected out of hand, but which Beauvoir continued to believe in. In the published (1943) version of this *roman à clef*, the story starts in Paris with the narrator, Françoise, as a young woman, caught up in the bohemian whorl of café society, and functioning as a kind of double of Simone at a similar age. In the 1938 draft there was a prequel, with the opening chapter being set in the French countryside, in the interior and grounds of Françoise's grandmother's house. In the published version, the narrative is structured round Françoise's gradual recognition that other consciousnesses exist and that, as Hegel suggests in the quotation that Beauvoir uses as the epigraph to the French version of *L'Invitée*, "Each consciousness pursues the death of the other."[43] The deleted opening chapter is very different. It also is philosophical, but in a much less Hegelian way. We enter the world of the six-year-old Françoise who wonders what it means to exist. Thus, for example, sitting outside in her grandmother's garden, Françoise's "I" dissolves into a metamorphic medley of sense impressions and Françoise enters into a kind of joyous trance:

> There was a scent of scrub; there were pine needles, a taste of apple, a gentle and mysterious sensation that turned the whole body, from head to toe, into a shivering piece of tissue paper; and all this was neither good nor bad. It existed, indifferent, and Françoise no longer existed anywhere.[44]

This is strongly reminiscent of Schopenhauer and fits with his privilege of the mystic who accesses a reality in which there is no "I".

The Schopenhauerian undertones of this opening chapter are still more evident in a related passage which involves an extended meditation on whether the "I" can

be said to exist before it is born into a body. Puzzling over what it might be like to exist as an old jacket that does not know that it exists, Françoise muses:

> This was like a pitch-dark night that was terrible to imagine. I cannot remember anything from before I was born; this is exactly what it must have been like; it is the same for the little children who have not been born yet: they do not know, they will not remember anything; what if one of them happened to be myself? She stood stock still in the middle of the lawn, trying to catch one of these opaque little souls as they flew by in the air in order to illumine it from inside briefly, so that it might at least remember something later on. There was no use; all she could do was say "I am Françoise" and that was all; she could say "I" for no one else.[45]

Schopenhauer had argued that the simple fact of being born forces us to think of an infinite time in which, metaphysically speaking, my "I" did not exist or, alternatively, to contemplate a time when "'I was always I.'" Schopenhauer solved this conundrum by arguing that life is but an "ephemeral life-dream," drawing on myths of the re-incarnation of souls in Eastern religions, as well as on Kant and Plato, in order to support this claim. Schopenhauer explains how species or essences (Platonic Ideas) struggle to materialize themselves as they manipulate the erotic desires of already existing human couples. The Schopenhauerian human being believes that he or she is exercising free and individualized choice in selecting a love-object; but this is a "*delusion*," and the only freedom is that of the underlying will-to-life and the "*genius of the species*" that seeks to express itself through taking over the desires and consciousness of the individualized man and woman. It is "the urge of the future individual (who has only just become possible) to enter into being" which disguises itself as "the lofty passion of the future parents for one another," and which dictates which erotic choices will be made.[46] For Schopenhauer, there are latent children waiting to be born—in much the same way that Beauvoir describes in the deleted first chapter of *She Came to Stay*, where the "opaque little souls" flying by in the garden belong to tiny children yet to be born, and who do not yet know they exist.

Beauvoir's youthful passion for Schopenhauer would be of merely academic interest if traces of it were not also evident in her mature writings. Schopenhauer is the probable source for the title of Beauvoir's most famous book, *The Second Sex* (*Le Deuxième Sexe*, 1949). In his unflattering essay "On Women," Schopenhauer had explicitly referred to women as the "*sexus sequior*": "the 'inferior sex', the second sex that lags behind in *every* respect." Schopenhauer was certainly not the first to use the phrase, "*sexus sequior*": it can be found in two early Latin-language authors from the first and second centuries AD: Apuleius and Juvenal. Schopenhauer himself credits Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, otherwise known as *The Golden Ass*, for the origins of the phrase, and in *The Second Sex* Beauvoir several times mentions Juvenal's harsh views on women's sexual greed.[47] However, it is Beauvoir's surprisingly uncritical reliance on Schopenhauer at key points in her classic 1949 text which strongly suggests that it is Schopenhauer who is uppermost in her mind when she selects *Le Deuxième Sexe* for her title. Thus, for example, after a short account of the pride that a male takes in his penis and the power it gives him, Beauvoir quotes Schopenhauer approvingly, commending him on his description of the dominance of the male sexual drive and its centrality to "will" and to man's "attachment

to life"; "he is right to see the expression of man's duality in the sex–brain opposition." Schopenhauer is also quoted approvingly in the context of a discussion of the necessity for female prostitution in early medieval Europe.[48]

Even more disturbingly, Chap. 1 of Part 1, Volume 1 of *The Second Sex* recycles Schopenhauer's misogynistic view of women's biology, before seeking to compensate for it via a feminist swerve. Its French title is "*Les données de la biologie*," and this is best translated as "The Givens of Biology." In existentialist phenomenology, "*données*" is a semi-technical term and denotes the facticity—the "givens" of one's "situation"—*against which* freedom needs to be exercised.[49] These "givens" cannot be wished away, but they can nevertheless be overcome via changes in social circumstances, and also through the projects that women (and men) adopt. For Sartre, the biological body was not one of the five "givens" that make up the "situation" of particular human beings.[50] Beauvoir, however, disagreed with Sartre on this, and hence it is with an analysis of the biological *givens* of being born *femelle*—and what women and animals have in common—that *The Second Sex* opens. And here it should be noted that the French term "*femelle*" is not a straightforward equivalent to the English term "female", in that *femelle* is in general employed only for animals and plants and is generally avoided in the discussion of human sexuality. The French term *féminin* should be understood as including both English-language "female" and English-language "feminine". According to Beauvoir, one is born *femelle* or *mâle* (these are biological categories); but one is not born *femme (féminin)* or *homme (masculin)*. Hence her insistence at the start of Volume 2: "One is not born, but rather becomes, woman [*femme*]."[51]

The opening chapter of Volume 1 sets up Beauvoir's existentialist framework. Although Schopenhauer's name is not explicitly mentioned in the chapter, it is his overly negative and species-based view of female biology that nevertheless dominates. Beauvoir claims, for example, that in the case of vertebrates "the whole organism of the female is adapted to and determined by the servitude of maternity," and that this makes females "the prey of the species" in a way that is simply not true of males. In the case of higher mammals (including humans) a male can "affirm himself in his autonomy" during the processes of copulation, multiplying his "specific energy" and producing "new and individualised forces." In females, by contrast, "individuality is fought by the interest of the species," and the female "seems possessed by outside forces: alienated."[52] For both Schopenhauer and Beauvoir, the biologically female organism lacks the individuality that characterizes the male. Beauvoir is portraying the *femelle* in terms of a kind of species embodiment that a *woman* is able to negate in virtue of the fact that she is not simply a thing (a mere "in-itself") and is also more than a mere animal; as such, a woman is able to dream, plan, organize and also transform the situation. Schopenhauer's denigration of the female body is recycled, even as Beauvoir insists that every *woman* can compensate for female bodily disadvantages through her own life-choices. Throughout *The Second Sex* Beauvoir describes female biology in terms that render it horrid: as a kind of "facticity" that pulls against the transforming consciousness in ways that involve the resistance of otherness—the clinging, slimy, flabby, sticky, fleshy "in-itself" which presents itself as "Other",

and as alien to the consciousness (the free "for-itself") of the woman. Beauvoir has inherited Schopenhauer's negative view of female biology; but, unlike Schopenhauer, she is insistent that women are not constrained by their biology. Arguing that "existence precedes essence," she made it possible to think the essence of the human in terms of the *sum* of human acts, instead of being simply a consequence of species biology. Beauvoir is, in other words, a kind of feminist misogynist. Her misogyny is inherited directly from Schopenhauer; what characterizes her feminism is her insistence that *women* can attain autonomy by transcending their biology to become *more-than-femelle* / more than mere bodies.

A similar pattern of reliance on Schopenhauer is evident in Beauvoir's 1970 book on old age where Schopenhauer is frequently referenced and also quoted, and once again in an alarmingly uncritical way.[53] In this case it is the ageing body which is "the given", and which the embodied consciousness seeks to negate through its dreams, projects and actions. There are other passages elsewhere where the influence of Schopenhauer can also be detected. Thus, for example, both in *The Second Sex* and also in a 1966 lecture on "Women and Creativity," Beauvoir claims that women cannot have the kind of life experiences that would enable them to become geniuses.[54] With regard to her ethical writings, however, it would be a mistake to overemphasize the influence of Schopenhauer. What they have in common is their strong opposition to Kant's deontological moral system, and their shared refusal to make abstract reason or *a priori* principles the basis for deciding what is ethically desirable. But despite these shared premises, in her *Ethics* Beauvoir is careful to insist that the "notion of ambiguity" which is the grounding for her own ethical system "must not be confused with that of absurdity." For Beauvoir, Schopenhauer's ethics would count as a type of "nihilism": a mode of thinking which is criticized for its failure to recognize that each individual is free to choose—or at least work towards—a better future for her or himself.[55] Freedom can be constrained, but not in the extreme way that Schopenhauer posited when he reduced human beings to Will-driven puppets. Furthermore, Beauvoir's emphasis on authenticity, and on not being deflected from one's choice by the feelings of others, means that Beauvoir's novels explore the loss of self, but certainly do not privilege fellow-feeling or compassion as motives for action.[56]

5 Concluding Remarks

Given Schopenhauer's celebrated misogyny, it's hardly surprising that few post-'68 feminists mention him as a precursor—even when indirect influences and congruities are clearly present. The overlap between Schopenhauer's ethics and Carol Gilligan's foundational text of the "ethics of care", *In a Different Voice* (1982), has long been registered; but there is no evidence that Gilligan engaged with Schopenhauer's work.[57] The congruity is, instead, a consequence of the fact that Gilligan rejected the psychological theories of Lawrence Kohlberg, and Kohlberg drew directly on Kant's deontological account of moral judgment in outlining the

stages of moral development in childhood. To support her own alternative account of a child's moral maturity, Gilligan emphasized the adequacy of sympathy as a response to injustice or harm. Gilligan linked such feelings to a typically "*feminine*" process of moral maturation, and argued that such feelings-based judgments are at least as valid as those of Kohlberg's ideal (Kantian) child who matures as he learns to follow inflexible moral rules. The anti-Kantian morality of Gilligan's "feminine" subject overlaps with that of Schopenhauer's compassion-suffused—and also anti-Kantian—*male*. The irony is obvious, and Josephine Donovan is unusual amongst recent care theorists in citing Schopenhauer as a precursor. Noting the "abominable" nature of his remarks on Jews and women, Donovan nevertheless praises Schopenhauer for treating animals as more than mere "things"; and she also draws on him as she emphasizes sympathy in her attempts to "reactivate the moral imagination" and bring animals within the scope of an ethics of care. But Donovan also departs from Schopenhauer when she insists on the need to hold political analysis together with "the primary experience of sympathy" when responding with "attentive love" to the injustices and suffering inflicted by humans on animals. The links to Schopenhauer are carefully recorded, but nevertheless play a relatively minor role in Donovan's politically informed ethics of care.[58]

Another exception to this neglect of Schopenhauer is Luce Irigaray who provides a detailed consideration of his engagement with the Indian philosophical traditions in her own short text, *Between East and West* (1999).[59] This is one of Irigaray's late works, and has moved on from the focus on sexual difference which characterized her early writings. It engages with political and cultural differences, and the means of healing them, but has been severely criticized by some feminist theorists on the grounds that it lumps together different strands of Indian thought, including Hinduism, Buddhism, "aboriginal" thought—described (very problematically) by Irigaray as "feminine" thought—and her own adoption of the breathing practices of tantric yoga.[60] Irigaray argues that Schopenhauer has a too abstract approach to Eastern philosophies and to the body; she reads him as promoting a patriarchal philosophy of death, as opposed to her own promotion of a life-force, linked to "breath". Irigaray's criticisms of Schopenhauer are not unjustified, but she nevertheless severely misrepresents Schopenhauer when she defines his metaphysics as "*biological materialism*." She also goes seriously astray when she equates Schopenhauer's "genius of the species" with the male human being's own will and sex drive, rather with that of an impersonal and non-individuated Will that is simply acting through him. Irigaray's and Schopenhauer's positions are much closer than she herself supposes. Both are opposed to any philosophy that makes man the master of nature; both treat the earth holistically, emphasizing the role of competing energies and the ability of the environment, and also races and cultures, to dynamically evolve. Notwithstanding his "abominable" misogyny, Schopenhauer's writings resonate with certain strands of ecofeminism and care theory, alongside contemporary Buddhist and decolonial feminisms.[61] It is, therefore, worth looking back at his philosophy to see if it can help feminists find remedies for the current global and environmental crises.

Notes

1. Arthur Schopenhauer, "On Women," *Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays, Volume 2,* trans. and ed. Adrian Del Caro and Christopher Janaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), Ch. 27, §367, 554 [6/655]. The reference gives the chapter title and number, then section number and page numbers. In square brackets is the volume number, followed by the page numbers in Arthur Schopenhauer, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Arthur Hübscher (Mannheim: F.A. Brockhaus, 7 vols, 1988).
2. Schopenhauer, "On Women," §369, 555 [6/656].
3. May Sinclair, "Letter to Samuel Alexander," March 16, 1926. Cited in Emily Thomas, "The Idealism and Pantheism of May Sinclair," *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* 5, no. 2 (2019): 137–157, doi:10.1017/apa.2018.45.
4. Helene von Druskowitz, *Wie ist Verantwortung und Zurechnung ohne Annahme der Willensfreiheit möglich?* (Heidelberg: Georg Weiß, 1887); Erna [Helene von Druskowitz], *Pessimistische Kardinalsätze. Ein Vademekum für die freiesten Geister* (Wittenberg: Herrosé Zimsen Verlag, 1905).
5. S. Pearl Brilmyer, "Schopenhauer and British Literary Feminism," in *The Palgrave Schopenhauer Handbook*, ed. S. Shapshay (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 397–424.
6. E A. McCobb, "*Daniel Deronda* as Will and Representation: George Eliot and Schopenhauer," *The Modern Language Review* 80, no. 3 (1985): 533–549. For Eliot's Spinozism see Benedictus de Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans. George Eliot, ed. Clare Carlisle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020).
7. Brilmyer, "Schopenhauer," 404; and see *Olive Schreiner Letters Online*, letter 55, March 2, 1885. www.oliveschreiner.org/vre?view=collections&colid=137&letterid=55.
8. Helen Zimmern, *Arthur Schopenhauer: His Life and Philosophy* (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1876), 228, and see Brilmyer, "Schopenhauer," 417.
9. 1819 appears on the title page of the first German edition of volume 1 of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, but it was published in late 1818. All references will be to Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. and ed. Judith Norman, Alistair Welchman and Christopher Janaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, vol. 1, 2010; vol. 2, 2018). [Henceforward cited as *WWR*, followed by the Volume, Book, Section or Chapter number, then the page numbers. In square brackets is the volume number, followed by the page numbers in Arthur Schopenhauer, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Arthur Hübscher (7 vols, 1988).].
10. Frederick C. Beiser. *After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840–1900* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 12.
11. Dale Jacquette, ed., *Schopenhauer, Philosophy and the Arts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
12. *WWR2*, IV, ch. 48, 620 [3/695]; *WWR1*, IV, §59, 350–351 [2/382–384].
13. *WWR2*, II, ch. 28, 374 [3/410]; *WWR1*, IV, §58, 348 [2/379].
14. *WWR2*, IV, ch. 42, 526–530 [3/584–589].
15. *WWR1*, IV, §59, 352 [2/385]. Jacob Golomb, "The Inscrutable Riddle of Schopenhauer's Relations to Jews and to Judaism," in *The Oxford Handbook of Schopenhauer,* ed. Robert L. Wicks, 425–445 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).
16. May Sinclair, *The New Idealism* (New York: Macmillan, 1922), x. And see May Sinclair, *A Defence of Idealism: Some Questions and Conclusions* (London: Macmillan, 1917), xii.
17. Christine Battersby, "May Sinclair's Philosophy Books in The London Library (Part II)," The website of the *May Sinclair Society*, May 11, 2020, https://maysinclairsociety.com/people-and-research/may-sinclairs-philosophy-books-in-the-london-library-part-ii/.
18. May Sinclair, *The Divine Fire* (New York: H. Holt, reprint, 1905), 269–270.
19. May Sinclair, *Mary Olivier: A Life* (London: Virago, 1980), 232, 294, 254. Since there is no English equivalent of the term *Vorstellung* (which suggests that which is presented to consciousness or the mind's eye), the English word "Idea" has often been used instead of "Representation," and Sinclair follows that convention here.

20. May Sinclair, *Arnold Waterlow: A Life* (New York: Hutchinson, 1924), 185. See also Battersby, "May Sinclair"; also Eduard von Hartmann, *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, trans. William Chatterton Coupland, 3 vols. (London: Trübner & Co, 1884). Sinclair owned the 3 volume German edition of 1890. For the influence of Schopenhauer on Hartmann (1842–1906) see Beiser, *After Hegel*, 46–48, 184ff.
21. Sinclair, *Arnold*, 285, 327, 440–442.
22. Julian Sinclair [pseudonym], *Nakiketas and Other Poems* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co, 1886).
23. Theophilus E. M. Boll, "May Sinclair and the Medico-Psychological Clinic of London," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 106, no. 4 (Aug. 22, 1962): 310–326.
24. May Sinclair, *A Journal of Impressions in Belgium* (New York: Macmillan, 1915), 10, 11, 167, 253, 256–257, 264.
25. For Hitler see Yvonne Sherratt, *Hitler's Philosophers* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 23; for Franz Marc see Rose-Carol Washton Long, ed., *German Expressionism: Documents* (Berkeley: California University Press, 2013), 162–164. Sinclair scholars have expressed unease with Sinclair's *Journal*, not only because of its many inaccuracies, but also on account of Sinclair's apparently irrational passions and war fever; but without registering the links to Schopenhauer's philosophy. See, for example, Suzanne Raitt, *May Sinclair: A Modern Victorian* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), ch. 5.
26. Sinclair, *Journal*, 157, and see 12, 69, 167–168.
27. *Ibid*., 218–222, for example.
28. *Ibid*., 169–272, 255–260.
29. May Sinclair, "The Way of Sublimation," Annotated Typescript Carbon, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, University of Pennsylvania, Box 24, Folder 439. With thanks to Rebecca Bowler for supplying the digital files. I have corrected obvious misspellings. The manuscript is only now scheduled for publication in the forthcoming "Edinburgh Critical Editions of the Works of May Sinclair," ed. Rebecca Bowler and Claire Drewery (in preparation).
30. Sinclair, "Sublimation," 3–4, 23.
31. *Ibid*., 113–114.
32. May Sinclair, *Feminism* (London: The Women Writers' Suffrage League, 1912), 30.
33. Margaret A. Simons, "Two Interviews with Simone de Beauvoir," trans. J. M. Todd, *Hypatia* 3, no. 3 (1989): 13.
34. Simone de Beauvoir, *Diary of a Philosophy Student Volume 1, 1926–1927*, ed. Barbara Klaw et al., trans. Barbara Klaw (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006). Volume 1 of the *Diary* appeared in English before being published in French as Simone de Beauvoir, *Cahiers de jeunesse*, ed. Sylvie Le Bon de Beauvoir (Paris: Gallimard, 2008).
35. Beauvoir, *Diary*, 225, quoting *WWR1*, IV, §57, 338 [2/367]. I have kept Klaw's wording which seeks to reflect Beauvoir's French.
36. Beauvoir, *Diary*, 252–54, quoting *WWR1*, II, §26, 163 [2/165]; III, §52, 295 [2/315]; IV, §54, 301 [2/323], 304–305 [2/328], 305 [2/328], 306–307 [2/330–331]; IV, §57, 337 [2/367], 338 [2/368], 339 [2/369], 342 [2/373]; IV, §58, 348 [2/379]; IV, §67, 403 [2/444], 404 [2/446]. In the French edition the Schopenhauer quotations are ascribed to May 11, 1927, *Cahiers*, 339–341. The disagreement about dates is understandable given the insertions and additions that are a feature of the notebooks.
37. Beauvoir, *Diary,* 258; *Cahiers,* 344. In the French edition the enthusiastic comments on Schopenhauer are made in the very next diary entry, after the quotations, dated—as in the English version—May 13, 1927.
38. For Beauvoir on her childish "love match" with Jacques see Le Bon de Beauvoir, "Introduction" to Beauvoir, *Cahiers*, 27.
39. Beauvoir, *Diary*, 246.
40. Beauvoir, *Diary*, 252.; *WWR1*, II, §26, 163 [2/165].
41. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, trans. B. Frechtman (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1962).

42. Simone de Beauvoir, "Two Unpublished Chapters from *She Came to Stay,*" in *Philosophical Writings*, ed. Margaret A. Simons, Marybeth Timmermann and Mary Beth Mader, 31–75 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004). For a more detailed analysis, see Christine Battersby, "Simone de Beauvoir, Stream of Consciousness and Philosophical Fiction: Becoming a Self in the First Draft of *She Came to Stay*," *Literature Compass* 17, no. 6 (2020): e12553, https://doi.org/10.1111/lic3.12553.
43. The epigraph is missing from the English translation: Simone de Beauvoir, *She Came to Stay*, trans. Y. Moyse and R. Senhouse (London: Harper Perennial, 2006).
44. Beauvoir, "Two Unpublished," 44–45.
45. Beauvoir, "Two Unpublished," 42.
46. *WWR2*, IV, ch. 41, 484 [3/533, 3/534]; ch. 44, 554 [3/616], 565 [3/629], 566 [3/631].
47. Schopenhauer, "On Women," Ch. 27, §369, 556 and fn. f. [6/657–658]; Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, trans. and eds. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (London: Vintage, 2011), 106, 420, 421.
48. Beauvoir, *Second Sex*, 185, 116.
49. "Biological Data"—the English chapter title—misses the philosophical point. In French editions this chapter is sometimes missing or severely abridged.
50. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, trans. Hazel Barnes (London: Methuen, 1966), 489–553.
51. Beauvoir, *Second Sex*, 293
52. Beauvoir, *Second Sex*, 35, 38–39.
53. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Coming of Age*, trans. Patrick O'Brian (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), 35, 201–203, 275, 350, 374, 449, 459, 491.
54. Beauvoir, *Second Sex*, 766–768; Simone de Beauvoir, "Women and Creativity," trans. Roisin Mallaghan, in *French Feminist Thought: A Reader,* ed. Toril Moi (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 17–32.
55. Beauvoir, *Ethics*, 129, 55–58.
56. Battersby, "Simone," 7–9.
57. Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Lawrence A. Blum, "Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory," *Ethics* 98, no. 3 (1988): 472–791.
58. Josephine Donovan, "Attention to Suffering: A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals," *Journal of Social Philosophy* 27, no. 1 (1996): 98–99 fn1, 98, 81–90.
59. Luce Irigaray, *Between East and West: From Singularity to Community,* trans. Stephen Pluhácek (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), ch. 1.
60. See Joy Morny, *Divine Love: Luce Irigaray, Women, Gender, and Religion* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 137–141.
61. For Buddhism see Erin McCarthy, *Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010).