

6. Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man: In a Series of Letters*, ed. and trans. E. M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967), 183.
7. Arthur Miller, *Einstein, Picasso: Space, Time and the Beauty That Causes Havoc* (New York: Basic Books, 2001).
8. Thomas Nagel, *The View from Nowhere* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
9. For an illuminating gloss on Kandinsky's phrase see Kurt Forster, "Aby Warburg: His Study of Ritual and Art on Two Continents," *October* 77 (Summer 1996): 12–14.
10. The phrase "objects of knowledge" evokes the writings of Michel Foucault, who distinguishes *connaissance* from *savoir* in the following way: "By *connaissance* I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it. *Savoir* refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object to be given to *connaissance* and for this or that enunciation to be formulated." Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 15. In this book I explore connotations of *connaissance* and *savoir* through a study of how aesthetic objects become objects of knowledge, aesthetic judgment, and notions of systematicity.
11. Cited in Philippe-Alain Michaud, *Aby Warburg and the Image in Motion*, trans. Sophie Hawkes (New York: Zone Books, 2004), 305.
12. Max Dessoir, "Kunstgeschichte und Kunstsystematik," *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 21 (1927): 142. Unless otherwise noted, all translations in this book are mine.
13. Erwin Panofsky, "The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline," in *Meaning in the Visual Arts* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 15; originally published in *Meaning in the Humanities*, ed. T. M. Greene (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), 89–118.
14. Hans Belting, *Art History after Modernism*, trans. Caroline Saltzweid, Mitch Cohen, and Kenneth Northcott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 26.
15. Heine's aphorism is cited in the illuminating essay by Wolfgang Ernst, "Signifikaten jenseits der Lettern: Archäologie, Museum und Archiv als Medien der Aufklärung," in *Nach der Aufklärung? Beiträge zum Diskurs der Kulturwissenschaften*, ed. Wolfgang Klein and Waltraud Naumann-Beyer (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), 277–296.
16. Ernst Cassirer, *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, vol. 1, *Language* [1923], trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 76.
17. Cassirer and Warburg's admiration for Goethe existed as part of a cult of Goethe among the German-Jewish bourgeoisie. Cassirer, Warburg, Panofsky, and Walter Benjamin considered Goethe the touchstone of European humanism. What Goethe calls symbolic objects encompass a "certain totality." They "therefore lay claim to a certain unity and universality from the outside and the inside." See Goethe's letter to Schiller, August 16, 1797, in *Correspondence between Goethe and Schiller 1794–1805*, trans. Liselotte Dieckmann (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 208–210.
18. Georg Simmel, "Die Ruine," in *Philosophische Kultur: Gesammelte Essays* (Leipzig: W. Klinkhardt, 1911), 137–154.
19. Walter Benjamin, "Little History of Photography," trans. Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter, in *Selected Writings / Walter Benjamin*, vol. 2, 1927–1934, ed. Michael Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 517.
20. Walter Benjamin, K1.1, in his *The Arcades Project*, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 388.
21. Colin Simpson, *Artful Partners: Bernard Berenson and Joseph Duveen* (New York: Macmillan, 1986).
22. Allan Megill, "Introduction: Four Senses of Objectivity," in *Rethinking Objectivity*, ed. Allan Megill (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 1–20.

## 1. Points of View in Panofsky's Early Theoretical Essays

1. Rosalind Krauss, *The Optical Unconscious* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), 103. See also Annette Michelson, "Art and the Structuralist Perspective," in *On the Future of Art* (New York: Viking, 1970), 37–59.

2. On the "scientific revolution" in early German art history see Georg Dehio, *Kunst-*

*historische Aufsätze* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1914); Max Dessoir, "Kunstgeschichte und Kunstsystematik," *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 21 (1927): 131–142; Heinrich Dilly, *Kunstgeschichte als Institution: Studien zur Geschichte einer Disziplin* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979); Lorenz Dittmann and Oskar Bätschmann, eds., *Kategorien und Methoden der deutschen Kunstgeschichte, 1900–1930* (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner Verlag, 1985); Max Dvůrák, *Idealismus und Naturalismus in der gothischen Skulptur und Malerei* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1918); Max Eisler, "Die Sprache der Kunstwissenschaft," *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 13 (1918–19): 309–316; *Empathy, Form, and Space: Problems in German Aesthetics 1873–1893*, introduction and trans. Harry Francis Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomu (Santa Monica, Calif.: Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1994); Jost Hermand, *Literaturwissenschaft und Kunstwissenschaft: Methodische Wechselbeziehungen seit 1900* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1965); Johann Jahn, ed., *Die Kunstwissenschaft der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen* (Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1924); B. Krystal, *Wie ist Kunstgeschichte als Wissenschaft möglich?* (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1910); Udo Kultermann, *The History of Art History* (New York: Abaris Books, 1993); Michael Podro, *The Critical Historians of Art* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Alois Riegl, *Late Roman Art Industry* [1901], trans. Rolf Winkes (Rome: Giorgio Bretschneider Editore, 1985); Julius von Schlosser, *Der Wiener Schule der Kunstgeschichte* (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1934); August Schmarsow, "Kunstwissenschaft und Kulturphilosophie mit gemeinsamen Grundbegriffe," *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 13 (1918–19): 165–190, 225–258; Hans Tietze, *Methode der Kunstgeschichte* (Leipzig: E. A. Seemann Verlag, 1913); Heinrich Wölfflin, *Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style in Later Art*, trans. M. D. Hottinger (New York: Dover, 1950); Christopher Wood, ed., *The Vienna School Reader: Politics and Art Historical Method in the 1930s* (New York: Zone Books, 2003).

3. John Michael Krois, *Cassirer: Symbolic Forms and History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 126. The interrelation of academic institutions with the formation of disciplines, scholarly paradigms, and methodological protocols lies beyond the scope of this chapter. On this see the trenchant critique of the university by Bill Readings, *The University in Ruins* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).

4. Erwin Panofsky, "Das Problem des Stils in der bildenden Kunst," 29. Panofsky's essay originally appeared in the *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 10 (1915): 460–467. It is reprinted in *Erwin Panofsky, Aufsätze zu Grundfragen der Kunstwissenschaft*, ed. Hariolf Oberer and Egon Verheyen (Berlin: Verlag Bruno Hessling, 1964), 23–31; and more recently in *Deutschsprachige Aufsätze*, ed. Karen Michels and Martin Warnke (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998), 2:1009–1018. I will cite the 1964 reprint. As Sander Gilman rightly states, "But the very act of perception is of course colored by our mental representations of the world." Sander Gilman, *Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 28. The notion of a "worldview" is a onerous one: on the one hand, imagining a worldview enables the art historian to find a greater conceptual unity among the artifacts of a given period; on the other hand, as Ernst Gombrich and others have assiduously emphasized, the concept of a worldview slides rather easily into normative, often pernicious concepts of national and racial character. On this latter point, see Christopher S. Wood's introduction to *Vienna School Reader*, 9–81.

5. Panofsky's famous collection of essays, *Meaning in the Visual Arts* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), bears the German title *Sinn und Deutung in der bildenden Kunst* (Cologne: DuMont, 1975; trans. Wilhelm Höck). *Sinn und Deutung*, "sense and meaning," draw out the connotations of "meaning" that I believe Panofsky seeks to demonstrate in his essays and is therefore a more useful description of his project than is the single English word. In the following chapter I intend "sense and meaning" to refer to processes of making what is seen into an object in and for thought (processes, then, of representing and knowing), and of discovering the meaning or value of objects within a system of knowledge.

6. "Science has no higher criterion than truth; and can have no other than unity and completeness in the systematic construction of experience." Ernst Cassirer, *Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity*, trans. William Curtis Swabey and Marie Collins Swabey (New York: Dover Publications, 1953), 187. Brought together in one English volume, Cassirer's studies originally appeared as *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff: Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik* [1910] and *Zur Einstein'schen Relativitätstheorie: Erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtungen* [1920]. A new German edition of Cassirer's

1910 study, edited by Reinold Schmücker, appeared in 2000 (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag). Cassirer's understanding of the quest for "truth" in scientific experiments has been replaced by the consideration of experimental results as social constructions. From a full palette of varied responses see Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972); Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge* (London: Verso, 1975); Thomas Kuhn, "Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice," in *The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 320–329; Steven Shapin, "History of Science and Its Sociological Reconstructions," *History of Science* 20 (1982): 157–211; Bruno Latour and Peter Woolgar, *Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Karin Knorr-Cetina, *Die Fabrikation von Erkenntnis: Zur Anthropologie der Naturwissenschaft* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984); and Erhard Scheibe, "Missverständene Naturwissenschaft," in *Wissenschaft und Aufklärung*, ed. Rainer Enskat, Montagsvorträge der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1997), 9–29.

7. As Wilhelm Dilthey put it somewhat earlier, in his inaugural lecture at the University of Basel in 1867, "The task of our generation is clearly before us: following Kant's critical path, but in cooperation with researchers in other areas, we must found an empirical science of the human mind. It is necessary to know the laws which rule social, intellectual, and moral phenomena. This knowledge of laws is the source of all the power of man, even where mental phenomena are concerned." Cited in Michael Ermarth, *Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 74. On neo-Kantianism see Klaus Christian Köhnke, *The Rise of Neo-Kantianism: German Academic Philosophy between Idealism and Positivism* [1986], trans. R. J. Hollingdate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Thomas Willey, *Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, 1860–1914* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978); and Fritz Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890–1933* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), 305–366.

8. Donald Phillip Verene, "The Development of Cassirer's Philosophy," cited in Thora Ilin Bayer, *Cassirer's Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms: A Philosophical Commentary* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 10.

9. For an overview see Stephan Nachtsheim, *Kunstphilosophie und empirische Kunstforschung 1870–1920* (Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 1984). Nachtsheim does not study Panofsky's early theoretical essays. For a discussion of these early essays see Silvia Ferretti, *Cassirer, Panofsky, Warburg: Symbol, Art, and History* [1984], trans. Richard Pierce (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 177–236; and Michael Ann Holly, *Panofsky and the Foundations of Art History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 57–68, 79–96. In Alois Riegl: *Art History and Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), 152–156, Margaret Iverson discusses Panofsky's 1920 paper, "The Concept of the *Kunstwollen*."

10. Edgar Wind, "Theory of Art versus Aesthetics," *Philosophical Review* 34, no. 4 (July 1925): 351, 354. In contrast to aesthetics, Wind writes, "fortunately we have an art history which is a science; which looks at pictures not from the point of view of what impressions they make on human souls, but what artistic problems they undertake to solve and how they solve them" (355). Wind's "Theory of Art versus Aesthetics" is an English-language synopsis of his 1925 dissertation, "Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme," *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 18 (1925): 438–486, which he wrote under Panofsky at the University of Hamburg. It should be noted that Panofsky drew heavily on Wind's work, especially in his conception of artistic problems, aesthetic re-creation, and the relation between art history and art theory. Especially helpful critical analyses of Wind's writings include the essays in Horst Bredekamp, Bernard Buschendorf, Freia Hartung, and John Michael Krois, eds., *Edgar Wind: Kunsthistoriker und Philosoph* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998); and the introduction by Brigitte Falkenburg and the afterword by Bernhard Buschendorf to Edgar Wind's habilitation, *Experiment und Metaphysik: Zur Auflösung der kosmologischen Antinomen* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001).

11. Considered in this way, the aesthetic point of view shares features with curiosity, a specific attitude toward aesthetic phenomena that took hold in Europe around 1550. Stephen Bann points out that for "the scientific temper of a scholar like Bacon or Descartes, the habit of 'curiosity' was offensive because it attached itself almost obsessively to the in-

dividual object, rather than using classes of objects to arrive at general conclusions which would have the force of law. Curiosity in sum was inimical to inductive reason" (Bann, "Shrines, Curiosities, and the Rhetoric of Display," in *Visual Display: Culture beyond Appearances*, ed. Lynne Cooke and Peter Wollen [Seattle: Bay, 1995], 24). In its attempt to break the spell of the aesthetic point of view in favor of a systematic approach toward aesthetic phenomena, scientific art history reiterates this shift from curiosity to science.

12. Panofsky writes, for example,

A work of art is not always created exclusively for the purpose of being enjoyed, or, to use a more scholarly expression, of being experienced aesthetically. . . . But a work of art always *has* aesthetic significance (not to be confused with aesthetic value): whether or not it serves some practical purpose, and whether it is good or bad, it demands to be experienced aesthetically. . . . Only he who simply and wholly abandons himself to the object of his perception will experience it aesthetically. . . . A man-made object, however, either demands or does not demand to be so experienced, for it has what the scholastics call an "intention."

Erwin Panofsky, "The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline," in *Meaning in the Visual Arts*, 10–11.

13. A useful compendium in English of German psychological aesthetics is *Empathy, Form, and Space*. On "hedonistic aesthetics" and "art-historical anhedonia" see Randolph Starn, "Pleasure in the Visual Arts," in *Meaning in the Visual Arts: Views from the Outside; A Centennial Commemoration of Erwin Panofsky (1892–1968)*, ed. Irving Lavin (Princeton: Institute for Advanced Study, 1995), 151–162; and Arthur Danto, *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

14. Erwin Panofsky, "Der Begriff des Kunstwollens," *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 14 (1920): 321–339; translated by Kenneth J. Northcott and Joel Snyder as "The Concept of Artistic Volition," *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 1 (Autumn 1981): 19. I will cite the English translation of this essay, modifying it as indicated.

15. Panofsky, "History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline," 15, 10, 24.

16. Richard M. Ludwig, ed., *Dr. Panofsky and Mr. Tarkington: An Exchange of Letters, 1938–1946* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 114.

17. Originally published as "Die Perspektive als 'symbolische Form,'" *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg, 1924/25* (Leipzig/Berlin, 1927), 258–330; translated by Christopher S. Wood as *Perspective as Symbolic Form* (New York: Zone Books, 1991).

18. See Martin Warnke's brief remarks on this curious state of affairs in "Panofsky: Die Hamburger Vorlesungen," in *Erwin Panofsky: Beiträge des Symposiums Hamburg 1992*, ed. Bruno Reudenbach (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), 58; see also Panofsky, "History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline," 19ff., on the necessity of "aesthetic re-creation."

19. "Scientia and knowledge, denoting a mental possession rather than a mental process, can be identified with the natural sciences; *eruditio* and learning, denoting a process rather than a possession, with the humanities. The ideal aim of science would seem to be something like mastery, that of the humanities something like wisdom." Panofsky, "History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline," 25.

20. *Ibid.*, 15. See also Martin Kemp, "Relativity not Relativism: Some Thoughts on the Histories of Science and Art, Having Reread Panofsky," in Lavin, *Meaning in the Visual Arts*, 225–236.

21. An objective viewpoint should not be confused with objectivity per se. With the "objective viewpoint" I intend to mark out a distinction between an object existing in the world and *Anschauung*, the mental image or representation of an object. For a brief discussion of *Anschauung*, see my introduction. This distinction is nicely articulated in the German language: whereas *das Objekt*, literally speaking, denotes an object in the world, *das Gegenstand*, philosophically speaking, implies the taking up of an object by the mind in such a way that it stands out as a re-presentation, or object for analysis. In his 1910 study *Substance and Function*, Cassirer discusses the role of representation for knowledge, noting how the "impression of the object and the object itself are separated from each other; instead of identity, the relation of representation appears. No matter how complete our knowledge may be in itself, it never offers us the objects themselves, but only *signs* of them and their

reciprocal relations. . . . To know a content means to make it an object by raising it out of the mere status of givenness and granting it a certain logical constancy and necessity" (303).

22. On the formation and activation of objects, categories, and systems of knowledge, see Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966); translated as *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973); Harriett Ritvo, *The Platypus and the Mermaid and Other Figments of the Classifying Imagination* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997); and most recently, Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, *Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999).

23. Cassirer, *Substance and Function*, 128.

24. *Ibid.*, 122.

25. *Ibid.*, 286. Citing the results of Helmholtz's recent experiments in physiological optics, Cassirer notes how this "ordering by a concept means . . . that the various elements do not lie alongside of each other like the parts of an aggregate, but that we estimate each of them according to its systematic significance" (289).

26. This negotiation of two points of view is addressed anew in Edgar Wind's concept of "embodiment." See Wind, *Experiment und Metaphysik*, translated by Cyril Edwards as *Experiment and Metaphysics: Towards a Resolution of the Cosmological Antinomies* (Oxford: European Humanities Research Centre, 2001).

27. Cassirer, *Substance and Function*, 281.

28. The relation of objectivity to art history is treated briefly in chapter 2 and more extensively in my conclusion. For our purposes here see David Hackett Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); Allan Megill, "Introduction: Four Senses of Objectivity," in *Rethinking Objectivity*, ed. Allan Megill (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994), 1–20; Thomas Nagel, *The View from Nowhere* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

29. For instance, when Hans Reichenbach "on a certain occasion, asked Professor Einstein how he found his theory of relativity, he answered that he found it because he was so strongly convinced of the harmony of the universe." Hans Reichenbach, "The Philosophical Significance of the Theory of Relativity," in *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist*, ed. Paul Arthur Schlipp (Evanston, Ill.: Library of Living Philosophers, 1949), 292. In terms of the discipline of history, see R. G. Collingwood, "Epilegomena" to *The Idea of History* [1946] (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 205–334.

30. Edgar Wind nicely articulates the mutual relation between the scientist and the philosopher in this regard: "every philosophical statement in the field of methodology has, therefore, its scientific aspect; it must be considered as an anticipation which needs to be tested. Every scientific statement in the field of methodology has also its philosophical aspect; it must be considered as a postulate which needs to be interpreted." Wind, review of *Kant und Einstein*, by Alfred C. Elsbach, *Journal of Philosophy* 24, no. 3 (February 3, 1927): 71.

31. Cassirer's 1910 study of the function of scientific concepts provides numerous examples, drawn from the fields of mathematics, chemistry, and physics, of the necessity of this shift in viewpoint for the building up of the scientific disciplines. To cite just one example, Cassirer explains how knowledge of the magnetic field proceeded from its identification with sensuous properties to the understanding of it as a concept to, finally, the use of "the magnetic field" as a symbol of the mathematico-physical relations and connections suggested by the concept. In this transformation from seeing to representing to knowing, and, correspondingly, from the empirical to the objective to the transcendental point of view, the magnetic field itself remained constant while knowledge of it expanded accordingly.

32. Albert Einstein, "Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper," *Annalen der Physik* 17 (1905): 891–921. I have found the following sources of especial interest: Michael Friedman, *Foundations of Space-Time Theories: Relativistic Physics and Philosophy of Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Reichenbach, "Philosophical Significance of the Theory of Relativity"; and Gerald Holton, *Einstein, History, and Other Passions: The Rebellion against Science at the End of the Twentieth Century* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1996). On the

impact of Einstein's theories on Panofsky and Wind's writing in the 1930s, see Kemp, "Relativity not Relativism."

33. "An absolutely lawless and unordered something of perceptions is a thought, that cannot even be realized as a methodological fiction; for the mere possibility of consciousness includes at least the conceptual anticipation of a possible order, even though the details may not be made out." Cassirer, *Substance and Function*, 297.

34. "Das Höchste wäre: zu begreifen, dass alles Faktische schon Theorie ist." Goethe, *Maximen und Reflexionen*, ed. M. Hecker, Schriften der Goethe-Gesellschaft 21 (Weimar, 1907), no. 575, 125. As Cassirer put it in 1942: "We can no longer relegate the particular sciences to the extraction and collection of 'facts,' while we reserve the study of 'principles' for philosophy. This separation between the 'factual' and the 'theoretical' proves to be thoroughly artificial; it dissects and cuts to pieces the organism of knowledge. There are no 'naked' facts—no facts other than those that can be ascertained by reference to, and with the aid of, determinate conceptual premises. Every observation of fact is possible only within a particular context of judgments, which for its part is based on certain logical conditions." Ernst Cassirer, *The Logic of the Cultural Sciences: Five Studies*, trans. S. G. Lofts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 16–17.

35. Erwin Panofsky, *Dürers Kunsttheorie, vornehmlich in ihrem Verhältnis zur Kunsttheorie der Italiener* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1915), 199. Michael Podro uses Goethe's maxim profitably to discuss how Panofsky "attempted to construct . . . an authoritative viewpoint, one which would show how the various factors within a work of art cohered and the work took on the distinctive meaning it had qua work of art." Podro, *The Critical Historians of Art*, 179. I am more concerned with demonstrating how Panofsky negotiated shifts in points of view in his early theoretical essays, and especially with the manner in which, in his conceptual system, seeing is bound up with knowledge or "an authoritative viewpoint." From the field of history see also the important essay by Hayden Whyte, "The Fictions of Factual Representation," in *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985; originally published in 1976), 121–134.

36. Panofsky, "Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie: Ein Beitrag zu der Erörterung über die Möglichkeit 'kunstwissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe,'" *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 18 (1925): 156. This essay is reprinted in Michels and Warnke, *Deutschsprachige Aufsätze*, 2:1035–1063. In a similar vein he writes in "History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline" that "archaeological research is blind and empty without aesthetic re-creation, and aesthetic re-creation is irrational and often misguided without archaeological research" (19).

37. Panofsky, "Concept of Artistic Volition," 18. Panofsky continues: "This demand is, as we have said, both a curse and a blessing. It is a blessing because it keeps the academic study of art in a constant state of tension, consistently challenging methodological consideration and, above all, reminding us that the work of art is a work of art and not just an arbitrary historical artifact. It is a curse because it introduces an uncertainty and fragmentation into scholarship which is hard to tolerate and which either cannot be reconciled with serious scholarship or which appear to offend the notion that the individual work of art has a unique value" (19).

38. Panofsky asks the reader to note that his text was in the hands of the editors at the beginning of July 1915, which is to say before Wölfflin's book was published.

39. Panofsky, "Das Problem des Stils," 23. Wölfflin's lecture was published in the *Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 31 (1912): 572ff.; it was available as an offprint. Wölfflin makes this point explicitly in his 1915 *Principles of Art History*: "Yet an analysis with quality and expression as its objects by no means exhausts the facts. There is a third factor—and here we arrive at the crux of this enquiry—the mode of representation as such. Every artist finds certain visual possibilities before him, to which he is bound. Not everything is possible at all times. Vision itself has a history, and the revelation of these visual strata must be regarded as the primary task of art history" (11).

40. Panofsky, "Das Problem des Stils," 23. On Wölfflin's art history see Marshall Brown, "The Classic Is the Baroque: On the Principle of Wölfflin's Art History," *Critical Inquiry* 9, no. 2 (December 1982): 379–404; Joan Hart, "Reinterpreting Wölfflin: Neo-Kantianism and Hermeneutics," *Art Journal* 42, no. 2 (Winter 1982): 292–300; Michael Ann Holly,

"Wölfflin and the Imagining of the Baroque," in *Past Looking: Historical Imagination and the Rhetoric of the Image* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 91–111; Christine McCorkel, "Sense and Sensibility: An Epistemological Approach to the Philosophy of Art History," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 34, no. 1 (Fall 1975): 35–50; Podro, *Critical Historians of Art*, 98–151; Frederic Schwartz, "Cathedrals and Shoes: Concepts of Style in Wölfflin and Adorno," *New German Critique* 76 (1999): 3–48; and Martin Warnke, "On Heinrich Wölfflin," *Representations*, no. 27 (Summer 1989): 172–187.

41. On "form" see David Summers, "'Form,' Nineteenth-Century Metaphysics, and the Problem of Art Historical Description," *Critical Inquiry* 15 (Winter 1989): 372–393.

42. Panofsky, "Das Problem des Stils," 25. In answering these questions Panofsky explores the "methodological-philosophical meaning" of Wölfflin's concepts. As he informs the reader, we "will not ask whether it is justified to conceive of the development from the Cinquecento to the Seicento as a development from the linear to the painterly. . . . Instead, we will ask whether it is justified to characterize the development from linear to painterly . . . as merely formal" (24). Panofsky indicates at several points in this essay that Wölfflin himself did not conceive of style as strictly formal. While Wölfflin chose to highlight the purely formal root of style as the basic principle of his system, he indicated the role of expressive content in the creation of style. See Wölfflin, *Principles of Art History*, 17, 229–230; notes 4 and 6 of Panofsky's 1915 essay in the *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*; as well as Brown, "Classic Is the Baroque"; and Hart, "Reinterpreting Wölfflin."

43. "Either 'seeing' has nothing to do with the expressive tendencies of art because it only gives, but does not form, the objects of the creative process—yet then on these very grounds it cannot have any influence on style; if 'seeing' influences style, however, then it is a more than an optical activity." Panofsky, "Das Problem des Stils," 26.

44. Erwin Panofsky, "Heinrich Wölfflin: Zu seinem 60. Geburtstag am 21. Juni 1924," in Michels and Warnke, *Erwin Panofsky*, 2:1107; originally published in the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, June 21, 1924.

45. "Formal and imitative elements (in contrast to Wölfflin's doctrine of the 'double root of style') need not be reduced to separable and, for their part, irreducible concepts. They must be understood as different manifestations of a common fundamental tendency, the comprehension of which is precisely the task of the real 'fundamentals' of art history." Panofsky, "Das Problem des Stils," 26. Hence, in "art history there is no question of 'being able to,' only a question of will" (22).

46. This sense of the artist's choice or will is captured in Panofsky's term "artistic intention." On this point see also Panofsky's 1921 essay "The History of the Theory of Human Proportions as a Reflection of the History of Styles," in *Meaning in the Visual Arts*, 55–107; and his essay of 1930, "The First Page of Giorgio Vasari's 'Libro': A Study on the Gothic Style in the Judgment of the Italian Renaissance with an Excursus on Two Façade Designs by Domenico Beccafumi," in *Meaning in the Visual Arts*, 169–225.

47. Panofsky uses the terms *Ausdruckswille* and *Gestaltungs-Wille* to describe the a priori will to form and expression. As he puts it, the difference between the style of a single work of art and the art of a period is "a difference of extent and degree, not of essence." Panofsky, "Das Problem des Stils," 26.

48. *Ibid.*, 28. Panofsky echoes an observation that Cassirer makes in his 1910 study: "Two entirely different complexes of tone-sensations can give us the same melody while, on the other hand, two complexes of elements having the same content can lead to entirely different melodies, in so far as these elements are different from each other in relative sequence." Cassirer, *Substance and Function*, 332. Turning from music to painting (29), Panofsky describes how even if Holbein were to return one hundred years after his death to paint his portrait of Georg Ginzler once again, he would never be able to create a work with the same expression since the same content cannot be expressed in exactly the same way at different times.

49. Jorge Luis Borges, *Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings* (New York: New Directions, 1964), 36–44. On this condition see also Arthur Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); and Nelson Goodman, "Art and Authenticity," in *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976), 99–123.

50. Chapter 2 examines how the Kantian sublime negotiates the "unknowable" object of perception.

51. See for instance Stephen Melville, "'Theory,' Discipline, and Institution," in *Art History, Aesthetics, Visual Studies*, ed. Michael Ann Holly and Keith Moxey (Williamstown, Mass.: Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, 2002), 203–214; and Podro, *Critical Historians of Art*, 117–151.

52. On the logic and techniques of the comparative method see Michel de Certeau, "Writing vs. Time: History and Anthropology in the works of Lafitau," *Yale French Studies*, no. 59 (1980): 37–64; and two essays by Natalie Melas: "Versions of Incommensurability," *World Literature Today* 69, no. 2 (1995): 275–301; and "Humanity/Humanities: Decolonization and the Poetics of Relation," *Topoi* 18, no. 1 (1999): 13–29.

53. On dual slide projection in art history see Heinrich Dilly, "Lichtbildprojektion—Prothese der Kunstbetrachtung," in *Kunstwissenschaft und Kunstvermittlung*, ed. Irene Below (Giessen: Anabas-Verlag, 1975), 153–172; Heinrich Dilly, "Die Bildwerfer: 121 Jahre kunstwissenschaftliche Dia-Projektion," *Rundbrief Fotografie*, n.s. 5 (1995): 39–44; Robert Nelson, "The Slide Lecture, or The Work of Art History in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," *Critical Inquiry* 26, no. 3 (Spring 2000): 414–434; Donald Preziosi, "Seeing through Art History," in *Knowledges: Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity*, ed. Ellen Messer-Davidow et al. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 215–231; Ingeborg Reichle, "Medienbrüche," *kritische berichte* 30, no. 1 (2002): 40–56; and Silke Wenk, "Zeigen und Schweigen: Der kunsthistorische Diskurs und die Diaprojektion," in *Konfigurationen: Zwischen Kunst und Medien*, ed. Sigrid Schade et al. (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1999), 292–305. Beyond the scope of this chapter lies Panofsky's own very interesting remarks on the art historian's use of originals and reproductions of works of art.

54. Panofsky, "Das Problem des Stils," 29.

55. *Ibid.*, 31 n. 5.

56. *Ibid.*

57. Carlo Ginzburg, "From Aby Warburg to E. H. Gombrich: A Problem of Method," in *Myths, Emblems, Clues*, trans. John Tadeschi and Anne C. Tadeschi (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1986), 17–59, 170–194; and Ginzburg, "Clues: Morelli, Freud, and Sherlock Holmes," in *The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce*, ed. Umberto Eco and Thomas A. Sebeok (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 81–118.

58. Panofsky, "Das Problem des Stils," 29.

59. "He has not only created the concept of artistic volition, he has also discovered categories suited to the understanding of the concept," such as his "concepts of 'optical' and . . . 'haptic,'" which "aim at revealing a meaning immanent in artistic phenomena." Panofsky, "Concept of Artistic Volition," 28.

60. For a fuller discussion of Riegl's concept of the *Kunstwollen*, see chapter 4.

61. Panofsky, "Concept of Artistic Volition," 26.

62. *Ibid.*, 20. If artistic volition "does not designate either a psychological reality or an abstract general complex, artistic volition cannot be anything except (and not for us, but objectively) what 'lies' in the artistic phenomenon as its ultimate meaning" (26).

63. *Ibid.*, 24. Panofsky cites Theodor Lipps, *Ästhetik: Psychologie des Schönen und der Kunst*, 2 vols. (1903–6), as an example of "modern aesthetics."

64. *Ibid.*, 28. "Far from displacing purely historical work, the method which adopts the history of meaning [*sinnsgeschichtlich*] is the only one competent to complement it, more competent, in any case, than psychologizing, which appears to deepen the historical picture but which in fact only confuses art and artist, subject and object, reality and idea" (30–31).

65. *Ibid.*, 27; translation modified.

66. *Ibid.*, 27–28; translation modified.

67. *Ibid.*, 26. Five years later, Panofsky defines the artistic phenomenon as follows: "Here . . . the characterization 'artistic phenomenon' or 'artistic appearance' is understood as every art-historical [*kunstwissenschaftliche*] object that, from the point of view of style criticism, can be seen as a unity—whether this unity is restricted to the merely regional (*Volksstil*), epochal (*Zeitstil*), or personal (*Individualstil*), or whether it is represented in a single work of art." Panofsky, "Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie," 129.

68. Panofsky, "Concept of Artistic Volition," 31.

69. "And now we are at the point where the effort to establish the perception of the immanent meaning needs the help of 'documents,' primarily to secure the phenomenal understanding of the given artistic phenomenon" (*ibid.*, 32).



70. Returning to Panofsky's earlier use of Kantian terminology we would therefore say that while we cannot, perhaps, have judgments of experience of artistic phenomena, we can have judgments of perception of them.

71. "Riegl could still not completely recognize that he had justified a transcendental philosophy of art which left behind the purely genetic method which prevailed at that time." Panofsky, "Concept of Artistic Volition," 30 n. 18.

72. As Margaret Iverson rightly states, "Panofsky's use of Riegl's concept of the *Kunstwollen* to secure an historically unconditioned, fixed point of departure for art-historical enquiry was against the spirit of Riegl's work. There is no Archimedean point, and the *Kunstwollen*, far from proposing one, was intended as its undoing." Iverson, *Alois Riegl*, 7; see also 13–14. I explore Riegl's concept of the *Kunstwollen* in chapter 4.

73. Panofsky, "Concept of Artistic Volition," 28.

74. In this essay Panofsky borrows heavily from the dissertation of his student Edgar Wind, which was completed in July 1922. See Wind, "Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme," 438–486. Panofsky's 1925 essay responds to Alfred Dörner's critique of his 1920 essay on Riegl, published in *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 16 (1922): 216ff. In response to Dörner's criticism, Panofsky here aims to demonstrate the "theoretical essence, as well as the practical methodological meaning, of the fundamental concepts of systematic art history in order to articulate more precisely the relation between art history and art theory." Panofsky, "Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie," 130.

On July 29, 1925, Panofsky's professorship at the University of Hamburg was confirmed. On Panofsky's professorship in Hamburg see Aby Warburg's interesting letter to Otto Lauffer of the Museum for the History of Hamburg, dated November 11, 1925, which provides a detailed history of Panofsky's appointment. *Erwin Panofsky: Korrespondenz 1910 bis 1968; Eine kommentierte Auswahl in fünf Bänden*, ed. Dieter Wuttke, vol. 1 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2001), 181–184. See also Claudia Naber, "'Heuernte bei Gewitter': Aby Warburg 1924–1929," in *Ekstatische Nymphe . . . trauernder Flussgott': Porträt eines Gelehrten*, ed. Robert Galitz and Brita Reimers (Hamburg: Dölling and Galitz, 1995), 104–129.

75. Panofsky, "Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie," 139 n. 1.

76. *Ibid.*, 132.

77. Though a quite different note is struck in the 1925 essay, this presentation of different but complementary points of view is not unlike that of the well-known tables of his later essay on "Iconography and Iconology." See Panofsky, "Iconography and Iconology: An Introduction to the Study of Renaissance Art," in *Meaning in the Visual Arts*, 26–54. This essay was first published in 1939.

78. Panofsky, "Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie," 130.

79. *Ibid.* 130–131.

80. Although Panofsky considers ontological, or natural, time and historical time as part of the same categorical system, he therefore draws a distinction between them. See further his essay "Zum Problem der historischen Zeit," an appendix to "Über die Reihenfolge der vier Meister von Reims," *Jahrbuch für Kunstwissenschaft*, 1927, 55–82.

81. Here I am drawing on the ontological distinction between "absolute" and "relative" since I believe Panofsky is alluding to this in his essay.

82. Panofsky goes on to make analogies between the a priori concepts of fullness and time, on the one hand, and form and space, on the other, thereby knitting more tightly to one another the elements in the system of values he presents in the table.

83. Panofsky, "Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie," 131, 142.

84. *Ibid.*, 133, 139.

85. *Ibid.*, 142, 152, 147.

86. Erwin Panofsky, "Probleme der Kunstgeschichte," *Idea: Jahrbuch der Hamburger Kunsthalle* 7 (1988): 9.

87. Edgar Wind, "Contemporary German Philosophy," *Journal of Philosophy* 22, no. 18 (1925): 491.

88. On the hermeneutic circle of interpretation see Wind, *Experiment and Metaphysics*; Wind, "Some Points of Contact between History and Natural Science" [1936], in *Philosophy and History: Essays presented to Ernst Cassirer*, ed. Raymond Klubansky and H. J. Paton (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), 255–264; and Panofsky, "History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline." Contemporaneous essays from the field of history include Hajo Holborn, "His-

tory and the Humanities," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 9, no. 1 (January 1948): 65–69; and Leo Spitzer, "Linguistics and Literary History," *Linguistics and Literary History: Essays in Stylistics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), 1–39.

89. The literature on the concept of style in art history is fairly vast. See for example, in order of appearance, Alois Riegl, *Problems of Style: Foundations for a History of Ornament* [1893], ed. David Castriota, trans. Evelyn Kain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Henri Focillon, *The Life of Forms in Art* (New York: Zone Books, 1989; originally published in 1934); Meyer Schapiro, "Style," in *Anthropology Today*, ed. A. L. Kroeber (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 287–312; George Kubler, *The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); James Ackerman, "Style," in *Art and Archaeology*, ed. James Ackerman and Rhys Carpenter (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 164–186; Lorenz Dittmann, *Stil, Symbol, Struktur: Studien zu Katagorien der Kunstgeschichte* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1967); Michael Baxandall, *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy: A Primer in the Social History of Pictorial Style* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972); Nelson Goodman, "The Status of Style," *Critical Inquiry* 1, no. 4 (June 1975): 799–811; Ernst Gombrich, "The Psychology of Styles," in *The Sense of Order: A Study of the Psychology of Decorative Art* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 194–216; Dick Hebdige, *Subculture, the Meaning of Style* (London: Methuen, 1979); Berel Lang and Leonard Meyer, eds., *The Concept of Style* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979); Willibald Sauerländer, "From Stilus to Style: Reflections on the Fate of a Notion," *Art History* 6, no. 3 (September 1983): 253–270; Friedrich Möbius and Helga Scieurie, eds., *Stil und Epoche* (Dresden: Verlag der Kunst, 1989); Esther Pasztor, "Identity and Difference: The Uses and Meanings of Ethnic Styles," in *Cultural Differentiation and Cultural Identity in the Visual Arts*, ed. S. J. Barner and W. S. Melion (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, Hanover, N.H.: Distributed by the University of New England, 1989), 15–38; Margaret Conkey and Christine Hastorf, *The Uses of Style in Archaeology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Peter Por and Sándor Rádnóti, eds., *Stilephoche, Theorie und Diskussion: eine interdisziplinäre Anthologie von Winckelmann bis heute* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1990); Whitney Davis, "Style and History in Art History," in *Replications: Archaeology, Art History, Psychoanalysis* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 171–198; Carlo Ginzburg, "Style as Inclusion, Style as Exclusion," in *Picturing Science, Producing Art*, ed. Caroline Jones and Peter Galison (London: Routledge, 1998), 27–54; C. J. Van Eck, J. Macalister, and R. Van de Vall, eds., *The Question of Style in Philosophy and the Arts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Irene J. Winter, "The Affective Properties of Styles: An Inquiry into Analytical Processes and the Inscription of Meaning in Art History," in Jones and Galison, *Picturing Science, Producing Art*, 55–77; James Elkins, "Style," in *Grove Dictionary of Art* (New York: Grove's Dictionaries, 1996), 876–883; and Jonathan Gilmore, *The Life of a Style: Beginnings and Endings in the Narrative History of Style* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

90. Panofsky, "Probleme der Kunstgeschichte," 9.

91. Panofsky writes:

From the end of the eighteenth century, there has arisen a dichotomy—inevitable, to be sure, but nevertheless a little saddening—between a *scientific* interpretation of the world that looks for *laus and principles* regardless of *meanings*; and a *humanistic* interpretation of the world that gropes for *meanings* while no longer being able to believe in *laus and principles*. This was not so when both the sciences and the humanities came into being and walked hand in hand for a few glorious centuries. . . . Needless to say, we cannot go back. We cannot revert to the acceptance of either classical tradition or Christian dogma, however much revered, as something that guarantees meaning to the law of nature, and, at the same time, guarantees the force of a law to the meaning of history. (Ludwig, *Dr. Panofsky and Mr. Tarkington*, 114–116)

92. Panofsky's iconographic method resonated persuasively with the current emphasis on "objective" method in American art history, more than his more speculative work ever could have. Yet, as I have attempted to demonstrate, this American disciplinary climate should not be taken as the sole reason for his abandonment of theory, as it has been gener-

ally. On the fate of German art history and German art historians “transplanted” into the United States after 1933, see two important recent studies: Ulrike Wendland, *Biographisches Handbuch deutschsprachiger Kunsthistoriker im Exil: Leben und Werk der unter dem Nationalsozialismus verfolgten und vertriebenen Wissenschaftler*, 2 vols. (Munich: Saur, 1998); and Karen Michels, *Transplantierte Kunstwissenschaft: Deutschsprachige Kunstgeschichte im amerikanischen Exile*, Studien der Warburg Haus, vol. 2 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999).

93. Erwin Panofsky, “Zum Problem der Beschreibung und Inhaltsbedeutung von Werken der bildenden Kunst,” *Logos* 21 (1932): 103–119; reprinted in Michels and Warnke, *Erwin Panofsky*, 2:1064–1077. I will cite this reprint.

94. Panofsky, “Iconography and Iconology,” 39.

95. Panofsky, “Concept of Artistic Volition,” 33.

96. To be sure, the ordering of objects under generic concepts such as “Gothic” or “Renaissance” provides a new law of relation and with it a greater unity of artistic phenomena than does the concept of serial relation. Though he fell prey to the lure of the generic concept, Panofsky was nevertheless aware of some of the shortcomings of the use of these powerful concepts. As he remarked in his 1920 essay, “The Concept of Artistic Volition,” “‘Gothic’ man or the ‘primitive’ from whose alleged existence we wish to explain a particular artistic product is in truth the hypostatized impression which has been culled from the works of art themselves” (23). Like psychological or historically genetic volition, generic concepts do not provide an Archimedean point outside the field of investigation; hence, although generic concepts offer a gain in terms of relation, they remain an unsuitable means with which to discover the fundamental principles of systematic art history.

97. As Cassirer puts it in *The Logic of the Cultural Sciences*, “For once we are convinced that the logical concept is the necessary and sufficient condition for the knowledge of the essence of things, then everything else, which is specifically different and which does not meet this standard of clarity and distinctness, ends up being only an unreal appearance” (29).

98. On “Renaissance” as a normative generic concept see Ernst Gombrich, “Norm and Form: The Stylistic Categories of Art History and Their Origins in Renaissance Ideals” [1961], in *Norm and Form: Studies in the Art of the Renaissance* (London: Phaidon, 1971), 81–98, 149; and Svetlana Alpers, “Style Is What You Make It: The Visual Arts Once Again,” in *The Concept of Style*, ed. Berel Lang (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 137–162.

99. Edgar Wind, “Aby Warburg’s Concept of *Kunstwissenschaft*,” in *The Eloquence of Symbols*, ed. Jaynie Anderson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), 22.

100. Edward Harrison, *Masks of the Universe: Changing Ideas on the Nature of the Cosmos* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 118–119.

101. Panofsky, “Zum Problem der Beschreibung und Inhaltsbedeutung,” 1072; Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 138. On Panofsky’s quotation of Heidegger and its relation to “the scheme of art historical interpretation that persisted through the later versions of his essay” see David Summers, “Meaning in the Visual Arts as a Humanistic Discipline,” in Lavin, *Meaning in the Visual Arts*, 9–24. I agree with Summers that Panofsky “did not think it desirable to eliminate ‘violence’ since we must always—or should always—approach the past on our own personal and historical ground” (11).

102. Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 138.

103. See, for instance, Aby Warburg, “Sandro Botticelli” [1898], “Francesco Sassetti’s Last Injunction to his Sons” [1907], and “Italian Art and International Astrology in the Palazzo Schifanoia, Ferrara” [1912], in *The Renewal of Pagan Antiquity*, trans. David Britt (Santa Monica, Calif.: Getty Research Institute for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1999). Warburg’s approach to the study of aesthetic phenomena is explored in chapter 3.

104. Erwin Panofsky, “The Neoplatonic Movement and Michelangelo,” *Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), 171–230ff. See also Kurt Forster, “Critical History of Art, or Transfiguration of Values?” *New Literary History* 3, no. 3 (Spring 1972): 459–470; and Holly, *Panofsky*, 172–174.

105. Erwin Panofsky, *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism* (New York: Meridian Books, 1968). Originally delivered as the Wimmer lecture for 1948.

106. David Summers puts it eloquently: “It is through history that we understand our own historicity and thus confront so many human possibilities. This is the historicist version of the ideal of the examined life. If it is because of our histories that we think and act

as we do in the present, it is also partly because of our knowledge of history that we may act differently in the present." Summers, "Meaning in the Visual Arts," 20.

107. See "Bilderflut oder Interpretationsebbe?" special issue, *kritische berichte* 26, no. 2 (1998). If the "flood tide" of images is the visual condition of contemporary times, then what Eric Hobsbawm has termed a "permanent present," which is to say a present lacking an organic relation to the past, may be its corresponding historical condition. See Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994).

108. On the vicissitudes of the concept of the "masterpiece" from the early nineteenth century to the present, see Hans Belting, *The Invisible Masterpiece* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). Applying Stephen Greenblatt's convenient formulation, the designation of a work of art as a masterpiece would entail "that kind of impulse that moves us away from resonance and toward wonder." It is useful to consider the implications of this impulse in relation to the Museum of Modern Art in New York, for example. As Greenblatt suggests, MOMA works to efface the historical and ethnographic thickness of "resonance" in favor of a poetics of "wonder," both as a mode of viewing and a strategy of display: "For MOMA is one of the great contemporary places not for hearing of intertwining voices, not for historical memory, not for ethnographic thickness, but for intense, indeed enchanting looking. Looking may be called enchanted when the act of attention draws a circle around itself from which everything but the object is excluded, when intensity of regard blocks out all circumambient images, stills all murmuring voices. To be sure, the viewer may have purchased a catalogue, read an inscription on the wall, or switched on a cassette player, but in the moment of wonder all of this apparatus seems mere static." Stephen Greenblatt, "Resonance and Wonder," in *The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display*, ed. Ivan Karp and Steven Lavine (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 49.

109. Panofsky, "Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie," 156–157.

110. Panofsky, "Probleme der Kunstgeschichte," 7. Here Panofsky implies an investigation of aesthetic objects, broadly conceived. In this sense he leans more toward a *Bildwissenschaft*, a science of the image, rather than a more narrowly conceived history of art. Horst Bredekamp rightly argues for *Bildwissenschaft* as a neglected tradition of art history, especially in the United States. See his essay "A Neglected Tradition? Art History as *Bildwissenschaft*," in *The Art Historian: National Traditions and Institutional Practices*, ed. Michael Zimmermann, Clark Studies in the Visual Arts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 147–159. In *Bild-Anthropologie: Entwürfe für eine Bildwissenschaft* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2001), Hans Belting offers an anthropological approach to the study of the image or likeness. See also *Quel Corps? Eine Frage der Repräsentation*, ed. Hans Belting, Deitmar Kamper, and Martin Schulz (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2002).

111. A fundamental inquiry might begin with the definition and function of the image. See, for instance, Gottfried Boehm, ed., *Was ist ein Bild?* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1994); Matthias Bruhn, ed., *Darstellung und Deutung: Abbilder der Kunstgeschichte* (Weimar: Verlag und Datenbank für Geisteswissenschaft, 2000); Dieter Kamper and Hans Belting, eds., *Der Zweite Blick: Bildgeschichte und Bildreflexion* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1998); and Horst Bredekamp, "Einbildungen," *kritische berichte* 28, no. 1 (2000): 31–37.

## 2. The Dialectics of Decay

1. Erwin Panofsky, "The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline," in *Meaning in the Visual Arts* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 1. In a note, Panofsky cites E. A. C. Wasianski, *Immanuel Kant in seinen letzten Lebensjahren (Über Immanuel Kant, 1804, vol. 3)*, reprinted in Immanuel Kant, *Sein Leben in Darstellungen von Zeitgenossen* (Berlin: Deutsche Bibliothek, 1912), 298. On eighteenth-century German connotations of "Humanitas" see Edna Purdie, "Some Renderings of *Humanitas* in German in the Eighteenth Century," in *Fritz Sazl: 1890–1948; A Volume of Memorial Essays from his friends in England*, ed. D. J. Gordon (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1957), 339–358.

2. Clement Greenberg, "Modernist Painting," in *Postmodern Perspectives: Issues in Contemporary Art*, ed. Howard Risatti (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1990), 12. Greenberg's essay was originally broadcast over radio in 1960 by the Voice of America; after a bit of retouching it was then published in *Art and Literature* 4 (Spring 1963).

3. Greenberg, "Modernist Painting," 13. On Greenberg's particular use of Kant, see