My thesis, ‘The Constitution of Consciousness’, is primarily focused on developing an account of consciousness that gives pride of place to our ordinary explanatory practices concerning consciousness and its contraries. Our ordinary concept of consciousness is, I argue, a special kind of thick concept, and much of my thesis is concerned with elaborating and defending this claim. I do so by drawing on a rich vein of Aristotelian thought running through the work of philosophers like Gilbert Ryle, Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, and, above all, Brian O’Shaughnessy.
I am interested in our ordinary conception of ourselves and our own minds, as well as the issues in epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind and language that crop up in the course of giving that ordinary conception a philosophical articulation. Besides this, I have been unable to shake a fascination for the works of Aristotle and Kant.
Prior to starting a PhD at Warwick, I completed an MPhil there; my MPhil thesis was on the significance of Kant’s epistemology of modality for his epistemology and metaphysics of mind as developed in the Critique of Pure Reason. Before that, I completed a degree in politics and philosophy at the University of York.