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James Openshaw

I joined the Department at Warwick as a Postdoctoral Researcher in September 2020, funded by an Analysis Trust and Mind Association award (until August 2021).

My areas of focus are the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of language. I'm particularly interested in memory and in singular thought. In the past I've defended the view that singular thought is a broadly epistemic achievement. I now think there's interesting work to be done in reconciling this with work in the science and philosophy of memory. One question concerns what the requirements are for an episodic memory to provide a sufficiently reliable link to enable singular thoughts about a past object. Another is whether there are ways of remembering a past object without remembering any past event in which it featured—and, if there are, whether this capacity can be understood on the model which distinguishes between only episodic, semantic, and procedural memory.

I received my DPhil (PhD) from the University of Oxford in August 2018 under the supervision of John Hawthorne and Timothy Williamson. I have since been a Teaching Fellow at the University of Edinburgh (2019–20) and a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Haifa (2018–19). In the final year of my DPhil (2017–18) I was a Stipendiary Lecturer in Philosophy at St. Edmund Hall (Oxford) and a Teaching Assistant at Kings College London. Back in 2016 I was a visiting research student at the University of Southern California. And before all this I did my undergraduate and masters work at the University of Leeds.

My personal website: www.jamesopenshaw.com

 Publications

(2020). ‘A puzzle about seeing for representationalism’ (with Assaf Weksler), Philosophical Studies 177: 2625–46.

(2018). ‘Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports’, Mind & Language 33(4): 415–37.

(2018). ‘Self-ascription and the de se’, Synthese 197: 2039–2050.