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Sharing Secrets with the Sea

Nietzsche, Emerson, Santayana, and Feeling Sympathy with Nature

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> How great a delight it is to drown one's gaze in the vastness of sky and sea! The solitude, the silence, the incomparable chastity of all that azure! a small sail trembling on the horizon, imitating in its minuteness and its solitude my own irremediable existence, the monotonous melody of the surge, all these things think through me and I through them . . . . The insensitivity of the sea, the immutability of the spectacle revolt me . . . Oh! must one endlessly suffer or endlessly flee from beauty? Nature, merciless enchantress, ever-victorious rival, let me be!
> —Baudelaire, "The Artist's Confiteor"[1]

> The fortunate star that rose on us sank not;
> The prodigal sunshine rested on the land,
> The rivers gambolled onward to the sea,
> And Nature, the inscrutable and mute,
> Permitted on her infinite repose
> Almost a smile to steal to cheer her sons,
> As if one riddle of the Sphinx were guessed.
> —Emerson, "The Adirondacs"[2]

> I would not build a house for myself, and I count it part of my good fortune that I do not own a house. But if I had to, then I should build it as some of the Romans did—right into the sea. I should not mind sharing a few secrets with this beautiful monster.
> —Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*[3]

1.

In this essay, we consider Friedrich Nietzsche's and Ralph Waldo Emerson's thoughts about our experience of feeling sympathy with nature

and what we can learn about ourselves from reflecting on the experience. There are several reasons why we should engage in such reflection, such as the need to be honest with ourselves about the nature of our experiences, understanding just what is taking place when we experience a sympathy with nature, and what it reveals about the human being. We may find reflecting on our experiences and emotions unconfortable, as in so much philosophical thinking. Nevertheless, it is imperative we do so if our desire is to liberate ourselves from certain abiding illusions and truly understand our receptiveness to nature's suggestions.

When we consider Nietzsche on nature, it is likely that we may immediately think of his call to de-deify nature and to naturalize humanity, and so arrive at a "newly redeemed" conception of nature (GS 109); or perhaps we will wish to refer to his call to translate the human back into nature.[4] These aphorisms are not difficult to fathom. The well-known denouement of aphorism 109 of *The Gay Science* centres on Nietzsche's insight into the evolutionary, indeed cosmic, insignificance of the human animal, and the aphorism as a whole warns against applying ethical and aesthetic anthropomorphisms in our attempts to understand the universe—anthropomorphisms through which we view it erroneously as either a machine or an organism. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, §230 is designed to work against unconscious human vanity and so bring to light vain and enthusiastic interpretations of the human animal that posit it as something higher or superior to the rest of nature.

An intriguing aphorism to consider and be provoked by, and consonant with the overall lesson on nature that Nietzsche is keen to impart to his readers, is that which opens book 5 of *Dawn*—the final and closing book—and is entitled "In the great silence."[5] This aphorism stages an encounter with the sea, concerns the human in a fundamental manner, and ends on a curious note with an enigmatic reference to the sublime. In *Ecce Homo* (1888), Nietzsche speaks of *Dawn* as amounting to a search for the new morning that ushers in a whole series of new days, and he insists that not a single negative word is to be found in it, and no "attack" or "malice" either.[6] In *Dawn*, Nietzsche says, we encounter a thinker who lies in the sun, "like a sea creature sunning itself among rocks," and the book itself was largely conceived in solitude amid the rocks near Genoa, Italy where, so Nietzsche discloses, he "had secrets to share with the sea."[7] In the aphorism, Nietzsche writes: "Here is the sea, here we can forget the city" (D 423).

In the 1886 preface to *Dawn*, Nietzsche tells his readers that he writes as a friend of the *lento* (slowly), and he encourages us to read slowly, referring to philology as the venerable art that requires of us that we take our time and learn how to become still and slow: "It teaches

to read *well*, which means to read slowly, deeply, backward and forward with care and respect, with reservations, with doors left open, with delicate fingers and eyes" (D 5). This advice applies well to aphorism 423 of *Dawn*. The aphorism contains a valuable lesson in the practice of silence and the need for wisdom about it. We need to remind ourselves of the importance of meditating, of hearing the echo and resonances of our own being in the world and coming to know the extent to which we are projectionists of reality. As Emerson writes, "Not in nature but in man is all the beauty and worth he sees. The world is very empty, and is indebted to this gilding, exalting soul for all its pride."[8] We shall have much more to say on this in due course.

The scene that Nietzsche depicts in the aphorism is one of stillness and solitude. After the noisy ringing of bells announcing the Angelus, which produce the sad and foolish yet sweet noise that divides night and day, all becomes still and the sea lies pale and shimmering, but unable or unwilling to speak; similarly, the night sky plays its everlasting evening game with red and yellow and green, but chooses not to speak. We are encompassed on all sides by a "prodigious muteness" that is experienced as both lovely and dreadful and at which the heart swells (D 423). But Nietzsche invites us to ask if there is not hypocrisy in this silent beauty? Would it not speak well and evilly if it so wished? Would it not mock our feeling of sympathy (*Mitgefühl*) with it (ibid.)?[9] A voice, Nietzsche's voice, then interrupts and declares, "So be it! I'm not ashamed to be the ridicule of such powers" (ibid.). This voice pities nature for its silence and on account of the malice that ties its tongue. In this scene, the heart, the regulating source of life's blood flow, continues to swell and is "startled by a new truth": "*It too cannot speak*, it joins in the ridicule whenever a mouth cries out into this beauty; it enjoys its own sweet malice of silence" (ibid.). The voice begins to hate speech and even thinking, for, behind every word, it hears the "laughter of error, wishful thinking, [and] delusion" (ibid.). Should one not, then, mock at one's pity and at one's mockery? The aphorism concludes as follows:

> Oh sea! Oh evening! You are terrible mentors! You teach the human being to *cease* being human! Ought he to sacrifice himself to you? Ought he to become as you are now, pale, shimmering, mute, prodigious [*ungeheuer*], reposing above oneself? Sublimely above oneself [*Über sich selber erhaben*]? (ibid.; M 260)[10]

The reader has good reason to pause and reflect on what might be expressed here. One response might be to suggest that the encounter with the sea challenges our human sense of scale and measure, confronting us with something immense and monstrous. But here we have to be careful because of the "mockery" that greets us in the experience. All the names we might come up with to describe the mute

sea will come back to us as projections of our own making: profound, eternal, and mysterious. Are we not endowing the sea with our own names and virtues? Do we ever escape the net of language; do we ever escape the human?[11] If we do not escape, then what kind of sublime state is it that the human being might attain? How can the human being cease being itself? Is this what has really taken place in this experience? How are we to understand the depiction of the sea as a teacher in this aphorism?

The idea of the mockery of nature is not peculiar to Nietzsche but is also found in Emerson's essay "Nature": "The beauty of nature must always seem unreal and mocking, until the landscape has human figures that are as good as itself."[12] In Nietzsche's aphorism, however, the issue of mockery is working in a different way from what we encounter in Emerson. Although the great silence may be a curious experience of the sublime—an experience of elevation as captured in the German word for the sublime, *das Erhabene*—, it is one that Nietzsche is keen to invite his readers to confront. It can also be seen as part of his dramatic revision of the sublime whereby it no longer serves to signify a desire for transcendent otherworldliness or metaphysical completion, such as we may find in romantic appeals to the experience of oneness with nature or in the Kantian appeal to a supersensible humanity.[13]

With its lesson on the sea and the sublime, and as the opening aphorism of the final part of the text, aphorism 423 of *Dawn* is a commencement, and as is so often the case with an aphorism in Nietzsche it is the start of a journey into a labyrinth.

2.

We shall now develop a close reading of aphorism 423 of *Dawn*, which opens thus:

> Here is the sea, here we can forget the city. To be sure, you can still hear the bells sounding the Angelus just now—it is that somber and foolish, yet sweet sound at the crossroads of day and night—but only for one moment more![14] Now all is silent! The sea lies before one pale and shimmering; it cannot speak. The sky plays its eternal mute evening game of red, yellow, and green colors; it cannot speak. The small crags and ribbons of rock descending into the sea as if to find the most solitary spot, none of them can speak. This prodigious muteness that suddenly overcomes us is beautiful and terrifying, it swells the heart. (D 423)

The first question we need to ask is whether the sea, a pregnant metaphor throughout the Nietzsche corpus, is functioning as such in this opening segment. The second question is whether the imagistic cluster of sea, sky, cliffs, and rocks conforms in any way to

a *Natureingang* (nature-introduction), a medieval literary convention with which Nietzsche would have been familiar via Richard Wagner's opera, *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg*.[15] The third question is why nature's inability to speak, iterated three times in the previous block quotation, is experienced by the spectator as simultaneously "beautiful and terrifying." To answer the first question (whether the sea in D 423 is functioning as a metaphor), we would argue that it is not; rather, it is a part of the landscape upon which Nietzsche is musing. Nor, to answer the second question, are the opening sentences of aphorism 423 a *Natureingang*—a literary device whereby the opening lines of a lyric poem depict and deploy a seasonal landscape as a means of reflecting the poet's emotions.[16] Given that the silent stillness of the natural scene "suddenly overcomes" Nietzsche, it has not therefore been appropriated by him as a vehicle for his own feelings; in other words, the spectator here is passive not active. To answer the third question (the import of the sea's inability to speak), we need to move on to the the segment in the aphorism that follows the previous block quotation:

> —Oh the hypocrisy of this mute beauty! How much good it could speak, and how much evil too, if it so wanted! Its bound tongue and expression [*Antlitz*] of long-suffering happiness are a ruse used to ridicule your sympathy [*Mitgefühl*]!—So be it! I'm not ashamed to be the ridicule of such powers. But I have compassion [*bemitleide*] for you, Nature, because you must remain silent, even if it is only your malice that binds your tongue: indeed, I have compassion for you on account of your malice!—Ah, it's growing stiller yet, and my heart swells again: it is startled by a new truth; *it too cannot speak*, it joins in the ridicule whenever a mouth cries out into this beauty; it enjoys its own sweet malice of silence. (D 423; M 259)

In contrast to the opening segment, this passage is indeed an instance of *Natureingang*, but a highly self-aware one. The mockery and malice that are being anthropomorphically attributed to nature's "silent beauty" are but transferred epithets for the mockery and malice rising in Nietzsche's own heart—a heart that mocks at the confidence with which the mouth articulates the heart's feelings and projects them onto the mute beauty of nature. It is important, here, not to confuse sympathy (*Mitgefühl*) and compassion (*Mitleid*). Nietzsche's compassion for nature's inanimate muteness is motivated by a sudden cognitive realization, "a new truth," that words can no more do justice to the feelings of the heart than penetrate the mystery of natural phenomena. As Nietzsche observes in an aphorism penned shortly before *Dawn*, when human beings speak of nature, they forget that their nature is fundamentally different from the one of which they speak.[17] Sympathy, on the other hand, refers back to the oxymoronic "long-suffering happiness" that one might be tempted to read into the

"expression" (*Antlitz*)—note the ironic personification here—of nature's silent beauty. It is a reading, moreover, the folly of which is fully acknowledged by Nietzsche in the personified image of nature mocking at any such presumed sympathy with humankind.

Three similar allusions to the innate human propensity to interpret the world from a human perspective and color it with human values, concepts, and feelings can be found in part 2 of Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.[18] In one of these allusions, Zarathustra asserts that when thinkers characterize their drive to knowledge as a "will to truth," they are profoundly mistaken:

> Will to the conceivability of all being: that is what I call your will! You first want to *make* all being conceivable: for, with a healthy mistrust, you doubt whether it is in fact conceivable. But it must bend and accommodate itself to you! Thus will your will have it. It must become smooth and subject to the mind as the mind's mirror and reflection. . . . You want to create the world before which you can kneel: this is your ultimate hope and intoxication. (Z II "Of Self-Overcoming")

The other two allusions are rendered figuratively through an allegorical representation of life as a woman. In the first, Zarathustra speaks directly to life:

> Lately I looked into your eye, O Life! And I seemed to sink into the unfathomable.
> But you pulled me out with a golden rod; you laughed mockingly when I called you unfathomable.
> "All fish talk like that," you said; "what *they* cannot fathom is unfathomable.
> But I am merely changeable and untamed and in everything a woman, and no virtuous one.
> Although you men call me 'profound' or 'faithful,' 'eternal,' 'mysterious.'" (Z II "The Dance Song")

In other words, just as the fish's perception of the element in which it necessarily finds itself is determined by its anatomy and physiology, so too is the human's perception. In the second figurative allusion, Zarathustra speaks directly to the reader with whom he wishes to share the secret once imparted to him by life:

> "Behold," it said, "I am that *which must overcome itself again and again.* To be sure, you call it will to procreate or impulse towards a goal, towards the higher, more distant, more manifold: but this is one, and one secret.
> I would rather perish than renounce this one thing; and truly, where there is perishing and the falling of leaves, behold, there life sacrifices itself—for the sake of power!

> That I have to be struggle and becoming and goal and conflict of goals: ah, he who divines my will surely divines, too, along what *crooked* paths it has to go! . . .
> He who shot the doctrine of 'will to existence [*Dasein*]' at truth certainly did not hit the truth: this will—does not exist!" (Z II "Of Self-Overcoming")[19]

Ironically, since life's secret is imparted to the reader through human speech, that secret is itself shaped by the language and concepts with which human beings endeavor to articulate it, such as overcoming, sacrifice, power, "will to existence," and so forth.[20]

Let us return to aphorism 423 of *Dawn*: As Nietzsche's realization of the limits and limitations of human knowledge takes hold, so too does his hostility and self-derision. The aphorism continues: "I come to hate speech, even thought: don't I hear behind every word the laughter of error, wishful thinking, delusion? Mustn't I ridicule my own compassion? Ridicule my ridicule?" The sheer ferocity of this outburst is remarkable, effecting a dramatic and dissonant contrast to the aphorism's opening vista of a pale, shimmering sea, a pastel-hued evening sky, and distant bells chiming the Ave Maria. Yet even here, a gentle note of self-mockery can be detected in Nietzsche's description of the church bells as "somber and foolish," but also sweet; is "foolish," perhaps, a transferred epithet for the sweetness that Nietzsche feels? Nevertheless, the dissonance remains and Nietzsche's evident impatience in the face of human error and delusion anticipates aphorism 483, which appears later in book 5 of *Dawn*. Written in the form of an internal dialogue or dialectic between two interlocutors (A and B), aphorism 483 gives vent to Nietzsche's frustration over the extent to which we humans create the world (quite literally) in our own image. As Kant sought to show, our experience of the world is ineluctably shaped by the dual mechanism of sensory perception and the mind's *a priori* filtering and ordering of raw sensory data. Nietzsche, in a similar vein, writes:

> A: Know! Yes, but always as a human being! What? Always to sit before the same comedy, to act in the same comedy? Never to be able to see things with any eyes other than *these* eyes? And how many countless types of beings might there be, whose organs are better suited to knowledge! What will humanity have known at the end of all its knowledge?—its organs! And that might well mean: the impossibility of knowledge! Misery and disgust! (D 483)

Interlocutor B commiserates with A, but assures her that she will feel much better tomorrow when this day's attack of reason will have passed and A will once again find herself "in the midst of unreason, by which I mean: in the *pleasure* of being human" (ibid.).

Mockery or ridicule is a dominant motif in *Dawn* and is largely associated with the solitary thinker who, having chosen to carve out her own path, far from the well-trodden ruts of the city, inevitably becomes an object of mockery and laughter, ridicule and derision—Nietzsche avails himself of the entire spectrum of synonymous nouns: *Spott*, *Verspottung*, *Lachen*, *Verlachen*, *Hohn*, *Verhöhnung* (see, e.g., D 113, 270, 423, 449; M 103, 212, 259–260, 272). Those who live the *vita contemplativa*, be they ascetics or martyrs (D 113), or thinkers or scientific laborers (D 41, 270, 449), have always been objects of derision. So too have free(d) spirits like Nietzsche, whose suffering, consequent upon a courageous self-liberation from the shackles of socio-religious conventions, is ridiculed not only by strangers (D 480; see also Z II "The Stillest Hour") but also by his former friends and acquaintances, who now declare him to be either temporarily deranged or a conceited fool (D 484). In aphorism 423, however, the mockery directed at Nietzsche is not that of others but of nature, which in turn prompts his own self-derision. He derides his compassion for nature's inability to speak, a silence that not only mocks the risible tendency of human beings to animate the inanimate but also elicits a kindred silent mockery within his own heart. Thus, the malice and hypocrisy with which Nietzsche had imbued the beauty of the evening landscape is now turned toward himself: "Mustn't I ridicule my own compassion? Ridicule my ridicule?"[21]

Neither malice nor ridicule motivates the enigmatic closing lines of the aphorism:

> Oh sea! Oh evening! You are terrible mentors! You teach the human being to *cease* being human! Ought he to sacrifice himself to you? Ought he to become as you are now, pale, shimmering, mute, prodigious, reposing above oneself? Sublimely above oneself [*Über sich selber erhaben*]? (D 423; M 260)

In the playful wryness of the apostrophic exclamatory clauses and the earnest interrogatives that follow lies a genuine perplexity. On the one hand, the confluence of the sea's "prodigious" otherness and the evening's "great silence" ineluctably stimulates our natural propensity to project our thoughts and feelings onto nature. Such feelings, we learn from a later aphorism, are particularly susceptible in the waning light of evening, when "Your physical lassitudes will imbue things with a listless hue, your fever will turn them into monsters! Doesn't your morning shine differently on things than your evening?" (D 539; see also D 542). On the other hand, the sea's eternally inaccessible otherness leaves us wondering whether our best recourse is not to burden the evening with unanswerable questions but to silence all questions in harmony with its mute stillness.[22]

3.

What can this prodigious, eternal muteness teach human beings? It can teach us to remain silent. This is not because, as in Wittgenstein, we wish to speak of metaphysics and the religious experience but cannot owing to the limits of language and the need to rely on factual experience; rather, we remain silent because we know there is quite simply *nothing* to say. Hence, Nietzsche's exasperated outburst: "I come to hate speech, even thought: don't I hear behind every word the laughter of error, wishful thinking, delusion?" (D 423). In this, he is unlike: the idealists who believe in a pure, disinterested contemplation of an object whereby the beholder intuits and communes with the noumenal world—an illusory power according to Zarathustra, who derisively dubs it "immaculate perception" (Z II "Of Immaculate Perception"); the (Romantic) poets who fondly believe in their powers of divination and that nature herself whispers in their ears and lovingly imparts her innermost secrets to them (Z II "Of Poets"); and the philosophical realists who believe "that the world really is the way that it appears to [them]. As if reality (*Wirklichkeit*) stood unveiled before [them] only, and [they themselves] were perhaps the best part of it" (GS 57). In this aphorism from *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche rhetorically inquires what in, say, a mountain or a cloud is "real" once we have subtracted from them our mental image or representation (*Phantasma*) of mountain and cloud and everything human that we have added (ibid.).[23] Nietzsche is not addressing head-on issues of epistemology, such as assessing the rival claims of realism and idealism.[24] Rather, he is reflecting on the artist's love for reality and contending that the "realist," who thinks that he sees the world unadorned is, in fact, unable to perceive the world without a human contribution, including their "primeval love" for it. This love is part of the descent of the human animal, including ancient feelings and sensations that persist in us (ibid.). Nietzsche is appealing in the aphorism, then, to the realist's sense of honesty.

Although human knowledge of the world is necessarily conditioned and shaped by our sensory, perceptual, and affective apparatus, Nietzsche holds that it is a basic human trait to inquire and to understand. However, for the higher human nature that "risk[s] . . . health and honor for the sake of a passion for knowledge" (GS 3), the pursuit of knowledge is not merely a natural human propensity but an all-consuming passion.[25] Any person who can stand amidst the "whole marvelous uncertainty and rich ambiguity of existence *without questioning*, without trembling with the craving and the rapture of such questioning" is, in Nietzsche's view, contemptible (GS 2). Hence, the successive questions with which Nietzsche closes out aphorism 423 of *Dawn*: Nietzsche asks whether

the most appropriate response to the silent stillness of the sea and the evening is one of imitation. Ought one to repose "Sublimely above oneself?" (D 423; M 260)—not unlike, perhaps, those rare individuals who possess "the *pure, purifying eye*" that can look down on the world as on a god and, more importantly, love this god (D 497).

Although there are geniuses who are teachers of "pure seeing" for us (ibid.), Nietzsche is keen to stress that such seeing requires apprenticeship and long practice. True genius is something extremely rare simply because so few can free themselves from their temperaments and character. Most of us see existence through a veil or cloak. He challenges us to reflect on whether we are in fact suited for knowing what is true. Our mind may be too dull, our vision too crude, to permit us access to such knowledge. He runs through the many subjective elements of our perception and vision of the world—how, for example, we are often on the lookout for something that affects us strongly, and, at other times, for something that calms us because we are tired. We are, Nietzsche says, "always full of secret predeterminations as to *how* the truth would have to be constituted if you, precisely you, were able to accept it!" (D 539). To attain objectivity of perception and vision is hard for human beings—to be just toward something requires from us warmth and enthusiasm, and the lovable and hateful ego appears to be always present—and may in fact be only attainable in degrees. We may, then, have good reasons for living in fear of our own ghost: "In the cavern of every type of knowledge, are you not afraid once more of running into your own ghost, the ghost that is the cloak (*verkleidet*) in which truth has disguised itself from you?" (D 539; M 308).

Nietzsche wants us to resist the idea of positing a divine or diabolical nature, one that would be suffused with ethical and symbolic significance, and that we find in Schopenhauer's metaphysics (see D 197). In aphorism 190 of *Dawn,* Nietzsche appeals to a "natural science that does not lend itself to some religious symbolism," and he does so to guard against the temptation and error of viewing everything as more beautiful than it actually is (D 190). This "good-natured, silver-lined idealism . . . wants, above all, nobly affected gestures and nobly affected voices, a thing as presumptuous as it is naive, animated by a most sincere aversion to 'cold' or 'dry' reality, to anatomy, to undiluted passions, to every type of philosophical temperance and skepticism" (ibid.). Nietzsche advises us to be skeptical particularly of "the passionate demand for brilliant boneless generalities combined with an intentional 'beautifying vision'" (ibid.). He expresses his admiration for those thinkers such as Aristotle who have been able to take joy in science, including its "coldness, dryness, and inhumanity" (D 424). Indeed, Nietzsche voices his warning about the dangerous naivete of "good-natured, silver-lined idealism" in the

context of a critique of a German culture that, he holds, has only served to make fools of Europeans, and that he associates with figures such as Schiller, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Schelling (D 190).[26] It is in *Dawn* that Nietzsche also discusses the "realism" of contemporary artists and suggests that our happiness today may reside in what is realistic:

> in having the most acute senses possible . . . not therefore *in* reality but *in knowing about reality* . . . . Science has gained such a profound and widespread effect that artists of this century . . . have already become the true glorifiers of scientific 'ecstasies'!" (D 433).[27]

He wants us to learn to appreciate that knowledge of the "ugliest reality" can itself be beautiful (D 550).[28] "The realm of beauty" is thus getting bigger for us moderns (D 468), and we may come to appreciate that those who pursue knowledge serve to increase the amount of beauty in the world: "Knowledge places its beauty not merely around things but, in the long run, into things—may future humanity bear witness to this proposition!" (D 550). Nietzsche writes that philosophers such as Descartes and Spinoza must have enormously enjoyed their knowledge, but notes also the worry that through this enjoyment they became panegyrists of things despite their wish to always remain faithful to honesty (*Redlichkeit*) (ibid.; M 321). Nietzsche associates knowing (*Erkennen*) things with "the activity of a well-trained, inquisitive, and inventive *understanding*," as opposed, he adds, to finding knowledge in intuition, a method favored by (German) "theologians and semitheologians," or in the "vision," which is favored by mystics (ibid.).

4.

In Emerson's essay, "Illusions," from the late text *The Conduct of Life* (1862), a copy of which was owned by Nietzsche, he writes: "The world rolls, the din of life is never hushed," and then adds, "I find men victims of illusion in all parts of life."[29] Like Nietzsche in aphorism 57 of *The Gay Science* ("To the realists"), Emerson fully recognizes the extent to which our perception of the world is governed by our imaginations, admirations, and sentiments, and this means that "our conversation with Nature is not just what it seems" (I 166). This living by illusion and failing to understand the extent to which we project ourselves onto the real, including nature, reaches an extreme point for Emerson when he observes that "everybody is drugged with his own frenzy" and, moreover, that "we live amid hallucinations" (I 167, 169). On the level of so-called typical, empirical, and ordinary life, Emerson finds that "there are deceptions of the senses, deceptions of the passions, and the structural, beneficent illusions of sentiment and of the intellect," including the

illusion of love by which we project onto the beloved person all the attributes of beauty and desire (I 170).[30]

Emerson was acutely aware of the importance of silence and the extent to which it needs to be acknowledged as playing an important role in our lives: "Good as is discourse, silence is better and shames it."[31] In silence, as in solitude, we gain a valuable distance from ourselves and from the "din of life," and Emerson writes: "I like the silent church before the service begins, better than any preaching."[32] Indeed, Emerson connects this withdrawal from our typical way of being in the world—away from the "mob" and the "emphatic trifles" with which the world at times seems to be conspiring to importune us—with a specific experience that is strikingly similar to the one that we find depicted in *Dawn*'s aphorism 423, which ends with an appeal to the sublime: "But your isolation must not be mechanical, but spiritual, that is, must be elevation."[33] Emerson speaks of this whole experience of disconnecting from the world in terms of communicating with an internal ocean. In Nietzsche's aphorism, such an experience is depicted in terms of a sublime elevation beyond the human, and here we may want to take the "human" as referring to the chatter of human life in which we exist, oblivious to who we are, to ourselves as projectors.

In Nietzsche, it might be suggested, the lesson in silence is twofold. On the one hand, it teaches us to acknowledge the alterity of nature, and in respecting nature in this way, we become aware of ourselves as projectors and colorists of reality: there are different and multiple ways by which we can and do project and color. On the other hand, it is a way of being in the world that encourages us to be more singularly reflective in relation to ourselves and our own becoming. As Emerson writes, "Real action is in silent moments. The epochs of our life are not in the visible facts of our choices of a calling, our marriage, our acquisition of an office, and the like, but in a silent thought by the wayside as we walk; in a thought which revises our entire manner of life."[34] For Emerson there is, in fact, a different kind of mocking dimension to nature, and it is one from which we can take inspiration as we conduct our lives in a more reflective and honest manner. This consists in the recognition that things, including nature, speak to us not in terms of complete satisfactions but rather in terms of suggestions. It is worth citing Emerson at some length on this crucial insight, from his essay "Nature":

> There is throughout nature something mocking, something that leads us on and on, but arrives nowhere; keeps no faith with us. All promise outruns the performance. We live in a system of approximations. Every end is prospective of some other end, which is also temporary; a round and final success nowhere. We are encamped in nature, not domesticated. Hunger and thirst lead us on to eat and to drink; but bread and wine, mix and cook them how

> you will, leave us hungry and thirsty, after the stomach is full. It is the same with all our arts and performances. Our music, our poetry, our language itself are not satisfactions, but suggestions.[35]

In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche approaches the question of appearance (*Erscheinung*) and how philosophers conceive it by making an analogy with painting.[36] He first states that philosophers think they stand in front of life and experience it as if in front of a painting that has been unrolled for all time with all incidents and events unalterably fixed. In effect, time does not exist in this conception of appearance amongst the philosophers. Moreover, they hold that to arrive at a definite conclusion about the essential being or thing-in-itself that produced the painting, it is necessary to have the correct interpretation of these incidents. If we are more rigorous in how we think the metaphysical (the unconditioned), then we know there cannot be any connection between the unconditioned and the world known to us, that is, the world as it appears to us. This must mean that the thing-in-itself does not appear at all, and we cannot arrive at any conclusion about appearances from the thing-in-itself. What both positions overlook, Nietzsche argues, is the possibility that the painting—what we take life and experience to be and to consist in—is something that has come to be; that is, it has evolved and has a history, and it is still becoming or evolving. It is through moral, religious, and aesthetic demands, along with our blind inclination, passion, and fear, together with a revelling in habits of illogical thinking, that the world has become what it is for us, namely something colorful, meaningful, and soulful; and yet, we have been the colorists and continue to be.

This issue of our coloring of the world is taken up again in *Dawn*. In aphorism 426 ("Color-blindness of thinkers"), for example, Nietzsche reflects on how the ancient Greeks viewed their nature only through certain colors, having a blind eye for blue and green (colors that, for Nietzsche, "dehumanize nature more than anything else") and seeing the former as deep brown and the latter as yellow (they used the same word to describe the "color of dark hair, the cornflower, and the Mediterranean") (D 426). The result was that nature was made to appear close to humankind, "because in their [the Greeks'] view the color of human beings also predominated in nature," as if nature "swam in the atmospheric palette of humanity!" (ibid.). However, this partial coloring of the world is not to be seen simply as a deficiency, since it can serve as a metaphor for further inquiry: "Every thinker paints his world and every individual thing in it with fewer colors *than actually exist* and is blind to certain particular colors" (ibid.). Such blindness—amounting to approximation and simplification—enables the thinker to read color harmonies into the things themselves, which then end up

appealing to us and serving to enrich nature for us, even facilitating our learning of how to take pleasure in existence. In the following aphorism in *Dawn*, Nietzsche notes how philosophy itself has arisen time and time again as the attempt to beautify *Wissenschaft* (scholarly science)—scholarly science considered as something "ugly, dry, dreary, difficult, tedious" (D 427; M 263). Like art and poetry, he contends, philosophy wants to entertain, that is, to aid and promote human attention and attentiveness, and it aims to do so in a "sublime and elevated manner among a group of select spirits" (ibid.). In aphorism 561 of *Dawn*, Nietzsche notes how the melancholic poet and philosopher, considered as types for whom "the radiant luster of happiness is unattainable," present their appreciations of reality by coloring "things a few degrees darker than they are," and so leading to an exaggerated picture of reality, giving "all things the blackest and gloomiest colors," making use of only flames and lightning bolts that serve to produce a "glaring brilliance" that "confuses the eye"; for such a poet or philosopher, even brightness is there only "to increase the horror and to make us sense that things are more terrifying than they really are" (D 561).

There is color, too, in the scene that Nietzsche sees before him and depicts for the reader in aphorism 423: the sea is found to be "pale and shimmering" and the sky "plays its eternal mute evening game of red, yellow, and green colors." Although the scene is witnessed as both beautiful and terrifying, Nietzsche does not wish his readers to remain stuck in the sublime of terror but rather for them to hear the silence amid the color, and to ponder its significance. In the experience, he suggests to us, we may find repose and a unique kind of elevation above ourselves, above the human—while, of course, experiencing at the same time the curious and undeniable pleasures of being human.

5.

John Ruskin famously coined "the pathetic fallacy" as a derogatory term for the manner in which feelings "produce in us a falseness in all our impressions of external things"; he specifically associates this with the passion-infused depictions of nature that is characteristic of the "second-order of poets" such as Wordsworth, Keats, and Tennyson.[37] One of the most intelligent treatments of this fallacy, and one that to some degree is in accord with Nietzsche's insights into our feeling for nature, is to be found in George Santayana's work. In concluding this essay, we wish to consider Santayana's insights and then bring Nietzsche back into the picture.

Santayana writes: "We dye the world of our own color; by a pathetic fallacy, by a false projection of sentiment, we soak Nature with our own

feeling, and then celebrate her tender sympathy with our moral being."[38] This is consonant with Nietzsche's insights into how we relate to nature, though he is more probing about the character of the sympathy that is at work in the experience that Santayana is depicting. Where Santayana is helpful, though, is in showing how we can rescue that which is involved in the "pathetic fallacy"—rescue it as a source that can disclose something valuable about our human being in the world. This centers on the reference that he makes to "our moral being," where the word "moral" denotes our imaginative and creative capacities. This includes the way that the feeling of sympathy, often provoked in us through our contemplation of nature and what is suggested to us in the encounter, allows us to broaden our experience of life and fashion from it new ideals and new ways of thinking and feeling. It may be for a similar reason that Nietzsche, who is notorious for his critique of the empathetic emotions, notably compassion or pity (*Mitleid*), lists "sympathy" (*Mitgefühl*) as one of the four key virtues he especially prizes (BGE 284).

Santayana notes that the pathetic fallacy represents a return to an ancient habit of thought when human ancestors "peopled the world" with spirits both benevolent and malevolent, so that "what they felt in the presence of objects they took to be a part of the objects themselves" (EFP 159). Santayana then goes onto to argue that poetry, which returns to this natural confusion, including the confusion of vision and feeling, performs a valuable service for us by recalling and consecrating aspects of our experience that, although useless to an understanding of material reality, we are in danger of forgetting altogether. There is, then, he is claiming, *vitality* in poetry since it "shakes us out of our servile speech and imaginative poverty," helps us "to nurse the wonderful spontaneous creations which at every waking moment we are snuffing out in our brain," and so affords us a richer experience of nature and life than ordinary utilitarian existence allows (ibid.). In short, the value of poetry resides in the fact that it enables us to break with conventions of feeling and thinking and with dull habits. Santayana writes: "Our descent into the elements of our being is then justified by our subsequent freer ascent toward its goal; we revert to sense only to find food for reason; we destroy conventions only to construct ideals" (EFP 161).

Santayana holds that when we appreciate the function of poetry in this way—be it the poetry of fancy, observation, and passion, the poetry of mere sound and virtuosity, or the poetry of creative reason—, we need to recognize that it is the principle of beauty that lies at the base of our creative being as projectionists in the world; he calls this principle "the art of assimilating phenomena, whether words, images, emotions, or systems of ideas, to the deeper innate cravings of the mind" (EFP

162). Far from having a depressive effect on us, these insights into the character of the human being in the world can serve to embolden us.

A similar view lies at the heart of Nietzsche's remarks on science and aesthetics in his remarkable notebooks of 1881, in which he holds that the whole passion of knowledge needs to grant our existence an aesthetic meaning, as a way of increasing our taste for existence. He recognizes that the world that science discloses to us, including the inner world of our selves, is not what we take it to be, and it challenges us as such, profoundly so. Indeed, science presents us humans with a foreign world.[39] He holds, however, that we should not love science without thinking about its possible utility, and suggests that it can be utilized as a means of turning the human being into an artist of life "in an unheard-of-sense [*unerhörten Sinne*]!" (UFJS 314; KSA 9, 11[23]). We will find it necessary, Nietzsche reflects, "to reclaim all the beauty and sublimity that we have conferred on things real and imagined as the *property and productivity of human beings* and as their most beautiful ornamentation, most beautiful apology. The human being as poet, as thinker, as god, as power, as compassion [*Mitleid*]" (UFJS 427; KSA 9, 12[34]). The beauty and sublimity of nature before which the human appears small "was first *imposed* on nature by us—consequently humankind has been *deprived* of this portion. It will have to atone for it" (UFJS 428; KSA 9, 12[38]).

For Nietzsche, we are never standing outside of life where we would exist as passive and contemplative spectators of ourselves. Rather, we can conceive ourselves as poets who keep creating their own lives; being neither actors nor mere spectators, we invent by always being able to "*fashion*" something that was not there before, including "the whole eternally growing world of valuations, colors, accents, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations" (GS 301). When human beings fail to recognize what is their "best power"—the capacity to invent and create—they end up being "*neither as proud nor as happy* as . . . [they] might be" (ibid.).

NOTES

1. Charles Baudelaire, "*The Artist's* Confiteor," in *The Prose Poems and* La Fanfarlo, trans. Rosemary Lloyd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) p. 33.
2. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The Adirondacs," in "Poems," in *The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, ed. Brooks Atkinson (New York: Modern Library, 2000), p. 732.

3. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), aphorism 240; henceforth GS, followed by aphorism number.

4. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, in *Beyond Good and Evil / On the Genealogy of Morality*, trans. Adrian del Caro (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), §230; henceforth BGE, followed by section number.

5. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Dawn: Thoughts on the Presumptions of Morality*, trans. Brittain Smith (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), aphorism 423; henceforth D, followed by aphorism number (in the case of the preface, the letter "P" appears before the aphorism number).

6. Friedrich Nietzsche, "Daybreak: Thoughts on Morality as Prejudice," in "Why I Write Such Good Books," pt. 3 of *Ecce Homo: How to Become What You Are*, trans. and ed. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), §1.

7. Ibid. Nietzsche was remarkably fond of Genoa, a maritime city that also gave him access to the mountains; he first visited it in October 1876 as a stopover on the way to Nice (see Duncan Large, "Nietzsche and the Figure of Columbus," *Nietzsche-Studien* 24:1 [1995], pp. 162–83, esp. 164). He resided in Genoa and its environs for three successive winters between 1880 and 1883 (ibid., p. 163).

8. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Spiritual Laws," in "Essays: First Series," in *The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, p. 180.

9. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Morgenröte: Gedanken über die moralischen Vorurtheile*, in Morgenröte, Idyllen aus Messina*, and* Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, vol. 3 of *Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Munich: De Gruyter, 1988), p. 259; henceforth M, followed by page number.

10. The painter knows especially well the muteness of landscape. The painter and art critic Christopher Neve writes, for example, of the landscape in the work of Paul Nash as follows: "How it keeps its secrets! . . . Its age and its inertia have nothing to do with us. We can scratch it or build on it or burn it but it will no more accept our passions or our actions than a stone picked up will accept the warmth of a hand. . . . Does not all landscape suggest this muteness?" (Christopher Neve, *Unquiet Landscape: Places and Ideas in 20th-Century British Painting* [London: Thames & Hudson, 2020], pp. 20, 22; for Neve's remarks on Joan Eardley and painting the sea, see ibid., pp. 91–7).

11. In the closing lines of aphorism 117, entitled "In prison," Nietzsche writes: "We hang within our web, we spiders, and no matter what we capture in it, we can capture nothing whatsoever other than what allows itself to be captured precisely in *our* web" (D 117). See also Nietzsche's remarks on "Our new 'infinite,'" in book 5 of *The Gay Science* (GS 374).

12. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature," in "Essays: Second Series," in *The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, p. 368.

13. See also George Santayana's account of the "superhuman" experience of the sublime: "The surprised enlargement of vision, the sudden escape from our ordinary interests and the identification of ourselves with something permanent and superhuman, something much more abstract and inalienable than our changing personality, all this carries us away from the private tragedies before us, and raises us into a sort of ecstasy. . . . when in thus translating ourselves we rise and play a higher personage, feeling the exhilaration of a life freer and wilder than our own, then the experience is one of sublimity" (George Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outlines of Aesthetic Theory*, ed. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr., vol. 2 of *The Works of George Santayana*, ed. Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. and William G. Holzberger [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988], pp. 151–2).

14. In his commentary on *Dawn* (*Morgenröthe*), Jochen Schmidt suggests that Nietzsche may have drawn on passages in Montaigne and Stendhal for the setting of aphorism 423 (Jochen Schmidt, "Kommentar zu Nietzsches *Morgenröthe*," in vol. 3.1 of *Historischer und kritischer Kommentar zu Friedrich Nietzsches Werken*, ed. Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften [Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015], p. 365). The relevant passage from Montaigne runs: "At home I live in a tower where at dawn and at sunset every day a very big bell rings out the 'Ave Maria.' This jangling frightens my very tower; to me, it seems unendurable at first, but in a short time it has me tamed, so that I hear it without disturbance and often without awaking" (Michel de Montaigne, *Essais*: *Avec des notes de tous les commentateurs*, [Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1864], bk. 1, chap. 23; cited in Schmidt, "Kommentar zu Nietzsches *Morgenröthe*," p. 365). The relevant passage from Stendhal runs: "Ave Maria (Twilight), in Italy the hour for tenderness, for the pleasures of the soul and for melancholy: sensation enhanced by the sound of those lovely bells. Hours for pleasures unrelated to the senses except through memories" (Stendhal [Henri Beyle], "Various Fragments," in *Love*, trans. Gilbert Sale and Suzanne Sale [London: Penguin, 1975], frag. 66; "Fragments Divers," in *De l'amour*: *Seule édition complète, augmentée de préfaces et de fragments entièrement inédits* [Paris: Michel-Lévy, 1876], frag. 66, p. 245; cited in Schmidt, "Kommentar zu Nietzsches *Morgenröthe*," p. 365). What is unique to Nietzsche in this aphorism, however, is the depiction of the Angelus scene and the encounter with nature—with the sea and with silence—in terms of a figuration of the sublime.

15. *Natureingang* was a distinctive feature of the medieval *Minnesang*, or love song, that owed its origins to the courtly love poetry of the troubadours (see Albrecht Classen, "Courtly Love Lyric," in *A Companion to Middle High German Literature to the 14th Century*, ed. Francis G. Gentry [Leiden: Brill, 2002], p. 117–50). In Wagner's *Die Meistersinger*, the protagonist Walther von Stolzing, when asked to comment upon his eligibility to become a *Meistersinger*, responds in the medieval form of the *Minnesang* that he had learned from an ancestral manuscript. According to Arthur Groos, *Meistersang* or *Meistergesang* was conceived as "an urban renovation" of the *Minnesang* (see Arthur Groos, "Becoming a Composer: Walther's Songs in 'Die Meistersinger,'" *Cambridge Opera Journal* 25:3 [2013], pp. 261–84, esp. 265). In two letters written in January 1869—one addressed

to his mother and sister, the other to Carl von Gersdorff—Nietzsche declared *Die Meistersinger* to be his favorite opera (Friedrich Nietzsche to Franziska and Elisabeth Nietzsche, in *Briefe von Nietzsche [1869]*, in *Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe: Werke und Briefe*, ed. Paolo D' Iorio [Paris: Nietzsche Source, 2009–], letter 611, http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/BVN-1869,611) and for which he felt "the greatest affection" (Nietzsche to Von Gersdorff, in *Briefe von Nietzsche [1869]*, letter 610, http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/BVN-1869,610), respectively.

16. *Natureingang* is the ancestor of what John Ruskin termed "the pathetic fallacy," a term to which we will return in the final section of this essay (see John Ruskin, "Of the Pathetic Fallacy," in *Modern Painters III*, vol. 5 of *The Works of John Ruskin*, ed. Edward Tyas Cook and Alexander Wedderburn [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010], pp. 201–20).

17. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, pt. 2 of *Human, All Too Human, II*, trans. Gary Handwerk (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), aphorism 327; *Der Wanderer und sein Schatten*, pt. 2 of *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches II*, p. 696. For example, while beast and human both exhibit abundant happiness in high-spiritedness (D 439), the native element in which that high-spiritedness is expressed will be different: pigs in mud or fish in water, to take two popular idioms.

18. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1969); henceforth Z, followed by part number in Roman numerals, section title in quotation marks, and, where appropriate, section number in Arabic numerals.

19. See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Also sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen (I–IV)*, vol. 4 of *Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Munich: De Gruyter, 1988), p. 148.

20. Zarathustra's scare-quoted "will to existence" is a reference to Schopenhauer's doctrine of the "will to life" (*Wille zum Leben*) (see *The World as Will and Representation,* trans. and ed. Judith Norman, Alistair Welchman, and Christopher Janaway [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010], vol. 1, bk. 4, esp. §54).

21. Self-mockery is a distinctive characteristic of the solitary seeker after knowledge, as he is portrayed in *Zarathustra*. We read of how the solitary thinker shivers from the "frost of solitude" and mocks at his slow and stumbling progress along the steep mountain paths of knowledge (Z I "Of the Tree on the Mountainside"); how he pants under the weight of his devil and arch-enemy, the "spirit of gravity"; how, in the desolate, "deathly-grey twilight," even the stones underfoot mock him with their clatter (Z III "Of the Vision and the Riddle" 1); and how, in a Gothic nightmare, Zarathustra is ambushed by the mockery of a thousandfold peel of laughter that spews out of a burst-open black coffin (Z II "The Prophet"). From which one might plausibly infer that, for Nietzsche personally, self-mockery was an ever-present deflationary voice in his head.

22. There is something of John Keats's "negative capability" here, namely the ability to remain in "uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason" (*The Letters of John Keats*, *1814–*

1821, ed. Hyder Edward Rollins [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958], vol. 1, p. 193).

23. Nietzsche, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft ("La gaya scienza")*, in vol. 3 of *Kritische Studienausgabe*, p. 421.

24. It is wise to recall that Kant claims to be both a transcendental idealist and an empirical realist, a position he makes clear in the "Refutation of Idealism" section in the second edition of *the Critique of Pure Reason* published in 1787 (see Immanuel Kant, "Refutation of Idealism," in *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], B274–9).

25. One is reminded here of Tennyson's Ulysses "yearning in desire / To follow knowledge like a sinking star, / Beyond the utmost bound of human thought," save that, for Kant and Nietzsche, the utmost bound of human thought is a limit beyond which the human can never go, however great her desire to do so (see Alfred Tennyson, "Ulysses," in *A Selected Edition*, rev. ed., ed. Christopher Ricks [London: Routledge, 2014], lines 30–2, p. 143).

26. In the preface to the second edition of his book *Views of Nature* (1849), Humboldt writes of the dangers of seeking to combine literary and scientific goals, and he confesses that at the time he wrote the book he had more love than he has now for the "half-poetic adornment of serious truths," and he invites the reader to practice their skepticism when reading the book (see Alexander von Humboldt, "From *Views of Nature*," trans. Mark W. Person, in *Selected Writings*, ed. Andrea Wulf [New York: Everyman's Library, 2018], pp. 407–8).

27. In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche esteems Goethe for his "reckless realism," which expresses itself in "a reverence for everything factual" (Friedrich Nietzsche, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man," in *Twilight of the Idols: Or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer*, in *Twilight of the Idols* and *The Anti-Christ*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale [London: Penguin, 2003], §50). Elsewhere in *Dawn*, Goethe is depicted as a "great learner" (D 540).

28. See also Nietzsche, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man," §§ 19, 20.

29. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Illusions," in *The Conduct of Life*, vol. 6 of *The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, ed. Joseph Slater and Douglas Emory Wilson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 167; henceforth I, followed by page number. For Emerson's works in Nietzsche's personal library, see Thomas J. Brobjer, *Nietzsche's Philosophical Context: An Intellectual Biography* (Chicago: University of Illinois, 2008), pp. 23, 44, 119n. 11.

30. Emerson's appreciation of the illusion of love is in accord with the insights into projection found in Stendhal's classic modern study, *Love*, and that the latter develops throughout the text in terms of the notion of "crystallization." Stendhal was one of Nietzsche's favourite writers and *Love* is a text with which he was very familiar and that exerted an influence on his conception of the "passion" of knowledge. In *Ecce Homo*, he writes of his wish to always praise Stendhal as a "profound psychologist," especially in the context of an appraisal of the German spirit, which, he contends, is sorely lacking in the "harsh self-examination" that psychology

provides (Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Wagner Case: A Musician's Problem," in "Why I Write Such Good Books," pt. 3 of *Ecce Homo*, §3). In *Beyond Good and Evil*, he singles Stendhal out for special praise because he is a writer who goes against "German taste" and can inspire free-spirited philosophizing (BGE 39; see also BGE 254 and 256).

31. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Circles," in "Essays: First Series," in *The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, p. 257.

32. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Self-Reliance," in "Essays: First Series," p. 145. Compare this remark with Schopenhauer's essay "On Noise and Sounds," in *Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays*, vol. 2, trans. and ed. Adrian del Caro and Christopher Janaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 575–9.

33. Emerson, "Self-Reliance," p. 145.

34. Emerson, "Spiritual Laws," pp. 186–7.

35. Emerson, "Nature," p. 374. For instructive insight into what the "wisdom of nature" meant to Emerson—and Thoreau—, see the chapters on both writers in Virginia Woolf, *Books and Portraits: Some Further Selections from the Literary and Biographical Writings of Virginia Woolf*, ed. Mary Lyon (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), pp. 67–72 and pp. 72–80, respectively.

36. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human, I: A Book for Free Spirits*, trans. Gary Handwerk (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), aphorism 16; *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches I: Ein Buch für freie Geister*, in *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches I und II*, vol. 2 of *Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Munich: De Gruyter, 1988), p. 36.

37. Ruskin, "Of the Pathetic Fallacy," p. 205.

38. George Santayana, "The Elements and Functions of Poetry," in *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, ed. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr., vol. 3 of *The Works of George Santayana*, ed. Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. and William G. Holzberger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), p. 158; henceforth EFP, followed by page number.

39. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Nachgelassene Fragmente: 1880–1882*, vol. 9 of *Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Munich: De Gruyter, 1988), notebook 12, frag. 24, p. 580; henceforth KSA 9, followed by notebook number and fragment number in brackets; see also Friedrich Nietzsche, *Unpublished Fragments from the Period of* The Joyful Science *(Spring 1881–Summer 1882)*, in *The Joyful Science* / *Idylls from Messina* / *Unpublished Fragments from the Period of* The Joyful Science, trans. Adrian Del Caro (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2023), p. 426; henceforth UFJS, followed by page number.