I was recently awarded a PhD titled 'Relationalism in the Face of Hallucinations' from the University of Warwick and the University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne. I was jointly supervised by Matthew Soteriou (Warwick) and Maximilian Kistler (Paris I) working on the philosophy of mind and perception.
Currently I am a DAAD P.R.I.M.E Fellow at the philosophy department of the University of Tübingen and Visiting Researcher at the philosophy department of the University of Fribourg.
For more information, see my personal website: http://locatellirobe.wixsite.com/robertalocatelli
This year I am leading seminars for the Epistemology module at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Warwick. In 2014/2015, I have led seminars for the Issues in Philosophy module and in 2013/2014 for the History of Modern Philosophy module.
Thesis Title: Relationalism In The Face Of Misperception
Funding: Chancellor's/ University of Warwick PhD Fellowship
Abstract: Relationalism claims that the phenomenal character of perception is constituted by the obtaining of a non-representational psychological relation to mind-independent objects. Although relationalism provides what seems to be the most straightforward and intuitive account of how experience strikes us introspectively, it is very often believed that the argument from hallucination shows that the view is untenable. The aim of this thesis is to defend relationalism against the argument from hallucination. The argument claims that the phenomenal character of hallucination and perception deserves the same account, and that relationalism cannot be true for hallucinations, therefore relationalism must be rejected. This argument relies on the Indiscriminability Principle (IND), the claim that two experiences that are introspectively indiscriminable from each other have the same phenomenal character. Before assessing the plausibility of this principle, I first consider and dismiss versions of the argument which wouldn’t depend on IND. Although widely accepted, no satisfactory support for IND has been presented yet. In this thesis I argue that defending IND requires that we understand the notion of ‘indiscriminability’ employed in IND in an impersonal sense. I then identify what underwrites IND: the intuition that, in virtue of its superficiality, the nature of a phenomenal character must be accessible through introspection, together with the claim that it is not possible to deny IND without denying the superficiality of phenomenal characters too. I argue that the relationalist can deny IND while preserving the superficiality of phenomenal characters. This can be done by adopting a negative view of hallucination and an account of introspection whereby the phenomenal character doesn’t exist independently of one’s introspective awareness of it and where having introspective access to our experience depends on our perceptual access to the world.
My other research interests:
- Various topics in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics such as:
- Non-visual sensory modalities
- Cognitive phenomenology
- Metaphysics of colour and colour experience
- Metaphysics of time and experience of temporal passage
- History of Analytic Philosophy, in particular L. Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin
- Pictorial Representations and other issues in Analytic Aesthetics
I have a BA (summa cum laude) in philosophy from the University of Milan, an MA in philosophy (summa cum laude) from the University of Milan and another MA in philosophy (mention: très bien) from the University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne. I have been a visiting student (2011/2012) at the Institute of Philosophy of London, where I was supervised by Professor Micheal Martin and Professor Paul Snowdon from UCL.
See navigation links (above) for Publications and Talks.
- Chair of the Organising Committee of MindGrad'14.
- Graduate Staff–Student Liaison Committee (SSLC) Representative, Universiy of Warwick, 2013-2014.
- Co-organiser of the London-Warwick Graduate Mind Forum, 2013-2015.
- Co-organizer of Conference “L’objet de la perception”, University Paris 1 (with P. Nadrigny), 27-29th May 2011.
- Organizer of International Workshop ‘Perceptual Presence. Disjunctivism and Direct Realism’, Archives Husserl de Paris (ENS/CNRS), 14-15th January.
- October 2013 Onwards: 3-year Full Chancellor's Scholarship.
- 2009-20013: 3-year Full Ministerial Fellowship for a PhD Programme (University Paris I)
- 2008-2009: 1-year Full Scholarship for outstanding International Master Students allocated by the Ile-de-France Region.
- 2007-2008: 1-year Erasmus Scholarship for a study period at theUniversity Paris 1.