My thesis concerns the claim that conscious perceptual experience provides the subject with knowledge of their environment because it provides them with epistemic reasons in favour of judging true the relevant claims about their environment. On that view, conscious perceptual experience is a source of epistemic reasons and it provides the subject with empirical knowledge qua source of epistemic reasons.
The first part of my thesis concerns the nature of reasons. It focuses on three related questions: (i) what is the ontological status of reasons? (ii) what is it to have access to a reason in the sense that's required for reasons-based knowledge or justification? (iii) what is it to judge that p is true based on epistemic reasons? In response to (i) I argue that reasons are true propositions qua true: for every item that's a reason, that item is a true proposition and it's status as a reason is partly constituted by it's status of being true. In response to (ii) I argue that nothing less than knowing the relevant truth is required for one's awareness of
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