More details to follow.

Lecture Title: 'Spinoza and Architectural Knowledge'.

Title: 'Global Aesthetics'

Title: 'Which Thinker: Me, Me, or Me?'

Title: 'Poetry, Affectivity and Self-Understanding'

ABSTRACT:

When thinking of affect and emotion, it is tempting to see this as a route to understanding and gaining knowledge of others. Literature on empathy, sympathy and the underlying mechanisms such as mirror neurons has blossomed in recent years, leading to an understanding of the emotions and affect as a way of bridging the gap to other minds. What I set out to do in this paper is complicate such focus on interpersonal emotions and affective states by highlighting how they in fact fail to provide full understanding of others yet can make significant contribution to our self-understanding that would otherwise have gone unnoticed. I will argue that in fact such self-understanding is inaccessible without making the effort to reach out to others and feel connections with others that poetry can facilitate. Poetry is inherently perspectival and consequently provides an opportunity to reflect on the possibilities of sharing beliefs, values and commitments.

Full title: ‘“… I have become less and less convinced that criticism does or should proceed through the use of anything that can reasonably be described as criteria”: V.F. Perkins, E.H. Gombrich and Criteria’

Details to follow.

Title: 'Gender Fictionalism'

ABSTRACT:

"This paper addresses the question of what it is to be a woman. In section 1, I argue that theories of womanhood face a dilemma. If a theory of womanhood does not regard believing that one is a woman as sufficient for being one (the belief condition), then it excludes some women. On the other hand, the belief condition faces serious objections. I argue that these objections can be overcome if we adopt fictionalism about gender discourse. In section 2, I sketch gender fictionalism and compare it to other relevant views. In section 3, I flesh out the details of gender fictionalism and how it rescues the belief condition. In section 4, I respond to two important objections to the view".

Details to follow.

Title: Kant, Design and Biological Theory

Abstract:

In philosophy of biology there has been ongoing debate between proponents of adaptationism (standard neo-Darwinism) and developmentalism (‘Evo-Devo’) for at least half a century. In the past few years, several philosophers have asked whether the two standpoints can be synthesised into a single theory. In this paper I examine the possibility of a new synthesis by noting a curious return on both sides of the debate to the account of design Kant proposed in Critique of the Power of Judgment. I suggest that each standpoint fulfils one of the two criteria Kant identifies for the investigation of organisms. I then argue that each standpoint departs from Kant’s account at some point or other. I conclude that the recent reception of Kant’s account of design suggests that a new synthesis would require a revised theoretical structure that acknowledges a plurality of investigative standpoints in biology.

Workshop supported by CRPLA and HRC at Warwick and by Royal Holloway

'Punishment'

Speakers include: Kimberley Brownlee, Patrick Tomlin, David James and David Woods

Workshop on Self-Knowledge with Hannah Ginsborg (UCBerkeley) and Alexander Greenberg (Southhampton)

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