INCORPORATION AND INDIVIDUATION: ON NIETZSCHE’S USE OF PHENOMENOLOGY FOR LIFE
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Even now, most philosophers have no inkling of the real critique of concepts or (as I once called it) a real “history of the genesis of thinking”,

Nietzsche

Introduction

An encounter with Nietzsche, including one that will enable us to relate his work to phenomenology in an incisive and pertinent manner, is not possible until we have identified some essential aspects of his thinking and unfolded them. Paul Ricœur argues that one has to orient oneself within Husserl’s work, which is to be approached as “a labyrinth with several entries and perhaps several centres, each relative to different perspectives on the total work”.1 In spite of the labyrinthine character of the work, we know that Husserl is working towards the ends of a unique and novel philosophical project – transcendental phenomenology with its search for “transcendentally purified” phenomena and experiences.2 This project creates original concepts,3 and has distinctive methods and modes of philosophizing, such as the epoché. Can we say the same of Nietzsche? Although it is fashionable to assume in the wake of Foucault that there is no single, core Nietzscheanism, this grossly underestimates the extent to which a definite project unfolds in Nietzsche’s writings, one that renders his thinking unique and distinctive.

Husserl is concerned with a special kind of consciousness – the consciousness of – which is accorded transcendental status, and which he notes is at one and the same time something quite obvious and highly obscure.4 For Husserl, there is always a limit to naturalizing simply because, “Subjects cannot be dissolved into nature, for in that case what gives nature its sense would be missing”.5 The world of the subject is not a physicalistic one, but a surrounding world, a “thematic world of … intentional life”.6 Nietzsche’s approach to consciousness is different, focused on a specific set of issues and problems, and, as a result, his conception of phenomenology is also different. In contrast to Husserl, Nietzsche seeks a different purification; it is one that he himself conceives as a naturalistic purification. Nietzsche’s naturalism, it is necessary to note, is not the naturalism that is subject to Husserl’s criticism, which is a physicalism and objectivism that Nietzsche too would not be content with (see GS 373’). Nietzsche’s naturalism is bound up with his theory of life, which is ultimately conceived by him in terms of the will to power and denotes growth and expansion and supposes processes of assimilation and
incorporation. Life is a matter of sense and interpretation; in each event it is the will to power that interprets. Nietzsche’s conception of life is very specific: *Life is* an “ordering, overwhelming, simplifying, abbreviating power” (KSA 12, 6 [14], WLN, p. 125). The insights he develops about all kinds of things on the basis of this conception of life, including the human being and its fate, about truth and error, about knowledge and knowing, will strike the reader as enigmatic at best and absurd at worst unless they are given an adequate demonstration. As has been noted by various commentators, Nietzsche’s transcendentalist commitments take the form of a transcendental psychologism and naturalism. However, the critical relation between Nietzsche and Husserlian phenomenology is best approached not in terms of the contest between naturalism and its critique, but in terms of different phenomenologies of life. For Nietzsche, life is ‘will to power’, which, on the one hand denotes a pre-form of life (pure potentiality or virtuality) (BGE 36), and which, on the other, is knowable only as ‘Schein’. In a note of 1885 Nietzsche writes that Schein “is the actual and sole reality of things”. Moreover, Schein is “the reality that resists transformation into an imaginary ‘truth-world’ – it is our best bet against metaphysics – and a “determinate name” for it is “will to power”, which can only be “characterized from inside and not from its ungraspable, flowing Proteus-nature” (KSA 11, 40 [53]; see also BGE 36).

I think we can most productively relate Nietzsche’s thinking to phenomenology through exploring two core and related issues: consciousness and individuation. For Husserl, what is uniquely and originally individual is consciousness taken concretely with its Ego. All other individuality is appearance and has the principle of its individuation in actual and possible appearing that must refer back to an individual consciousness. Absolute individuation enters into the personal Ego. That which is given to us, qua human subject and one with the human Body in immediate experiential apprehension, is the human person that has its spiritual individuality, its intellectual and practical abilities and skills, its character, and its sensibility. For Husserl, individuation is the fundamental transcendental, and it is necessary to carry out the reduction to demonstrate this. For Nietzsche, by contrast, the sovereign individual – the rational and autonomous agent supposed as the transcendental ego – is the aim and goal of culture, conceived as the training of the human animal as a being of time and that produces a creature that can calculate and compute, in short, that is sanctioned to promise and has earned the prerogative to say ‘I’ (*On the Genealogy of Morality*, essay two): “Culture precisely means learning to calculate, learning to think causally learning to act preventively, learning to believe in regularity” (KSA 12, 10 [21], WLN p. 179). For Husserl, individuation, properly understood, is, and can only be, spiritual and personal; it involves a subjectifying of the world.
Nietzsche is not as distanced from this as one might suppose; when he translates the human being back into nature he finds a spiritual animal (BGE 230, which is entitled “The fundamental will of the spirit”). However, his call for a naturalistic purification entails approaching our affects and drives, our inclinations and disinclinations, our pros and cons, free from the fateful beautifications and curse of morality (KSA 12, 1 [90], WLN p. 61). Spirit for Nietzsche, one might say, is not to be entrusted with transcendental prominence. What is typically conceived as existing “without nature” must be given back to nature, that is, back to “natural immorality” (KSA 12, 9 [86], WLN p. 153). For Nietzsche, however, true individuation is to come in the future; it is bound up with a fateful history of the human animal and the overcoming of humanity into a superior form and the coming into existence of superior individuals (see D164, GS 335, but especially BGE 260). The specific accomplishment of Nietzsche’s philosophy is a superior humanization of the world. Only with this insight – which we owe to Heidegger – is at all possible to effectively and intelligently engage Nietzsche.

Various logoi are put to work in Nietzsche’s writings, such as semiology and genealogy. As far as I have been able to ascertain, there is only one occurrence of the word ‘phenomenology’ in his writings, which we will encounter presently. This passage has features that are typical of Nietzsche’s thought in the 1880s: consciousness is a late development and a falsifying, error-prone ‘organ’. As he puts it in Daybreak 119, “our moral judgments and evaluations … are only images and fantasies based on a physiological process unknown to us … all our so-called consciousness is a more or less fantastic commentary on an unknown, perhaps unknowable, but felt text … ”. In his Nietzsche and Philosophy of 1962 Deleuze correctly noted that we find a new sense of the phenomenon in Nietzsche: “A phenomenon is not an appearance or even an apparition, but a sign, a symptom … The whole of philosophy is a symptomatology, and a semiology …”.

In this essay I can only make a modest contribution to the task of securing an adequate comprehension of Nietzsche’s project and its possible relation to (Husserlian) phenomenology. Nietzsche’s transcendental naturalism can only be effectively grasped and engaged with by understanding it in the context of the specific problematic that informs his most essential thinking. This is what I would call his focus on life’s incorporation, and this is where I shall begin.

The Incorporation of Truth and Knowledge

The sketch I shall focus my attention on in this section, and as a way of opening up the essential character of his philosophical project, is the very first sketch of the eternal recurrence of the same that we find in Nietzsche’s corpus. Its recent appearance in The Nietzsche Reader is the first time it has appeared in English in its entirety. Nietzsche composed it in Sils-Maria at the
beginning of August, 1881. This is his first summer of assuming residency in Sils, where he will reside every summer up to 1888. He has recently discovered he has a precursor in Spinoza, and indeed a Spinozist inspiration hovers over the sketch, which, like *The Ethics*, is a plan for a book in five parts, culminating in a meditation on ‘blessedness’ or beatitude. In a letter to his friend Franz Overbeck postmarked July 30, 1881, Nietzsche enumerates the points of doctrine he shares with Spinoza, such as the denial of free will, of a moral world order, and of evil, and also mentions the task of “making knowledge the most powerful passion”.15 The challenge presented to us in reading the sketch is one of understanding Nietzsche’s questions and aiming to get the measure of them. This is very difficult. Nietzsche’s question, one he will eventually publish in *The Gay Science* under aphorism 110, is a seemingly straightforward one: to what extent can truth stand or endure incorporation? We need to attend to two main issues: first, what does Nietzsche have in mind when he speaks of truth?; and, second, why is truth to be conceived as a matter of incorporation?

When we reflect on these questions and attempt to provide answers to them, we need to take into account some key points. First, much of what Nietzsche says about truth with respect to our categories of thought and habits of representation supposes a Kantian background. Kant’s transcendental ‘truths’, which seek to establish an agreement between cognition and its objects (*Critique of Pure Reason* A 58/B 82), are errors for Nietzsche, though this does not warrant a negative assessment of them. Secondly, Nietzsche’s positive estimation of error, semblance, and apparentness has to be seen in the context of his critical reception of Schopenhauer (to say nothing of Plato), for whom there is a metaphysical truth and for whom existence can be judged not only to be an error but a guilty one. When Nietzsche writes that the best science (*Wissenschaft*) loves error because, being alive, it loves life (BGE 24) his target is, I think, obvious: it is directed against any metaphysical and ‘moral’ evaluation of truth and error. When Nietzsche stipulates that the question to ask of a judgment, such as a synthetic *a priori* one, is to what extent it has preserved and furthered life and the species, which is what it means to place oneself ‘beyond good and evil’, I take him to be assuming a position outside metaphysics and morality, so admitting “untruth as a condition of life” (BGE 4). Belief in the truth of transcendental judgments gains its necessity “as one of the foreground beliefs and appearances that constitute the perspective-optics of life” (BGE 11).

The sketch appears as note 141 of a notebook (“M III, 1”) made up of 348 notes, and contains many notes and drafts of material that will eventually be published in *The Gay Science*, and in radically different form. It is also fair to say that in this sketch we find, in embryonic form, almost all the matters of thought that will occupy Nietzsche throughout the 1880s. The sketch as
projected is as follows. Part 1 will be on the incorporation of the fundamental errors; part 2 will be on the incorporation of the passions; part 3 will cover the incorporation of knowledge and of renunciatory knowledge (Nietzsche calls this the “passion of knowledge”); part 4 will be on “the innocent one” and “the individual as experiment” (Nietzsche refers to “the alleviation of life, abasement, enfeeblement,” and speaks of a point of transition (Übergang); part 5 will be on “the heavy new burden [Schwergewicht]: the eternal recurrence (Wiederkunft) of the same.” The task, Nietzsche says, is to demonstrate the “infinite importance of our knowing, erring, habits, ways of living for all that is to come.” The question is then asked: “What shall we do with the rest of our lives – we who have spent the majority of our lives in the most profound ignorance? We shall teach the teaching – it is the most powerful means of incorporating [einzüberleiben] it in ourselves. Our kind of blessedness [Seligkeit], as teachers of the greatest teaching.” There then follows the sublime signature, “Early August 1881 in Sils-Maria, 6,000 feet above sea level and much higher above all human things!”

In the sketch only part 4 of the projected book is given an extended treatment by Nietzsche, and this forms the bulk of the rest of the sketch. Let me cite it in full:

On 4) Philosophy of Indifference [Gleichgültigkeit]. What used to be the strongest stimulus now has a quite different effect: it is seen as just a game and accepted (the passions and labours), rejected on principle as a life of untruth, but aesthetically enjoyed and cultivated as form and stimulus; we adopt a child’s attitude towards what used to constitute the seriousness of existence. The seriousness of our striving, though, is to understand everything as becoming, to deny ourselves as individuals, to look into the world through as many eyes as possible, to live in drives and activities so as to create eyes for ourselves, temporarily abandoning ourselves to life so as to rest our eye on it temporarily afterwards; to maintain the drives as the foundation of all knowing, but to know at what point they become the enemies of knowing: in sum, to wait and see how far knowledge [Wissen] and truth can be incorporated – and to what extent a transformation of man occurs when he finally lives only so as to know [erkennen]. –

This is a consequence of the passion of knowledge [Erkenntnis]: there is no way of ensuring its existence except by preserving as well the sources and powers of knowledge, the errors and passions; from the conflict between them it draws its sustaining strength. – What will this life look like from the point of view of its sum total of well-being? A children’s game under the gaze of the wise man, with power over the latter and the former conditions – and over death, if such a thing is not possible. – But now comes the weightiest knowledge [Erkenntnis], one which prompts the terrible reconsideration of all forms of life: an absolute surplus of pleasure must be demonstrable, or else we must choose to destroy ourselves with regard to humanity as a means of destroying humanity. Just this: we have to put the past – our past and that of all humanity – on the scales and also outweigh it – no! this piece of human history will and must repeat [wiederholen] itself eternally; we can leave that out of account, we have no influence over it; even if it afflicts our fellow-feeling and biases us against life in general. If we are not to be overwhelmed by it, our compassion must not be great. Indifference needs to have worked away deep inside us, and enjoyment in contemplation, too. Even the misery of future humanity must not concern us. But the question is whether we still want to live: and how!

This first sketch shows that Nietzsche conceived the eternal recurrence or return of the same – whatever the object of this thought is and kind of thought
it is – in the context of a much wider set of problems than is commonly supposed. At the centre of these problems is the task of incorporating truth and knowledge. The only engagement with it I have been able to find in the great readings of Nietzsche takes place in Heidegger’s remarkable second lecture course of 1937, where he deals only with the book’s projected five parts. For Heidegger, we have no ‘schema’ available to us that might enable us to ‘pigeonhole’ the project of incorporation outlined in the sketch, and so make it familiar to us. Instead, he proposes that we must be on the lookout for the project itself and for its own schema. This is an important point that I concur with. However, it is also the case that the project is one that is well underway by the time Nietzsche composes his sketch, and is deeply rooted in the project of the ‘free-spirit trilogy’. This concerns various tasks Nietzsche assigns to us moderns, including, the renunciation of the first and last things of metaphysics (see especially The Wanderer and His Shadow 16 on ‘Where Indifference is needed’), the passion of knowledge (D 429), the purification of our valuations and opinions (D 33, GS 335), and the incorporation of truth and knowledge (GS 110). Let us also simply note that the sketch clearly anticipates the well-known perspectivism Nietzsche puts forward in GM III, 12: “the more affects we allow to speak about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ of the thing”. Moreover, the motif of ‘incorporation’ is one that Nietzsche is preoccupied with from the time of his early writings: it plays an important role, for example, in the thinking on memory and forgetting he conducts in his unfashionable meditation of history of 1874, where it is conceived as a plastic power (Kraft), and appearances of the term can be found in his work even earlier than this. Although a term of physiology, its appearance in Nietzsche is not, as David Krell has argued, the result of Nietzsche suddenly having read in 1881 Wilhelm Roux’s book on embryology, The Struggle of Parts in the Organism.

Questions concerning ‘incorporation’ do not, of course, originate with Nietzsche in modern thought. We find interesting remarks on incorporation in Novalis, for example, for whom incorporation is bound up with the future: if conceptions of times past draw us toward disintegration, then conceptions of the future “drive us toward living forms – to incorporation, the action of assimilation”. We can also go right back to the beginnings of philosophy, to the Greeks and Roman Stoics, as does Foucault for example in his lecture course of 1981-2 on ‘The Hermeneutics of the Subject’. The term has an interesting history after Nietzsche. In ‘Overcoming Metaphysics’ Heidegger considers the significance of “the preliminary sign of the primal incorporation of the oblivion of Being” for the history of Being, and argues that “Overcoming is worthy of thought only when we think about incorporation”.

In his lecture course Foucault makes central the idea of the ‘incorporation of
truth’ in his attempt to recover a lost ancient care of truth, and without any awareness of Nietzsche’s prior concern with this very question;22 and the great Czech phenomenologist Jan Patočka makes ‘incorporation’ a central concept in his development of the project of phenomenology.23 In addition, it is worth noting its appearance in Husserl, for example, in his treatment of how the subject constitutes nature in terms of “a Body, within an open horizon of possible experience ….” Husserl argues that the primary constitution is a ‘normal’ one that gives us “the first reality of the world and of the Body”. This is because it is only on the basis of a ‘normal’ or typical constitution that there can then take place “the constitution of apperceptive transformations precisely as transformations, as incorporating ‘anomalous’ experiential circumstances” (Ideas 2, section 18c).

In this essay I shall have to restrict myself to dealing with some basic questions of incorporation as the notion figures in Nietzsche’s project. It could be claimed that the project of ‘the gay science’ is Nietzsche’s attempt to work out the ancient tasks of ‘truth’ under peculiarly and specifically modern conditions of existence (see GS 11). The modern knowers that Nietzsche addresses in his writings are knowers who are, in fact, unknown to themselves (GM Preface 1), ones who remain “idealists of knowledge” and godless anti-metaphysicians (GM III, 24). Once again, Heidegger proves incisive here: “… Nietzsche thinks in a thoroughly modern way … we must emphasize again and again that for modern thought the essence of truth is determined on the basis of the essence of knowledge; for incipient Greek thought the essence of knowledge is determined on the basis of the essence of truth, albeit for a brief historical moment and only at the outset”.24

We should not be surprised that running throughout Nietzsche’s corpus is a concern with incorporation and allied notions such as assimilation, digestion, rumination, repetition, interpretation, and so on; he was, after all, trained as a philologist and although he became a severe critic of its scholasticism and pedantry, the emphasis philology places of the arts of reading and interpretation deeply inform Nietzsche’s philosophical practice. On one level, it is a question of knowing the speeds and rhythms of our thinking and learning about the way we digest life. We can think too fast, or we can encounter truth in a premature fashion, which is what Nietzsche finds in Schopenhauer. In Schopenhauer existence is judged to be a guilty error (individuation of necessity bears for him the ‘guilt of existence’), to will life is always to will in vain, and nothingness is posited as the ultimate truth, at once both moral and metaphysical. For Nietzsche these insights come too early to Schopenhauer; his solution to the problem of existence, advocating a denial of the will to life, is hasty and youthful, and also a compromise (see D 481 & GM III, 6).

Nietzsche seems to anticipate an important phenomenological insight when he notes that we do not normally think about thinking when we are thinking
However, by this he means not so much our ignorance of the sources of thinking and positing in a transcendental subjectivity, but rather the origins of our knowing in 'life'. Nevertheless the sketch of 1881 does allow for postulating a possible correspondence between Nietzsche and phenomenology. In it, for example, something close to a suspension of, and withdrawal from, the natural attitude could be said to be at work, as well as recognition of the need to move to a superior standpoint of reflection. To attain this superior from and practice of knowledge, the kind that will challenge us and put us to the test, we need to contemplate, stand back, and produce a reduction of some kind. However, Nietzsche does not make it clear in the sketch just what his conception of this superior form is and what it amounts to.

Whatever form it is to assume, we still need to ask why he conceives its development in terms of a task of incorporation (the German word *Einverleibung* means literally a taking into the body). John Richardson has recently clarified this issue, arguing that as Nietzsche sees it we need to give our distancing insights a causal presence within us, embodying them in our behavioural dispositions (in effect, creating new habits). Indeed, in GS 11 Nietzsche writes of the task of incorporating knowledge (*Wissen*) as one in which it is made *instinctive*. Heidegger fully appreciated this insight when he described eternal recurrence, conceived as an incorporating thought *par excellence*, as “the juice that will now feed all our energies (*Kräfte*)”. Nietzsche himself conceived the cultivation of the thought in terms of a slow sinking in: “whole generations must build upon it and become fruitful, so that it will become a large tree which would overshadow all humanity to come” (KSA 9, 11 [158]). In number 220 of this notebook from 1881 Nietzsche writes that “the most powerful thought” uses the energy that has hitherto been at the command of other goals (*Zielen*). It thus has a “transforming effect” not through the creation of any new energy but simply by creating “new laws of movement for energy.” It is in this sense that it holds “the possibility of determining and ordering individual human beings and their affects differently.” In short, eternal recurrence is a new thought of culture (selection, training, and discipline).

In *The Gay Science* Nietzsche makes significant usage of incorporation in a long aphorism devoted to truth and knowledge (GS 110). This aphorism helps to clarify what Nietzsche has in mind with regard to the incorporation of truth and knowledge. However, as we shall see, Nietzsche leaves it to his readers to work out his meaning and to negotiate the most difficult questions.

Although we exist today in a situation where knowledge itself has now become a part of life, a preoccupation with truth actually appeared late in the evolution of human life and was for a long time held to be “the weakest form of knowledge” on account of the fact that humans found it hard to endure it as
a practice of living. In the story Nietzsche is telling in this aphorism, this was owing to the fact that for the greater part of its evolutionary history the human animal has survived, prospered even, by incorporating a set of “basic errors” which became for it a set of “erroneous articles of faith,” such as that there are equal things, enduring things, indeed that there are things such as substances and bodies, that things are what we immediately take them to be, that the will is free, and so on. All the higher functions of our organism, including sense perception, have worked with these basic errors and incorporated them. Moreover, these propositions concerning self and world established themselves as the norm according to which “true” and “untrue” could be determined. Truth, then, at least initially and during this highly formative period of human evolution, operates in the context of the incorporated errors.

In the section that immediately comes after GS 110 he presents a quasi-Darwinian account of the origins and development of our basic ways of thinking. For example, to be able to think all the time in terms of identity proves helpful in the struggle for survival since it means things in the environment can be recognized and acted upon with speed and quickness. To see only a perpetual becoming everywhere would be disastrous for the evolution of a species of animal. As Nietzsche points out, “the beings who did not see exactly had a head start over those who saw everything ‘in a flux’” (GS 111). What has so far determined the strength or power of knowledge is not its degree of truth, as we might suppose, but rather its “character as a condition of life” (the conditions of life include error). Wherever life and knowledge came into conflict, denial and doubt were taken to be expressions of madness. Where a more truthful humanity has sought to come into being – Nietzsche mentions the school of the Eleatics (Parmenides and his disciples, such as Zeno) – it has arrived at “truth” only by deceiving itself about its own states, for example positing a fictitious impersonality and an unchanging duration. In the process it misunderstood the nature of the knower and lived in denial of the impulses that inform knowledge. Although these human beings cultivated honesty and scepticism, it was these which led to their downfall since their ways of living and judging were seen to be also dependent on the primeval impulses and basic errors of sentient existence.

A subtle kind of scepticism comes into being when two opposing propositions about the world appeared to be applicable to life, simply because both proved compatible with the basic errors and an argument could be put forward about the degrees of utility for life. The same was true, Nietzsche notes, where new propositions came into being that were neither useful nor harmful to life. Such a situation creates room for the expression of an intellectual play impulse. Gradually the human brain becomes full of antinomical judgments and convictions to the point where a “lust for power” manifests itself in this tangle of knowledge. It is in this context that knowledge
and a striving for truth come to inform what we take to be our innermost needs and desires: “all ‘evil’ instincts were subordinated to knowledge, employed in her service, and acquired the splendour of what is permitted, honoured, and useful” (GS 110). With this stage in our evolution we find ourselves in a new situation in which the quest for knowledge and the striving for the true have taken their rightful place among others as being considered among the most fundamental needs, to the point where we now have techniques and disciplines of scrutiny, of denial, and of suspicion. Nietzsche brings the aphorism to a close by saying that the thinker today is “the being in whom the drive to truth and those life-preserving errors are fighting their first battle.” Such a battle is now taking place because the striving for the true has also shown itself to be a life-preserving and life-enhancing power. In order to make further progress with truth it is necessary to conduct an experiment. Nietzsche’s question is: “to what extent can truth stand [verträgt] incorporation?”

The precise meaning of Nietzsche’s questioning is not self-evident. He appears to leave open the result of the experiment that is to be conducted, as well as the precise nature of the fundamental question he has posed. As Heidegger asks, what kind of ‘truth’ is it that stands outside incorporation and that now challenges us in the manner of incorporation? What is the precise nature and status of this ‘truth’? We can see the difficulty of what Nietzsche is trying to think, as well as the complex character of the challenge he is laying down for us: if incorporation conforms to the logic of identity, making the unequal equal, subjugating difference to resemblance, and so on, then, the correct question to be posed of ‘truth’ is whether it can stand or endure incorporation. Nietzsche’s question is thus a fundamental one. Now, it might be that in posing the question in the way he has, Nietzsche also wants us to reflect on the kind of ‘truth’ that can be made the subject of a practice of incorporation.

Although we can say that the truth Nietzsche has in mind is neither the articles of faith of primeval humanity nor the knowledge sought by refined truth-seekers such as the Eleatics, it is very difficult to determine exactly what he does have in mind. Trying to work this out becomes a complicated task when we take into account other notes from the MIII, 1 notebook of 1881. In note 156, for example, he indicates that a fundamental rethinking of the individual is required, and away from the coarse “error” of the species; the individual struggles for its existence, for its new taste, and for its relative singular position in relation to all things. It despises the general taste and wants to rule supreme. But the notion of the individual also has its error, a more refined one to be sure, and its nature must be intensified: it discovers that it itself is something wandering and has a taste that changes; in the smallest moment it is something other than in the next and its conditions of existence are that of a host of individuals. Nietzsche declares: “the infinitely small
moment is the highest reality and truth, a lightning-image that emerges from the eternal river [ein Blitzbild aus dem ewigen Flusse]” (KSA 9, 11[156]). In note 162 Nietzsche states that the organs of a living system work in favour of error, and, therefore, the “ultimate truth” (die letzte Wahrheit) of the flux of things cannot stand incorporation.

In what way (s), then, is truth to be made the subject of incorporation? It seems clear that we need to look elsewhere than the “ultimate truth”, simply because such a truth is literally (physically and spiritually) impossible to incorporate for a finite organic life-form. We could suggest that what Nietzsche has in mind is truth conceived as a set of practices of truthfulness that is now part and parcel of our passion of knowledge, such as doubt, suspicion, critical distance, subjecting all things to scrutiny, and so on. Here we might want to phrase the question of incorporation in the following terms: can there be a diet of knowledge? How will our commitment to truth work itself out in the context of an appreciation of the general economy of life, including our recognition of the need to will illusion, appearance, and semblance? This, I think, is one important part of what Nietzsche intends. We also need to strive to be more just in our evaluations of life and the living, for example, thinking “beyond good and evil” in order to develop a more complex appreciation of the economy of life. For Nietzsche it is largely the prejudices of “morality” that stand in the way of this since morality presumes a knowledge it does not in fact, have. As Nietzsche writes in Daybreak, “We must anew get rid from the world the many types of false grandeur, since they go against the justice that all things are entitled to demand of us!” (D 4)

In note 162 Nietzsche argues that “life is the condition of knowing”, whilst “error is the condition of the living” at its deepest level. It is thus necessary to love and cultivate error as it is the womb (Mutterschoss) of our knowing. We are to advance life for the sake of knowledge and promote illusion for the sake of life. Nietzsche then states that the “fundamental condition” of the whole passion of knowledge is to grant existence an “aesthetic meaning,” that is, to “increase our taste for it.” What we discover in this play of life is a night and a day, the ebb and flow of our desiring knowledge and our desiring error. Ruled absolutely by one of these desires, the human and its capacities would perish. In note number 229 Nietzsche states that only by adapting to the living errors can the “initially dead truth” be brought to life. In note 325 he spells out what is to be the task of science (Wissenschaft): “Not to ask the question how error is possible, but how a kind of truth is at all possible in spite of the fundamental untruth in knowing.” To contemplate the possible incorporation of truth and knowledge is, for Nietzsche, to consider something radical. If we are not designed for truth and knowledge, then to learn how to incorporate them involves something significant, something that will have a transformative effect on human life – even though, of course, truth and knowledge could not
appear without the error of life and the great erring creature that is the human
animal. Heidegger is absolutely correct, I believe, when he argues that
Nietzsche’s entire project, so in evidence in this sketch from 1881, albeit in
cryptic form, is best conceived in terms of a “humanisation” taken to a higher
power.\textsuperscript{30} This is what the overman essentially names in Nietzsche.

The challenge Nietzsche presents is that of learning “to live in drives,” as
that through which we come to see, and to uphold this mode of living as a
foundation of all our knowing; but then to cultivate at the same time the
superior knowledge that will enable us to discern at what point the drives
become the enemies of knowing. Our drive to knowledge has its
presuppositions in the conditions of life and these conditions include error
(KSA 9, 11[162]). Humanity has been cultivated on the basis of a set of
fundamental errors, and this has involved the development of certain kinds of
sensation and perception in which the changes in things go unperceived and
all kinds of influences are not felt. In addition, a certain mode of judging and
valuing has been cultivated, one that affirms rather than suspends judgment,
that errs and fabricates things rather than waits, and that passes judgment
rather than strives to be just (GS 111). Nietzsche argues that our knowledge
amounts to a humanization of things; we perfect an image of becoming for
ourselves but do not see beyond or behind this image. We have done this, for
example, by diagramming reality in a specific manner, such as through “lines,
planes, bodies, atoms, divisible time spans, divisible spaces” (GS 112). In GS
121 he writes: “We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we are able
to live – by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest,
form and content; without these articles of faith no one could endure living!
But that does not prove them.” Our fundamental schemas of thought and habits
of representation are imprecise and make us reliant on perceptions that are too
coarse. Moreover, man’s errors have led him to endow himself with so many
fictitious attributes, to place himself in false rank in relation to animals and
nature, and to invent ever new tables of the goods that are held to be eternal
and unconditionally binding (GS 115). Man’s errors are the vehicles of his
education, but once the effects of these errors are removed we remove at the
same time “humanity”.

Nietzsche will continue to refine the insights at work in the sketch of 1881
throughout the rest of the decade. He will seek to account for the emergence
of error, he will clarify the question of truth, and he will come to define life as
will to power, and he will leave his readers to come with the task of pondering
strange, difficult questions (I shall indicate the nature of some of these towards
the end of the essay). In 1881 Nietzsche envisions a new singularity for a
historical humanity, which Heidegger describes as a matter of making a
decision – in effect, an in-cision – in the evolution of human life.\textsuperscript{31} Eternal
recurrence names this singularity conceived by Nietzsche as ‘the new life’,
which Heidegger interprets as “… a new way of standing in the midst of beings as a whole; it is a new kind of truth and thereby a metamorphosis of beings”.32 Eternal recurrence addresses modern atheistic and immoral knowers in the singularity of their historical moment; it does so, however, by inviting them to assume responsibility for a specific and curious task, that of incorporating truth and knowledge, which will add weight to their existence. What are the truth and knowledge that Nietzsche has in mind when he writes of this experiment in a new incorporation? On a straightforward level, Nietzsche is simply asking whether we are able to make room for truth now that our own becoming is so deeply tied up with the passion of knowledge. Subsequent texts and notebooks make it clear that he is also asking whether we can incorporate a set of ungodly and immoral truths that show us that we are not what we take ourselves to be either as knowing subjects or as moral agents. Moreover, can we practise the superior knowledge that will enable us to develop better descriptions of ourselves? (GS 112)

We still have not got proper sense of Nietzsche’s thinking on life, truth, and error; neither have I explained how Nietzsche develops his own conception of phenomenology. I will now attempt this by focusing on two core issues: Nietzsche on consciousness, and his attempt to develop a new thinking of individuation.

Nietzsche on Consciousness

For phenomenology, ‘consciousness’ is a self-validating source or origin of truth (conceived as manifestation or the being of showing). For Nietzsche, consciousness is implicated in error and the realm of the superficial; it must, therefore, be approached in terms of a hermeneutics of suspicion, and it cannot be regarded as the most important domain of life. However, we cannot simply deduce from this that his critical conception of consciousness automatically applies to what Husserl was attempting to open up with his new thinking of consciousness. Furthermore, it is mistaken to suppose that Nietzsche can dispense with consciousness – the execution of the tasks he sets a new humanity require that consciousness assumes new efficacious powers.

For Nietzsche, the problem of consciousness – what it does, how it comes about – confronts us once when we appreciate that it would be possible to dispense with it; now that they have caught up with Leibniz’s suspicion, “physiology and the history of animals place us at the beginning of such comprehension”. In GS 357 Nietzsche refers to Leibniz’s “incomparable insight … that consciousness is merely an accidens of experience and not its necessary and essential attribute”. What we call consciousness is but merely one state of our spiritual and psychical world, not the whole of it; it is “perhaps a pathological state” (the harmful character of excessive self-consciousness, for example). When viewed in the context of the economy of life as a whole,
consciousness – the becoming-conscious of something – is superfluous and vastly over-estimated in importance: “For we could think, feel, will, and remember, and we could also ‘act’ … and yet none of all this would have to ‘enter our consciousness’ (as one says metaphorically)”. The widespread supposition is that consciousness provides a mirror of life, but for Nietzsche nothing necessitates this view: “Even now, for that matter, by far the greatest portion of our life actually takes place without this mirror effect”. When we reflect on ourselves through self-consciousness we are not, as we suppose, coming to know ourselves; rather, we come to know only that which is superficial and general, that which has been structured and shaped in accordance with concepts that have historically evolved and gained their raison d’être from the needs of life (adaptation, survival, etc.). This is why consciousness needs to be subjected to a critique for Nietzsche, and cannot constitute an uncritical starting-point for philosophy. If our aspiration is now towards new life then new methods and modes of knowledge are called for.

Nietzsche reflects on the possible reasons for consciousness’s coming into existence: if it is superfluous (not necessary), why do we have it? His suggestion is that consciousness evolves under the pressure of the need for communication. The subtlety and strength of consciousness is, when viewed through the lens of evolutionary thinking, proportionate to a capacity for communication; in turn, this capacity is proportionate to the need for communication. Nietzsche proffers the hypothesis that consciousness is, in essence, a net of communication between human beings. This means that thoughts, feelings, and movements enter our individual consciousness as the result of a social categorical imperative, one that “for a terribly long time lorded it over man”. Man became an animal that needed assistance from others and social protection: “he needed his peers, he had to learn to express his distress and to make himself understood; and for all of this he needed ‘consciousness’ first of all, he needed to ‘know’ himself what distressed him, he needed to ‘know’ how he felt, he needed to ‘know’ what he thought”. Therefore, thinking can take place without our knowing that we are thinking: “the thinking that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part of all this – the most superficial and worst part”. It is so because it takes the form of words conceived as signs of communication: “… the development of language and the development of consciousness (not of reason but merely of the way reason enters consciousness) go hand in hand”. Language not only serves as a bridge between human beings but also works as “a mien, a pressure, a gesture”. In Daybreak Nietzsche had noted that words exist only for superlative degrees of inner processes and drives (D 115). With a single crude word language assaults “so polyphonic an essence” (D 133; the example Nietzsche treats in this aphorism is Mitleid).

What we receive from the external world through sense impressions is codified in consciousness, including the ability to fix meanings and the
external exhibition of these meanings. All of this takes place through the
invention of signs: “The human being inventing signs is at the same time the
human being who becomes ever more keenly conscious of himself” (GS 354).
Nietzsche makes it clear that consciousness is social by nature and the kind of
consciousness he is describing is, in effect, what we would call self-
consciousness conceived as a monitoring consciousness. “Man becomes a sign
animal at the same as he becomes a social animal, and the thinking that is
expressed in consciousness constitutes the smallest part and most superficial
part of life’s intelligence. The solitary human being that lives like a beast of
prey would have no need of consciousness in this sense. When man becomes
a sign animal he thinks in accordance with customs and conventions, he speaks
in clichés and accepted opinions, and he employs all the categories that are
abbreviating and simplifying signs: “Our thoughts themselves are continually
governed by the character of consciousness – by the ‘genius of the species’
that commands it”.

Nietzsche puts forward the claim that consciousness belongs to our social
or herd nature, not our “individual existence”. In our efforts at self-knowledge,
where we attempt with the best will in the world to understand ourselves as
individually as possible, we misrecognise ourselves, constantly and
necessarily; we only become aware of what is average: “Fundamentally, all
our actions are altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely
individual … But as soon as we translate them into consciousness they no
longer seem to be”. This, Nietzsche says, constitutes the essence of
phenomenalism and perspectivism, both of which he understands critically.
The word of which we become conscious and reflect in it is a surface and sign-
world, one that is by definition common and mean. The implication is clear:
through consciousness we deal only with what is shallow, stupid, general,
“sign, herd signal”. Moreover, our dependency on this consciousness means
we are stuck in falsification, generalization and a reduction to superficialities.

Nietzsche’s key claims regarding ‘consciousness’ can be enumerated as
follows:

1. Consciousness, its intuitions and categories, have their ground in a specific
set of selective drives, such as the drive to exclude and the drive to chase
away, which ensure that only certain information reaches it:
“Consciousness is the hand with which the organism reaches out furthest:
it must be a firm hand. Our logic, our sense of time, our sense of space are
prodigious capacities to abbreviate, for the purpose of commanding. A
concept is an invention which nothing corresponds to wholly but many
things slightly … ” (KSA 11, 34 [131], WLN p.9). All organic life is
involved in this activity of sense-making and interpreting; what
distinguishes the animal man from the rest of interpreting nature is his
apparatus of signs and the translation of experience into signs.
2. Conscious states are terminal states, “the last link in a chain, a closure” (KSA 12, 1 [61], WLN p.60). It is not the case that there is a pure realm of thought, in which one thought would cause another; rather, the “events which are actually connected are played out below our consciousness … Below every thought lies an affect” (ibid.). In this scenario of our activity every thought and every feeling has to be seen as a total state and not simply born of one particular drive. This means that a new or subsequent thought is “a sign of how the total power situation has now shifted again”. In short, thought is rooted in a complex assemblage of affects and drives: “Man as a multiplicity of ‘wills to power’: each one with a multiplicity of means of expression and forms” (KSA 12, 1 [58], WLN p.60. What we take to be individual supposed passions are fictitious unities, as is self-consciousness, in which what enters consciousness from the different fundamental drives becomes, through a synthesizing fiction, a being or faculty.

3. It is thus ludicrous to posit a single entity, be it the will, the soul, or self-consciousness as the cause of all these phenomena. The illusion is to conceive of a “single plane of consciousness” and to subjugate everything to it (KSA 12, 7 [1], WLN p.128). Because knowledge relies on these fictitious entities, conceived as metaphysical unities, it produces only error. Hence Nietzsche claims that knowledge is possible only as “error about itself, as will to power, as will to deception” (KSA 12, 7 [54], WLN p.138). Knowledge conceived in these terms can necessarily only be credited with an anthropological and biological sense (KSA 13, 14 [122], WLN p.258). It would be idealism to claim any other status for knowledge. Our valuations must stand in relation to actual conditions of existence, and what is essential about them is their inexactitude and indeterminacy; this gives rise to a simplification of the external world, denoting an intelligence that favours survival. Also in this context truth designates not error’s antithesis but rather, “the status of certain errors vis-à-vis others, such as being older, more deeply assimilated, our not knowing how to live without them, and so on” (KSA 12, 34 [247], WLN p.15).

4. In Nietzsche’s reduction a critique of consciousness must be attempted since the “degeneration of life is essentially conditioned” by its “extraordinary capacity for error”. Because consciousness is not kept under control by the instincts, and is marked by a drive for reified total independence, it errs “longest and most thoroughly” (KSA 13, 11 [83], WLN p.215). It is consciousness that gives rise to the pathologies that have characterized human life on earth, including the “bold insanities of metaphysics” (GS preface 2) and nihilism (which Nietzsche conceives as the result of our idealism and a pathological transitional stage). Nietzsche’s naturalistic purification is an attempt to see the world and ourselves free of the prejudices and fears of “morality”, which is the greatest system of errors
ever devised and that has made of the earth “a madhouse” (GM II, 22). It is morality which has created the most fictitious entities (the soul, free will conceived as a faculty or entity, guilt, sin, punishment, and so on), and whose sublimity is dangerous and menacing.

Nietzsche does not, of course, put forward this (self-) overcoming of morality in glib terms, and neither does he envisage it as an easy task. Once we no longer see the world and ourselves through the lens of morality we run the risk of making ourselves blind and may no longer see at all. In the course of time we will develop new eyes.

### Nietzsche’s Critique of Consciousness

Nietzsche has a specific conception in mind when he proposes that consciousness be made the subject of a critique. Failure to appreciate this point has led many commentators astray, supposing that Nietzsche is proposing consciousness be got rid of, or that he adheres to the position that it is something merely epiphenomenal without causal efficacy. Epiphenomenalism rests on the thesis that only the physical is causally potent, whilst the mental or psychological is devoid of potency. As recent commentators have pointed out, if this is Nietzsche’s view then many of his most important critical analyses, as well as his conceptions for the future development of human beings, would make little sense. For example, if mental events are to be regarded as purely epiphenomenal then Nietzsche’s analysis of the dreadful consequences of *ressentiment* would be false and without critical purchase: “if *ressentiment* were caused by some perceived insult, it would be an end state that has no subsequent consequences, so there would be no consequences for the psychology of the person suffering from *ressentiment*, and no subsequent intentional action motivated by it”. Furthermore, Nietzsche posits the doctrine of eternal recurrence *as an ethics* on the supposition that this new “thought of thoughts”, as he calls it, can guide and steer an individual’s task of becoming the one (the singular) that it is. In a note from 1881 Nietzsche asks, if all is necessity, how can I attain a degree of power over my actions? He answers as follows: “Thought and belief are a weight pressing down on me as much as and even more than any other weight. You say that food, a location, air, society transform and condition you: well your opinions do so even more, since it is they that determine your choice of food, dwelling, air, society. If you incorporate this thought within you, amongst your other thoughts, it will transform you. The question in everything that you will: ‘am I certain I want to do to an infinite number of times?’ will become for you the heaviest weight” (KSA 9, 11[143]).

Nietzsche’s critique of consciousness, like his critiques of morality and the will to truth, proposes a refining and limiting task. Consciousness, including the categories it posits, has evolved in terms of the needs of adaptation and
survival; it produces an elaborate system of signs that necessarily amount to a
system of simplification and abbreviation. On one level there is nothing wrong
or at fault in this for Nietzsche; there is a need simply to be careful when we
speak of truth and knowledge in this domain. On the other hand, he does want
to propose new methods and modes of knowledge as a way of moving human
life in the direction of new possibilities of existence. The question here, of
course, is the extent to which this is possible since we cannot miraculously
overcome the errors we have inherited or the sentient conditions of our
existence (see GS 374). Nietzsche is acutely aware of this, hence his insistence
on the free spirit devoting itself to questionable tasks and working its way
through the “enigma of liberation” (Human, All Too Human, volume one,
preface).

When we speak of substances and faculties – the Ego, the Will, etc – we are
engaged in fabrication. We are distorting and simplifying processes and events
that are much more complex than our categories and established modes of
thinking enable us to appreciate. Nietzsche wishes us to be on guard against
this tendency to substantialise entities, including ourselves, in this way. On
one level he is sympathetic to Kant’s critique of the paralogisms of pure reason
– the positing of the transcendental unity of apperception does not allow us to
make any knowledge claims about the subject as a substance. However, this
transcendental consciousness cannot remain immune from critical thinking
since it too is fictitious. Philosophy takes consciousness for a determinate
magnitude, and when this happens we deny its growth and intermittences, we
posit it uncritically for the unity of the organism (GS 11). Nietzsche proposes
we make the body and physiology the starting-point instead: “Essential to start
from the body and use it as a guiding thread. It is the far richer phenomenon,
and can be observed more distinctly” (KSA 11, 40 [15], WLN p. 43). Nietzsche’s critical point is not that consciousness is merely epiphenomenal,
but that we over-value it7: “We find it ill-considered that human consciousness
has for so long been regarded as the highest stage of organic development”
(KSA 11, 37 [4], WLN p. 29). What is astonishing is the human body and how
it has evolved in terms of “a prodigious alliance of living beings”. In a
modification of Leibnizian doctrine, Nietzsche writes:

For this “miracle of miracles”, consciousness is just a “tool” and nothing more – a tool in the
sense that the stomach is a tool. The magnificent binding together of the most diverse life, the
ordering and arrangement of the higher and lower activities, the thousand-fold obedience
which is not blind, even less mechanical, but a shrewd, selecting, considerate, even resistant
obedience – measured by intellectual standards, this whole phenomenon “body” is as superior
to our consciousness, our “mind”, our conscious thinking, feeling, willing, as algebra is
superior to the times tables … Nowadays we’ve forbidden ourselves to spin yarns about
“unity”, the “soul”, the “person”: hypotheses like these make one’s problem
more difficult, that much is clear. And for us, even the smallest living beings which constitute our body (more
correctly: for whose interaction the thing we call “body” is the best simile – ) are not soul-
atoms, but rather something growing, struggling, reproducing and dying off again: so that their
number alters unsteadily, and our living, like all living, is at once incessant dying. There are thus in man as many “consciousnesses” as – at every moment of his existence – there are beings which constitute his body (ibid.). (ibid., p. 30)

Nietzsche does not propose that we simply jettison our concepts, such as the soul or the ego. There are many instances in Nietzsche’s writings where he claims the right to re-work and deploy anew these concepts. When viewed in terms of a faculty or entity “free will” is a total fiction. This does not stop Nietzsche, however, from conceiving the value and validity of this concept in a different fashion: for example, as the accomplishment of the morality of custom where it serves to denote the proud subject of responsibility (GM II, 2, D 112), or “the emotion of superiority felt towards one who must obey: ‘I am free, he must obey’” (BGE 19). Any act of willing is complicated and enjoys a unity only as a word. Willing is a matter of commanding and obeying and comes into existence in the material context of social relations: “a philosopher should claim the right to comprehend willing from within the sphere of morals – morals understood as the doctrine of relations of mastery under which the phenomenon ‘life’ arises” (ibid.). The idea of free will reveals its “cloddish simplicity” when it is posited in “the superlative metaphysical sense” (BGE 21; for Nietzsche’s positive retention of freedom of the will see HH preface and GS 347).

For Nietzsche, this critique has implications for our two main modes and methods of knowledge, science and phenomenology. We ‘know’ what proves to be useful for our interests as a species and this knowledge may simply be belief or imagination, and we then confuse ‘truth’ with them. In GS 355 Nietzsche makes it clear that he is taking knowledge (Erkenntnis) in this context to be an evolved social practice that aims to reduce something strange to the familiar. The knowledge that philosophy hitherto has sought is the kind that will provide the species with a sense of security and make it feel at home in the world. We approach the entire riddle of the world with some rule in which we are stuck and in terms of accustomed perspectives. This explains philosophy’s preference for starting with the “inner world,” with so-called “facts of consciousness.” Nietzsche pronounces this to be the “Error of errors!” (GS 355). He then argues that that which we are used to is what is most difficult to know, simply because we lack the distance that would enable us to see it as a problem and as something strange. He concludes by noting, first, that the natural sciences acquire their surety (Sicherheit) by taking as the object of their inquiries what is strange and unfamiliar and, second, that for common sense it is contradictory to want to take the non-strange as an object of inquiry. The “gay science” has a major investment in the development of new techniques and sciences of knowing and inquiry: “We ourselves wish to be our experiments and guinea pigs” (GS 319). This is a task that is at one and the same time “scientific” and phenomenological: focusing on the strange and
paying attention to what lies closest to us but which we simply do not see adequately or properly. It is in a note of 1886-7 that Nietzsche makes use of a conception of phenomenology:

**Methodologically**: the value of internal and external phenomenology.

A. *Consciousness* late, poorly developed, exposed to external purposes and the grossest errors, even essentially something falsifying, coarsening, synoptic

B. by contrast the phenomenon of the sensory world a hundred times more complex, subtler and more precisely observable. External phenomenology gives us by far the richest material and permits greater strictness in observation, whereas internal phenomena are difficult to grasp and more allied to error (the internal processes are essentially error-generating, because life is only possible under the leadership of such constraining, perspective-creating forces)

**NB.** All movement as a sign of an internal event: – i.e. by far the majority of all internal events are given to us only as signs. *(KSA 12, 7 [9]).* 8

For Nietzsche, then, ‘phenomenology’ is to work as a mode of observation in the new tasks of knowledge that are devoted to securing a more refined appreciation of ourselves and the world, and that amounts to overcoming metaphysical realism and moral realism (D 116). We are to forgo imaginary entities and dangerous fictions, the innocence of our knowing, and to enable us to do this we shall have recourse to those sciences of life and of spirit or soul which do not take our valuations and claims to knowledge at face-value, such as physiology and psychology. Henceforth we shall have to be suspicious of philosophers:

… I point my finger at the prodigious perspectival falsification which allows the human species to assert itself. It is a condition of the species’ life to take pleasure in itself on this account … In all this the will to power expresses itself, reaching unscrupulously for the means of deception: one can imagine a malicious enjoyment that a God might feel at the sight of man admiring himself.

Thus: the will to power.

**Consequence:** if this idea is hostile to us, why do we acquiesce in it? Give us those lovely phantasms! Let’s be swindlers and beautifiers of humanity! Fact of what a philosopher actually is. *(KSA 11 43 [1], WLN p.51).*

**Nietzsche’s New Individual**

In GS 335, entitled “Long Live Physics!”, Nietzsche addresses the issue of self-knowledge that bothers him so much. By the term ‘physics’ Nietzsche means knowledge conceived as a practice of refined observation and self-observation. He begins the aphorism by asking some basic questions: “How many people know how to observe something? Of the few who do, how many observe themselves?” Do we really know who we are? The aphorism is a meditation on individuation, and reflects a concern which lies deep in Nietzsche’s thinking and marks its character from first to last. As a way of demonstrating how desperate the situation is with respect to self-observation, Nietzsche selects an example, that of morality (moral actions, moral judgments). Why is it that we are so quick, eager, and garrulous in our chatter
about our moral actions and the value of them? Might not our pathetic rationalizations and justifications of our actions conceal a deep ignorance of ourselves? If so, how might this be corrected? And what would the correction consist of and amount to?

Nietzsche considers various modes of thinking for justifying our actions. First, he considers conscience: “this is what my conscience tells me is right and this voice is never immoral”. Our appeal to conscience rests on a faith that cannot withstand serious scrutiny. Our judgment that “this is right” has a prehistory in our instincts, our likes and dislikes, our experiences and the lack of them. One can listen to the commands of a conscience in numerous ways: “like a good soldier who hears his officer’s command. Or like a woman who loves the man who commands. Or like a flatterer and coward who is afraid of the commander”. Moreover, our reliance on conscience might reveal that we have never thought deeply about ourselves and blindly accepted what we have been told since childhood concerning what is right, or it may be little more than maintaining ourselves within the conditions of existence that we regard as our own. In short, what one takes to be the firmness of one’s moral judgment might be evidence only of our personal abjectness and our so-called “moral strength” might have its source in our stubbornness and inability to envisage new ideals. Our grand words, such as conscience and duty, need to be spoiled by knowledge of their actual sources, as opposed to what we like to believe of ourselves and how we like to idealize ourselves to ourselves.

Nietzsche then considers Kant’s categorical imperative as a possible candidate of moral vindication, and he locates in it another deceit. Nietzsche misreads Kant on a fundamental point, interpreting the universalising of one’s own judgment into a law as an act of selfishness. Here, Nietzsche says, one should only admire one’s blindness, pettiness, and frugality. To posit the categorical imperative is only to expose the fact that one has neither discovered nor created an ideal of one’s own for oneself. In spite of this misreading, Nietzsche’s point is a serious one: how can we think of a sovereign law once we appreciate the extent to which actions can never be the same and that every action is a singular one, “done in an altogether unique and irretrievable way”? Like consciousness, moral conscience relates only to a coarse exterior. Even the most inward and subtle regulations of all moralities so far have produced only a semblance of sameness. Nietzsche then stresses his fundamental point, namely, that although our opinions, valuations, and tables of what is good belong among the most powerful levers in the involved mechanism of our actions, in any particular case the law of their mechanism is indemonstrable. It is at this point that his treatment of the problem moves from a negative mode to a positive one. The difficulty is one of physics – of securing the most adequate conception of it (e.g. phenomenological). All that is open to us is to refine our methods and powers of self-observation and for Nietzsche

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This entails imposing a new limit on ourselves. We can claim no credit for ourselves where we think we can (I am right). So, how is one to distinguish oneself, individuate oneself, and become the singular one that one is?40

This new limit concerns purifying our opinions and values – recognizing that they only come into contact with something real in a highly superficial manner – and creating our own new tables of what is good. When we do this we shall stop brooding over the so-called moral value of our actions and come to regard the moral chatter of some about others as something highly distasteful: “Sitting in moral judgment should offend our taste”. Nietzsche writes in praise of a “physics” of morals by appealing to the supra-moral virtue that compels (zwingt) us to it, namely, probity (Redlichkeit), and which gains its voice from the superior form of conscience that he names the “intellectual conscience.” It is superior to the moral conscience simply because it acknowledges that we do not have an adequate knowledge of our actions and valuations; rather, “all regulations about actions relate only to their course exterior.” It is this honesty about ourselves that compels us to physics.

What is the ‘law’ of individuation? Is it a transcendent fate hidden from us, like Schopenhauer’s intelligible character, or is it a monstrous freedom we can assume for ourselves and give to ourselves as a task? Eternal recurrence provides the ultimate eternal confirmation and seal of this fateful and free nature: fateful because it is implicated in a past (all that has been and the ‘es war’ of time’s pastness) and free because it will influence everything that is to come. What we need to respect is not so much the moral law but our dual nature as creatures and creators: “In the human being, creature and creator are united: the human being is matter, fragment, excess, filth, nonsense, chaos; but the human being is also creator, sculptor, hammer-hardness, observer-divinity, and the Seventh Day – do you understand this opposition?” (BGE 225). This is the “opposition” Nietzsche is working through in many of his writings, and it informs the demonic voice that inspires the thought of eternal recurrence in GS 341: “do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?”, in which we are not sure whether the “this” refers to what has happened and will happen again and again (fate), or whether it refers to what we will make happen, transforming fate into a task (freedom), willing it to return again and again as the object of a desire. Nietzsche seeks a strictly non-metaphysical and immanent, conception of fate: “The individual is a piece of fate from top to bottom, one more law, one more necessity for all that is to come and will be” (TI ‘Morality as Anti-Nature’, 6).

Nietzsche is, of course, dealing with a paradox: how can I regularize my irregularity? How can I assume responsibility for my irresponsible nature? How can I create a stable ground – a centre of gravity – where none is simply given to me? How can I become what I am when what I am is a singularity that is repeated at every moment and never the same? In part, solving this
problem is the work of culture (the labour of prehistory), and it is this labour which has been ruined for Nietzsche by Christian-moral civilization. The morality of custom aims to fulfil the paradoxical task nature sets itself in the case of the human animal, that of cultivating an autonomous and supra-moral (übersittlich) sovereign individual. The task facing Nietzsche’s new individual is that of becoming a new nature from out of nature. My nature must be uniquely my own.

Are we to suppose that eternal recurrence is one more error, or is it the correction of error by a superior error, say a more refined one? Nietzsche writes: “There would be no suffering [Leiden] if there were nothing organic; that is, without belief in the same [Gleiches], that is, without this error; there would be no pain in the world!” (KSA 9, 11[254]). What is this “same”? On the one hand, it refers to the logic of incorporation, which is a making-equal and identical (only in the inorganic world do we find an absence of error and narrowness of perspective, KSA 12, 1 [105], WLN p.62). On the other hand, it refers to the “play of life”, the play of incorporated errors and the attempt to incorporate truth and knowledge (which is to speak of a superior incorporation). This is why, I think, Nietzsche says that to endure the thought of eternal recurrence one needs freedom from “morality” (der Moral), new means against the fact of pain, enjoyment of all kinds of uncertainty, and experimentalism. It is the “greatest elevation (Erhöhung) of the consciousness of strength (Kraft) of human beings” that comes into being as the over-human is created (KSA 11, 26 [283]). In one note Nietzsche poses the question: “did error originate as a property of being?” If this is the case, he says, then “to err is continuous becoming and transformation?” (KSA 9, 11, 321). This complicates our understanding of the presentation of eternal recurrence as a doctrine of becoming, as when Nietzsche famously declares, “That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being” (KSA 12, 7 [54], WLN p.138). The way I read this is by interpreting Nietzsche as saying that eternal recurrence is, in fact, a thought of ‘being’ (it is an error), but as a thought of being (life) in its constant renewal and re-vision it is a thought of ‘becoming’ (it names the becoming ‘of’ being caught up in the play and contest of the powers of life).

Nietzsche calls for a new justice (GS 382) that involves allowing for new individualities and new experiments of life and at living. He insists that we need “to grasp the necessary injustice in every For and Against … life itself is conditioned by the sense of perspective and its injustice” (HH preface). The greatest injustice is to be found in a state “where life has developed at its smallest, narrowest, neediest …” If our desire is for “higher, greater, and richer” life, then we can come to appreciate “how power and right and spaciousness of perspective grow into the heights together”. It is the uniquely “personal” in each of us that has been most neglected (HH 95), and that now
needs discovering and inventing. To date the individual has been trained by its educators as if it ought to become a mere repetition of a pre-existing norm or concept and unlearn its newness (HH 228). In a note of 1880 Nietzsche signals his intent to invert our ordinary conception of morality (as that which makes us recognizable to others):

Should not each individual be an attempt to achieve a higher species than man through its most individual things? My morality would be to take the general character of man more and more away from him ... to make him to a degree non-understandable to others (and wit it an object of experiences, of astonishment, of instruction for them) (KSA 9, 6 [158]).

As a doctrine of individuation, eternal recurrence aims to work as a culture and technology, and is to be placed, then, in the service of cultivating new individualities. As Karl Jaspers noted, like Kant’s categorical imperative it is a mere form capable of receiving a potentially limitless number of contents. Unlike Kant’s practical rule – a rule of incorporation for Kant – Nietzsche’s new rule does not envisage our positing of it as an unattainable ideal that supposes a radical split between autonomy (law) and heteronomy (desire or inclination). For this reason, Nietzsche expects it to be practiced in terms other than that of a sublimely cruel asceticism; the task of becoming the singular one that one is, is an experimental one that needs to be focused on that which has a nature and can be given a nature (long live physics). The new imperative demands only this one thing: the need to impress or stamp the image of eternity on our lives. For Nietzsche, it is not a matter of hoping for “unknown felicities”, abiding by an incomprehensible moral law whose incomprehensibility is to be comprehended (D 142, GM III, 24), or of “blessing and bestowals of grace”; rather, “we should live in such a way that we want to live again and to live thus into eternity” (KSA 9, 11 [161]).

Nietzsche stresses that it is a matter of our becoming well disposed towards life and ourselves. When he says this he is, in fact, inviting us to freely undertake a monstrous – and truthful – testing and recognition of ourselves.

Conclusion

It has to be emphasized that nothing in Nietzsche refutes Husserl’s conception of the intentionality of consciousness. Rather, Nietzsche’s analysis of consciousness focuses on a specific set of questions and problems which, taken together, constitute his attempt at a naturalistic purification and reduction. Nietzsche approaches consciousness in the context of his appreciation of the strange history of life and the evolution of the human animal, as well through the lens of the new ‘gay’ science and a reformed genealogy of morality. It seems to me necessary to grasp the critical aspects of Nietzsche’s project. Nietzsche’s project of a new incorporation has to be understood in terms of its fundamental ambition: the critique of morality. It is this critique that philosophy has found it hard to catch up with, let alone be
equal to (we should never pretend that this is easy). The attempt to do so is what inspired Deleuze in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* to combat the phenomenological appropriation of Nietzsche’s work. On the very opening page of the book Deleuze wrote:

… what has happened in modern philosophy is that the theory of values has given rise to a new conformism and new forms of submission. Even the phenomenological apparatus has contributed to placing the Nietzschean inspiration, which is often present in phenomenology, at the service of modern conformism.

In part, the work of both Nietzsche and Husserl responds to the problem of individuation as defined by Leibniz. However, Nietzsche’s stress on the new law of individuality (GS 335, BGE 262) means that his theory of individuation cannot establish itself on the basis of the personalistic consciousness of the transcendental ego; it must seek a new and different personalism. Nietzsche conceives the sovereignty of this ego as the fundamental goal of culture; the superior culture of the future – the new life that is to come – will transcend even this achievement of the human animal and give birth to radically new individualities.

Nietzsche cannot readily be enlisted for the phenomenological cause (in Husserl’s founding sense), in spite of some very fine efforts to do so. However, although a Nietzschean-inspired philosophy necessarily has specific worries over phenomenology – for example, does it retain too much belief in grammar? Does it still believe too much in ‘morality’? Is it a genuinely ‘critical’ project? – it is evident that there are fundamental philosophical issues and problems, such as incorporation and individuation, that both Nietzschean philosophy and phenomenology concerns themselves with, and at a very deep level. In large part it is the ‘prejudices’ of contemporary philosophy (our prejudices), as well as the neglect of ‘life’ within philosophy, that stand in the way of staging a dialogue between Nietzsche and developments in phenomenology that has the potential to be genuinely productive, fruitful, and full of surprises. When it comes to ourselves we ‘knowers’ are quite simply unknown to ourselves.

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References

3. On phenomenology’s creation of concepts see ibid., p.27.
7. I have used the following editions and translations of Nietzsche’s work, often with modifications: *Beyond Good and Evil* (BGE), trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random

8. On phenomenology as a philosophy of life, see Renaud Barbaras, ‘A Phenomenology of Life’, in Taylor Carmen & Mark B. N. Hansen (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty*, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press 2005, pp.206-31: “…the question of life, the question concerning the status, the meaning of the being of life, as that which comprises the natural and the transcendental, is the main question of phenomenology” (p. 208).


10. Ibid., section 34.

11. Ibid., section 59.

12. Nietzsche has something quite specific in mind when he analyses ‘morality’ and subjects it to ‘critique’. Simplifying somewhat, we can say that he is concerned with how the world becomes subject to a ‘metaphysics’ of morality, a moralization, with the creation of a range of fictitious entities and beings. Nietzsche understands ancient societies and prehistory (the morality of custom, basic human animal psychology, and so on) as free of this moralization which comes later with the advent of Christian culture, a culture that we moderns remain very much in the grip of. A good example of his approach can be found in the analysis of bad conscience and its fate (Verhängnis) conducted in the second essay of the *Genealogy of Morality*. Nietzsche outlines a remarkable story about the origins and emergence of feelings of responsibility and debt (personal obligation). He is concerned with nothing less than the evolution of the human mind and how its basic ways of thinking have come into being, such as inferring, calculating, weighing, and anticipating. Indeed, he points out that our word “man” (manas) denotes a being that values, measures, and weighs. Already in *The Wanderer and His Shadow* Nietzsche had noted: “Perhaps all the morality of mankind has its origin in the tremendous inner excitement which seized on primeval men when they discovered measure and measuring, scales and weighing (the word ‘Mensch’, indeed, means the measurer, he desired to name himself after his great discovery!). With these conceptions they climbed into realms that are quite unmeasurable and unweighable but originally did not seem to be” (WS 21). Nietzsche is concerned with how a Christian-moral culture has cultivated a type of bad conscience in which the feeling of debt can never be relieved. This is because it becomes attached to a set of sublime metaphysical fictions, such as eternal punishment and original sin, in which release is inconceivable. For Nietzsche, the sense of “guilt” has evolved through several momentous and fateful events in history. In the earliest societies a person is answerable for their deeds and there is an obligation to honouring debts. In the course of history this material sense of obligation has been subject to increasing moralization and reaches its summit with guilt before the Christian God. Now a person is answerable for their very existence, regardless of any of its actual conditions. Nietzsche is keen to draw the reader’s attention to what he regards as an important historical insight: the principal moral concept of “guilt” (Schuld) descends from the material concept of “debt” (Schulden). In this sphere of legal obligations, he stresses, we find the breeding-ground of the “moral conceptual world” of guilt, conscience, and duty (GM II, 6). See also D 78. “Morality” for Nietzsche is that which involves the positing of imaginary causes and imaginary entities.

16. I have hitherto attempted to subject this sketch to a treatment in my contribution to Ansell Pearson (ed.), *A Nietzsche Companion* (Oxford and Malden MA, Basil Blackwell 2006), pp.230-50. I draw on some of this material in this contribution.
22. Foucault contrasts the ancients and the moderns, arguing that the oracular task of ‘knowing oneself’ was not conceived as an epistemological task of abstract theoretical knowledge, but rather as a care of the self in which the incorporation of discourses of the ‘true’ was directed towards “preparation for life”: that is, a statement or a discourse is not of value for its own theoretical content, even when what is at stake is the theory of the world or the theory of the subject. Here it is not a matter of learning the truth either about the world or about oneself, but of assimilating, in the physiological sense of the term, discourses of the true that are aids for confronting external events and internal passions. Foucault says that the point is not to discover the truth of oneself, but rather of knowing with what true principles one is equipped, to what extent one is in a position to have them available when necessary. This entails disciplines of purification and transfiguration, involving techniques of meditation, uses of memory and forgetting, and the examination of conscience – regards the latter, the task is not to track down latent truths and buried secrets but to gauge how far one has got in one’s appropriation of truth as a principle of conduct.
25. In the sketch of 1881 Nietzsche uses the two main words in German for knowledge, *Wissen* and *Erkenntnis*. Incorporating knowledge refers to *Wissen*, whilst the passion of knowledge and the weightiest knowledge refer to *Erkenntnis*. Although there is a difference between them as forms of knowing – *Erkennen* involves a process of coming to know, it is a form of re-cognition or realization, as when we come to know a truth by knowing we have made an error or were mistaken about something, whilst *Wissen* denotes epistemic certainty (‘truth’ in this sense) – it is difficult to determine whether Nietzsche attaches any great significance to this. In GS 11 he uses *Wissen* for incorporating knowledge, but in GS 110, entitled ‘Origin of Knowledge’, the word he uses throughout in discussing this topic, including the forms of knowledge humankind has incorporated to date, is *Erkenntnis*.
28. Nietzsche is indebted to Schopenhauer for aspects of his appreciation of the evolution of knowledge and his understanding of the chief function of the intellect (it is a tool of self-preservation and self-enhancement, not something that can help us solve metaphysical riddles). Schopenhauer does speak of the assimilation or incorporation of knowledge (The World as Will and Representation II, chapter VII), but when he does so it is in the context of distinguishing between intuitive perception (Anschauung), which is to be regarded as the source of all knowledge (Erkenntnis) and the mode that is fully worthy of the name, and which can be assimilated, and concepts which merely ‘cling’ to us. Nietzsche’s question in GS 110 leaves open what kind of knowledge and truth it is that we are now being asked and challenged to incorporate and does not simply refer to or name the truth and knowledge which we think we can assimilate or that we already know is possible for us to do so. In short, his question is meant to work as a genuine question.


31. Ibid., p.331; p.75.

32. Ibid., p.337; p.80.

33. In a note of 1885-6 Nietzsche writes: “ – all movements are to be taken as gestures, as a kind of language through which the forces understand each other. In the inorganic world misunderstanding is absent, and communication seems perfect. It’s in the organic world that error begins. ‘Things’, ‘substances’, ‘qualities’, ‘activities’… They are the specific errors that enable organisms to live. Problem of the possibility of ‘error’? The opposition is not between ‘false’ and ‘true’ but between the ‘abbreviation of signs’ and the signs themselves…” For further insight into this important aspect of Nietzsche’s thinking, see Werner Stegmaier, ‘Nietzsche’s Doctrines, Nietzsche’s Signs’, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 31, 2006, pp.20-42 (originally published in German in Nietzsche-Studien, Band 29, 2000, pp.41-70).

34. A very good account of Nietzsche on consciousness, which helpfully distinguishes between kinds or types of consciousness, is to be found in, Steven D. Hales & Rex Welshon, Nietzsche’s Perspectivism, Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press 2000, pp.130-57, especially pp.133ff.


36. Nietzsche identifies Saint Paul as the inventor of the original “thought of thoughts”. See D 68, 72.

37. For insight into the way in which Nietzsche legitimately holds conscious states to be epiphenomenal, see Hales & Welshon, Nietzsche’s Perspectivism, pp.145 ff. They note that for Nietzsche: “… psychological events, whether conscious or not, whether cognitive or not, are all refined drives and affects, and drives and affects are causally efficacious” (p.148).

38. I am grateful to Duncan Large for assisting me with the translation of this and other notes from Nietzsche’s notebooks used in this essay.


40. I am unable to probe the nature and extent of Nietzsche’s commitment to this issue in this essay. For further insight see Hamacher, “‘Disgregation of the Will’: Nietzsche on the Individual and Individuality’ in his Premises, pp.143-81.

commentator to see a connection between the categorical imperative and Nietzsche’s articulation of eternal recurrence as an ethical maxim was Georg Simmel in his study Schopenhauer and Nietzsche of 1907. Most contemporary readers of Nietzsche are perhaps familiar with this way of approaching Nietzsche’s thought from the way Deleuze construes it in Nietzsche et la philosophie.

42. See Nietzsche, *Daybreak* 339, where he writes: “To demand that duty must always be something of a burden – as Kant does – means to demand that it should never become habit and custom: in this demand there is concealed a remnant of ascetic cruelty”. It is not one of my tasks in this essay to deliberate over the correctness or adequacy of Nietzsche’s interpretation of Kant.


44. For Husserl on the significance of Leibniz see Ideas 2 section 26 and, of course, the fifth *Cartesian Mediation*. See also Ricoeur, *Husserl*, p.78. On Nietzsche’s relation to Leibniz see Hamacher, “‘Disregation of the Will’”, pp.151 ff.

45. Ricoeur, for example, suggests that Nietzsche’s *Genealogy of Morality* – the text that many, in the wake of Foucault’s influential essay of 1971 ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, regard as an anti-phenomenological work – can be read as an exercise in a critical phenomenology: “The *Genealogy of Morals* … is a genuine phenomenology, at once reductive and genetic, applied to the totality of moral phenomena…long before the Husserlian phenomenology issued from the technique of reduction, the philosopher of ‘suspicion’ followed the path from the derived to the originary. It matters little to us that he mixed in with this technique of truth a dogmatism of instinct and an evolutionistic scientism which are antiquated today. It even matters little that Nietzsche should have lost himself in his destructive passion… The genesis of the spirit of humility from the will to power and the demonic form from the project of saintliness are the most remarkable, and in certain respects the most frightening, examples, of this critical phenomenology, a phenomenology noticeably more inclusive than the phenomenology of cognition to which the greatest part of Husserl’s work had to be limited”, *Husserl*, pp.207-8.