

EMOTION AND OTHER MINDS

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What is the relation between emotional experience and its behavioural expression? As very preliminary clarification, I mean by 'emotional experience' such things as the subjective feeling of being afraid of something, or of being angry at someone. On the side of behavioural expression, I focus on such things as cowering in fear, or shaking a fist or thumping the table in anger. Very crudely, this is behaviour intermediate between the bodily changes which just happen in emotional arousal, such as sweating or the secretion of adrenalin, and reasoned actions done 'out of an emotion', such as breathing deeply to clam down, or writing a letter of complaint, for which a standard rationalizing explanation can be given.¹ I pursue the relation between this experience and expression in a somewhat roundabout manner. First, I note an analogy between a problem of other minds, and Berkeley's (1975) challenge to Locke's (1975) realism. Second, I sketch what I regard as the correct strategy for meeting this challenge. Third, I develop and defend a parallel response to the problem of other minds, as this applies to certain basic directed emotions. This yields the following answer to my opening question. Reference to the appropriate expressive behaviour is essential to the identification of the way in which various emotional experiences present their worldly objects.

I

Berkeley's (1975) central challenge to Lockean realism (Locke, 1975) can be put like this. Existence, for perceptible things - that is, for the familiar physical objects which we encounter in perception - is precisely what we recognize these things to have when we perceive them. Perception of such things just is perception of their existence. This is the most basic source of our conception of what the existence of such things consists in,

¹This rough characterization draws on Goldie, 2000; and Pickard, draft.

hence of what we mean by 'existence' for such things, hence of what it is for them to exist as we understand this. So how could their existence - again, insofar as we have any genuine conception of this - possibly be detached entirely from their being perceived? It must, rather, be tied in some way to perception (to their being perceived, actually, by us or by God; or to the possibility of certain perceptions of them under various counterfactual conditions).²

Analogously, in my view, one problem of other minds, at least, can be put like this. Being psychologically ψ is precisely what is recognized as instantiated in a person's own subjective experience of being ψ . This is the most basic source of her conception of what being ψ consists in, hence of what she means by 'being ψ ', hence of what it is to be ψ insofar as she understands this. So how could what it is to be ψ - again, insofar as she grasps what this is - possibly be detached entirely from her subjective experience? It must, rather, be tied in some way to that very experience. But then how is she supposed to make any sense at all of another's being ψ ? How could anything ascribed simply on the basis of another's observable behaviour possibly be just that psychological condition?

II

²There is also, I think, a strong structural parallel here with one strand in Michael Dummett's more general challenge to realism of various kinds (Dummett, 1978, 1991). According to Dummett, truth, for statements in a given area, is precisely what we recognize to obtain when we verify such statements in the most basic way available in that area (by direct observation, in the empirical case, say; or by actually giving a proof in the mathematical case). To observe that p , for some empirical statement ' p ', just is to observe that ' p ' is true. This is the most basic source of our conception of what the truth of such statements consists in, hence of what we mean by 'truth' for such statements, hence of what it is for them to be true as we understand this. So how could their truth - again, insofar as we have any genuine conception of this - possibly be detached entirely from this method of verification? It must, rather, be tied in some way to the possibility of such verification. The difficult issue is precisely what the relation is between truth and verification in any given area, and what slack this leaves between truth and actual verification by us now. Nevertheless, if Dummett's argument is sound, the realist picture of empirical truth, say, as utterly unconstrained by our observational recognition of it is a metaphysical prejudice.

I think that the most promising response to Berkeley's challenge is what I shall call the 'Strawson-Evans Strategy' (SES).³ This insists that the possibility of existence unperceived is built into a correct characterization of perceived existence. A proper account of what it is for a person to perceive a physical object will entail that this object is, evidently, something whose existence is quite independent of any such perception of it.⁴

The key move here is the complete rejection of Berkeley's initial characterization of the perceptual perspective itself, on which this is exhaustively constituted by the presence or absence of wholly mind-dependent 'ideas', whose essence is being perceived, and which are individuated entirely without reference to anything in the mind-independent world. A good deal of contemporary discussion shares his starting point, attempting to supplement essentially that conception of the perceptual perspective with some kind of independent theory as the source for our understanding of the possibility of existence unperceived. So far as I can see, though, Berkeley is just right that the most to be achieved by this route is some form of idealism. Either physical objects are conceived as logical constructs out of actual or possible ideas, in which case the result is one or other form of empirical idealism, which nevertheless may allow such objects some kind of existence when not actually being perceived by me now.⁵ Or there really are entities whose existence is wholly independent of any experience; but these are postulated in explanation of some feature of the mind-dependent empirical world of ideas, which is all that is directly available in perception. In the latter case, the idealism is of a transcendental variety (Kant, 1929). Either way, the familiar world of tables, trees, people and other animals, insofar as this is what is presented in our perceptual experience, is not

³This is the response initiated by Strawson (1959, 1966, and 1974) and Evans (esp. 1980, and also 1982).

⁴Similarly, in connection with Dummett's anti-realist argument, the response would be that the possibility of verification-transcendent truth is made available automatically by a proper account of verification - at least in the empirical case, in which verification consists in direct perception.

⁵See Foster, 1985, for an excellent presentation of two of the most promising versions of Berkeley's own position here, and of their serious difficulties too.

after all wholly independent of our minds or our experience of it. So the Berkeleian challenge is left unmet.

The whole point of SES, on the other hand, is to register the respect in which the perceptual perspective cannot possibly be characterized other than as the presentation to a person of a mind-independent world. Reference to mind-independent things, as such, is essential to the individuation of perceptual experiences. Thus, the possibility of existence unperceived is built into the very idea of perceived existence, not a secondary theoretical construct out of it.

To see this strategy in action, consider what unifies experiences of redness, say, or of circularity. How are just these experiences to be individuated from the subjective perspective? The correct answer is that these experiences are precisely those which display something in the world as being objectively thus and so, as being red, or as being circular. An account must then be given, of course, of what it is for worldly items to be objectively thus and so, of how redness or circularity as applied to such things themselves are to be individuated; and to avoid circularity (of the unacceptable kind), this account of the relevant mind-independent properties must be explanatory of, rather than merely constituted by, their disposition to give rise to precisely the experiences in question. Having said that, meeting this non-circularity condition is in my view quite consistent with the possibility, in certain cases at least, that the account in question may only be understood by those who have had just those experiences.⁶

Experiences of redness, as opposed to experiences of greenness, then, are those experiences which display things in the world as being red, rather than green or any other colour; and the most fundamental characterization, in turn, of which way of being coloured being red is, is as ‘that colour’, said, or thought, whilst pointing at something red. Thus:

⁶See Campbell, 1993, for a very important discussion of the central issues here.

(R1) to be red is to be that colour; and

(R2) experiences of redness are precisely those which present something as being red, i.e. as being just that colour.⁷

(R2) provides the analysis of certain colour experiences in terms of the way in which they present mind-independent objects; (R1) provides the supplementary, but theoretically prior and independent, account of what it is to be the way in which these experiences present such objects as being.

So, perceiving the existence of something red is being presented with something's being mind-independently coloured in that specific way. It is therefore a matter of being presented with something whose existence in that condition is thereby presented as independent of one's perception of it. Thus, although perception provides the source of one's conception of what it is to be in that condition, this is nevertheless a conception of a condition whose existence and nature are entirely independent of any such perception.

III

1. It is not my purpose here to give any detailed development or defence of SES as a satisfactory response to Berkeley's challenge. My point in raising it is rather to suggest a line of investigation, at least, in connection with the parallel problem of other minds. Again, the first move is to reject any initial characterization of a person's subjective experiential perspective upon her own mental life simply as a phenomenal presence, individuated entirely without reference to its characteristic behavioural expression, only to be connected with others' behaviour by some kind of extraneous theoretical supplement. Instead, the way in which a person's psychological condition presents itself

⁷The account of colour perception here, and, indeed, my basic approach to the case of objective perception in this paper overall, is heavily indebted to John Campbell (1993).

to her has to be reconfigured, so that the possibility of applying the very same psychological concepts as are accessible from within this perspective to other people on the basis of their observable behaviour is built into its proper characterization.

The issue to focus upon, then, is the individuation of a person's emotional condition from the subjective experiential perspective. How are her basic emotional states to be characterized as these present themselves to her own subjective point of view? The challenge is to understand how it may be that this individuation itself makes essential reference to the forms of observable behaviour on the basis of which the very same emotional states may therefore intelligibly be ascribed to others. Yet this must also be done in a way which acknowledges the privileged status of the first person perspective, and certainly without any implication that emotional self-ascriptions depend upon the subject's assurance that she is exhibiting appropriate expressive behaviour.

2. As is well known, William James (1890, ch. 25) offers an account of roughly this kind, on which emotional experiences are simply identified with feelings of various basic bodily changes - those characteristic of the emotions in question - as these occur. His motivation is phenomenological, rather than any concern with the problem of other minds. The subtraction, in imagination, of all feeling of such bodily changes from any genuine emotional response, he claims, would leave, at best, the mere thought or perception of some worldly item as thus and so, altogether devoid of any authentic emotional content. I agree with James that removing all reference to behaviour does serious damage to the phenomenology of emotional experience by simply ignoring its fundamentally bodily nature. On the other hand, the idea of a "cold and neutral state of intellectual perception [of some worldly item and thus and so]" (1890, p. 451), with which he correctly contrasts a genuinely emotional response, succeeds in capturing something which his own account misses, at least in the cases with which I am primarily concerned here, of basic directed emotions. For his identification of emotional experiences with feelings of bodily changes leaves their object entirely external to the

nature of the experiences themselves, as if one first felt afraid alright, but then had to go on the look out for some likely candidate object of one's fear. In feeling afraid of something, though, the identity of the object of one's experience is simply not opaque in this way. That one is afraid of that particular object or event is absolutely perspicuous, and intrinsic to the experience itself. So it looks as though we need to combine elements from both James' own theory and the idea of emotions as presenting specific worldly objects in some way with which he contrasts it.

Our question is what unifies fear phenomena - those conditions of a person which constitute her being afraid of something. What unifies them, as cases of fear, from the subject's own experiential point of view? Very much along the lines adopted in my brief discussion of colour experiences, I propose that the first step here is to characterize these experiences in terms of their presentation to the subject of some specific worldly item in a certain light: as frightening in some way. This, I claim, corrects the deficiency in James' account, of leaving the identity of the object of a person's directed emotions quite open in the characterization of the experiences themselves. Once again, though, as with the case of colour, any theory along these lines requires a supplementary account of what it is for a worldly item to be frightening in this sense. That is to say, we need an answer to the further question, how to individuate the characteristic light in which a person's experience of being afraid of something presents that thing; and, if the theory as a whole is to avoid circularity, this must be explanatory of, rather than merely constituted by, the fact that things which are that way are disposed to give rise to the very experience in question, to a person's being afraid of them. It is at just this point, I believe, that the crucial disanalogy appears with the case of colour perception, which enables my account also to satisfy James' phenomenological insight about the bodily nature of emotional experiences, and, at the same time, offers the prospect of a solution to the problem of other minds.

So, I begin with a parallel to (R2) in the case of fear as this presents itself to the subjective experiential perspective, or to its first clause at least:

(F2) experiences of being afraid are precisely those which present something in a certain light, as frightening.

What we need next is the supplementary account, (F1), of what it is for something actually to be the way in which something which is presented in this light is thereby presented as being. What is it for external objects or events to be frightening in this sense? The parallel with the case of colour remains, I contend, at least in the fact that the most basic characterization of the relevant worldly phenomenon here is again ineliminably demonstrative; but there is also a highly significant respect in which (F1) has to deviate from the guideline provided by (R1).

The key difference between the two cases is that, whereas, in the case of colour, the demonstrative characterization of what it is for something in the world to be red, say, is a standard perceptual demonstrative, the characterization of what it is for something in the world to be the way it is presented as being in a person's experience of being afraid of it, for example, is, I claim, what I shall call a behavioural demonstrative. In the former case, perceptual experience displays something as being that colour, on the basis of which it is possible to grasp which mind-independent property it is which experiences of redness are individuated as presenting, what it is, that is to say, for something to be red. In the latter case, the way things are characteristically presented as being in a person's experience of being afraid of them is once again to be demonstratively individuated, not by appeal to a perceptual presentation of a certain mind-independent property of things, though, but rather by appeal to the actual performance of a certain type of (expressive) behaviour: the experience presents things as eliciting just that kind of behaviour in the subject.

Thus, the most fundamental characterization of what it is for something to be frightening is as 'that way', thought or said whilst performing the behaviour in question, where this provides a means by which to identify a specific condition of worldly objects and events, namely, the condition of eliciting behaviour of just that kind in the subject in question. So:

(F1) to be frightening is to be thus, and

(F2) experiences of being afraid are precisely those which present something in a certain light, as frightening, i.e. as being thus,

where the referent of the behavioural demonstrative figuring in (F1) is the property, roughly speaking, of eliciting certain behaviour in the subject: precisely the kind of behaviour which provides the accompanying demonstration.⁸

An account along these lines seems to me to avoid the difficulty with James' own account, of leaving the object of directed emotions entirely opaque in their subjective characterization. For emotional experience is to be characterized as presenting some specific worldly item in a certain light: as frightening, say. Nevertheless, the account secures James' phenomenological insight concerning the bodily nature of such experiences. For the relevant worldly item is presented as eliciting a certain kind of behaviour in the subject. Relatedly, it also offers the possibility of a satisfactory solution to my initial problem of other minds. For the individuation of a given emotional condition from the subjective experiential perspective makes essential reference to the kind of behaviour on the basis of which that very same condition may reasonably be ascribed to others. Hence there is no obstacle to the very same thing - just that condition - being ascribed simply on the basis of another's observable performance of that very behaviour.

⁸See § 3 below for discussion of the crucial question of what unifies behaviour of this kind.

3. The obvious question at this point is precisely which behaviour is presented as being elicited in a person by something of which she is afraid? Here we reach a parallel to the point mentioned only in passing earlier, that the account which I gave of colour experience individuation may only be understood by those who have had precisely the experiences concerned - for only they properly understand which property of mind-independent things redness is. In the present context, the point is that the most basic way to characterize the expressive behaviour exploited in identifying the way in which something is presented in a person's experience of being afraid of it is again demonstrative, as this kind of behaviour, said or thought whilst actually performing it, and here attending to the behaviour itself, rather than exploiting that very behaviour in referring to the worldly condition of eliciting such behaviour. The question to press, though, is how this demonstration succeeds in identifying a specific type of behaviour; and children's emotional development suggests the following answer.

In the early stages of a child's first year, certain environmental phenomena simply provoke various patterns of behaviour. Although these are recognizably associated with certain basic emotions, in the eyes of observing adults, they are at this stage most appropriately thought of as mere responses, wrung from the child automatically, rather than expressions of any specific emotional condition. Over the next few years there is an evolving process of attunement, regulation and reinforcement of these initially automatic responses. To begin with, this is wholly orchestrated by caregivers; but it soon develops into a genuinely dyadic interaction, in which increasingly subtle and complex responses are harmonized between participants and mutually modified in various circumstances. As a result, the child learns simultaneously to categorize behaviour as of just this type, thought whilst performing some appropriate exemplar, and to recognize various items as eliciting behaviour of that type in him. Thus, as his response develops into one of genuinely feeling afraid of the relevant worldly phenomena, say, he also acquires a determinate identification of his, now expressive, behaviour, in terms of which this

feeling is itself to be individuated. Furthermore, what were initially natural bodily responses involuntarily wrung from the infant are now subject to a limited amount of control. The presentation of something as eliciting, or calling forth, such responses in a person is therefore compatible with her inhibiting or stifling her actual performance to some extent, or overriding the experience, as it were, by deliberately doing something else in the attempt to avoid or modify her outward expression.

It follows from all of this that the account of emotional experience individuation on offer here may also only be properly understood by those who have had something like the experiences concerned. For it identifies a given emotional experience by appeal to a behavioural demonstrative identification of the worldly condition of eliciting such and such behaviour in the subject, where the most basic knowledge of what is involved in having just that behaviour elicited in this way is available only to those with experience of expressing the emotion in question in that very behaviour. This, I claim, is the correct sense in which a person's subjective experiential perspective upon her emotional life is fundamental, or primary, in relation to the objective behavioural perspective from which others interpret her emotions: she does not fully understand what fear is unless she has herself experienced it.⁹

Nevertheless, there may be a kind of knowledge of what a given emotion involves, of which condition it is, even, which is available in the absence of this subjective experiential acquaintance. For a given emotion may be descriptively identified, as what is normally caused by such and such circumstances, normally develops in such and such ways over time given such and such further influences, and normally provokes

⁹Perceptual demonstrative identification of the relevant type of expressive behaviour in others alone is insufficient for a proper understanding of the crucial notion of elicitation as this figures in the characterization of the emotional experience in question. As I remarked at the outset, this is intermediate between simply finding oneself engaged in some kind of behaviour, which just happens, as it were, and the reflective performance of a fully intentional action. What must be understood is the way in which emotion-expressive behaviour is drawn out of one by the circumstances, yet is also to some extent within one's control. And this is what requires actual immersion in intersubjective attunement, regulation and reinforcement of such expressive responses to the world.

such and such responses in those circumstances, where all of these causes and effects are characterized emotionally neutrally, as it were, in terms not drawing essentially upon prior grasp of the nature of the emotion concerned.¹⁰ Let us call any such emotionally neutral description of the characteristic causal-functional role of an emotion a descriptive schema for that emotion. On the basis of learning such a descriptive schema for each of a set of basic emotions, then, it may well be possible for a person to ascribe those emotions, quite reliably, in a reasonably wide range of circumstances. Or at least it may be possible for him to say, within that range, ‘a is ψ ’, roughly, when and only when that sentence is true, for each of the ‘ ψ ’ in question. Nevertheless, it is not possible for him genuinely to judge that a is ψ , without understanding which psychological condition ψ is; and the mere capacity to make these utterances in ‘appropriate’ such circumstances on the basis of a descriptive schema is, in my view, insufficient for a proper understanding. Although this capacity displays a kind of knowledge in connection with the condition in question, it falls short of any adequate grasp of the nature of that condition, of why, that is, these ‘appropriate’ circumstances really are appropriate to that condition. Thus, although there may be a certain facility with emotional vocabulary in the absence of any subjective experiential acquaintance with the phenomena which this vocabulary picks out, the subjective experiential perspective is nevertheless primary in a proper understanding of which phenomena these are.

4. My position here has some affinity with certain projectivist views, in ethics, for example, or concerning the secondary qualities. I myself think that these views face serious difficulties. So the question arises whether my own account is equally vulnerable.

¹⁰Precisely what this requires is far from straightforward. For nothing on the proposed list of causes and effects may be qualified in any way as an object, cause or expression of that emotion. Indeed, given this constraint, it is far from clear to me whether any such list could actually succeed in providing a remotely faithful extensional correlate of the target emotion. The issues here are complex and interesting. For a suggestive parallel, see Barry Stroud’s (2000, esp. ch. 7) argument for the claim that it is “a necessary condition of our acknowledging the presence in the world of perceptions of and beliefs about the colours of things that we believe that some objects are coloured” (p. 157). What I take this to suggest is that it is similarly impossible faithfully to identify the characteristic patterns of causes and effects of a given emotional experience without presupposing their status as objects, causes and expressions of that very emotion.

I shall argue that it is not. First, I set out the essence of a familiar form of projectivism. Second, I sketch what I regard as a powerful line of objection to this kind of view. Third, I go on to explain how any parallel problem is to be avoided in my own case.

Very crudely indeed, ethical projectivism begins with the claim that to hold that a certain action is morally wrong, say, is not, or is not straightforwardly, to regard it as instantiating some mind-independent property of being wrong. For there are no such objective moral properties. Rather, it is to experience, or in some way to express, a certain affective response to the action in question, a feeling of disapprobation towards it. Nevertheless, we have a natural tendency to ‘project’ this feeling of disapprobation out onto the action itself, whatever exactly that may be held to involve. This in turn explains our practice, which may in this context even be given some kind of legitimation, of treating our moral responses as conforming, or not, to the way things really are out there in the world.

There are of course numerous variations on this basic Humean theme, in which it is developed with more or less imagination and sophistication. A key question to ask of all of them, though, is this. How is the feeling of disapprobation itself, say, to be identified; how is this particular affective response to the world to be individuated from the subjective experiential perspective? In particular, does this individuation make any essential reference to the moral standing of the features of the world to which it is a response? If, on the one hand, it does, then the danger of circularity looms. For the whole point of the position is supposed to be that we first identify a certain affective response, and then derivatively characterize what is involved in our holding various actions or agents to be morally thus and so in terms of their eliciting just that response. Yet, on the current version of the view, we cannot even start to say which response is in question without a prior identification of the moral standing of the worldly features which prompt it, of what it is to be morally wrong, say, and thus of what it is to hold something to be so. On the other hand, if the feeling of disapprobation is supposed to be individuated entirely

independently of any question what the moral standing may be of the actions or agents which prompt it, then it is impossible to recognize it as the feeling of moral disapprobation at all. For, as Foot points out (1978), this is not something about which it is intelligible that it should be felt in response to anything. To take her own example, involving moral approbation this time rather than disapprobation: “Does it make sense to suppose that one might wake up one morning feeling approval of something believed to be an ordinary, unnecessary, unbeautiful speck of dust?” (Foot, 1978, p. 76). From the subjective experiential perspective, then, there are significant constraints upon what may intelligibly elicit the various affective responses characteristic of moral experience. Yet any attempt to bring these constraints directly into the individuation of such responses, by characterizing the latter as responses to certain moral qualities of things, introduces a fatal circularity into the overall projectivist account. Ethical projectivism is therefore incompatible with the nature of moral experience, or else it is circular.¹¹

In a way, my approach here shares with projectivism the idea of characterizing certain features of the world - in this case its emotionally salient features - in terms of a kind of projection of our responses to them. Our emotional responses, that is to say, have a certain primacy over the emotionally salient features of the world which are to be

¹¹Unsurprisingly, a very similar dilemma faces a closely related projectivism with respect to the secondary qualities. According to this view, our thought about the colours of things, say, is correctly to be construed as a ‘projection’, onto an austere world consisting only of physical things with their primary qualities (however exactly these are to be specified), of our colour-experiential responses to these things. Once again, though, the question to press is precisely how these responses themselves are supposed to be individuated from the subjective experiential perspective. If, on the one hand, this requires reference to the colours of things out there in the world, in characterizations such as ‘the appearance that o is red’, say, in which the embedded colour predicate has primary application to such worldly things, then circularity threatens. For we cannot understand which appearance this is until we know which property of o its being red is. Yet the projectivist is attempting to elucidate the latter in terms of a prior appeal to the former. On the other hand, if the relevant experiential response is supposed to be identified without any reference to the colour of the things to which it is our response, then it faces two related problems. First, it is completely unrecognizable as a colour experience as we all know and love these. Second, it leaves us entirely in the dark as to which colour property we are supposedly taking some mind-independent object to have when we go on to project this experience out onto the world around us. See Stroud, 2000, for a detailed and exhaustive development of these lines of objection to the various attempts at establishing a ‘subjectivist’ account of the colours of things.

regarded as something like a projection of them. So the question must be faced how exactly these emotional responses are to be individuated from the subjective experiential perspective. The analogous dilemma here, to the one which I have been raising in objection to more standard forms of projectivism, divides over the question whether or not this individuation makes essential reference to the emotional characteristics of the worldly features which prompt the responses in question. (F2) above looks like a straightforward endorsement of its first horn. For it is an explicit acknowledgement that the individuation of the experience of fear makes reference to the frightening nature of the things in the world which prompt it. So the threat of circularity is at least in the air. To see whether it is a real threat, we need to return to (F1), which provides an elucidation of what it is for something to be frightening. Modelled as it is upon the case of the secondary qualities, this may give the impression that any initial appearance of circularity is obviously illusory. This would be to lose sight of the projectivist element in the story, though. The demonstrative figuring in (F1) is not, as it is in (R1), a perceptual demonstrative, making direct reference to a certain mind-independent property of things out there, which is to be individuated without appeal to the projection of anything. It is, rather, a behavioural demonstrative, which refers only to the relational property of eliciting a certain response in the subject. Nevertheless, the threat of circularity is ultimately unconvincing. For the response in question is a specific type of behaviour, which can be identified directly, as just this behaviour, said or thought whilst performing some appropriate exemplar, much as the parallel perceptual demonstrative in the case of the secondary qualities directly identifies the property of being red as just that colour.

The second horn of the dilemma may now seem uncomfortably close. For, as is explicit in the final clause of (F2), the reference to things being frightening has apparently been eliminated altogether in the final subjective individuation of the experience of being afraid of something. This is, roughly, experience which presents something as eliciting such and such behaviour in the subject. So the threat now is that this experience has become unrecognizable as a genuinely emotional response. Again,

though, I claim that this is unfounded in the present case. It is a real threat in the ethical case, on the horn of the dilemma there on which it is denied that the moral standing of worldly features enters in any way into the individuation of the feelings of approbation or disapprobation to which they give rise. For this denial leaves the position incapable of accounting for the very real constraints, essential to the nature of anything genuinely recognizable as a feeling of moral approbation or disapprobation, upon the kinds of things to which such a feeling can intelligibly be a response. These essential constraints are provided, I claim, by the idea that the experience of being afraid of something, which presents that thing as frightening, presents it as eliciting such and such characteristic behaviour in the subject. For the required constraints consist in the perfectly intelligible appropriateness, in creatures suitably like the subject in question, of just that kind of behaviour in response to the worldly phenomena in question, characterized emotionally neutrally of course. This is certainly a complex matter, combining biological-evolutionary factors with conventional-sociological factors, and no doubt others besides; but it is, in the main, an intelligible relation, and therefore constrains the range of phenomena to which a given emotional response may reasonably be felt.

5. This may be all very well, so far as it goes; but a revised dilemma now comes into view. For let us turn to the behaviour itself, which is presented as elicited by the object of a person's fear, rather than the experience which presents that thing as eliciting such behaviour. Again, the question is whether this is to be individuated only by making reference to the frightening nature of the object in question, as behaviour expressive in some way of the subject's fear, say, or whether it may be characterized entirely without appeal to the concept of fear, simply as some kind of neutral bodily movement. In the first case, the overall account appears once more to be circular. For it attempts to identify the experience of being afraid in terms of something's eliciting a certain kind of behaviour, which in turn may only be identified as expressive of fear, the very experience in question. In the second case, the account appears unfaithful to the phenomenon. For my being genuinely afraid of something is not just a matter of its being presented as

eliciting some neutral bodily movement in me, in a way which is utterly silent on what kind of thing it may be. It is possible to avoid this final dilemma too, though. For, as I argued earlier, the most basic identification of the relevant kind of behaviour, which figures in the characterization of a person's experience of being afraid of something, and indeed of what is involved in its being appropriately elicited, is as this kind of behaviour, said or thought whilst having some suitable exemplar elicited by the world in just this way, where this demonstrative identification is made available only as the subject also comes to recognize various things in the world as eliciting such behaviour in her, that is, as frightening. Therefore there is neither circularity nor disloyalty to the phenomenon. For the demonstrative neither identifies this behaviour as the expression of fear, nor in a way which is only accidentally related to what the subject finds frightening.

6. Finally, then, to return to my opening question: what is the relation between emotional experience and its behavioural expression? Reference to this behaviour is essential to the identification of the way in which the emotional experience in question presents its worldly object. For this experience just is the experience of that thing as eliciting such behaviour in the subject.¹²

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