Semantics and Pragmatics

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1. Pragmatics and semantics.

We use language in order to achieve a wide variety of ends. To a good first approximation, pragmatics is the study of the things we do in, or by, using language, together with the facts, knowledge, and abilities that we exploit in order to do those things. Correlatively, pragmatic phenomena are all and only the phenomena that are studied in doing pragmatics. In using bits of language in order to achieve our ends, we rely on various facts about those bits of language, together with knowledge and abilities relating to those facts. For one prominent example, we exploit facts about the meanings of the words that we use, and facts about the meanings of sentences that depend upon the combination of words in them given those words' meanings. To a good first approximation, semantics is the study of facts about the meanings of words and sentences, about the dependence of sentence meaning on combinations of word meanings, and about our knowledge and abilities relating to those facts. Correlatively, semantic phenomena are all and only those phenomena studied in doing semantics. There is no obvious reason, in advance of further inquiry, to suppose that no phenomena fall within the remit of both semantics and pragmatics, and some reason to think that many phenomena fall within both. For example, it is natural to assume that speakers’ knowledge of meaning will figure in shaping their use of language, and in the reception of that use. And many philosophers have held that the use of language plays a constitutive role in determining the standing meanings of the words that are so used. However, some theorists appeal to a more restrictive conception of pragmatics—roughly, pragmatics minus semantics—and thereby to force a sort of partition. Nothing turns on this.

(The label “pragmatics” derives from the Greek root “pragma”, meaning deed. The earliest relevant occurrence in the Oxford English Dictionary, for the study of practical aspects of human action and thought is the 1693 title of a book by E. Settle, The new Athenian comedy containing the politicks, oeconomicks, theologicks, poeticks, mathematicks, sophisticks, pragmacks, dogmaticks, &c. of that most learned society.

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The label “semantics” derives from the Greek roots “sēma”, meaning sign, or “sēmantikos”, meaning significant. The earliest relevant occurrence in the Oxford English Dictionary, for that which relates to divination through the interpretation of signs, is from 1665, in John Spencer’s A discourse concerning prodigies. (2nd ed. London: printed by F. Field for W. Graves. Contemporary uses of the labels seem to derive, more or less loosely, from work by Charles Morris in the 1930s, culminating in his 1938. But we shouldn’t get too hung up about labels. Useful discussions of various ways of distinguishing between semantics and pragmatics may be found in Bach 1999; Szabo 2006.)

In addition to getting on with the projects of pragmatics and semantics—that is, theorizing about things done with words and about some of the properties of words that figure in doing those things—philosophers and linguists have been concerned to say more about the natures of the two projects, the range of phenomena that fall within each, and the connections between the projects and the phenomena that each aim to treat. As Dorothy Edington puts it,

> At its most general, the issue here is how much of our ability to communicate rests on specifically linguistic knowledge, and how large a role is played by background knowledge, common sense and inference to the best explanation, all of which play a role in the pragmatics of communication. (Edgington 2006: 769.)

Of central importance here have been two related questions.

The first question concerns one type of thing that people do with language and that seems to depend heavily on the meanings of the words that they use: stating things. Philosophers care about what people state, and the circumstances in which they state those things, for various reasons, but in particular because of the way that the things people state figure in revealing their commitments, including their beliefs. (That is not to say that what one commits to in speaking, or in stating what one does, is to be identified with that which one says. We might say things without thereby committing ourselves, for instance in speaking ironically. And we might commit ourselves to things that we do not say or state, for instance in stating things that entail further commitments.) The first question is whether facts about what people state—for example, the fact that Bill stated that Jill smokes—are to be accounted for within semantics or pragmatics. Are the facts about what people state determined solely by the meanings of the words they use—so that they fall within the remit of semantics? Or are facts about what people state dependent also on general facts about what they are up to, the circumstances in which they speak, and so forth—so that they fall partly within the remit of pragmatics?

The second question concerns a specific mode of evaluation of people’s actions, or of the commitments embodied in those actions: evaluation as to truth. We often evaluate what people state, as well as what they believe, as being true or false. For instance, Bill stated that Jill smokes. But Jill doesn’t smoke. So what Bill stated is false. Philosophers care about this mode of evaluation in part because it figures in wider assessments of what people do: for one artificial example, if we suppose that it is wrong to state things that are false, then the fact that what Bill
stated is false entails that it was wrong of Bill to say it. In addition, philosophers care about the conditions in which one or another evaluation of that sort of mandated, the conditions in which what someone is committed to would be true or false. Bill stated that Jill smokes. How would the world need to be in order for what Bill stated to be true? How would it need to be for what he stated to be false? In learning answers to those questions, we might learn something about what it is for someone to smoke. And so, mutatis mutandis, for topics of more pressing philosophical interest: the conditions in which stating that Bill knows that Jill smokes would be stating something true or false; the conditions in which stating that it is wrong for Jill to smoke would be stating something true or false; and so forth. The second question is whether facts about the conditions in which what someone states would be true or false are to be accounted for within semantics or pragmatics. Are the facts about the conditions in which what someone states would be true or false determined solely by the meanings of the words they use—so that those facts fall within the remit of semantics? Even if they are not, it may be that the meaning of a sentence determines its truth conditions, so that it is possible to assess sentences as true or false independently of what speakers state by the use of those sentences. Alternatively, facts about truth-conditions may be dependent also on general facts about what speakers are up to, the circumstances in which they speak, and so forth—so that those facts fall within the remit of pragmatics. Crucially, it will be possible to account for sentence meaning by appeal to truth conditions, or by appeal to propositions that determine truth conditions, only insofar as meaning determines truth conditions. (See Wiggins, this volume. XXXX.)

In order to discuss those issues, we will need to spend some time developing the orthodox contemporary position on these matters, which derives from the work of Paul Grice. (Sections 3–5.) And it will facilitate our understanding of Grice to start a little further back, with the types of position to which Grice was responding, and an initial response to those types of view, due to J. L. Austin, that Grice sought to develop in his own work. (Sections 2–3.) Having developed the orthodox view, we’ll then consider one source of opposition to the view, due to Charles Travis, and see how it leads to an alternative view. (Sections 6–7.)

2. Austin on locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts.

Contemporary recognition of the importance of divisions amongst pragmatic and semantic phenomena has its roots in earlier recognition of the importance of pragmatic phenomena. By the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers had begun to emphasize the importance of attention to language use in theorizing about language, including attention to the things speakers achieve, or aim to achieve, by saying what they do. In itself, the emphasis on use seems admirable, and is preserved in more recent theorizing about language. However, it was common during this period for philosophers to overplay the connection between meaning and use. Gripped by the importance of attention to the use of language, some philosophers went so far as to claim that meaning is determined by, and fully explains, use—in its most plausible formulations, that the meanings of many
words are determined by the uses of sentences involving those words. More generally, a number of philosophers had assumed that appeals to meaning would underwrite direct explanations of use, so that it would be comparatively straightforward to discern features of the meanings of words from features of the uses of those words. Attempts to distinguish meaning from use, and to draw distinctions amongst types of uses of language, emerged in reaction to such assimilations of meaning and use. (See Soames 2003: 65–219.)

While it is surely true that the meanings of words play an explanatory role in many of the things that we do with those words, that bromide leaves open that the explanation of language use may have many other moving parts and that, as a consequence, the connection between meaning and use might be quite indirect. Moreover, it leaves open that the use of language might be many-faceted, and that meaning might play different roles—and more or less direct roles—in explaining different facets of use. Recognition of both points figured in the articulation of distinctions between semantic and pragmatic phenomena as well as distinctions amongst the pragmatic phenomena that meaning figures in explaining. (It is perhaps worth observing that many philosophers during this period had a more general tendency to assume that explanatory connections would be direct. For example, many philosophers during this period were sympathetic to the ideas that aspects of mind are directly expressed in behavior and that the cognitive content of scientific theories might be determined in a simple way by the pattern of observations taken to support those theories. So, the recognition of a need to allow for greater theoretical distance between meaning and various facets of use is of a piece with a more general cognizance of the potential indirectness of explanatory connections.)

J. L. Austin played an important role in directing attention onto some of the required distinctions. In particular, he sketched a distinction amongst three types of thing a speaker might do in using a sentence—that is, amongst three types of act a speaker might perform by speaking as they do:

*The locutionary act*: the production of an utterance that can be classified by its phonetic, grammatical, and lexical characteristics, up to sentence meaning (the *phatic act*). It is also the performance of an act that can be classified by its *content* (the *rhetoric act*)—a feature distinctively of acts of speech. If I promise that I'll be home for dinner and then promise that I'll work late, my actions are instances of two different locutionary acts: one with the content that I'll be home for dinner, and one with the content that I'll work late (1962b: 94–98).

*The illocutionary act*: an act classifiable not only by its content—as with the locutionary act—but also by its *force* (stating, warning, promising, etc.). If I promise that I'll be home for dinner and later state that I'll be home for dinner, my actions might be instances of a single locutionary act: both actions might involve the content that I'll be home for dinner. However, my actions are instances of different illocutionary acts: one has the force of a promise, while the other has the force of a statement (1962b: 98–101).
The perlocutionary act: an act classifiable by its “…consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons…” If I warn that the ice is thin, and so perform one illocutionary act, I may thereby perform a variety of perlocutionary acts: I may persuade someone to avoid it, or encourage someone to take a risk, and so forth (1962b: 101).

Crucially, these are distinctions amongst types of things that one might do, rather than amongst individual actions. It is possible for a single action to instantiate all three types of act: a speaker’s saying something might be their uttering some words with particular meanings, their inviting someone to leave, and their inducing a guest to feel unwelcome. Moreover, as in other cases of human action, the various things a speaker does will often be ordered as means to ends: the speaker might have uttered those words in order to produce an invitation; and they might have produced the invitation in order to make their guest feel unwelcome. Thus, we can see how the meanings of the words that the speaker used, which figure most directly in the locutionary act that they performed, figure less directly in the illocutionary act or acts that they perform, and less directly still in the further, perlocutionary consequences of the performance of that illocutionary act.

Consider, for example, saying to a guest, “You should leave now.” Performing that locutionary act might be a means to the performance of any of a variety of illocutionary acts. For instance, one might give an order or make a statement. And one might use the same words without either ordering or stating that the guest should leave, for example if one uttered those words as part of a larger construction: “If your train arrives at 10pm, you should leave now.” Attempting to account for that variety just by appeal to meaning would lead to an implausibly complicated account of meaning. Similarly, performing one of those illocutionary acts—say, ordering the guest to leave—might be a means to the performance of any of a variety of perlocutionary acts: one might encourage the guest to leave, or to stay; one might thereby reveal one’s inhospitality towards the guest, or one’s hospitality to other guests; one might cause the guest’s enmity, or induce in them a grudging respect; and so forth. Again, any attempt to account for that variety by appeal just to meaning would be bound to lead to implausible complications. Austin’s tripartite distinction made clear that there is no reason to try to explain all the things that can be done by the use of some words by appeal only to the meanings of those words. Unlike locutionary acts, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts are to be explained not only by appeal to meanings, but also by appeal to a combination of further factors, including speakers’ illocutionary and perlocutionary ends of speakers, and other features of the broader circumstances in which the act of speaking takes place. However, Austin’s discussion left open the precise nature of the distinctions between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, and provided inadequate guidance to the application of those distinctions. (See Bird 1981; Hornsby 1988, 1994, 2006.)

Paul Grice’s work on what he called “non-natural meaning” provided the basis for one way of trying further to develop Austin’s three-way distinction. (Avramides chapter XXXX. Grice 1989: 213–223.) As we’ll see, it also furnished a motivation for drawing further distinctions within the field of illocutionary acts. Grice sought to contrast non-natural meaning with natural meaning. An example of natural meaning would be the connection between black clouds and impending rain that is specified when one claims that those black clouds mean rain. To a good first approximation, the connection is factive—if rain is not forthcoming, then it wasn’t the case that the clouds meant rain. And except in special cases, the connection is independent of anyone’s beliefs or intentions: the fact that the clouds mean rain has nothing to do with what anyone believes or intends about the clouds or about the rain. (Special cases might include cases in which someone’s behavior means that they intend or believe something.) Examples of non-natural meaning would be the fact that those three rings on the bell mean the bus is full, or that, in saying, “The bus is full,” the conductor meant that the bus is full. By contrast with natural meaning, non-natural meaning is non-factive and does appear to depend on speakers’ intentions.

Grice proposed an account of non-natural meaning that was given by appeal to speakers’ intentions to have certain cognitive effects on an audience on the basis of the audience’s recognition of some of the speakers’ intentions. In one of Grice’s formulations, appeal is made to a reflexive intention—an intention the content of which makes reference to itself:

\[ A \text{ meant}_{\text{NN}} \text{ something by } \chi \] [that is, a speaker, \(A\), non-naturally meant something by producing some behaviour—say, an utterance—\(\chi\)] is (roughly) equivalent to “\(A\) intended the utterance of \(\chi\) to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention”; and we may add that to ask what \(A\) meant is to ask for a specification of the intended effect… (Grice, 1989: 220)

It is this type of formulation, given in terms of reflexive intentions, to which some theorists have appealed in trying to clarify the nature of illocutionary acts. On this account of illocutionary acts, what marks out illocutionary acts from other kinds of act is that an act is illocutionary just in case the intended audience’s recognition of the intention with which the act are undertaken—the intention recognizably to perform one or another illocutionary act—suffices for its successful completion. (See Bach and Harnish 1979, Hornsby 1994, McDowell 1980, Searle 1969. For a useful critical summary of attempts to account for the nature of illocutionary acts, see Bird 1981.) When illocutionary acts are understood in this way, they are distinguished clearly from perlocutionary acts. For example, one might act with the perlocutionary intention that one’s action should induce an audience to leave, but one’s audience might recognize one’s intention without leaving and, so, without their recognition of one’s intention sufficing for achievement of the perlocutionary end with which one acted. By contrast, if one acted with the illocutionary intention that one’s audience recognize one’s illocutionary intention—say, one’s intention recognizably to order one’s audience to leave—then it would suffice for success that one’s audience did recognize that intention.
Moreover, if we assume that locutionary acts, and the intentions with which they are undertaken, can be characterized without appeal to potential effects on an audience, the appeal to the presence or absence of reflexive intentions provides the basis for a clear distinction between illocutionary and illocutionary acts.

Let’s suppose that Grice’s account of non-natural meaning can serve in this way to sharpen the boundaries of the class of illocutionary acts. The picture that emerges is one in which some of a speaker’s actions instantiate at least three types of act: locutionary acts—the utterance of some meaningful words; illocutionary acts—the production of some behavior (for example, behavior instantiating a locutionary act) with the intention to make recognizable an intention to perform a certain type of illocutionary act; and perlocutionary acts—the production of some behavior (for example, an illocutionary act) with the intention of having effects on over and above an audience’s recognition of one’s illocutionary intentions. Moreover, it is a picture on which the three types of act are typically related as means to ends: the speaker utters some words in order to perform an illocutionary act—in order, that is, to make recognizable their illocutionary intentions; and the speaker performs that illocutionary act in order to achieve further perlocutionary ends.

So stated, the account is deceptively simple. Room must be made for some additional complications that arise from the role of intentions in the account. For one thing, intentions figure in rational psychology, and are plausibly subject to rational constraint. In particular, one can rationally intend to $\Phi$ only insofar as one holds that it is possible for one to $\Phi$. So, one can rationally intend to make recognizable one’s illocutionary intention by performing a locutionary act in particular circumstances only insofar as one holds that it’s possible that one’s performance of the locutionary act in those circumstances will make recognizable one’s illocutionary intention. Furthermore, it’s plausible that one can rationally intend to make recognizable one’s illocutionary intentions only if it is reasonable for one to hold that it’s possible that one’s performance in those circumstances will make recognizable one’s intention. Thus, if we build into Grice’s account that meaning determining intentions must be rational, the outcome will be one on which meaning determining intentions are highly constrained by what it’s reasonable to expect concerning the interaction of one’s overt performance with the recognitional capacities of one’s audience. In addition, we shouldn’t expect that the intentions with which a speaker acts invariably will form a consistent set. Even amongst the fairly rational, cases are likely to arise in which a speaker’s intentions can’t all be satisfied. For instance, one might use the words, “He smokes,” with the intentions, first, to speak about a man and, second, to speak about a salient individual who is not in fact a man. In such cases, judgment will be required in moving from facts about the speaker’s intentions to facts about the illocutionary acts that they have performed.

Modulo those complications, the account seems to make space for a simple view about the relationship between locutionary and illocutionary acts, at least with respect to a range of central cases in which a speaker intends to exploit the meanings of their words in order to perform an illocutionary act. According to the simple view, word meanings are combined into sentence meanings in such a way as to determine that each sentence expresses a unique proposition. It is that
connection between sentence and proposition that speakers exploit in order to reveal their illocutionary intention. In central cases, speakers intend to use a sentence as expressing whatever proposition is determined by its meaning in order to make recognizable their illocutionary intention to state, order, question, and so forth. In those cases, where the proposition determined by the meaning of \( S \) is that (or whether) \( p \), and \( \Phi \) is the illocutionary act type that the speaker intends to perform (e.g. stating, ordering, asking, and so forth), the speaker utters \( S \) in order to \( \Phi \) that (or whether) \( p \). According to this simple view, sentence meaning determines the propositional content of the illocutionary act, and the remaining shift from locutionary to illocutionary act is a matter merely of the determination of illocutionary force. So, the simple view fixes a backward route from illocutionary act content to meaning, and thereby puts the theorist in a position to discern facts about sentence meaning fairly directly from facts about the illocutionary acts that the sentence may be used to perform. On such a view, claims about meaning, what is stated, and truth conditions will tend to run in step. Thus, distinctions between semantics and pragmatics on which semantics is held responsible either for meaning, or for what is stated, or for truth conditions, will also tend to run in step. However, although the simple view is attractively simple, Grice argued that the assumption about the connection between meanings and the contents of illocutionary acts on which the simple view depends is not tenable.

4. Grice on basic and derivative illocutionary acts.

In addition to sharpening Austin’s distinctions between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, Grice recognized the importance of drawing further distinctions within the field of illocutionary acts. In doing so, Grice was responding to philosophers who, as he understood them, endorsed something like the simple view of the relation between meaning and illocutionary acts sketched in the previous paragraph. Because they endorsed versions of the simple view, they were willing to draw conclusions about the meanings of sentences on the basis of observations about the propositional contents of illocutionary acts that those sentences can be used to perform. Adherence to the simple view gave rise to two main difficulties. The first difficulty was that accounts of meaning based on the simple view tended to be very complex, reflecting, as Grice saw it, the fact that the connection between meaning and illocutionary act is less direct than the simple view makes it out to be. The second, related difficulty arose because the simple view led to treating as ambiguous words and sentences that might otherwise have seemed to express unitary meanings. (Grice 1989: 3–21.)

The basic difficulty here is that the form of words constituting a sentence can be used in order to perform illocutionary acts with a wide variety of different propositional contents, depending on variation in speakers’ illocutionary intentions. To take an example connecting the first two difficulties, Peter Strawson had noticed that sentences of the form “It is true that \( p \)” were typically used in the performance of illocutionary acts in which it was suggested that someone had stated, or might state, that \( p \). The simple view thus conditioned him to assume that that suggestion was determined by the meanings of sentences of
that form. (Strawson 1949.) However, where the form of words constituting that sentence are embedded in certain larger structures—for example, “If it is true that \( p \), then \( q \)” or, “Either it is true that \( p \) or it is true that \( q \)” —the apparent correlation of word form and illocutionary suggestion lapses. (Geach 1965.) The form of words can be used in different circumstances to perform illocutionary acts with different propositional contents. Thus, if one sought to explain the variety by appeal only to sentence meanings, one’s account of meanings would again be required to be implausibly complicated.

Grice’s response was based on the observation that very often, in performing actions that seem to exemplify a single locutionary act, speakers thereby perform a plurality of illocutionary acts. Moreover, he observed that that plurality is typically organized so that some of the basic illocutionary things speakers do serve as means to other, derivative illocutionary things that they do. Thus, to modify one of Grice’s own examples, a speaker might respond to a query about the philosophical competence of one of their students by uttering the words, “They have neat handwriting.” In performing that locutionary act, the speaker would be performing the following basic illocutionary act: they would be stating that the student in question has neat handwriting. However, given the circumstances in which the speaker performed that act, they might also be performing one or more derivative illocutionary acts: they might, for example, be implying, or insinuating, that the student in question was not a very good philosopher. Just as the speaker would intend the first illocutionary act to be recognizable, so they would intend the second to be. Moreover, the speaker would be performing the first illocutionary act in order to perform the second: they would intend their audience to recognize what they had stated and, on that basis, to come to recognize their further illocutionary intention to imply, or insinuate, that the student is philosophically incompetent. Thus, the new distinction within the field of illocutionary acts mirrors Austin’s broader distinction between illocutionary and other acts. Grice called the propositional contents of the derivative illocutionary acts implicatures. (Grice 1989: 3–143; 224–247; Soames 2003: 197–219.)

(In addition to cases in which a basic illocutionary act is performed in order to perform derivative illocutionary acts, Grice allowed for the possibility that a speaker might only “make as if to” perform a basic illocutionary act in order to perform other illocutionary acts. (Grice 1989: 30.) Given the structure of Grice’s account, it would be natural to treat the act of making as if to perform an illocutionary act of some type as itself an illocutionary act, albeit of a different type. However, an alternative would be to treat making as if to perform an illocutionary act as the performance not of an illocutionary act, but only of a locutionary act. In taking that line, we would allow that some illocutionary acts are derivative not from the performance of more basic illocutionary acts, but from the performance only of locutionary acts. See Bach 1994, 2001.)

Grice offered two sorts of accounts of cases of implicature. The first account was of what he called conventional implicature. Here, the central idea is that it is a feature of the meanings of certain words of sentences—or otherwise a conventional feature of those words or sentences—that their use is at the service of the performance of a plurality of speech acts (at least typically, or by default).
Thus, just as a speaker can exploit the meaning of a sentence in order to help make recognizable their basic illocutionary intentions, so a speaker can exploit the fact that the use of a sentence conventionally carries certain implicatures in order to make recognizable their performance of derivative illocutionary acts with those implicatures as contents. The second account was of what he called *conversational implicature*. Grice’s account of conversational implicatures is based on the idea that the ends of many central cases of linguistic interaction are, and may be presupposed by interlocutors to be, cooperative. Thus, with respect to many conversations, participants are entitled to assume that other participants aim to adhere to the following *Cooperative Principle*:

Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. (Grice, 1989: 26.)

The Cooperative principle in turn may, in general, be implemented by appeal to a number of more specific maxims:

*Maxims of Quantity*: 1. Make your conversational contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange). 2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

*Maxims of Quality*: 1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

*Maxim of Relevance*: Be relevant.


The Cooperative Principle and its sub-maxims are used in order to help explain how speakers are able to make manifest their performance of derivative illocutionary acts on the basis of their recognizable performance of more basic illocutionary acts. (In the case of the Maxims of Manner, which make appeal to the specific ways in which speakers are to say what they do, the performance of locutionary acts also figures.) The explanation goes via the standing entitlement of speaker and audience to assume that the speaker is aiming to adhere to the Cooperative Principle and maxims. Grice assumes that the basic illocutionary act performed by the use of a sentence will be accounted for more or less in accord with the simple view, so that its propositional content will be determined more or less directly by the meaning of the sentence. However, very often the way in which a speaker is observing the Cooperative Principle and maxims will not be obvious given only the basic locutionary and illocutionary acts that they have performed. Instead, it will be possible to see the speaker as adhering to the maxims only on the assumption that their basic locutionary and illocutionary acts were shaped by their having certain beliefs and, moreover, by their reasonably
intending it to be recognizable, in part by appeal to the assumption that they are observing the maxims, that they have those beliefs.

To see how this might work in a particular case, consider the following gloss on the example given above, involving someone responding to a request for information about a student’s philosophical competence by saying, “They have neat handwriting.” The audience might reasonably be expected to recognize that they were intended to reason in the following way: the speaker must be being cooperative since, otherwise, they wouldn’t have replied to the request. The speaker cannot be unable to say something more relevant, since the question concerns one of their students. The speaker must, therefore, be wishing to impart information that they are reluctant to write down. This supposition is tenable only if the speaker thinks that the student is no good at philosophy. This, then, is what the speaker is implicating. (Gloss modified from Grice 1989: 33. It’s worth noting that Grice presented his account of conversational implicature as preliminary and partial and, moreover, as covering only a subclass of non-conventional implicatures. See e.g. Grice 1989: 26, but compare 31. Grice says very little about the class of non-conventional, non-conversational implicatures. Grice’s main focus is on implicatures carried by natural language analogues of the logical constants, on which see Edgington 2006.)

Grice’s distinction between basic and derivative illocutionary acts—that is, between what a speaker strictly and literally states and what they implicate by stating it—can help to illuminate three important types of possibility.

The first type of possibility is that the very same basic illocutionary act might serve as a means to the performance of a wide variety of derivative illocutionary acts. Thus, the fact that a form of words can be used to perform illocutionary acts with a variety of propositional contents does not alone demonstrate that the form of words is ambiguous, or carries complex meanings that determine different propositional contents in different circumstances.

The second type of possibility is that speakers might be unwilling to state something, and might even judge that stating it would be incorrect, or that what was stated would be false, not because stating it would be incorrect, or because what was stated would be false, but rather because stating it would give rise to implicatures that were false and, so, would be misleading. Thus, the fact that in certain circumstances speakers are unwilling assertively to use some words, and even the fact that they would judge the assertive use of those words to be incorrect, or judge what was thereby communicated to be false, does not alone demonstrate that what would be stated in those circumstances would be false.

The third type of possibility is that speakers might be willing to state something, and might even judge that stating it would be correct or that what was stated is true, not because stating it would be correct, or because what was stated would be true, but rather because stating it would give rise to implicatures that were true. Thus, the fact that in certain circumstances speakers are willing assertively to use some words, and even the fact that they would judge the assertive use of those words to be correct or what was thereby communicated to be true, does not alone demonstrate that what would be stated in those circumstances would be true.
At the most general level, Grice offered an account on which there is no backward road from speakers’ uncritical judgments about the correctness or incorrectness of the illocutionary acts performed by the use of some words to facts about the basic illocutionary acts that are so performed. And so, even on the assumption that there is a backward road from the propositional contents of basic illocutionary acts to facts about the meanings of the words used to perform those acts, the route from judgments about illocutionary acts per se to meanings is, at best, indirect. It’s important to observe, however, that that consequence doesn’t arise simply from Grice’s account of the distinction between basic and derived illocutionary acts. Rather, it depends in addition on the view that speakers and audiences can sometimes be insensitive to the application of that distinction. Given that the range of illocutionary acts is supposed to be determined by speakers’ intentions, and moreover by their intentions to make recognizable their intentions, the required form of insensitivity might reasonably be found puzzling. (See e.g. Grice 1989: 49 and Recanati 2004: 5–22. Note that this issue appears most pressing when we attend to cases in which what is at issue is the distinction between a basic illocutionary act and derivative illocutionary acts performed on its basis. For in those cases, it is natural to assume that speakers and audiences will need to be cognizant of the intentions with which the various acts are performed. However, if we also allow cases in which a derivative illocutionary act is performed on the basis not of a more basic illocutionary act, but of a locutionary act, we might be more willing to allow that speakers and their audiences can be appropriately insensitive. See Bach 2001.)

5. The orthodox view.

Grice’s distinction between basic and derivative illocutionary acts ruins the simple view, on which the propositional contents of illocutionary acts are determined by the meanings of the words that are used in order to perform those acts. However, it makes available a more nuanced successor, which Grice also sought to defend, the orthodox view. According to the orthodox view the propositional contents of basic illocutionary acts are to a large extent determined by the meanings of the words used to perform them. Variation in the illocutionary acts performed by the use of some words from occasion to occasion is therefore mainly due not to variation in the basic illocutionary acts that are performed, but rather to variation in the derivative illocutionary acts that are performed. More carefully, the orthodox view holds the following: (i) the propositional contents of basic illocutionary acts are to a large extent determined by the contents of locutionary acts; (ii) the contents of locutionary acts are determined by the meanings of the words that are used to perform them in combination with meaning-specified features of the circumstances in which the locutionary acts are performed; and (iii) the contents of locutionary acts determine truth conditions or satisfaction conditions (where the latter are conditions in which a predicate like “is green” would be true of an individual). (On the natural assumption that illocutionary act contents determine truth conditions, (iii) approximates to a corollary of (ii), for locutionary act contents must be truth conditional if they are to determine the
truth conditional contents of other acts.) According to the orthodox view, there are two sorts of cases in which the contents of basic illocutionary acts are not determined by the meanings of the words used in their performance.

The first sort, which we will henceforth ignore, comprises cases in which speakers inadvertently or otherwise perform basic illocutionary acts without intentionally exploiting the meanings of the words that they use in order to make recognizable their illocutionary intentions. This might happen if a speaker were intentionally to use a sentence in a way that departed from its meaning, but in such a way that they were nonetheless able to make recognizable their basic illocutionary intentions. Cases of this sort might include slips of the tongue, malapropism, and deliberately creative uses of language. (Davidson 1986 contains a useful discussion of such cases.)

The second sort comprises cases in which speakers make use of sentences involving *indexicals*—for example, “I”, “here”, or “now”, “She”, and “That cat”. These are expressions that, despite carrying unitary meanings, vary in the contribution that they make to illocutionary content. For example, “here” is used in order to say something about wherever the speaker happens to be, which might well vary from occasion to occasion. Similarly, “That cat” is used in order to say something about a cat that is distinctively salient, or that is made distinctively salient by an accompanying gesture. In both sorts of case, the meaning of the expression figures in making recognizable the basic illocutionary act that the speaker performs. However, it serves to make recognizable that act only in conjunction with information about the circumstances of speaking—for example, where the speaking takes place, or what the speaker is pointing at. The meanings of such expressions serve not to determine a specific contribution to the contents of illocutionary acts performed by their use, but rather to provide more or less detailed guidance about how information about circumstances is to be used in discerning such a contribution.

We can usefully distinguish two types of indexical, the discretionary and the non-discretionary. Non-discretionary indexicals—for example, “I” or “now”—have meanings that provide very detailed guidance to the ways in which the contents of acts performed by their use are to be discerned. The meanings of such expressions determine a range of relevant circumstantial features and specify the way that those features figure in determining a specific contribution to content. For instance, the meaning of the indexical “I” might be taken to determine a function from a specific feature of the circumstance—i.e., the identity of the speaker (or “agent of the context”)—to a contribution to truth conditional content: reference to the speaker. Although the meanings of such expressions do not alone determine a contribution to truth conditional content, those meanings combine with specific circumstantial features that the meanings select in order to determine such a contribution. Thus, insofar as the speaker intends to perform an act that exploits the meanings of such expressions, no further role is played by their illocutionary intentions either in determining the contents of that act or in selecting specific features of the circumstances that are to be exploited in discerning their illocutionary intentions. Rather, the meanings of the expressions dictate which locutionary acts are performed by their use, and combine with specific features of the circumstances of use in order to determine the contents of
those locutionary acts. With respect to the use of non-discretionary indexicals, the orthodox view holds that locutionary content determines illocutionary content.

Discretionary indexicals offer less detailed guidance about how circumstantial features are to be exploited in order to discern illocutionary content. For instance, the meaning of “That cat” provides some guidance to discerning a speaker’s illocutionary intentions—indicating, for example, that they intend to say something about a certain salient cat—but leaves it up to speakers how they will exploit, or manipulate, the circumstances of speech in order to make recognizable which cat they intend to say something about. Thus, since meanings alone fail to combine with circumstances in order to determine a truth conditional content, determination of truth conditional content for discretionary indexicals can’t take place at the level of locutionary content. Rather, since the determination of truth conditional content depends on speakers’ illocutionary intentions, it occurs with respect only to the illocutionary act. With respect to the use of discretionary indexicals, the orthodox view allows that locutionary content fails to determine illocutionary content. Furthermore, the orthodox view allows that in such cases, locutionary content fails to determine truth conditions, although it will typically still determine satisfaction conditions. For although the locutionary use of “That cat is on the mat” will fail to determine to which cat the speaker intends to refer, it is open to hold that it will determine that the sentence is true of something if and only if it is a cat and is on the mat. (See e.g. Bach 1992; Perry chapter XXXX.)

Returning to the general character of the orthodox view, we can now say the following. In cases in which a sentence is used intentionally in accord with the meanings of its constituent words and structure, those meanings figure in two types of way in making recognizable the propositional contents of basic illocutionary acts. First, the meanings of the sentence’s indexical constituents serve as guides to the use of circumstantial information in discerning aspects of the speaker’s illocutionary intentions. In the case of non-discretionary indexicals, this is a matter of determining the content of the locutionary act performed by their use. In the case of discretionary indexicals, it is a matter of determining the content of an illocutionary act. Second, the meanings of the sentence’s remaining constituents, including non-discretionary indexical constituents, serve simply to determine the remaining contribution to locutionary, and so illocutionary, content. According to the orthodox view, then, there are only three ways in which a sentence could be used in accord with its meaning in order, on different occasions, to perform illocutionary acts with different propositional contents. First, the sentence might be used in order to perform derivative illocutionary acts with any of a variety of contents, as long as that variety were explicable by appeal to a combination of the performance of a basic illocutionary act together with the Cooperative Principle (or principles of broadly the same sort). Second, a sentence might be used in order to perform basic illocutionary acts with a variety of contents if the sentence were ambiguous, so that it could be used in accord with different of its meanings on different occasions.
As noted in the introduction, attempts to sharpen the division between semantics and pragmatics have been guided by a number of considerations. The first and most important consideration is the idea that semantics should concern information about some of the stable, broadly conventional properties of words and sentences: the meanings of those words and sentences. Such information is of a sort that can be learned in advance and then brought to bear in seeking to understand particular uses of those words and sentences. The second consideration is that semantics should figure in explaining what speakers are able to state, or ask, or command, by the use of words and sentences—that is, it should have something to say about the propositional contents of basic illocutionary acts. The third consideration, which may be viewed as a consequence of the assumption that the propositional contents of speech acts determine truth conditions, is that semantics should have something to say about truth conditions. The orthodox view allows for a division of labour between semantics and pragmatics that comes close to respecting all three considerations. For according to the orthodox view, the stable properties of words and sentences for the most part determine the propositional contents of locutionary acts that are performed by their use. And the contents of those locutionary acts for the most part determine the contents of basic illocutionary acts. Insofar as the determination of illocutionary content is due only for the most part to the contents of locutionary acts, that is due to the operation of discretionary indexicals, and so leaves open that in cases in which locutionary act contents fail to determine truth conditions, they nonetheless determine satisfaction conditions. For although the meaning of ‘That is green’ leaves up to speakers’ discretion what ‘that’ is used to refer to, it might be held that ‘is green’ is true of any such thing (or is satisfied by that thing) if and only if it is green. So, although the orthodox view treats the effects of discretionary indexicals as falling partly within the remit of pragmatics, rather than semantics, it accords to meaning, and so semantics, responsibility for all other effects on locutionary and illocutionary act contents, including the potential effects of non-discretionary indexicals.

Although the orthodox view is widely endorsed, in recent years it has come under increasing pressure from the defenders of views on which the connection between meaning and the propositional contents of basic illocutionary acts is taken to be less straightforward. As we noted, discretionary indexicals differ from non-discretionary indexicals in that they do not fully specify a function from specific features of circumstances of use to a contribution to propositional content, but instead provide only more or less detailed guidance to the discernment of speakers’ illocutionary intentions. Opponents of the orthodox view seek to treat that sort of model as more generally applicable: in general, the meanings of words don’t determine a contribution to the contents of basic illocutionary acts, but rather provide guidance to that contribution. (Importantly, their claim is that substantive expressions are in that specific way like discretionary indexicals, not that they simply are discretionary indexicals. For one important difference, ‘is green’ seems to provide more detailed guidance as to the kinds of things that can be stated by its use than do expressions like ‘that’.) By contrast with the orthodox view, the opposing view holds that substantive word meaning rarely, if ever, provides sufficient guidance to facilitate recognition of speakers’
basic illocutionary intentions. Speakers must therefore exploit features of the 
circumstance of speaking over and above the meanings of the words and 
sentences that they use in order to make recognizable their basic illocutionary 
intentions. On this view, the tasks of making one’s basic illocutionary intentions 
recognizable, and of recognizing another’s basic illocutionary intentions, will often 
exploit the sorts of information and principles that figure on the orthodox view 
only in mediating the transition from basic to derived illocutionary acts. 
Furthermore, just as discretionary indexicals fail to determine a contribution to 
truth conditional content, so word meanings in general fail to determine such a 
contribution. Truth and satisfaction conditions are determined not at the level of 
meaning or locutionary act, but only at the level of illocutionary act.

One main motivation for opposition to the orthodox view comes from the 
fact that our judgments about what sentences can be used to state in particular 
circumstances seem to vary in ways that don’t obviously fit the orthodox view. 
That is, our pattern of judgments isn’t easily accounted for by appeal either to 
ambiguity, or to the operation of ordinary indexicals or demonstratives, or to 
distinctions between the contents of basic and derived illocutionary acts. In the 
following two sections, we’ll briefly consider an argument of this sort against the 
orthodox view due to Charles Travis (chapter XXXX). Connectedly, we observed 
earlier that interesting applications of the distinction between basic and derivative 
illocutionary acts rely upon treating competent speakers as somewhat insensitive 
to the way the distinction applies. Opposition to the orthodox view has been 
bolstered by an unwillingness to treat the pattern of competent speakers’ 
judgments as due to an insensitivity to the sorts of distinctions between basic and 
derivative illocutionary acts that would be required in order to preserve the 
orthodox view. (Related attacks on the orthodox view may be found in Austin 
1962a; Bach 1994, 2001; Carston 2002; Neale 2005; Pietroski 2003, 2005; Recanati 
2004, 2010; Sperber and Wilson 1995; Travis 2008.)


In the previous section, we saw that the orthodox view is committed to the 
following claims:

(OV1) Most substantive expressions, other than explicit discretionary 
indexicals, do not function in a similar way to discretionary indexicals.

(OV2) With respect to those substantive expressions, meaning combines 
with features of circumstances of speech to determine the content of 
speakers’ locutionary acts in a way that doesn’t depend on speakers’ further 
illocutionary intentions.

(OV3) With respect to the use of such expressions, locutionary act content 
determines basic illocutionary act content.

(OV4) Basic illocutionary act content determines truth conditions.
With respect to the use of such expressions, locutionary act content determines truth conditions.

The claim that basic illocutionary act content determines truth conditions, is common ground between Travis and proponents of the orthodox view. Travis aims to provide reasons to reject (OV3) and (OV5). He does so by attempting to show that the truth conditions determined by basic illocutionary acts vary in a way that cannot be explained by appeal to the possession of truth conditions by locutionary acts or by the role of explicit indexicals. If successful, Travis’ argument would in the first place undermine (OV3), by showing that the connection between locutionary act content and basic illocutionary act content is in general—not only in cases involving explicit discretionary indexicals—less straightforward than the proponents of the orthodox view maintains. Contrary to (OV1), most substantive expressions would function in a similar way to discretionary indexicals: their meanings would provide more or less detailed guidance to discerning speakers’ illocutionary intentions. In the second place, Travis’ rejection of (OV3) would put pressure on (OV5). One source of pressure here is the apparent dependence of (OV5) on (OV4): if the only reason for holding that locutionary act content determines truth conditions were that those contents determine illocutionary act contents that determine truth conditions, then that reason would lapse with rejection of (OV3). A further, connected source of pressure is that assessment as to truth seems typically to be directed at the contents of illocutionary acts. We typically seek to ascertain, for example, whether what someone states is true or false. If there were cases in which locutionary act contents determined illocutionary act contents, as per (OV3), then truth assessments of illocutionary acts could in those cases be used in order to gain insight into the truth conditions determined by their corresponding locutionary acts. However, in the absence of that connection between locutionary and illocutionary acts, it would be difficult to see how to gain purchase on the truth conditions supposedly determined by locutionary act contents. Minimally, Travis’ argument presents the defender of a truth conditional conception of meaning or locutionary content with the challenge of providing grounds other than the combination of (OV3) and (OV4) for endorsing their conception.

Travis develops an argument against the orthodox view based around cases like the following:

Pia’s Japanese maple is full of russet leaves. Believing that green is colour of leaves, she paints them. [Case 1:] Returning, she reports, ‘That’s better. The leaves are green now.’ She speaks truth. [Case 2:] A botanist friend then phones, seeking green leaves for the study of green-leaf chemistry. ‘The leaves (on my tree) are green,’ Pia says. ‘You can have those.’ But now Pia speaks falsehood. (Travis chapter XXXX.)

According to Travis, we can suppose that the same words, with the same meanings, are used in both cases. Moreover, we can assume that the operations of discretionary and explicit non-discretionary indexicals are confined to determining
which leaves are being spoken about, and that the same leaves are being spoken about in both cases. Thus, we can assume that the same locutionary act, with the same locutionary content, is performed in case 1 and case 2. And since the same leaves, in the same condition, are being spoken about in both cases, if ‘The leaves are green’ were used in both cases to make the same statement and, so, in accord with (OV4) to determine the same truth conditions, then Pia would either state a truth in both cases, or state a falsehood in both cases. Since it is plausible that Pia can state a truth (and no falsehood) in case 1 and that she can state a falsehood (and no truth) in case 2, even though the leaves are in the same condition in both cases, we have that ‘The leaves are green’ is not used in both cases to make the same statement. So, we have that the statement that Pia makes in case 1 is not the same as the statement that she makes in case 2. Finally, if we assume that the statements that Pia makes in both cases are the contents of basic illocutionary acts, we have grounds for rejecting (OV3). For we have that Pia performed locutionary acts with the same contents and basic illocutionary acts with different contents and, moreover, that the difference in illocutionary content was not due to the operation of explicit discretionary indexicals. And since n-tuples of cases of this sort can be constructed for most, if not all, substantive expressions, there are grounds for generalizing Travis’ conclusion: most, if not all, substantive expressions function in a similar way to discretionary indexicals.

Travis’ argument depends upon three main assumptions. The first assumption is that the variation in truth conditions exhibited across cases 1 and 2 affects basic illocutionary acts performed in those cases. For if the variance affected only derivative illocutionary acts, it would be consistent with maintaining (OV3). The second assumption is that the variation is not due to ambiguity. For if ‘The leaves are green’ was used with relevantly different meanings across the two cases, the variation in truth conditions might be traced to a difference in locutionary act content. The third assumption is that the variation is not due to the operation of non-discretionary indexicality. For if it were due to such indexicality, then the variation in truth conditions might again be due to variation in locutionary act content. Travis’ second and third assumptions have been subjected to interesting challenges in recent years. However, no clear case has yet been presented in favour of the view that the variation in truth conditions that Travis highlights can be accounted for by a combination of non-discretionary indexicality and ambiguity. (For approaches that appeal to indexicals, see Rothschild and Segal 2009; Stanley 2000, 2002, 2005; Stanley and Szabó 2000; Szabó 2001. For an account that appeals in addition to ambiguity, see Kennedy and McNally 2010. For discussion see Clapp 2012; Collins 2007. The main weakness exhibited by extant proposals is that no attempt has been made to provide evidence for a plausible account of a function from meaning-specified features of circumstances of speech to truth conditional contents. Thus, such accounts seem, at best, either to mitigate discretionary variation without eradicating it, or to resolve into versions of Travis’ position. Versions of that complaint are developed in Clapp 2012 and Rothschild and Segal 2009.)

7. Basic and derivative illocutionary acts.
As we saw in discussing Grice’s distinction between basic and derivative illocutionary acts, theorists have been willing to allow that competent speakers can be insensitive to the distinction between what speakers state and the contents of derivative illocutionary acts that speakers thereby perform. If defensible, such an allowance would make space for the following response to Travis’ argument. Although there is variation across cases of the sort that Travis emphasizes, that variation affects only the contents of derivative illocutionary acts. Insofar as we are inclined to judge that there is variation in the contents of what speakers state in the cases that Travis presents, that is a mistake fostered by our insensitivity to the distinction between what speakers state and the derivative illocutionary acts that they perform on the basis of so stating.

The central difficulty with this position arises because illocutionary acts of stating embody intentionally undertaken commitments. Let’s suppose that the locutionary act performed by use of “The leaves are green” determines the content of a basic illocutionary act. That act is therefore performed in both case 1 and case 2. Since the content of that act determines truth conditions, it will represent a harmless simplification to suppose that those truth conditions are such as to make the illocutionary act false in both cases. To a first approximation, the illocutionary act has a content that would be true if and only if the leaves were naturally green. Thus, let’s suppose that in case 2 Pia uses ‘The leaves are green’ in order to perform a basic illocutionary act with that content. As Travis maintains, and as Pia could easily be brought to accept, she thereby states a falsehood. However, contrary to Travis’ description, Pia performs the same basic illocutionary act in case 1, thereby committing herself to something false in that case too, her protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. According to the position currently being considered, although Pia commits to a falsehood in case 1, she thereby also performs a derivative illocutionary with a true content and thereby commits to something true. Furthermore, Pia’s failure to recognize, or to accept, that she commits to a falsehood in case 1 is to be explained by her insensitivity to the distinction between basic and derivative illocutionary acts. That is, it is explained by her failure to recognize that in addition to committing herself to a truth by performance of the derivative illocutionary act, she committed herself to falsehood by performing the basic illocutionary act. The difficulty, then, is that it is hard to accept that in case 1 Pia openly and intentionally commits herself to a falsehood, even though that is something that she failed to recognize and would even be prepared to deny. That consequence is hard to accept because it conflicts with the natural presumption that agents know the intentions with which they act. Furthermore, not only would Pia fail to recognize that she had openly and intentionally committed herself to a falsehood in case 1, but her audience would also fail to recognize it. And that consequence is in tension with the requirement that Pia should act with the reasonable expectation that her illocutionary intentions will be recognizable. (See e.g. Bach 1994, 2001; Soames 2005.)

It’s important to emphasize that the claim that Pia does not perform the same basic illocutionary act in cases 1 and 2, and so does not make the same the same statement, is compatible with allowing that she performs other types of act
in both cases. As we saw, Travis allows that Pia performs the same locutionary act in the two cases. Thus, on a broadly locutionary understanding of what speakers say, as opposed to the illocutionary understanding that we’ve characterized in terms of what speakers state, Travis can allow that Pia says the same thing in both cases. (See e.g. Bach 2001; Travis explicitly allows that the same thing might be said in pairs of cases like those involving Pia in his 2008: 156.) All that Travis is committed to denying, as a consequence of his denial of (OV5), is that what speakers say—on the operative locutionary understanding of what they say—determines truth or satisfaction conditions. For that reason, arguments designed to show that Pia says the same thing in cases 1 and 2 are impotent unless supplemented with reason to think that what she says in both cases determines a single set of truth conditions. (Compare Cappelen and Lepore 2005; Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009.)

In summary, then, the defender of the orthodox view has two options. First, they might try to show that Pia performs the same basic illocutionary act in cases 1 and 2. That would be a way of seeking to defend (OV3) and (OV5). In doing so, they would need to provide evidence not only that Pia says the same thing in the two cases, but that she makes the same statement, and thereby takes on the same commitments. They would thereby incur the burden of explaining Pia’s insensitivity to the commitments that she thereby takes on. Second, they might try to argue that there are locutionary acts that Pia performs in both cases and that those acts have contents that determine truth conditions. That would be a way of conceding (OV3) while seeking to defend (OV5). Since such acts are not illocutionary acts, and so are not determined by Pia’s reflexive intentions, it is liable to be easier to explain why we are insensitive to their occurrence. However, for the same reason, it will be harder to defend the claim that such acts have contents that determine truth conditions, since it will no longer be possible to use the connection between illocutionary acts and truth conditions (as per (OV4)) in order to do so.

8. Conclusion.

We began with the idea that semantics concerns the stable meanings of words and expressions while pragmatics concerns language use, or things done with words. We saw that that rough distinction is associated with other concerns, including a concern to understand the features of language and its use that are responsible for what speakers state, and for the determination of truth conditions. According to the orthodox view, the initial distinction between stable meanings and use is connected with what is stated and with truth conditions. For according to the orthodox view, word meanings combine with circumstances to determine the contents of locutionary acts, and locutionary acts combine with illocutionary intentions with respect to explicit discretionary indexicals in order to determine the contents of basic illocutionary acts, including acts of stating. And illocutionary acts, including acts of stating, have contents that determine truth conditions. Thus, there is a more or less direct connection between meanings, the things that speakers state, and truth conditions.
We saw that the orthodox view comes under pressure from reflection on certain forms of variation in the illocutionary acts that speakers perform. According to the opposing view, personified here by Travis, the connection between meaning and basic illocutionary act contents—in particular, the things speakers state—is less direct, and is mediated by some of the same sorts of factors that the orthodox view exploits in order to connect basic and derived illocutionary acts. We considered, and provided some grounds for rejecting, a defence of orthodoxy that sought to treat the variation that Travis highlights as occurring only with respect to derivative illocutionary acts. However, deciding the outcome of the dispute over the standing of the orthodox view will require further work. In particular, it will require further work on the nature of illocutionary acts, the nature of illocutionary intentions, and the extent to which speakers and their audiences can be expected to be cognizant of the illocutionary acts that speakers perform.

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