DANTO AND KANT
TOGETHER AT LAST?*

1 Danto and Kant

Danto and Kant: for anyone who has followed debates in either the theory or the philosophy of art over the last 40-odd years, this has to look like a very odd couple. Indeed, “The Odd Couple” might have served equally well as a title for what follows: an attempt to show how much Danto’s and Kant’s aesthetics have in common, counterintuitive as that may sound; and, within the context of this broad commonality, to offer a comparative analysis of the merits of their respective accounts of our relation – both cognitive and affective – to works of art. Given that art since the 1960s is widely thought to pose particular problems for aesthetic theories of art (such as Kant’s), to which various forms of cognitivism in the philosophy of art (such as Danto’s) have been offered as solutions, I intend to conduct this comparison on artistic terrain with which Danto (but not Kant) would be naturally associated – to see whether Kant’s aesthetics withstands the challenge. That Danto’s theory speaks to contemporary art hardly bears saying; his ontology was conceived in order to meet the challenges posed by art after modernism – but Kant and contemporary art? According to current consensus, the value of Kant’s aesthetics for the theory of art was tied to the fate of formalism, with which it is widely regarded (at least outside Kant scholarship) to have sunk.

Contrary to this perception, I believe that Kant’s theory of art remains a valuable, if underused, resource for understanding our relation – both cognitive and affective – to art after modernism. Until recently, one would have had little difficulty anticipating where Danto stood on this question – having tarred Kant’s aesthetics with the brush of Greenbergian formalism in *After the End of Art.*1 Despite this, the view that Kant’s aesthetics may prove amenable for contemporary theories of art received Danto’s surprise

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endorsement with the publication of “Embodied Meanings, Isotypes, and Aesthetical Ideas,” in 2007. Here Danto asks whether his own most basic claim that works of art are “embodied meanings” – that is, entities that are, irreducibly, both about something, and embody what they are about – might be seen as an inheritance (albeit unwitting) of Kant’s theory of fine art as “the expression of aesthetic ideas.” Whether this rather counter-intuitive sounding suggestion is plausible is what I want to examine here.

My procedure will be straightforward: I shall look at Danto’s and Kant’s respective views of the embodiment of meaning in art in turn. Both Danto and Kant can be seen as proponents of expressionism in the philosophy of art, to the extent that both hold works of art to embody, and thereby express, the mental states (broadly construed to encompass beliefs, attitudes, and feelings) of those that created them and, if successful, to dispose their viewers to a similar state. Moreover, both appeal – explicitly, in the case of Danto, implicitly in the case of Kant – to a conception of metaphor in their account of what a work of art is.

I shall begin with Danto’s most recent remarks about Kant, and track backwards, through the qualified “aesthetic turn” of the Abuse of Beauty, to Danto’s most developed account of artworks as “embodied meanings” in Transfiguration of the Commonplace. My goal in doing so is to show both that those aspects of Danto’s recent work, which might otherwise be taken as a fundamental reorientation of his earlier work, may be traced back to its foundational statement in Transfiguration of the Commonplace, and that they can pose internal problems for Danto’s standard arguments against aesthetic theories to date. This raises the heretical thought that Danto’s own theory, contrary to both his own presentation of it and its orthodox reception, might commit Danto, despite himself, to an aesthetics after all. In this light, I juxtapose Danto’s proposed cognitivist alternative to aesthetic theories – that to understand a work of art (through interpretation) is, at root, “to grasp the metaphor that is always there” – with Kant’s theory of fine art as the “expression of aesthetic ideas,” in order to bring out their common commitment to a metaphorical conception of artistic meaning. In doing so, I draw on a recent paper by Kirk Pillow that distinguishes two competing conceptions of metaphor in Kant’s theory of art: I suggest that Danto’s broadly Aristotelian view of metaphor has one significant feature in common with what Pillow calls Kant’s “weak” conception of metaphor. I go on to argue that what Pillow calls the “strong” conception of metaphor at work in Kant’s theory of aesthetic ideas offers something that neither Kant’s “weak” conception nor Danto’s thorough going cognitivism can provide, namely a basis for understanding the longevity of art – the widely held intuition that we never reach the end of a successful work of art, that if we do, the work has failed in some crucial respect as art – by grounding it in the open-ended imaginative play that works of art elicit on Kant’s theory. I do this by bringing Kant’s account of aesthetic ideas to bear on Art & Language’s Index 01 (1972), the kind of work that would typically be thought to shipwreck Kant’s aesthetics in the face of recent art. My goal is to show otherwise.

2 Recent Danto on Kant’s Aesthetics

Danto’s perception of Kant’s aesthetics has always been mediated, and in my view distorted, by the controversial use to which Clement Greenberg put a version of Kant’s
theory of pure aesthetic judgment – for Kant, a judgment concerning “free,” conceptually unconstrained, beauties – in underwriting his activity as a formalist art critic. This remains true of what Danto has to say about what he calls, in my view misleadingly, the “Kant-Greenberg aesthetics of form” in his recent “Embodied Meanings” papers. I have taken issue with Danto’s tendency to take his Kant at Greenberg’s word before; but as several of the worries I have raised elsewhere still pertain to Danto’s presentation of Kant, I will briefly enumerate them for the record.3

To begin with an old saw, and the basis for Danto’s antipathy for the general tenor of Kant’s aesthetics over the years: the thought that for Kant “artistic excellence is at one with aesthetic excellence.”4 Although there is no doubt some prima facie plausibility to this charge – unlike Hegel, Kant does not set natural beauty aside in his opening remarks – it nonetheless ignores the crucial distinction Kant makes between “free” and “dependent” beauty (Critique of Judgment, §16). According to Kant the latter, but not the former, puts conceptual constraints on the beauty of works of art, in line with “what they are meant to be” – thereby building intention, and some minimal cultural milieu, into the account at the ground level.5 To cite Kant’s own example: a beautiful church must not only be beautiful, its beauty must be fitting to its purpose as a place of worship; much that might otherwise please freely in aesthetic judgment would fall foul of this constraint. As such, the notion of dependent beauty puts a restriction on the scope of free beauty: it requires, to put it in Danto’s terms, that the beauty of a church must be conceptually constrained by (and hence “internal to”) its meaning or purpose. This idea of conceptually constrained beauty, as anyone who has followed Danto’s recent work will recognize, is remarkably similar to Danto’s own account of “internal beauty.”6 Indeed, it is axiomatic to both Danto’s philosophy of art and his philosophy of criticism that works of art should be judged for the appropriateness or “fit” of their form of presentation to the content thereby presented. If this is correct, there is nothing that need trouble Danto in Kant’s notion of dependent beauty – on the contrary, it is Kant’s notion of dependent (rather than free) beauty to which he should look. Of course, not all works of art are dependently beautiful for Kant – there are free artistic beauties, such as Kant’s notorious “designs à la grecque, the foliage on borders or on wall paper, etc.” – though the vast majority will be: if a work has any semantic content at all, it will be dependently beautiful (or “beautiful as . . .”) for Kant.7 But this need not trouble Danto either, given that not all art is internally beautiful on his own account.

Similarly, Danto routinely conflates Kant’s central claim that aesthetic pleasure is undetermined by concepts with the more contentious claim that it is independent of concepts. This would make Kant’s conception of pure aesthetic judgment (judgments of free rather than dependent beauty) “non-conceptual” in the strong sense of conceptually empty as opposed to the weaker sense of conceptually unconstrained.8 But Kant’s commitment to safeguarding the freedom of aesthetic judgment only commits him to the latter, namely that beauty cannot be directly inferred from the fulfillment of any concept or rule – a point since widely associated with Frank Sibley’s work on aesthetic concepts (the thought that no array of non-aesthetic properties ever suffices, logically, to license the inference of an aesthetic one).9 Then there is the contentious equation of what Greenberg means by “formal” (the design features of works of art) with what Kant means by this (generally, the a priori or “formal” conditions of aesthetic judgment, though also, in the
notorious remarks in *Critique of Judgment* §§13–14, the spatio-temporal configuration of particular, empirical works of art); and local infidelities such as the claim that judgments of taste are universally valid for Kant when, as Kant believes we can never know that we have made such a judgment (given the stringent conditions such judgments must fulfill and our opacity to our own motives and interests), the best we can do is lay claim, in full expectation of disagreement, to the assent of others. All these come together in Danto’s use of the generic “Kant–Greenberg aesthetics of form.”

The foregoing examples suffice to show how problematic that equation is.

That said, in fairness to Danto, his recent “Embodied Meanings” paper is also more attentive than before to various disparities between Greenberg and Kant, distinguishing between Kant’s concern (across art and nature) with beauty and Greenberg’s concern (exclusive to art) with quality; and acknowledging that while for both aesthetic judgment is non-conceptual (albeit in the sense I have contested above, which is not true of Kant and may not even be true of Greenberg), it is not therefore non-cognitive. Moreover, Danto now grants that many of Greenberg’s views on criticism owe more to Hume than to Kant, and accepts that one ought to calibrate claims about what counts as “aesthetic,” “anti-aesthetic,” or “non-aesthetic” to the relative restrictiveness of the aesthetic theory in question: though one will find Duchamp’s readymades anti-aesthetic on a narrowly formalist aesthetics that turns on the perceptual features of works of art, this leaves entirely undetermined whether the readymades might count as aesthetic according to some richer conception of aesthetic value. Hence it is no longer clear, even for Danto, that works such as Duchamp’s or Warhol’s shipwreck aesthetic theories tout court; it all depends what one means by “aesthetic.”

All this is to be welcomed, but rather than dwell further on these refinements to Danto’s previous positions vis-à-vis Greenberg and Kant here, I want to focus for the remainder of this chapter on what is new in Danto’s relation to Kant, namely his attempt to recoup Kant’s conception of aesthetic ideas for his own theory of art. I am sympathetic to this move to the extent that it looks like the right place to start in any discussion of the applicability of Kant’s aesthetics to recent art. About §49, Danto now claims: “the Kant of §49 is not the Kant of Kantian aesthetics, which is based almost entirely on the Analytic of Taste. I owe it to Kant – and to myself – to show how close my views are to his in this section of his book.” The plausibility of this claim is what I want to consider.

I shall briefly set out what Danto takes Kant to mean by an aesthetic idea, with a view to providing a more detailed account of my own later. *In nuce*, Danto regards aesthetic ideas as Kant’s recognition of the inadequacy of taste in the domain of art and, hence, of the fact that art requires more than taste, namely “spirit,” the inner animation conferred by ideas. What most interests Danto about such ideas is that they are given sensory embodiment; they are aesthetic in the sense, that is, of being “given to sense”: “Kant has stumbled onto something that is both given to sense and intellectual – where we grasp a meaning through the senses.” Danto notes in passing how, on Kant’s theory, the way this works relies on indirect meaning of the sort that characterizes both irony and metaphor – something I shall come back to, given the centrality of metaphor to both accounts. He also notes that presenting ideas in this way “expands” the imagination for Kant, though he does not elaborate on what this might mean. Finally, he equates Kant’s conception of aesthetic ideas, shorn of the baggage of taste and aesthetic judgment, with his own notion of embodied meanings:
Aesthetical ideas have nothing much to do with the aesthetics of taste, and they are what is missing entirely from Greenberg’s agenda, who seldom spoke of meaning in his discussions of quality in art.

My own view is that the relationship of aesthetics to art was always external and contingent . . . But the theory of art as embodied meanings – or the “aesthetical presentation of ideas” – makes it clear how aesthetic qualities can contribute to the meaning of the work that possesses them.15

Danto’s attempt to hive off “the Kant of §49” from the rest of the Third Critique (“the Kant of Kantian aesthetics”) is tailor-made to goad Kantians; and though I am neither sympathetic to it myself nor regard it as faithful to Kant’s own position, it would take me too far from my present purposes to address it here, given how complex and contentious the relation between formalism and expressionism in the Third Critique still is.16 Instead, I want to examine whether Danto’s identification of Kant’s “aesthetic presentation of ideas” with his own “embodied meanings” is credible, taken on his own terms.

3 Late Danto’s “Aesthetic Turn”?  

Giving an account of the relation, assuming there is one, between aesthetic ideas and “embodied meanings” involves weighing the extent to which Danto may have been implicitly committed to an aesthetics of sorts all along. I believe that he has. But to show this requires two steps. In this section I consider what Danto himself says about the relation between aesthetics and the concept of art – specifically, whether aesthetic properties are necessary to the definition of art. Danto holds that they are not. In the next I argue that this conflicts with basic features of the ontology he has held since Transfiguration of the Commonplace. If this is correct, the latter has to win out, on pain of Danto having no way to differentiate works of art, properly so-called, from what he calls “mere representations,” according to his own theory. Danto’s protestations to the contrary notwithstanding then, I conclude that his conception of what a work of art is has had an ineliminable, if implicit, aesthetic dimension from the outset. This lays the ground for a direct comparison of Kant and Danto on our cognitive and affective relation to works of art.

Since The Abuse of Beauty appeared, in 2003, Danto has been concerned primarily with the legacy of his major work, Transfiguration of the Commonplace, on the one hand, and a reconsideration of aesthetics, notably Kant’s aesthetics – largely ignored in that work – on the other. As a result, several commentators, myself included, have drawn attention to an apparent, if heavily qualified, “aesthetic turn” in Danto’s late work, exemplified by his incorporation of the idea of “internal beauty” into his theory of art. This is the concession that beauty may be a necessary feature of some works of art after all, but only insofar as it is “internal to” their meaning. This would be the case when a work’s meaning requires a beautiful presentation, which must therefore figure in its interpretation as art.17 Failing that, a work’s beauty will remain adventitious to its meaning and hence, strictly speaking, irrelevant to it as art. On Danto’s account it would be incorrect to say that the work itself is beautiful in such cases; rather it is the “mere real thing” from which the work cannot be
visually discriminated, but to which it nonetheless cannot be reduced, that is beautiful in such instances. The mistake is to think the work itself must therefore be.

For Danto, Duchamp’s *Fountain* and Warhol’s *Brillo Boxes* would be examples of the latter, were they to be admired – perhaps formally – for their beauty as objects; they are “externally” beautiful. As Danto puts it, they would be merely “freely” beautiful, that is beautiful in a way that is orthogonal to their meaning as works of art. Maya Lin’s *Vietnam Veteran’s Memorial*, Robert Motherwell’s *Elegies to the Spanish Republic*, and Jacques-Louis David’s *Death of Marat*, by contrast, would be examples of the former; because their beauty is required by their meaning as works of art they are internally beautiful. In the case of Motherwell, for example, it is internal to the meaning of these paintings as works of mourning for the death of a political ideal (Motherwell himself described them as a “lamentation or funeral song,” “his private insistence that a terrible death happened that should not be forgot”) that they be beautiful; the somber nature of their beauty – their limited palette of forms and restricted use of color – works, in Danto’s terms, to “color” or “inflect” our attitude to what has been lost in such a way as to dispose us, the work’s viewers, to see it as something to be mourned. An analogous case could be made for Gerhard Richter’s *18 Oktober 1977* (1988) cycle of paintings – based on police photographs of members of the Baader-Meinhof gang found dead in Stammheim prison – given Richter’s intention to transform the “horror” of these documents into “something more like grief,” and thereby open up a space for mourning. Given, however, that it is clearly not the case that all works of art need be internally beautiful in Danto’s sense, beauty remains external to art’s definition nonetheless.

But what of aesthetic properties more generally – could it be that having some aesthetic property is a necessary feature of works of art after all? Danto thinks not. But that he does, I believe, is grounded on certain assumptions Danto seems never to have questioned. Only if one begins from the premises that (1) all aesthetic properties are perceptual, and (2) it is the primary task of aesthetic theories to distinguish art from non-art on the basis of such properties, is there reason to think (as Danto does) that drawing attention to the non-manifest differences that must obtain between art and non-art, in the event that the two are indiscernible, suffices to demonstrate the inadequacy of aesthetic theories of art.

Clearly, this would compromise such theories if one construes them as essentially sortal mechanisms for distinguishing art and non-art perceptually. But why suppose that? Many aesthetic theories are more concerned to define what, if anything, distinguishes the experience of art than they are to specify what is required to identify it. Indeed, there is no prima facie incompatibility between granting the force of those considerations Danto adduces for discriminating art, in the event of indiscernibility, whilst holding an aesthetic theory nonetheless: one can accept Danto’s strictures on identifying art – the necessity for a background knowledge of art history and theory that “the eye cannot descry,” for example – while retaining an aesthetic theory of the experience of art once that identification is in place. Aesthetic theories need not, as formalist theories arguably do, turn on those perceptual features of objects, narrowly construed, that may or may not (as the case may be) be used to discriminate art from non-art, as Danto supposes.

If this is correct, aesthetic theories are ill-characterized in Danto’s characteristic thought-experiments. Consider wit, understood as a piquant relation between ideas, as a
non-perceptual aesthetic property that many contemporary works of art exhibit. One does not literally see a work’s wit, the way one sees that it is so-high, so-colored, or made of such and such materials; one appreciates it when one appreciates the work as a whole. But why should the fact that one does not directly perceive a work’s wit by means of the senses warrant the conclusion that it is not an aesthetic property, as opposed to the more modest, and more warranted, conclusion that it is not a perceptual property, narrowly construed? In sum, to begin by defining aesthetic properties perceptually looks contentious, and perhaps even stipulative. One might, with greater justification, define art’s aesthetic properties functionally, as any feature of a work that engages the imagination in some particular way.

Be that as it may, Danto maintains that all aesthetic properties are perceptual; more specifically, he takes them to be those perceptual features of a work employed rhetorically to dispose its viewers to see its subject matter, the meaning embodied in the work, in a particular light. For Danto, then, an aesthetic quality is any quality that “inflects” or “colors” the attitude of a work’s recipient to its subject matter. The point of construing aesthetic properties in this way is to encourage a wider diet of aesthetic properties than has traditionally been entertained: on a rhetorical conception, the list is in principle open-ended. Hence Danto’s frequent invocation in recent years of J. L. Austin’s dictum, from “A Plea for Excuses”: “How much it is to be wished that . . . we could forget for a while about the beautiful and get down instead to the dainty and the dumpy.”

Nonetheless, while Danto may now be prepared to grant a wider variety of aesthetic properties, so conceived, a greater rhetorical role than previously in inflecting viewers’ attitudes toward the meaning of works of art, such properties remain as irrelevant, ontologically, as ever to a work’s existence as art: although aesthetic properties may be a necessary feature of some works of art, if they inflect their viewers’ attitudes in ways that are internal to the meaning those works embody, they are not a necessary feature of all works of art, and so remain external to art’s definition nonetheless. Now, it seems to me that this conclusion ought to present a serious problem for Danto, for reasons internal to his own theory; for it appears to entail that there can be artworks that express no point of view toward their own content (and hence have no recourse to aesthetic properties understood as “inflectors” of said content). To show that this is so, and why it ought to be a problem for Danto, I now turn to the ontology of art Danto set out in Transfiguration of the Commonplace.

4 Danto on Works of Art as “Embodied Meanings”

Noël Carroll has provided the most elegant summary of the ontology set out in Transfiguration of the Commonplace, one that has been endorsed by Danto himself. Carroll claims that, for Danto,
which ellipsis, in turn, engages audience participation in filling in what is missing (an operation which can also be called interpretation) (5) where the works in question and the interpretations thereof require an art-historical context (which context is generally specified as a background of historically situated theory).

In what follows, I shall focus on the second, third and fourth of Carroll’s five conditions [(2–4)]: the second speaks to the problem at hand (namely why Danto’s view that aesthetic properties are not necessary to art’s definition presents a problem for the integrity of his own theory); the third and the fourth speak to the parallels with Kant. “Aboutness” [(1)] is self-evidently definitional of works of art conceived as “embodied meanings”: for a work to possess meaning requires minimally that it be about something or other. Danto has a number of arguments to this conclusion, which seek to show that the difference between a “mere real thing” and a work of art that exactly resembles it must consist in the meaning that the latter, but not the former, may be supposed to convey, in virtue of their different histories of production – the most notorious featuring a doppelgänger of Rembrandt’s *Polish Rider* produced by a freak explosion in a paint shop. Only the original, and not its unlikely counterpart, supports an interpretation [(4)]. I do not propose to examine these arguments, or the plausibility of the thought–experiments that underwrite them – for the sake of argument, I propose to simply grant aboutness here.

Nonetheless, as Danto points out, there are many everyday artifacts (such as maps or diagrams) that are also about something, and hence possess semantic content, without that sufficing to make them art. Danto calls this sub-class of “mere real things” “mere representations” and asks, “What must we add to the concept of representationality which will make the difference between ordinary representations and works of art?” More is required, and Danto argues that expressing some attitude, or point of view, toward what they are about [(2)] provides what is necessary to distinguish mere representations, which are only about what they represent, but do not project any point of view toward it, from works of art, which do.

Consider, in this light, the contrast between a computer print out of a curve generated by plotting coordinates against two axes, and a perceptually indiscernible counterpart, also produced by computer, presented as art. While there might be good mathematical, demographic, or scientific reasons for asking why the former presents the precise curve that it does, depending on what it represents, it would make no sense to seek an interpretation for why the diagram itself takes the form that it does: that is just the way diagrams produced this way look. But the perceptually identical work of art might credibly be interpreted as “mechanical”: that is, as intentionally aping the artlessness of the former to make some artistic point – perhaps, in line with Danto’s penchant for angry young artists, to pour scorn on touch and virtuosity in *la belle peinture*. In Danto’s words, such an artwork would “use the way the non-artwork presents its content to make a point about how that content is presented.”

In Danto’s full-blown example, a diagram of a portrait of Madame Cézanne in Erle Loran’s book analyzing the structure of Cézanne’s paintings is appropriated by Roy Lichtenstein to make a point about how Cézanne sees the world: where Loran tries to make the scaffolding of a particular Cézanne perspicuous by means of a diagram, Lichtenstein’s
painting uses the former to make a point about the way the world – including the artist’s own wife – was perceived by Cézanne as so many geometrical figures and planes. Thus, although Lichtenstein’s painting may resemble a diagram, it is not in fact one; instead, it uses a diagrammatic idiom rhetorically, to express an attitude toward what it presents, and thereby color its viewers’ attitudes accordingly. So, where Loran produces a diagram of a painting, Lichtenstein employs a diagrammatic idiom within painting rhetorically, “transfiguring” his source material in the process. From this, and other, examples Danto concludes:

[W]orks of art, in categorial contrast with mere representations, use the means of representation in a way that is not exhaustively specified when one has exhaustively specified what is being represented. This is a use that transcends semantic considerations (considerations of Sinn and Bedeutung). Whatever Lichtenstein’s work finally represents, it expresses something about that content.27

Danto’s argument here, on which his later work depends, makes expressing some attitude or point of view toward their own content in this way a necessary feature of all works of art; it does so because expressing a point of view toward their own content is what constitutes the difference between works of art and “mere representations.” Earlier, I remarked that Danto’s claim that aesthetic properties are not a necessary feature of art creates a serious problem for his own theory. The difficulty should now be evident: if Danto’s argument in Transfiguration of the Commonplace is correct, then aesthetic properties must be a necessary feature of works of art according to his own theory; such properties are what enable artworks to express an attitude toward whatever they are about. According to his own conception of what an aesthetic property is, such properties mark the difference between “mere representations” and works of art, properly so-called. And this is at odds with his contention that such properties play no necessary part in the definition of art.

Hence, where I once thought the qualified “aesthetic turn” of Danto’s late work might represent some kind of return of the repressed – a reconsideration of precisely those features of art that the method of “indiscernible counterparts” had been designed to dispatch – this a view that I no longer hold.28 That I do not is because it now seems to me that Danto’s “aesthetic turn” – if turn it is – would be better characterized as an acknowledgement or extrapolation of features of his ontology that have been present all along. The more interesting (and certainly more provocative) question, it therefore seems to me, is whether Danto may not have been implicitly committed to an aesthetics compatible with Kant’s all along. To assess this, the next two sections consider their respective views of metaphor, which is where the comparison can best be made.

5 Danto on Metaphor

On Danto’s account, the kind of rhetorical structure in which artworks pre-eminentely trade is metaphor: to understand the work is “to grasp the metaphor that is ... always
29 Artworks invite us to see one thing as, or in the light of, another. In doing so, the work’s viewers must “fill in” [(3–4)] what the work leaves unsaid, thereby making connections for themselves that the work itself leaves implicit. On Danto’s account, the metaphors embodied in a work are closely tied to how the artist perceives the world; when the work is successful it brings its viewers to see whatever it is about from the point of view of the artist. The extent to which Danto conceives artists and artworks on the model of rhetoricians and rhetoric cannot be overstated; as he puts it in “Metaphor and Cognition,” an essay subsequent to *Transfiguration of the Commonplace*, “The rhetorician uses metaphor to drive the hearer’s mind where he wants it to go . . . Metaphors belong to the theory of manipulation.” 30 The same applies to Danto’s conception of the artist. It is because Danto takes works of art to express the artist’s point of view toward a given subject, and in so doing to dispose their audience to a similar view, that Danto’s theory is at root a variant of expression theories of art. 31 Works of art succeed in “coloring” their viewers’ attitudes in this way, according to Danto, by means of “rhetorical ellipsis” – leaving something unsaid for their viewers to fill in, in much the same way that a joke’s recipient must make the connections that illuminate its punchline for herself.

Danto draws on Aristotle’s understanding of enthymemes to illuminate his case, and that he does reveals something fundamental about how he understands metaphor. An enthymeme is a syllogism with a missing premise (or conclusion) that yields a valid syllogism when what is missing is supplied. What is missing is taken to be an obvious truth, one that anyone within the target community could be counted on to supply – that regarding one’s own wife as just so many cones and pyramids, for example, leaves something to be desired. Thus, in “Metaphor and Cognition” Danto professes to be doubtful that metaphors “ever, as metaphors, tell us something we do not [already] know.” 32 On this account, grasping a metaphor requires that one already possess the background knowledge it depends on, if one is to be able to supply what it leaves unsaid. The important pragmatic consideration for Danto is that metaphors activate the reader/viewer/listener nonetheless. They must supply what is missing themselves, the rhetorical gain being that whatever they supply for themselves will carry far more weight, and hence persuade more readily, than anything provided for them would be capable of doing.

Danto brings this Aristotelian discussion of rhetorical ellipsis in general to bear on metaphor in particular in the following way. On this conception, grasping a metaphor requires “finding a middle term \( t \) so that if \( a \) is metaphorically \( b \), there must be some \( t \) such that \( a \) is to \( t \) what \( t \) is to \( b \). A metaphor would then be a kind of elliptical syllogism with a missing term and hence an enthymematic conclusion.” 33 To grasp the metaphor is to complete the syllogism by “filling in” what it leaves unsaid. What remains unclear, at least in *Transfiguration of the Commonplace*, is whether Danto himself endorses this conception of metaphor:

The important observation . . . has less to do with whether Aristotle has successfully found the logical form of the metaphor than with the fact that he has pragmatically identified something crucial: the middle term has to be found, the gap has to be filled in, the mind moved to action.” 34
That said, some of Danto’s later remarks, in “Metaphor and Cognition,” suggest that he does:

My sense is that metaphor must work in this way: the rhetorician demonstrates whatever it is that he wants the audience to believe whatever he is talking about is – and for this reason the connection must be as obvious as the suppressed premise of the enthymeme or the stifled answer to the rhetorical question.35

Now, assuming that Danto does in fact endorse this conception of metaphor as incomplete syllogism, he would be right to hold that metaphors require their hearers to make connections for themselves, but wrong to suggest this entails supplying a determinant missing premise. If that were true, metaphors would be finite, and hence amenable to paraphrase. Once more, however, Danto’s position on this remains hard to pin down. Danto seems to hold, in line with contemporary theories of metaphor, that if artworks are metaphorical, they cannot admit of paraphrase:

no paraphrase or summary of an artwork can engage the participatory mind in all the ways that it can: and no critical account of the internal metaphor of the work can substitute for the work inasmuch as a description of a metaphor simply does not have the power of the metaphor it describes . . . it is rather the power of the work which is implicated in the metaphor, and power is something that must be felt.36

Notice, however, that Danto does not say metaphors cannot be exhaustively paraphrased – what he says leaves that possibility open. What he says, in effect, is that even if they can, what cannot be captured by paraphrase, no matter how exhaustive, is the richness of the cognitive experience of grasping the metaphor, which may only be had – interestingly, for the comparison with Kant, Danto’s word is felt – first-hand. Thus, in Danto’s main example, depicting Napoleon as a Roman emperor is not only meant to elicit a particular view of Napoleon in the work’s viewer, namely to view Napoleon in the light of Caesar, but also meant to occasion a complex set of feelings about that possibility. So garbed, the figure is a metaphor of dignity, authority, grandeur, and political power. A depicted as B, or under the attributes of B, has the same metaphorical structure as “Juliet is the Sun” or “Man is a Wolf”; we are encouraged to see Napoleon in the light of Caesar, as we are encouraged to see Juliet under certain attributes of the sun, man under certain attributes of a wolf and so on. If successful, by making the connections and associations the work invites, the audience will be brought to feel toward Napoleon what they would have felt toward Caesar: amongst other things, presumably, awe – perhaps mingled with respect or fear. Hence, the aim is not solely, or even predominantly, to bring the viewer to entertain some simple proposition, namely to see Napoleon as Caesar, but to feel toward what is depicted what would have been felt were what is depicted the case; in this way the audience is actively solicited to adopt the point of view of the work.37

Now, it seems to me that Danto’s own account of how this takes place in the metaphor of Napoleon-as-Caesar conflicts with his recourse to Aristotle on metaphor as enthymeme. His own description of what this involves suggests a far richer process than merely supplying some determinant missing premise; for this fails to capture the
non-paraphrasable, non-transferable dimension of being moved by the work that he draws attention to. In this respect, Danto’s best descriptions of metaphors at work often exceed the theory into which he appears, intermittently, to be trying to shoehorn them. This being so, I now turn to the conception of metaphor at play in Kant’s theory of art, to see whether it is better able to accommodate the richness of metaphorical meaning, and the experience thereof, that Danto himself draws attention to.

6 Metaphor in Kant

The most illuminating account of the conception(s) of metaphor implicit in Kant’s theory of art that I know of is Kirk Pillow’s “Jupiter’s Eagle and the Despot’s Hand Mill: Two Views of Metaphor in Kant,” and I am indebted to Pillow’s analysis in what follows. Pillow’s central claim is that there are two competing conceptions of metaphor in Kant that need to be distinguished: one based on what Kant calls “symbolic hypotyposis” (essentially a kind of analogy) as when beauty serves as a “symbol” of morality (Critique of Judgment, §59) and a second, far richer, account that Pillow wants to show is compatible with contemporary “interactionist” theories of metaphor, of the sort pioneered by Max Black.38 It is the latter that is of most interest here, though I will briefly sketch the former, as it will help illuminate Danto’s account. On Pillow’s account, this takes the form of a (qualitative) proportional analogy, of the form A is to B as C is to D [A:B::C:D]; it consists, essentially, in drawing attention to an analogy between relations in two domains. In Kant’s example, a hand mill serves as a metaphor (in this limited, analogical sense) for a tyrannical state, not by virtue of exhibiting tyranny, obviously, but by virtue of their shared activity of grinding down resistance. In Pillow’s words, “the material fed through a hand mill is to its operator as the subjects under an absolute monarch are to the despot . . . [W]hen you see a state apparatus mangling its subjects’ freedoms the way a hand mill crushes through force, you know you are dealing with a tyrant.”39 It is this relational isomorphism between the two that allows the hand mill to symbolize the power of a despotic state—the problem being that this allows metaphors to be reduced to complex similes, the basis of which may be precisely specified.

Now this is similar, in one crucial respect, to the theory of metaphor that Danto claims to find in Aristotle. Indeed, it is striking, given Danto’s recourse to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, that Pillow traces the notion of metaphor as symbolic exhibition, Kant’s first conception of metaphor, back to Aristotle’s notion of implicit analogy in the Poetics.40 Though “metaphor” conceived analogically has a crucial role in Kant’s critical philosophy of facilitating reflection on rational ideas, it runs the risk of reducing metaphors to determinant, and hence in principle finite, analogies: grasp the analogy and you grasp the metaphor. On this conception of metaphor, the finite meaning it communicates may be exhaustively specified, as in Kant’s own hand mill example, and this is the feature it shares with the theory Danto derives from Aristotle: both can be completed by providing the missing determinant premise or relational term. And this runs counter to contemporary views that metaphors resist paraphrase because their content cannot be exhaustively specified in either of these ways.
Now contrast this with the second conception of metaphor that Pillow claims to find in Kant. On the foregoing account metaphor is not so much generative as revelatory; it reveals previously existing, if insufficiently remarked, similarities, rather than creating new affinities. Pillow contrasts what he calls the “weak” creativity of implicit analogy with the “strong” creativity of metaphor proper. On the latter conception, metaphors create new affinities between what they bring together, thereby bringing new thoughts into being. Paul Ricoeur has this stronger conception of metaphor in mind when he describes metaphor as “world-disclosive”: it affords the possibility of new ways of carving up the world, thereby allowing new patterns of salience to emerge. It is this stronger, productive sort of creativity that Pillow attributes to aesthetic ideas, and elucidates as a kind of proto-“interactionism.” On the interactionist theory of metaphor, “Man is a Wolf” encourages us to view the principal subject, man, in the light of our “system of associated commonplaces” about the subsidiary subject, wolf, thereby creating novel associations between previously unrelated terms. We are invited, in Black’s terms, to see the principal subject through its metaphorical expression. The theory is “interactive” in the sense that our perception of the nature of the principal subject has a bearing on what aspects of the subsidiary subject appear relevant (the fact that wolves hunt in packs, for example, rather than the fact that they have cold snouts), and those connotations then generate further reflection on both the principal and the subsidiary subjects in turn.

Although, in common with the theory of metaphor as implicit analogy, the interactionist account requires a metaphor’s target audience to share broadly similar sets of connotations and associations about men and wolves – that is, their “associated commonplaces” about wolves need to be broadly compatible, internally, with one another, and likewise for their associations about men – the theory does not require each member of the audience to have the same connotations for each term. On the contrary, because the theory assumes that individuals will have somewhat different, if not incompatible, overlapping sets of associations, the theory secures the openness and inexhaustibility of metaphorical meaning at the ground level; as such, the richness of a metaphorical meaning will be dependent to a significant degree on the knowledge, sophistication, and interpretative élan of its audience – as with artistic meaning in general.

7 Kant on Aesthetic Ideas

Armed with Pillow’s two conceptions of metaphor, I now want to consider Kant’s claim that artworks express “aesthetic ideas.” To put this in the most straightforward terms possible, an aesthetic idea is Kant’s account of what is distinctive about either the content of a work of art, or the way in which it presents that content. What is distinctive about the content of works of art is either that they present concepts that may be encountered in experience, but with a completeness that experience never affords, or that they communicate ideas that cannot – in principle – be exhibited in experience. What is distinctive about the way in which works of art present such content is that they imaginatively “expand” the ideas presented, by metaphorically embodying them in sensible form. For rather than seeking to present the idea itself directly to intuition, which would be impossible – ideas
being by definition what cannot be exhibited in experience for Kant – aesthetic ideas present the “aesthetic attributes” of their object, thereby expressing an idea’s “implications” and “kinship with other concepts.”

To take Kant’s own example: “Jupiter’s eagle with the lightning in its claws” expands the idea of God’s majesty by presenting it aesthetically. What Kant calls the “logical” attributes of an idea, in this case God, would be those in virtue of which it fulfills a concept, in this case majesty. Jupiter’s eagle with the lightning in its claws, by contrast, is a metaphorical expression of those same attributes, through which we are encouraged to view God’s majesty in the light of the wealth of thoughts provoked by Jupiter’s eagle, thereby opening up a rich – and in principle endless – seam of further associations. Through the interaction of the work’s idea or theme (God’s majesty), the image by which it is presented (Jupiter’s eagle), and the specific aesthetic attributes through which the latter encourages us to view the former (the lightning bolt in the eagle’s claws, etc.), the embodiment of ideas in art provokes “more thought” than a conceptual elaboration of their content could hope to facilitate. Works of art “expand” the ideas they embody in this way because, in Kant’s words, the aesthetic attributes through which they present ideas

prompt the imagination to spread over a multitude of kindred presentations that arouse more thought than can be expressed in a concept determined by words. These aesthetic attributes yield an aesthetic idea . . . [I]ts proper function is to quicken the mind by opening up for it a view into an immense realm of kindred presentations.

In doing so, aesthetic ideas might be thought to achieve the impossible: they allow works of art to present rational ideas in sensuous form. Consider Delacroix’s Liberty Leading the People (1830) as a sensible embodiment of the idea of freedom: the aesthetic attributes through which freedom is embodied in the guise of “Liberty” and shown leading her people to victory – fearlessness, spontaneity, resoluteness, leadership, all attributes of an active self-determining will – while holding a flag, symbol of freedom from oppression, aloft in one hand, and clutching a musket in the other, serve to “aesthetically expand” the idea of freedom itself. By presenting freedom in the guise of “Liberty” in this way, freedom is depicted concretely as something worth fighting for – indeed, as something requiring courage and fortitude to attain. This is what Kant means when he claims that the expression of ideas in art “quickens” the mind, by freeing imagination from the mechanical task of schematizing concepts of the understanding. No longer constrained to present concepts of the understanding in sensible form, as it is in determinate judgment, aesthetic ideas free the imagination to move swiftly over a multitude of related thoughts. By doing so, aesthetic ideas stimulate the mind, albeit in a less structured way than determinate thought, enabling us to think through the ideas presented in a new light.

Now it might be objected that the foregoing account only works because it takes a representational painting as its object, and that this will be of little use to art in its contemporary context of non-traditional media and forms, which is where I need to demonstrate the purchase of Kant’s theory. To show that this is not the case, and that the argument runs irrespective of whether one takes a figurative painting as one’s example, my second example will be a work from the opposite end of the artistic spectrum.
But before turning to that, I want to acknowledge the force of a question that Pillow has raised about Kant’s account, as I have presented it thus far: namely where – precisely – is the aesthetic idea to be located? In Kant’s example, is it in the image of the Jupiter’s eagle with the lightning in its claws, or is it in the “aesthetically expanded idea” to which reflection on that image gives rise? Pillow opts for the latter: “Kant indicates that the presentation of such attributes yields an aesthetic idea, which suggests . . . the aesthetic idea is the aesthetically expanded idea of majesty resulting from the reflection that the eagle image prompts.”45 The presentation itself obviously initiates this reflection, but what Pillow calls “the fulfilled aesthetic idea” is the enriched conception of majesty that emerges. The same is true of the terms in which I presented Delacroix’s Liberty above; the aesthetic value of an “aesthetic idea” resides in the richness and longevity of the imaginative play to which it gives rise.

From Pillow’s perspective this is important because, in line with interactionist theories, it secures a role for both creator and recipient to play in the metaphorical exchange the work elicits. From my perspective it is important because it suggests a way of reading Kant that rings true of our imaginative engagement with art, indeed perhaps above all recent art, given its often bewildering array of non-traditional media and forms, by putting center stage the experience of finding oneself imaginatively stimulated and cognitively stretched. If this is true, it is a historical irony of the sort that Danto would be the first to appreciate, given that it was art after modernism (or what Danto calls art “after the end of art”) that his own theory was framed to accommodate.

Kant’s account, as I have presented it, has this much in common with Danto’s: the creation of a work of art is, in part, the creation of an interpretative context – of something that gives rise to a rich interpretative play. On Kant’s account, however, this cannot be reduced to “filling in” some determinant missing premise, on pain of ceasing to be aesthetic, but must involve an open-ended imaginative exploration of the enriched idea that emerges in reflection on the work, in which there is in principle always more to be discovered. Though not, broadly speaking, incompatible with Danto’s cognitivism, on Kant’s account aesthetic ideas are not governed by a syllogistic logic of the sort that Danto finds in Aristotle, and are not to be confused with the finite way in which symbols, such as the hand mill, function in Kant’s own account. This raises a question as to whether Kant’s conception of aesthetic ideas may not be better able to accommodate Danto’s richer examples than his own theory. To address this I turn, in closing, to my contemporary example.

8 Aesthetic Ideas, a Contemporary Example

My contemporary example is Art & Language’s Index 01 (1972). In addition to demonstrating the applicability of Kant’s theory to art after modernism, I would like this example to capture something of what it means, in practice, for a work to “yield” an aesthetic idea. My choice of a work by Art & Language (and from just this period) is far from innocent, given that their work from this period might be thought to show, as well as any individual works of art might, the inapplicability of Kant’s aesthetics to recent art. Against this
perception, I suggest that this work may be understood, in the terms advanced here, as a metaphorical embodiment of the idea of an exhaustive catalogue.

Index 01 consists of a cross-referenced index of the group’s writings on art to that date, and of the relations between them. Though it had various later incarnations, it originally took the form of eight small metal filing cabinets, displayed on four grey plinths, consisting of six tray-like drawers each, containing both published writings and unpublished writings, some of which raised the question of their own status as artworks. These were hinged one on top of the other in a series of nested sequences determined alphabetically, and sub-alphabetically, in terms of their order and degree of completion. The cabinets and their contents were displayed together with an index listing their contents in terms of three logical relations (of compatibility, incompatibility, and incomparability) believed to obtain between them. The latter was papered directly onto the walls of the room in which the work was displayed, as if in an attempt to provide an “external” vantage that would render the work’s internal relations perspicuous.

At least in terms of its rhetoric of display and address, such a work seems to propose not only an exhaustive catalogue of the group’s writings to date, which is feasible, being finite, but to also aspire to map a set of logical relations between those writings. But the latter is something that can only exist as an idea, in Kant’s sense, because there are in principle always further relations to be mapped, were we acute enough to spot them, and had we sufficient time (and patience) at our disposal. Moreover, by embodying the idea of a self-reflexive catalogue, the project of the work makes internal reference to ideas of infinite relationality, discursivity, even sociability—another strata of ideas that cannot be directly presented—in that the production of the index itself creates a further layer of relations to be mapped, which would then have to be mapped in turn, and so on ad infinitum, in order to realize its goal. As such, undertaking the work itself makes its goal unrealizable. Nonetheless, by embodying this aspiration in sensible form, this seemingly austere—even “administrative”—work of art opens up a potentially limitless array of imaginative associations: to lists, taxonomies, and typologies; to attempts at self-documentation, self-reflexivity, and (ultimately) to ideals of complete self-knowledge or transparency; to machines for self-replication, self-generation, recursivity, and even perpetual motion; to conversation, collaboration, interaction, study and learning; and, of course, to various regimes of archiving, cataloguing, and the like. By doing so, the work imaginatively “expands” the ideas it embodies in ways that Kant’s theory of aesthetic ideas is well placed to capture: it “prompts the imagination to spread over a multitude of kindred presentations that arouse more thought than can be expressed in a concept determined by words.” It is just such imaginative engagement with sensibly embodied ideas—far removed from the astringent formalism typically attributed to the Third Critique as a reception theory—that I would like to see retrieved for contemporary debates about art.

Moreover, although Kant conceived of fine art in representational terms for historical reasons, there is nothing in his account of aesthetic ideas that requires art be representational, in a narrow sense, as my second example is intended to show. All Kant’s account requires is that artworks indirectly present ideas to sense, and in doing so engage their viewers in imaginatively complex ways—and there does not seem to be anything wrong
with that thought in the light of more recent art that Kant could not have envisaged. Whether Kant’s account, schematic as it is, is ultimately better able to accommodate the richness of contemporary art than Danto’s is not something I claim to have demonstrated here. More would be required to establish that; though the fact that this possibility can be seriously raised at all, in virtue of his theory’s capacity to encompass both the cognitive and the affective dimensions of our engagement with art, is itself worth remarking. What I do take myself to have demonstrated, against the orthodox receptions of both Danto and Kant, is how much more their theories have in common than is typically acknowledged, and the costs that attach to too narrow, too exclusively cognitivist, a conception of what it is to fully engage with a work of art.

Notes

I would like to thank Charles Harrison for his expertise on Index 01, Arthur Danto for correspondence relating to this chapter, and Kathleen Stock for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

5 Kant, Critique of Judgment, §16, Ak. 229, 76. Citations from the Third Critique give the section number, followed by the pagination of the Akademie Ausgabe, followed by the pagination of the Pluhar translation.
6 Danto, The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the Concept of Art (Chicago, 2003), ch. 4, discussed below.
7 That is, the judgment would take the form “This is a beautiful x” and not “This x is beautiful.” Only the former judges x to be beautiful as an x, thereby taking its beauty to be constrained by its being an x.
8 For more on this, see C. Janaway, “Kant’s Aesthetics and the Empty Cognitive Stock,” Philosophical Quarterly, 47(189), 1997, 459–76.
12 See also P. Guyer, “From Jupiter’s Eagle to Warhol’s Boxes: The Concept of Art from Kant to Danto,” in Values of Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics (Cambridge, 2005). Though I share Guyer’s intuition about the broad compatibility of Kant’s and Danto’s theories of art, I find several of the specific parallels he draws strained, notably that involving aesthetic pleasure – which Guyer is forced to claim Danto thinks so obvious as to not require comment.
14 Ibid., p. 127.
The literature on the relation between formalism and expression in Kant’s Third Critique is substantial, but Kenneth Rogerson’s work is particularly interesting to the point at hand: Rogerson argues that Kant’s formalism is not only compatible with his theory of aesthetic ideas but is only coherent in virtue of the theory of aesthetic ideas that completes it. See K. F. Rogerson, Kant’s Aesthetics: The Role of Form and Expression (Lanham, MD, 1986), especially pp. 156–65.


Carroll, “Essence, Expression, and History: Arthur Danto’s Philosophy of Art,” this volume, chapter 8.


Ibid., p. 146.

Ibid., pp 147–8. Since Transfiguration, Danto has appealed to Frege’s notion of Farbung, or “coloration” to capture this pragmatic aspect of meaning, pertaining to the way something is presented rather than what is presented. See Danto, Transfiguration, pp. 162–4, and The Abuse of Beauty, pp. 121–2.


Danto, Transfiguration, p. 172.


On this, see Carroll, “Essence, Expression, and History: Arthur Danto’s Philosophy of Art,” this volume, chapter 8, p. 140.


Danto, Transfiguration, p. 171.

Ibid.


43 Ibid., Ak. 315, 183.

44 Ibid., Ak. 315, 183–4.


46 On the index itself these relations were symbolized, respectively, by “+,” “−,” and “T.” The latter stood for “Transformation,” indicating that the documents in question did not occupy the same logical or ethical space and hence were incomparable. On *Index 01*, see C. Harrison, “The Index as Art-Work,” in *Essays on Art and Language* (Cambridge, MA, 2001), p. 65.

47 Harrison’s writings on *Index 01* stress the degree to which it revolves around changed ideas of art’s production, display, address, and potential publics. As such it might be thought to embody a further series of ideas about community and communication, and even – in true avant-garde spirit – a sociability or society to come, in sensible form. See “The Index as Art-Work.”

48 One aesthetician who has consistently brought Kant’s aesthetics to bear on such debates is Paul Crowther (see his “The Significance of Kant’s Pure Aesthetic Judgement,” *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 36(2), 1996, 109–21), as has the art theorist Thierry de Duve (see *Kant after Duchamp*, Cambridge, MA, 1996). I take issue with de Duve’s appeal to Kant on pure aesthetic judgment in “Retrieving Kant’s Aesthetics for Art Theory after Greenberg: Remarks on Arthur C. Danto and Thierry de Duve,” in *Re-Discovering Aesthetics*, ed. T. O’Connor, F. Halsall, and J. Jansen (Stanford, 2009).

49 For a detailed examination of whether Kant is committed to a representational concept of art, see H. Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 290–8.

50 I am aware that more remains to be said about the question of form: specifically, whether the form of much contemporary art can be squared with the more restrictive aspects of Kant’s formalism. Unfortunately, the debates around Kant’s formalism are too complex to go into here. For a defense of Kant’s aesthetics against the charge of formalism, see P. Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 199–210; and Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, pp. 131–43. For a defense of Kant’s formalism, see Crowther, “Kant’s Pure Aesthetic Judgement.”