

## Transcript

[...] to share this session this evening and to introduce Miguel Beistegui. Miguel until quite recently and for many years was Professor philosophy at Warwick. From October of this year you will take up the position of Icrea research professor at the University that Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. And as you probably well know, is the author of many books, influential books, books on Heidegger, Proust, and alerts. His last book was published in 2018, the Government of Desire and his new book will be out in November of this year, and it's entitled, Thought Under Threat On Spite Superstition and Stupidity. To be published by Chicago University Press and tonight is going to talk. Maybe in part inspired by the work is done in that book, The Spirit and connected to it, the spirit of revenge and its political Dennis Destiny with a focus on Spinoza and Nietzsche. And normally we would finish this session. I think it's 7:15. But anybody that is able to wishes to work will probably carry on until about 7:30. OK, so they'll be plenty of time for questions and discussion. So great pleasure to have you with us, Miguel and back at Warwick. I hope it to you for your for your talk.

Thank you very much Keith. Thank you Keith and Daniele for the invitation. It's wonderful to be back having it feels like I never left because this is, you know, the first thought talk that I do having after having left Warwick. I also wanted to thank Keith in particular for reading and commenting on quite an advanced draft of this long chapter in the book that he just talked about, which is the chatter on on spite. And yes, his comments were extremely helpful, so any sort of errors, flaws, mistakes that you might identify are entirely key fault and have very little to do with me. Now, let me start by saying the following, that the. The topic that I will be talking about is related to the notion of spite that I develop in the book, which I ultimately want to associate with an emotion and affect that we're all quite familiar with, which is that of resentment, but that I want to distinguish from. Even though of course it is related, the very specific philosophical concept of assault email that we find in nature, and I think part of the difficulty, especially when we move into the political manifestations of those affects, have to do with the philosophical ability. I think need a necessity to distinguish between them. So I think there are semantic issues that we might want to talk about. I also am very aware that. The talk raises far more questions than it can answer, but I hope that in the course of this discussion will be able to answer some of them. OK, so let me start and I really will. Will stick to an hour, and even if it means sort of cutting the talk short so we can have ample time for discussion. At in the latest season of Curb Your Enthusiasm, which some of you may be aware of and fans of Larry David decides to open Little Larry's cafe on the doorstep of the coffee shop for which he has developed a particular dislike. Motivated by spite only he is ready to run his operation at a loss, so long as he can take away customers from Mocha

Joe's Cafe. Larry's initiative sets are a trend many other celebrities open their own spite. Stores Deli Bird Store, a jewelry store with the sole purpose of putting stalls. They hold a grudge against out of business. And at the risk of the running their brilliant acting careers to the ground. Larry is of course delighted by this development, and we, the spectators, are both amused and appalled as we can't help recognize a bit of ourselves in Larry's spiteful enterprise. Did Larry David have Dostoyevsky's notes from underground in mind when writing his episodes? Dostoyevsky's short book is surely less humorous, but arguably the greatest literary monument to the utterly destructive, including self destructive logic of spite. The narrator's confession, that of a spiteful man is initially ambiguous. Is he sick and spiteful? Spiteful because he is sick or sick with spite? The first paragraph of the short book seems to leave the matter open. Dostoyevski organ that narrator writes, I am an unpleasant man. I think my liver is diseased. He's not, certainly. He's not entirely certain about his liver. He has in fact, refused to consult a doctor about the matter, but he is certain about his unpleasantness, which he also refers to throughout his confession as bitterness, hatred, resentment, wretchedness hysterical rage and perhaps more importantly for today's purposes, a deep. Revenge. Like yago of motiveless malignity. The rest of notes from underground consists in a detailed description of the narrator's spiteful thoughts, words, and actions, as well as his attempt to identify the roots of his disease. The narrator himself seems to locate the origin of his disease in what he calls hyper consciousness, by which he means a highly developed yet selective form of consciousness, one that orients us in the world and retains only suffering. And it's this connection between suffering and revenge that I will be exploring. He writes to be hyper conscious is a disease, any consciousness is a disease. Suffering is the whole origin of consciousness. Spite then is a response to the ills of unhappiness and suffering, yet one that far from offering a cure, only aggravate them. Dostoyevsky himself, as we know you, or a thing or two about suffering eight months in Nicholas, is notoriously harsh. Jails and mock execution by firing squad. Four years of hard labor in Siberia. A gambling addiction. Regular attacks of epilepsy, insolvency and poverty seen in that light. It is natural to wonder whether the path of spite chosen by the narrator is one that Dostoyevsky himself contemplated. It is tempting to read the text as the author's own temptation and his confrontation with Salvation through nihilism. But of course I'm not going to go further into Dostoyevsky himself. This is just just to set up the discussion, and there are two things that I would like to do today. First of all developed what I just alluded to in relation to a possible definition of spite and its origin. And second focus on the connection between suffering the spirit of revenge and its political manifestations with a particular focus on the affect. The political affect which both Spinoza and Nietzsche refer to as indignation. As well as, perhaps to lesser extent of phenomenon that I think is a deeply phenomenon, political political phenomenon that we're all familiar with, which we call recognition. My basically

regarding the first point and part of the talk is that spite resentment Crisostomo the spirit of revenge are rooted in suffering, and more specifically in a certain interpretation of suffering. That is to say they respond to a certain kind of question that we ask ourselves when we suffer. My basic claim regarding the second point and part of the talk is that indignation, as an expression of the spirit of revenge, lies at the root of many, if not all political constitutions. And this is perhaps the more controversial point that you might have questions about, but I also want to say that this is not a necessary or inevitable connection. Alright, so let me start with the first part that has that. Concerned with an attempt at a definition of spite and tracing its. Origin. Suffering is so I forgot to say that that I circulated or then eventually circulated a list of quotations that I will not refer to in order every time, because I think it it takes up too much of our time. But when I do quote a passage, it should be on the sheet that I circulated. Suffering is the physiological or mental condition. The basic affect that lies at the root of the range of emotions that we call rancor, resentment, spite, indignation, vindictiveness, etc. It is nature writes impossible to suffer without making someone pay for it. Every grievance contains the seed of revenge. In other words, we can't help feel indignant, and this is a word that nature himself uses in the face of his suffering. We judged to be senseless's in laws right and undeserved. But how exactly does suffering generate those feelings? As we'll see, this generation is neither immediate nor inevitable. It is in fact an interpretation of this basic physiological feeling, the source of which then can only be attributed to something other than the suffering itself. The strange thing about pain nature remarks in the gay science is that, and I quote, it always raises the question about its origin, whereas he remarks pleasure is inclined to stop with itself without looking back. And if the generation of spite is neither immediate nor inevitable, it also suggests that suffering can lead to a different interpretation and a different response, including a philosophical one. But this in turn requires that philosophy rid itself not of suffering as such, but of nihilistic responses to suffering and the will to suffer with which it poisons itself and others. Now before I answered the genial jailed regarding the origin or provenance of resentment, rancor and spite, and also broached that of its possible overcoming, let me venture a definition of suffering. Perhaps a tentative definition of suffering. And I'll do so by drawing on Spinoza and Nietzsche. Suffering Spinoza calls it sadness. Tristitia is the immediate reaction to and a sign of a decrease of my power to act and think. It signals a shift from agree to a greater to a weaker perfection, a diminishing of my own being a drop in my own vitality. It signals a frustration or impediment in my desire to grow. In short, an expression of impotence. Nietzsche calls it a feeling of obstruction. As such, and whatever the nature of the suffering of flesh wound a disease, the loss of someone we love, a hurtful comment. Suffering is always bad. Insofar as it affects the human or animal body negatively, it is necessarily bad. Furthermore, what we call evil and I include quotation marks here to distinguish it

from any moral interpretation is nothing besides the feeling of this on to physiological drop in power. I called bad Spinoza right malume every kind of sadness tristitia and every force or affection of the body which he says frustrates our desire, human desire, and more generally, the effort of every mode or living being to persevere in its own being or augment its power to the maximum of its capacity is equivalent to what nature? In a perhaps more ambiguous way, calls the will to power. Throughout I will refer to suffering or sadness as the generic passion that invades us. When we move from a greater to a lesser perfection. When our power shrinks, it is a passion insofar as it reveals that our power to act has been affected negatively. It has been frustrated or compromised. Insofar as this affection of the body is accompanied by an idea that corresponds to it, it is an affect or emotion, the range of which Spinoza suggests is quite broad, sad passions, as he calls them, include fear, anger, hatred, cruelty, disdain, despair, envy, jealousy, spite, etc. Nietzsche agrees, it seems, although it is precisely the passage from. Weakness to envy, hatred, spite that I want to focus on and account for. In Antichrist he writes what is bad, everything that proceeds from weakness from envy. From revenge, fullness everything that locks me into a passive reactive position frustrates my power to act. Subjects me to the power of others. Everything that inhibits my own vitality. My, he says again in Antichrist. My instinct for growth for continuance. Accumulation of forces for power. This condemnation of envy night and its connection with weakness should not eclipse the passages in which nature presents a more positive picture of such a drive. One that he sees at work in ancient Greek culture. In his discussion of the two Ares, goddess is in an earlier text called Homers Contest, inspired by Hesiod's works and days. Nature contrasts the negative form of errors or envy, which brings about destruction and annihilation, with the positive form, which forces human beings to better themselves and achieve excellence through. Ambition and competition. And as you know, Greek festival's physical contests and wrestling matches where, according to nature and expression of the latter. In addition, and as a necessary corollary, insofar as those negative revengeful passions diminish my power, whilst always also expressing a degree of power. They limit my freedom. In Astro, I am subjected to the power of external forces over which I feel I have no control and which affect me negatively. Thus generating me thoughts of hatred and revenge. I am locked into a state of servitude, forced to think and act like a slave, that is to react. That is all I can do. What I have become, unable to act, that is to combine my powers with those of others around me so as to increase it and thus experience joy. I can only suffer life. Every form of suffering, from the most trivial to the most excruciating. Is an indication of a passive or reactive life. By contrast, of course, anything that increases my power to act and think is necessarily good, or Spinoza would say virtuous. And in the same way that a decrease of power or loss of vitality brings about sadness and pain and increase of 1's power, a growth in vitality brings

about good. Sorry about joy by good Spinoza, says Bonum. I understand every kind of joy and Furthermore whatever is conducive thereto, and especially whatever satisfies a desire of any sort. Philosophy itself, insofar as it is concerned with understanding the conditions under which power is increased, and the ways of bringing it about, is the highest expression of action. And the gay or joyful science, which also acknowledges and includes the grace, woes, and sufferings of life. It is the science that is concerned with the creation and transmission of joyful affects. And combats the introduction, reproduction, and proliferation of sadness with all its heart. In that respect. It is an antidote to the Dostoyevsky in paradigm. It is the struggle against the oppression of sadness and the glorification of stuff. In all its forms. In the late note from the analysis from 19 from 1888, nature illustrates the conception of virtue have just been sketching. By contrast ING what he calls the virtue of the moralists with what he calls true moral line free virtue. The first, he claims is the hemiplegia of virtue, that is castrated, virtue, or virtue amputated of all the instincts that allow life to struggle and grow those instincts he writes, with which he can be an enemy, can cause harm, can be angry, can demand revenge. This of course then suggest that revenge as such is not the issue, so long as it is Swift directed at the true culprit and proportional. It is just and needs to be distinguished from the revenge fullness of rancor and spite. Sad passions themselves, hate anger and revenge are from a Nietzschean POV, at least often necessary to arrive at the glorious. Yes, to life. The life that is itself struggle and hardship. There is a yes, a sheepish spineless form of acceptance that is detrimental to life. Similarly there is a no form of struggle and combat and anger and rage that affirms life that speaks from a desire to grow and increase. Once power. I am thinking here of the Apollonian rage of Achilles, which manages to express itself directly by exterior Ising itself and creating havoc. And which partakes of what slaughtered Ike, described as a happy and limitless warmongering of free and combative energy. But I am also thinking in a more contemporary context of the constructive, transformative anger. Someone like Audre Lorde feels and claims in the face of racist and sexist attitudes, and the deep destructive hatred that animates them and in the quotations I inserted a passage from Audre, Lord, that I'm not going to read. This kind of rage of fury, even that she claims as a legitimate and fury, I think, is a recurring theme in Lord, needs to be distinguished quite fundamentally from the purely nihilistic hatred and longing for revenge that characterizes result, IMO, and spite in particular. In that respect, I think I would disagree with Martha Nussbaum's claim in anger and forgiveness. That anger is necessarily bound up with retribution and retribution with resentment from a niche in perspective. The taming of the Furys and their transformations in the kindly ones can only be a decadent deception animated by the desire for delayed revenge. If anything, I want to show how resentment is rooted, not in anger persay, but in the specific form of anger that is purely reactive, imaginary and vindictive. Think Lord makes the same point by pointing

to the positive side of anger when she write the angers of woman can transform difference into power for anger between peers. Birth change, not destruction and the discomfort and sense of loss if often causes is not fatal but is a sign of growth. As soon as hatred and anger are conserved, preserved or in terrorized, as soon as they are allowed or worse, still encouraged to accumulate as soon as their externalization is deferred, they enter into a different kind of economy than the one I was just sketching. An economy of accumulation, growth and. Interest, like monetary economy, the economy of anger crosses its critical threshold when anger rises and moves from a state of local accumulation and punctual expenditure. What we could call revenge to that of a systematic investment and cyclical growth, most notably and perhaps controversially, revolution, especially in ITS global ambition. And in the politics of spite in general. Anger, hatred and the desire for revenge are therefore not the issue. Hatred is the emotion that naturally accompanies suffering or the spontaneous rejection of suffering insofar as to speak more spin notice language, it is accompanied by the idea of its course as my power or perfection diminishes, I naturally develop hatred towards the idea. Of its course, there is therefore nothing morally wrong about anger. As Spinoza puts it in so far as it leads us. I could to Ward off from us that which has called us some harm and avoid the thing we hate. It is not bad. It is also natural when we hate someone and are understandably angry to endeavor to cause them harm unless we fear this is still Spinoza speaking away, we fear that we will suffer greater entry in return. It is likewise natural whenever we imagine the destruction of someone or something, we hate to feel joyful. The feelings of anger and revenge are natural consequences of hatred, which is itself generated by the representation of the cause of our sadness. But to say that hatred against anger and revenge are not morally bad. Does not mean that they are not until logically or ethically bad there is to be sure something intrinsically bad about them insofar as they are a negative feeling. They are a sad passion indicative of a loss of power. I can't feel hatred, anger and \*\*\* \*\*\*\* Tidnish without imagining my own powerlessness without imagining the frustration of my own essence or perfection. The inhibition of my desire I can't be subjected to those feelings without the representation of my own passivity and servitude without the realization that might desire or will to power, that is the force with which I persevere in existence. Limited. Exposed to the power of external causes which can cause it harm. But to say again, that following Spinoza had hatred is always bad does not mean that it can be entirely eradicated. In fact, in his political writings, Spinoza sees indignation right, to which I will return, which is a form of hate, as the passion that is at the origin of political movements, such as revolutions, but also and more significantly still of political formations. In the most basic sense, and again I'll return to this question. But after I address the question of the origin of the spirit of revenge or how we deal with our own suffering. So let me now turn to the second part of this first part, which is

concerned with the origin of the spirit of revenge, and I'll try and be quick. And here I'll take my my cousin in Nietzsche who recognizes three different possible responses to suffering, or at least three niche that through nature. I think we can identify three possible responses to suffering there is. What Nietzsche called the Buddhist way, which nature also finds in Epicurus in Schopenhauer, and to an extent also in Wagner, the Buddhist way, also coincides with what he calls the innocent methods of the ascetic. His ability to dampen emotions in general or also in a different context with what he calls the blessing of work, which distracts the sufferings from their pain. So work as a distraction, mechanical activity, which he also called mindless obedience, which he also refers to as the tedium of the life of routine all contribute to the Constitution. Of the multitude as a herd, as an obedient head. All of this, I think the Buddhist attitude way consists in asking how can suffering be eliminated or at least avoided kept to a bare minimum. Right, this is a strategy in relation to suffering. There is also and. I'm going very, very quickly here. There is also what Nietzsche calls at the Dionysian or tragic way, which he embraces as his own. It is concerned with how to accept suffering, live with it, affirm it. Not, and this is of course the crucial point, not as a curse or a punishment, not as a sign of my necessary imperfection, but as a consequence in dimension of life itself, of its unsettling, disruptive, upsetting, and even destructive faults. And in the knowledge that suffering has no meaning, that is to say that suffering is gratuitous and random. What he calls Dionysian pessimism. Whichever cocoas contrast with romantic pessimism, is the genuine philosophical attitude concerned with the creation of values and concepts and animated by a deep love of life, including the suffering it entails. Tragic suffering as he also calls it, is joyful and gay. The discipline of suffering of great suffering, he writes in beyond good and evil alone. Has elevated vacuum, but the 3rd way of course that I'm interested in exploring today since it provides the key to understand the spirit of revenge, is what we could call the guilty or moralizing way. Once this third reaction to suffering and the immediate feelings it gives rise to also and eventually lead to the question of its alleviation. It begins by asking a different kind of question. I think this is the question that both nature and Spinoza have real problems with who is responsible for my suffering. Whom can I blame? That is, the reactive and in a way unforgivable question, which adds cruelty to suffering and thus ends up increasing suffering. It is the question that judges and moralizes suffering dismisses it as A and on to ethical question concerned with the cause of my sadness and my ability to avoid it. It is also the question that opens up the path of spite. And resentment and constitutes the multitude, not as a herd, but as a model. As a lynching mob. If anything Nietzsche like Spinoza before him presents this tendency to impute responsibility to suffering to something like a transcendental illusion, if not a transcendental stupidity. What is specific about this solution to pain is it's an exercising power through the release of stronger yet negative emotions, and in that respect it is different from the Buddhist way. It is

not. Therefore the attempt to present further harm through the defensive return of a blow or through any protective physiological measure. It is an emotional response which is at the same time. A deflection and interpretation and one that needs to be more intense, deeper and longer lasting than the suffering itself. In genealogy 315 nature right, I feel ill. Therefore someone or other must be to blame. And if someone is to blame, then I deserve my revenge, such as the origin of the emotions of revenge, rancor, and spite. For if someone is to blame for my suffering, then I deserve my revenge and I'm entitled to my hatred. Such also is the path. Including the political path that I want to focus on eventually, of course, Ultima. And if we recall what Spinoza says about emotions, namely that they can be fought and replaced only by stronger emotions, you do not fight emotions with ideas. You fight emotions with stronger emotions. I think this is something we've come to learn in the context of our recent very recent political past. If we recall what Spinoza said about emotions that they can be fought and replaced only by stronger emotion, the question ultimately is that of knowing which emotions can be opposed to those deeply sad ones. How we can dig ourselves out of this nihilistic hold an at the political level? Which political affect or emotions can avoid the Constitution of the multitude as either a herd or a lynching mob. What I would call a demos, right? The people in the true sense of the term. OK, now let me turn to the second main section concerned with the spirit of revenge and its its political destiny and its political manifestations. The feelings of resentment, rancor and spite, and the longing for revenge they generate are not limited to the religious, the moral, or the spiritual domain, which both Nietzsche and Spinoza. Address they also play an important. Some would argue even positive role in the social and political sphere and I want to address ultimately the possibility of possible of positive manifestations of result. IMO in a political context. The politics of spite today seems to be ubiquitous. The politics of blame and vindictiveness seem to have reached new Heights. With the recent election of populist leaders across the world who promised to clean the swamp take on the establishment and take back control who lash out at technocrats and the urban elite, the media, the judiciary and the civil service. As well as foreigners, of course, although why claiming to feel the pain of those who suffer and telling them who is responsible for it? Who deserves to pay and against whom they should turn their anger and hatred. It is a rebellion, not of the people, but of the mob, who is not that simply because it feels powerless, but because it would sooner bring down the powerful and the structures of power, then see their own power increase. Political campaigns and decisions are carried out in the name of a struggle against a more or less visible enemy, whether external or internal. So demos is reduced to the gayness or ethnos and democracy to the struggle for the recovery of its power and former glory. Nationalism in that respect is not an expression of true love and generosity, but of fear and therefore hatred of anything and everything that does not conform to its view of nationhood, which



often combines theological and ethnocentric elements similarly. And I quote here from a recent psychologist from the Open University conspiracy theories seduce, not so much through the power. Argument, but through the intensity of the passions that they stir. And this he goes on to say he is Jovan Byford underpinning conspiracy theories are he writes feelings of resentment, indignation and disenchantment. But I would go further and argue at least if we follow a disturbing spinner, this line that all politics, including Democratic politics, is rooted in hatred of one form or another and this is what I would like to hear your response to. This is the difficult, even shocking reality that Nietzsche, like Spinoza before him try to confront it. Been illuminating article. Spinoza scholar called French scholar called Metal, focuses on the discrete but crucial role that indignation plays in Spinoza's political writings. Since the publication of Stephen Selden, I don't know if you're familiar with this name, but Steven is sales 32 pages long essay in French. It was called ending evil. It was translated as outrage, but you can't indignant yourself in English. But in a way, that's that's the invitation. Become indignant, which sold over 4,000,000 copies worldwide in just one year and was translated in 34 languages. We have become accustomed to seeing indignation as. A positive political affect and I'll return to Excel in a minute, but let me just point to the fact that I think only a couple of years before SLS book was published. Philip Roth himself published his own novel called Indignation. And in in. In a book. Look, we witness. Well, let me just say that I I, I think that this this book is a very spinners is booked for the following for the following reason it describes the futile and destructive chain of sad passions, including indignation, which somewhat enigmatically Philip Roth characterize as or described as the most beautiful word of the English language. But I think he does that with a degree of irony and and try and say why at the same time the indignation that the young college student. And main character called Marcus Messner feels when confronted with the implicit but tangible antisemitism of the Dean of Men in this College in Ohio, in which he finds himself and the bigotry of the deeply Christian ethos of Winsper College. It appears as the only adequate response. Indignation appears as the only adequate response, despite the fact that it inevitably leads Messner. To drop out of his hot Bohyo college, be drafted in the US Army to fight in the Korean War and be killed after a few months. In a recent interview, so I think it's it has a sort of open open ended ending that that that forces us to ask ourselves about the value of this affect of indignation. In a recent interview in a similar vein, the French economist turned spin assist for declawed or draws our attention to the fact that was a sad passion and he recognizes that absolutely, which combined anger and hatred. Indignation is sometimes the only possible reaction, and all things considered the least bad option. Now let me return to a cell sort of very short term pamphlet in a way. In his office, kill his cell. Who was a hero of the French resistance and therefore really over 90 year old. When he wrote that little pamphlet and who had been deported to booking but celebrates

indignation as deferment of political resistance. His brief call to indignation in reaction to the treatment of the subkey and migrant workers in France, the face of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, the victims of inequality. Francis Politics of immigration as well as the place of financial capitals in today's world clearly resonated with a large section of the population. Soon after the publication of SLS, Best Center, which was translated, I think in over 30 languages. Spain saw the formation and rise of the anti austerity movement, called Movimiento Kensa. Emer, also known as the movement of the indignant Movimiento de Los Indignados, which eventually led to the formation of political parties such as party lackeys and Bottomless Spinoza's take on indignation. Is singular in that he recognized it as the political affect bikes in loss and would therefore claim that there is nothing you in SLS pamphlet or the formation of N 15 whilst insisting that indignation is a form of hatred, namely and I quote here from book three of the ethics hatred towards one who has injured another and who is like me, right? So indignation? Is hatred towards one who has injured another and with whom I identify in other ways? If I feel indignant, it is because of the injury caused to someone with whom I identify whose hatred and resentment I therefore share and the cause or origin of which I want to destroy. And since hatred, at least if we are consistent, is always bad indignation is also necessarily bad. It is bad because it's been over to say it is contrary to reason, which causes us to desire for others what we desire for ourselves. Once we might naturally grant Spinoza the idea that indignation fuels revolutions, we might be less inclined to agree with him, but it also accounts for the emergence and existence of any state or imperium as he calls it. In his eyes, though, the connection is a matter of certainty, indignation, he says, generates the state in exactly the same way that it causes revolutions. What is that? How does indignation work? The first thing to recall and I I'm referring here to Spinoza's political treaties, is that and I quote, insofar as men are assailed by anger, envy, or any emotion deriving from hatred, they are drawn apart and contrary to one another. And since men, he goes on to say. Human beings are by nature is specially subject to these emotions. They are therefore by nature enemies. As such, they have less power and therefore less right. Then when they come together and join voice forces, yet insofar as they are also prone to mimetic affects, and feel closer to those whom they think are like them, then those who aren't. They tend to associate and join forces with those who are like them and rise against those who are not. This is what happens with indignation. It is contagious. In a dispute or struggle involving two parties, a third party identifies with the feeling of the adversary who is most like him or her. Similarly, he or she will feel indignation toward the adversary who is less like her and will fight against her. And the person who most resembles her is of course the person with whom she shares desires and values and possesses the same sort of things. As a result, the outcome and victory will tend to favor the adversary who most conforms to the model in place. And the adversary who is

most removed from it will be defeated. This is how a consensus eventually emerges with norms, designating what people can desire and possess without feeling endangered or threatened. A collective power or Commonwealth begins to take shape, guaranteeing the safety and security of the conformists and repressing the deviant elements of the multitude. This in effect, accounts for the emergence. However, in formal and embryonic of what Spinoza calls an Imperium democratical. So according to Spinoza's definition, a Democratic state is, and I quote right, defined by the power of the multitude. We can draw, I think several conclusions, and I will draw several conclusions and then perhaps further provisional conclusion that will be my conclusion. So there's a kind of series of conclusion, and I'll leave the talk somewhat. Suspend in there would be there is much more following, but I think we're coming close to the end here. We can draw several conclusions from Spinoza's account of indignation, the first general conclusion is that the political order or Imperium exists as a result of human passions rather than reason or interest, and of course, for Spinoza that is a deeply troubling reality. But he says it's one that we absolutely have to confront. Furthermore, the passions in questions are not joyful. This is a further problem, but sad and rooted in forms of hatred. You know what? Politics is a very dirty business. My indignation is rooted, not in a feeling of love towards those who suffer in the hands of political power, but in the fact that I identify with them in one way or another, which, after all, is what Nietzsche himself argues, even though, like Spinoza, he raises the question of the conditions under which the multitude could be the expression. And I think this is the ultimate political goal. The conditions under which the multitude could be the expression not of weakness, but strength, not impotence, but power, by not servitude, but freedom, and both agree that this requires a political order based not on morality, but ethics not on a plane of transcendence, but a plane of immanence. In genealogy, Nietzsche writes the following, viewed from the highest. Biological point of view. States of legality can never be anything but exceptional states since he goes on to write, they are partial restrictions of the true will of life, which is bent upon power is GM 211. But, and I think this is the crucial point. Their exceptional state does not make them illegitimate. On the contrary, once the question of right or the question of power has been acknowledged as the unsurpassable individual dimension, the truly political question becomes one of knowing how to combine individual powers into greater units of power, how to establish the social conditions. Under which the many or the multitude will become more powerful, and therefore more joyful. Nietzsche remains attached to the notion of a people, and especially what he calls knew peoples. In the section of thus spoke Zarathustra in title of old and new law tables. Also in his early writings, he draws a contrast between Amir and he uses the word in French purple right which he associates with the mob and what he calls a genuine people or publican and he speaks of the need to learn to love and become kind. This is

human all to human 601. We must learn to love, learn to be kind from our youth on up if education Anchante provides us with no opportunity for practicing these feelings, then our souls will dry out and become incapable of even understanding those tender inventions of loving people. The second conclusion is that since Ignation is intrinsically and necessarily bad. It is impossible to distinguish or should be impossible to distinguish between forms of indignation, some of which, for example, revolutionary indignation against tyranny or moral indignation, before genocide, could be good, whilst others would be necessarily bad. The same applies into nature's view of rancor and spite, and to the politics of race Ultima. Even if we admit that indignation can be good for society in general, is that it signals the crossing of an affect of threshold the sense that the situation has become unbearable, thus causing the multitude to move against the power in place and think that that's a good thing. It can never be good for the person who feels it. In addition, it inevitably introduces elements of discord within the Imperial, which is another way of saying that it is bad for the state. Spinoza is uncomfortable if not. Shocking conclusion then, is that something irremediably bad, lies at the root of what he calls the Commonwealth, as Matt Hall puts it. And I could hear from his essay the elementary form of democracy. According to Spinoza is lynching. The elementary form of democracy is the hatred and bloodthirsty model. So again, the question is, is the alternative this soul alternative between the violent mob and the obedient heard in the absence of a political order governed entirely by the knowledge of adequate ideas? And given the fact that the multitude as he emphasizes is naturally governed by negative passengers, passions such as fear, hatred, envy and indignation of big question mark remains. Regarding the possibility of ever overcoming such a pessimist, if not new Mystic horizon which needs there also refers to as the pessimism of indignation. And so let me just finish, perhaps with a few remarks on nature here. Nature himself, I think, looks beyond the openly unashamedly, spiteful politics of his time and our own. Whilst critical of progressive, even revolutionary and anarchist politics as animated by the spirit of revenge, and this is a whole critique feature that we can perhaps return to in the discussion, he also, I think perhaps more interesting. Lee seems to allow for a more ambiguous, perhaps numerous conception of justice as a mechanism to compensate for wrongs or injuries, that is to say, to absorb. Appetite for revenge and guarantee. Social order and peace. This however does not mean, as some have argued, and I have someone like Robert Solomon in mind, or more recently someone like DJ FASA in mind that Nature concludes that there is a necessary connection between justice and or assault. IMO, although he is of course of the opinion that under the reactive moral, specially Christian derived system with thrusters, a decadent system of justice, it is indeed the case. Indeed, despite his critique of Russell, Timothy Nietzsche recognizes, I think, at different points. It's need and purpose under certain historical conditions and in what? What I do in the following part of the

chapter in. And perhaps we could talk about in the discussion is ways in which in our contemporary political context there are manifestations of recent emotion that we think. Are absolutely intrinsic to the Democratic process that once recognizing them as intrinsically bad, we also recognize them as somewhat necessary. And in that respect, I think his views nature's views are brought closer to Adam Smith, views of resentment that Adam Smith. Described in the theory of moral sentiments, resentment added, Smith claims, is he calls it an unsocial and most disagreeable passion? One that he says is far removed from love and joy and rooted in revenge. As such, he says it is the greatest poison and and he uses this vocabulary of the poison to the happiness of a good mind and also to the Constitution of the people. At the same time, Smith says it is both natural and inevitable. Pain spontaneously produces anger and hatred of the person, the situation or even the. Object that causes it. Yet even when hatred and resentment and I quote here are most justly provoked, there is still something about them which disgusts us, and which with which we can never sympathize. Mere expressions of spite, he writes, inspired against nobody but the man who uses them. Resentment, therefore, is unsociable and a sort of discourse among human beings. The voice of anger, hatred, and of all the passions, then stemmed from them. Adam Smith, right, is harsh and discordant and less conducive to sympathy. Spinoza said the same thing about indignation. Even though it is a mimetic affect and thus brings people together in hatred, it is also for that reason the source of discord, and one that a truly Democratic state seeks to minimize. In other words, resentment, enough, I'll finish with this and and, and I think that the discussion will give us plenty of opportunities to two. Clarify some of the distinctions that I've been trying to make, and perhaps find some answers to some of the questions that I raised in. Otherwise, resentment can only be a last resort and applies to situations that are so extreme that it becomes a matter of necessity. It is only when we have no choice and feel drawn into a state very similar to that of Ignatian that we should cede to resentment. OK, let me then try and wrap this up by saying that ultimately. By looking at specific examples that I've not mentioned so far, and the examples that I look at on drawing, first of all on work they did, you fasten has done in the context of post apartheid South Africa, but also considering the work of Jean Marie, the Resistance Jewish fighter, Austrian who was sent to concentration camp and wrote his memoirs. Oh well, a series of essays, one of which is entitled very interesting Lee Russotti model, in which he claims a right and of course as as as as as a critique of nature, are right to hold a grudge and to remain in the state of resentment. Given the experience of the post genocidal experience, fast size, also interested. In the context of post apartheid, South Africa, in looking at the difference between the discourse and also the politics of Mandela, which was oriented towards truth and reconciliation, and the position of Mbeki, who. Demands of the South African people. A position that is far less lenient, not oriented towards forgetting all forgiveness or

reconciliation, but also that that remains steeped in a form of resentment in order to confront the other side to confront its own past. I also mentioned still in the context of. Sort of post Holocaust situation, but Thomas Bare nuts play hidden paths in which we have this character that is. Jew who comes back from London professor of mathematics after the war and eventually commits suicide the day before the 50th anniversary of the Angelus and bounce position. Of course, is that? Austrian situation is is has not evolved sufficiently since the end of the World War, such that this position of resentment is one that he presents as immoral and a necessary one. OK, so all of this to say that the difficult situation that we find ourselves in relation to this affect of indignation is the possibility under certain circumstances of distinguishing between a form of indignation that we could embrace and others that we feel we cannot embrace so. Of course, one could have the images of the assault on the Capitol, in in in Washington DC recently, thinking well, clearly there was a form of indignation at work there. What is it that makes us? What is it that makes us reject it as a form of Ignatian that we found illegitimate? And ultimately I think what makes us reject it is what I based on, what the distinction that I would want to make between spite and resentment on the one hand, and what we would call or something more. Which. Still has a place within politics. OK, so I don't know if this is too confusing or but maybe we can talk about some of those issues in the discussion. Thank you.