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KNOWING YOUR EVIDENCE

So far in this book I’ve concentrated on just one type of self-knowledge: knowledge of our own standing attitudes. The sense in which standing attitudes are ‘standing’ is that they are ones you have even when you aren’t entertaining them. For example, you still believe that Sacramento is the capital of California even when you are asleep or thinking about something else. Standing attitudes aren’t mental events; they aren’t datable occurrences even if the onset or acquisition of a standing attitude is a datable event. I’ve been defending an inferentialist account of our knowledge of our standing attitudes but we have attitudes that aren’t standing, and some of our states of mind aren’t attitudes, that is, ‘propositional’ attitudes. Judging that the government will be re-elected, or deciding to spend the summer in Italy are examples of ‘occurrent’ mental events rather than standing attitudes, and feelings like pain or nausea aren’t attitudes to propositions. The obvious question, then, is: what does inferentialism have to say about knowledge of occurrent attitudes and feelings?

If you are a lazy inferentialist you might try dodging this question by pointing out that inferentialism is specifically an account of self-knowledge of standing attitudes and so does not have to say anything about other kinds of self-knowledge. As argued in the last chapter, an inferentialist about self-knowledge of standing attitudes doesn’t have to be an inferentialist about self-knowledge of occurrent attitudes. You can have a hybrid view according to which self-knowledge of standing attitudes is inferred from non-inferential knowledge of occurrent attitudes and feelings. Alternatively, you might think that knowledge of one’s feelings and occurrent attitudes is itself inferential. This would raise the question what this knowledge is inferred from, but the lazy inferentialist doesn’t see why he has to answer this question. The question he was supposed to be answering is whether self-knowledge of standing attitudes is inferential, and this question has been answered: the answer is ‘yes’.

It would certainly make life easier if one could get away with this, but in reality no one is going to be terribly impressed by an account of self-knowledge which only talks about how we know our standing attitudes, and has nothing to say about any other self-knowledge. It’s not just that such an account is disappointingly limited in scope. It’s also incomplete in own terms. Suppose you infer from evidence E that you have a particular attitude A. You can’t infer A from E unless you have access to E, and you haven’t fully explained your knowledge that you have A without also explaining how you have access to E. Suppose that you judge you are wearing socks, and infer from this that you believe that you are wearing socks. Merely judging that you are wearing socks won’t enable you to infer and thereby know that you believe you are wearing socks unless you know that you judge that you are wearing socks, and that your so judging is good evidence that you believe you are wearing socks. If you have nothing to say about your knowledge that you judge that you are wearing socks, then you haven’t fully explained your knowledge that you believe that you are wearing socks. Your account is incomplete.

It’s possible to imagine some inferentialists objecting that in order to know on the basis of evidence E that you have standing attitude A you don’t have to know that you have E. Consider this analogy: you know there is a pig in front of you because you can see a pig in front of you. Your evidence of porcine presence is your visual experience of the pig, but in order to know on the basis of this evidence that there is a pig in front of you you don’t need know or believe that you are having the visual experience of a pig. You certainly don’t know or believe that you are having the visual experience of a pig if you lack the concept of visual experience, but not having this concept needn’t prevent you from knowing on the basis of your visual experience that there is a pig in front of you. You have evidence that there is a pig in front of you but you don’t need to know your evidence. It’s enough that you have evidence and use it appropriately. In that case, why can’t you know that you believe you are wearing socks on the basis of your judgement that you are wearing socks even if you don’t know your judgement? Why isn’t it enough that you make the judgement and use it in the appropriate manner to arrive at the conclusion that you believe you are wearing socks?

The reason is that the two cases are quite different. You knowledge that there is a pig in front of you is based on your experience but you don’t infer it from your experience. In contrast, the inferentialist’s proposal is that you infer, and thereby know, your standing attitude from the corresponding judgement or other evidence. In the case of knowledge that is not only based on evidence but inferred from evidence it’s more plausible that you need to have knowledge of your evidence, at least on the assumption that your inference is conscious. Another porcine example makes the point: imagine knowing there is a pig in the vicinity not because you can see a pig but because there are pig droppings on the ground and buckets of half-eaten pig food. You infer from this evidence that there is a pig in the vicinity but you only come to know on this basis that there is a pig in the vicinity because you know that there are pig droppings on the ground and that this is evidence that there is a pig in the vicinity. Unless, by whatever means, you actually know your evidence and grasp its significance you can’t infer anything from it.

Suppose the lazy inferentialist is convinced by this and accepts that he has to account for our knowledge of the psychological and other evidence from which we infer our standing attitudes. There are many different kinds of evidence that bear on our standing attitudes. I’ve talked in this chapter about occurrent judgements as evidence of our standing beliefs. In the last chapter I talked about the possibility of inferring our standing attitudes from behavioural evidence and from internal promptings, including inner speech, emotions, feelings and mental images. What should inferentialism say about our knowledge of these things? Should it go for the ‘hybrid’ view that self-knowledge of internal promptings is non-inferential, or should it insist that it’s inference all the way? Inference all the way means that, in addition to inferring your standing attitudes, you also know by inference the internal promptings from which you infer your standing attitudes. The question which can no longer be avoided is: which way should the inferentialist about self-knowledge of standing attitudes go?

It’s easy to see why the ‘inference all the way’ option looks unattractive since it threatens a regress. The epistemological buck has to stop somewhere and this means that self-knowledge can’t be inferential all the way – or so you might think. On this view, the question is not whether any self-knowledge is non-inferential but which self-knowledge is non-inferential. If knowledge our own judgements, feelings and mental images turns out to be inferential one would face the challenge of identifying their evidential base, but this seems like a lost cause; presumably we don’t know our own feelings and mental images by inferring them. Better to accept that self-knowledge of internal promptings is non-inferential. This deals with the regress because inferential self-knowledge of standing attitudes is now seen to be based on non-inferential self-knowledge.

This amounts to a kind of ‘foundationalism’ about self-knowledge, motivated by just the kind of regress argument which motivates other, more familiar forms of foundationalism. The basic thought of the regress argument is that no knowledge or epistemic justification can be inferential unless some knowledge or epistemic justification is non-inferential. This claim raises a whole lot of questions that are well beyond the scope of this book but the point I want to make here is that foundationalism about self-knowledge has less going for it than you might think. Specifically, I’d like to suggest that:

1. There are in fact excellent positive reasons for thinking self-knowledge of internal promptings is inferential.
2. The fact that self-knowledge of internal promptings is inferential doesn’t generate a problematic regress.

You can say that self-knowledge of internal promptings is inferential without saying that it’s inference all the way but it’s certainly inference much more of the way that foundationalism implies.

A good way of seeing the force of these claims is to look at Carruthers’ account of self-knowledge in his 2011 book The Opacity of Mind and 2009 paper on the same subject. Carruthers focuses on knowledge of our current thoughts and thought processes. He doesn’t spend much time on self-knowledge of standing attitudes because he – mistakenly in my view - takes it as uncontroversial that ‘knowledge of our own standing attitudes depends upon knowledge of the corresponding (or otherwise suitably related) current mental events’ (2011: xi). He calls his positive account the Interpretive Sensory Access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge. ISA holds that ‘our only mode of access to our own thinking is through the same sensory channels that we use when figuring out the mental states of others’ (2011: xii). On this account, access to our propositional attitudes is ‘almost always interpretive (and often confabulatory), utilizing the same kinds of inferences (and many of the same sorts of data) that are employed when attributing attitudes to other people’ (2011: 1).

What would it be for access to our occurrent propositional attitudes to be interpretive? Carruthers describes a self-interpretive process as ‘one that accesses information about the subject’s current circumstances, or the subject’s current or recent behaviour, as well as any other information about the subject’s current or recent mental life’ (2009: 3). It’s in this sense that ‘self-attributions of propositional attitude events like judging and deciding are always the result of a swift (and unconscious) process of self-interpretation’ (2009: 4). When you interpret propositional attitude events in the light of information about your circumstances, behaviour and mental life the resulting self-knowledge is not just interpretive but inferential. It’s inferential because it’s interpretive, but being inferential in this sense doesn’t produce an unacceptable regress. That’s the point of (a) and (b).

We can start to flesh all of this out by going back to the example of Katherine figuring out whether she wants another child. Her desire for another child is a standing attitude, and she knows that she has this attitude by inference from internal promptings: she is aware of a range of feelings, emotions and mental images from which she correctly infers that she wants another child. Her internal promptings are her evidence, and what they are evidence of is a particular standing desire. How, then, does Katherine know her evidence? Suppose that her internal promptings include a feeling of wistfulness or the yearning for another child as she puts away her son’s clothes. What tells Katherine that this is what she is feeling? The hybrid view says that what tells Katherine what she feels is – what could be more obvious? - the feeling itself: it has a raw feel or phenomenal character which enables Katherine to identify it as the yearning for another child as long as she attends to it. All she has to do to know her evidence is to ‘notice’ her feelings, emotions and images. Noticing that you have a particular feeling F is a way of knowing that you have that feeling, and is different from inferring that you have F. So Katherine discovers her standing desire for another child by inference from internal promptings which she knows about by means other than inference.

What’s wrong with this account? One thing that is wrong with it is that it’s barely an ‘account’ of Katherine’s self-knowledge. Saying that Katherine ‘notices’ her feelings doesn’t casts much light on the nature of her knowledge of her feelings. Noticing that P, where P is a proposition about your mental life, might be your way of knowing that P, at least in the sense that it entails that you know that P, but it’s a further question how you notice that P. For all that the hybrid view says, noticing that you have a particular feeling could itself be the result of an inference. More to the point, it’s also implausible that there is such a thing as the ‘raw feel’ of a yearning for another child. The feelings we classify as such are subtle and complex. Given a collection of mental images, bodily changes, memories, and inner speech, it takes cognitive effort to identify them as amounting to the yearning for another child, and the effort required isn’t just the effort of paying attention. You can’t just “read off” from the way you feel that your yearning is for another child. You can yearn for any number of things, and it would be odd to think that each yearning has its own a distinctive phenomenology. When you identify your feeling as the yearning for another child what you are doing is interpreting it, and your cognitive effort is the effort of interpretation. Crucially, when you interpret your feeling you don’t just go on “how it feels”. You also take account of contextual factors, such as the fact that you have recently been thinking about whether to have another child. More often than not, at least in the case of complex feelings and emotions, it is your knowledge of the context which makes it possible for you to determine its nature, which means that you are to some extent inferring what you feel from your background knowledge. Your inference is an inference to the best explanation rather than inductive or deductive.

It’s an interesting question how far this view can be pressed. I’ve talked about the role of interpretation as a source of self-knowledge of complex feelings and emotions but what about knowledge of simple feelings or sensations like nausea and pain? When you are in pain isn’t it the just pain itself, without any interpretive effort on your part, that tells you that you are in pain? Surely you don’t interpret what you feel as pain on the basis of background knowledge of your circumstances and behaviour. If this is right then here we have a case of non-interpretive and non-inferential access to an “internal prompting”. However, this is a possibility that inferentialism about self-knowledge of standing attitudes and more complex feelings and emotions can allow, as long as self-knowledge of simple sensations isn’t seen as the basis of all other self-knowledge. Knowledge of sensations like pain contributes little to self-knowledge of standing attitudes, and even the true extent to which our access to so-called “simple” sensations is non-interpretive can be questioned. The answer to the question “Are you in pain?” isn’t always obvious, and it’s not unusual for people to report being conscious of sensations which they are unsure whether to classify as pain. In such cases, it can happen that discovering the cause of the sensation can help you to make sense of it, to classify it one way rather than another. Here, your access to the sensation look genuinely interpretive.

What about the role of interpretation in relation to inner speech? As Carruthers notes, ‘we sometimes learn of our own beliefs and desires by first becoming aware of their formulation into speech (whether inner or outer)’ (2009: 5). However, ‘all speech – whether the speech of oneself or someone else – needs to be interpreted before it can be understood’ (ibid.). It might seem that this can’t be right because our own utterances aren’t ambiguous to us in the way that other peoples’ utterances can be. But consider Katherine saying to herself “I want another one” as she folds her son’s clothes. Another what? It’s obvious to Katherine that the force of her utterance is that she wants another child but this is only obvious to her because her circumstances, memories and mental images leave her in no doubt as to the topic of her utterance. She doesn’t find what she says ambiguous or unclear, but not because she has non-interpretive access to her utterance. It is because it is obvious to her how to interpret her utterance. Viewed in isolation, her utterance “I want another one” would mean very little to her; it’s her knowledge of the context of the utterance that makes it possible for her to interpret it.

We can put all this together in the form of a two-step argument in support of the view that self-knowledge of internal promptings is inferential:

1. Access to internal promptings is interpretive.
2. Interpretive access is inferential.

The point of 1 is that what enables you to make sense of your internal promptings and attach a specific significance to them is your background knowledge of your current circumstances, current or recent behaviour, and current or recent mental life. Carruthers defines interpretive access as access that depends on such background knowledge, and this is the background knowledge on which self-knowledge of internal promptings is dependent. But couldn’t self-knowledge of internal promptings depend on background knowledge without being inferred from it? In other words, 1 couldn’t be true without 2 also being true? This raises the question whether you can be a Carruthers-style interpretationist without also being an inferentialist about self-knowledge of internal promptings.

This isn’t just a theoretical possibility because it’s not true in general that knowledge of one proposition P can depend on knowledge of another proposition Q only if P is inferred from Q. Suppose you see and thereby know there is a pig in front of you. You can only know this if you have the concept of a pig, and (let’s suppose) you only have this concept if you know something about pigs, for example, that pigs are animals. Although your knowledge that there is a pig in front of you depends in this way on your background knowledge of pigs this doesn’t mean that your knowledge that there is a pig in front of you is inferred from your knowledge that pigs are animals. The role of such background knowledge is to sustain your grasp of the concept of a pig and thereby to enable you to know, by seeing, that there is a pig in front of you. In that case, why can’t knowledge of your internal promptings be ‘enabled by’, rather than ‘inferred from’, knowledge of your circumstances and current or recent mental life?

To make any progress with this we need to get clearer about the notion of inferential knowledge. One understanding of this notion is purely epistemic rather than psychological. The idea is that your knowledge that P is inferential just if your justification for believing P is inferential, and your justification is inferential as long as, as Pryor puts it, it comes in part from your having justification to believe other, supporting propositions. This is an epistemic conception of inferential knowledge and justification because it says nothing about how you arrived at your belief that P. If you also arrived at your belief that P by inferring it from other, supporting propositions then your knowledge/ justification is inferential in a psychological as well as an epistemic sense.

We can now see why interpretive access to one’s internal promptings is inferential, both epistemically and psychologically. The epistemic point is easier to see. In the porcine example your justification for believing that there is a pig in front of you doesn’t come even in part from your justification to believe pigs are animals. The two propositions just aren’t related in the right way. There might be other propositions from which your justification for believing that there is a pig in front of your derives, but the propositions that pigs are animals isn’t one of them. The role of your background belief that pigs are animals is purely enabling; what it makes available to you is the concept of a pig, not the knowledge that there is a pig in front of you. Now compare the justification Katherine has for believing that what she feels is a yearning for another child. If we imagine that her background knowledge includes the knowledge that the question whether to have another child has been on her mind recently it’s reasonable to suppose that her justification for believing that her yearning is for another child comes in part from her justification to believe that the topic of another child has been on her mind recently. This is a case in which the subject’s background knowledge is playing a supporting and not just enabling role, and Katherine’s knowledge of her feeling is inferential in the epistemic sense.

It doesn’t straightforwardly follow that her knowledge is inferential in the other sense. You could accept that Katherine’s self-knowledge is inferential in the epistemic sense while remaining silent regarding the psychological processes which result in her coming to know her own feelings or other internal promptings. But having got as far as agreeing that her self-knowledge is inferential in the epistemic sense it’s not clear why one would want to deny that it’s also inferential in the psychological sense. If we imagine Katherine making the transition from not knowing to knowing it’s natural to ask how, from a psychological standpoint, she makes this transition. This question is easy to answer if we think of her inferring (consciously or not) the nature of her feeling from how it feels, together with her background knowledge. Positing such a psychological transition isn’t strictly unavoidable but is a case of inference to the best explanation: the best explanation of Katherine’s psychological transition from not knowing to knowing is one that represents her as inferring what she feels from, among other things, her background knowledge. Again, the contrast with the pig example could hardly be clearer: you plainly don’t come to know that there is a pig in front of you by consciously or unconsciously inferring that there is a pig in front of you from your background knowledge that pigs are animals.

To sum up: once you accept that access to your internal promptings is interpretive, there is no reason to deny that it is also inferential, both epistemically and psychologically. The next question is whether this generates a problematic regress. The worry is this: if you are an inferentialist then you think that knowledge of your standing attitudes is inferred from knowledge of your internal promptings, but now it’s being claimed that the knowledge of your internal promptings is also inferential. In that case, inferentialism also needs to account for the background knowledge from which knowledge of internal promptings is inferred. Is this knowledge inferential? If it is, then where does it come from? And so on. This is just the regress that foundationalism tries to avoid, and it’s not clear how inferentialism can avoid it.

This ‘regress objection’ to inferentialism sounds threatening but isn’t. Here are a few things that can be said in response to it: to begin with, inferentialism doesn’t say that internal promptings are the only evidence from which our standing attitudes can be inferred. There is also behavioural evidence, our access to which is presumably very different from our access to internal promptings. If, as in the Festinger-Carlsmith experiment, you are doing something boring and repetitive for little financial reward, the question why you are doing it only arises for you if you know you are doing something boring and repetitive for little financial reward. If you conclude that you must be enjoying the task (otherwise you wouldn’t be doing it), one can imagine someone asking how you know you are doing something boring and repetitive. The reason this now doesn’t seem a terribly pertinent or threatening question is that we don’t normally have much difficulty with the idea that when explaining knowledge of one thing it’s legitimate to take knowledge of other things for granted. If knowledge of what you are doing is partly interpretive, and takes other knowledge for granted, that isn’t necessarily a problem. Again, it’s simply an example of the need to take some knowledge for granted in explaining other knowledge. The myth that drives the regress argument is the myth of an explanation of a particular piece of knowledge which assumes no other knowledge. Once we give up on that idea, we are then free to explain some of our standing attitudes on the basis of behavioural evidence.

Even if we just focus on self-attributions of standing attitudes on the basis of internal promptings the regress argument isn’t much of a threat. Let’s say that, as I’ve been arguing, you infer your standing attitudes from internal promptings your knowledge of which is also inferential in the sense that it derives in part from your background knowledge. Again, this is not a problem if we are prepared to take your background knowledge for granted. But what if we aren’t? What if someone insists on an account of your background knowledge? So, for example, Katherine infers that what she feels is the yearning for another child in part because she knows that this subject has been on her mind over the last few weeks, but how does she know that? It’s hard to feel threatened by this question because it has an obvious answer: she knows what has been on her mind because she can remember. It doesn’t matter if you think that memory knowledge is inferential. As long as the presupposed memory knowledge isn’t the knowledge you are trying to explain there is no problem: there is no need for anyone to try to explain all our knowledge at once.

This last observation brings us to the heart of the matter. When people worry about the regress problem they aren’t necessarily assuming that genuine explanations of knowledge can presuppose no other knowledge. Rather, their objection is to explanations of knowledge which presuppose the very knowledge they are trying to explain. Going back to Katherine, it doesn’t matter that knowledge of her internal promptings is inferred in part from background knowledge of her behaviour and circumstances but it does matter if it presupposes knowledge of her ‘current or recent mental life’ (Carruthers 2009: 3). Her current or recent mental life is presumably made up of different elements, including internal promptings. So now we have not just a regress but a vicious regress: it’s not just that inferentialism’s explanation of self-knowledge of internal promptings presupposes some other knowledge, or even that it presupposes some other self-knowledge. What it presupposes is, specifically, self-knowledge of internal promptings, and that makes the account viciously circular.

It’s also now possible to see more clearly the significance of the discussion, at the start of this chapter, of the discussion of what I called lazy inferentialism. A lazy inferentialist is someone who sees no reason why, in the course of defending the view that knowledge of our standing attitudes is inferential, he also has to account for self-knowledge of the occurrent attitudes and various other internal promptings on which self-knowledge of standing attitudes is based. I objected that lazy inferentialism’s account is incomplete but there is more than one way of taking this. If the charge is that lazy inferentialism is incomplete because its account of self-knowledge presupposes some other knowledge which it doesn’t seek to explain then it is possible to defend lazy inferentialism against this by again pointing out that explanations of knowledge can legitimately take other knowledge for granted. A much more serious charge is that lazy inferentialism is incomplete because it presupposes other self-knowledge which it doesn’t seek to explain. It is in the course of closing this gap, and trying to account for self-knowledge of internal promptings, that we run into the problem of circularity: knowledge of our standing attitudes can be inferred from knowledge of internal promptings, but in order to infer our internal promptings we need to have background knowledge which already includes knowledge of other internal promptings. How can this be legitimate?

The answer to this question is the same answer that so called ‘coherentists’ have given over the years to the regress argument: self-knowledge is holistic rather than linear, and the circularity its holism implies is genuine but not vicious. You interpret your standing attitudes in the light of justified beliefs about your feelings and emotions, you interpret your feelings and emotions in the light of further justified beliefs about your recent mental life, but your recent mental life includes standing attitudes your access to which was and is interpretive. So the picture is one in there is a kind of interpretive circle in which each element depends for its significance on other elements of the circle. The various interlocking elements are intelligible to us as a collectivity, and there is nothing wrong with this as long as the interpretive circle is wide enough. Making sense of your own mental life is like solving a complex simultaneous equation, and circularity per se isn’t a problem. What would be a problem is if in order to know that you have a particular attitude A you already need to know that you have A, or in order to know that your feeling is F you already need to know that you feel F. However, this isn’t how it is with Katherine. She doesn’t already need to know she yearns for another child in order to know that she yearns for another child. There are other things about her mental life she needs to know in order to interpret her feelings but this is a benign rather than a vicious circle.

To get a sense of what a more problematic circularity might look like we should look again the role of occurrent attitudes, as distinct from other internal promptings, as evidence for standing attitudes. The example I have used is the example of someone judging that P and inferring from this that he believes that P. On the view that you have to know your evidence this only works if you know that you judge, or are judging, that P, and the question this raises is: how do you know your own judgements? That depends on what it is to judge that P, and it is harder to know the answer to this question than one might think. Schwitzgebel gives the example of a philosophy student saying some obscure words from Kant in inner speech, with a feeling of assent, but failing to reach a judgement with the appropriate content. In this case part of the problem is that the student doesn’t fully grasp what the obscure Kantian sentence means, but the problem can arise even when there is no problem of meaning. You can think or say to yourself that P but fail to judge that P if ‘judging that P is partly defined in terms of having the right sorts of functional connections to other P-related thoughts and behaviours’ (Schwitzgebel 2011: 58). You think or say the right words in inner speech but your mental action doesn’t have the right connections for it to constitute your judging that P.

What are the ‘right connections? Back in chapter 9 I mentioned the view that to judge that P is to take P to be true, and that to take P to be true is to believe that P (cf. Boyle ‘Active Belief’). If taking P to be true is believing that P then you don’t count as judging that P unless you believe that P. If, in addition, you only know that you judge that P if you know that you believe that P then it would be viciously circular to claim that you infer that you believe that P from your knowledge that you judge that P: knowledge of the conclusion of your inference (that you believe that P) would be presupposed by your knowledge of its premise (that you judge that P).

One thing this might show is that the relationship between judging that P and believing that P isn’t evidential. Judging that P isn’t evidence that you believe that P since it constitutes believing that P. Your evidence that you believe that P must take a different form. A different line would be to question the assumption that you can’t judge that P without believing that P, or the assumption that you can’t know that you judge that P without already knowing that you believe that P. Each of these moves is an attempt to deal with a potentially vicious circularity which threatens a particular conception of the evidence for standing beliefs. The worry is that the supposed evidence (an occurrent attitude) to too closely tied to what it is supposed to be evidence for (the corresponding standing attitude). But this is not a reason for thinking that an occurrent attitude can’t ever be evidence for an independent standing attitude or that a feeling can’t be evidence for an independent feeling. The trick is not to avoid representing any psychological self-knowledge as resting on other psychological self-knowledge but to avoid representing a given piece of psychological self-knowledge as “inferred” from the very same, or too closely related, psychological self-knowledge. As Katherine demonstrates, there is no reason to think that this trick can’t be pulled off.

Hopefully, you are now persuaded that inferentialism about self-knowledge is neither incomplete nor incoherent. The inferentialism I’ve been defending so far is an inferentialism about self-knowledge of standing attitudes and internal promptings. The standing attitudes I have been discussing include ones our knowledge of which is relatively “trivial” (knowing that you believe you are wearing socks) as well as one’s our knowledge of which looks more “substantial” (knowing you want another child). However, substantial self-knowledge goes well beyond self-knowledge of a range of standing attitudes. It also includes self-knowledge of such things as our values, emotions and character. If you are already convinced that self-knowledge of deeper standing attitudes is inferential then you are unlikely to need a whole lot of convincing that other substantial self-knowledge is also inferential. Still, it’s important to understand the exact sense in which other substantial self-knowledge is inferential, and to be clear about any differences between different varieties of substantial self-knowledge. This is what the next chapter is about.