And now it is my great pleasure to welcome Angela Breitenbach. Angela is a University lecturer in the Faculty of Philosophy and a Fellow of King’s College at Cambridge University. Her research focuses on Kant and the history of modern philosophy, as well as on themes in aesthetics, philosophy of science, philosophy of biology, and environmental philosophy. She's the author of many articles, of a monograph on the analogy of reason and nature, an environmental philosophy according to Kant, and the co-editor among others of the book Kant and the Laws of Nature. Her paper today is titled Kant’s Idea of Unity. So thanks so much for accepting to be here and the floor is yours.

Thank you so much Daniele, and thanks very much for having me. It's a great pleasure to be here with you, even if only virtually I I should say, just as soon as I start that I prepared a presentation, but unfortunately I can't share it. So then yeah, if you wouldn't mind sharing your screen, I'm really sorry about that. I I don't know what the problem is, but there is a problem so. The title of my paper today is Daniela. Mentioned is the. Is Kant's idea of unity. Um? And this is work in progress, so it's a paper that in which I tried to. Provide an interpretation of. Of cancer idea of unity in particular that the idea of the unity of cognitions. We can progress because it's part of a bigger project. I think the conception of unity is sort of at the heart of that project. I'm interested in a number of questions about cats, conception of science and cognition, and the role of aesthetic considerations in that account of cognition and science and the conception of unity is an important component of that project. Can you see the? Presentation. Can you see it? I can see it, yeah. Can everybody see it? Yeah, I can see it as well. Yeah, OK great yeah. OK, So what I want to do is offer an interpretation of what I take to Become's idea of the unity of cognition, in particular in the critique of pure reason. And what I want to argue is that the standard interpretation what I take to be the received reading of this idea. Is mistaken what I take to be the standard reading implies a conception of a sort of hierarchical conception of the idea of unity and what I want to argue is that that hierarchical conception can't account for an important claim that can't makes about the role that the idea of unity is meant to play. I perhaps I I want to say that the standard interpretation is wrong. Perhaps I should say it's not wrong, but incomplete, but if it is only incomplete, then what I want to say it is that it's incomplete in a way that is misleading in an important respect. So instead I want to argue for a teleological conception of the idea of the unity of cognition. So what I'm going to suggest is that can't construes the unity of cognition as a position from which nature nature is, so that the object of cognition is fully comprehensible to us, and from which it is fully comprehensible, because nature is construed in accordance with an idea, so too to aim for. The unity of cognitions is to aim for insight into that idea. I'm going to
say more about what I take that to mean. So what I'm going to suggest is that the standard hierarchical account isn't entirely mistaken, but it only really makes sense of what it wants to get across by means of it. If it is subsumed under the teleological interpretation that I'm going to argue for in this paper, why is this important? While he had two reasons on the slide, I take cans, conception of the unity of cognition to be. The sort of culmination of his account or cognition in the critique of pure reason, so can't presents unity. The unity of cognition is the criterion of Scientificity, so he argues that only unified cognition can have the status of science, which means that an unified cognition can be grounded in rational principles and be certain, and so if we want to find out what in what sense. We can achieve certain cognition. We have to have an account of the unity of cognition, cancer count and what I think the teleological interpretation that I want to argue for brings out about Kant's account of cognition and science is that it's important Lee related to conceptions of practical reason that it that it has an intrinsic relation to conception, in particular of intention and purpose. That's one reason why I think we should be interested in cancer conception of the unity of cognition. Another reason goes beyond count interpretation, strictly speaking. The second reason has to do with counts place in the unity of science debate more widely. So I take count to have a distinctive place in this wider debate about the unity of science. So Candace often understood to show that the unity of science is not something that we find or discover empirically, but rather something that. That we project and that in fact we have to project because of the nature of our reason because of the kinds of reasons that we are. But what I take my proposed and teleological reading to show is that that's not the only the only reason. Why can't place in the the unity of science debate is distinctive the other. So I think what is distinctive about conception. It isn't just that he takes the unity of science to be grounded in reason, and is sort of demand that is put on reason us by, by the nature of reason. But I also think that counts conception is distinctive because of the shape or content of the idea of unity itself. So what I want to argue is that by contrast with more recent conceptions of the unity of science on cancer count, unity isn't associated with homogeneity or simplicity. But rather it at least leaves open the possibility of a conception of unity of the plurality of heterogeneous cognitions, and that's something I want to. Um, that I'm going to gesture at the end, but I think that is is implied by the teleological interpretation that I'm going to put forward. OK, so here's the plan. It's very simple. I'm going to in the first part of the talk I'm going to review what I take to be the standard interpretation. In the second part, I'm going to look at the problem that I see with that standard interpretation, and then Thirdly, I'll spell out in a bit more detail the teleological interpretation that I want to put forward. OK, so here's the first part. So to begin. I should say that there is of course a lot of disagreement among can't commentators about the conception of unity. In particular, the conception of the unity of cognition in canned, and so I don't think
there's one interpretation that is accepted by all, and in that sense it may be a bit misleading to talk about the standard interpretation. Nonetheless, I think there are that we can sort of distill a Common Core views that I take to be relatively uncontroversial among recent. Interpreters and this common call view is what I call the standard interpretation here. So what is the standard interpretation where festival? Count gives us a characterization of unity of cognition that comes almost, I think, halfway into the critique of pure reason. So it relies on a conception of cognition as it's laid out in the first part of the critique. On this conception can't presents cognition as the result of two faculty sensibility and understanding sensibility provides sense impressions. The so called material of intuition, the understanding then unifies those sensory impressions and. Concepts and judgments and cognition emerges as the joint product of these. Sensory and intellectual capacities and so then in the second half of the critic in the transcendental deduction is sorry. Transcendental dialectic can't makes an important addition to this conception of cognition, so this is where I can't argues that the intellectual activities that are involved in cognition and exhausted by the judge mental operations of the understanding but reason 2 plays a role so. Argues here that while the understanding confers unity on the manifold of intuitions, by subsuming those intuitions under concepts, reason in turn, then unifies the manifold of cognitions that are provided by the understanding, and by doing so, it brings about what can cause the highest unity of thinking. So this is the quote. Here's a readout. This passage from the introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic. All our cognition starts from the sensors can says goes from there to the understanding and ends with reason, beyond which there's nothing higher to be found in our US to work on the material of intuition and bring it under the highest unity of thinking. So this high highest unity of thinking is the task of reason and the question then is what? What is this? What does it consist in? What is the highest unity of thinking consistent? Well, an important part of counts claim here is that it consists in the unification of cognitions under principles, and in particular under principles in inferences. So that's the next slide that we just saw briefly. Here's an example that count himself gives of such an inference. The the conclusion all bodies are alterable is unified. Can says in this inference in which it is inferred from the major premise that everything composite is alterable and the minor premise that bodies are composite an. The thought is that a conclusion is unified by the major premise by the principle that is expressed in the major premise with all kinds of other cognitions that equally fall under this universal principle. So inferences. Way of unifying unifying cognitions. But can't adds that influences don't have to start from a universal principle and infer two particular cognitions. They also they can also go the other way. They can start from particular cognitions and infer 2 universal principles, so we may infer the principle that everything is composite. Everything composite is alterable from some more general principles such as everything. Material is alterable or everything in space
is alterable. So the point count is making here is that this is another way in which reason unifies cognitions by looking for more general unifying principles, and he calls. He distinguishes the two kinds of inferences as inferences of descending or ascending. A reason now, as it turns out, and I'm not quite at the slide, so if we could just go back one step so as it turns out the ascending function of reason is both problematic, especially problematic on cancer count, and particularly important for his argument. So ascending inferences are problematic. Can't argues because they merely establish their conclusions as hypothesis. And this difference to the descending kind of inferences can be explained by the asymmetry of conditioning relations that are that we're concerned with in these two different kinds of inferences. So in descending inferences were inquiring into the conditioned, we're asking for particular. We're looking at the particular combinations that are conditioned by a principle that we buy them by the condition that is already given. Rise in the case of ascending inferences we are inquiring into the condition of a given cognition. So here the problem is that any universal principle that we might infer too isn't isn't secured by the premises, it would only be secured. Can't says if we could infer the universal principle itself from its conditions, and so This is why can't cause the use of reason in these. Ascending inference is merely problematic or hypothetical. He also thinks they are particularly important for his argument, and that is that has to do with their problematic status. So as as we've seen in this example, I think thinks that when we infer 2A cognition to a condition of a given cognition, we can only take that inference that the conclusion of that inference to be secured. If we could, we could infer. That conclusion, from its conditions, and so he thinks that in ascending inferences we actually imply the search for an unconditioned condition. We can't take an inference to a condition to be secure unless we had where, unless we could infer it itself from its conditions. An ultimately from an unconditioned condition. So things that the ascending inferences imply the item to find the unconditioned. For any condition cognitions. And this is where things we we see an important. Well, move or or switch that. That reason automatically makes in these inferences and this is on the next slide, so can't argues that. Reason in ascending inferences shifts from the merely logical principle to find the unconditioned for conditioned cognitions to a substantive principle where the substantive substantive principle says that when the condition is given when a conditioned cognition is given, then so is the whole series of conditions subordinated one to the other, which is itself unconditioned. Also given, so the thought is that when we are inquiring. In ascending influences into the conditions of a given cognition. We automatically at all. We naturally make the assumption that those conditions are given and that the totality of the conditions are given and can take this principle to be substantive. It doesn't. It doesn't sort of. Just tell us what you do, and it's not a logical principle in that sense, but it actually makes a claim about what exists. I've highlighted lighted that
on the next slide, so the. Unconditioned is taken as a sort of given if the if the conditioned cognition that we start from in our premises, if that those are given, then we naturally assume that it's conditions and the whole series of its conditions that are themselves unconditioned are also given, that it could in principle be given in experience. So so cons argument here on the standard reading is that we, in ascending inferences in the unifying activities of reading reason in these ascending inferences we actually come up with. Or reason comes up with its own original concept. The concept of a given unconditioned. Something that isn't that is itself unconditioned, but could in principle be given an experience. And this concept is abstract. It's it's indeterminate. Things that we sort of determine it at least we specify it a bit more in in the three traditional domains of metaphysical inquiry, so. These are the well known ideas of of the soul, the world, and God can't argues that these are specifications of this idea of the unconditioned in psychology. For instance, reason forms the idea of other concept of the soul as the absolute or unconditioned unity of the thinking, substance, subject and cosmology. Reason generates the concept of the world as the absolute or unconditioned unity of the series of conditions of appearances. And and theology reason comes up with the concept of God as the absolute or unconditioned unity of conditions of any object of thought in general, that's those are counts words. So the thought is that reason generates these concepts by furring to buy in the course of its ascending inferences. Generates these three more specific concepts in the domains of psychology, cosmology, and theology. OK, So what we have then on the standard reading is that first of all we have a conception of. Reasons unifying activities so we have a conception of what? Does an inference is to unify cognitions? And by by searching for more and more general principles that express universal conditions, and we also have a conception of what the complete unity of cognitions would look like. It would be an ordering of all possible cognitions and our highest principle that expresses. This sort of an unconditioned condition. Now here's one further part of the picture that I want to mention. Part of the the interpretation that I think is important. An important component of the picture, and that is that these concepts of reason of the unconditioned have and importantly have a special epistemic status. So they are a priority concepts. Formed in the process of unifying cognitions of objects, but they aren't themselves. Concepts of those objects. So incomes, terminology, they are ideas. The ideas which go beyond the possibility of experience and count importantly argues that they have a dual function, so they have a negative and a positive function. The first function is negative because they lead us astray. And that the bulk of the Transcendental Dialectic is meant to show how they lead us astray. They lead us astray if they are mistaken for concepts that really do apply to objects. So so they are. They easily sort of lead us into illusion if they aren't mistaken as concepts of objects, but they also have a positive function in guiding us to extend cognition. And is this positive
function that may look surprising if we also keep in view that these these concepts don't apply to any objects but the distinctive. Solution that can give to that puzzle is to say, well they can. The ideas can have a positive function if they are used, not as consecutive concepts, but as regulative concepts so consecutive concepts, concepts that are used to make claims about objects that are taken to be to describe the Constitution of the object. Regulative concepts merely used as heuristics. As guiding inquiry into the objects and so can't claim is that that that if we mistake the ideas of reason for consecutive concepts, that's what leads us into the mistakes of traditional metaphysics. By contrast, if we use them as merely regulative guides to inquiry the ideas of reason have a perfectly legitimate use. In fact, they are even useful. They are. Fruitful because they have they guide us in extending the unity of cognitions, and this is what is expected. Presti ran the quote on the slide. Can says that just as the understanding unites the manifold into an object through concepts. So reason on its side unites the manifold of concepts through ideas by positing a certain collective unity as the goal of the understandings actions. So taken as regulative principles, the ideas can posit a goal towards which we can, so that we can aim at in our unifying activities and the inferences of reason that we can never achieve. We can never have insight into the complete unity of cognitions, enter the unconditioned. That is what it means to say that these the notion of the unconditioned is a mere idea, but as a goal it can never less. Provide a regulative heuristic regulative guide to. In our efforts to to infer to more and more, sorry, more and more general principles and thereby. Achieve more and more comprehensive unities of cognition. OK, so this is as much as I want to say about what I take to be the standard reading of Kant's conception of the unity of cognition. I hope this was comprehensible if you are not that familiar with this part of count. I hope it was familiar and somewhat uncontroversial if you are familiar with this pod of kind. What I want to do now is look at the problem that I see with this. Reading of Kant's idea of the unity of cognitions. So what's the problem? I think that on the standard account, the unity of cognitions turns out to consist in. Complete ordering of all possible cognitions under ever higher principles, with ultimately the highest unifying principle at the sort of top of the hierarchy, and so that's why I talk about the hierarchical account. I take the standard reading to imply a sort of hierarchical account of the unity of cognitions. Now the problem as I see it is that if the idea of. Of the unity of cognitions were correctly construed as hierarchical in this way, then it couldn't serve the regulatory function that can't wants it to serve. In other words, the hierarchical conception doesn't explain. The the regular function of the idea of unity and it doesn't explain it because it can't account for how the unifying activities that were involved in the ascending inferences of reason would ever get us closer to the goal of the unconditioned and the associated unity of cognition. So here's one way to spell out the problem and. I put it on the slide here, so if we think of reasons, unifying activities as this sort of efforts of inferring
to more and more general principles and their board, thereby discovering more and more. General conditions, then the thought is that if we sort of. Conclude this activity if we go through with it all the way we were in the end. We will thereby aim at the principle of the unconditioned, a principle that that conditions all particular cognitions under which a particular cognitions could be subsumed. I'm. And the the idea then, is that this. That that following that, the unifying activities are aimed at this principle of of the unconditioned, the problem that I see with this is that we can't really make sense of the principle of the unconditioned as being in any sense part of the hierarchy. So what I mean by that is that if we are thinking of this hierarchy as a hierarchy of principles of more and more general principles, then. The hierarchy will only ever provide us with more general, more general, but still empirical principles and therefore still conditioned or principles that still express conditioned cognitive conditions. So the hierarchy will never be able to include a principle that expresses an unconditioned condition. And So what? What I think this means is that we can't really think of the unconditioned as in any sensitive, just the culmination of this process, but rather we have to. We have to do something else. We can't just extend the ascending series of inferences, but rather we have to take a step of a different kind in order to. If we were to be able to reach the unconditioned. So in other words, and. In other words, when another way to put the point is that in a sense the unconditioned can't be found as part of the hierarchy, but has to be found as sort of in a conception of the hierarchy as a whole. So so. It's not clear how merely extending the unifying activities of reason will give us that, and the next, I think next couple of slides were meant to illustrate that. So. Um, I could put the same point by talking about concepts, but maybe I'll leave. I'll leave that. So another way of pushing the same point would be to look at a different way in which can't spells out this. These unifying activities of reasons, so he sometimes talks about inferences to more and more general principles in other parts of the text. He talks about the system of concepts that we have to grasp in its entirety in order to achieve the complete unity of cognitions. And again, there I'd want to say that that. Merely extending Millie, understanding more of the system of concepts won't get us to the unconditioned. What we'd have to do is sort of grasp the system of concepts in its entire T, but in a sense that's the same points I I won't say more about concepts at at now. If you'd like me to talk about that. Maybe I can get to that, then the next slides were meant to illustrate that, and I was going to talk about visual concepts. I'm sorry for skipping that part. But but but the the general. Implication I'd take from this is that it's not simply a difference in extent in our unifying activities by the difference in kind that would get us to the goal that that that reason sets in the unconditioned. So my my objection to the standard interpretation is that it doesn't give us a model that would make sense of the unity of cognition. As an extension of the hierarchy of principles or concepts, but we if we have no model that connects our unifying
activities with the goal of the unity of cognitions, then it's unclear how the idea of Unity can have any regulatory function at all. Or another way to present the problem is in terms of the contrast between two kinds of unity. A system an an aggregate, so can't argues that reason seeks systematic unity of cognitions, where systematic unity consists in. Unity that is complete to which we couldn't add any further. Parts without radically changing the nature of the whole rose in aggregate is incomplete in the sense that it could always be further extended. And so the thought is that the kinds of unities we can achieve we can actually achieve through the inferences of reason. I always aggregates and it doesn't really. The hierarchical account doesn't give us a model of how we could get from these aggregate aggregate of unities that are more and more comprehensive, but still aggregates to conception of a systematic unity of cognition. OK, so just to be clear about the problem, I don't think there's a problem in the. I thought that we on the on the hierarchical interpret interpretation. We can't reach the highest principle or the complete system of concepts. I think that is an agreement with accounts account. The problem is rather that we can't really account for how the unifying activities of reason could be regarded as taking us closer to the goal. So there's no no explanation for this idea of approximation on the hierarchical conception. And so if that's right, then the hierarchical conception of unity cannot, I think, account for the regulatory function of the idea of unity, and so the unity that reason seeks among cognitions isn't adequately represented by the hierarchical account. That's my, that's my worry. OK, so um, let me then move on to the third part, the theological interpretation. I want to put forward. But I want to argue is that the idea of the unity of cognition has to be construed until a logical terms, and So what I want to do first is sketch the idea, sketch the proposal and give you some evidence that this is in fact, Kant's proposal. So what I want to suggest is that Kant identifies the unity of cognition with sort of position of full comprehensibility. So I think the unity of cognition is is there by not identi- fied with the highest principle, but rather with a position from which we can fully comprehend the phenomena and so to have the unity of cognitions as a goal goal. That reason sets us is to have to seek for comprehensibility of the phenomena. I mean, that's a relatively simple idea, straightforward idea. I think Conte makes it specifies it further by giving us well by saying a bit more and then giving us a model of how we might make sense of this different conception of the idea of unity, so can't identify as the unity of cognition. Specifically, I think with standpoint from which we can fully comprehend nature, not. Contingently, but necessarily. Sorry, now various things are ringing. I'm. Once again, sorry. So, So what kind suggests, I think is that we identify the unity of cognition specifically with the standpoint from which we can fully comprehend nature, not just contingently, but necessarily. And he gives us a model for that idea. The thought is that the unity of cognition as a position from from which nature is fully comprehensible, is a position from which. It is fully comprehensible because it is
construed in accordance with an idea, so I think it's part of Kant's conception of the idea of unity that this idea is an idea in the sense of an end. That is, a concept in accordance with which the phenomena that are cognized. Construed and realized, so it's an end in the sense that it's a concept in accordance with which the object is realized. And so to have the unity of cognition as one's goal is to seek insight into this idea. Now how does that propose a help to solve the problem that I set out in the previous part of the talk? What I want to suggest is that the there the problem was that we didn't have a model for how the unifying activities of reason could get us any closer to the goal of complete unity. Here I want to suggest that the situation looks different if we think about the idea of unity in these theological terms. Is now we can think of this. The aggregates of cognition, that is, the results of our actual unifying activities as parts of the systematic unity of cognition. That is construed as a standpoint of full comprehensibility, so the thought is that sort of partial insight or partial. Comprehension can be regarded as. As ways in which certain domains of inquiry are made comprehensible to us, so the results of our unifying activities are only aggregates of cognition because they can always be further extended. Our understanding can always be further extended. But we can think of these aggregates as part of the full comprehensibility of nature. If we had insight into the idea of unity, then we could infer all other cognitions from it a priority so we could see how the aggregates that the partial realizations of the idea would fit into the system. But without such insight, we can nevertheless take those aggregates of cognition as partial realizations of the idea. So that's a proposal for a different kind of model for thinking about the relation between our unifying activities and the goal that we want to. Get to all that we take as our regulatory guide in unifying cognition. So here's then some textual evidence for my reading. First of all, I think there's evidence for the general thought that **** held the view that teleological unities are the highest possible thinkable unities. So he says, for instance, in the transition to electric that this is in the appendix to the transcendent dialectic that the highest form of unity, that alone rests on concepts of reason is the purpose of unity of things. And again a bit just a few pages later. The greatest systematic unity and consequently also purpose. If Unity is the ground of the possibility of the greatest use of human reason. So, um, so can't clearly holds the thesis that. Still illogical, unities are the highest possible think of a unities. Now, why does he think that? So why does he think that purposive or teleological unities are the greatest possible unities of things? Here's one reason. Can't explains that by means of teleological principles. So which state that state that something ought to be X in order to be why we can connect phenomena that otherwise appear to be related contingently, so, for instance. Psychological and material phenomena may become unified in a in a system because they were intended to stand in certain relations to one another. This, I think, is what is implied by the following passage. Then on the next slide, can says
that such a principle of purpose of unity opens up for our reason as applied to the field of experience entirely. New prospects for connecting up things in the world. In accordance with theological laws and thereby attaining to the greatest systematic unity among them so. The systematic unity of the phenomena which corresponds to the unity of cognitions is construed on this model of a teleological unity as a unity that is made or brought about as the realization of an idea so. Can't presents this idea then as a purpose of unity and. Um, that as a unity that can't otherwise be seen to be to have any necessity to be purely contingent. If we don't think of it as being made or or. Construed in accordance with an idea. OK, so that's one piece of evidence I wanted to show you. I should say. And I think this is it's important to notice I the context of this discussion. Can't brings it up in the context of discussing the idea of God, by which he means the idea of an intentional ground and intellect that brings about the unity of nature in accordance with an idea or a plan. But I want to make a few points about that connection, so the connection with the discussion of the idea of God. So one is that. Remember that the three ideas of Soul World and God at all specific or specifications of the idea of complete unity and the unconditioned that is associated with that idea. But while the first 2 ideas of the soul and world represent unity of cognitions in this restricted domains of psychology. It is that the the phenomena of innocence and cosmology that has to do with the phenomena of outer sense kind thought is that the idea of God is the idea of the unconditioned. All phenomena in general. So both those of innocence and outer sense. So it's the idea that is most comprehensive, or the idea of the unconditioned of all conditioned things, and so it's not surprising that he would connect this idea of God with. The discussion of the highest unity. That's one one comment on the connection here. Another comment is that I think it's important that can't think of the ideas in particular here. The idea of God as a sort of schema for our conception of of the unconditioned. So he presents these ideas as giving us a sense of how we might connect the entire abstract and indeterminate idea of an unconditioned with empirical phenomena, and the thought is that we can somehow make sense of this entirely abstract, unconditioned if we think of it in relation to. Some concepts we do know and we can experience, such As for instance. The concept of or such As for instance, intentional activity as we know it from ourselves. So bringing in the idea of God here, I think is a way of making sense of this teleological conception of the realization of an idea in intentional actions. And then the final point, I wanted to make on the connection with the idea of God here is that I don't think we should read too much into it. The main point? I think that can't. Takes from this discussion is that we have to do here with an idea of the highest intelligence as a model of a for a sort of point of view, from which the whole of cognition can be surveyed, and from which it can be surveyed. Because it is produced in accordance with an idea, I don't think that any further theological implications are. Connotations are implied, and this is also why
later in class. Discussion of the idea of the unity of cognitions. Count drops the connection with the idea of God, so we find this in particular in the critique of judgment, where kind revises his characterization of this same notion of unity and presents it under the idea of a principle of purposiveness for human understanding. So now the thought is that we think of the idea of the unity of cognition as. Unity, that is, that is directly related to its being. Opposite for our comprehension of the phenomena. So that's that's the way in which count develops the idea, and in his later writing, but perhaps more importantly, for my argument here is that even in the critique of pure reason can't says more about the same teleological conception of the idea in the architectonic of pure reason. So a few chapters later. So this is on the next slide, here the unity of cognition can says is. The unity of the manifold of cognitions under one idea. And this idea is the concept of reason of the form of the whole, and so far as through it the domain of the manifold as well as the position of the parts with respect to each other is determined a priority. And can't continue this this passage. This is on the next slide by saying that the scientific concept of reason. So this is the concept by the scientific concept of reason. County means that the concept of unity, so reasons concept of unity. So this concept thus contains the end and the form of the whole. So I take this to mean that as a sort of end of reason, the idea guides the realization of the whole of the system, and it's because the idea of the whole contains an end in this teleological sense that it is the concept whose realization is the object. It's because the the concept contains this end in this teleological sense that in a complete system it. As composite here precedes the parts and the. At a time that cognition of the parts. So the idea determines the realization of the system and therefore precedes our cognition of the parts. We could infer that the cognition of the parts from the idea, if we had insight into it. So what I want to. Thank you bye bye. Referring to these passages is that count does think of the idea of the unity of cognitions in the teleological way that I've suggested. And So what I want to conclude from it is that the. Let count thinks that we here have a model of how to construe the idea of the unity of cognitions. Um, and if we. If we could have insight into the idea, we would see how all particular cognitions would follow from it necessarily. Of course we don't. That's part of the the story. But even if we, even if we don't, we can still make sense of our partial cognitions as sort of partial realizations of the idea. So. What does this mean for for the relationship between the two logical conception and the hierarchical interpretation that I started with? I just I I before I come to the final conclusions. I just want to come back to the to the idea that we have to subsume the original account so that the standard account that I described as hierarchical under the theological interpretation that I've proposed here. So the thought is that on its own, the hierarchical account is incomplete, but it isn't entirely. False in describing the unifying activities of reason. So what I want to suggest is that we do cognize by subsuming intuitions under concepts and we cognize sort of more
systematically by subsuming cognitions and the principles. And so the hierarchical reading gets something right. It explains how we extend and systematize cognition. But it doesn't provide an adequate account of the unity of cognition. That reason sets as its goal, and that can offer a regulative guide in extending cognition, and I want to suggest that this understanding. This regulative guide can be offered by the teleological account. So what I want to suggest is that, according to that illogical reading reason, sort of instructs us to search for high end or high end higher order principles or more and more general principles and the associated more and more comprehensive aggregates of cognition. And it also thereby gives us a model of how we can take those more and more inclusive systems or aggregates of cognition rather as filling in more and more details of the complete system that we would have insight into if we had insight into the idea of systematic unity. So we have to assume this idea that still logic idea in order to make sense of our empirical activity or activity of extending cognition. As getting us closer to the idea of the unity of cognition. Um? And that's the proposal. That's where I want to end. I just wanted to briefly come back to the implications that I take to take this to have one is that this account, which is an account of. The unity of cognitions. On the side of Owen in Kansas, theoretical philosophy is, I think, deeply infused with these practical notions of intention and purpose, and so I think that we ultimately have to make sense of the idea of the unity of cognitions in these in relation to. What can describes as the needs of reason? And then ultimately practical. And Secondly, I also think that we can. We can say more about the distinctiveness of cancer count. So it turns out that cancer count looks quite different from more recent conception of the unity of science. It's not just distinctive because it presents the unity of science as. As regulative, or as demand of reason, but also because it doesn't put the idea of a hyest principle up front or the idea of of of of unity as simplicity. But we could make sense on kinds account of the unity of cognitions as a unity of the heterogeneity or a plurality of heterogeneous cognitions that are unified by their common purpose, where the purpose is the full comprehensibility of the phenomena. OK, so stop there, thank you.