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Programme of Events 2020-21


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Fri 30 Oct, '20
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Book Discussion with Miguel de Beistegui: 'The Government of Desire: A Genealogy of the Liberal Subject'
By Zoom

Miguel de Beistegui discusses his latest book, The Government of Desire: A Genealogy of the Liberal Subject (Chicago UP).

Mon 2 Nov, '20
-
Philosophy Skills Development Session
MS Teams

Top Tips for Take-Home Exams

Led by David Bather Woods

Tue 3 Nov, '20
-
Warwick Post-Kantian European Seminar
Webinar

Speaker: Thomas Nail (University of Denver)

Title: TBC

Wed 4 Nov, '20
-
Philosophy Society: Festival of Philosophy 2020
MS Teams

Guest Speakers: Benjamin Ferguson (Warwick) and Simon May (KCL)

Title: 'On Love'

Wed 4 Nov, '20
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Biopolitics Reading Group II
Webinar

Death in Biopolitics: Ege Selin Islekel (Fordham University)

Thu 5 Nov, '20
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Knowledge and Belief Seminar
By Zoom

Guest Speaker: Paul Silva (University of Cologne)

Title: 'Knowledge, Belief, and the Possession of Reasons'

Abstract. Lottery cases, cases of naked statistical evidence, fine-tuning arguments, and profiling evidence can provide a thinker with evidence that ensures a high probability in some claim p. Yet it's widely believed that p's being very probable on one's evidence is insufficient for justified belief that p and therefore also insufficient for knowing that p. Accordingly, lottery cases (etc.) are cases where justified belief and knowledge are inaccessible. This lesson seems to naturally extend to fine-tuning arguments (for theism or a multiverse) as well as profiling cases.

In this paper I provide cases where one's evidence is "statistical" in a way that parallels lottery cases (etc.) but, shockingly, our intuitions are reversed: these parallel cases are cases where high probability justifies belief and holds the promise of knowledge. Existing accounts of what goes wrong in cases of "merely statistical evidence" cannot explain the justificatory asymmetry between the parallel cases of statistical evidence. I examine two explanations. One builds on insights from Timothy Williamson. Another builds on insights from David Lewis. Lessons are drawn about the flaws and limitations of fine-tuning arguments as well as a certain class of arguments for the existence of moral encroachment on justification.

Thu 12 Nov, '20
-
CineMap (Map Film Club)
MS Teams

For discussion: Danquart's 'Schwarzfahrer' (1992)

Please contact Sailee Khurjekar for further information or if you wish to join.

Thu 12 Nov, '20
-
Knowledge and Belief Seminar
By Zoom

Guest Speaker: Alan Millar (Stirling)

Title: 'Detached Factual Knowledge'

Sat 14 Nov, '20
-
A Day of Philosophy Talks for Naomi Eilan
By Zoom

Programme

10.00am - Welcome

10.10am-11.10am - Quassim Cassam (Warwick): 'Extremism: A Philosophical Analysis'

11.10-11.20 - Break

11.20-12.20 - Bill Brewer (KCL): 'The Metaphysics of Perception and the Place of Consciousness in the Natural World'

12.20-12.30 - Break

12.30-1.30 - Adrian Moore (Oxford) 'The Possibility of Absolute Representations'

1.30-2.30 - LUNCH

2.30-3.30 - Matthew Soteriou (KCL): 'The First Person Perspective'

3.30-3.40 - Break

3.40-4.40 - M.G.F Martin (Oxford/Berkeley): Title TBC

Please contact Maria Corrado for further information.

Mon 16 Nov, '20
-
Philosophy Skills Development Session
MS Teams

Writing a Thesis Statement

Led by David Bather Woods

Tue 17 Nov, '20
-
CELPA Seminar Series Term 1
Webinar

Guest Speaker: Erin Kelly (Tufts)

Tue 17 Nov, '20
-
Philosophy Society: Festival of Philosophy 2020
MS Teams

Guest Speaker: Tom Sorrell

Title: 'The Ethics of COVID-19 Surveillance'

Tue 17 Nov, '20
-
Warwick Post-Kantian European Seminar
Webinar

Speaker: Naomi Waltham-Smith (Warwick)

Title: 'The Rhythm of Democracy - The Pulse of Destruction'

Wed 18 Nov, '20
-
Philosophy Department Equality and Welfare Committee
MS Teams
Wed 18 Nov, '20
-
Philosophy Department Colloquium
By Zoom

Guest Speaker: Anton Ford (Chicago)

Title: 'The Objectification of Agency'

Thu 19 Nov, '20
-
Knowledge and Belief Seminar
By Zoom

Guest Speaker: Rachel Dudley (CEU)

Title; 'The Pragmatics of Knowing'

Abstract:

 "Children’s understanding of propositional attitude reports (and their understanding of others’ minds) has played a central role in the study of cognitive development for several decades. Over the years, an orthodox perspective emerged whereby children fail to understand attitude reports, with sources of difficulty being syntactic, semantic or even conceptual in nature. This orthodoxy has also been ported over into other fields such as epistemology and philosophy of mind. However, a wave of findings from new methods and analyses has cast this orthodoxy into doubt. These new findings suggest that even infants have a greater understanding of mental state concepts than we once suspected, and that the apparent difficulties in later childhood stem from pragmatic sources. Resolving the conflict between these new findings and the orthodox perspective is critical to understanding the development of children’s minds and their language faculties, but the debate is far from settled.

In this talk, I’ll discuss my research on children’s understanding of the attitude verbs "know" and "think" and how it relates to the broader conflict. While both verbs can be used to describe beliefs, there are subtle differences between them. As a factive verb, "know" only felicitously describes true beliefs about propositions which we take for granted. In contrast, the non-factive "think" can describe false beliefs or beliefs which we do not take for granted. Using a combination of behavioral methods and corpus analyses, I investigate how children come to master this subtle contrast. Results from this line of research highlight the importance of pragmatic cues to the language acquisition process, particularly from the different kinds of discourse moves that adults make in everyday conversation (e.g., I think it's time for bed, Do you know where my keys are?). Results also suggest that we are sensitive to related pragmatic factors even much later in development. Ultimately, this supports a broader picture where older children’s errors with attitude reports are pragmatic performance errors and not deeper conceptual or semantic errors, highlighting the need for more research on the interplay between semantic and pragmatic development in early development."

 

Thu 19 Nov, '20
-
Art and Mind Reading Group
MS Teams

Subject: Contemporary Visual Art

Please contact Giulia Lorenzi for further information.

Mon 23 Nov, '20
-
Philosophy Skills Development Session
MS Teams

Editing and Drafting Your Work

Led by David Bather Woods

Mon 23 Nov, '20
-
Philosophy Society: Festival of Philosophy 2020
MS Teams

Guest Speaker: Miguel de Beistegui (Warwick)

Title: 'Stupidity and Racism'

Tue 24 Nov, '20
-
CELPA Seminar Series Term 1
Webinar

Guest Speaker: Andrew Williams (UPF)

Tue 24 Nov, '20
-
CRPLA Reading Group: Philosophy in a Time of Crisis
Wed 25 Nov, '20
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Biopolitics Reading Group II
Webinar

Biopolitics and the Changing Use of Statistics: Laurence Barry (Hebrew University, Jerusalem)

Thu 26 Nov, '20
-
Knowledge and Belief Seminar
By Zoom

Guest Speaker: Johannes Roessler (Warwick)

Title: 'Perceptual Self-Knowledge and Doxastic Self-Determination'

Abstract. According to a widely held view of the nature of belief (which I label the Activity thesis, AT), beliefs belong to the ‘active side’ of the human mind. In this paper I explore a challenge to AT. I argue that reflection on the distinctive immediacy of perceptual knowledge, as we ordinarily understand it, puts pressure on an assumption informing AT, viz. that reasons for belief can always coherently be treated as a basis for ‘making up one’s mind’. Our best reasons for perceptual beliefs, I suggest, manifestly entail that we hold the belief they support, and so imply that our minds are already made up. (For example, one's best reason for believing that p may be 'I can see that p'.) I do not mean to suggest that perceptual beliefs should therefore be classified as belonging to the 'passive side' of the human mind. Rather, I think we should question the exhaustiveness (and perhaps usefulness) of the active vs passive distinction, as it has been employed in the philosophy of mind.

Thu 26 Nov, '20
-
Philosophy Society: Festival of Philosophy 2020
MS Teams

Guest Speaker: Angie Hobbs (Sheffield)

Title: 'Is Ancient Greek Philosophy Any Use in a Pandemic'

Thu 26 Nov, '20
-
Thanksgiving Cocktail Hour
By Zoom

Please contact Eileen John for further details.

Mon 30 Nov, '20
-
Philosophy Skills Development Session
MS Teams

Managing Your Workload and Getting "Stuff" Done over Christmas!

Tue 1 Dec, '20
-
CELPA Seminar Series Term 1
Webinar

Guest Speaker: Renée Bolinger (Princeton)

Tue 1 Dec, '20
-
Warwick Post-Kantian European Seminar
Webinar

Speaker: Wahida Khandar (Manchester Metropolitan University)

Title: 'Sketches of Lived Time'

Wed 2 Dec, '20
-
Philosophy Department Colloquium
By Zoom

Guest Speaker: Miriam Schoenfield (Austin, Texas)

Title: 'Can Bayesianism Accommodate Higher Order Defeat?'

Thu 3 Dec, '20
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Knowledge and Belief Seminar
By Zoom

Guest Speaker: Leda Berio (HHU, Düsseldorf)

Title: "Talking about Thinking: Language Acquisition and False Belief Reasoning"