

## Perception, knowledge, and reflection

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### *Abstract*

Some philosophers take it that understanding human self-knowledge must be a matter of giving an account of how we discover the relevant facts about ourselves. Others maintain that rational thinkers have no need for any way of finding out (e.g.) what they believe or what they are intentionally doing: self-knowledge in these cases is thought to flow from the successful exercise of the relevant first-order capacities (capacities to believe, or act, for reasons). This chapter aims to develop the second tradition in a way that broadens its traditional remit, which has been restricted to attitudes or actions for which reasons can intelligibly be asked. It is argued that if a rational perceiver can see that  $p$  she will typically be aware that she can see that  $p$ , in virtue of exercising relevant capacities for perceptual recognition. Such capacities, it is suggested, are potentially reflective in the following sense: we paradigmatically exercise them in making perceptual judgements, underwritten by an implicit awareness of how we know what we judge to be the case.

Key words: perceptual knowledge, perceptual judgement, recognitional capacities, reflectivism, non-observational knowledge, pre-reflective self-awareness

### **1. Introduction**

A number of philosophers have recently formulated versions of what I will call a simple view of perceptual knowledge. According to the simple view, the explanatory connection between perception and knowledge is more direct than epistemologists have traditionally allowed. The connection is not mediated by the acquisition of perceptual belief. It's not that perception yields knowledge because it provides evidence or warrant or any kind of epistemic basis for belief (such that, in the light of its basis, the belief can be seen to 'amount to knowledge'). Rather, perceiving an

object enables a suitably equipped perceiver non-inferentially to know what the object is like or what kind of object it is. Of course, coming to know that *p* entails coming to believe that *p*. But that entailment sheds no light on the *explanation* of perceptual knowledge. It is not by reflection on perceptual beliefs and their grounds that we understand how we know what we know through perception. Our knowledge is explained by reference to our exercising relevant perceptual-epistemic capacities. Nor is there any reason to assume that this simple-minded schema must somehow be underwritten by a (more informative?) explanation in terms of the role of perception in warranting belief. What we get from perception, if all goes well, is simply knowledge.

How is the simple view to be motivated? Its leading advocates, Alan Millar and Barry Stroud, have argued for the view in different ways. According to Millar, the simple view best captures the way perception figures in our ordinary explanatory practice, and the more traditional 'belief-centred' model is rooted in a reductive conception of propositional knowledge we have no reason to accept. (Millar 2008, 2019) For Stroud, the principal problem with the demand for a belief-centred explanation lies in its skeptical implications: it would disable us from understanding how perceptual knowledge of objects is possible at all. The promise of the simple view is that it would make the possibility of such knowledge intelligible. (Stroud 2009, 2011) I will not examine these arguments here. For now, I will simply assume that the simple view has considerable attractions (I will later touch on some of them, and on some challenges confronting rival views). My topic is a question we face in trying to develop the simple view: the question, roughly put, of how to understand the relation between perceptual knowledge and self-consciousness. Typically, when we (reasonably mature human perceivers) see a blue tile we not only come to see and know that the tile is blue.<sup>1</sup> We are also able to reflect that we can see and know the

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<sup>1</sup> In keeping with the simple view, I will assume that seeing that *p* entails knowing that *p*; specifically: to see that *p* is to know that *p* by sight. The assumption is defended by French 2012 and Millar 2019: 91-96.

tile to be blue. Perceptual knowledge, it seems, is typically ‘open to reflection’.<sup>2</sup> But what does that mean?

I want to approach this question by examining two types of answers that have recently been advanced, each of them part of a general account of perceptual knowledge. One is Millar’s theory of what he calls ‘second-order perceptual recognition’ (Millar 2011, 2014, 2019), the other is John McDowell’s view of perception as a ‘potentially self-conscious’ rational capacity (McDowell 2011). The basic difference between the two accounts may be put in terms of the arithmetic of epistemic capacities. How many sorts of capacities does it take to secure perceivers’ self-knowledge? Millar’s answer is: two sorts of capacities, viz. capacities for first- and second-order perceptual recognition (capacities to find out about the world around one, and capacities to find out about one’s current epistemic perception). Call this a ‘two-capacities’ or ‘additive’ approach. McDowell’s answer is: just one capacity, the capacity for immediate perceptual knowledge, ‘self-consciously possessed and exercised.’ (2011: 41) On this view, the capacity for self-knowledge is but ‘an aspect’ of a rational perceiver’s capacity for acquiring first-order knowledge about the world through perception. (ibid.) If you properly exercise the latter, reflective self-knowledge comes for free, as it were. Call this a ‘single capacity’ or ‘reflectivist’ approach.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> One philosopher who has consistently given this phenomenon a central place in his thinking about perceptual knowledge is Michael Ayers. (See Ayers 1991: 155-192; 2019) I discuss Ayers’ (2019) account of what he calls the perspicuity of perceptual knowledge in Roessler 2021.

<sup>3</sup> A word about the terminology. I borrow the labels ‘additive’ and ‘reflectivist’ from Matthew Boyle’s work, but my use here differs in some ways from Boyle’s. While ‘additive’, in Boyle’s discussion, pertains to a theory of rationality, I’m using the term to refer to a theory of self-knowledge. (By way of illustrating the difference, it is worth noting that Millar — whose account of self-knowledge is clearly additive in my sense — dissociates himself from an additive theory of rationality in Boyle’s sense: see this volume, p. ) Again, my use of ‘reflectivism’ is wider than Boyle’s. It refers to any account on which self-knowledge is to be made intelligible by reference to the exercise of the relevant first-order capacities. That leaves open, for example, whether reflectivist should endorse the metaphysical claim that self-knowledge and its object are the same mental state (= ‘reflectivism’ in the sense recommended in Boyle 2011). In the wider sense in which I am using the term, Anscombe 1957, Hampshire 1965 and Moran 2001 may all, I think, be classified as pursuing reflectivist ideas (about

In the next section, I will present a pair of objections to Millar's account. If successful, I think these arguments not only show up difficulties with the idea of 'second-order perceptual recognition' but they raise more general concerns about the additive approach to perceivers' self-knowledge. This makes it natural to look to the reflectivist approach for a more promising alternative. There are, to be sure, some well-known concerns about reflectivism in general, such as whether it can give an adequate account of the univocity of psychological predicates as applied to, say, young children and fully reflective subjects. I will come back to this issue. My main interest, however, will be in understanding and disarming a worry that arises from within the reflectivist tradition itself. Writers in that tradition tend to work with a distinction between an 'active' and a 'passive' side of the human mind, and they tend to limit the scope of a reflectivist account of first-person self-knowledge to the former.<sup>4</sup> The worry is that perceptual knowledge, *as conceived by the simple view*, is not a condition that is 'active' in the relevant sense, and is therefore not amenable to a reflectivist account.

Consideration of McDowell's version of reflectivism reinforces the worry. For McDowell's account of perceptual knowledge (and its inherently self-conscious nature) falls squarely in the tradition of 'belief-centred' theorizing about perceptual knowledge, to which the simple view stands opposed. Perceptual knowledge is inherently reflective, on McDowell's account, *because perceptual belief is*. This reflects McDowell's commitment to what he calls an internalist epistemology: perceptual knowledge is belief that 'counts as knowledge' in virtue being warranted by one's perceptual states, where that sort of warrant is normally open to reflection. The point that matters for current purposes is that perceptual knowledge, on this view, is inherently self-conscious only by proxy, in virtue of the inherently self-conscious nature of rational belief.

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knowledge of our current intentional actions and/or beliefs). The version I propose below is indebted to Boyle 2019.

<sup>4</sup> Compare Hampshire's discussion of the 'distinction between activity and passivity in the mind' (1965: 80). Recent work in which the distinction figures prominently includes Moran 2001 and Boyle 2009.

We may seem to face a choice between two packages, then: roughly, the simple view of perceptual knowledge plus an additive account of self-knowledge; or reflectivism about self-knowledge, underwritten by a belief-centred explanation of perceptual knowledge. My aim in this chapter is to argue that we should resist the terms of that alternative. Specifically, we should question the assumption that reflectivism only works for attitudes or actions we hold/perform for reasons. Seeing that something is so is not an attitude we hold for a reason, and thus does not fall within the 'active side' of the human mind, as standardly conceived. Still, it belongs to the 'rational side' of the human mind insofar as it finds expression in a (potentially self-conscious) perceptual judgement that *p*; a judgement whose credentials lie in the account the subject is able to give of how she knows that *p*.

## **2. Perceptual recognition: first- and second-order?**

I once found myself observing a familiar-looking figure walking down the high street, notable for his surly expression. I wondered who he was. I took a closer look and eventually recognized David Cameron. This is an illustration, in slow motion, of something that, according to the simple view, is true of perceptual knowledge in general. We all have capacities for perceptually telling (or recognizing or identifying) not only individuals, but also kinds and properties, and much of our knowledge of objects (and people) around us is acquired by exercising such capacities. Ordinarily we may reserve talk of perceptual recognition for cases that are in some way remarkable (or slow-moving) but the point applies equally to banal and effortless cases, such as seeing that the tile is blue or that someone is in a foul mood. Let me start by going over three core commitments of the simple view.

First, to say, as seems natural, that I was able to tell Cameron 'from the way he looks' is not to say that I drew an inference or formed a belief on the basis of evidence. Seeing that something is so is often a matter of exercising capacities for *non-inferential* visual knowledge.

Second, if by ‘epistemic basis’ we mean a warrant for belief that helps to account for the belief’s ‘status as knowledge’, then non-inferential perceptual knowledge does not have any epistemic basis. How did I know the man was Cameron?

According to the simple view, we can distinguish three sorts of relevant factors: I saw him; I know what he looks like and so (to put it more technically) I have a visual-recognitional capacity for Cameron; and the circumstances of my visual encounter with him were such as to provide an opportunity to exercise that capacity.<sup>5</sup> Putting all this together, we get a good explanation of how I knew he was Cameron, though the explanation makes no mention of any grounds for *belief*. Of course, the simple view does not deny that occasionally perception only yields mere belief. But it denies that there must be a common core shared by perceptual explanations of knowledge and perceptual explanations of mere belief. In other words, it is committed to a form of explanatory disjunctivism.<sup>6</sup>

Third, the simple view offers a distinctive perspective on the normative dimension of perceptual explanations of knowledge. Consider Austin’s observation that ‘How do you know that p?’, asked in response to an assertion that p, can bring into play the question *whether* you know that p. (1961: 78) When used in this ‘pointed’ way, the question serves a familiar dialectical function: a good answer is expected to show that your assertion that p expresses knowledge rather than mere opinion or speculation. This raises a set of questions regarding the way a perceptual explanation of knowledge can help to validate the relevant claim to knowledge. In addition, there is a familiar set of questions about the justification of perceptual beliefs. And there are questions to be asked about the relationship between the two sets of questions. The simple view’s distinctive perspective on this last issue is this: we should approach questions about the justification of perceptual beliefs in the

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<sup>5</sup> I follow Millar in taking deployment of a capacity for perceptual recognition to be a success-notion. To exercise one’s visual-recognitional capacity for Cameron is to come to know that someone is (or isn’t) Cameron. Mistaking someone else for Cameron involves an unsuccessful attempt at exercising the capacity.

<sup>6</sup> Note that explanatory disjunctivism is something the simple view shares with McDowell’s version of a belief-centred account of perceptual knowledge: on the latter, the kind of warrant that makes perceptual knowledge intelligible is only available in ‘good’ cases.

light of perception's more basic role in revealing (making *known*) to us what objects are like. Perceptual knowledge comes first in the order of explanation. Consider the following question (a member of the second set): what justified my belief that the surly pedestrian was Cameron? In particular, how did my *seeing him* contribute to my justification? Part of the answer, on the simple view, is that seeing Cameron made it possible for me to exercise my visual-recognitional capacity for Cameron, and so to come to know (not merely opine or speculate) that he was Cameron. Another part of the answer is that it's surely OK to believe what one knows to be the case.<sup>7</sup> In this way, a perceptual explanation of someone's knowledge that *p* can shed light on her justification for believing that *p*.

These claims raise a variety of questions, and I will discuss some of them below. But at this point I want to turn to the subject of perceiver's self-knowledge. Consider the knowledge you might express by saying 'I see that the tile is blue.' Is this an example of knowledge acquired by the exercise of suitable visual-recognitional capacities? I'm not asking whether your knowledge *that the tile is blue* is visual-recognitional. I assume that it is. The question is whether your knowledge *that you see* the tile to be blue is intelligible in the same sort of way as your knowledge that the tile is blue, by reference to your capacity visually to tell the relevant fact. Alan Millar, who has provided the most detailed articulation of the simple view I'm aware of, recommends an affirmative answer. You know you can see the tile to be blue, according to Millar, by mobilizing what he calls a second-order perceptual-recognitional capacity: not the capacity visually to tell whether something is blue (or a tile), but visually to tell whether it is *seen by one to be a blue tile*. It's a second-order capacity in the sense that its exercise involves or embeds the relevant first-order capacities. Yet, it is a perceptual-epistemic capacity in its own right. Knowledge

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<sup>7</sup> See Williamson 2007: 357-9. We might call the idea the Busch doctrine, after the author of *Max and Moritz*:

'Und, was er sicher weiß, zu glauben,  
Darf sich doch Jeder wohl erlauben.' (Busch 1907:3)  
(And it is surely our due  
To believe that which we know is true.)

of one's current epistemic perception, on this account, is an example of the *same kind of knowledge* that forms its object.

An important attraction of this account is that it can respect and explain what might be called the 'transparency' of epistemic perception, by analogy with the 'transparency' of belief. As Evans remarked, in reflecting on what we believe our eyes are 'so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward.' (Evans 1982: 225) Similarly, in reflecting on whether you can see that the tile is blue, your eyes are (literally) directed at the tile. On Millar's account, the matter is susceptible of a ready explanation. Just as you need to inspect the tile to discover whether it's blue, you also need to look at it in order to discover whether it is something seen by you to be blue. As Millar notes, '(n)othing that deserves to be called 'introspection' figures in this account. The knowledge in question is acquired by looking outward.' (2014: 12, n.13)

Despite this and other attractions, the idea of second-order perceptual recognition can seem perplexing. I think there is a natural worry that develops from general concerns about the explanatory value of perceptual recognition: the idea of second-order perceptual recognition seems vulnerable to such concerns in a way the first-order case is not. I call this the Intelligibility challenge. Consideration of this issue leads to wider misgivings about the status of Millar's theory — or indeed any additive theory of perceivers' self-knowledge. I'll call this the challenge from ordinary practice.

### **2.1. The Intelligibility challenge**

I first present the challenge in three steps, and then consider some rejoinders.

*The virtus dormitiva objection.* Start from the following general complaint about the simple view: explanations in terms of perceptual recognition are, if not completely trivial then at least not as informative as they need to be to provide a serious alternative to belief-centred models of perceptual knowledge. This is a natural concern, given that such explanations invoke capacities *to gain knowledge*. 'S



exercised her capacity to come to know whether  $p$  does not sound like a fully satisfactory response to the question 'How does  $S$  know that  $p$ ?', and it may seem as if capacities for perceptual recognition are no more than variations on that uninformative theme. As Millar puts the worry: '(i)t might seem that explaining why one gains knowledge that  $p$  in terms of the exercise of an ability to tell, and thus come to know, by looking, is a bit like explaining why people fall asleep in terms of their having taken a drug with the power to make someone fall asleep.' (2008: 336)

'*Structure*'. Millar's response is to insist that a 'perceptual-recognitional capacity' is not a mere power or disposition but an 'ability that has a certain structure.' For example, the ability to recognize a chaffinch involves 'being able to tell from the way the bird looks that it is a chaffinch. Thus it involves being responsive to the shape of the bird, its size, how it moves, and so on.' (2008, p. 336) This is why appeal to the ability provides an illuminating explanation of how you know of a particular bird that it's a chaffinch. There is no mystery as to *how* you are able to tell, and thus know, that the bird is a chaffinch, given that it is, as we might say, *visibly* a chaffinch, presenting you with the complex of features, or the 'gestalt', that constitutes what you know to be the (or a) characteristic look of a chaffinch.

*No 'structure' in the second-order case.* There is no look that is distinctive of something seen by me to be chaffinch, or a tile. Unperceived tiles (or tiles seen by someone else) don't generally look different from tiles seen by me. It does not seem right to say that the tile is 'visibly' (or looks like) something seen by me to be a tile. The 'structure' that is supposedly internal to capacities for perceptual recognition — in virtue of which such capacities are held to provide for intelligible knowledge — is conspicuous for its absence in the case of 'second-order' recognition. Invoking 'second-order' capacities really does seem to be akin to invoking the power to put someone to sleep.

The apparent lack of 'structure' in 'second-order' perceptual recognition has of course not escaped Millar's attention. (See Millar 2011: 339) Some of his comments on this matter seem to reflect a temptation to resort to a purely reliabilist

conception of second-order recognition. Such a reading is encouraged by passages in which Millar uses traditional reliabilist materials to defend the idea that the second-order case is 'genuinely recognitional'. For example, he argues that it involves 'the application of a concept in immediate response to a visual perception', where the experience in response to which I apply the concept is a 'highly reliable indicator of a thing's being a tomato seen by me' (2011: 339-40). He also writes that 'I have the concept of a thing that I see and I have been trained up to apply it recognitionally to things I see' (2014: 12). The problem is that even granting these points, they are not sufficient to substantiate the idea of second-order perceptual recognition. The intelligibility of knowledge from perceptual recognition was supposed to be *sui generis*, not reducible to any kind of explanatory link between perception and belief. A purely reliabilist account of perceivers' self-knowledge would amount to abandoning the suggestion that such knowledge is an example of perceptual recognition, as conceived by the simple view.

An alternative response that can be extracted from Millar's discussion is that the second-order case has its own intelligibility-conferring kind of 'structure', albeit one that formally differs from the first-order case. I am said to be responsive, in judging that I can see something to be so, to 'its looking that way *to me*' (2019: 114, Millar's emphasis; see also Millar's chapter in this volume). Just as the capacity visually to tell a chaffinch is the capacity to tell a chaffinch *from its distinctive visual appearance*, similarly, it might be said, the capacity to tell that something is seen by me to be a chaffinch is the ability to do so *from its looking to me* like a chaffinch. In abstract terms, this response seems promising. In particular, it promises simultaneously to accommodate the intuitive dissimilarity between the first- and the second-order case and to show that, nevertheless, perceiver's self-knowledge is a bona fide example of perceptual recognition. But can both promises be kept? Note that the features making up the distinctive visual appearance of a chaffinch are *visible* features. If you look at a chaffinch under favourable conditions, its colour pattern and various other distinguishing features will determine the character of your visual experience. You will be *visually aware* of them. This is what makes it natural to say that the bird is 'visibly' a chaffinch, and why it does not seem mysterious how

someone who knows what chaffinches characteristically look like is able to classify the bird as a chaffinch. By contrast, the bird's looking to me like a chaffinch is not a visible feature, on a par with its flash of white on the wings or its blue-grey crown. It's not a feature of which I'm visually aware when I look at a chaffinch in good lighting conditions. Nor do I know what something seen by me to be a chaffinch looks like. It may be said that this is just an instance of the dissimilarities between the first- and second-order cases, acknowledged by Millar. Still, it seems fair to say that the difference points to an explanatory gap: it remains unclear how the 'structure' supposedly underpinning second-order perceptual recognition renders self-knowledge intelligible. The *virtus dormitiva* objection has surely not been fully answered.

So far I have tried to articulated what I take to be intuitive misgivings about the intelligibility of second-order perceptual recognition. These misgivings are connected, I think, to a question about the 'consumers' of perceptual explanations of perceivers' self-knowledge. *To whom* are such explanations supposed to be addressed? The second challenge begins from reflection on that issue.

## **2.2 The challenge from ordinary practice**

Start from a question about the status of Millar's 'structure' point. Is the suggestion just part of a philosophical theory, intended to reassure philosophers troubled by the *virtus dormitiva* objection? Or is it intended to articulate something to which ordinary perceivers are alive in their ordinary explanatory and dialectical practice? The first thing to note here is that Millar's characterization of the 'structure' of *first-order* capacities for perceptual recognition is not particularly esoteric. It is naturally interpreted as a theoretical articulation of our ordinary thinking about perceptual recognition; the thinking that is to the fore in our practice of probing and defending claims to knowledge. 'How can you tell it's a chaffinch?' can be a sensible question, and there are familiar ways of addressing it, invoking the ability to tell a finch 'from its distinctive appearance'. Compare and contrast the second-order case. 'How can you tell you can see it's a chaffinch?' (or 'How do you know you can see it's a chaffinch?') is not a question we would ordinarily raise or consider. If someone were

to ask it, I think it would naturally be heard simply as a convoluted way to ask about your *first-order* recognition. 'I can tell from its unmistakable patterned plumage' would be a sensible response. 'I can tell from its looking like a chaffinch *to me*' would leave most of us mystified.

What is the dialectical significance of these observations? One way to frame the argument would be that a theory of second-order perceptual recognition *receives no support* from reflection on our ordinary practice (unlike its first-order counterpart). There may then be a lacuna in Millar's case for the theory, and the question would be whether alternative sources of support are available. But we may also consider a stronger version of the challenge. It's not just that in our ordinary practice we take no particular interest in questions of the form 'How do you know you perceive that p?'; we would regard such questions as off-key. According to this version, there is a sense in which a theory of second-order perceptual recognition is *at variance with* our ordinary practice: it addresses what would ordinarily be regarded as a bad question.

We can put the underlying interpretation of our practice by recasting the idea of the 'transparency' of perceptual knowledge. The idea should not just be taken as an observation about the phenomenology of self-ascriptions of perceptual knowledge ('in making such a self-ascriptions one's attention is focused on the perceived object') but as an analysis of the relationship between two questions. Roughly, to ascertain whether one can see that p one needs to answer the question whether p by looking. Furthermore, answering the latter question is all one needs to do. There is no additional cognitive activity, no method of self-discovery, to be employed in order to answer the first question. Determining whether p (by the use of vision) is sufficient. This is why the question 'How can you tell you can see that p?' is naturally heard as collapsing into the first-order question 'How can you tell that p?' and why, construed as a request for an account of how you were able to find out that you can see that p, the question would be out of place.

We are obviously getting close to reflectivist ideas here. The transparency of perceptual knowledge, on the revised construal, invites the thought that perceivers' self-knowledge is somehow implicit in our ability to find out about the world around us through perception. The force of the stronger version of the challenge depends on whether something like that thought can be corroborated. The best way to develop that version of the challenge, then, is to present a reflectivist alternative.

### **3. Perceptual judgement and reflection**

I mentioned earlier that a single capacity approach to self-knowledge is generally thought to be limited to the 'active side' of the human mind, viz. actions and attitudes that are responsive to reasons, as we see them. Now, knowing that a tile is blue is not an attitude we hold for a reason. 'Why do you know the tile is blue?' is not an intelligible request for one's normative reason for knowing. (At best, it might probe one's reason for relevant exploratory activities.) Importantly, however, that is not to say that rationality is not implicated in perceptual knowledge. Advocates of the simple view can and should allow that it is. Doing so, I want to suggest, makes room for the idea that (rational subjects') perceptual knowledge is potentially reflective — despite not being 'active' in the received sense.

The first step in that direction is to endorse a thesis that is central to McDowell's account. I will call this the Judgement thesis. Simply put, it says that the capacity for perceptual knowledge, in the case of rational perceivers, is inseparable from the capacity for perceptual judgement.<sup>8</sup> If you see and so know that the tile is blue you must be able to express your knowledge by judging 'that tile is blue.' Here is a second step, still in keeping with McDowell's discussion. Full mastery of the capacity to judge requires an appreciation of the normative dimension of judging. One needs to understand that in judging that *p* one lays oneself open to questions about one's entitlement to make the judgement, and one needs to be able to engage with such questions. Putting the two points together, we can begin see the rationale for

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<sup>8</sup> The Judgement thesis is also a central element of Stroud's version of the simple view (in his 2015 paper, entitled 'The Primacy of Judgement'). But Stroud does not consider its bearing on perceivers' self-knowledge.

reflectivism: the capacity for perceptual knowledge, the capacity to express such knowledge by making judgements, and the capacity to corroborate a judgement — centrally, by explaining how one knows what one judges to be the case — are all (in McDowell's words) 'aspects' of the same capacity.

To these points, I suggest, the simple theorist should add a third point, now parting company with McDowell. Compare a judgement that *p* expressive of a reasoned belief and a judgement that *p* expressive of non-inferential perceptual knowledge. In the first case, in making the judgement, the subject will have at least an implicit grasp of the reason for which she believes that *p*. It is by articulating her reason that she will be able to produce the credentials of her judgement, if challenged to do so. In the second case, the belief that *p* is not to the fore at all.<sup>9</sup> Instead, in making the judgement, the subject has an implicit grasp of how she is able to know that *p*, and the most immediate way to justify her judgement is to articulate this implicit understanding, perhaps in response to the 'pointed' question 'How do you know?'

I want to pursue the comparison in more detail, drawing on a suggestion of Matthew Boyle's about how, in the case of reasoned beliefs, the idea of an implicit grasp of the credentials of a judgement may be filled out.

Boyle considers a subject who, after giving the matter some thought, reaches the 'alarming conclusion' that

(1) There will be a third world war.

While the content of the judgement is 'a proposition about the non-mental world', the judgement, so Boyle argues, also involves a specific 'manner of representing this proposition', to be distinguished, for example, from the manner in which you represent that proposition when you *suppose* that, or *ask* whether, there will be a

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<sup>9</sup> The suggestion here is reminiscent of Aquinas's distinction between two species of the genus 'thinking with assent'. See Antognazza 2020 for illuminating discussion of the distinction.

third world war. Specifically, the subject ‘represents’ the proposition as the answer to a question, where this means that the question is now, for her, ‘closed’. Thus, the subject implicitly recognizes that ‘her own belief on this question is settled’. (Boyle 2019, p. 1034-5) We can make this vivid by comparing our subject — who confidently judges (1) — with someone who, while certainly being able to see the evidence supporting (1), regards the matter as too uncertain to permit any categorical judgement. There is a sense in which both subjects recognize the reasons for (1). But only the first subject takes those reasons to be conclusive and so to settle or close her question.

One way to put Boyle’s suggestion is to say that when we answer a question ‘about the non-mental world’ by considering relevant evidence, we simultaneously engage with a subsidiary question, though it may not occupy the foreground of our attention; viz. the question whether the available evidence is strong enough to settle our first-order enquiry. In judging (1) our subject has taken a stand on this background question (she takes the evidence to settle the matter), and in doing so, as Boyle puts it, ‘expresses a non-positional consciousness of her own belief.’ (ibd.)

Consider now a subject who, looking at a tile in front of her, idly observes that

(2) This tile is blue.

Once again, we can distinguish the content of the judgement (a proposition ‘about the non-mental world’) and the manner in which that proposition is represented. In making the judgement, the subject clearly considers the question of the tile’s colour to be closed. But what does that involve? What is the background question on which she is implicitly taking a stand in judging (2)? Arguably, the question is not whether she has adequate evidence regarding the tile’s colour. To adapt Austin’s well-known dictum, seeing the tile doesn’t provide her with *evidence* that it’s blue, she can just

see that it is, the question is settled.<sup>10</sup> Now, there is a distinction between seeing a blue tile and seeing that the tile is blue. The former does not always capacitate the latter. Consider someone who is looking at the tile in semi-darkness, leaving her unable to make out its colour. She might say: ‘it could be blue, but it’s too dark to be sure’. What she will not do is consider the matter closed. A natural formulation of the background question in play here (borrowed from Stoic-Cartesian epistemology) is this: ‘can I clearly and distinctly perceive the tile’s colour?’ In making a categorical perceptual judgement, the subject is expressing confidence on that score. That is not a matter of recognizing the adequacy of reasons for believing (2), and so does not make (2) an expression of ‘non-positional consciousness’ of one’s belief that the tile is blue. What grounds the judgment is something like an implicit recognition that looking at the tile reveals its colour. By analogy with Boyle’s suggestion, we might say that in judging (2), the subject expresses a ‘non-positional consciousness’ of seeing (or being able to see) that the tile is blue. It is as if there were a tacit adverb preceding her judgement: [visibly] the tile is blue.

I want to spell out and defend the conception of perceptual judgements that underwrites this picture by contrasting it with two competitors.

Consider first an ‘internalist’ conception, such as McDowell’s. On that conception, there is no structural difference between (2) and (1). In both cases, the judgement expresses a belief the subject holds for what she takes to be a good reason. One challenge facing this account is that it has turned out to be hard to say just what our reasons for perceptual judgements are.<sup>11</sup> That is particularly awkward for a view aspiring to track our ordinary epistemic practice. If the view is ‘sheer common sense’

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<sup>10</sup> ‘But if the animal then emerges and stands plainly in view, there is no longer any question of collecting evidence; its coming into view doesn’t provide me with *evidence* that it’s a pig, I can now just *see* that it is, the question is settled.’ (Austin 1962: 115)

<sup>11</sup> Candidates that can be extracted from McDowell’s own writings include ‘The tile looks blue’, ‘The tile is blue’ and ‘I see that the tile is blue’. Philosophers sympathetic to a broadly McDowellian view have recently added another candidate, viz. the blue tile itself. For critical discussion of the various proposals, see Ginsborg 2006; Roessler 2009, forthcoming.



why should it be so hard to articulate our reasons for perceptual judgements? I think what impels McDowell to assume that (2) is relevantly similar to (1) is that he all but equates the request for the credentials of a judgement that p with the request for the subject's reason for believing that p. True, McDowell would presumably not deny that 'How do you know that p?' can be used to probe your entitlement to judge that p. But he assumes that the answer to that question will turn on your reason for believing that p (even in the case of perceptual judgements); a reason that, if all goes well, will explain how your belief 'counts as knowledge'. In that sense, 'Why do you believe that p?' is seen as the primary way to ask for the credentials of a judgment.

Note that this 'belief-centred' conception of perceptual judgement does not follow from the truism that to ask for credentials is to ask for a normative reason. A good explanation of how you know that p would deliver a reason for accepting your (perhaps implicit) *claim to knowledge that p* — a reason, that is, for believing that you do know that p, or that your judgement that p is indeed expressive of knowledge. The assumption that that sort of reason can only be delivered by expounding some knowledge-providing reason for believing that p does not receive much support from reflection on our ordinary practice. It looks more like a remnant of the traditional philosophical project of understanding our knowledge of the world around us as something akin to a theory based on suitable evidence. Suppose we drop that assumption. Then we make room for a view on which perceptual knowledge is (in Sellars' phrase) a position 'in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says' (quoted in McDowell 2011: 9), without embracing any kind of internalist epistemology. The primary way to justify what one says, when one makes a perceptual judgement that p, is by explaining how one knows that p.

On the other hand, consider an externalist conception of perceptual judgement. Externalists typically reject the Judgment thesis. They focus on perceptual beliefs and the non-rational mechanisms they think lead us to hold such beliefs. Although perceptual judgements are not an essential part of the story, they sometimes get a mention. One of Robert Brandom's examples features an archeologist who is able to

discriminate Toltec from Aztec pottery without having the faintest idea of how she does it. She has what Brandom describes as ‘off-the-cuff inclinations to call something Toltec rather than Aztec’, and these inclinations ‘can be trusted’ — though, significantly, the archeologist herself does not trust them: she ‘insists on confirmatory evidence for her belief.’ (Brandom 2000: 98-9) What are her ‘inclinations’ inclinations for? ‘Calling’ a potsherd ‘Toltec’, one might suggest, surely amounts to judging that it’s Toltec. But is that right, on Brandom’s externalist account? The question creates a dilemma. Suppose the externalist says ‘yes’, admitting that the subject has no reason for her judgement but insisting that this gives us a more lifelike, less ‘hyper-intellectualized’ conception of perceptual judgements than the one familiar from the internalist tradition. Note, however, that the archeologist is not expressing a guess in the ordinary sense of the word, something sustained at least by considerations of plausibility. Hers is an utterly blind sort of guess, reminiscent of the speech acts blindseers perform when they finally (after considerable resistance) agree to accede to an experimenter’s request for a ‘guess’ about an object they cannot even see. Suppose that in the light of this, the externalist grants that the archeologist’s utterance, not entering any sort of *claim*, is something less than a judgement. That is, the archeologist can only be seen to make a judgement once she has obtained the ‘confirmatory evidence’ she was seeking. Perceptual judgments would then be based on inference, and the externalist would be hoisted with her own petard: her view of perceptual judgements would be as ‘hyper-intellectualized’ as anyone’s.

The externalist, then, seems to be destined to oscillate between a ‘reasoned-belief’ and a ‘blind-guess’ conception of perceptual judgements. Is there a middle way? I think there is, and it is in keeping with the simple view. According to one tradition in philosophical work on attention, perceptual attention — the attentional ‘highlighting’ of perceptually experienced objects, features or regions of space — is, among other things, a means for answering questions about perceived objects.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> See Evans 1970: 100; Eilan 1998; Campbell 2002: 10-11. The background to this is a picture on which perceptual experience presents us with an array of objects and events, only some elements or parts of which are typically the focus of perceptual

Turning things around, we can say: a perceptual judgement is the answer to a question obtained by means of perceptual attention. For example, (2) is the answer to a question obtained by attending to the tile and its colour. The role of attention here is not just that it causes you to utter 'it's blue'. That might be said of the non-conscious, sub-personal mechanisms (including what are sometimes called 'attentional mechanisms') that cause a *blindseer* to say 'it's blue.' Unlike those mechanisms, visually attending is a person-level activity, something a subject may do in order to find out about something. Often, perhaps typically, the activity is initiated spontaneously and executed unreflectively. Still, it's a rational activity, informed by a grasp of the relation between an end and a suitable means, and it's something the subject is aware of doing. As in other fields, failure can be a spur to reflection. If lighting conditions are too poor to permit visual attention to the tile's colour, you may pause and, if possible, adjust relevant enabling conditions of perception (by switching on the light). On the other hand, if all goes well, your (not necessarily articulated) awareness of attending to the tile's colour gives you a reason to take your question to be settled. 'It's blue' is not a thought that, blindsight-style, strikes you out of the blue. It is the intelligible answer to a question, obtained by looking at a tile that is (visibly) blue.

To summarize. Recall Millar's 'structure' point: perceptual recognition is not an occult power to receive knowledge, we know not how, but involves the exercise of intelligible capacities for discovering what perceived objects are like. My suggestion in this section has been that Millar's point captures the *perceiver's own perspective*. (Note that this would provide a satisfying gloss on the status of the 'structure' point: the point provides a philosophical articulation of something familiar to us all.) In the case of rational subjects, the capacity to gain knowledge through perception is the capacity to make a judgement by attending (in some modality) to recognition-enabling objects and features. That sort of judgement 'closes' an enquiry in a

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attention. Attention, in other words, is essentially selective. Seeing a tile is not sufficient to enable you to answer questions about it by the use of vision. Only once you visually attend to the tile will you be able to do so. It's not that the tile needs to be fixated. You may fixate one object while attending to another object. Usually, of course, the two things go hand in hand, but it's attending that is essential.

distinctively intelligible way, as a statement of what is non-inferentially perceivable (in some modality). It involves a 'non-positional consciousness' of being able to perceive the relevant fact.

In a moment, I consider how this account of perceptual judgement bears on the explanation of perceivers' explicit self-knowledge. First, let me address two objections.

*'The grounds of perceptual recognition are typically opaque to the perceiver'*

A recurring theme in the literature on perceptual recognition is that we are often unable to articulate the features to which a perceptual judgement is responsive.<sup>13</sup> The following statement by H.H. Price gives a flavour of this theme: '(w)hat enables us to recognize Jones at sight is something we cannot describe, even to ourselves.' (1953:55) The intuitive force of such observations is undeniable, but where do they leave us? Here is a radical interpretation: the idea that perceptual recognition is intelligible from the first-person perspective falsifies the phenomenology. From the first-person point of view, and indeed from the perspective of commonsense psychology in general, we have no insight into *how* we are able perceptually to tell things. Demystifying this is a matter for the cognitive sciences.

Something like the radical interpretation is sometimes assumed by writers in the 'externalist' tradition. Consider the following passage from Bernard Williams's early paper 'Knowledge and reasons':

Someone in close relations with another may often know how the other feels, what thought has occurred to them, how they are about to react, why they reacted in a certain way. Their grounds for these convictions are often, at the conscious level, virtually non-existent or at least hopelessly unspecific. But if it is true that such a person is usually right (..) then we have little hesitation in ascribing knowledge. (2006: 52)

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<sup>13</sup> See Price 1953: 55; Broad, 1954; Urmson 1955: 273-4; Austin 1961: 84-5; Millar 2010: 122-3.

I would like to make three comments on this passage.

First, it seems natural to wonder whether Williams does not conflate two quite different sorts of cases: mere hunches (where grounds are 'non-existent') and perceptual judgements, intelligible in terms of one's ability to tell (e.g.) how someone is about to react from the way she looks. No doubt there are intermediate cases that defy straightforward classification (which may be what Williams has in mind). But such cases provide no grounds for scepticism about the existence, or importance, of the distinction itself.

Second, the distinction can be spelled out and substantiated by offering a more moderate interpretation of observations such as Price's. The moderate interpretation would insist that while we are typically unable to *describe* recognition-enabling features, we are nevertheless aware of them, able to attend to them, and indeed able to think and talk about them. As J.O. Urmson put it, you may identify a flower by its colour, or an oboe by its sound, without being able to identify the operative colour as 'mauve' or the operative sound as 'slightly acid and reedy'. You may nevertheless be able to pick out the colour '*as the colour of that sort of flower*' or the sound as the characteristic sound of an oboe. (Urmson 1955: 274) Even in the case of face recognition, we are aware of a complex of features or a gestalt that represents the characteristic look of Jones (or Cameron). In brief, our inability to describe the features that go into the characteristic sensory appearance of something would be no good reason to deny the reality (or our awareness) of the appearance.

Third, consider Williams' claim that our grounds for the relevant sorts of 'convictions' would at best be 'hopelessly unspecific'. I think it is instructive to juxtapose this with Austin's remark (a variation on the theme from Price) that recognition-enabling features would not necessarily be 'describable in words, still less describable in detail, and in non-committal words, and by anyone you please.' (1961: 84-5) Suppose you try to describe 'in detail' the look that enabled you to tell

that someone was surly, where the description would be expected to be fully comprehensible to someone who cannot see that person and does not know what a surly person looks like. Presumably Williams would be right to complain about the disappointing lack of specificity in your description. It does not follow, though, that your grounds for your claim to knowledge are ‘hopelessly unspecific’. Your grounds need not consist of an independent (‘non-committal’<sup>14</sup>) description of the relevant features: they may (partly) lie in the fact the person *looks surly*. A good way to share those grounds would be to draw our attention to the person’s facial expression, perhaps mobilizing perceptual demonstratives. Full comprehension of our grounds is only available to those who know (or to whom we can show) a surly look. They are not fully available to ‘anyone you please’. But that does not mean they cannot make our knowledge appropriately intelligible.

*What about perceptual knowledge in infancy?*

Young children enjoy perceptual knowledge, but they lack the conceptual abilities required for explaining and corroborating perceptual judgements. How can reflectivism be defended against the charge of denying the obvious (the existence of unreflective subjects of perceptual knowledge)?

I want to set aside what may seem to be a ready-made answer to this question.

McDowell writes that we should think of ‘perceptual knowledge in rational animals as a sophisticated species of a genus that is also instantiated more primitively in non-rational animals and pre-rational (pre-linguistic) human children.’ (2011: 20) While, to my mind, McDowell’s proposal has considerable force in relation to the case of non-human animals<sup>15</sup>, it seems less promising as an account of human infancy.

Briefly: young children are on their way towards full mastery of human intellectual capacities; it is not that they have already fully mastered an alternative set of capacities. To postulate a separate ‘pre-rational’ species of perceptual knowledge would be to multiply species beyond plausibility. This very point, however, suggests

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<sup>14</sup> A ‘non-committal’ description of a surly look or the smell of tar would describe them ‘otherwise than as “surly” or “of tar”.’ (1961: 85)

<sup>15</sup> See Boyle 2016 for a forceful statement of this view.

an alternative response to the objection from perceptual knowledge in infancy. The response is less concessive than McDowell's. It insists that the objection rests on two questionable assumptions: (i) that infants have *fully mastered* the capacity for perceptual knowledge, and that (ii) they *entirely lack* capacities for reflective perceptual judgements. On what is arguably a more realistic picture, over the first years of our lives we make progress on both fronts: we start our intellectual lives with a rudimentary mastery of the various prerequisites for *reflective perceptual knowledge*, refining and developing them over the course of the pre-school years.<sup>16</sup>

#### 4. Perceivers' self-knowledge as non-observational knowledge

I earlier suggested that self-ascriptions of epistemic perception are not ordinarily regarded as a proper target for the question 'How do you know?' (HK, for ease of reference). This raises two issues which we are not in a better position to address: what is the rationale for refusing HK application in the case of self-ascriptions of epistemic perception? And how is perceivers' self-knowledge to be explained, if not by answering HK?

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<sup>16</sup> I cannot develop this response in detail here, but a rough indication would be on the following lines. On the one hand, various precursors of the capacity to judge emerge very early in development. Consider a 2-year-old who exclaims 'no!' when someone tells them 'this is an apple' (pointing at a car). Or consider 18-month-olds' use of 'holophrases' in describing a perceived scene ('truck', 'off'). Or consider 12-month-olds' proficiency at 'proto-declarative' pointing — pointing that serves to 'identify something for us to attend to', presenting 'us with a topic, an object of predication'. (Moll 2012: 242, 238-9) The case of proto-declarative pointing, aimed to establish shared attention to an object, is particularly interesting in that it simultaneously involves a sort of proto-judgement ('an object of predication', where the predication is often a matter of sharing an emotional response to the object: see Franco 2005) and incipient reflection (perhaps in the first-person plural (Moll 2007): an awareness of what we are attending to, sustained by a rudimentary grasp of the enabling conditions of joint attention). On the other hand, we should be reluctant to credit young children with a fully developed capacity for perceptual knowledge. Full mastery of the capacity to know that there is an apple on the table would require full mastery of the concept of an apple. It may also (as per Hyman 1999) require the capacity to act in the light of reasons. All this provides grounds for scepticism about the idea that young children are wholly-unreflective-yet-fully-competent subjects of perceptual knowledge.

In a nutshell, the answer to the first question encouraged by the foregoing discussion may be put this way: the reason HK has no application in relation to 'I see that p' is that it *does* have application in relation to a perceptual judgement that p. When HK is posed (pointedly) in response to your claim that the tile is blue, it is not intended to change the subject. It does not invite you, say, to turn your hand to cognitive-scientific theorizing about the etiology of your knowledge. It would not be the pointed question it is if it changed the subject. What it requests are the credentials of your first-order judgement — specifically, the credentials of the claim to knowledge you are interpreted as having entered, at least implicitly, in making that judgement. It invites you to articulate something on which you have already taken a stand. The question presupposes that you are already aware that and how you know the tile to be blue. (Of course, your response may reveal that presupposition to have been incorrect, along with your judgement.) Another way to put the question's presupposition is this: you have a form of self-knowledge that is not a matter of discovering some independently obtaining fact but of making explicit something of which, if the fact obtains, you have already some (possibly inarticulate) sense. Here we can begin to see why HK — standardly used to probe how you were able to find out about something — would be off-key in relation to self-ascriptions of epistemic perception. In that respect, perceivers' self-knowledge might be compared to the 'non-observational knowledge' Anscombe (1957) maintains is part and parcel of intentional agency.

Turning to the second question (how is perceivers' self-knowledge to be explained, if not by answering HK), there is more than one direction in which reflectivists may go here. One strand in recent reflectivist thinking has centred on the metaphysics of mental states. For example, Matthew Boyle (in his 2011) suggests that certain kinds of self-knowledge are to be rendered intelligible by reflecting that 'being in a given mental state M and believing oneself to be in M' are not, in the relevant cases, 'two distinct psychological conditions.' (Boyle 2011: 235) There are various concerns one might raise about this proposal: for example, one might wonder if it involves a conception of beliefs and other attitudes as 'token states' and so an objectionable



reification of believing and other mental states.<sup>17</sup> In any case, it's not clear that theorizing about the non-distinctness of certain mental states is mandatory as a framework for developing reflectivism. The core idea may best be put at the level of the operative psychological *capacities*. Compare: when we consider the rich set of capacities implicated in intentional agency, we should not be surprised that intentional activities are potentially reflective. Anscombe's notion of 'knowledge in intention' precisely captures the sense in which the exercise of rational-agentive 'first-order' capacities — in particular, the capacity to form intentions — simultaneously provides for self-knowledge. Very briefly: an agent who puts means and ends together in the form of an intention to do x by doing y is thereby equipped to answer various sorts of second-person questions: what are you doing? (x and y) How are you doing x? (by doing y)? Why are you doing y? (in order to do x) By analogy, we might characterize perceivers' self-knowledge as 'knowledge in recognition'. A perceiver who puts together a question (what's the tile's colour?) and a means for figuring out the answer (visually attending to the tile and its colour) and thus comes to judge and know 'that tile is blue' will be equipped to account for her judgement, by making explicit the means by which she has reached it. Asked 'How do you know?', she might say 'by looking at its colour' or 'It's visibly blue' or 'I can see it's blue'. As in the case of intentional agency, there is an intelligible connection between the fully successful operation of first-order capacities and the ability to give an account of the resulting condition. Correlatively, as in the case of intentional agency, perceivers' self-knowledge involves a distinctive kind of *self-understanding*.

An important refinement of the reflectivist explanation is provided by the distinction between 'pre-reflective' and explicit self-knowledge. Consider Charles Taylor's formula for what he calls 'agent's knowledge': such knowledge brings to articulation something of which we 'already have some sense', 'however dim or inarticulate'. (Taylor 1985: 80) What Taylor has in mind is Anscombean 'knowledge in intention', but his formula seems equally intuitive in the case of 'knowledge in recognition'. In

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<sup>17</sup> Compare David Hunter's strictures against the tendency to 'hypostasize' believing, by 'treating a belief state as an object in its own right.' (Hunter 2022 ch. 2; the quote is at p. 36).

both cases, we often exercise our first-order capacities unreflectively, spontaneously, unthinkingly; yet in doing so we have at least a dim sense of the means and end we are putting together, something we are able to make explicit if the occasion demands it. Or rather: we are usually able to do so, though there may be circumstances in which we are not. The distinction between implicit and explicit self-knowledge does not just recommend itself on phenomenological grounds, I want to suggest, it also creates an opening for understanding various limitations and impairments of self-knowledge. An agent may be unable, owing to motivation or to her state of mind, to express the intention informing some activity. Some such cases might properly be described as intentional activities the agent is not fully aware of performing.<sup>18</sup> Again, suppose you see a chaffinch for a split second. You may see just enough of it to spot it, without being sufficiently confident to venture a judgement. In some such cases, the right thing to say may be that you could see there was a chaffinch but, owing to your diffidence, did not believe or know that you could see there was a chaffinch. Given that we often need to deploy (or try to deploy) perceptual-recognitional capacities in less than ideal circumstances, it should not be surprising if at times our attempts are only partially successful. Thus, while reflectivism obviously postulates a close connection between epistemic perception and self-knowledge, it is not committed to the modal thesis that necessarily, if you see that *p* you know that you see that *p* (a local version of the KK principle). What matters is that cases of unreflective perceptual knowledge are not perfect or paradigmatic exemplars of perceptual recognition, given that they fail to engage the capacity to judge.

## 5. Conclusion

I would like to conclude by returning to the worry from which I started: that perceptual knowledge, as conceived by the simple view, is not eligible for a reflectivist treatment since the scope of reflectivism is restricted to the 'active side' of the human mind. My argument in this chapter suggests the following diagnosis. It

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<sup>18</sup> Anscombe would apparently have no objection: 'It is clear that, for any deed *X*, you cannot have intentionally done *X* unless you know you are doing *X*, except in a psychoanalytical sense in which there can be unconscious intentions.' (2008: 104).

is true that there is a close connection between ‘reflective’ self-knowledge and the exercise of rationality. Reflectivism, we might say, is restricted to the ‘rational side’ of the human mind.<sup>19</sup> Only conditions that implicate rational capacities are inherently reflective. But to restrict reflectivism to ‘judgement-sensitive’ attitudes (attitudes for which reasons can be asked and given, e.g. intentions and beliefs) would be to overlook or eliminate what might be called *knowledge of the obvious*. Your knowledge that the tile is blue is inherently reflective, not because you freely adopt the belief that the tile is blue by assessing the probative force of your reasons, but because, in the Stoics’ phrase, you clearly and distinctly perceive the tile and its colour, rightly leading you to regard the question of the tile’s colour to have been settled. As Stroud remarks, when we see that there is a red apple on a brown table, ‘there is no need for something to serve as our reason for believing that there is a red apple on a brown table. There is not even any room for such reason. That there is a red apple on a brown table is something that we see and know to be so right before our eyes.’<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> This raises a large question I cannot pursue here: does a rational subject’s mind contain anything that is *not* part of its ‘rational side’? If not, might reflectivism provide a *fully general* account of first-person self-knowledge? Another way to put the question would be this: should the ‘transformative’ view of rationality promoted by Boyle 2016 lead us to question the bifurcationist approach to first-person self-knowledge recommended by Boyle 2009?

<sup>20</sup> Stroud 2015: 394. Previous versions of this chapter were presented at a workshop in Fribourg in 2018 and at a colloquium talk in Sterling in 2019. I am very grateful to the audiences for their comments, in particular to Matt Boyle, Lucy Campbell, Andrea Giananti, Guy Longworth, Giulia Luvisotto, Alan Millar, Eylem Özaltun, Gianfranco Soldati, Crispin Wright. Special thanks to Lucy Campbell and Naomi Eilan for many conversations about self-knowledge, and to Guy Longworth and Gianfranco Soldati for written comments on an earlier draft.

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