history in “History for Life” and of exemplary individuals in “Schopenhauer” and “Wagner,” Nietzsche incorporates a suprahistorical perspective as well.

These are minor quibbles with an otherwise illuminating interpretation of this important early text. My recommendation is that as soon as anyone cracks open the Meditations—a first-time reader or scholar—she should have Brooks by her side.

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This book had me at hello. Keith Ansell-Pearson’s meta project is to persuade Nietzsche’s readers to pay more attention to his neglected middle-period writings. The middle-period works consist of Human, All Too Human (1878), Mixed Opinions and Maxims (1879), The Wanderer and His Shadow (1880), Dawn (1881), and the first four books of The Gay Science (1882). This period is demarcated at one end by the contrast with Nietzsche’s early writings and their enthusiasm for Wagner and Schopenhauer and at the other by Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883) and Nietzsche’s subsequent works.

In 2000 I published a book on Nietzsche’s middle period, urging a turn toward these five writings as rich and fascinating works in their own right as well as for the light they shed on Nietzsche’s development as a thinker. Since then, more attention has been paid by scholars to these texts. In some cases, the focus has been the individual work. Thus two books have been written about The Gay Science—one by Kathleen Higgins and another by Monika Langer. There has been a careful and rewarding book on Human, All Too Human by Jonathan Cohen. In other cases scholars have treated the writings together. In 2008 Michael Ure produced Nietzsche’s Therapy: Self-Cultivation in the Middle Works, while in 2011 Paul Franco published Nietzsche’s Enlightenment: The Free Spirit Trilogy of the Middle Period. Robin Small’s Nietzsche and Rée: A Star Friendship sheds immense light on Nietzsche’s thinking during this time through an examination of his relationship with Paul Rée. Several articles and a number of book chapters that focus on the middle-period writings, together or separately, have also appeared. The Free Spirit Trilogy initiative at Warwick University in the UK hosted a series of conferences on these writings.
Post hoc is not, of course, propter hoc, and I am sure that even without my prodding, scholarly attention would have gravitated to these works, given the massive interest in and importance of Nietzsche. But as Ansell-Pearson’s book makes abundantly clear, even with the increased interest in the middle-period works in the last two decades, ample room remains for interpreting these intriguing texts in innovative ways. Ansell-Pearson’s preferred way of reading them is as pervaded by a spirit of Epicurean enlightenment (3, 41). Associating Nietzsche with any sort of enlightenment could strike many readers as very odd, but in the middle-period writings he appeals favorably to the Enlightenment, associates it with the growth of scientific knowledge as a positive thing, and situates himself as part of that Enlightenment. But his relationship to the Enlightenment in these texts is nuanced, and Ansell-Pearson’s focus on Epicurus as a source of enlightenment thinking for Nietzsche lends a new layer of nuance to this.

Ansell-Pearson suggests that as Nietzsche moves away from Schopenhauer during the course of these writings, he goes in search of a better philosophical model. This quest gives Ansell-Pearson’s book its title. It contends that Epicurus represents for Nietzsche at this time a model of how to live joyfully and rationally, attentive to the self in its particular needs, and doing so despite great, and perhaps insuperable, uncertainty about the ultimate questions of religion and metaphysics. Ansell-Pearson insists therefore that the Epicurean presence in these writings is greater than Nietzsche’s explicit references to Epicurus signal.

Chapter 1 focuses on *Human, All Too Human, Mixed Opinions and Maxims,* and *The Wanderer and His Shadow.* Ansell-Pearson examines the repeated references to cooling the human mind down, philosophical sobriety, serenity, moderation, and modesty in these texts. These qualities are typically associated for Nietzsche with a scientific, as opposed to metaphysical, approach to philosophy, but Ansell-Pearson conveys very clearly what a mistake it would be to conflate Nietzsche’s praise of science as a disciplined and sober style of inquiry, informed by a knowledge of history, with any form of positivism. Chapter 2 ventures beyond these three works to add a reading of *Dawn* to its exploration of the topic of fanaticism. Be it moral, religious, metaphysical, or political, fanaticism is antithetical to the approach to knowledge Nietzsche advocates here. This chapter also shows how Nietzsche’s enthusiasm for the Enlightenment project allows him to criticize the French Revolution, which he sees as the enemy, not the culmination, of enlightenment.

Chapter 3 confines itself to a discussion of *Dawn* and the change it represents in Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy because it brings an emphasis on a passion for knowledge. Nietzsche remains under the influence of Epicurus, however, and the bundle of goods Ansell-Pearson associates with him (which includes his materialism but not his atomism). Chapter 4 outlines the ethic of care of the self that can be retrieved from the middle writings. This represents an alternative conception of morality to the dominant one.
Nietzsche inherited from Christianity which associated moral action and motivation with the unegotistical.

Chapter 5 moves on to *The Gay Science*, with Ansell-Pearson continuing to admire Nietzsche’s prowess as a psychologist and asking how this informs his conception and practice of philosophy. The book closes as chapter 6 considers the centrality of happiness, pleasure, and joy in these writings. It also draws together the various ways in which Ansell-Pearson detects the Epicurean presence in the middle-period writings and offers some contrast with Nietzsche’s later view of Epicurus.

This bare-bones summary does no justice to the richness of each of Ansell-Pearson’s chapters, in terms of topics covered, close readings offered, or authors and secondary sources engaged. He is clear that we do not need to assume that these middle-period works are united by a single, overarching project, for there are differences within and among them. And he is adamant that his readings of these works open up just some of the themes and topics and strands of inquiry available to their readers. His hope would be that readers return to these texts for themselves to mine their many possibilities. Throughout Ansell-Pearson also encourages us to welcome the sort of philosophy Nietzsche articulates and practices in these writings into our contemporary understanding of philosophical practice.

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Flattery is a pervasive, perpetual, and perplexing feature of human life. It is too useful to categorically denounce but too distasteful to wholeheartedly embrace. Or so argues Daniel Kapust in an illuminating and crisply written new book which emphasizes the morally ambiguous status of flattery. Pushing gently, but firmly, back against a “moralistic” account which characterizes flattery as an unqualified evil, Kapust seeks to partially rehabilitate the concept by highlighting the way in which it “turns power relationships upside down, allowing the physically weak … to trick and trap his more powerful adversaries” (8). Though the attempt to underscore flattery’s subversive potential might have been more effectively realized by engaging more with the literary traditions of marginalized peoples than with the usual cast of