



*Warwick Continental Philosophy Conference (3rd Edition)*

25-27 March 2021



**BSHP**

British Society for the  
History of Philosophy



BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC



**plf** The Warwick Journal of Philosophy

This booklet collects all the relevant information for WCPC 2021 Conference  
*Continental Philosophy and its Histories.*

The information presented here should be accurate.

In case of discrepancy, the information on the conference website takes precedence:

[https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/research/activities/postkantian/  
events/wcpc/](https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/research/activities/postkantian/events/wcpc/)

**NOTE:** In case of last minute changes please follow the guidelines communicated to you from the conference email account.

Conference Booklet Version 3.0 [Archive edition]

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# About

## WCPC

*Warwick Continental Philosophy Conference* is an annual conference organised by the Postgraduate and Early-Career community of the University of Warwick Philosophy Department. The conference aims to be a meeting point for scholars who understand their work as falling within the purview of 'Continental Philosophy' broadly construed. WCPC operates as a part of the *Centre for Research in Post-Kantian European Philosophy* at the University of Warwick.

This is the third instantiation of the conference. It was originally planned to take place in June 2020, however, it was postponed to March 2021 and transformed into an online event due to Covid-19 pandemic.

## PKEP

The Centre for Research in Post-Kantian European Philosophy at the University of Warwick provides a unique forum for discussion and research in 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century European philosophy, including interdisciplinary research with scholars across the humanities and social sciences. It organises regular seminars, workshops and conferences to promote innovative work in the field of post-Kantian European philosophy and provide a stimulating research environment for MA and PhD students, junior and senior faculty. For our programme of events, [please click here](#).

As a complement to its research programme, the Centre is also closely associated with the [MA in Continental Philosophy](#).

The other departments and centres affiliated to the Centre for Research in Post-Kantian European Philosophy include Philosophy, French Studies, German Studies, Film & TV Studies, English, History, Sociology, Politics and International Studies, as well as the Centre for Interdisciplinary Methodologies and the Social Theory Centre.

The Centre is run by a Director, [Keith Ansell-Pearson](#), and a Deputy Director, [Daniele Lorenzini](#). For a full list of staff associated with the work of the Centre please [click here](#).

## Organizing committee

Raffaella Grandoni      Camilla Pitton  
Dino Jakusic              Lorenzo Serini

## Panel chairs

Callum Blake              Bernardo Ferro              Jacob Schwessinger  
Jonathan Clarke-West      George Meyerowitz          Theofano Vasilopoulou  
Daniel Davis              Maria Mourtou-Paradeisopoulou

## Special thanks to

Irene Dal Poz      Sarah Taylor      Emily Hargreaves  
Clare Simpson

# Joining the Conference

## Conference format - PLEASE READ

The conference is organised as a pre-read event. This means that the papers submitted by the speakers will be circulated in advance. There will be no long presentations of articles. Instead, the panelists will be given **5 minutes to introduce their paper**, with the rest of the time (25 min) being dedicated to questions and answers from the audience. Panelist presentations and Q&A will proceed sequentially in 30-minute slots. Due to this, please familiarise yourself with the submitted papers in order to better follow the discussion.

This structure will **not apply to keynote presentations**. Instead, they will proceed in a more traditional manner (45 min presentation + 45 min Q&A without pre-circulation). We hope to record keynote lectures and make them available on the conference website after the conference. Panels and Keynote Q&As will **not** be recorded.

The conference will take place over Zoom. We have organised one meeting per day, so you can join any slot you wish taking place on that day using the same link. You can either use the links in this booklet, or enter the meeting ID and password.

During the Q&A, audience questions will be selected by the chair. Please use the Zoom 'raise hand' function if you would like to ask the question.

Links to pre-circulated papers, as well as to Zoom meetings are available in the next section.

If you require a letter confirming your attendance at the conference please email us as [wcpc \[at\] warwick.ac.uk](mailto:wcpc@warwick.ac.uk).

If you encounter any other issues or have questions regarding the conference, please feel free to contact us on the same address as above.

## Conference links

### Link for conference papers

Please click here in order to access the papers for the conference. The link should allow you access to the conference OneDrive account. You will be able to read and download papers, but not modify them. Papers are separated per day and panel. Please familiarise yourself with the papers for the panel(s) you wish to attend.

## **Day 1 - Zoom link**

Please consult the timetable before joining the meeting.

Topic: WCPC Day 1 - 25 Mar 2021

Time: Mar 25, 2021 10:00–18:30 London

Join Zoom Meeting – Click here to join WCPC Day 1 Meeting.

Alternatively, use the following details to join manually:

Meeting ID: 961 7712 7697

Passcode: 167258

## **Day 2 - Zoom link**

Please consult the timetable before joining the meeting.

Topic: WCPC Day 2 - 26 Mar 2021

Time: Mar 26, 2021 12:00–18:30 London

Join Zoom Meeting – Click here to join WCPC Day 2 Meeting.

Meeting ID: 961 1416 9611

Passcode: 763353

## **Day 3 - Zoom link**

Please consult the timetable before joining the meeting.

Topic: WCPC Day 3 - 27 Mar 2021

Time: Mar 27, 2021 10:00–18:30 London

Join Zoom Meeting – Click here to join WCPC Day 3 Meeting.

Meeting ID: 997 6909 7784

Passcode: 949725

# Timetable

CT: Contribution, KL: Keynote Lecture.

## Thursday, 25<sup>th</sup> of March

10:00–11:30	Panel 1		
10:00–10:30	CT	<b>Aleksandra Gomulczak</b> Adam Mickiewicz University, Poland	Research Approaches to the Study of the Analytic-Continental Divide
10:30–11:00	CT	<b>Mary Peterson</b> University of Edinburgh, UK	An Irony in History: Rorty and Bernstein on the Analytic Tradition
11:00–11:30	CT	<b>Detlef Von Daniels</b> FU-Berlin, Germany	Gottlob Frege as a Continental Philosopher, or: Analytical Philosophy and its Dialectics
11:30–12:00	Short Break		
12:00–13:30	KL	<b>Mogens Lærke</b> CNRS & MFO, UK	Historiographical Neutrality from Delbos to Gueroult
13:30–15:00	Long Break		
15:00–16:00	Panel 2		
15:00–15:30	CT	<b>Marie Louise Krogh</b> CRMEP, UK	The Historiography of Philosophy in Three Inaugural Lectures: Gueroult, Hyppolite and Foucault at Collège de France
15:30–16:00	CT	<b>Daniel Weizman, UK</b> CRMEP, UK	Discipline or Encounter: Deleuze and his Professors on the History of Philosophy
CANCELLED	CT	<b>Evgenia Ilieva</b> Ithaca College, USA	J.L. Mehta's Critical Encounter with Hegel and Heidegger
16:00–17:00	Break		
17:00–18:30	Panel 3		
17:00–17:30	CT	<b>Luke Ilott</b> Cambridge, UK	Foucault's Parodic Histories
17:30–18:00	CT	<b>Christopher R. Myers</b> Fordham, USA	Nietzsche, Dilthey, and the <i>Lebensphilosophie</i> Shift in Perspective on Life and History
18:00–18:30	CT	<b>Kim Maslin</b> Hendrix College, USA	Hannah Arendt and the Importance of History or Why is Heidegger the "Last Romantic"?
Day 1 End			

## Friday, 26<sup>th</sup> of March

12:00–13:30	<b>Panel 4</b>		
12:00–12:30	CT	<b>William Parkhurst</b> South Florida, USA	Rethinking Historical Methodology: Falsifying Methodologies with Archival Evidence
12:30–13:00	CT	<b>Alexander A. Lvov</b> St Petersburg, Russia	How to Philosophize Scientifically: The Historians' of Thought Project of Philosophy as Strict Science
13:00–13:30	CT	<b>Robert Scott</b> Cambridge, UK	Hegel's Gallery of Images
13:30–14:30	<b>Break</b>		
14:30–16:00	<b>Panel 5</b>		
14:30–15:00	CT	<b>Chiara de Cosmo</b> Fondazione Collegio San Carlo, Italy	Facts and Tendencies: The Connection Between Philosophy of History and Sociology in Adorno's Thought
15:00–15:30	CT	<b>Zeke Goggin</b> Skidmore College, USA	Presenting the Unpresentable: History and Redemption in Novalis and Benjamin
15:30–16:00	CT	<b>Sebastiano Taccola</b> Scuola Normale Superiore Pisa, Italy	Marx's Critique of Political Economy and the Foundation of a Critical Historiography: Models of Social Formation and the Reading of Historical Processes
CANCELLED	CT	<b>Josh Lalonde</b> Independent	From the History of Being to Historical Materialism
16:00–17:00	<b>Break</b>		
17:00–18:30	KL	<b>Francey Russell</b> Columbia, USA	Picturing the Mind: On Freud's Structural Theory
<b>Day 2 End</b>			

## Saturday, 27<sup>th</sup> of March

10:00 – 11:30	KL	<b>Christine Battersby</b> Warwick Emerita, UK	Continental Philosophy and Feminist Philosophy: Slipping Through the Gaps
11:30 – 12:00	<b>Short Break</b>		
12:00 – 13:30	<b>Panel 6</b>		
12:00 – 12:30	CT	<b>Tadahiro Oota</b> Waseda, Japan	The Reception and Influence of J.F. Fries: The Limits of the ‘German Idealism’ Frame
12:30 – 13:00	CT	<b>Beatrice Beccari</b> Ferrara, Italy	Eadem Sed Aliter: The Value of History According to Arthur Schopenhauer
13:00 – 13:30	CT	<b>Elisabeth Li</b> Princeton, USA	On History and Aporia: Gillian Rose’s use of Søren Kierkegaard
13:30 – 15:00	<b>Long Break</b>		
15:00 – 16:30	<b>Panel 7</b>		
15:00 – 15:30	CT	<b>Elvira Basevich</b> Massachusetts, USA	Reckoning with Hegel on Race
15:30 – 16:00	CT	<b>Ryan J. Johnson</b> Elon University, USA	Eternal Recurrence and a History of Racism
16:00 – 16:30	CT	<b>John Harfouch</b> Alabama Huntsville, USA	Direct Restitutions: A Methodology in the Philosophy of Mind
16:30 – 17:00	<b>Short Break</b>		
17:00 – 18:30	KL	<b>Stella Sandford</b> CRMEP, UK	Kant, ‘Race’, and ‘Sex’
<b>Conference end</b>			

## Day 1

### Research Approaches to the Study of the Analytic-Continental Divide

**Aleksandra Gomulczak**

Panel 1

Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland

The notorious analytic-continental divide continues to shape the landscape of contemporary philosophy. It is strongly entrenched institutionally and sociologically. Thus, the history of continental philosophy and the history of analytic philosophy are intrinsically bound to the history of the analytic-continental divide. However, the gap has been recently subjected to numerous and various studies. Many authors started to undermine its philosophical significance. There seems to be a growing contention that the divide should be transcended. Philosophers proposed several ways of doing so.

In my talk, I aim to show the consequences of these studies for the development of contemporary philosophy. To do so, I will present and comment on seven approaches adapted to study the divide. In looking for the possibilities of transcending the divide philosophers aim: (1) to identify the common ground for the philosophy of the main figures, e.g. Frege and Husserl (Føllesdal 1994, Mohanty 1982, Dummett 2014), Carnap and Husserl (Rosado Haddock 2008), Russell and Husserl (Milkov 2020), Tarski and Husserl (Smith 2018); (2) to analyse the definitions of the terms “analytic philosophy” and “continental philosophy” to show that however one defines them, there are always overlaps and exceptions (Moran 2001, Zahavi 2016); (3) to identify the crucial feature, a basis upon they are both built (Beaney 2009); (4) to compare the crucial concepts and the way they are treated in both traditions (Smith and McIntyre 1984, Chase and Reynolds 2011); (5) to deny the significance of the divide by the introduction of the alternative way to conceptualize contemporary philosophy (Fréchette 2020); (6) to present the philosophical work that situates itself beyond the divide (Bell, Cutrofello, Livingston 2016); (7) to inquire into the philosophy of thinkers who are hard to classify univocally, e.g. Susanne K. Langer (Dengerink Chaplin 2019), Ernst Cassirer (Friedman 2000).

The goal of these studies is not to overturn the divide in general. Researchers don't claim that there isn't anything distinctive about these traditions. But they want to weaken the division and show the possibilities of a fruitful dialogue between them. Surprisingly, most of the studies I am acquainted with, examine Husserl's philosophy as a representative not only for phenomenology (Moran 2001, Beaney 2009) but sometimes also for continental philosophy (Zahavi 2016). The exceptions are, e.g. Chase and Reynolds (2011) who analyse the topic from the perspectives of crucial concepts and methods, and they include postmodernism, hermeneutics, and critical theory from the continental side; Bell, Cutrofello, and Livingston (2016) who introduce the concept of synthetic philosophy and show some connections between seemingly opposed conceptions; Friedman (2000) who looks for

the neo-Kantian entrenchment of Carnap, and his connection to Heidegger and Cassirer.

These various approaches show how complex is the image of Twentieth-Century philosophy, and how the divide projects onto the philosophy of Twenty-First Century. They also provide the possible ways of fruitful exchange between these seemingly opposite traditions.

## **An Irony in History: Rorty and Bernstein on the Analytic Tradition**

**Mary Peterson**

Panel 1

University of Edinburgh, UK

An Irony in History: Rorty and Bernstein on the Analytic Tradition In the 1979 book *Philosophy and the Mirror Nature*, Richard Rorty writes an expansive historiography of philosophy ranging from Plato to W.V. Quine. His purpose is to expose the problems of contemporary epistemology as historically contingent and therefore soluble. Rorty traces the idea of an eye 'seeing' knowledge, found in Plato, to the mirror metaphor of mind in Descartes, giving way to the mind-body problem, correspondence theory of truth and evil demon-like skepticism about foundations in 20<sup>th</sup> century Analytic philosophy.

Published four years later, Richard Bernstein's *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* advances historicism as the intellectual means to move past a collective phenomenon he calls 'Cartesian anxiety.' Bernstein historicizes the phenomenon to Descartes' influence on modern science. Cartesian anxiety is a fear that without firm foundations in philosophy, ontological relativism will ensue – a state suggested in Descartes' *Meditations* as dark, swirling chaos. Both thinkers use historical claims in two ways. First, a historiography is constructed to motivate their distinctive method of doing philosophy. Second, historicization is proposed as a therapeutic antidote to philosophical problems. Though the problems in question differ, both philosophers trace the source of those problems to Descartes. Rorty addresses the correspondence theory of truth and concept of mind in epistemology while Bernstein attacks objectivism in history and philosophy of science.

Bernstein reads Rorty as critiquing the analytic tradition from a historicist's perspective. Assessing journal articles written in the 1960s and 70s, Bernstein observes: "At the same time that Rorty was arguing in a style that had become canonical for analytic philosophers, he also seemed to be raising deeply disturbing questions about some of the unstated presuppositions and unquestioned assumptions of these philosophers. What had at first seemed to be merely hesitations and reservations emerged, in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, as a comprehensive critique of not only analytic philosophy but the entire 'Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian tradition.' Bernstein thinks that a lasting concern with metaphilosophy leads Rorty to contextualize analytic philosophy as a contingent discourse that might give way to philosophical discourses with deeper cultural impact.

This paper argues that Richard Bernstein follows Richard Rorty's metaphilosophical and historical critique of the Analytic tradition, landing on a historicism that speaks to contemporary culture by revealing the contingency of its practices. While Rorty chooses Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Dewey as the heroes of his narrative, Bernstein chooses Hans-Georg Gadamer. Rorty and Bernstein direct their choice philosophers against the Analytic trend of scientific accuracy in knowledge, expressed as the correspondence theory of truth in one instance and objectivity in

the other. Both philosophers conclude that pursuit of scientific accuracy paralyzes meaningful practices, while historicism invigorates new discourses.

In opening, the paper defends characterization of Rorty and Bernstein's historicism as ironic. Next, it is argued that both thinkers choose this method from a practical commitment to enhanced cultural life. Finally, the paper maintains the relevance of this critique and historicizing method to contemporary debates within epistemology and philosophy of science.

## **Gottlob Frege as a Continental Philosopher, or: Analytical Philosophy and its Dialectics**

**Detlef Von Daniels**

Panel 1

European Studies Program, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany

Gottlob Frege is usually not included in the tradition of continental philosophy but considered as an honourable member of the analytic camp. In my paper, I will question this implicit presupposition. To this end, I will first very briefly explain how I structure for educational purposes the continental tradition along three strands of thinking: 1. Reflecting the work, the values, and the world of human being according to Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, 2. reflecting language, the world, and the history of the sciences according to Frege, Schlick, and Kuhn, and 3. reflecting the history, the world, and the language of interpreted life according to Dilthey, Husserl, and Wittgenstein. This structure is not meant as a definite system but as an overview in need of being questioned and deconstructed.

I will then show in greater detail that Frege's *Begriffsschrift* already entails like a germ all developments of the first strand of thinking. As we have hardly any biographical information about Frege's philosophical formation (e.g. the influence of his Protestant upbringing on his thinking) we have to rely on the textual evidence of his published works. In the preface of the *Begriffsschrift* he situates himself in a specific tradition by arguing that he "did not want to create a bare *calculus ratiocinator* but a *lingua characterica* in Leibniz's sense." In Leibniz, this idea has an onto-theological dimension aiming at overcoming the split between confessions and ultimately religions. Frege transferred this program into the scientific sphere, to be precise a specific 19<sup>th</sup> century understanding of the sciences. By reinterpreting the square of logical oppositions in the *Begriffsschrift* he tried to take up the Aristotelian model of science (every proposition of the sciences inherits its truth and its content from the principles of the science, i.e. from its axioms and fundamental concepts) while debunking at the same time the core of Kant's system, which is based on the table of judgements. In this way, the German idealist tradition growing out of Kant would lose its basis. As the *Begriffsschrift* was supposed to be applied in different sciences (Frege mentions geometry and mechanics) later ideas of the Vienna circle are clearly prefigured.

Thus far, the reading would confirm the traditional, analytic view that Frege has initiated a revolution in logic, which has rendered all previous philosophy antiquated. However, I will end by showing that at three points 'suppressed alternatives' creep into the Frege's system, which opens the tradition of philosophy he initiated to the previous dialectical tradition. First, it can be questioned whether Frege really overcame general formal logic in Kant's specific sense. Michael Wolff as argued that Kant's proof of the completeness of the table of judgement is correct whereas Frege has developed only the specific branch of mathematical logic. Thus Frege's *Begriffsschrift* does not exhaust the

entire field of logic, or, in other words, the language of the sciences is not even the most general logical language. Second, Russell's paradox ensuing from Frege's *Grundgesetze* can be seen as the point where formal logic becomes self-aware. This way, reflexivity, the key characteristic of consciousness, becomes a feature of the logical world as well. Finally, the materialistic questions why certain theorems were developed at a certain time and how even the sciences can develop symptoms of a foundational crisis can also be taken up. As a conclusion I would answer the leading questions of the Warwick Continental Philosophy Conference with a thesis: Frege and the ensuing tradition belong firmly to the continental canon.

## Historiographical Neutrality from Delbos to Gueroult

Mogens Lærke

KL

Centre national de la recherche scientifique; Maison Française d'Oxford, Oxford, UK

In this paper, I want to highlight a particular neo-Kantian tradition in French historiography of philosophy constituted on an axis going from Victor Delbos (1862-1916), professor at the Sorbonne from 1902 to his premature death in 1916, to Martial Gueroult (1891-1976), perhaps the most important French historian of philosophy of the 20th century. My focus will mostly be on Gueroult, showing how conceiving of his overall historiographical project in the light of an ambition of historiographical "neutrality" that I think he inherited from Delbos can help better understand the Kantian underpinnings of this project as laid out in his *Dianoématique*, an opus magnum in four volumes he first drafted in the 1930s, but continued to work on for more than four decades.

## The Historiography of Philosophy in Three Inaugural Lectures: Gueroult, Hyppolite and Foucault at Collège de France

Marie Louise Krogh

Panel 2

Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy, Kingston University, London, UK

The persistent intimacy of the practice and the history of philosophy in what today goes under the name of continental philosophy, cannot easily be mistaken for any form of consensus on what constitutes the proper form of philosophy as such, nor indeed of its history and of how this history is to be written. In this presentation, I propose to argue this point by using as a prism a comparative analysis of the three inaugural lectures given at the Collège de France by Martial Gueroult (1951), Jean Hyppolite (1962) and, Michel Foucault (1970), at the moment of their assumptions of the chairs in respectively 'The History and Technology of Philosophical Systems', 'History of Philosophical Thought' and, 'History of Systems of Thought'.

Since the inaugural lectures so decidedly mark the moment whereby a torch is passed, each speaker weaves a narrative of their assumption of the post, revealing both their debts and their distance from those who came before. Aside from simply indexing changes and institutional-historical developments in the landscape of 20th century French philosophy, these lectures also provide fecund ground for an inquiry into the differential conceptions each speaker had of the specificity of the relation between philosophy and history as well as between the history of philosophy and the histories of other sciences or disciplines. In this regard, it is the question of truth – of the truth expressed within philosophical works – which will form the vector along which each lecture can be

compared to the others, serving to reveal their proximities and distances. Gueroult – who perhaps more than any thinker in the twentieth century was preoccupied with the question of the legitimacy of the history of philosophy as a discipline and to whom the larger part of this paper will be devoted – forcefully asserted that since philosophical truth is expressed in a plurality of self-enclosed systems, for the historian of philosophy ‘truths as objects of science and truths as objects of history are to be found on the same level, scientific interest and historical interest endlessly tangling with one another and tearing one another apart. ‘Thus,’ he continues, ‘the historian of philosophy can never stop being a philosopher, as the doctrines of another time are not discarded in a past that has been left behind by the presence of a constituted body of established truths: they persist before him in an eternal present, as a collection of philosophical knowledge. Hyppolite, who followed in Gueroult’s footsteps and dedicated much of his lecture to what he conceived off as his own debt to both him and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, subtly displaced Gueroult’s claims by placing a stronger emphasis on the relation between philosophy and non-philosophy, finding himself – as a proposed historian of philosophical thought – before the dual task of elucidating a historical search for ‘the necessity of truth within the vicissitudes of existence’ and of coming to grasp with the specific mode of endurance that pertains to philosophical works. In this lineage, Foucault, who in turn would dedicate a substantial part of his lecture to a tribute to Hyppolite, performed the most violent gesture, in the liquidation philosophy into a discourse among others. In this lineage, Foucault’s lecture, in which a substantial part is dedicated to a tribute to Hyppolite, is the least obviously concerned with the question of the history of philosophy as such. And yet, with the proposal to analyse philosophical discourse in terms of its mechanisms of self-enclosure and in terms of the relation between truth and power, this history may be dethroned but nevertheless remains continuously at stake in the proposal of a transformation of the historiography of philosophy.

By contrasting these three inaugural lectures, it is the aim of this paper to draw out the lesser known figure of Gueroult in the history of twentieth century French philosophy and to situate the works of Hyppolite and Foucault in relation thereto, while emphasising the relative displacements they both introduced in relation to Gueroult’s philosophy of the history of philosophy.’

## **J.L. Mehta’s Critical Encounter with Hegel and Heidegger [Cancelled]**

***Evgenia Ilieva***

Panel 2

Department of Politics, Ithaca College, USA

This paper explores J.L. Mehta’s critical engagement with the tradition of hermeneutics as it was given shape by Martin Heidegger. Although Mehta presents a subtle, sophisticated and novel hermeneutic theory that he developed via a sustained engagement with Heidegger’s work (and to some extent with Gadamer’s as well), Mehta’s writings remain little known and therefore seldom discussed by most contemporary scholars. Consider, for instance, that none of the three most recent books devoted to hermeneutics and its history – *The Routledge Companion to Hermeneutics* (Malpass 2015), *The Cambridge Companion to Hermeneutics* (Forster and Gjesdal 2019), and *Orientation and Judgment in Hermeneutics* (Makkreel 2015) – offers a sustained discussion of Mehta’s work. Indeed, if Mehta is mentioned at all, it is only in the footnotes. Against this background, this paper seeks to highlight the distinctiveness of Mehta’s hermeneutics by situating his contribution within the long history of modern hermeneutic theory. Particularly important in this context is Mehta’s reading of Hegel’s and Heidegger’s respective orientations to the history of Western philosophy.

Mehta devoted his entire scholarly career to the philosophical encounter between India and the West, channeling much of his energies towards elucidating and developing the hermeneutic notions of understanding and interpretation. Writing during the latter half of the twentieth century, he viewed the encounter between Western and non-Western philosophical thought as deeply asymmetrical and argued that it takes place within a world-historical situation in which the European mode of thinking has attained planetary proportions. He drew heavily on Heidegger's notion of the "Europeanization of the earth" – a phrase meant to capture the irreversible global spread of Western representational, calculative rationality – to describe the framework within which this encounter takes place. Although Mehta was highly critical of proposals that called for a superficial synthesis of East and West, he was also bold enough to acknowledge the irreversibility of Europeanization. Importantly, he argued that even as we now live within the enframing structure of Europeanization, it is nonetheless possible to find ways to think beyond it. But how might it be possible to think outside of Western representational grids when the entire world is today "implicated in the metaphysical core of Western history through the spread of science and technology" and their associated modes of thinking? What might it mean to travel outwards from a horizon of meaning (in this case Indian philosophy) that, on Mehta's own account, has undergone a catastrophic alteration as a result of the encounter with colonialism? It is in Heidegger's philosophy and critique of metaphysics that Mehta claimed to have discovered helpful guidance that would liberate Indian thinkers from subservience to Western categories, thus paving the way for an Indian "Swaraj" in ideas.

To bring into view Mehta's own hermeneutics, this paper first asks why Mehta singled out the work of Heidegger as particularly important to the task of liberating Indian thought from subordination to Western categories and frameworks of understanding. How can Heidegger, who on Mehta's own reading expressed such profound disinterest for the tradition of Indian philosophy, help India to regain its voice? I will show that Mehta locates Heidegger's relevance to the project of creatively re-appropriating one's tradition in the particular way in which the German thinker attempted to overcome Western metaphysics. Here Mehta refers to Heidegger's famous "step back" (*Schritt zurück*) to the origins of Western philosophy – a step that involved a return to and a repetition (*Wiederholung*) of the beginnings of European philosophy. I will show that Mehta brings into sharper relief the novelty of Heidegger's hermeneutics and his approach to the history of Western philosophy by contrasting it to that of Hegel. While both German thinkers recognized that philosophical interpretation requires and involves a dialogue with the heritage of the past, for Heidegger Hegel's error was to suggest that "philosophical thought is at its poorest... in its historical beginning." Where Hegel claimed that history begins with "the primitive and backward, the clumsy and weak," Heidegger asserted that the opposite is true: "The beginning is the uncanniest and mightiest," he wrote. "What comes after is not development but shallowness and diffusion." Where Hegel locates the power of past thinkers in what has already been thought by them, for Heidegger this power resides in what remains unsaid and unthought in their work.

In considering the challenges that stood in the way of a more equitable philosophical encounter between India and the West, Mehta developed his own original hermeneutics, thus elaborating and carrying further the implications of Heidegger's and Gadamer's respective philosophies. I will show that Mehta's is a hermeneutics that hardly calls for the simplistic rejection of the Western philosophical tradition and its replacement by its presumed opposite. Nor does it counsel the abandonment of non-Western traditions in favor of attempts at perpetuating Western thought and philosophy by translating non-Western thinking into the language of Western metaphysics. Rather, it encourages a return to and a rereading of those historical traditions in order to bring out

what remains unthought in each of them. Mehta argued that it is only through such a going back – through such a repetition – that each tradition could more adequately reach out to the other.

## **Discipline or Encounter: Deleuze and his Professors on the History of Philosophy**

**Daniel Weizman**

Panel 2

Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy, Kingston University, London, UK

This paper argues that Gilles Deleuze's distinctive readings of the history of philosophy, and his interpretive approach as a whole, were shaped by and responded to leading interpretations put forward by his dominant university professors: Jean Hyppolite, Ferdinand Alquié, Martial Guérout and Jean Wahl.

While these authors were celebrated at their time in the 1940s until the 1960s, and their highly original interpretations of the history of philosophy codified the readings of philosophers such as Spinoza, Descartes, Kant and Hegel in France, they have become somewhat marginalized figures in the more recent history of philosophy and their work remains unacknowledged in many circles. I argue that their retreat into obscurity was brought about by the work of their students, namely Deleuze, Foucault and Derrida. It was Deleuze, however, who was repeatedly preoccupied with the inheritance he accepted from his masters, mutating the problems they brought to prominence and putting forward more satisfactory and captivating solutions to these problems. If we cannot find this ongoing preoccupation within the pages of his texts, it is because, as I intend to show, in Deleuze the history of philosophy itself becomes the curtain behind which such altercation takes place. In this context I would like to suggest that one cannot fully appreciate Deleuze's Bergsonism and Nietzsche and Philosophy without Hyppolite, Empiricism and Subjectivity without Wahl, and Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza without Alquié and Guérout. By overlooking the works of these authors, we risk falling into some sort of naiveté concerning the scope of Deleuze's originality. While I do not intend on taking too much away from the innovative nature of Deleuze's texts, I do hope to offer a more sober and sceptical reading of Deleuze, linking him with his most immediate philosophical environment, an environment which often goes unnoticed in existing literature evaluating Deleuze's relationship with the history of philosophy, which invests heavily in answering questions concerning his status as a "Spinozist", a "Nietzschean", a "Kantian", etc., and neglects to acknowledge the subtle yet powerful authorities that mediate and act upon these seemingly unique positions. By taking these influences into full consideration, hidden dialogues between Deleuze and his teachers emerge: Empiricism and Subjectivity, originally Deleuze's master thesis supervised by Hyppolite, should also be read as an anti-Hegelian provocation against his Hegelian adviser, inspired by Wahl's singular vision of empiricism, who have revived Bertrand Russell's claim that "relations are external to their terms", a claim that would become the leitmotif of Deleuze's study of Hume; Nietzsche and Philosophy should be read as a determined response to Hyppolite's renowned interpretation of The Phenomenology of Spirit, Genesis and Structure, which was a primary text in Deleuze's education of Hegel, and to which Deleuze implicitly referred to in his infamous anti-Hegelian accusations; Bergsonism can be understood as the ground upon which Deleuze attempts to triangulate the disparate positions of Alquié and Guérout concerning the very nature of philosophy and the reading of the history of philosophy, with Alquié advocating a philosophy of "lived experience", according to which the history of philosophy serves as a pathway to an ineffable "encounter", and Guérout a philosophy of quasi-scientific conceptual structures, which designates the history of philosophy as

a “discipline”. Deleuze’s stratagem is to introduce Bergson as a facilitator between the conflicting demands of these approaches; and *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (Deleuze’s secondary doctoral thesis supervised by Alquié) as a text which undermines some of the dominant themes in Guérout’s first volume in his unfinished magnum opus on Spinoza, *Spinoza I: Dieu*, Alquié’s interpretation of Descartes, and Hyppolite’s *Logic and Existence*, a central proto-structuralist text that attempts to put forward an uncompromising Hegelian philosophy of immanence, and from which Foucault has claimed to derive the very “meaning and possibility” of his entire work.

It is from within these undisclosed engagements, from the highly strategic approach that Deleuze implements with respect to his teachers’ work, in which he manipulates them willy-nilly, that he would emerge as a fully sovereign thinker, reshaping the history of philosophy in the image of his own thought. The question, however, whether it is indeed his own image or his teachers’, could pave the way to a new understanding of how Deleuze and his contemporaries employed the history of philosophy at the service of their own individual interests, which were often tied with undermining their most recent predecessors, and how these interests came to define their philosophical trajectories.

## Foucault’s Parodic Histories

**Luke Ilott**

Panel 3

Faculty of History, University of Cambridge, UK

Michel Foucault often called his Nietzschean method of genealogy a ‘counter-history’. But counter to what? In this paper, I suggest that many of Foucault’s genealogies consciously parodied the historical narratives invoked by other French thinkers of his time. By venturing onto the historical territory of philosophers like Derrida and Althusser, or of figures in wide currency like Marx and Freud, Foucault subverted the historical narratives which structured his contemporaries’ self-orientation in the present. Understanding the parodic function of Foucauldian genealogy points to the importance of narrative and diagnosis in Foucault’s modes of argument – and sheds contextual light upon why he used history in his practice of philosophy.

Most of Foucault’s Collège de France lectures of the 1970s revisited historical subjects already discussed by prominent interlocutors. Lectures on the Will to Know (1970-71) re-told the stories about ancient Greek philosophy which had underpinned the claims of Martin Heidegger and, perhaps more pertinently, of Jacques Derrida in *Of Grammatology* (1967). By drawing on the cutting-edge research of the Paris School of Classics, including Jean-Pierre Vernant and Marcel Detienne, Foucault turned Derrida’s story about the suppression of writing into a political history about power struggles in ancient Athens. Foucault’s next course, *Penal Theories and Institutions* (1971-72), has been read as a genealogical response to Louis Althusser’s theory of the state, engaging with the Soviet historian Boris Porshnev whom Althusser had used in his book *Montesquieu* (1959). *The Punitive Society* (1973) made a foray onto Karl Marx’s terrain, re-describing *Capital*’s account of primitive accumulation as a story about the very formation of a productive labour-power. Notes in Foucault’s journals suggest that he was also concerned to rebut Gilles Deleuze’s assumption of the givenness of productive drives. A critical engagement with Freud-Marxist narratives about Victorian repression runs through the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* (1976), and drafts for subsequent volumes preserved at Foucault’s archive show that Foucault was interested in charting how the nineteenth-century science of sexuality had developed historical claims about the

timeliness of its interventions. There are elements of parody in *Security, Territory, Population* (1978), too, which subvert common historiographical tropes about the simultaneous births of modern physics and modern politics in Renaissance Italy. The *Birth of Biopolitics* (1979) claimed that politics in 1970s France was not a story about massive, repressive state power, as interlocutors on the left like Deleuze, Pierre Dommergues, Pierre Rosanvallon and Nicos Poulantzas assumed, but in fact a story about the emergence of a 'neoliberal' governmentality critical of state interventions.

As a case study, this paper engages in a close reading of the parodic dimension of *Society Must be Defended* (1976), which can be read as a sustained critique of Louis Althusser's intellectual project. Foucault sought to refute Althusser's claims in *Reading Capital* about the birth of a 'science of history' with Marx. In doing so, Foucault returned to Althusser's Montesquieu. In that book, and in lectures and papers from the 1950s, Althusser had discussed the *querelle des deux races* in eighteenth-century France as an important context for the emergence of a science of history. Foucault noted that the same episode was the fulcrum in many contemporary genealogies of Nazism and twentieth-century racism. He re-narrated Althusser's story about the emergence of a science of history as a genealogy of the totalitarianism and death camps of the twentieth century. Foucault's 1976 lectures thus belong to a genre of anti-totalitarian and anti-Marxist interventions which swept through French intellectual culture after 1974. Like Jacques Rancière and Claude Lefort, Foucault responded with invective to Althusser's own claims in his 'Reply to John Lewis' (1972) about the causes of Stalinist terror.

Re-centring the parodic dimension of Foucauldian genealogy enables a finer contextual and inter-textual approach to his histories. The upshot is that asking 'why history matters for philosophy' is the wrong question to pose of Foucault. Genealogy was not, as for thinkers today like Quentin Skinner, Raymond Geuss and Amia Srinivasan engaging with the analytic tradition, a way to introduce historical content to ahistorical philosophising. Foucault deployed genealogy in a 1970s context where most of his interlocutors already invoked historical narratives in support of their positions, from Derrida's sweeping claims about the suppression of writing since Plato, through Althusser's claims about Marx's epistemological break, to Freudo-Marxist narratives about repression. As a counter-history, genealogy fragmented, upended and parodied the historical frameworks which shaped how Foucault's contemporaries envisioned the past and present. By re-describing 'how we got to here', his counter-narratives offered an alternative diagnosis of the pressing political tasks in the present. This paper is therefore a contribution to historicising Foucault's method of genealogy itself, establishing how far genealogy belongs to a genre of post-1968 counter-historicisms whose urgency derived from the prevalence of Hegelian, Marxist and Freudian grand narratives which no longer structure intellectual debate.

## **Nietzsche, Dilthey, and the *Lebensphilosophie* Shift in Perspective on Life and History**

**Christopher R. Myers**

Panel 3

Philosophy Department, Fordham University, NYC, USA

In this paper I will consider the philosophical motivations behind the tradition of *Lebensphilosophie*, and I will argue that Nietzsche and Dilthey's interest in taking a philosophical approach to 'life' was motivated by the belief that the development of historical consciousness has contributed to widespread crisis and nihilism. Although Nietzsche and Dilthey were trained in critical-historical

interpretation themselves – Nietzsche as a classical philologist, Dilthey as a historian and biographer – both observe that human beings’ increasing awareness of the historicity of all things has destroyed their belief in foundational values, and has moreover compromised their belief in the possibility of genuine understanding. Nietzsche and Dilthey similarly characterize this situation in terms of a separation of knowledge and life: knowledge has become something ‘contrary’ or ‘opposed’ to the requirements of life itself. In the second of his *Unfashionable Observations*, for instance, Nietzsche suggests that the development of historical science has made human beings into “walking encyclopedias” capable only of learning about self-cultivation but never engaging in it. In the same spirit, Dilthey argues that “the problem posed by this epoch” is the fact that human beings’ historical consciousness has plunged them deeper and deeper into skepticism, and now there is no way forward but following the consequences of this consciousness to its end.

What interests me about Nietzsche and Dilthey’s insistence on the proximity of historical consciousness to crisis is that neither thinker argues for an opposition to historical study. Recognizing that the true problem is the separation of life and knowledge that has taken place through historical consciousness, Nietzsche and Dilthey attempt a shift in philosophical perspective: a shift in which knowledge is recognized as an activity of life, and thus an activity that can be waged either for or against life. When Nietzsche is brought to consider the origin of historical consciousness, for instance, he writes:

“this origin must itself, in turn, be understood historically, history (*Historie*) itself must solve the problem of history, knowledge must turn the goad upon itself – this threefold must is the imperative of the spirit of the “new age”, provided that there is really something new, powerful, life-promoting, and original in it.”

Nietzsche’s point here is that knowledge of history, which has so far proved destructive of life, could be used to understand how life and knowledge first became separated. Such a use of historical study would be “untimely” – insofar as it would undermine modern science’s belief in ‘knowledge for its own sake’ – but it would nevertheless imply a use of knowledge for the advancement of life. Dilthey similarly argues that the solution to the crisis of historical consciousness must be sought in historical consciousness itself:

“(E)verything historical is relative in the sense that if we gather it all in consciousness, it seems to surreptitiously breed dissolution, skepticism, and impotent subjectivity.... What is relative must be brought into a more fundamental connection with what is universally valid... historical consciousness itself must contain the rules and the power for dedicating ourselves freely and with sovereignty, in the fact of the past, to a unified goal of human culture.”

Dilthey implies here that the development of historical consciousness must be extended past the point at which the claims of metaphysics are relativized, and toward a “unified goal of human culture” which is found in historical life itself. For Dilthey – just as for Nietzsche – what remains for us to achieve is a study of history from the ‘perspective of life’ itself, i.e. a study of history which does not effect any separation of knowledge and life.

In this paper I will examine Nietzsche and Dilthey’s descriptions of the crisis brought forth by historical consciousness, and I will demonstrate that these thinkers’ shifts toward a philosophical analysis of ‘life’ are similarly driven by an interest in determining how we can study history from the perspective of life. After first considering their commentaries on historical consciousness and the

separation of knowledge and life which takes place through it, I will conclude with a comparison of Nietzsche and Dilthey's shifts toward the possibility of a study of history from the perspective of life. My prospective thesis is that Nietzsche and Dilthey share the view that historical consciousness needs to be recognized as an activity of life itself, but that they encounter different difficulties in clarifying what the study of history would need to become if we are to avoid a separation of life and knowledge.

## **Hannah Arendt and the Importance of History or Why is Heidegger the “Last Romantic”?**

*Kim Maslin*

Panel 3

Politics Department, Hendrix College, Arkansas, USA

Hannah Arendt is often criticized for what appears to be a haphazard use of history. Heidi Thomann Tewarson argues that Arendt misrepresents both Rahel and Karl Varnhagen. Kathryn Gines takes issue with the distinction that she draws between colonialism and imperialism. The historiography of Eichmann in Jerusalem has famously been a contentious subject since the text first appeared. Lisa Disch finds Arendt's understanding of the American Revolution wanting. It is my intent in this paper to develop the argument that in order to understand the use Arendt makes of history, we must first acknowledge her concomitant debts to Heidegger and early German Romanticism.

Hannah Arendt's career began, in many ways, with the Romantics. She discovered Rahel Varnhagen while working on a project on German Romanticism. Explicitly, most of Arendt's discussion of Romanticism occurs in the context of her Jewish writings. Implicitly, Arendt's disagreement with the Romantics goes to the heart of her interest in political philosophy. The thing that Arendt unambiguously shares with the Romantics is an interest in human freedom. Arendt strives to protect a space for human plurality, a goal with which many of the early Romantics would likely agree. She parts ways with them on the best path. Arendt's space of human plurality is necessarily historical, whereas the Romantics pursued a distinctly ahistorical path. Arendt borrows the Romantic methodology of a fragment, but insists that the content be historical.

Arendt's debt to Heidegger scarcely needs mentioning; yet the aspect of Heidegger's legacy that is rarely mentioned in the Arendt literature is his notion of historicity. I suggest that in approaching her Jewish identity, Arendt was engaging in an act of Heideggerian historicity, which is to say, she took more seriously than did Heidegger himself one of the basic, even if often overlooked, precepts of his fundamental ontology. One can only approach the ontological through the ontic, which is to say the nature of being can only be understood through the unconcealment of some concrete aspect of one's existence as it presents itself. In other words, one's project is conditioned by an understanding of the inescapable historicity of one's own existence. As such, Arendt takes up her own existence and projects herself forward by offering an existential interpretation of Jewishness, one grounded in a re-interpretation of Jewish history, in which she highlights the structures that pressed upon Jews, the existential choices made by a few individuals, and the subsequent structures that, in turn, press upon others.

In short, this paper aspires to contribute to the literature on the role in history in continental philosophy, by highlighting Arendt's philosophical use. Drawing on both her experiences as a Jew, in the final days of the Weimar Republic and her understanding of the American Revolution, she

ends up re-establishing the common and visible world, utilizing historic moments as guideposts in narrative form. In a 1946 book review, Arendt wrote that the book failed “because its authors, submerged in a chaos of details, were unable to understand or make clear the nature of the facts confronting them.”<sup>iv</sup> Facts alone reveal little; meaning, and ultimately understanding, derive not from simply re-telling of an event or set of facts but rather from the relating of a series of events in the form of a narrative. In other words, history is less the compilation of a set of objective facts than it is the attempt to interpret events or occurrences, such that they can be contested in the spaces of appearances. The collective can then reconcile itself to those events and take from them a guide to the future. Thus, in her own project, Arendt firmly roots her Self in an understanding of Jewish history, challenging the dominant narrative and inviting contestation. She offers an alternative narrative to the dominant antisemitic narrative of a calculating people aspiring to world domination, suggesting instead a people seeking acceptance, survival, love and in some cases, esteem. In so doing, she highlights the structures that pressed upon Jews, the existential choices made by a few individuals and the subsequent structures that continued to press upon others.

## Day 2

### Rethinking Historical Methodology: Falsifying Methodologies with Archival Evidence

**William A.B. Parkhurst**

Panel 4

University of South Florida, Tampa, USA

I argue that based on a review of the literature and historical evidence, that the use of the methodological principle known as the *priority principle* in historical scholarship is inconsistent and irreconcilable with historical evidence. This principle claims that published philosophical works should take priority over unpublished philosophical works. The argument goes as follows: 1. There is a sharp and transparent demarcation between the published and unpublished work. 2. The published works should be prioritized over the unpublished work as evidence. 2a. The unpublished work is never admissible as valid evidence. 3. The unpublished work, if used at all, only functions as a “supplement” for the complete evidence found in the published work. 1, 2, and 3 are nearly universal among commentators who endorse the priority principle while 2a is an extreme position often advanced and applied, if not completely consistently.

However, there are no agreed upon necessary and sufficient conditions of a particular textual object being considered “Published.” This absence leads to implicit and often tacit value demarcation criteria that can be broadly grouped into four types of consideration: [1] publication, [2] authorization, [3] publicness, and [4] audience. Each of these criteria pick out a different set of texts as “published”. Thus, despite the veneer of agreement, the most broadly accepted methodological approach historical continental scholarship is applied inconsistently. I argue, we must either offer necessary and sufficient conditions for a piece of text being published, or we ought to abandon such abstract criteria altogether and embrace a contextual and historical approach. I then argue that the first option is impossible given historical and archival evidence.

My application of this argument to the texts of Nietzsche and Foucault have been published in *Le Foucauldien* and *Nietzsche-Studien*. This paper, however, argues that this problem is a systemic

problem within historical scholarship more generally.

I argue that the four demarcation criteria applied by scholars end up classifying texts into non-extensive and mutually exclusive sets considered “published.” This means two scholars who seem to agree about the priority principle in theory, apply it differently in practice. While scholars often agree we ought to privilege the “published” work, they tacitly diverge regarding which texts should be considered “published.” This central principle in historical scholarship is methodologically bankrupt.

I end my paper arguing that philosophers ought to abandon the universal application of the priority principle since it is based on a premise which is demonstrably false. Rather, I argue we should embrace genetic forms or interpretation. Genetic interpretation has nothing to do with DNA but rather tracks the genesis of texts through their creation. In doing so it tracks texts through readings, letters, notes, drafts, fair copies, correction copies and approval copies. Further, this goes beyond initial publication through later editions as well as author annotations in their own works. Genetic interpretation allows scholars and historians to take the status of a work seriously as an individual historically constituted material object and do away with falsifiable abstractions.

## **How to Philosophize Scientifically: The Historians’ of Thought Project of Philosophy as Strict Science**

**Alexander A. Lvov**

Panel 4

Department of Philosophical Anthropology, Institute of Philosophy,  
Saint Petersburg State University, Russia

The problem of establishing scientific type of philosophy, or as Edmund Husserl had formulated it “philosophy in a strict sense”, has been one of the major challenges for the Modern thinkers. Starting from Descartes and Leibnitz, they attempted to solve this problem conceptually by elaborating the principles of a universal science, *sapientia universalissima* in Cartesian or *mathesis universalis* in Leibnizian terms. Perhaps, the most impressive result of such a universally comprehensive doctrine was conceived by Hegel, although his efforts marked a certain dead-end of any further conceptual development of theoretical perspective in philosophy. An exceptional (as he always appears to be) figure here is Kant, who realized that, firstly, he only starts the construction of such a building, which could be finished as a complete science of metaphysics over time, secondly, that the nearest example of that is the classical philosophical canon, known as such since the school of Speusippus. The later efforts of the phenomenologists and neo-Kantians to establish such a scientific type of philosophy failed as well.

However by the middle of 19<sup>th</sup> century this challenge was accepted by an alternative party. I argue that it was the historians of philosophy who introduced an alternative project of scientific philosophy towards the conceptual efforts of Descartes, Kant, Husserl and others. I hold that the history of the history of philosophy demonstrates the attempts to found such a discipline, within which there could be found strict and accurate tenets and postulates as well as methodological principles of how to philosophize coherently, hence scientifically.

Since antiquity, the scrutiny in the history of thought had widely considered (with few exceptions) as an investigation proper for the historians and men of letters, not the philosophers. Yet after

the fall of Hegelian hegemony in the conceptual field of philosophy, the task of the historians of thought became more precise, namely: to revisit the great chain of the Western (and later also Eastern, and then global) thought to survey and understand the matters of fact in the course of the history of the developments of spirit. Moreover, the historians of philosophy took the initiative to reconsider, how Hegel and his followers exploited the historical data to found and explicate the reasons of their leadership from the past. A breakthrough in the discipline was made by Adolf Trendelenburg, who announced the historical-philosophical investigation as an academic guideline along with the conceptual (i.e. logical, metaphysical or ethical) works within philosophy. An auxiliary, however quite or even more influential means to such an enterprise became the rules of quotation, bibliographical work and inquiry into sources in theses, treatises, articles, monographs, etc. All this preparatory background work became obligatory for the philosophers as scholars, who were made to obey the new-established objective rules in their field of research. No doubts that this played a crucial part in forming the ethos of an academic philosopher.

The followers of Trendelenburg as well as Neo-Kantians and Neo-Hegelians took such an enterprise up and elaborated the early stances to the comprehensive history of philosophy, understood as a project towards the codification and detailed reading of the very course of the history of human thought. This latter task produced two important implications. Firstly, they discerned the borders of the history of philosophy as not merely instrumental, but independent sphere of investigation and, consequently, problematized the concept of philosophy as such. Secondly, they recognized the non-European forms of philosophy, which priorly used to be referred to only as to a specific forms of philosophizing, and included them in the canon.

Consequently there emerged such important developments within the sphere of the history of philosophy as Gustav Teichmüller's history of concepts (*Begriffsgeschichte*), Paul Masson-Oursel's comparative philosophy, and various forms of history of philosophy designed under a certain metaphysical, methodological or general social principles (as those by W. Windelband, K. Fischer, B. Russell, etc.). The latter lay the basis of the today's canon of philosophy, a framework of the current educative and conceptual work, nonetheless it has been thoroughly discussed (by R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, B. Kuklick et al.) if the current canon is a dead-end of the alternative historical-philosophical rout in the search for the scientific philosophy.

Thus, there are three circumstances – the distinct subject-matter together with elaborated historical-philosophical methodology and formal principles of objectiveness of historical attitude to philosophical issues – that created the ideological (to put it in terms of Quentin Skinner) canon of the history of (Western) philosophy for both educative and research purposes.

## Hegel's Gallery of Images

**Robert Scott**

Panel 4

English (Criticism and Culture), University of Cambridge, UK

What are the relationships between philosophy, the history of philosophy, and the aesthetic? How should philosophical thinking recollect its own history, and orient itself in critical relation to what came before?

For the early Hegel (as for many of his German contemporaries), the promise of a unified system of

philosophy would be fulfilled through a radicalisation of Kant's aesthetic theory –his theorisation of the simultaneous distinction and inseparability between concept and intuition, a priori knowledge and aesthetic intelligibility. For the later Hegel, however, from his *Phenomenology of Spirit* onwards, *Vorstellung* (translated variously as 'representation' or 'picture-thinking', and closely associated with the thinking of art, religion, and the senses more generally) is repeatedly invoked as an inadequate means to philosophical knowledge. Such thinking, according to Hegel, does not disclose the true, but corrupts and obfuscates it. Representation stains the purity of the concept, and thus prevents it from being realised in its true form.

Against the grain of this traditional interpretation, the present paper will argue that *das Bild* [the image] (a central component and means of picture-thinking) remains an essential feature across Hegel's thought. Through readings of the section on 'Representation' in his *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, and two brief but key passages in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, it will argue that the image, while not the locus of Hegel's philosophy, is of crucial importance to it, as that which provides initial epistemological access to history. It will end by giving some remarks, in light of this, on how Hegel recollects the philosophies of his past, and how we, in turn, should recollect Hegel.

After a brief introduction, the paper will begin by expositing Hegel's schematic account of the relationships between intuition, representation (subdivided into recollection, imagination, and memory), and thinking in his *Encyclopaedia* (§§445-468). In the briefest of terms: 'representation' is understood as recollected [*erinnert*] intuition. (The precise term that Hegel uses, *Erinnerung*, encapsulates both 'recollection' and 'internalisation'.) It is this activity of recollection which translates the content of sensible intuition into an image, free from its particular immediacy and singularity. It is the means by which the thinking subject internalises and takes account of things in order to learn from and later draw upon them. This image, while mentally internal, is internally separated from and placed before consciousness for the purpose of intellectual consideration and conceptualisation (*Vorstellung* translates literally as 'that which is placed before'). The image, as a recollection of a past intuition, is thus an essential moment in the generation and passage of the concept, as that which thinking is developed from and nourishes itself upon. This section will therefore introduce the idea that images, for Hegel, function to mediate between past and present.

While this apparently incidental passage from the *Encyclopaedia* claims to pertain only to individual psychology, the second section of the paper will argue that it is of central importance to the entirety of Hegel's philosophy. It will do this by using it to read a passage from the Preface to the *Phenomenology* (§28) which describes the way in which present philosophical thinking relates to its past: The recollection of the past (which Hegel identifies with the 'cultural formation of the world') takes the form of a 'silhouette'. Past philosophies are rendered as mere 'shapes which spirit has already laid aside', 'fragments of knowing,' but which have also, at once, become 'acquired possessions'. Like 'the image' in the *Encyclopaedia* they are represented as both separate from and internal to consciousness for the purpose of conceptualisation. They are rendered in simplified form, in outline, their concrete particularity lost; as images against which and with which present thinking can define itself. Each generation recollects and internalises previous shapes of spirit, not in exhaustive detail, but as images. From this we can begin to account for Hegel's critiques of the philosophies of his predecessors (from Socrates to Kant) which are often noted for their lack of nuance and textual justification. Past shapes [*Gestalten*] of spirit, and hence past philosophies, for Hegel, are just that: not faithful reconstructions but caricatures.

The paper will end by arguing that this theorisation of 'the image' and its centrality to Hegel's conceptualisation of philosophy as a philosophy of history gives new significance to his own description of the *Phenomenology* as a 'gallery of images' (§808): as the recollected, internalised history of spirit. It also suggests that in our own reading and recollection of Hegel, we should not aim to abstract the 'arguments' or 'positions' from his texts, but should instead pay particular attention to his own use of imagery. If we neglect this function of the image, we deprive philosophy of thinking its own history, and therefore of the absolute.

## **Facts and Tendencies: The Connection Between Philosophy of History and Sociology in Adorno's Thought**

**Chiara de Cosmo**

Panel 5

Fondazione Collegio San Carlo, Modena, Italy

As remarked by Stefan Müller-Doohm, Adorno's concept of immanent critique stays at the real core of both his philosophical and sociological reflection. This category, strictly connected with the Marxian critique of political economy, refers to an analysis of contemporary society which deals with its inner contradictions. These contradictions, Müller-Doohm further observes, can be revealed by an emancipative critique which involves two dimensions of time: the consideration of the burden of the past in the forms of domination and suffering which still permeates social relationships and the anticipation of the future, not as a utopian prefiguration of a society which has yet to come, but rather a possibility arising from the inner fractures of the social reality. In this sense, sociological critique cannot be separated from a specific form of "philosophy of history".

My aim is to emphasize the connection between these two poles by exploring Adorno's criticism of the positivist notion of "facts" on the one side, and by showing, on the other side, the specific meaning of "philosophy of history" in Adorno's thought and its evolution from the essays written in the '30s to the mature works of the '60s.

In my opinion, Adorno's critique of the theoretical approach of positivist thinkers is strictly related with his reflection about history. In his Introduction to *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, Adorno underlines that "the core of the critique of positivism is that it shuts itself off from both the experience of the blindly dominating totality and the driving desire that it should ultimately become something else. It contents itself with the senseless ruins which remain after the liquidation of idealism, without interpreting, for their part, both liquidation and what is liquidated, and rendering them true." Here the weakness of the positivist position is related to the incapacity to go beyond "senseless ruins", i.e. to recognize the genesis of the material of knowledge, and, therefore, of its latent possibility of being otherwise. Conversely, according to Adorno, a sociological perspective which aspires to be critical must not conceive reality as a mere collection of empirical data, but has to recognize its historical stratification, by keeping together the moment of the objective validity and that of the genesis. In this sense, "facts" are not a simple empirical object of science, as in the positivist view, but a material with its own proper history, built through a process of formation, which is at the same time synchronic and diachronic. In the *Negative Dialectics*, published in 1966, Adorno wrote that "the philosophy of history comes as close to historiography as historiography itself, the insight into the essence veiled by the facticity it qualifies, has come to be impossible save as philosophy." Therefore, philosophy of history, understood as a dialectical combination of historiography and theory, represents for Adorno the privileged way to take into consideration the

genesis of our contemporary society in a critical perspective.

The first work in which Adorno seeks to confront with the category of history is the short essay *The Idea of Natural History*, written in 1932. Here Adorno introduces the concept of natural history: social processes involve both the repetition of invariant structures (which Adorno defines as “natural” or mythical) and the emergence of elements of novelty (the genuinely “historical” moment of the process). The two dimension of myth and history are conceived by Adorno in a dialectical relationship, i.e. the recognition of the natural element can disclose its caducity and historical dynamics can reverse itself.

## **From the History of Being to Historical Materialism [Cancelled]**

*Josh Lalonde*

Panel 5

Independent Scholar

Heidegger’s history of philosophy as the history of being, from its first emergence in the Presocratics to its culmination in the reign of technology, constitutes an essential reference point for the tradition that has come to be known as Continental philosophy. This history of philosophy is at the same time a philosophy of history, which it would not be an exaggeration to summarize under the slogan: metaphysics as the motor of history. Not only is the history of the successive “epochs” of being, or ways in which being comes to be thought, the essence of history for Heidegger, but these epochs are “sendings” of being itself to which thought can only be receptive. Such a philosophy of history is a remarkable example of what Marx, with reference to Hegel, called a standing of history on its head, in the sense both that it makes ideas, the productions of the head, into the basis on which history rests, and also that it inverts the proper order of explanation, according to which ideas arise out of a more fundamental real basis.

I propose to examine the consequences for the history of philosophy of instead standing history on its feet; that is, of adopting historical materialism as philosophy of history. I first confront this proposal with Marx and Engels’ dictum in the *German Ideology* that metaphysics has no history. I take this proposition to mean that metaphysics, like all spheres of ideology, has its history outside itself: it is a domain of the class struggle in the realm of the ideal which is determined in the last instance by the real class struggle that constitutes history as such. A materialist approach to the history of philosophy would accordingly have to present the conflicts between philosophical positions, and the tensions within each philosophical system, as reflections – though not of course mechanical reproductions – of the class conflict that make up their socio-historical context. Next, I examine a particular application of the proposal by arguing that what Heidegger in “*The Question Concerning Technology*” depicts as the “enframing” of the world by technology is an idealized reflection of the real subsumption of the world under capital; that is, not simply the abstract imposition of the capital-relation onto a preexisting production process and social order more generally (formal subsumption), but the transformation of the social order as a whole and its inclusion within the circuit of capital. Finally, I draw on Lukács and Sohn-Rethel to suggest that the history of being as a whole is the idealized reflection of the real history of the commodity form. According to this hypothesis, it is only when what Sohn-Rethel calls the social nexus appears in the form of a thing (commodity) that this social nexus can itself become an object of thought for members of that society, depicted as an abstract “thing” distinct from all things: being.

## Presenting the Unpresentable: History and Redemption in Novalis and Benjamin

Zeke Goggin

Panel 5

Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, USA

Contributions of Romantic philosophers to the philosophy of history have been overshadowed by dialectical thinkers like Hegel and Marx. This is perhaps due to the intuitive appeal of interpreting continuity as the foundational determination of historicity. But no less is essential to historical consciousness is discontinuity. Without ruptures of historical continuity, there would quite simply be nothing to thematize as continuous. Dialectic offers a powerful model for integrating discontinuity into continuity, but we ignore Romantic emphases on radical rupture, loss, and discontinuity at our peril. In this regard, the works of Friedrich von Hardenberg, better known by his pen-name “Novalis,” are worthy of renewed attention.

A reading of Novalis’ philosophical and mystico-political works helps us glimpse the enduring value and legacy of Romantic views of history. Pace Hegel, Novalis never rejects historical agency in favor of an inner world of poetic fancies. Rather, he re-conceives historical agency and its narration as forms of mystical poesis. The philosophical justification for this approach begins with a critique of Fichte. Novalis’ displacement of Fichtean intuition provides an alternative temporality which haunts the dialectical unfolding of historical consciousness. Connecting this to Novalis’ controversial political works, we find a conception of history which is not, as caricature has it, mere reaction or revanchist fantasy. Instead, we discover a critique of the temporality of historical redemption itself, mediated by the “mystical” dimension of poetic imagination. This critique persists, I claim, the post-dialectical materialist historiography of Walter Benjamin. For both Novalis and Benjamin, the paradigm for grasping the inner relationship of historical continuity and discontinuity is not a the progressive integration of the discontinuous within the continuous in the Concept. It is, rather, a phantasmatic representation of a missed encounter with the present.

In his *Fichte Studien*, Novalis combines the Fichtean emphasis on self-constituting activity with the Kantian critique of apperception. In his view, we must understand self-consciousness as self-constituting while also affirming that this activity cannot be rendered conceptually transparent. Rather than self-authenticating knowledge, Fichte’s intellectual intuition turns out to be the enraptured self-encounter of transcendental imagination with its own constructive act. Here imagination meets its limit: its participation in the Absolute cannot be grasped immediately because the very act of self-representation involves a redoubling modification of the primordial activity [*Urhandlung*] of the I. Our attempt to grasp this primordial activity always implicates self-consciousness in a missed encounter with its own activity: by the time reflection arrives, the *Urhandlung* of self-consciousness has fled the scene. Our participation in the Absolute, and thus the Absolute itself, are thus irreducibly self-occluding, for Novalis.

Like mysticism, poetry “presents the unpresentable” [*Er stellt das Undarstellbare dar*]. Such mystical poetizing is consonant with the limits of transcendental reflection, properly conceived. Like the mystic, the poet transfigures certain forms of discursive failure into indices of a paradoxical success. Poetic figurations of the eternal lack of the Absolute, like Novalis’ “Night”, represent the transcendental imagination’s self-occlusion, missed encounter, or discontinuity by producing images that evince un-imaginability.

The missed encounter of self-consciousness with its own act becomes the model for the immanent discontinuity of historicity. In that connection, the mystical poetry which brings this discontinuity to expression assumes a historiographical and political power. *Poesis* is, after all, primarily *making*. Novalis insists that this mystical poetry plays a public role in the construction of “Religion, Nature, and the State”. He goes further: the fundamental touchstones of historical communities are, in fact, nothing other than poetic productions or even “fictions”. Rather than explaining fantasy away, historical critique must learn how to use fantasy.

Such uses of fantasy implicate Novalis’ mystical poetics approach in a dangerously proto-fascistic “aestheticization” of the political. At the same time, his strategy reveals a vector of revolutionary potential. This asynchronous temporality of redemption reverberates in Western Marxism through Walter Benjamin’s “messianic materialism.” For both Novalis and Benjamin, the paradigm of historical consciousness is not progressive integration of the discontinuous within the continuous. It is, rather, a phantasmatic representation of a missed encounter with the present. Reading the historical struggle for emancipation through a “secret index by which it is referred to redemption,” Benjamin’s construction of dialectical images combine the messianic theology of post-exilic Judaism with the redemptive temporality of Novalis’ mystico-political writings.

## **Marx’s Critique of Political Economy and the Foundation of a Critical Historiography: Models of Social Formation and the Reading of Historical Processes**

**Sebastiano Taccola**

Panel 5

Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, Italy

Marx never wrote an essay explicitly dedicated to historiographical theory; nevertheless, in his works committed to the critique of political economy we can find some interesting and productive considerations for the foundation of a critical historiographical paradigm.

As Marx writes in *Capital, Volume III*, “all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided”. In the Marxian perspective, in order to be effective knowledge, science must have an anti-empiricist, anti-naturalistic and counterintuitive character. As far as it concerns the realm of history, this would mean that it is necessary to look for an epistemological matrix capable of accounting for the osmosis between the logical level of abstract categories and that of the real historical becoming without presupposing their immediate identity. Marx’s theory of history is built upon this tension between the logical and the historical: on the one hand, we have abstract models (modes of production and social formations), on the other, we have historical becoming.

In this presentation, I’d like to highlight the epistemological elements essential to Marx’s theory of history in order to stress its anti-historicist and materialist character. I will focus on the following points:

1) Marx’s critique of political economy aims at deconstructing the naturalisations and eternisations immanent to the method of political economy. Marx’s critical science does this not by merely adding a historical determination to the categories of political economy, but by showing their epistemological incapability of founding a perspective, in which social processes are explained

in all their richness and complexity. From Marx's point of view, it's only through the critical and systematic determination of the social specificity of a mode of production that we can find its historical specificity, and not the other way around. Otherwise, we ideologically presuppose the structure of historical becoming –which is the explanandum, and not the explanans.

2) In this horizon, the specific logic of a mode of production sheds a light on its specific historicity (its rhythms of reproduction, its laws of movement, its tendencies). Therefore, the basis of the Marxian theory of history coincides with a logical-constructive method, in which the logical moment (the synchronic structure of the mode of production) and the historical moment (the reconstruction of the form of its historical becoming) form an organic unity without reflecting each other; in order to understand their unity, we must pass through the theoretical mediation constituted by their difference.

3) At this analytical level, 'unity' and 'difference' are the categories that give us the key to understand the concept of 'specific historicity'. The specific historicity of a determined model of social formation is the result of a montage, in which every level that participates to the reproduction of the social totality is characterized by its own specific temporality. The differential temporality of the levels is the presupposition in order to understand the specific form of their recomposition in a unity and, in this way, to gain the field of visibility of the modes of reproduction specific to a determined social totality.

4) This method can also show the conditions of possibility of a historiographical knowledge which is capable of moving backwards towards the past (i.e., the pre-capitalist social formations). Such a method is built upon a series of abstract categories that spring out of the critical analysis of the "contemporary society"; according to the critique of political economy, it is in the capitalist society that we can clearly see the process of autonomisation of Society as such, as an organic whole that reproduces itself in the temporality of the abstract. From this present, then, it is possible to proceed per differentiam towards the historiographical reconstruction of the pre-capitalist social formations –this is what Marx means when he writes that "Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape". The present constitutes the point of departure (*Standpunkt*), not that of arrival, of the historiographical theory that is disclosed by Marx's critique of political economy.

5) Such a historiographical theory is alternative both to *Universalgeschichte* and to traditional historicism: the first tends towards a homogeneous reading of history where the historical process coincide with the developing of pre-determined forms of relationship; the latter presupposes nothing less than History as such. The Marxian theory of history shows the conditions of possibility of a historiographical knowledge founded on the consideration of differential temporalities and the reconstruction of historical processes characterized by specific forms of continuity and discontinuity, interruption and transformation of their own structure of diachronic becoming. On these bases, we can then: a) analyse the morphological structure immanent to different historical epochs and understand (and not merely describe) their historical transformations and historically determined laws of motion; b) try to foresee in a scientific (non-prophetic) way the conditions of possibility of the leap between the "realm of necessity" and the "realm of freedom". The critical understanding of the present constitutes the necessary form of mediation in order to move our analysis both towards the past and the future.

## Picturing the Mind: On Freud's Structural Theory

*Francey Russell*

KL

Department of Philosophy, Bernard College, Columbia University, NY, USA

This talk will be about Freud in particular, but is oriented by a broader philosophical idea or preoccupation, namely a preoccupation with a tendency to picture the mind, its states, and its capacities as things, objects, and more particularly as figures. This tendency to picture the mind as a thing has been variously diagnosed and critiqued from Kant onwards (in, for instance, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Lacan, Wittgenstein, and others). Here, I analyze this tendency to objectify the mind as expressed in Freud's final metapsychology, which analyzes the mind into id, ego, and superego. I argue that Freud's structural metapsychology does picture psychic capacities or structures as inner objects or figures, not erroneously or naively, but for principled reasons, namely because the structural metapsychology reflects a way in which – at some level and to some extent – the mind already pictures itself (to take a phrase from Richard Wollheim). I also argue that a theory of mind must reflect the mind's own picture of itself because, Freud suggests, a psychoanalytic theory of mind must be such as to be understood by its object: that is, the mind must be able to recognize itself in its theorization, however obliquely or uncannily. I call this “the recognition requirement” and discuss the extent to which it can be generalized.

## Day 3

### Continental Philosophy and Feminist Philosophy: Slipping Through the Gaps

*Christine Battersby*

KL

Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Emerita Reader; FRSA

Anyone who has engaged with continental philosophy must surely be aware that it is a tradition that places feminist philosophers in an extremely awkward position. This is for a variety of reasons, including the fact that very few of the philosophers canonised in the so-called “continental tradition” are themselves women. A large number of significant female philosophers have simply been written out of the historical record. Even canonised feminist and female philosophers, such as Simone de Beauvoir, have not received the philosophical attention – and, indeed, the translation and editing – which they deserve. This has meant that whole areas of philosophical thought have themselves been marginalised, and made to seem insignificant in terms of the (his)stories that continental philosophers tell themselves. I will show how a recent attempt to define “continental feminism” has, in fact, made matters worse, and consider why this might have happened. Highlighting some of the gaps in the histories of philosophy relating to women, as well as issues to do with geolocation and also “race”, I will also consider a recent attempt to broaden out “continental feminist philosophy”, and ask whether continental philosophy should also be reimagined in order to better fill in these egregious gaps.

# The Reception and Influence of J.F. Fries: The Limits of the 'German Idealism' Frame

Tadahiro Oota

Panel 6

Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan; Japan Society for the Promotion of Science

This paper aims to examine the historical reception of J.F. Fries' philosophy, as well as Fries' hidden influence in the history of philosophy, in order to illuminate the limits of the historical framework known as 'German idealism'.

Traditionally, 19<sup>th</sup>-century German philosophy has been understood using a linear structuring scheme: 'German idealism', as it is called, begins with Kant, develops via Fichte and Schelling, and ends with Hegel. Although some recent researchers criticise this schematisation of German philosophy as old-fashioned, and many who take this view are working to excavate and reevaluate forgotten philosophers of the age in order to reconstruct the history of philosophy anew as a constellation of philosophers, some philosophers are still overlooked or at least misunderstood in a history of philosophy that retains the imprint of the old narrative.

One such philosopher is Jacob Friedrich Fries, and this paper aims to illuminate the ways his work has historically been received. Fries was a 19<sup>th</sup>-century German philosopher contemporaneous with Hegel and opposed to so-called German idealism. Fries' philosophy has been dismissed as a 'psychological approach' to Kant's philosophy with no place in the canon of legitimate German philosophy, but he had significant influence during his lifetime. Hegel himself aggressively criticised Fries and two distinct Friesian schools of thought developed after Fries' death.

In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, Hegelian and neo-Kantian philosophers criticised Fries and Friesian thought for its perceived empiricist bent, characterising Fries' philosophy as 'psychologism'. This critique was first offered by Kuno Fischer, a famous Hegelian philosopher as well as the first great opponent of Fries' philosophy. In an 1862 lecture, Fischer criticised Fries' emphasis on empirical psychology, arguing that in Fries' philosophy, 'the critique of reason is only psychological and therefore merely empirical'.

Johann Eduard Erdmann, another Hegelian philosopher contemporaneous with Fischer, agreed with Fischer's critique of Fries. In his *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, Erdmann summarised Fries' standpoint: 'As his main deviation from Kant, Fries himself explains that he transformed Kant's investigations into the empirical-psychological or anthropological one'. Wilhelm Windelband, a neo-Kantian philosopher known for his work in the history of philosophy, followed the Hegelians' view of Fries. In his *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, Windelband asserted that Fries' philosophy was 'an attempt to translate a critical principle of self-cognition of human reason into words of the empirical psychology'. With this assessment, Fries' philosophy disappeared from the 'legitimate' genealogy of 19<sup>th</sup>-century German philosophy.

However, misunderstanding of Fries' philosophy hinders comprehension of other philosophers' thought and distorts the history of philosophy itself. First, German philosophers contemporaneous with him did not regard Fries' philosophy as psychologism. For example, Arthur Schopenhauer read the book for which Fries was and is mainly known, *Neue Kritik der Vernunft*, in his youth. Schopenhauer made extensive notes on *Neue Kritik* and made use of Fries' ideas in developing his

own standpoint. In Schopenhauer's notes, he does not use words like 'psychology' or 'anthropology' to characterise Fries' philosophy, as many Hegelian philosophers later did. Instead, Schopenhauer's notebook suggests that Fries' contemporaries (including Schopenhauer) correctly understood the key insights of Fries' philosophy. Second, ignorance of Fries' philosophy hinders our comprehension of Hegel himself. Hegel referred to Fries' philosophy in the manuscript (*Notiz zu Fries*) and letter he sent to Niethammer in 1811. In these materials, Hegel quotes from - and describes his objections to - Fries' *System der Logik*. Thus, without knowledge of Fries' philosophy, it is difficult to comprehend not only Hegel's reception of Fries, but also Hegel's own, rival conception of philosophy, which he attempts to articulate in these materials.

Third, Fries' philosophy is often referenced by modern Japanese philosophers. For example, Kitaro Nishida, a prominent Japanese philosopher and founding member of the Kyoto school, referred to Fries and Friesian philosophy in his university lecture series titled 'Introduction to Philosophy', given every year from 1910 to 1928 at Kyoto University. In this lecture series, Nishida examined Fries' standpoint in a section titled 'Philosophy and Religion'. Nishida's precise explanation of Fries' philosophy suggests that, for Nishida's comprehension of the history of philosophy, as well as the formation of Nishida's own standpoint, Fries might have much more influence than is usually credited to him.

## **Eadem Sed Aliter: The Value of History According to Arthur Schopenhauer**

**Beatrice Beccari**

Panel 6

Department of Humanistic Studies (Philosophy), University of Ferrara, Italy;  
Pontifical Catholic University of Paraná, Brazil

The aim of this contribution is to outline a clear picture of Schopenhauer's considerations of History and Philosophy of History. In particular, my task will be to elucidate the reasons why Schopenhauer did not present a Philosophy of History in the manner of his fellow contemporaries. My thesis is the following: behind Schopenhauer's well-known antipathy towards German Idealists, there is a theoretical presupposition of an epistemological-transcendental type and of Kantian source that led Schopenhauer towards his eccentric and antagonistic position with respect to the German cultural milieu of the time. Consequently, together with the criticism of a certain way of understanding Philosophy of History, it will be noted that for Schopenhauer a philosophical reflection on History is nevertheless acceptable and admitted, as long as the value of History as a domain of knowledge has been ascertained.

My discussion will give considerable space to Schopenhauer's theory of knowledge, a pivotal aspect in understanding his Philosophy as a whole; but it will also take a philological-genealogical perspective in order to show the origin and development of his claims about History and Philosophy of History.

To begin with, I will present the considerations on History included in *The World as Will and Representation*. History is characterised here as a knowledge different from both Science and Art, the two complementary domains of the representational consideration of the world. At the same time, History is also identified as the antithetical knowledge with respect to Philosophy. In these pages one also encounters Schopenhauer's conclusions on the significance of History, which are strictly connected with his rejection of the recognition of History as a lens through which

Philosophy can exercise its highest explanatory power. The core of Schopenhauer's critique resides in contrasting the assumption of a "realist" point of view, guilty of mistaking the phenomenon for the thing in itself and extremely focused on the realm of becoming with an exaggerated optimistic approach. For Schopenhauer, this is a particularly "dangerous" move, especially when advanced at a time when Kantian criticism has already changed the fate of Philosophy.

In order to fully understand these statements, it will be necessary to dwell first on the conception of "representation" in the global context of *The World as Will and Representation*, and secondly, on the "fundamental premises of the book", to which Schopenhauer himself refers at the beginning of the text: *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* and *On Sight and Colour*. Thanks to them one can become more acquainted with Schopenhauer's so-called Elementary (Transcendental) Philosophy. In fact, this is the theoretical place where the epistemological dualism between Representation and Will arises together with the corresponding dualism between appearance and noumena. This is important because it is the kernel from which the philosopher draws his well-known considerations on Ethics, Aesthetics and, more generally, the "Metaphysics of the Will". Only by giving voice to this epistemological-transcendental premise, and by examining its formulation, it will be possible to highlight the origin of Schopenhauer's circumscribed statements on History with the consequent criticism of German Idealists' Philosophy of History.

In so doing, on the one hand, the post-Kantian basis that Schopenhauer's proposals have will clearly emerge. On the other, the core of Schopenhauer's originality will be finally detected in his interpretation of the human rational faculty and in the related positioning of the source of Ethics, which has essential implications for our theme.

Hence, to conclude, I will show that this is precisely the point where the critique of the Philosophy of History springs from and that, beyond purely personal resentments, the divergence between Schopenhauer and German Idealists has firm theoretical foundations, which go back to the earliest moments of the genesis of Schopenhauer's thought.

## **On History and Aporia: Gillian Rose's use of Søren Kierkegaard**

***Elisabeth Li***

Panel 6

Princeton Project for Philosophy and Religion, Princeton, USA

In this paper, I propose to address how and why Continental thought utilises past thinkers as part of its method through consideration of the philosopher Gillian Rose's engagement with the nineteenth century Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard. I will argue that Rose's reading and reinterpretation of Kierkegaard is informed by and recommends to us a methodological ideal of reading philosophical works aporetically. I hope to show that this approach in turn reflects a productive tension between Rose's simultaneous defence and problematisation of philosophy's use of its history.

As a Hegelian, Rose can on the one hand be seen as a proponent of what Charles Taylor has summarised as the historical view or thesis about philosophy, which reflects Hegel's claim that studying philosophy and studying the history of philosophy are one and the same. Rose thus deplores what she identifies as philosophy's self-destruction through its hubristic rejection of its own history, as each new generation has come to believe it "must murder its intellectual fathers in order to obtain the license to practice the profession that they learnt from them." In contrast, Rose

strongly underlines her own debt to the history of philosophy as she states that all her “work starts from Kant and Hegel,” and follows the trajectories of the post-Kantian tradition up to her own times, staging vast, idiosyncratic conversations with mainly European nineteenth and twentieth century philosophers, authors, theologians and social theorists.

And yet, on the other hand, Rose also problematises this philosophical use of past thinkers. Here Kierkegaard proves a particularly apt conversation partner. In *The Broken Middle*, a work Rose described as her “book on Kierkegaard,” she notes that following a thinker like Kierkegaard confronts us with the problem that Kierkegaard himself denied being an authority to be followed: “Why,” she asks, “has the tradition not trusted itself to think without such towering ‘authorities’ and ‘masters’, without attributing the content and matter of the tradition to the writing of geni – instead of learning from it what thinking might be”. Rose notes that to genuinely and consistently follow the ‘authority’ of Kierkegaard (and Hegel), is rather to learn that we have no authorities. In other words, Rose simultaneously, and playfully, problematises the historical view precisely by defending it – and vice versa – defends the historical view by problematising it: For what point is there to engage with our past if we do not learn from it. And yet, Rose suggests that reading Kierkegaard teaches us that we should not only question the authority of the past and think for ourselves, but that we must also consider the limits of our reason generally.

In this paper I will trace this tension in Rose’s call to approach philosophy – its canon, claims and concepts – aporetically, that is, “according to the difficulty which the conceptuality represents by leaving gaps and silences in the mode of representation”. In what reads as a Kierkegaardian riposte to Hegel, Rose both draws this aporetic methodology from Kierkegaard, whose “notion of history,” she argues is “aporetic,” and applies this methodology to her reading of Kierkegaard. I propose to explore this further through Rose’s analysis of Kierkegaard’s *Philosophical Fragments* written under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus. Criticising readings of Kierkegaard that do not take into account his indirect or inverted mode of communication, Rose suggests that Climacus’ polemical and ironic treatment of past thinkers precisely highlights this aporetic notion of history. However, this has led to misreadings of Climacus as anti-philosophical and anti-historical: “Lamentably, Climacus’ philosophical sleight-of-hand, ironic and masked, has come to found a whole, anti-philosophical culture, now *de rigueur*, which... perpetuates an erstwhile ruse as an assault on the history of philosophy.” It is ironic, then, that Rose’s work has itself been perceived as such an assault on the history of philosophy, her fragmentary and idiosyncratic interpretations being viewed to run the risk of reductionism and tendentiousness. And yet the reason both Kierkegaard and Rose problematise and instil a tension in their use of the history of philosophy is precisely to “reinsinuate the aporia, ‘the difficulty’, into over-educated minds,” in order to reintroduce and reconfigure the difficulty and complexity of philosophy and of engaging with its history. For as Climacus notes, “when it is the difficult that I am to appropriate, it is always an advantage, a relief, to have it made difficult for me.”

Thus, I hope to show that Rose, through her reading of Kierkegaard, keenly reveals the gap or aporia that must necessarily exist between us and the past. And yet it is precisely, and somewhat paradoxically, for the sake of being confronted with this aporia – which Rose sets up as an ideal for both the philosophical present and future – that we should continue to engage with the past.

## Reckoning with Hegel on Race

*Elvira Basevich*

Panel 7

Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Lowell, USA

In his racist philosophy of race, Hegel endorses the “development thesis,” the view that the implicit purpose of history is to actualize an “infinite final end” or “Idea.” The development thesis holds that non-white racial groups are permanently or temporarily stalled in their historical development. Hegel maintains that the sociocultural activities of nonwhite racial groups indicate that the latter passively follow ‘natural’ imperatives, rather than the self-determining norms of a bona fide ‘spiritual’ world. On his view, the norms that dictate the sociocultural activities of non-Europeans are not the result of their self-conscious adoption, nor do such norms rest on a universalizable standard of practical judgment. Ostensibly, outside of continental Europe, racial groups struggle to advance political modernity, that is, individual rights and a functional constitutional state.

In this essay, I rework Hegel’s development thesis. I aim both to establish people of color as self-determining historical agents and to articulate a theory of progress without the racist baggage of Hegel’s original formulation of racial identity and historical progress. First, I draw on his Lectures on History to explain what it means for a group to establish a ‘spiritual’ world in historical time. A people, Hegel maintains, must detach themselves from the natural world through their self-conscious adoption of universalizable norms, such that their spiritual world is an ‘achievement’ for them. I underscore that only from the point of view ‘internal’ to a particular spiritual landscape can one accurately assess whether a particular shared sociocultural activity departs from – or refines – a previous historical situation. Next, I show that Hegel fails to provide an appropriate philosophical methodology for surveying historical development because he takes certain arbitrary empirical markers, such as skin color and cultural habits, to be *eo ipso* symbols indicating spiritual maturity and political modernity. Aside from the issue of the nescient status of the empirical sciences in the nineteenth century, pace Hegel, I argue that we must never rely on the fields of biology and the social sciences to assess the normative character of the spiritual achievements of any racial group.

Finally, I develop an immanent critique of Hegel’s methodology to interrogate what the historical actualization of practical freedom amounts to. The normative character of the sociocultural activities of a group must convey what those activities signify to the group members who pursue them. In other words, the relevant perspective for assessing historical progress – or the arbiter of value – is the first-personal perspective of a shared ‘we’ and should not appeal to an external standpoint that takes continental Europe as its normative reference for cultural excellence and political maturity. Though the infinite final end of history orients practical judgment in historical time, we must refrain from assuming that its practical advance will have the same sociocultural expression for all human communities. I conclude that an anti-racist philosophy of race in Hegel must offer an immanent critique of the Hegelian methodology that provides an egalitarian account of historical development, in which the unique sociocultural activities of all human groups unfold the Idea.

# Eternal Recurrence and a History of Racism

Ryan J. Johnson

Panel 7

Department of Philosophy, Elon University, North Carolina, USA

The history of philosophy is an act of homage. But what happens when such homage is conflicted or when the person deemed worthy is compromised? To write a book on Aristotle or Hegel, especially their ethical or political writings, is a conflicted homage because of their respective complicities in and contributions to practices and history of slavery and racism. Inasmuch as this essay is a call for honesty in the history of philosophy, it is a call to not merely recognize but center the conflict in every act of homage. Redeploying the Socrates maxim, an unexamined history is not worth remembering.

A history worth remembering requires a nuanced hermeneutical strategy: redeploying figures, arguments, concepts, and theories in ways that might run contrary to, or far beyond, the explicit or implicit positions, intentions and assumptions of the originators. We see this when Susan Neiman redeploys Kant's famous dictum to ends he would not recognize: "reparations without apologies are blind. But apologies without reparations may be empty." Like Neiman, this essay will use the ancient concept of eternal recurrence in order to re-engage a concept absent from antiquity: racism. Eternal recurrence has been used in many ways and places, and we will redeploy it in yet another: living with histories of racism. We thus follow James Baldwin's prompt, a recent formulation of a classic trope: "when one takes a position one must attempt to see where that position leads." We position ourselves as if eternal recurrence were an ontological truth and see where it inexorably leads.

There are three Parts. First, we begin with a survey of the uses of eternal recurrence from the ancient Indians and Egyptians to the Pythagoreans and Stoics to Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Deleuze. Second, we pause to recognize that through race was not present in antiquity, but is a medieval/early modern invention, we sketch turning points in the history of racism and whiteness, from its formulation in 15th-century Europe through its intellectual furtherance in Blumenbach's pseudo-science and Hegel's history of philosophy to the legal and social inscription of whiteness in the American Colony and later U.S. Third, we learn from contemporary Black continental philosophers in order to draw out four antiracist consequences that follow from understanding history as fixed yet repeating:

(1) "Counterfactual v. Counteracting" claims that eternal recurrence is an imaginative figure that counteracts escape into the white fantasies and racial amnesia enabled by counterfactual histories.

(2) Modeled on Baldwin's identification with his Black ancestors, "Very Serious Identity" extends that identification between living white people and their white ancestors in order to feel the weight of such a sordid inheritance.

(3) "The Nonprogressive" explores the implications of a circular history insofar as it counteracts narratives of historical progress.

(4) "Its Structural, Not Personal" follows Malcolm X's diagnosis of cause and perpetuation of racism as rooted in whiteness.

The overarching claim of the paper is that the ancient concept of eternal recurrence, especially through Nietzsche's formulation, opens up what Claudia Rankine calls "a crack in my own imaginative possibilities" in order to "combat the racism of a culture." Understanding contemporary racism through this classic concept refuses to leave history unexamined and thus worth remembering.

## **Direct Restitutions: A Methodology in the Philosophy of Mind**

**John Harfouch**

Panel 7

Department of Philosophy, The University of Alabama in Huntsville, USA

My presentation will ask how one might reclaim philosophy's defining problem – the mind-body problem – from the colonial regime that is philosophy today. My study will draw parallels with the recent activities of Mwazulu Diyabanza. Diyabanza has recently documented himself at several European museums simply walking out with stolen African artifacts. He calls this method 'restitution directe' because he refuses to ask a thief for permission to recuperate his stolen property. I am interested in what we might learn from Diyabanza, since philosophy is also a colonial institution albeit one with a very different medium and systems of exchange.

A certain historical context is necessary to understand what motivates this research. In philosophy, the determination of problems on the one hand and, on the other hand, a general system of accumulation defines imperialism and colonialism as economic systems. Peter K.J. Park's 2014 book *Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy* demonstrates how at the turn of the nineteenth century Kantian historians including Christoph Meiners and Wilhelm Tennemen led a successful campaign to exclude the non-white world from philosophy's canon. This was accomplished not through careful argumentation but simply through a raw stipulation that philosophy is a European enterprise beginning in Greece. As we see in today's anthologies and conferences, this intervention did not just effect one generation. It has determined the shape of this profession for the past two centuries. As Park observes, the exclusion of Africa and Asia (and the rest of the non-white world, I would add) from the history of philosophy has profound effects on how we understand our field. Specifically, the way in which we narrate the history of philosophy is in direct communication with what philosophers see as today's defining problems, the mind-body problem being but one example.

It is unsurprising that this Eurocentric usurpation of philosophy would happen in the nineteenth century (building on certain 18<sup>th</sup> century themes). This period is notable for a general expansion of European dominance wherein not just thought traditions were occupied, but also non-European religious artifacts were stolen, land was occupied, and natural resources were exploited. The invention of philosophy as a white's only enterprise should be contextualized within a general regime of material accumulation that has defined European imperialism in the 19th and 20th centuries.

With that context, I would like to think about our recovery of the problem-making function in light of allies also looking to recover what was stolen in the colonial period. That leads to a consideration of Mwazulu Diyabanza's recent work of 'direct restitution'. Direct restitution, as Diyabanza explains, is a methodology that takes back Africa's stolen artistic and religious heritage by entering European museums and walking out with the stolen artifacts. Diyabanza neither negotiates nor asks for the stolen materials. He is interested in neither recognition nor integration. European countries and

the institutions possessing his stolen heritage are thieves. For that reason, direct restitution is the appropriate method, “because we cannot ask for a thief’s permission and authorization to be able to recuperate what has been stolen from us.”

In my talk, I will ask what Diyabanza’s actions might mean for philosophers working in a very different kind of colonial museum. Is there such a thing as direct restitution in philosophy? I will argue that philosophy’s problems were stolen in the 19<sup>th</sup> century formation of the profession detailed by Park. In that regard, my argument is strongly influenced by the writing of Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, both of whom argue that problem making is philosophy’s defining activity. In the theft of problems, European philosophy stole not only the problem but also the problem’s concomitant field of solutions and the field of experts qualified to formulate those solutions. Above all, the occupation of philosophy’s core problem – the mind-body problem being but one important example – depends on and draws from a certain construction of philosophy’s history. Accordingly, direct restitution in philosophy must begin with a reclamation of the histories from which philosophy’s problems draw their legitimacy.

## Kant, ‘Race’, and ‘Sex’

**Stella Sandford**

KL

Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy, Kingston University, London, UK

This lecture aims to clarify the difference between the theoretical status of the concept of *Rasse* (race) and that of *Geschlecht* (sex) in Kant’s philosophy, and to consider the significance of that difference. Kant was influential in disambiguating the meanings of these German terms. Most important, for Kant, was the philosophical ‘Determination of the Concept of Race [Rasse]’ (the title of Kant’s 1785 essay). This paper will show that the context for Kant’s philosophical determination of the concept of race is the problem of the justification of a natural system of nature – that is, the problem of the justification of the usage of the (hitherto logical) terms ‘genus’ and ‘species’ as natural taxonomical categories. This paper will argue that Kant’s theory of race, especially in the 1770s and 1780s, aims to establish ‘race’ as a natural, taxonomical category (below the category of species), introducing a new terminal category in zoological taxonomy. Thus, although Kant maintained (contra the polygenecists of his day) that all humans comprised one species, his introduction of the sub-specific concept of ‘race’ as a taxonomical category still justified, for him, the positing of significant natural, ‘biological’ differences between the human ‘races’. In contrast, the concept of sex or gender (*Geschlecht*) was not and could not be a taxonomical concept for Kant (as indeed it is not and cannot be for modern biology), and it is never subject to any philosophical determination. Unlike his discussions of ‘race’, which are explicitly philosophical and aim to contribute to the life sciences of his day, Kant’s discussions of *Geschlecht* are part of his empirical anthropology, and they concentrate on the psychological and social characteristics of men and women. What, if anything, is the significance of this conceptual history for us when we try to define the concepts of ‘race’ and ‘sex’ today?

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