Identity and Community: Metaphysics, Politics and Aesthetics

University of Warwick, Department of Philosophy, 27-29th June 2018

INFORMATION BOOKLET

Dear Conference Attendee,

Thank you for participating at the Warwick Continental Philosophy Conference (WCPC) 2018. This is our first continental philosophy conference at Warwick and we hope that it is the start of many to come!

This information booklet contains useful information regarding transport, accommodation, conference registration, places to eat on campus, and schedule of events. In case we have missed anything, please do not hesitate to get in touch with us on WCPC@warwick.ac.uk and we will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

We have an exciting, diverse selection of paper presentations, which centre around this year's conference theme on *Identity and Community: Metaphysics, Politics and Aesthetics*. Please refer to the conference programme (p.8-9) and list of abstracts (p.10 onwards). Our panel discussion with Prof. Miguel de Beistegui, Daniele Lorenzini and Federico Testa and our conference keynote with Professor Alison Stone will take place on Thursday 28th June and Friday 29th June respectively (see Schedule of Events on p.6 for exact locations).

We would like to especially thank all of our conference contributors this year, many of whom have travelled from a great distance. A special thanks also goes to Sarah Taylor from Warwick's philosophy department, without whom this conference could not have materialised.

We hope you enjoy the conference and we look forward to meeting you in person!

Best Wishes,

Clelia Furlan
Georgios Liaskos
Filip Niklas
Ahilleas Rokni
Jaideep Shah
Alexander Underwood

WCPC Conference Committee 2017-2018

Contents

Travelling to the University of Warwick

The University of Warwick lies between the area of Coventry city and two other towns, Kenilworth and Leamington Spa. Train services run from London Euston station to Coventry train station and from London Marylebone station to Leamington Spa town. Ticket prices vary depending on the time of travel but its best to book your rail tickets in advance to get a good deal. You can book by visiting the following website: http://www.nationalrail.co.uk

From Coventry train station: you can either take a taxi or a bus to the University's central campus (you will need to get off at central campus' Bus Interchange, ask the driver if you are unsure).

A taxi rank operates outside the station. The journey will cost you approximately £8-10 and will take 10-15 mins depending on traffic.

Bus services run between coventry station and the University of Warwick. You can take either the number 11, 11U or the 12X bus from Coventry station (and back). The journey time with the 11 and 11U buses takes 20-25 mins, whereas journey time with the 12X takes 12-15 mins. A single journey costs £2.20 and an unlimited day pass costs £4.00. You can pay by either cash or contactless debit/credit card on the bus (Note: international credit/debit cards may not work on the bus as forms of payment).

From Leamington Spa train station: you can either take a taxi or a bus to the University's central campus.

No taxi rank is in operation at Leamington Spa train station but you can call a cab (01926 42 59 59) to take you to the University's central campus. The cost will be approximately £20 and the journey time will be approximately 25 minutes.

Bus services run between Leamington Spa station and the University of Warwick.
You can take the number 11 bus, which will take you to the University. The bus stop for number 11 is located on High Street. As you come out of the rail station you will find yourself on a road called Old Warwick Road. Turn left and and walk down the road; as you walk down the road you should see opposite a big building called 'Station House', if you see this then you are going the right way. Continue down this road, crossing Lower Avenue. Upon crossing Lower Avenue you will notice that Old Warwick Road has now become High Street. On the opposite side of the road you should see a convenience store called 'Wisla Delikatesy'. From here one can take the 11 or the 11U bus to Warwick University (the 11 and the 11U follow an identical route).

The bus journey goes via Leamington Spa city centre and Kenilworth town and lasts approximately 40 minutes. All bus services run to the main campus' Bus Interchange. A single journey costs (£2.40) and a day pass (£4.60). Be advised that drivers will only accept the exact cash amount and do not give change, alternatively you can pay via contactless.

University campuses and Accommodation Locations

The University of Warwick is comprised of three campuses: Westwood campus, Central or Main campus and Gibbet Hill campus. They are a short distance apart.

University Address: University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, United Kingdom

Please visit this site for an Interactive Campus map: https://campus.warwick.ac.uk/. If you are looking for a particular building or room, just type its name in the search bar and you will be shown its exact location.

You can either walk, which takes around ten minutes, or take a taxi between Westwood and Main Campus. If you decide to go by taxi, then you can pick a taxi up at the Central campus' Bus Interchange to take you to Westwood campus. The University's Bus Interchange is located right next to the Warwick Arts Centre.

Arden Accommodation is located on Westwood Campus.

The address is: Arden, Kirby Corner Road, Westwood University Campus, CV4 8AH.
Tel: +44 (0) 24 7652 3904
Email: arden@warwick.ac.uk

Buses from Coventry and Leamington Spa all stop on **Kirby Corner Road**. Arden accommodation is a four minute walk from Kirby Corner Road bus stop.

If you need a taxi to go somewhere from Arden Accommodation, then please consult the reception at Arden, who can book you a taxi. The Arden reception is open 24 hours.

In case you need a taxi service within the Coventry/Leamington Spa area, use Trinity Taxis: https://trinitytaxiscoventry.co.uk or Tel: 02476 999999.

Registration

If you have not already registered online, please do so as soon as possible by filling in the following form: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/news/conference/wcpc/registration

Once you have registered online, please come to physically register and meet with us on Wednesday 27th June between 1pm and 3pm in the Humanities Studio (Room HO76, Humanities Building). Please bring a form of I.D with you. If you are not able to make it to registration at these times, you will still be able to register at the conference drinks reception or at 9am in the morning of the first official day of the conference (Thursday 28th June) outside rooms OC1.03 and OC1.04 of the Oculus building.

Conference rooms

All the conference rooms used (see below for more details) are wheelchair accessible, i.e. they are either located on the ground floor or can be accessed via a nearby lift. They also have accessible toilets nearby. Gender neutral toilets can be found in the Social Sciences building, in the Student Union Headquarters and in the Dirty Duck pub (these last two buildings are located on the main campus piazza). If you would like to discuss accessibility details further, please don't hesitate to contact us via the relevant section on the registration form or email us at warwickcpc@hotmail.com.

For more information on possible routes to the conference see the map attached in the end of the document or visit the official interactive map online (https://campus.warwick.ac.uk/). In case you are staying at Arden accommodation, ask the reception for a printed map.

Assistance and Emergency Contact

In case you need any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact either Jaideep (07830020045) or Alex (07766228050)

In case of emergency, please dial 999 from any phone and speak either to police or ambulance services. For less urgent matters, campus security are available 24 hours a day and can be reached on 024 7652 2083, or 22083 from an internal Warwick campus phone.

Schedule of Events

Wednesday 27th June

1-3pm: Registration
Location: Humanities Studio, Rm H076 (Humanities Building)

3.30-5.30pm: Roundtable discussion with Professor Alison Stone on *Aesthetics and Popular Music*
Location: Humanities Studio, Rm H076 (Humanities Building)

5.45pm: *Meeting point to walk together: Piazza, Main Campus.*
6pm: Drinks Reception
Location: The Grad Deck, Scarman Road, CV8 2JW.

8pm: Conference Dinner (see page p.7 for further details)
Location: Xananas, 6 University Road, CV4 7EZ (In Student Union building)

Thursday 28th June

9.30am-4.30pm: Paper Presentations (see Conference Sessions Programme p.8-10)
Location: OC1.03; OC1.04; OC1.06 (Oculus Building)

4.30-6pm: Panel Discussion with Prof. Miguel de Beistegui, Dr Daniele Lorenzini and Federico Testa
Location: OC.02 (Oculus Building)

Friday 29th June

9.30-4.30pm: Paper Presentations (see Conference Sessions Programme p.8-10)
Location: OC1.03; OC1.04; OC1.06 (Oculus Building)

4.30-6pm : Keynote by Professor Alison Stone on 'Hegel and Colonialism'
Location: L4 (Chemistry Building)

Conference End

Reception

There will be a drinks reception held at the Grad Deck on Wednesday 27th June from 6pm.
The Grad Deck can be found on Scarman Road:
https://www.google.co.uk/maps/place/The+Grad+Deck/@52.3812885,-1.5681206,15z/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x0:0xc6bcac9d99b4c859?hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj6goHO8qrbAhUEzqQKHc-HARkQ_BIIhwEwDw

At the reception we will have both red and white wine, as well as a selection of non-alcoholic drinks. Some of us will meet in the Piazza on Main Campus at 5:45pm to make our way to the Grad Deck, so please feel free to meet us there and we can then all walk together.

Conference Lunches and Dinner

On both the 28th and the 29th of June lunch will be provided during the conference, taking into account specified dietary requirements.

On the 27th, after the reception, we have booked a formal dinner for all attendees of the conference at Xananas. The dinner has been booked for 8pm. Xananas (pronounced 'shananas') can be found inside the Student Union building. If you walk past Rootes Grocery Store you will come to a glass door entrance. If you go through the glass doors, and then take the first flight of stairs you will find Xananas to your left.

Xananas offers a diverse range of meals that cater to vegetarian and vegan requirements. Nearer to the date of the conference we will circulate a menu to all participants where you will have the opportunity to choose what you would like to eat on the night of the dinner. The cost of dinner will be £12 for two courses of your choosing. We will circulate the menu to all confirmed attendees nearer to the date of the conference.

Places to eat on campus

There are a number of other eating establishments on campus that you might visit whilst at the conference. Bar Fusion boasts a pan-Asian cuisine and can be found on the first floor of the Rootes building (not to be confused with Rootes Grocery store). The Dirty Duck is the university pub and offers a selection of well priced drinks and traditional pub food. The Dirty Duck is just around the corner from the Student Union Building; instead of going through the glass doors you continue to walk around the building and you will see a flight of stairs in front of you leading up to a terraced area with wooden benches, there you will find The Dirty Duck. Xananas, Bar Fusion and the Dirty Duck are all located around the Piazza, the main square of central campus; but if you don't mind walking ten minutes you could also try Bar Varsity. Unlike the previous three options it is not a student run establishment, but it nevertheless has a good selection of drinks and a wider selection of food than one might find at The Dirty Duck, for example. All of the mentioned eating establishments have vegetarian and vegan options.

.

There are also two coffee shops on the Piazza. The student run one is called 'Curiositea' and opposite it lies Costa Coffee. There is a also supermarket on campus called Rootes Grocery Store. Here you will be able to find all basic amenities. The address for it is: University of Warwick, Rootes Grocery Store University of Warwick Gibbett Hill Road, Coventry CV4 7EQ.

Conference Sessions Thursday 28th June

Parallel Sessions OC1.04	Parallel Sessions OC1.06
1A - 09.30-11.30	**1B - 09.30-11.30**
Identity, Subjectification and Freedom in Foucault's works **- Dr Karsten Schubert**	***Toward a Dialectic of Identity: Negative and positive identity in Adorno's thought*** **- Prof. Eric Oberle**
Every organism is a melody which sings itself': Merleau-Ponty, Performance, and The Missing Chapter on Labor in the Phenomenology of Perception **- Zoe Belinsky**	***The Subject of the Fragmented World*** **– Ashley Fleshman**
The Identity and Intersubjectivity of creative perception: Merleau-Ponty and the painting body **- Adam Blair**	***The Photographic Portrait as evidence for the construction, recognition and evolution of identity throughout history to contemporary society today*** **- Aayushi Gupta**
Coffee Break	
2A – 12.00-13.20	**2B – 12.00 – 13.20**
The Theory of the Bloom **– Prof. Rémi Astruc**	***Identity and Anonymity, Eccentricity and Elasticity*** **- Martin Benson**
Le souvèlement de la jeuenesse – the Uprising of the Youth **- Joel White**	***Cavarero, Kant and the Relational Self*** **- Dr Christine Battersby**
Lunch 13.20-14.30	
3A – 14.30-15.50	**3B – 14.30-15.50**
Neo-Colonial Shifts: Understanding Fanon's Critique of Hegel Through Foucault and Mills **- Kaiah Eaton**	***Gemeinschaft, Communauté and community between compassion and tribalism*** **– Prof. Niall Bond**
The Nativity of Politics: Hannah Arendt on Natality, Narrativity, and the Question Concerning Totalitarianism **- Lee Wilson**	***Identity or Difference? Ontology and the Deconstruction of Race and Gender*** **- Dr Stephen Seely**
Coffee Break	
Keynote: 1630 – 18.00, Rm OC.04 (Oculus Building) **Roundtable Discussion with Prof. Miguel de Beistegui, Dr Daniele Lorenzini and Federico Testa**	

Conference Sessions Friday 29th June

Parallel Sessions OC1.04	Parallel Sessions: OC1.06
4A - 09.30-11.30	**4B: 09.30-11.30**
***What does a 'right to belong' look like?* – Yussef Al-Tamimi**	***Identity as mnemonic dialectic* – Maximilian Gregor Hepach**
***Democracy and Instability* - Daniel Cole jr.**	***Advent of Spirit: Hegel, Soul and Identity* – Filip Niklas**
***Art, Immigration, Community: the mutations of the question of identity in France* – Abderrahmane El Yousfi**	***The idea of community in the political readings of the Critique of Judgment: Arendt, Lyotard, and Cavell* – Andrea Di Gesu**
Coffee Break	
5A - 11.45-13.05	**5B - 11.45-13.05**
***Sacrifice, Identity and History in Walter Benjamin's Capitalism as Religion* - Daniel Pepe**	***Common sense as philosophical "misadventure" in Deleuze and Flaubert* - Josh Carswell**
***The Common and the Universal: The Commonality of Wounding according to Georges Bataille* – Behrang Pourhosseini**	***Between Identity and Difference: Deleuze, Rancière and the Meaning of Political Change* – Keren Shahar**
Lunch 13.05-14.00	
6A - 14.00-16.00	**6B – 14.00-16.00**
***Positionality as the Ontology of Identity and Community: Alcoff's Conception of Selfhood* – Dr Jo-Jo Koo**	***Re-imagining Acéphale: critical intersections with Jean-Luc Nancy* - Joe Fletcher**
***For the Love of the Living Individual: Michel Henry's Re-evaluation of the Political World* – Max Schaefer**	***Dwelling Aesthetically* - Evgenia Chrysochoou**
***The Philosopher's Craft: A Global Perspective on Martin Heidegger's Phenomenology*- Firat M. Haciahmetoglu**	***Human as ζoον λογον εχων and in-der-Welt-sein: Seeking gathering, the one always in relation* - Elena Bartolini**
Coffee Break	
Keynote Presentation: 16.30 - 18.00, Rm L4 (Chemistry Building) Prof. Alison Stone	

ABSTRACTS

Roundtable with Prof. Alison Stone

Wednesday 27th June, 3.30pm, Humanities Studio

Aesthetics and Popular Music

In this talk, based on a chapter of my book *The Value of Popular Music*, I explore how hierarchies of value from the history of aesthetic thought have impacted on popular music. I very briefly introduce these hierarchies, which rank art above craft and entertainment and aesthetic pleasures above pleasures that are purely sensuous and bodily. I then trace how aesthetic hierarchies have reappeared in popular music as its practitioners have sought to avoid confinement on the wrong side of the art/entertainment divide, specifically looking at rock's emergence out of rock-'n'-roll, with rock claiming greater aesthetic merit. Thus, there is a systematic pattern for the art/pop hierarchy to reappear within popular music as the hierarchy of rock over pop. Rock has repeatedly claimed greater authenticity, autonomy, seriousness, and integrity than music at the 'pop' end of the spectrum. Similar divisions run right across the popular music field: Stax *versus* Motown; funk *versus* disco; genuine rap *versus* mere 'pop-rap' or 'bubblegum rap'. But the terms in which these divisions are made—authenticity and innovation *versus* commerce and banality—find their defining statement in the rock/pop opposition.

Keynote Address by Prof. Alison Stone

Friday 29th June, 4.30pm, Rm L4 (Chemistry Building)

Hegel and Colonialism

This talk explores the implications of Hegel's Philosophy of World History as to colonialism. For Hegel, freedom can be recognized and practised only in classical, Christian and modern Europe; therefore, the world's other peoples can acquire freedom only if Europeans impose their civilization upon them. Although this imposition denies freedom to colonized peoples, this denial is legitimate for Hegel because it is the sole condition on which these peoples can gain freedom in the longer term. I then consider whether Hegel's basic account of freedom can be extricated from his Eurocentric and pro-colonialist interpretation of the course of history. I argue that matters are more complicated because that interpretation has significant connections with Hegel's fundamental conception of freedom as self-determination.

Roundtable discussion with Prof. Miguel de Beistegui, Dr Daniele Lorenzini, and Federico Testa

Thursday 28th June, 4.30pm, Rm OC.02 (Oculus Building)

The Government of Desire: A Genealogy of the Liberal Subject

Liberalism, Miguel de Beistegui argues in *The Government of Desire*, is best described as a technique of government directed towards the self, and desire as its central mechanism. Whether as economic interest, sexual drive, or the basic longing for recognition, desire is accepted as a core component of our modern self-identities, and something we ought to cultivate. But this has not been true in all times and all places. For centuries, as far back as late antiquity and early Christianity, philosophers believed that desire was an impulse that needed to be suppressed in order for the good life, whether personal or collective, ethical or political, to flourish. Though we now take it for granted, desire as a constitutive dimension of human nature and a positive force required a radical transformation, which coincided with the emergence of liberalism.

By critically exploring Foucault's claim that Western civilization is a civilization of desire, de Beistegui crafts a provocative and original genealogy of this shift in thinking. He shows how the relationship between identity, desire, and government has been harnessed and transformed in the modern world, shaping our relations with others and ourselves, and establishing desire as an essential driving force for the constitution of a new and better social order. But is it? *The Government of Desire* argues that this is precisely what a contemporary politics of resistance must seek to overcome: by questioning the supposed universality of a politics based on recognition and the economic satisfaction of desire, de Beistegui raises the crucial question of how we can manage to be less governed today, and explores contemporary forms of counter-conduct. Drawing on a host of thinkers from philosophy, political theory, and psychoanalysis, and concluding with a call for a sovereign and anarchic form of desire, *The Government of Desire* is a groundbreaking account of our freedom and unfreedom, of what makes us both governed and ungovernable.

Identity, Subjectivation and Freedom in Foucault's Works

Dr Karsten Schubert (Bremen)

The problem of freedom in the works of Foucault consists in an interpretation of his concept of power as subjecting individuals so thoroughly by imposing an identity on them, that it renders freedom impossible. It was coined regarding Foucault's early, „archeological" works, with the provocative conclusion about the „death of the subject" at the end of *The Order of Things*, and his „genealogical" works, with the famous talk about the soul as the body's prison in *Discipline and Punish*. The problem of freedom was articulated by particular readers of Foucault: Social philosophers, who read Foucault as one of them and who criticized him, consequentially, to be a bad social philosopher due to his incoherent concept of power and freedom. The most prominent authors who criticized Foucault were Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth,Nancy Fraser, and Charles Taylor, among others.

Other authors, who are both interested in the social philosophical problems raised by the critics, and who are convinced that Foucault makes indeed a valuable contribution the social philosophical discussion about freedom, defended Foucault. While there are several systematically different approaches to defend Foucault in the existing literature, which I reconstruct and criticize in my book *Freiheit als Kritik* (Schubert 2018, Berlin: transcript), one feature prevalent in most approaches is to refer to the late text *Subject and Power*. This text is one of the few texts where Foucault writes in an explicitly social philosophical idiom, in difference to his normal method and style, the genealogical analysis. Foucault writes in this text quite clearly that freedom is a presupposition of power. The defenders of Foucault take this position as a solution to the problem of freedom. I call this interpretation the standard view, as it is commonly held among social philosophical Foucault interpreters nowadays. My thesis is that it is wrong, as it does not solve the right problem of freedom — because indeed there are two different kinds of problems. In order to solve the right problem of freedom, it is necessary to take into account the subjectivating effects of political institutions and thereby interpret Foucault not as an anarchist, but as a political theorist. The outcome of such an institutionalist interpretation of Foucault is that it is more suitable than the standard interpretation to give a coherent account of the concept of freedom which is at stake in Foucault's theory of subjectification: Freedom as the capability to critically reflect one's own identity and subjectification, or in short: Freedom as Critique.

In what the paper, I first present the standard view, which solves only one problem — the wrong one —, but not the other. Second, I elaborate on the right problem and explore what would be needed to solve it: an account of freedom as critique. Third, I explain that the standard view only explains freedom to act differently, but not freedom as critique, because it conflates the two concepts and takes an account of freedom to act differently as an account of freedom as critique. In the fourth section, I will differentiate a more institutionalist reading of Foucault which solves the right problem, as it is not based on Foucault's normative distinction of power and domination, as the standard view. I will conclude, fifth, by explaining how the institutionalist reading is in a tension, but not contradiction, to Foucault's own method of genealogical critique.

On Faucauldian Metacritique

Sabina Vaccarino Bremner (Columbia)

In contemporary critical theory, increasing attention has been paid to the problem of how best to understand Foucault's distinctive contribution to the question of how to undertake social critique. A burgeoning line of research aims at how to construe genealogy as a mode of critique (Saar 2007, Srinivasan forthcoming, Koopman 2012), as well as how to understand Foucault's conception of critique more broadly (Butler 2001). In both cases, interpreters have limited themselves to texts dating from the 1970s and 1980s, the final period of Foucault's life. In so doing, they have reinforced the widespread view among commentators of the fragmentary (even internally inconsistent) nature of Foucault's life oeuvre (Dews 1989, Han 1998). Yet what has so far remained unrecognized for this line of commentary is that in little-known archival materials, only recently available even in France, Foucault devotes extended attention to the issue of critique. In his 1952-1953 lecture course at Lille entitled 'Knowledge of Man and Transcendental Reflection', Foucault develops a genealogy of the notion of critique in the history of philosophy that predates his 1978 lecture "What Is Critique?" by 25 years, establishing an underlying continuity in his life's work that has so far remained unappreciated.

In this paper, I advance the first scholarly appraisal of these early materials, recovering a conception of critique that I believe can inform contemporary debates on Foucault's legacy in critical theory. In the Lille lectures, Foucault argues that critique, as he traces it back to Kant, merges divergent moral-political and philosophical strands. On the one hand, "Kant takes himself to be an *Aufklärer* [an agent of the Enlightenment]", and therefore Kant's critique takes on a distinct political dimension (1953: 75). On the other, the foundation of his critique into the "a priori conditions of knowledge" is an "interrogation of man" (1953: 75), a point anticipating Foucault's line of argument in *The Order of Things* (1966). Thus, 'critique' takes on a new meaning from Kant onward, becoming *both* newly anthropological *and* newly politicized: "Henceforth, for the 19th century, a task opens up which is the philosophical means of access to Marxism: bringing critique to completion in a critique of man insofar as man constitutes the foundation of critique" (1953: 76). Throughout the lectures, Foucault situates his reading of critique historically, contextualizing it by way of Descartes' and Galileo's respective understandings of the relation between man and world, and tracing its legacy through readings of Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, and Nietzsche.

I argue that Foucault's own stance on the history of critique is fundamentally ambivalent, a point that I feel has been insufficiently appreciated in the literature. To comprehend this point, it's helpful to keep in mind that some scholars of the period have characterized the history of the reception of Kant's Critique as not merely *critical,* but '*metacritical*'—that is, Kant's successors adopted the critical framework of the Critique towards the end of calling the Critique itself into question. Resituating Foucault as a 'metacritic' allows us to see that, for him, this philosophical tradition encompasses both negative and positive aspects, while nevertheless situating Foucault himself squarely within this tradition. That is, on the one hand, Foucault rejects the appeal to an 'interrogation of man'; thus, as commentators on *The Order of Things* have acknowledged (Gutting 1989, Han 1998), he rejects its *anthropological* dimension. Yet, even in this early phase of his career, Foucault recovers a positive contribution from this tradition that he feels constitutes its enduring legacy. The 'anthropologies' that, for Foucault, make up a crucial component of the 19th century conception of critique *also* involve emergent reflection on 'pragmatic' subjectivity: a historically and socially embedded conception of the self that reframes transcendental practical reason in terms of

a reflexive process of 'self-making' (one arguably prefiguring Foucault's own later elaboration of 'techniques of the self'). Indeed, the 'pragmatic', relegated to the margins of Kant's critical system, becomes increasingly central: one can posit that, for figures such as Hegel and Marx, the pragmatic subject almost completely eclipses Kant's transcendental, ahistorical moral and theoretical reasoner. Thus, Foucault situates himself in the same critical tradition as Hegel and Marx while nevertheless criticizing the fact that they help themselves to a fixed conception of essential human nature.

Making the distinction between the 'anthropological' and the 'pragmatic', I argue, continues to be of relevance. The former corresponds to the notion of a fixed human essence, while the latter refers to a thoroughly socially constituted, historically situated conception of selfhood. There is, therefore, nothing internally inconsistent about Foucault's rejection of the former in favor of the latter; the repeated insistence among commentators to the contrary derives from a failure to acknowledge that Foucault *does* draw a nuanced, fine-grained distinction between the two. Moreover, in lieu of a convincing alternative, contemporary 'diagnoses of the present' continue to rely on universalizing premises regarding human nature (see, e.g., Honneth 1992). Foucault's early lectures rejecting the anthropological undergirding of such modes of critique opens up a new possible 'critical' approach, one secured by reinterrogating which sense of critique is most fruitfully appropriated from this tradition.

Toward a Dialectic of Identity: Negative and positive identity in Adorno's thought

Prof. Eric Oberle

In 1958, Theodor Adorno articulated a new critique of Hegel's infamous assertion that the "rational is the real and the real is the rational." Philosophy, Adorno argued, participated in Hegel's delusion if it thought of its work as that of discovering "the identity of subject and object in the whole" or of clarifying the "immediacy of intentionality"—when in fact the "non-identity in the particular is what inspires all interest in philosophy."

This talk explores Adorno's critique of logical identity and his concept of Nichtidentität (non-identity) by showing its common historical origin with the quotidian use of the concept of personal, subjective identity as we use it today. Adorno's post-war philosophical critique of German idealism and the identity concept is, I argue, only legible through analysis of the war-time sociological analysis of anti-Semitism, racism, and fascism carried out by Adorno and others in the Frankfurt School. My paper discusses how Erich Fromm first articulated the modern, social concept of subjective "identity" in his 1941 Escape from Freedom as a reaction to Nazism's manipulation of anti-Semitism. Looking to the "whole" culture of the Renaissance, Fromm believed that individuals needed strong "identities" to resist fascism. It was in response to this notion of strong subjectivity as personal "identity" that Adorno's philosophy and sociology both took a pivotal, negative turn. Adorno became interested in how the illiberal structure of "victim-blaming" projected a negative identity upon others while promoting a mythology of self-creation. At the same time, he began to explore how core myths of philosophy—the idea of the strong subject, of pure presence, of irreducible certainty—undermined Kantian notions of autonomy and experience upon which truth claims were articulated. Adorno would come to believe that the negative side of identity not only preceded all forms of identity but in fact gave rise to both the desire for and the impossibility of identity. Prior to

being or identity, there was the wound: injury, alterity, and limitation, and this vulnerability formed the basis not just of the desire to know the world, but for the articulation of the idea of self as something permanent, transcendent, and autonomous. This idea entered into Adorno's critique of existentialism's celebration of Dasein, but it also funded an analysis of the limits of human autonomy within neoliberalism. At once a critique and an extension of Hegel, Adorno's concept of Nichtidentität demonstrated the importance of recovering a dialectic within the idea of identity, and it points to the need for a concept of negative identity to counter the projective and falsifying languages of positive identity while recovering the emancipatory truth also inherent in their assertion.

Every organism is a melody which sings itself': Merleau-Ponty, Performance, and The Missing Chapter on Labor in the Phenomenology of Perception

Zoe Belinsky (Villanova)

Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological account of the body in the Phenome*nology of Perception* is well known; however, I claim that in this seminal work a central motif is lacking, namely that of labor in the Marxian sense as sensuous, practical necessity. I define labor as such because of its proto-phenomenological roots in Marx's early works, and I claim that such roots are largely ignored by Merleau-Ponty. When Merleau-Ponty *does* discuss labor, he does so in terms of concrete labor*ers* and the problems of class consciousness. The scattered references to labor in the *Phenomenology of Perception* center around the existential possibilities concerning the capacity of humans to take up their world and make it an object of political practice; however, the labor relation is never interrogated as such. In this essay, I consider the phenomenological grounds for labor on three accounts: (1) from the perspective of the human organism *qua* organism, a totality of relations involved in the world that includes the capacity for performance and labor, or the capacity to project such relations beyond themselves; (2) from a phenomenological account of *making* as the creative grounds of labor's transformative possibilities; and finally, (3) from the perspective of pain as labor's phenomenological twin. The phenomenological account of pain by Elaine Scarry in *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* entails an account of labor that is not founded on the "I can" as a counterweight to the Cartesian "I think," but instead stems from the experience of the "I can't," the incapacity of the organism to transform the world by means of the imaginary alone. The imaginary must ally itself to pain in order to transform pain into *work* , the means by which the "I can" finally is revealed. Thus, Merleau-Ponty's founding gesture of the "I can" is revealed to be the posterior epiphenomenal result of a prior and a-foundational "I can't", the phenomenological *in*capacity of the organism that sets the labor process in motion. Labor constitutes a phenomenological commons. In it, humans *qua* organisms transcend their particular boundaries and are incorporated into a higher level of *organi*zation, in which the particularities of their phenomenological horizons are negated and organized into a higher laboring organism. Labor must be understood as the process of fashioning tools, habits, institutions, and resources of culture that will in turn support the laborer in her capacity to transform pain into its opposite, or liberation from pain. Labor is thus immediately social and shared. Étienne Balibar describes such a species-character of human existence as *transindividuation*, or the claim that the particular organism can be individuated only in the context of other organisms that belong to the transformative horizons of the collective being of culture. The tools and institutions of culture become the means of mapping

a transforming world, a self-modifying process of absorbing and transforming culture in order to support the alleviation of pain that lies at the foundation of perception. The whole of human experience is contained in the pole from the foundationless experience of pain and incapacity to the capacity to transform the world and give oneself the foundation that pain shatters. Pain and labor thus constitute a *phenomenological commons*, the general horizon of suffering organisms as they attempt to transform the world. The dissolution of such commons under the capitalist labor relation is what Marx consistently describes as "alienation" or "self-estrangement"; it is in claiming these phenomenological commons that revolutionary possibilities lie.

The Identity and Intersubjectivity of Creative Perception: Merleau-Ponty and the Painting Body

Adam Blair (Stony Brook)

In "Eye & Mind," Maurice Merleau-Ponty uncovers the body's immediate openness to its world, analyzing the senses' immediate interweaving through painting. That is, rather than ascribing to a Cartesian model of artistic activity explained through modes of mediation and conceptualization, Merleau-Ponty develops his notion of "flesh" to understand how a body itself can be open to a creative expression of its world. This paper supports such a description, but shows that we miss a crucial region of human experience if we focus only on bare bodily sensation, such as vision and motricity, as Merleau-Ponty does. To push beyond his claims, I consider the place of identity and personal history within immediate experience, using insights from "Cézanne's Doubt" and *Phenomenology of Perception* to complicate the picture of the act of painting presented in "Eye & Mind." Ultimately, I argue that just as vision and motricity open onto the world and each other without mediation or imposition from the outside, so, too, does one's own sense of identity and intersubjectivity. "Eye & Mind" shows how vision and motricity are "dimensions" of my world which I gear into one another in the act of painting, and I intend to show that my identity and intersubjective relations are just as bound up within the perceptive expression of my body. Just as I do not wield vision as a tool, I do not engage my own identity or intersubjectivity through a labor of thought. Rather, my world is always already colored by the style of my relation to myself, to others, and to the world.

Subject of the Fragmented World: On the Destruction of Memory and the Critique of Second Nature in Kracauer's Mass Ornament

Ashley Fleshman (DePaul)

Photography occupies a singular place in the self-understanding of modernity as the aesthetic form proper to the fragmentation of ethical subjects from a felt unity [*Heimatlichkeit*] with the social and political institutions of ethical life. In his 1927 essay, "Photography," Siegfried Kracauer provides a prescient exposition of both the dangers and the critical potential of photography with respect to the modern subject, severed from the sense of an ethical community. Kracauer recognizes that the profusion of photographic images threatens to destroy both historical and personal memory by interrupting the associative perception which allows for the emergence of significant relations

beyond the incessant stream of fashion and the barrage of news. The total ensemble of images provides endless documentation of the spatial continuum of our world, reduced to the reified present of the ever new. The dialectic of nature and history is arrested in the appearance of the social order as the immutable, given present in the photographic continuum to which each individual is subjected, isolated and alone. The camera, however, also opens a critical space beyond the second nature of immutability by making the invisibly self-evident seem strange through its non-human perspective. For even if modern subjects are more tightly integrated into the institutions of capitalist modernity than those prior, it is not as subjects with a reflectively critical perspective upon objective social institutions, but rather as those merely subject to them. The problem of second nature for Kracauer and his associates in the Frankfurt School, therefore, appears as the capture of contingent, social and historical conditions of unfreedom and disassociation in both an appearance and reality of fatedness. The heap of photographs collected into an archive can appear in unusual combinations which draw out the fallacy of this fatedness and allow for the possibility of the historical memory they otherwise block in the thought that things could be otherwise. This paper will thus explore the viability of Kracauer's assessment of the dual nature of photography in our contemporary era of its ubiquitous use. Kracauer already had the sense that photography was intimately tied to the reification of the modern world into second nature and the subject fragmented from a meaningful relationship to it. This paper will seek to understand whether photography still maintains the capacity to render our world strange, thus breaking the spell of second nature which captivates isolated individuals in the immutable present, or if the critique of second nature which opens the horizon of a transformative historical memory must be sought in another technological or aesthetic form proper to our contemporary experience.

The Photographic Portrait as evidence for the construction, recognition and evolution of identity throughout history to contemporary society today

Aayushi Gupta (Edinburgh)

Roland Barthes has described the photograph as "the advent of the self as other: a cunning disassociation of consciousness from identity." Any portrait is assumed to inform the self-consciousness of a disinterested viewing subject, but when one confronts a photographic portrait of the self, the medium of photography re-defines that self as the other. Throughout the history of photography, from the east to the west, the photographic portrait has been used as more than a memoir, but as a relic for defining social and personal identities. This talk will compare portraiture in pre-modern, modern and post-modern eras, from the east to the west, to trace how the photographic portrait can act as empirical evidence to the shifts in social and personal identities of individuals. Examples of photographic portraits sourced from South-Asian and East-Asian archives, portraiture in Victorian and French photography, ethnographic photography, etc. along with examples of work from contemporary photographers exploring the various themes of identity politics, will clearly demonstrate the interdependency of photography and identity, and how shifts or developments in both have been affected by the other. Portraits of the nineteenth century show men and women elegantly dressed waiting to be captured in a photograph that they would then display, as proofs for the construction of a conventionally accepted social identity. But portraiture in contemporary photography aims to accept the expanding nature of identity politics, whereby photographers have explored themes of sexual, gender, race, ethnic, and body image identities. This

talk aims to explore the power of the Photographic Portrait in making people reflect on the dual nature of their own identities, and the nature of those identities when juxtaposed in relation to the other.

The Theory of the Bloom

Prof. Rémi Astruc (Paris-Seine University, UCP)

I would like to propose something for the conference on the Theory of the Bloom, a book by a collective called *Tiqqun*, probably constituted by future members of the Invisible Committee. This essay (2001) is a brilliant take on the question of the contemporary Subject or non-subject (they don't speak of the 'individual' but of the "dividual"). I could present the main thesis of the book : the disappearing of a real person under the reign of biopolitics in the Spectacle society. This non-subject they call a Bloom, (after Joyce). I will discuss their assumption of a coming community of Blooms through inevitable terrorist violence and insurrectional action. As it is also written in a post-situationist prose that makes it really worth reading, bold and often funny, full of mixed philosophical and literary references (Nietzsche, Walser, Kafka, Michaux...), I would also like to examine this aspect to understand what they choose to inherit from these figures and the link that appears between aesthetics and their thoughts about individualism and reformed communism.

Le souvèlement de la jeuenesse – the Uprising of the Youth

Joel White (KCL)

In light of both recent and historical political uprisings in France (for example, the current convergence between the student anti-selection movement and the public sector strikes, the 2016 movement against the Labour law reforms, and the events of May ‘68) this paper will discuss the politico-philosophical identity of the revolutionary youth in its relation to the philosophical and scientific paradigm of energy.
This paper takes its point of departure from Isidore Isou’s 1949 book of political-economic philosophy, *Treaty on Nuclear Economy: the Uprising of the Youth* as well as Antonin Artaud’s 1936/1971 *Revolutionary Messages* (texts which conceive of an “energetic” historical-materialism, or, as I have come to term it, a transcendental historical-energism/ historical-actualism). The central argument of this paper is that in order to avoid either the reification or abstraction of matter, matter must be thought of from the standpoint of its equivalence with energy. The term energy, here, sublates both the philosophical and modal category of actuality (*energeia*) and the thermodynamic or entropic concept of energy.

Once Forms, ideas, categories, concepts, classes and identities are understood energetically then it is possible to argue that these *genera* arise and form as meta-stabilised energetic points that develop as a result of economic, cultural and social relations. When Form is stabilised by energetic reproductions, then it becomes possible to negatively deform Form by increasing the entropy of any particular reproductive system (strikes, sabotage, blockades, and attacks on symbolic points of

power). It likewise positively attributes and binds the concept of a revolutionary force to an expression of the energetic relations that grows it (revolutionary political parties, trade unions, radical street movements, cadres, and autonomist movements).

To take the object of this paper – the revolutionary potential of the *youth* – this category develops and maintains itself by energetically sustaining the idea that the youth is a collective point/identity of available revolutionary energy. This positive growth must counter-act the maintenance of the reactive concept of a youth that is dependent and grateful to the systems that gave it life (the family, the school, the state). It is not surprising that the capitalist mode of production would attack a revolutionary concept of the youth, given the fact that, at present, it relies of the reproduction of children to sustain its own continuation. It is, therefore, all the more necessary to undermine such as a reactionary concept of the youth and to grow its potential as a revolutionary force.

Identity and Anonymity, Eccentricity and Elasticity: Cross-reading Bergson's Le rire with Chaplin's The Gold Rush

Martin Benson (Stony Brook)

Charlie Chaplin's *The Gold Rush* (1925) opens with images of the anonymous masses of prospectors, followed by the singular appearance of The Tramp. Bergson, according to his account in *Le rire* (1905), would emphasize that what's comic about this juxtaposition is the absentmindedness of Chaplin's character compared with the toils of the masses. Bergson's notion of "the comic" (*le comique*) says that we laugh at automatism in behavior, and that laughter has the social function of making this automatism more elastic and adaptable. When a fixed character is made elastic it fits a larger variety of social contexts. This is a form of anonymity that differs from that of the masses: a person with a highly elastic identity will be equally unrecognizable in various social contexts. The comic in Bergson's sense thus encloses an aesthetic process of socialization that goes from the eccentric or automatic in character, toward the elastic and social via the function of "intimidation by humiliation" (*d'intimider en humiliant*, p. 201). However, there are unspoken tensions in Bergson's account. First, between the 'eccentric' and the 'automatism,' because what's far away from the social norm does not seem to proceed automatically from a given identity. Second, and for the same reason, there is also a tension between 'elasticity of identity' and 'adaptation to the social norm.' When these tensions are spelled out and made explicit, the conclusion of Bergson's own account can be less somber, so that analyzing why Chaplin is funny does not necessarily leave us with the "scanty substance and bitter after-taste" that Bergson thinks that philosophical investigations of humor yield (*une petite quantité de matière, une certaine dose d'amertume*, p. 203). We thus see the importance of identity for Bergson's account of the comic: the latter's function is to find a mean between an exaggerated and unaware resemblance to the group on the one hand, and on the other hand an eccentric identity that is very distant from the group. The comic thus creates an elasticity that is precisely the connection between the center and the periphery. With this elasticity, identity can become a form of anonymity.

Cavavero, Kant and the Relational Self

Dr Christine Battersby (Warwick)

In this paper I consider Adriana Cavarero's critique of Kant in her most recent and extremely important book, *Inclinations: A Critique of Rectitude* (2016). Cavarero is highly critical of Kant for privileging a self that positions itself as solitary, as upright and always in the control of the head and of reason, and for developing an "autarchic and egoistic model" of "postural ethics". As such, she places him in opposition to her own relational ontology, and her own alternative ethics and politics which emphasise interpersonal relationships, vulnerability, and modes of inclination and subjectivity linked to maternity.

In *Inclinations*, it is the maternal that takes centre stage, and Cavarero shows how Kant, along with many other writers, fails to register the ontological and ethical imbalances that result from the fact that a human foetus is dependent for its growth on a mother, and that infancy is also a state of dependence on an adult—and usually female—carer. Neglecting ontological dependencies and power inequalities, philosophers and political theorists over-privilege fully autonomous, and ideally equal and adult selves. Cavarero provides a pithy critique of such cultural bias, and seeks to counterbalance it by stressing the visual, metaphoric and philosophical importance of being off-balance, with one self inclining towards another. As such, Cavarero is seeking to provide an alternative imaginary not only to an ontological schematism that has a dominant and solitary "I", but also to any ethics or politics that is erected on such a basis.

Much of Cavarero's critique of Kant is well-founded, but I will add into the picture Kant's privilege of friendship and his stress on "unsocial sociability" as grounding human civilisation. If we follow Kant into the labyrinths of his moral philosophy and also look more closely at his private life, we end up not with an isolated self and reason, but with an intimate circle of friends, who care for each other, mostly in male friendship circles, but also within the domestic and family sphere. I will argue that, in our own dangerous times, there are merits to Kant's ideal of relations modelled on friendship, rather than dependencies linked to maternity and vulnerability. As such, I will be suggesting that Cavarero's ontology with its emphasis on asymmetrical relationality needs a further swerve, to include arcs of dependence that are appropriate to friendship between adult individuals, states and other social groupings.

Neo-Colonial Shifts: Understanding Fanon's Critique of Hegel Through Foucault and Mills

Kaiah Eaton (Concordia)

In the West, race relations stem from the founding relation of master (colonizer) and slave (colonized). When the institution of slavery was abolished the oppression of Black subjects did not dissipate. Rather, this relation was re-inscribed, re-appropriated, and transformed into different practices within the larger social framework. My larger research project works to combat colonialism and white supremacy through critical pedagogy. I aim to amplify historically marginalized voices and analyze how Western philosophical discourses both participate in and preserve, the structural violence of white supremacy. For this paper, I will give a Foucauldian reading

of key excerpts from Frantz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks (BSWM)*, to analyze and discuss domination and the impossibility of a universal humanism within colonial contexts. Reading Fanon through Foucault lends itself to an extension of Fanon's critique of Hegel's discriminatory, Euro-centric ontology to work through its implications for Western thought and Western subjects. Foucault's concepts will assist in mapping structural similarities and differences to account for the political situatedness of particular groups. I will contend that race relations framed as identity politics in the United States do not significantly differ from those in France (or other western colonial powers) in the way Fanon seems to suggest in *BSWM*. The political realities of Black subjects post-emancipation have not changed, but have simply moved from "one way of life to another but not from one life to another" (195). Finally, I will turn to Charles W. Mills' work on "white epistemologies of ignorance" and "white normativity" to further describe the parallel mechanisms of structural racism at work both in Hegel and contemporary Western society. Given the socio-historical conditions shaping all thought, as philosophers we have a responsibility to question the intellectual traditions we inherit. By presenting the philosophies of Western thinkers like Hegel within critical contexts, we diversify our perspectives in ways that enable us to inhabit and learn from traditionally marginalized knowledges. This is fundamental to the realization of a radical humanism and plurality proper to truth.

The Nativity of Politics: Hannah Arendt on Natality, Narrativity, and the Question Concerning Totalitarianism

Lee Wilson (Edinburgh)

Arendt's division between the private/social and public/political is often denigrated as being premised on a problematic division between biological life and political life, which leaves the latter materially empty. This problem, rooted in Arendt's notion of natality as involving 'two births', has been subject to much scrutiny in recent years. Some have argued that natality should be understood as an anti-Heideggerian notion of theological biopolitics (e.g. Miguel Vatter), whereas others think that Arendt should instead turn to Heidegger's ontological understanding of natality to resolve the tension (e.g. Peg Birmingham). Against these positions, this paper compares Arendt's conceptualisation of natality within her rehabilitation of *praxis* as a mode of anti-totalitarian disclosure with Heidegger's rehabilitation of *poiēsis* as a mode of anti-technological disclosure. It will be observed that only the former mode is sufficient for a political dimension which resists totalitarian foreclosure, arguing that previous proposals on how to understand the relationship between the two births are insufficient for the disclosure of this political dimension, due to their neglect of Arendt's emphasis on the *dramaturgical* nature of *praxis.*

Gemeinschaft, Communauté and Community between Compassion and Tribalism

Dr Niall Bond (Lyon)

Our analysis of the term community focuses upon 1) the use of the term community and its German and French near-equivalents in the human sciences and 2) their political use. Starting from the vantage of comparative conceptual history, I shall trace the use of the terms back to the early modern era in various forms of social and political philosophy. A historical and philological survey of the intellectual background of one of the seminal thinkers on community, Ferdinand Tönnies, reveals that an important source of his thought was Arthur Schopenhauer, not just of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, but also of the *Morallehre*; Schopenhauer's concept of *Mitleid* or compassion was central and a defining characteristic of morality, and Tönnies thus presents *Gemeinschaft* as the actually moral sphere. Tönnies' intent was to overcome some of the limitations of the human sciences in classical economics, thus broadening the study to affects other than the profit motive, while assuming that the need for *Gemeinschaft* was a biological given that could be pinned to biological relations rooted in the family. His distaste for the profit motive explains not just his affinities to Marx, but also the interest reactionary romantics showed in Tönnies. Tönnies' desire to root Gemeinschaft in biologically given relations emanating from family and tribe illuminates the tribal consequences to be found in the reception of his thought, which he himself saw as having potentially influenced the rejection of modernism which culminated in the National Socialist regime.

Tönnies wrote at an apogee of nationalism and was himself drawn into both the nationalist movement of the Ideas of 1914 and the popular movement of the *Jugendbewegung*, but it was characteristic of his independence of mind to succumb less to tribalism than his contemporaries. As such, at the end of his life, he avoided all compromise with National Socialism notwithstanding enormous pressure for him to adhere to the party's ideology. At the same time, the overwhelming success of the notion of "folk community" (*Volksgemeinschaft*) should be studied in comparison with the French term, "*communauté nationale*"; the use of *Volksgemeinschaft* in literature soared after 1933, and that of "*communauté nationale*" went through a similar development after 1940. But the historiography of the respective countries and the consequences drawn from the defeat of both German and French fascism have meant that while the term, "*Gemeinschaft*" was sullied through associations with Nazism, the term "*communauté nationale*" is still popular among French statesmen. The absence of taboos surrounding the term "*communauté*" in part accounts for the success of contemporary French theoreticians of community such as Jean-Luc Nancy and Dominique Schnapper.

Identity or Difference? Ontology and the Deconstruction of Race and Gender

Dr Stephen Seeley (Warwick)

Since at least the 1980s, the central procedure of feminist and antiracist theorizations of race and gender derived from continental philosophy has been one of de-ontologization. In order to counter racism and sexism, which rely on some kind of essentialism, these theories have argued—and very successfully—that there is no stable ontological reality to categories of race or gender. Because they are working with sociological categories, this trajectory of theorization is often closely associated with social constructivism, and thus the procedure of de-ontologization is often associated with "deconstruction." Indeed, this is so much the case that in social theory, "deconstruction" often means the dismantling of socially constructed categories or identities. In this essay, I return to deconstruction's roots in Heidegger's *Destruktion* to take antiracist and feminist theory back to the question of Being. Through a close reading of Derrida's essay on Heidegger, "*Geschlecht*: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference," I argue that the resistance to ontology has driven feminist and antiracist theorists to a thinking of *identity* rather than a thinking of *difference,* which Heidegger and Derrida developed. In *"Geschlecht*," Derrida reads Heidegger's "neutralization" of *Geschlecht* (gender, race, nation, family) in his existential analytic as a way of opening *Dasein* to a thinking of difference beyond any biological, sociological, or anthropological categorization. Juxtaposing this to feminist and antiracist theory, I argue that the focus on identity—both its "deconstruction" and its multiplication—has allowed "difference" to be thought simply in terms of "genres" (*Geschlehct*) of the western ontology of the One, which has been occupied by Western Man. Such a thinking therefore represents a *retreat* from thinking difference. Because this One has always defined itself against Non-Being, rather than vis-à-vis Being-as-Other (or *différance*), I contend that overcoming racism and sexism demands a deeper confrontation with ontology capable of thinking real difference beyond genres or categories of the One.

What does a 'right to belong' look like?

Yussef Al-Tamimi (EUI)

"We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights…and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation." Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism

The 'right to have rights' has been exhausted in the realm of politics and law to formulate a response to social issues, especially regarding refugees. Yet, the sibling right that Arendt mentions, the 'right to belong', has received far less attention in theoretical and legal literature. With its potential relevance for (mobile and non-mobile) citizens more broadly, Arendt's right to belong raises important questions about the relationality of human identity and how this relationality should be accounted for in a rights framework. The presentation examines this lacuna and explores two areas of inquiry: (1) the conception of identity underpinning current legal rights, and (2) how relational identity functions in a rights framework.

(1) Four claims can be ascertained from current theoretical literature on the view of identity in law: *Firstly*, theorists claim that rights have an individualist approach to identity which disassociates the person from society (Douzinas 2002). *Secondly*, there is an essentialist critique which holds that rights approach identity as an ontologically objective essence (Marshall 2014). *Thirdly*, a formalistic critique suggests that rights neglect the affective character of identity, omitting a focal part of human experience from the legal subject (Costello 2015). *Fourthly*, postcolonial scholars claim that rights assign normative priority to national identity over other forms of identification (Bhabha 2003).

(2) The four strands tend to be critical of liberal tendencies in the dominant theory of identity in law. As an alternative, a relational view of identity emphasises the everyday experience of sense of belonging. Following Arendt, situating the law in a relational context – where law affects everyday relations between individuals, communities and the state – can help understand what kinds of belonging the law regards as worthy of protection, and which it does not (Nourse 2002). Belonging focuses on the affective rather than formal character of identity and acknowledges that human beings are social beings embedded in (often overlapping, fragmented and conflicting) collectives (May 2013). Helpful in grasping how law affects everyday attachments between individuals, communities and the state are Charles Taylor's politics of (mis)recognition (1994) and Joseph Carens' notion of psychological citizenship, which underlines the emotional relations involved in identification (2000, 166). Such theories foreground the affective aspect of identity and serve as entry points for the presentation for analysing the role of belonging in the rights framework.

Democracy and Instability

Daniel Cole Jr. (Kentucky)

In The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Carl Schmitt claims that all actual democracies operate on a principle of homogeneity, i.e. citizens within a democracy can be equals insofar as they share some substantive identity, such as religious belief or nationality. Schmitt further claims that in order to remain a functioning government, democracies must be willing to eradicate or expel heterogeneity and even, at times, eschew parliamentary procedure. Schmitt's claims about maintaining homogeneity and expelling heterogeneity seem objectionable, especially in light of Schmitt's own membership in the Nazi party. Surely every actual democracy cannot require homogeneity to the point of uniformity; heterogeneity is an ineradicable element of democracy. Nevertheless, Schmitt seems right that no democracy is completely without boundaries; every state must have citizens that it includes and must exclude others (United States citizens do not want Russians voting in American elections!). So what are we to make of Schmitt's arguments? Is he simply espousing fascist rhetoric?

Taking Schmitt's analysis of democracy as my point of departure, I aim to show that (a) the question of the identity of a people is necessary in democracy, and (b) both fascism and liberal democracy offer answers to the question of their membership through their modes of representation. In a functioning, liberal democracy, there is a plurality of representatives who stand in for various sub-

groups within the democracy, and no single group is taken to be 'the whole' of the people. In fascism, the single representative is taken to be a stand-in for the whole by virtue of hostility to the parts—that is, by way of antagonism to various sub-groups.

My first task in this paper—and the first section—is to clarify some basic terms, such as democracy, parliamentarism, and fascism. After that, there are two main points on which my argument hinges in section II. I will clarify and relate structures of identification and representation in liberal democracy and fascism. To elaborate these structures in a liberal democracy, I will draw upon some of Hegel's analyses of the estates in Elements of the Philosophy of Right, which shows how differentiated
groups in which one forms one's identity contributes to a whole body politic. Then, I will provide a brief analysis of part-whole structures of representation in both kinds of regimes, with emphasis on fascism's hostility to 'parts.' I take Karl Marx's analysis of Louis Bonaparte in "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" to be a helpful illustration for a leader who represents the whole of the people through hostility to the parts, and this will be the touchstone of my analysis.

Identity as Mnemonic Dialectic: The (dis-)entanglement of enlightenment

Maximilian Gregor Hepach (Stony Brook)

In the following paper, I aim to read Theodor W. Adorno's and Max Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment (henceforth called Dialectic) as a theory of identity formation through mnemonic dialectic by giving an account of their use of *Eingedenken*. I use the German word *Eingedenken*, because the English translations are both misleading and manifold, suggesting that *Eingedenken* should be understood as a form of recollection. In tracing the work *Eingedenken* does in the Dialectic, I will show that *Eingedenken* is closer to a form of mnemonic incorporation, similar to *memento mori*, than recollection.

I thus hold that *Eingedenken* is a key term for both understanding the Dialectic and how individual and group identity constitutes itself, for it denotes both the structure and development that Adorno and Horkheimer describe, namely the "intertwinement of enlightenment and myth", as well as the method Adorno and Horkheimer themselves employ to critique enlightenment by bringing this intertwinement to light. My analysis will show that *Eingedenken* functions both as entanglement, in which different intertwinements/identities constitute themselves–the "intertwinement of rationality and social reality", "intertwinement of […] nature and mastery of nature", "intertwinement of myth and rational labour", "intertwinement of history and prehistory", "intertwinement of enlightenment and power"–, and also as disentanglement, in which the different intertwinements/identities are genealogically unravelled, which Adorno and Horkheimer proceed to do over the course of the Dialectic. *Eingedenken*, as disentanglement, thus presents an answer to what Jürgen Habermas has criticised as the "performative contradiction inherent in totalized critique." *Eingedenken*, as practice, allows for a fundamental critique of social reality and the identities bound up with said reality without committing a performative contradiction. Herein lies *Eingedenken*'s emancipatory value, which will be developed in the following.

Advent of Spirit: Hegel, Soul and Identity

Filip Niklas (Warwick)

The idea of soul has been in philosophy identified with mind, cogito, thought and intellect, and one can trace at least two past traditions which have employed this notion to diverging effect. Descartes stipulated the soul as a separate immaterial entity, which covered the one side whereby matter was considered 'true' and the mind as a 'thing' on the other. This led to the difficult question of how to reconcile the two, apparently incommensurate substances. Going back to Aristotle, however, one finds the soul to be the animating principle of its living body, and as such, he conceived three logical stages to it (vegetative, animal and intellectual), where the latter encompass the former.

In modern times the idea of soul received again different treatment. Kant sees in the notion of soul reason's demand for the unconditioned, in this case as the metaphysically simple being. While parts of reason that generate this idea cannot be eradicated, the soul cannot, for Kant, take on a constitutive role, but may at best serve as a regulatory ideal, as guiding inquiries for the unconditioned (or at worst be consigned to the garbage pile of rational illusions).

For Hegel, on the other hand, the soul comes to play a constitutive role in the formation of his philosophical system, particularly serving as the advent of his philosophy concerning the rational, or spiritual, dimension. 'The soul stands midway between Nature which lies behind her, on the one hand, and the world of ethical freedom which extricates itself from natural mind, on the other hand' (PS 36/§391A). In this sense, soul becomes a transition between two domains. More importantly, soul, Hegel stipulates, 'is the substance or 'absolute' basis for all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought, and the soul remains the pervading, identical ideality of it all' (PS 29/§389, my emphasis).

This paper will aim to examine Hegel's concept of soul, the position it occupies in his system and how its 'identity' is to be understood. Hegel names the soul 'free judgment', and if we understand judgment in German (ur-teil) in the sense of an original partitioning, the soul comes to oppose itself not only to nature (in the form of feeling) but also to itself (becoming consciousness). If Hegel's analysis is correct, then the concept of soul occupies a constitutive place as the sensible and sentient element of primitive mind, conceptually prior to, and thus necessitated by, consciousness proper.

Sacrifice, Identity and History in Walter Benjamin's Capitalism as Religion

Daniel Pepe (DePaul)

Walter Benjamin's short fragment, *Capitalism as Religion* (1921), envisions a critical reinterpretation of Max Weber's seminal study, *On the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905), by means of retrieving an underlying continuity between the enchanted, ethical world of religious

communities and the disenchanted, rationalized practices of a capitalist or modern society. Where Weber attempts to isolate the definitively rationalized elements of the ethical subjectivity of a capitalist society, Benjamin indicates the return of a distinctly religious practices in capitalism that are not so much abolished so much as deformed and hereby become all the more apparent. Benjamin's purpose is not to falsify Weber's argument, but instead to rearrange its internal, conceptual relations, so as to provoke a different result from Weber's analysis. In his essay, *Guilt-History*, Werner Hammacher proposes to clarify the meaning of Benjamin's claim that capitalism takes on the religious appearance of a pure cult, which universalizes the fallen mark of guilt or debt (*Schuld*), instead of seeking atonement for it. Yet, Hammacher only attempts to clarify capitalism's seemingly contradictory religious character by means of referring to the rather dubious historical narrative of secularization, namely, that all modern social and political concepts and the very meaning of modernity itself derive from mere secularizations of theological concepts. The reason such an approach is mistaken lies in its misrepresentation of Weber's original argument about rationalization itself, which Weber does not propose to be the cause of a secular, economic sphere of society, since he shows that Lutheran theology already pronounced the need for such a worldly (*seculorum*) sphere in its own ethical practices. Instead, Weber suggests that rationalization emerges as a social process that undermines or disenchants a religious worldview out from under itself, that is, by the progressive outgrowth of instrumental rationality within social and economic practices. So, contrary to Hammacher's reading, it becomes clear that Benjamin does not so much disagree with Weber's understanding of rationalization, as much as he wants to preserve the argument for the historical idea of capitalism without falling under the spell of Weber's aestheticizing ultimatum of the iron cage, that is, that modern society must remain either locked into the historical necessity of instrumental rationality or reinvent itself in a cultural revolution that would give new values to capitalism. In this paper, I therefore argue that Benjamin's proposition to understand capitalism as a historical repetition of religion allows us to see the repetition of a particular kind of ethical subjectivity, not in its religious ascension over the worldliness of the world, but its downfall within it. As a result, if Weber understands the historical idea of capitalism to emerge from the rationalization of ascetic, ethical practices, Benjamin sees it in the religious enchantment of the capitalist logics of sacrifice and deferred salvation. In this way Benjamin's fragment suggests a reading of Weber's study that points toward the need for an intrahistorical redemption of the indebting and sacrificial practices of capitalism.

The Common and the Universal: The Commonality of Wounding according to Georges Bataille

Behrang Pourhosseini (Paris VIII)

In the renaissance of interest in the question of community in the post-communist era, incarnated by figures like Nancy, Agamben, and Esposito, among others, some readings tend to associate the community to a kind of particularism, as if it seems that the very idea of community serves to justify the identity-based politics. It is true that the notion of community, as opposed to totality, can and should be a basis for defending the cause of minorities. However, universality, as opposed to the totality, can not be easily abandoned, even if the anti-Hegelian readings generally take the two concepts as identical. By a return to one of the major figures of the reception of Hegel in French thought, Georges Bataille, we try to shed a new light on the concept of the universal. We aim to demonstrate that the logic of community in Bataille's work has not yet revealed its subversive

dimension. The impossible community, according to him, means that the common can not be realized; it is formed around its absence, its radical negativity. The community can not be truly lived, and its temporality slips between the present moments. The community, as Esposito points out, is the opposite of the immunity-based ideas. It has to do with the contamination, like a virus that doesn't allow for any proper self.

The common goes against all the tendencies that reclaim it but who's ideologeme is the very negation of its logic: the inter-subjectivity that presupposes separate entities whose relationship is secondary to their "self" integrity; the particularism supposing entities folded on themselves in local communities; liberal-libertarian individualism; multiculturalism advocating a being-together where the contact with the other is illustrated deprived of all risk; the post-colonialism representing an otherness supposed to be intact and unharmed; the narcissism of minorities nourished by the myth of origin; the immune paradigm conjuring any contact with the stranger, the immigrant, the unknown; in one word, any myth of belonging to territories, languages, religions, nations, and given identities. The community is less on the side of possession than on that of loss. In this way, the universal that Bataille's community implies is that of the global self-differentiation, a universal common that spread everywhere insofar as it destroys any kind of self-sufficient subjectivity. This is the way through which we try to redefine Bataillian community as a means of reviving thought on the universal; the universality of wounding that introduces the heterogeneity into homogeneous blocks.

Common sense as philosophical "misadventure" in Deleuze and Flaubert

Josh Carswell (Warwick)

The philosophical meaning of *common sense* is different for each theorist and their associated eras. Notable instances of the phrase include usage in Plato's *Theaetetus*, which differentiates forms of knowledge based on the mind alone from those based on exterior perception; Kant's *sensus communis*, used to validate aesthetic judgment; and the Scottish school of Common Sense associated with Thomas Reid. We might also consider Thomas Paine's political pamphlet *Common Sense*- (orig. published 1776), a profoundly influential work in the context of American independence.

In Chapter 3 of *Difference and Repetition* (orig. published 1968), Deleuze identifies common sense as one of the postulates of the dogmatic image of thought, the dominant mould by which thought is conceived and shaped in modern philosophy. Alongside *good sense*, common sense is the characterization of thought and the thinker as possessing both a *good will* and an *upright nature* (*Eudoxus*). The image of thought as derived from Plato and Descartes misrepresents all thought as morally, aesthetically, and epistemologically sensible by its very nature. Good thought here is opposed to error, which results from incorrect or mistaken thinking, and therefore is external to thought as such.

I would argue that it is the very *commonality* of common sense, upright thinking as identified by Deleuze as intrinsic to thought's dogmatic image which accounts for much of its problematic consequences: "It is because everybody naturally thinks that everybody is supposed to know

implicitly what it means to think." Here common sense is thus an example of philosophical unthinking: a substitution for generally accepted ideas over analysis and reflection.

A little further on in that same chapter, Deleuze briefly considers stupidity (*bêtise*) as an alternative to error as a "misadventure" of thought, quoting from Flaubert's posthumous, unfinished novel *Bouvard and Pécuchet* (orig. published 1881): "Then a lamentable faculty developed in their minds, that of noticing stupidity and finding it intolerable." Although frequently interpreted as reactionary ciphers for Flaubert's "campaign against the idiocies of his time", might it be possible to reappraise Bouvard and Pécuchet's epiphany not as a riposte to stupidity, but common sense itself? Aided somewhat by the complexities of the central characters' relationship to both pre-established common thought and the bêtise of the bourgeoisie, I propose that Flaubert's novel offers both a reflection and subtle criticism of how Deleuze formulates the problem of common sense regarding the dogmatic image of thought.

Between Identity and Difference: Deleuze, Rancière and the meaning of political change

Keren Shahar (Tel Aviv)

Is it possible to generate a political change without defining the boundaries of commonality and without considering an identity that holds a community together, or, does this ambition leads politics to its end? This question arises from Jacques Rancière's critique of Gilles Deleuze's political and aesthetic thought. For both thinkers, politics is inherently related to aesthetics, to sense perceptions. Accordingly, the question of political change or of the ability to generate a political change is related to questions about the existence of the boundaries that determine how we perceive reality along with the manner in which those boundaries are delineated. Deleuze rejects any *a priori* method limiting the sensible, as in his view a thought that assumes an *a priori* form is a thought that is bound by the structures of identity and representation. In contrast, Rancière contends that there is an *a priori* "distribution of the sensible", including and excluding what is perceptible by the senses.

These positions lead to a fundamental difference, both in the meaning of the political event and in the political horizon. For Deleuze, the power of political action is not acquiring recognition, i.e. becoming identifiable, but rather creating a change that leads to non-differentiation.Furthermore, he seeks to release the *sense* from the *common-sense* in order to allow individuals to change without limits. For Rancière, *common-sense*is a condition for politics and a political action is a transformation of boundaries determined by the distribution of the sensible: "the parts who have no part" gain recognition (visibility and a voice) and become part of the social sphere.

By juxtaposing these two viewpoints, I wish, on the one hand, to challenge Deleuze's concept of identity as a reduction of the sensible and as a limitation of transformation. On the other hand, I seek to reveal the missed opportunity in Rancière's rejection of the unidentifiable as an expression of the political. Thus, I offer a way of rethinking identity, both as a condition and as a goal for political change, in the space opened between these two viewpoints.

Art, Immigration, Community: the question of identity in France

Abderrahmane El Yousfi (Paris-Seine)

We propose to study the productions of some of the most emblematic artists of the current post-migration generation in France: those of a visual artist, Adel Abdessemed and that of a filmmaker, Soufiane Adel. We will illuminate our approach with the research and contexts of a Franco-Tunisian author, Mehdi Belhaj Kacem, who became a philosopher after having renounced his first novelistic works. All three have Maghreb immigration as their heritage.

Post-migration works in France are increasingly trying to thwart the expectations that attribute to them a testimonial or denunciatory purpose. Moving away from "exoticism", they are considered "atypical" and their status is close to that of "the refined anecdote". We will wonder if these works can be described as "post-identity" and if we can really talk about the idea of a post-colonial regime of the arts. How do post-migration works elaborate or modify the paradigms of the *common*? Is the challenge of these poetics or aesthetics to make Community by undoing what is given as the *common*? We will see how our artists work to a new "distribution of the Sensible" (Rancière), and propose a reflection on the notion of "Communitas". Indeed, if the idea of "identity" raises questions in these new productions of the post-migration, it is because it appears neither fixed nor progressing, but to build in a perpetual coup de force (Rancière).

Positionality as the Ontology of Identity and Community: Alcoff's Conception of Selfhood

Jo-Jo Koo (Grinnell)

Linda Alcoff has recently put forward a conception of the ontology of human identity and community in terms of the idea of *positionality*. To understand human identity as positional in this sense is at once to acknowledge that our sociocultural heritages and lifeworlds, i.e., our communities, fundamentally condition and shape our identities *and* to emphasize that we are not merely passive in relation to such communally given and structured identities. Thus, positionality in this sense expresses both the contextual or situational place where our identities are socially constituted/constructed by our communities *and* how we can each actively respond to such social constitution/construction in ways that can further determine our identities in relation to the communities in which they are embedded. In conceiving our identities as positional, Alcoff not only draws productively on the resources of existential phenomenology (cf. the early Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, de Beauvoir, Fanon), philosophical hermeneutics (cf. Gadamer, Charles Taylor), and relational conceptions of selfhood (cf. Hegel, Mead), but also on rich empirical descriptions and critical assessments of visible identities such as gender and race that originate from critical race theory and feminist philosophy. Consequently, she presents us with a nuanced and sophisticated conception of the self that is at once relational and contextually (situationally) variable and yet rejects the view that being so *positioned* can only ever restrict our freedom to shape our identities without also, at least potentially, *putting us in the position* to partially alter that communally given and structured positionality. In short, Alcoff offers us a compelling conception of how we can more adequately understand the ontology of identity and community: i.e., the "place of happening" or site where concrete intersectional identities actualize themselves in the contexts of the communities that condition them.

In this talk I sketch four key specific aspects of Alcoff's positional conception of the self in terms of: (1) its location in ongoing interpretive horizons, (2) its inescapably embodied nature, (3) its socially relational character, and (4) how these three constitutive aspects of the self as positionally determined have been historically and still largely shaped by sociocultural forces such as racism, sexism, heteronormativity, and ableism. What emerges from Alcoff's conception of positionality, then, is not only an ontology of identity and community that draws on the above-mentioned sources, but also a *normative* conception of legitimate and illegitimate ways in which human beings are positioned regarding their identities in the contexts of being socially constituted/constructed by their communities. She thereby exposes the untenability of static or reifying conceptions of identity and community that often underlie contemporary discourse about "identity politics" across both political and philosophical spectrums. I end this talk by addressing the likely criticism coming from poststructuralist quarters that any invocation and defense of identities, no matter how emancipatory, always carries the danger of reinstituting received and ongoing power relations that unwittingly oppress those who advocate for the rightful recognition and rights of such identities.

The Idea of Community in the Political Readings of the Critique of Judgment: Arendt, Lyotard, and Cavell

Andrea de Gesu (Normale di Pisa)

The political readings of the *Critique of Judgment* go back to the early lectures of Hannah Arendt. Her interpretation is justified through a reflexion about the architectural structure of kantian critical philosophy: she proposes a classification whereby the Critics of Pure and Practical Reason concern Man as a rational being, the second part of the *Critique of Judgment* concerns mankind as a part of nature and history showing and end-in-itself – thus under the jurisdiction of teleological judgment –, while the first part of the third Critique is the only one which covers particular men as individuals living in a community, i.e., according to Arendt, the political dimension properly. In her reflexions Arendt conceives community – *sensus communis* – as a precondition of political experience, what political judgment presupposes in order to exist: however, she subjects the notion to a fundamental modification which makes it an anthropological and intersubjective feature of human beings rather than an universal. In other terms, what Kant would situate on the field of Man as a rational being, thus conserving an aprioristic and universal nature, is, according to Arendt, a general characteristic of man as a particular individual: a creature bound to the earth, living in a community, and, because of this, endowed with *sensus communis*.

In a different context, Lyotard's reading of kantian aesthetics comes to a similar conclusion. He sees the concept of Sublime as an exploration of the limits of human communication, of the border between Reason and Sensitivity and of their disputes. By doing so, he outlines a space of meaning (common to everyone because specific to human experience) absolutely unattainable and beyond any possible representation but nonetheless founder of communicability, language and human political communities. His position presents therefore a conception of community again as a precondition to politics, even if as a dimension precluded to rationality and only visible by contrast in the sublime *différend*.

In this context, Stanley Cavell has proposed a different interpretation, based on his paradigm of perfectionism as a way to revisit the history of ethics and its relationships with politics. According to him, community is not to be seen as a precondition of the possibility of judgment or an inexpressible common feeling, but rather as something which obeys to a claiming logic: every aesthetic or political judgment claims to a possible community which could accept it, share it and acknowledge it, and the idea of community which could be drawn from Kant's writings consists exactly in this precarious and ever-changing structure, subject to failing, where the continuous transformation of the subjects and of the common forms of life they produce are intertwined.

I'll argue that this reading represents an original and stimulating way to re-read Kantian reflexions on political community and public speech, and opens new possibilities to make them play a decisive role in contemporary political debates, where the nature of community is an inescapable concern.

Re-imagining Acéphale: critical intersections with Jean-Luc Nancy

Joe Fletcher

This paper aims to develop a reading of Jean-Luc Nancy's thought of community and identity through an engagement with George Bataille's Acéphale group. The story of the Acéphale group's proposed human sacrifice provides a key point of engagement in Nancy's work The Inoperative Community, which outlines a thought of community distinct from an operationalised totality that Nancy identifies as a prevalent and deeply problematic reading.

The paper begins by developing a re-imaging of the story of the Acéphale sacrifice by tracing a narrative arc through Andre Masson's illustrations – appearing in all five issues of the Acéphale journal – that chart the adventures of Acéphale through a series of mythic worlds. The paper introduces a reading of the Acéphale group's proposed sacrifice that foregrounds the possibility of begetting the being Acéphale from the sacrificial offering, establishing Masson's illustrations as a document of a post-mortem arising and adventure.

Through establishing a re-imagined account of the Acéphale sacrifice, the paper introduces tensions into Nancy's reading of Bataille and Acéphale, with the arising introducing problematics in relation to concepts such as work and operativity, finitude, death and myth. The paper uses these tensions to explore developing themes of community and identity in Nancy's work, with the Acéphale story providing a tool for engaging with core themes such as the re-reading of Heidegger's ontology towards a fundamental ethics, the singular plural and its relation to sense and community, and the relation between world and sense.

Acéphale is thus used as an experimental scene, which is keyed to a logic of expanded registers of criticality developed in Bataille, and commensurate with Nancy's own approach towards an experimentation with the critical register of philosophy. This approach enables an engagement with Nancy's philosophy that is situated within the scene of an experiment in community. Through this the paper aims toward opening an experimental legacy of the Acéphale sacrifice and its relation to community through the possibilities of begotten Acéphale.

For the Love of the Living Individual: Michel Henry's Re-evaluation of the Political World

Max Schaefer (Limerick)

This project addresses French phenomenologist Michel Henry's account of the transcendental genesis of the political world. To develop Henry's finding that the political world arises from the non-political needs of the life (affective identity) of the living subject, I stake out the novel position that non-political affects such as love provide a utopian attitude, which are necessary to allow individuals to critically assess their current political system. In contrast to the dominant tradition (Arendt, Badiou, etc.), this will show that love and the subject's affective life are integral to the life of the political world.

I begin by showing how Henry comes to view an immanent affectivity as the reality or phenomenological material of the living subject. In so doing, I demonstrate that Henry's transcendental account of how the subject passively receives itself from an immanent embodied process of self-grounding affectivity involves a critique of the private/public distinction, which orients much of Western thought in its approach to the political realm. This critique reveals that the public affairs of the political realm (ecstatic appearing of the world) have their basis in the private needs of individuals (immanent, invisible appearing of life).

This critique demonstrates that individuals are not first with one another through the ecstatic appearing of the world or reason, but on the level of their affective lives, insofar as they respond to the needs of each other as sons and daughters of life. Since the essential formal structure of the life of the living subject stands as a self-givenness, Henry regards the latter as an act of love. As a development of this, I maintain that it is only by acting from a loving attention to the needs of the other that the subject can see the invisible affective presence of the other. It follows that it is only through love that individuals can understand the true value of others and their living labor, and that a political system grounded in social justice can be formed.

As a result, I argue that political systems — democracy in particular — cannot be sustained by autonomous rational deliberation concerning public affairs, but must be oriented by the non-political affects of life. This analysis of Henry's study of the political world reveals that political thinking (action) needs to sustain the tension between the political (objective representation) and the non-political (non-objective acts of love).

The Philosopher's Craft: A global perspective on Martin Heidegger's Phenomenology

Dr Firat M. Haciahmetoglu (KU Leuven)

This paper addresses the methodological elaborations of my research in which I analyse the emergence and the transformation of the phenomenological project of Martin Heidegger within its *global historical context*. This is to say that I will develop a methodology that helps me elaborate Heidegger's philosophical engagement as a response to the unprecedented impacts of globalization

which integrated the world unevenly (Harootunian) during the period that historians associate with "high-imperialism" (Osterhammel). The overwhelming majority of historical studies focusing on Heidegger' thinking presupposes a fixed spatial unit of analysis, most of the cases a "German culture" (which is isomorphic to German nation). Instead of such an approach that "conflates a contingent outcome as a methodological premise" (Goswami; Dirlik), my aim is to trace the location of Germany (Conrad) in "the uneven global space of modernity" (Karl) during the turn of the century; and argue that Heidegger's philosophical process should be understood as a response to the structured transformations on global scale. This methodological elaborations will further be presented as part of a larger research hypothesis that no *modern* philosopher could be *adequately* understood without being *contextualised* within his or her *global historical* context.

Dwelling Aesthetically

Evgenia Chrysochoou (Eastern Michigan)

When we consider our experience in the world, we commonly tend to distinguish between an outside, where things occur – and an inside, the self, who autonomously navigates that external reality. Quite naturally, one's identity is viewed as a matter of a personal invention, that overlooks the weight with which the 'other' (as other individuals, or as whole cultural settings) is present within her. Failing to notice the inherent 'natural attitudes' of our communal dimensions, we consider our perspectives to be neutral, and thus rely on them to justify our actions.

Drawing inspiration from phenomenology, I address how the self and the other mutually envelop each other, in a constantly transforming flux, which, however, in its demand for the dialectic recalibration of its members, can give rise to moments of what Sartre calls bad faith. Furthermore, we encounter this agonizing strife in Dostoevsky's *Notes from Underground,* through the absurd protagonist and the inconsistent narrative. Never offering us any closure or resolution, but instead, emphasizing the incompleteness of expression, the novel exposes us to our very own open-ended nature. Offering us an aesthetic experience, this piece of art allows us to bear witness to the dualities of our existence and recalibrate our orientation towards them. In this spirit, it is in the transformative experience of art that we may catch glimpses of the ever-unraveling dynamics between the infinite openness and confining dead-ends that this reality greets us with – it is in the aesthetic, that we experience the *imperative* to dwell within the 'nowness' of the primordial ambiguity of being.

Human as ζοον λογον εχων and in-der-Welt-sein. Seeking gathering, the one always in relation

Elena Bartolini (Milan)

"If it is true that man finds
the proper abode of his existence in language
— whether he is aware of to or not —
then an experience we undergo with language
will touch the innermost nexus of our existence."
M. Heidegger

In *Letter on Humanism*, commenting on the definition of man as ζοον λογον εχων,3 Heidegger addresses critically the metaphysical interpretation of such a phrase which sees language as something more added to a being — a mere, simple feature given to an animal. What he suggests, instead, is that this characteristic should be conceived in an essential way. Not a "more," rather it indicates something "less" than subjectivity, i. e., the condition of Dasein in a close relation to Being. Or, better, the ek-sistential condition of human, constantly more than only himself, always in-der-Welt-sein, open to a worldly existence — directly exposed to what is.

Even though such consideration appears during the 1940s, the relational aspect and its connection with λόγος is crucial in Heidegger since the very beginning of his thought. Λόγος, usually translated as "reason" or "language," because of its root recalls a meaningful gathering, relations structured in a meaningful way. Discussing human as ζοον λογον εχων means to consider human being, λόγος, and logic in a different manner, but also to think another way in which relating one to the others. In his early writings Heidegger interprets λόγος according to phenomenology, highlighting its role in showing something as something for Dasein, after the 1930s he explicitly connects λόγος to Being itself, as the very language of Being. In doing this, he expands the reflection of language in an ontological direction, pointing out the strict relation (Verhältnis) that λόγος represents.

Through the interpretation of de Beistegui and Baracchi, we will underline the unavoidable openness that gathers Dasein together with its world and with Being, in a meaningful relation, a relation that Heidegger calls Λόγος. According to the etymology of the term λόγος and following Heidegger's suggestion, it is possible to underline the fundamental role of relations for Dasein, relations which are the essential fundament of its being, constantly effective in its own way of living.



Fig. 1. Arden accommodation and Oculus shown in red circles