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WAR FROM WITHIN: A FEMINIST UNDERSTANDING

I very much appreciate the opportunity you have offered me today to present some thoughts in the context of the Centre's annual lecture. I'd like to use the valuable occasion to enlist your thinking and invite some discussion by exploring some ideas about militarism and war that don't usually make it into the standard textbooks. Briefly, what I'm going to suggest is that experiencing war, as a woman; or allying with women who are experiencing war; and especially getting actively involved in opposing war, gives rise to a particular understanding. It's the perception that militarism and war are – only in part, but very significantly - driven and perpetuated by *gender relations*. Economic factors, like oil or diamonds, drive war, yes. Ethno-national factors like the desire to kill all the Muslims in India, or all Christians and animists in Sudan, yes, they too drive war. But gender factors do too. And I'll try to explain how I think this works – drawing on insights from feminist activism, and then from feminist academic work.

Activism first. A host of people, both men and women, in this country and many others, direct their passions and energies to campaigning against war, against the arms trade, against the militarization of society, against the pursuit of political goals by armed conflict, conquest and invasion. Put more positively, they're campaigning for peace with justice, for international strategies of social and political inclusion and economic equity. It's surely important that this movement of ours use all the tools at its disposal to dismantle the war system. I'm going to suggest that challenging gender relations as we know them is one of these tools, and our movements are the weaker when they neglect it.

Of course this thought about gender being a motor of war isn't my own. There's an extensive feminist literature, both before and since Virginia Woolf, voicing the idea in different words. More immediately what I'm saying tonight arises out of some empirical research I carried out between 2004 and 2006, about and among women's organizations and networks.

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80,000 air miles of travel and took me to 12 different countries: Colombia, Spain, Belgium, Turkey, the USA, Italy, Serbia, India, the Pacific region, Sierra Leone, Israel and Palestine, as well as the UK. During that time I listened to more than 250 women talking about more than 60 organizations. Most of them were local, but four were transnational networks: Women in Black against War, with which I'm involved myself; the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; Code Pink Women for Peace; and the East-Asia-US-Puerto Rico Women's Network against Militarism that monitors the effects of US bases overseas.

My questions to these women began with 'who are you and what are the aims of your activism?' They mostly represented themselves as having three tasks.

The first was to inform and educate as wide a public as possible about the gendered nature of militarism and war and the suffering, courage and achievements of women in armed conflict. They're identifying the 'gender specificity' in the war experience - because there's a sexual division of war just as there's a sexual division of labour. In neither of them are the statistics totally definitive - it's not that 100% of soldiers are men, or 100% of rape victims are women. No. But there is a strong gender skew. They want to explore what's happening to women, and make it visible.

Second, they see their task as challenging the militarization of their own societies, they monitor and contest their countries' policies on war fighting, their defence policy, immigration and civil liberties.

But, third, and simultaneously, these activist women want to foster communication, connection and solidarity between women divided by war. And that means forging links between women in war-delivering countries, like the US and UK, and war-afflicted countries, like Afghanistan and Iraq, and also, between women on the two 'sides' of war, between those 'our' authorities identify as 'us' and those called the 'other', the 'enemy', whether they live beyond the national borders or inside them.

After this opening exploration of their activism I wanted to know from the women "what motivates you to organize *as women* against war? Why not be in the mainstream organizations that include both men and women?" And here I began to catch a glimpse of the conceptual and theoretical divergence between a mainstream and a feminist 'take' on war.

Everywhere I went, women discussed their choice to "be women" in terms of dissatisfactions with the mainstream movement. The dissatisfactions in the main were three.

First, they say they find the mainstream movement's organizational life and processes are dominated by men and by masculine priorities, resulting in a lack of inclusiveness, with a tendency to alienate women (and some men) and marginalize women's voices. This is particularly the case in Left groups with a traditional centrist, vertical, combative approach, less the case in

'pacifist' organizations like Quaker groups which, like women's organizations, prefer a more horizontal, relational and participative process.

Second, they say the mainstream movement's protest actions and language can be uncomfortable to them as women. Of course big demonstrations are necessary, and they join them. But they can be unimaginative and predictable, there's often a preference for repetitive chanting of slogans and these are often cast in simplistic, antagonistic terms. Some elements seem to relish violence, breaking windows, provoking police. A lot of women would rather put energy into more educative work, silent vigils, creative events, sustained peace camps and so on. Women stressed the importance of "prefigurative struggle", ensuring that the methods and relations of your engagement in struggle reflect the qualities of the world you hope to bring into being. 'Coherencia entre fines y medios' the Spanish women call it. A coherence of ends and means.

A third dissatisfaction women told me was that the analysis of the mainstream organizations appeared entirely unresponsive to the gender analysis they themselves were evolving and expressing in their women's organizations.

In a women-only network or organization you have the possibility and probability of talking and thinking with other women about what you're doing and why. You can address 'the problem', militarism and war, from a shared *location* and a negotiated *positionality*. The *location* maybe horribly close to the bloodshed, or maybe far away so you only see it on TV – yet that's enough to jolt you into activism. The *positionality* will be that of 'women' in a system of gender power relations; but of course that will be intersected with others – ethnicity in particular. I can illustrate this from the experience of Women in Black in London during the Yugoslav war. In our group we didn't just have English members, that would have been relatively simple. Among us were women refugees in flight from Yugoslavia, and from both 'sides', from Bosnia and Serbia. So we had to work out our analysis, our public words on the war, with some delicacy, listening attentively to women who, though all of them deplored the ethnic cleansing, were in one case having it done to them, in the other having it done 'in their name'.

Together, alert to such complex individual and group identities, as activists you hammer out a perspective. For instance a perspective on the impact of war on 'everyday life', for which women feel great affinity and responsibility. Take Colombia, trapped in a 40-year long three-sided war between government forces, the guerrilla and rightwing paramilitaries. *La Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres* are a very bold and effective Colombian women's organization. They denounce the state army, the guerrilla and the paramilitaries for trashing everyday life - "la cotidianidad", as they call it. Everydayness. When I was there they were still talking about a characteristic mass mobilization in which they'd recently taken 3,500 women in 38 buses the length of the country to bring support to the women of the region of Putamayo, where the war was wreaking havoc with the intricate and delicate systems of sustenance and survival that are everyday life.

Some groups are working out a shared perspective on the effects on their society of long-term militarization. The East-Asia Network for instance, that I mentioned just now, brings into alliance women's organizations in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Hawaii to monitor and campaign against the US military presence in the Pacific. They see how their governments' various pacts with the USA deform their own democracies, militarize their own men, and how women are trafficked from country to country, and drawn into prostitution in huge camp towns around the US bases to service the supposed sexual needs of male soldiers.

It maybe that what you learn through shared activism is how militarization constitutes and deforms manhood. Women in Black in Belgrade includes in its otherwise female membership a small number of men who are in trouble in Serbia for refusing military conscription, men who identify politically as feminists. This organization is well known in the wider movement for thoughtful theoretical work and writing. They define themselves as a feminist, anti-patriarchal and anti-nationalist organization, and also an anti-homophobic one.

It maybe that, as in Sierra Leone, you work out how ordinary women, because of their place in the community, and because of what happened to them in that atrocious conflict, are able to play a particular part in preventing the next war. The Mano River Women's Peace Network (which involves women of the neighbouring West African countries Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) maintain contact with women living in remote areas along the borders, engaging them in monitoring the movement of gangs of men, weapons and drugs between the three countries, as an early warning sign that fighting may break out again.

I hope these few examples, among many more that I can only ask you to imagine, are enough to establish that women anti-war activists don't just act, they also think, conceptualize and theorize as they do so. The analysis they arrive at goes something like this. Militarization and armed conflict are profoundly gendered. Militarized societies and institutions are masculinized societies and institutions. Masculinist cultures shape the foreign and defence policies of a lot of states. War deepens gender differentiation, misogyny and homophobia. Masculinity acquires more authority, and the feminine is more subjected, in war than in peacetime. Gender as a relation of power takes particularly malign forms in war and is widely acted out in sexual violence.

So the women's anti-war movements are predicated on the notion that, along with capitalism and nationalism, patriarchy is a driving force in war. The women's anti-war movements propose that an end to war is unlikely without a transformation of gender relations. The women see no signs of the mainstream anti-war movement recognising this gender story. They don't see them bearing placards that say "Don't exploit my masculinity for militarism" among those that say 'Blair is a liar' or 'No blood for oil'.

I think it may be worthwhile clarifying just what kind of feminism I found was evolving within women's anti-war activism and flowing from it. Because there are a lot of kinds of feminism, and we need to be clear. Actually a lot of Western feminists suppose that women of the Global South are suspicious of feminism as a Western imposition. My experience has been different. The women I met, let's say in the Indian group Vimochana, or in WEDPRO in the Philippines, long ago evolved feminism for themselves. And as a Western woman I had a lot to learn from them.

Given differences in women's locations and positionalities, anti-war feminism isn't and could never be anything unitary or dogmatic. On the other hand the political standpoint of opposition to war itself does delineate certain probabilities.

First, it's not one that sees differences between women and men as determined by biology. It's necessarily social constructionist, non-essentialist – because we all know some non-violent men and some violent women. After all, these women are working for peace. If they believed masculinity (and femininity) to be singular, inborn, natural and inescapable, it would make no sense at all to be campaigning for change.

Second, looking through the lens of war you absolutely can't ignore the way women are oppressed and exploited through *their bodies, their sexuality and reproductive capacities*. So this has to be a 'radical' feminism in the sense that it sees women's oppression as something more than just 'inequality' or 'capitalist exploitation'.

On the other hand, antimilitarist and anti-war feminism can hardly fail to have a *critique of capitalism*, of class exploitation and the thrust for global markets, since these are visibly implicated among the causes and motors of militarism and war. And again, since many wars exploit 'difference' and involve rival nationalisms between and within states, this feminism also has in view that cluster of things - *race / culture / religion / ethnicity*. In these two significant fields of class relations and quote 'race' relations, this feminism perceives the working of gender relations and is alert to how they intersect.

Then again, it's a 'rights feminism'. If 'rights' hadn't been invented we'd surely have needed to invent them. It defends international *human rights and women's rights*, so abused in war, and calls for international justice. It has a sense of women's marginalization and *under-representation in political systems* – we can see that from women activists' efforts at the United Nations to achieve a women's presence in peace negotiations.

So what you get in activism is very much a *holistic feminism*. There's no way the thinking of women anti-war activists can be reduced to those limited categories we usually box ourselves into – 'radical', 'socialist' and 'liberal' feminism. In my travels, both in the North and the South, I found women using the insights of all of them without any sense of incompatibility.

Furthermore, the insistence on prefigurative struggle that I mentioned earlier, the idea that our methods mustn't betray our purposes, I think that has to be seen as implying a *critique of the meanings and operation of power* itself. It's a call for power as domination to give way to power as capacity and capability, 'power to' instead of 'power over'. This feminism is also by definition *transnational*, in the dual sense of aspiring to cross state borders, and to transcend the system of sovereign nation states itself. In these movements women tend to ascribe feminist leadership and authority not to women in the white Western world but to women living in conditions of war, colonization and poverty.

Finally, it goes without saying, this feminism also sees *gender power relations as systemic*, not merely incidental. Through their analysis of war, women see how masculinities are resistant to change because they are embedded in structures and institutions. As Raewyn Connell puts it, quote: 'The *institutionalization* of masculinity is a major problem for peace strategy. Corporations, armed forces, workplaces, voluntary organizations, and the state are important sites of action. Collective struggle, and the re-shaping of institutions, including military and police forces, are as necessary as the reform of individual life' (Connell 2002a:38).

I'm about half way through this talk. That's the easy, anecdotal bit. Now I want to turn to some academic work on war. Because alongside the feminist anti-war activists is a growing number of feminist theorists, and as the former tangle with the mainstream anti-war movement, so the latter tangle with the mainstream theorists of war.

Theories of war have primarily been of concern to the academic discipline of international relations. I'm not going to address that body of work tonight – except to say that an energetic and perceptive school of feminist thinkers got busy in the early 1990s questioning the orthodoxies of academic IR, making a bid to lodge gender on its agenda. One of their main innovations was to make women visible in what seemed to be a world of male statesmen and diplomats, by showing how the domestic is inseparable from the national and the international. Some of you may remember Cynthia Enloe's book *Bananas, Beaches and Bases* in which she showed how wearing jeans stitched by poor women machinists in the Global South, or working as a migrant nanny, or being a sex-tourist in Thailand are all manifestations of international relations and foreign policy in action. The feminist slogan is "the personal is political" - but these writers, feminists like Ann Tickner, Spike Peterson and others, were telling us "the personal is international" too (Enloe 1989, Tickner 1992, Peterson 1992, 1998). Women also argued for a new notion of 'security', extending it from the 'state security' to 'human security', the security of the ordinary human being, and 'women's security' - because women live particularly insecure lives – war apart (eg. Peterson 1992, Tickner 1992).

Rather than on IR, I'm going to focus rather on war as it's dealt with in sociology. Every theorist of war has a different definition of it, but broadly speaking they boil down to an understanding that to be deemed 'war', a

conflict has to be a collectively-organized enterprise; involve weapons, and be potentially deadly; be fought for a purpose or with an interest; and most importantly be socially sanctioned, such that the killing isn't considered murder. Those criteria indicate that war involves certain understandings shared by the warring groups. In other words, surprising as it sounds, it's social, it's *relational* - this is something stressed by Brian Fogarty in his well known text *War, Peace and the Social Order* (Fogarty 2000). Even the atrocities of war have social meaning of a kind. Thus, mass rape may carry a message from one group of men to another – “you're such wimps you can't protect your most valued property, your womenfolk!”

You would expect then that, being a social thing, war would always have been a central subject for sociology. But actually, it was twenty or thirty years after the 1960s resurgence of sociology that war was first seriously addressed in the discipline. In 1980 a conference was held at the University of Hull on *War, State And Society* (Shaw 1984). That was where modern war studies took off, and whence it would eventually encounter gender studies..

Sociological theorists in the main singled out three factors as being implicated in the perpetuation of war: economics, the politics of the nation state, and the military system itself. The explanation of the first lies in capitalism and its continual search for the cheapest sources of material and labour, and new markets for its products (Mann 1984). A specific kind of profit-seeking enterprise bearing on war is of course weapons manufacture and the associated arms trade. But economic interests, as William Reno points out, also include phenomena like armed factions milking humanitarian agencies for resources intended for aid; and groups like the Afghan warlords or Sierra Leonean rebel militias, getting so rich from war-profiteering that they have no interest in making peace (Reno 2000).

A second motor of war, the natural companion to economics, is ethnic ambition - the emergence of armed 'selves' and armed ethnic others. In this vein, academic writers, like John Hutchinson, and Ted Gurr & Barbara Harff, trace the expansion and collapse of empires as an everlasting cause of war. People identifying as 'peoples' expand and colonize other 'peoples', racializing them in the process. There are rebellions and assertions of identity, nation-state projects, repressions and assimilations - all potential causes of war (Hutchinson 2005, Gurr and Harff 1994).

The third approach the social sciences have taken to understanding war has been to consider militarism, militarization, armies and weapons technologies as not just a concomitant, but themselves a *cause* of war - the war system as self-reproducing. For instance Paul Rogers and others have argued that after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 you could see the survival reflex of the military-industrial complex inspiring a search for new enemies (Rogers 1994) so there'd be no cut in military expenditure.

As in international relations, so also in sociology and related social sciences, since the late 1980s a great many thoughtful feminist scholars have tussled with the theme of militarization and war. Impossible to name all these

authors – much of the work has been in edited collections such as Cooke and Woollacott (1993), Lorentzen and Turpin (1998), Jacobs et al. (2000), Giles et al. (2003) and Giles and Hyndman (2004). The point is - none of these feminist social scientists have ignored, let alone denied, economic relations, politicised ethno-national relations and militarization itself as factors in the perpetuation of war. What they have done is to introduce an additional, entirely fresh, and complementary analysis, stating: *gender relations are also at work here*. And behind those relations they posit a distinctive structure of power: patriarchy.

Patriarchy, I've found, is also an inescapable concept in women's anti-war activism. Some of us who work in the academic field worry that to invoke patriarchy may seem crudely 'structuralist', implying determinism and a lack of historical perspective. We've worried for years about whether we should go on using the term. We know that in principle a sex/gender system could take a form in which the sexes are equal, or in which women dominate - even if, looking around, we have difficulty finding one! We take care to acknowledge that even male-dominant systems take different forms in different places and periods, that strictly speaking some of our societies may be better termed fratriarchies than patriarchies.

But I haven't encountered this cautiousness among activists. They unhesitatingly name the system they live in 'patriarchy'. They need a handy and recognizable word with which to invoke the notion of an enduring, adaptable, surviving structure of male power that they can see deforming their lives.

Academic disciplines I think always find it difficult to welcome and incorporate feminist work into mainstream theories, because feminists see and insist on introducing this entire, additional dimension of power. It's very troublesome! Whole edifices of thought have been built without it - on a perception of power as residing in ownership of the means of production, capture of the state and its institutions, and control of the 'means of coercion' as Charles Tilly terms it - armies and arsenals (Tilly 1992). It's uncomfortable, isn't it, if you've been writing about that all your life. Here you are being asked to question your own earlier work, to revisit and rethink. To see a whole new dimension of power that you never really saw before. To understand that class power and ethnic power vested in the state are crossed and recrossed, interwoven through and through, with gender power, the power of men as a sex over women as a sex:, what Gayle Rubin long ago termed the sex/gender system.

In fact of course, if we have eyes to see it, such a cross-weaving is an everyday reality. Nothing could be more gendered than economics: men own nine times more property than women; worldwide women get a fraction of men's hourly wage. It's so glaringly obvious that ethnicity too is gendered. The culture of ethnic groups is first and foremost expressed through family and community, dominated by men in ways that range from the relatively liberal to the murderously tyrannical. So all the ways that economic forces and ethno-national forces promote war are themselves necessarily gendered.

The term 'intersectionality' has become common to the point of banality in sociology. But I think it's main use has been as a reminder of how positioning in relation to the three main systems of power (and they are the ones most involved in war) class, race and gender, shapes the lives and chances of individuals and collectivities. But I think it's worth reminding ourselves that intersectionality even more importantly functions also at the systemic level. The power system of economic class based on ownership of the means of production, the power system of ethno-nationalism expressed in communities, states and 'civilizations', and the power system that constitutes sex/gender hierarchy *together* shape human chances. No single institution (a business firm, a church, a Ministry of Defence) embodies one of these powers alone. No one of power system produces its effects in the absence of the other two. Militarization and war are caused, shaped, achieved and reproduced over time by all three – inescapably. The gender drama is never absent: the male as subject, the female as alien, aliens as effeminate.

We need to talk a bit more about masculinities. To survive, a power system of any kind must be adaptively reproduced from generation to generation. So patriarchy as system, its structure and institutions, is in continual cyclical interaction with (it shapes and is shaped by) gender relations as *process and practise*. For men as a social group to retain supremacy over women, as they've done extraordinarily well for at least five thousand years, it's necessary not only for women to be constituted as the second sex, but also *for men and masculinity to acquire a shape that's adequate to power*.

By contrast to the ruling class, with its massive accumulation of wealth, and ruling 'peoples' with their imperial and state structures, the ruling sex, as such, has rather few and pitiful resources. Men don't have a larger or more complex brain than women. They don't have greater manual dexterity. They do have a 20-25% advantage in musculature and a little more height, a sex-specific hormonal energy and a penis. But the latter is a notoriously unreliable resource. To achieve supremacy for men as a social group the penis must be culturally transformed into the phallus. The consolidation of the phallus, the symbolic power that extends physical power into the social domain, is achieved by social and cultural means: processes of masculinization.

So, masculinity must be produced in appropriate forms and activated in social institutions such as business corporations and political structures where patriarchy (men as men) can share some of the wealth and authority deriving from the systems of class and racial supremacy. The church and the military are two institutions where, assisted in the one case by ideology and the other by hardware, patriarchy has sustained the ascendancy of men with striking success.

There's so much to be said about gender as a motor of war, I could begin this talk all over again, starting just here. But time's running out. So I'm going to take just two examples, two locations among many others where

social scientists have demonstrated masculinity in play in the maintenance of a war stance.

First of all, though, I have to say that, while you can see economic and ethno-national forces at work in war by reading company reports of multinationals and listening to the pronouncements of political leaders, the best way to see gender at work in war is by delving into cultures, what actually goes on when people are making war and making peace. In mainstream studies they often warn against this. There's a tendency to start descriptions of war by saying "War isn't just aggression you know" (eg. Shaw and Creighton 1987). No, it's all about institutions, share price values, international conventions, broken treaties. Well of course war isn't *just* aggression, it can't be *reduced* to interpersonal relations, to behaviours. However, it is *also* behaviours, it is *also* aggression – it's things like hand-to-hand fighting, camaraderie, heroism, rape. So looking at blogs and autobiographies, military training manuals, films and novels about war, can be an effective way of bringing war's gender power relations into view.

The first process I suggest we might choose to look at is the grooming of properly masculine national cultures disposed to war; a second is the grooming of actual men for war fighting. An example of the first...

Robert Dean is one of several social scientists who've taken a gender lens to observe the politics of the USA in the Cold War period, and particularly the Vietnam war. How was the country led into such a futile and destructive conflict? His answer is that the foreign policy of the US establishment in this period was profoundly shaped by a masculinist conception of the national interest. Notions of brotherhood, of privilege, power, service and sacrifice, he says, were central to what he calls "the identity narrative" of President Kennedy's foreign policy elite. It demanded a relentless defence of boundaries and a total rejection of appeasement (Dean 2001). And of course a generation later we've seen manliness strongly evoked by George Bush Junior in responding to 9/11 with his 'war on terror'. Democratic candidate John Kerry saw his political prospects damaged by being portrayed by the Republicans as a sissy not a warrior.

Several studies have shown how the defeat of US military power and the loss of 58,000 American lives in Vietnam brought about a crisis in US national self-respect, and how it was felt as an issue of masculine honour. Susan Jeffords, in *The Remasculinization of America*, analyses some novels and films of the period following the withdrawal from Vietnam, and she shows how that war was gendered (quote 'enemies are depicted as feminine, wives and mothers and girlfriends are justifications for fighting, and vocabularies are sexually-motivated') and also that the war was discussed - retrospectively - in terms designed, as she said, 'primarily to reinforce the interests of masculinity and patriarchy' (Jeffords 1989). Cultural strategies for the re-masculinization of America at this critical time involved creating a masculine bond across class and colour, emphasizing gender difference and marginalizing the feminine. So - re-establishing a proper *masculine* posture for the nation

became a conscious factor in the recovery of national pride and military preparedness.

If these careful studies are to be believed, then, masculinity plays a significant part in the US national social policies at home that underpin 'full spectrum dominance' abroad. Masculinity also plays an important part in the more practical matter of producing and managing effective armed forces. Which brings me to the second example....A lot of studies have shown how, down in the boot camps and barracks, *military training* exploits, and shapes, masculinity to produce the ideal soldier – the one aggressive enough to kill, brave enough to die, but also disciplined enough to obey orders.

Sandra Whitworth in her book *Men, Militaries and Peacekeeping* writes, 'the qualities demanded by militaries – the requisite lust for violence (when needed) and a corresponding willingness to subordinate oneself to hierarchy and authority (when needed) – must be selfconsciously cultivated' (Whitworth 2004). While training his men for aggression the sergeant fosters male bonding by inferiorizing – putting down, 'rubbishing' - those who are 'not us', using sexist, homophobic and racist allusion. More positively the military authorities inculcate discipline around notions of community, whose honour each soldier must defend.

I came across a wonderful summary of what goes on in military training. And though it reads like sociology it's actually written by a soldier. I found it in Joanne Bourke's new book *Rape*. This American GI was in fact testifying to the widespread practice of rape during his service in Vietnam. He wrote that training has a lot to do with it. They taught him, quote:

... good things are manly and collective; the despicable are feminine and individual. Virtually every sentence, every description, every lesson embodies this sexual duality, and the female anatomy provides a rich field of metaphor for every degradation. When you want to create a solidary group of male killers, that is what you do, you kill the woman in them (Gilder, 1973:258-9, cited in Bourke, 2007:367).

In conclusion, I think there's not one but two, important motivations for understanding the intimate relationship between patriarchy and what Betty Reardon calls the "war system" (Reardon 1996). The first we discussed at the outset – it's an insight we need to operationalize in our movements of opposition to war.

But war isn't just intolerable in and of itself. It's intolerable for the damage it does to non-war, to peace time, to normal, civilian life. Because while the point for us *as antiwar activists* may be that gender and sexuality play a part in shaping the violence of war, the point for us *as women* is the other way about - that militarist thinking, militarization processes and war fighting carry over into peacetime, where their imprint remains on gender, shaping men and masculinity as disposed to violence, shaping femininity as other, complementary, passive - and women as ready victims.

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