Chapter One

Introduction: conceiving cosmopolitanism

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'Cosmopolitanism' is a long-sidelined concept recently reactivated by a wide range of social and political theorists. For various reasons, as David Harvey (2000: 529) puts it, 'cosmopolitanism is back'.

   In most cases the re-emergence of cosmopolitanism arises by way of a proposed new politics of the left, embodying middle-path alternatives between ethnocentric nationalism and particularistic multiculturalism. For some contemporary writers on the topic, cosmopolitanism refers to a vision of global democracy and world citizenship; for others it points to possibilities for shaping new transnational frameworks for making links between social movements. Yet others invoke cosmopolitanism to advocate a non-communitarian, post-identity politics of overlapping interests and heterogeneous or hybrid publics in order to challenge conventional notions of belonging, identity and citizenship. And still others use cosmopolitanism descriptively to address certain socio-cultural processes or individual behaviours, values or dispositions manifesting a capacity to engage cultural multiplicity.

   What are the processes and conditions that have led to a call to conceive cosmopolitanism afresh? Globalization, nationalism, migration, multiculturalism and feminism are prominent among these (Held 1995a, Heater 1996, Hutchings 1999, Pollock et al. 2000). Again, the secular protests against corporate-led globalization, such as those seen in the dramatic demonstrations in Seattle in December 1999, as well as the excesses displayed and atrocities committed by those who evince narrow religious and ethnic identities, have led to the urgent reposing of two basic cosmopolitan questions: Can we ever live peacefully with one another? What do we share, collectively, as human beings?

Cosmopolitanism: international and social levels

While a growing awareness of common risks, such as climate change, is arguably fostering a sense of a globally shared collective future (Beck 1996a, this volume), many emergent political issues (including human rights, crime and terrorism) are beyond the capacity of individual states to control. Further, political and economic processes of globalization and regionalization, along with various perceived external challenges to national security, increasingly impact upon the accustomed sovereignties of the nation-state. New alliances between countries – whether for regularizing free trade, harmonizing social policies or combating crime – can be described as modes of cosmopolitanism superseding the nation-state model. Over the past decade there has been a new, post-cold war tendency for multinational military interventions such as the Gulf War, NATO actions in former Yugoslavia and the

international 'coalition against terrorism' following the events of 11 September 2001. These are sometimes described as 'cosmopolitan' institutions and initiatives since they are multilateral and seem to supplant the nation-state model. Indeed, they represent examples of 'cosmopolitan war' (Zolo 1997).

There are observers who claim that such developments fundamentally challenge the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states that is underpinned by tradition, convention and, not least, by the United Nations (see Lyons and Mastanduno 1995, Biersteker and Weber 1996, Sassen 1996). Today we are witnessing new tendencies towards interventionism (Mayall 1996) and 'proactive cosmopolitanism', or what Paul Taylor (1999: 540) defines as the 'deliberate attempt to create a consensus about values and behaviour – a cosmopolitan community – among diverse communities'.

Yet calls for an emergent cosmopolitan order beyond the nation-state system have not been accepted without challenge. As summed up by Kimberly Hutchings (1999: 25), 'The criticisms tend to be of two kinds: either they depend on a reassertion of realist claims about the continuing significance of state power in relation to global governance or they stress a pessimistic reading of the post-Westphalian order as the dominance of global capital over both state and inter-state politics.' Several contributors to this volume (Held, Bauböck, Linklater and Kaldor) engage realist and idealist perspectives on the nation-state and question what kinds of institutions and processes purport to transcend it.

At the other extreme – at a social, or more intimate personal level – many individuals now seem to be more than ever prone to articulate complex affiliations, meaningful attachments and multiple allegiances to issues, people, places and traditions that lie beyond the boundaries of their resident nation-state. This holds especially for migrants, members of ethnic diasporas and other transnational communities (Vertovec and Cohen 1999). People active in global social movements also orient their politics and identities toward agendas outside, as well as within, their resident nation-states (Cohen and Rai 2000).

Such 'pluralization' of political orientations is coexistent with the nation-state's struggle to maintain a singular political identity in the face of globalization (Held, this volume). Multiculturalism has been one notion embodying both a kind of broad vision of society and often a set of specific policies whereby both specific ethnic and religious identities could be maintained alongside a common national one. However, multiculturalism has received broad criticism for resting upon and reproducing rather rigid notions of culture and group belonging (see *inter alia* Taylor et al. 1994; Modood and Werbner 1997; Baumann 1999; Parekh 2000). In contrast to multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism is now increasingly invoked to avoid the pitfalls of essentialism or some kind of zero-sum, all-or-nothing understanding of identity issues within a nation-state framework (Clifford 1998).

In this introduction we commence by looking at the multi-layered ways ('windows') in which cosmopolitanism has entered our world. We continue with socially profiling various sorts of cosmopolites or 'cosmopolitans'.[1] We next review the major theoretical interventions of recent years, using six ideas and approaches ('perspectives') to synthesize a complex body of literature. We then review the other major themes considered by the contributors to this book by discussing the contexts and practices of cosmopolitanism. Finally, we provide a cautiously optimistic conclusion regarding the future of the concept and its relevance to the twenty-first century.

Windows on cosmopolitanism

The need to foreshadow and open up new ways for understanding cosmopolitanism is the primary purpose of this book. No single conceptualization is adequate. In the first part of the book we seek to gain a first taste of the multi-layered character of cosmopolitanism. We call this part 'windows' partly to evoke the switches in screens characteristic of computer operating systems, such as the one ubiquitously marketed by Mr Gates of Seattle. But more pertinently, 'windows' is a reference to the insights of the German sociologist Georg Simmel who, when looking through a window into the Potsdamer Platz in Berlin in 1908, first understood that relationships between the Self and the Other were being newly articulated in contemporary urban settings. As Richard Sennett (this volume) recalls, Simmel saw people he simply could not classify in conventional ways – Poles different from those from Warsaw, peasants coming from the south of Germany, and others. He discerned that this 'unknown other' provoked and enticed those dependent on a more monocultural background. Similar effects arise today. As Stuart Hall (in this volume), drawing on Waldron's (1992) argument suggests, people are no longer inspired by a single culture that is coherent, integrated and organic. Instead the arrival of transnational migrants has enriched and altered cultural repertoires of many people. As he (below) explains:

> It is not that we are without culture but we are drawing on the traces and residues of many cultural systems, of many ethical systems – and that is precisely what cosmopolitanism means. It means the ability to stand outside of having one's life written and scripted by any one community, whether that is a faith or tradition or religion or culture – whatever it might be – and to draw selectively on a variety of discursive meanings.

This widening of consciousness and confrontation with alterity can be found not only on the streets of cosmopolitan cities, but in the living rooms of more prosaic locales. As David Held notes in his 'window' in this volume, recent generations of people brought up with Yahoo and CNN – not to mention exposure to relentless 'We are the World'-type advertising, the rise of 'World Music' and decades of high profile environmental campaigns by Greenpeace and the like – are tending to manifest a sense of global identification. Their inherent sense of 'globality', or 'consciousness of the world as a single place' (Robertson 1992: 132), is consistent with many of the meanings of cosmopolitanism that have been voiced by philosophers. This growing consciousness fosters what Beck (2001) calls a 'banal cosmopolitanism', in which everyday nationalism is circumvented and we experience ourselves integrated into global processes and phenomena. For many people, then, a sense of global commonality is emerging.

The global, national and social/personal discursive levels represent but three points along a conceptual spectrum. At all positions along this spectrum, some notion of cosmopolitanism has acquired appeal because the term seems to represent a confluence of progressive ideas and new perspectives relevant to our culturally criss-crossed, media-bombarded, information-rich, capitalist dominated, politically plural times. Cosmopolitanism suggests something that simultaneously: (a) transcends the seemingly exhausted nation-state model; (b) is able to mediate actions and ideals oriented both to the universal and the particular, the global and the local; (c) is culturally anti-essentialist; and (d) is capable of representing variously complex

repertoires of allegiance, identity and interest. In these ways, cosmopolitanism seems to offer a mode of managing cultural and political multiplicities.

Since it has been around a long time, the term cosmopolitanism has attracted many understandings and uses over the years (cf. Fine and Cohen in this volume). Recently such mixed meanings have been elaborated and extended in a burgeoning body of literature in political philosophy and sociology. Yet, as Sheldon Pollock and his Chicago colleagues (2000: 577) point out, 'cosmopolitanism is not some known entity existing in the world, with a clear genealogy from the Stoics to Immanuel Kant, that simply awaits more detailed description at the hands of scholarship.' There is much scope for conceiving cosmopolitanism theoretically, practically and in terms of the people and contexts that the term might illuminate.

Who are the cosmopolitans?

Despite the danger of a small overlap between our later discussion of theories and what follows in this section, it may none the less be helpful to provide some sociological characterization of both those who practice cosmopolitanism (who may not always be the same as those who preach it) and those who are labelled as 'cosmopolitans'.

The earliest advocates of cosmopolitanism in ancient Greece were often *metics*, non-citizens, who attracted criticism from no less a figure than Homer. He attacked those who were 'clanless' and 'hearthless'. Yet Homer's most enduring hero, Odysseus, celebrates someone seeking adventure and valuing the unfamiliar and the strange. We can see in this earliest of literary examples the powerful tension between the exciting, stimulating and even arousing attractions of the exotic, and the converse desire for the support, consolation and warmth of the local and familiar (see Chan in this volume for further discussion). These contradictory pulls are often projected onto the cosmopolitans who are simultaneously or successively figures of emulation, envy, hatred and fear.

A frequent attack on cosmopolites is that cosmopolitanism is only available to an elite – those who have the resources necessary to travel, learn other languages, and absorb other cultures. This, historically, has often been true. For the majority of the population, living their lives within the cultural space of their own nation or ethnicity, cosmopolitanism has not been an option. However, in the contemporary world, cultural and linguistic diversity is omnipresent, and the capacity to communicate with others and to understand their cultures is available, at least potentially, to many (Poole 1999: 162). Travel and immigration have led to the necessity of cheek-by-jowl relationships between diverse peoples at work or at street corners, and in markets, neighbourhoods, schools and recreational areas. Some of the most fascinating social research in the field is now generating countless examples of so-called 'everyday' or 'ordinary' cosmopolitanism, where (as Hiebert puts it in this volume) 'men and women from different origins create a society where diversity is accepted [and] rendered ordinary'.

Such everyday cosmopolitanism might be regarded as a newly recognized form of behaviour. However, in more commonly described settings, cosmopolites have been seen as deviant – refusing to define themselves by location, ancestry, citizenship or language (Waldron 1992). 'Cosmopolite or cosmopolitan in mid-nineteenth century America,' for example, meant 'a well-travelled character probably lacking in substance' (Hollinger 1995: 89). Here 'substance' likely referred to readily identifiable provenance, an integrated and predictable pattern of behavioural practice, including loyalty to a single nation-state or cultural identity. In situations of extreme

nationalism or totalitarianism, such as those of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy, cosmopolites were seen as treacherous enemies of the state. It is not coincidental that the Jews and gypsies – 'rootless' peoples without an attachment to a particular land – were the first to the shunted to the charnel houses of the holocaust and the bleak camps of the Gulag.

Even where the reactions were not so extreme, the common stereotype of cosmopolitans suggested privileged, bourgeois, politically uncommitted elites. They have been associated with wealthy jet setters, corporate managers, intergovernmental bureaucrats, artists, tax dodgers, academics and intellectuals, all of whom maintained their condition 'by virtue of independent means, expensive tastes, and a globe-trotting lifestyle' (Robbins 1998b: 248). As Craig Calhoun (in this volume) notes, cosmopolitanism still often refers to 'the class consciousness of frequent travellers'. It is embodied in the emergent culture of the transnational capitalist class described by Leslie Sklair (2000). In his posthumous collection of essays, the US commentator, Lasch (1995: 46), echoed this pejorative use referring to the privileged classes or 'elites' said to be in revolt against the nation state:

> In the borderless global economy, money has lost its links to nationality. … The privileged classes in Los Angeles feel more kinship with their counterparts in Japan, Singapore, and Korea than with most of their countrymen. This detachment from the state means they regard themselves as "world citizens" without any of the normal obligations of national citizenship. They no longer pay their share of taxes or contribute to democratic life.

The members of such a class are people whom John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge (2000) label a new global economic elite, a meritocratic but elusive ruling group, the 'cosmocrats'. They are 'people who attend business-school weddings around the world, fill up the business-class lounges at international airports, provide the officer ranks of most of the world's companies and international institutions, and, through their collective efforts, probably do more than anyone else to make the world seem smaller' (p. 229). Rather wildly, Micklethwait and Wooldridge estimate their numbers amount to some twenty million people worldwide. 'Cosmocrats,' they say, 'are defined by their attitudes and lifestyles rather than just their bank accounts. That separates them from the widest class of winners from globalization' (p. 230). However, such financial experts, corporate personnel and the like embody a bounded and elitist version of cosmopolitanism, marked by a specialized and – paradoxically – rather homogenous transnational culture, a limited interest in engaging 'the Other', and a rather restricted corridor of physical movement between defined spaces in global cities (Monaci et al. 2001).

By being associated with such elites, cosmopolitanism is conceived largely as a matter of consumption, an acquired taste for cultural artefacts from around the world. The high-flying 'cosmocrats' take the lead: 'Fresh sea bass from Chile is now old hat for Manhattan cosmocrats; the fish displays in restaurants groan with *loups de mer* from the Mediterranean, *hamachi* from New Zealand. … Magazines such as *Wallpaper*, *Condé Nast Traveler*, and *Cigar Aficionado* all act as informal cosmocrat search engines, scouring the world to explain where the best cushions, holidays, and smokes can be found' (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2000: 233). In an amusing comment on the concept of 'cosmocrats' in a popular magazine Helen Kirwan-Taylor (2000: 190–1) suggests that the City of London is inhabited by Ethno-Yars (smart people without roots). They have American MBAs and law degrees and know nothing

about Britain beyond Heathrow airport. 'Going out of town' means a three-day weekend break in Bali with McKinsey's *Index of Members* – the cosmocrats' functional equivalent of the *Burke's Peerage* – as their reading material. Not surprisingly, cosmocrats 'get up many people's noses'. She suggests they can be relabelled 'cosmoprats' – floating above the world and treating everybody living in a small community as 'as though they were wearing a loincloth and clutching a handful of glass beads'.

The growth in the number and reach of global connoisseurs, elite or not, is sometimes taken as a sign of growing cosmopolitanism. The tendency is linked to John Urry's (1995) notion of 'aesthetic cosmopolitanism'. Not only elites, but also tourists of all kinds have developed more cosmopolitan or far-reaching aesthetic tastes. This can be directly linked with (as both driving force and outcome of) the enhanced popular trend over the past few decades towards the 'consumption' of foreign places. Cosmopolitan tourism includes the search for varied experiences, a delight in understanding contrasts between societies rather than a longing for uniformity or superiority, and the development of some skills at interpreting cultural meanings. It is a trend arguably based on exoticism, commodification and consumer culture. Considering where most global tourists come from, such a trend may contribute to an image of cosmopolitanism as 'a predominantly white/First World take on things' (Massey, in Tomlinson 1999: 187; cf. Zubaida and Chan, this volume).

Aesthetic cosmopolitanism can be found at home, too, through other forms of consumption. The growth in 'world music' represents such a case (Frith 2000), while routine exposure to global cultural difference through television creates the possibility of people becoming cosmopolitans in their own living rooms (Hebdige, in Tomlinson 1999: 202). A sure sign of this is the fact that advertising firms have sought to capitalize on people's growing cosmopolitan views. These kinds of campaigns were probably launched by Coca-Cola's 'I'd like to teach the world to sing' commercial in the 1970s. Now, such ad formulas are ubiquitous and formulaic. This point is captured by a critique of one firm's adverts, which have 'proffered the usual pick-and-mix stock shots: grinning people of mixed race, new dawns, foreign climes, hot air balloons, all swathed in a saccharine glow of nauseating mawkishness' (*Private Eye* 1020, 8 February 2001).

Certainly in the current age of post-national or post-Westphalian political trends, transnational flows, diasporic attachments and multiple identity politics, it is even harder to pin down the 'substance' or extent of cosmopolitans. 'Exactly what it means to be a post-national cosmopolitan is far from clear,' writes Gerard Delanty (2000: 138), 'particularly given the diffuse nature that nationalism is taking and the fact that the new media of communication and consumption have made everybody cosmopolitan.' Obviously a bit of dabbling in, or desire for, elements of cultural otherness in itself does not indicate a very deep sense of cosmopolitanism. Hannerz (1990) addresses this when he distinguishes true cosmopolitans from merely globally mobile people – tourists, exiles, expatriates, transnational employees, and labour migrants. The 'true' cosmopolitans exhibit a culturally open disposition and interest in a continuous engagement with one or other cosmopolitan project. The other category, Hannerz suggests, simply (and understandably) want some experience of 'home plus' a bit of exoticism when going abroad. In addition to a specific disposition, Tomlinson (1999) also insists that real cosmopolitans should have a sense of commitment to belonging to the world as a whole.

Despite this attempt to draw lines between 'real' and 'fake' cosmopolites, there is increasing recognition that 'cosmopolitan' philosophies, institutions, dispositions and practices – expressions of 'actually existing cosmopolitanism' (Robbins 1998a) – exist among a wide variety of non-elites, especially migrants and refugees. This approach to cosmopolitanism underlines the positive, socio-culturally and politically transformative meanings of the term (see Schein 1998a and 1998b; Werbner 1999; Zachary 2000a). And it is this sense that James Clifford employs to describe how the term cosmopolitanism helps to undermine the 'naturalness' of ethnic absolutisms, recognizes 'worldly, productive sites of crossing; complex, unfinished paths between local and global attachments' and 'presupposes encounters between worldly historical actors willing to link up aspects of their complex, different experiences' (Clifford 1998: 362, 365).

Theories: six perspectives on cosmopolitanism

Examining the question of who now identifies with the label 'cosmopolitan' and who is so identified provides a 'first pass' at the subject-matter, but we have next to turn explicitly to the proliferation of recent theories of cosmopolitanism. The rapidly expanding literature on the concept represents a considerable variety of descriptive uses, political discourses and levels of concern. These can be outlined under at least six rubrics. Drawing upon Vertovec (2000a), we argue that cosmopolitanism can be viewed or invoked as (a) a socio-cultural condition; (b) a kind of philosophy or worldview; (c) a political project towards building transnational institutions; (d) a political project for recognizing multiple identities; (e) an attitudinal or dispositional orientation; and/or (f) a mode of practice or competence.

A socio-cultural condition

While ethnic pluralism and cultural admixture has historically been the norm for most parts of the world (cf. McNeill 1986), several aspects of contemporary globalization combine to make current conditions rather different. The relative ease and cheapness of transportation across long distances, mass tourism, large-scale migration, visible multiculturalism in 'world cities', the flow of commodities to and from all points of the compass and the rapid development of telecommunications (including cheap telephone calls, satellite television, email and the Internet) have all wrought a socially and culturally interpenetrated planet on a scale and intensity hitherto unseen. This is the sense of a mounting contemporary 'cosmopolitanism' described by a number of commentators.

'The world of the late twentieth century,' observe Arjun Appadurai and Carol Breckenridge (1988: 5–9) for instance, 'is increasingly a cosmopolitan world. More people are widely travelled, are catholic in their tastes, are more inclusive in the range of cuisines they consume, are attentive to worldwide news, are exposed to global media-covered events and are influenced by universal trends in fashion.' In other words, as Geertz (1986: 121) foresaw, 'that the world is coming at each of its local points to look more like a Kuwaiti bazaar than like an Englishmen's club … seems shatteringly clear.'

For many, such a socio-cultural condition, loosely called 'cosmopolitanism' is to be celebrated for its vibrant cultural creativity as well as its political challenges to various ethnocentric, racialized, gendered and national narratives. There are critics, on the other hand, who are highly sceptical of what is perceived to be an emergent global, hybrid and 'rootless' cosmopolitan culture marked by 'a pastiche of traditional

local, folk and national motifs and styles; a culture of mass consumerism consisting of standardized mass commodities, images, practices and slogans; and an interdependence of all these elements across the globe, based upon the unifying pressures of global telecommunications and computerized information systems' (Smith 1995: 20). This view reflects widespread fears, among many professional commentators and members of the public associated with the death of local and national identities. Such resonant tension is found among political thinkers as well.

A philosophy or worldview

A number of authors suggest that contemporary political philosophers tend to divide themselves into *communitarians*, who believe that moral principles and obligations are grounded in specific groups and contexts, and *cosmopolitans*, who urge that we live in a world governed by overarching principles of rights and justice (Cohen 1992; Waldron 1992; Hollinger 1995; Bellamy and Castiglione 1998). In this latter sense, largely following Kant, cosmopolitanism refers to a philosophy that urges us all to be 'citizens of the world', creating a worldwide community of humanity committed to common values. Thomas Pogge (1992) suggests that such a general cosmopolitan philosophy can take the form of either a broad *moral* cosmopolitanism, urging that all persons have a certain respect for one another, or a *legal* cosmopolitanism that sets forth universal rights and duties. Further, the citizen-of-the-world philosophy can take various forms or slants. Michael Ignatieff (1999: 142) distinguishes Marxist cosmopolitans who stand for the brotherhood of workers, 'gentlemanly' cosmopolitans who feel at home everywhere and regard nationalism as vulgar, and liberal cosmopolitans who proclaim universal standards. Despite such differences, all these cosmopolitans appeal to ideals broader than the national one.

However, drawing on their strong views on the political need for moral grounding in groups, communitarians say that commitments to broad cosmopolitan ideals represent a view that 'embodies all the worst aspects of classical liberalism – atomism, abstraction, alienation from one's roots, vacuity of commitment, indeterminacy of character, and ambivalence towards the good' (Waldron 1992: 764–5). Perhaps the distinction is overplayed. As Ross Poole (1999: 156), for one, argues, 'there need be no inconsistency between affirming the cosmopolitan ideal and also recognizing the importance of particular attachments and the commitments they carry with them.' A degree of moral priority is often appropriate and justified in specific cases of human action, obligation and responsibility: as most people will see it, family and neighbourhood come first, humanity as a whole second.

A variant of this argument is found in the question of whether this sense of cosmopolitanism, and its proposed world citizens, can be reconciled with patriotism or loyalty to a single nation state (see especially Nussbaum et al. 1994). There seem to be at least two ways to solve this conundrum. One is advocated by Kwame Anthony Appiah (1998), who raises the possibility of being a 'cosmopolitan patriot' through celebrating different human ways of being while sharing commitment to the political culture of a single nation state. Another is suggested by Georgios Varouxakis (1999: 7) who believes that 'patriotism can be expressed in a cosmopolitan language and can seek to promote pride in what one's nation is contributing to the universal fund of humanity'; this could be demonstrated, for example, through participation in UN peace missions. As Fine and Cohen (this volume) point out, this attempt to reconcile cosmopolitanism and patriotism was implicitly at the heart of the contemporary 'moment' in the US debate before 'September 11'. But the bombing of the World

Trade Center has now propelled a number of US public intellectuals with established universalistic positions into overt displays of loyalty to the US state.

Other theorists effectively seek to transcend the national scale altogether. For example, in his 'Cosmopolitan Manifesto' Ulrich Beck (1998: 29–30) argues for 'a new dialectic of global and local questions which do not fit into national politics'. 'For this', Beck continues, 'there has to be a reinvention of politics, a founding and grounding of the new political subject' that puts 'globality at the heart of political imagination, action and organization'. Such a perspective informs most political scientists who envision a new order of transnational political structures that exercise what is now often described as 'cosmopolitan democracy' (Archibugi and Held 1995; Archibugi et al. 1998).

Political project I: transnational institutions

A 'cosmopolitan' or global perspective can be said to be at the heart of political initiatives to establish frameworks and institutions that bridge or overtake conventional political structures of the nation-state system (see especially Held 1995a). Mary Kaldor suggests that when applied to political institutions, the term cosmopolitan implies 'a layer of governance that constitutes a limitation on the sovereignty of states and yet does not itself constitute a state. In other words, a cosmopolitan institution would coexist with a system of states but would override states in clearly defined spheres of activity' (Kaldor 1999: 216). Foremost examples here are the United Nations and the European Union. In this sense cosmopolitan political institutions should address policy quandaries surrounding a host of problems that spill over national borders (such as pollution and crime).

Another transnational site of cosmopolitan democracy is that which is increasingly described as an emerging global civil society (for instance, Walzer 1995; Köhler 1998; Delanty 2001; see also Kaldor, this volume). This is to be seen in an exponential growth in the number, size and range of activities of transnational social movements and networks concerned with issues including the environment, labour conditions, human rights, women and peace (see Smith et al. 1997; Smith 1998; Cohen and Rai 2000). The possibilities for developing global civil society, according to Gerard Delanty (2000 and 2001), are dependent on the emergence of what he describes as a cosmopolitan public sphere of communication and cultural contestation that is necessary of any large-scale shift in values (cf. Bohman 1998).

Bringing together these kinds of democratic activity, Kaldor (1996) describes processes creating (a) cosmopolitanism from above, in the form of international organizations, complex partnerships and cooperative agreements between states, and (b) cosmopolitanism from below through the activities of new transnational social movements. The fact that individuals can continue their roles and identities as national citizens while directly engaging in political activities aimed at a sphere beyond the nation state points toward an understanding of cosmopolitanism of individuals conveying complex political interests.

Political project II: multiple subjects

On a far more immediate level than the global political agendas addressed by some political theorists, others who invoke a concept of cosmopolitanism do so to describe the variegated interests of political actors. Using this interpretation of the term, David Hollinger (1995: 86) suggests that 'Cosmopolitanism is more oriented to the individual, whom it is likely to understand as a member of a number of different communities simultaneously.' Mitchell Cohen (1992: 482) also advocates an

understanding of cosmopolitanism as 'a multidimensional conception of political society and human relations, one that implies an important democratic principle: the legitimacy of plural loyalties'.

In fact this view of cosmopolitanism is an age-old one. It can be traced to the ancient Greek Stoics and their proposal that 'we think of ourselves not as devoid of local affiliations, but as surrounded by a series of concentric circles' (Nussbaum 1994: 4). In this view, each circle is considered to represent a different kind or level of attachment or identification: from self, family, group, city, and country, to humanity at large. Accordingly, a person's specific political interests and activity is bound to shift from one 'circle' or another. Present-day processes, however, such as diasporic identification and the rise of identity politics, have multiplied people's interests and affiliations. Now gender, sexuality, age, disability, 'homeland', locality, race, ethnicity, religion – even cultural hybridity itself – are among the key identifications around which the same person might at one time or another politically mobilize.

A cosmopolitan politics, in this understanding, emphasizes that people have – and are encouraged to have – multiple affiliations. Political institutions catering to this would include civil and voluntary associations, networks and coalitions providing the expression of various interests and voices (Hirst 1994; Held 1995a; Vertovec 1999). Such a project entails the idea that 'each citizen of a state will have to learn to become a "cosmopolitan citizen" as well: that is, a person capable of mediating between national traditions, communities of fate and alternative forms of life' (Held et al. 1999: 449). As these authors continue (p. 450):

> The core of this project involves reconceiving legitimate political authority in a manner which disconnects it from its traditional anchor in fixed borders and delimited territories and, instead, articulates it as an attribute of basic democratic arrangements or basic democratic law which can, in principle, be entrenched and drawn on in diverse self-regulating associations – from cities and subnational regions, to nation-states, regions and wider global networks. It is clear that the process of disconnection has already begun as political authority and legitimate forms of governance are diffused 'below', 'above' and 'alongside' the nation-state.

An attitude or disposition

In addition to having multiplex identifications, cosmopolitans and cosmopolitanism are often said to embody a unique outlook or 'mode of engaging with the world' (Waldron 1992). In this way Ulf Hannerz views cosmopolitanism as 'a perspective, a state of mind, or – to take a more processual view – a mode of managing meaning' (Hannerz 1990: 238). Hannerz (p. 239) further suggests that 'The perspective of the cosmopolitan must entail relationships to a plurality of cultures' and that this entails 'first of all an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other. It is an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences' (cf. Vertovec 1996). Cosmopolitanism here represents a desire for, and appreciation of, cultural diversity – a view that Pierre-André Taguieff (1990) has deemed 'heterophilia'.

The cosmopolitan, then, develops 'habits of mind and life' through which he or she can end up anywhere in the world and be 'in the same relation of familiarity and strangeness' to the local culture, and by the same token 'feel partially adjusted everywhere' (Iyer 1997: 30, 32). Such an outlook or disposition is largely acquired through experience, especially travel. It entails not only respect and enjoyment of

cultural difference, but also a concomitant sense of 'globality' or global belonging that can be integrated into everyday life practices (Tomlinson 1999: 185).

A practice or competence

Along with a particular disposition or orientation towards the world and others, Hannerz (1990: 239) suggests that cosmopolitanism can be a matter of 'competence' marked by 'a personal ability to make one's way into other cultures, through listening, looking, intuiting and reflecting' as well as by a built-up skill of manoeuvring through systems of meaning. Jonathan Friedman (1994: 204), too, sees cosmopolitanism as characterized by a mode of behaviour that 'in identity terms [is] betwixt and between without being liminal. It is shifting, participating in many worlds, without becoming part of them'. For Waldron, it is such partial cultural competencies that comprise 'the cosmopolitan self'. 'If we live the cosmopolitan life,' he writes, 'we draw our allegiances from here, there, and everywhere. Bits of cultures come into our lives from different sources, and there is no guarantee that they will all fit together' (Waldron 1992: 788–9).

There is a qualitative difference, however, between the kind of cosmopolitan competence highlighted by Hannerz and people's practices that amount to mere cultural mix-and-match. The latter may often comprise simply what Craig Calhoun (in this volume) describes as 'consumerist cosmopolitanism'. Such is manifested in the globalization of tastes: the massive transfer of foodstuffs, artworks, music, literature and fashion. Such processes represent a multiculturalization of society, but also the advanced globalization of capitalism.

A key question of our age is: can or does exposure to other cultures – from buying bits of them to learning to partake in their beliefs and practices – lead to a fundamental change in attitudes? That would seem to be the *raison d'être* of most multicultural education, though the jury is out on whether people exposed to it have become 'more tolerant'. Surely it is a good thing to be exposed to, or even relish, some customs, habits, lifestyles, values and languages other than those of one's own locality or country? Like being multilingual, individuals themselves can be multicultural, or develop a personal repertoire that provides them with a multiple cultural competence (Vertovec and Rogers 1998). The opportunities for such exposure, learning and practice – even if initially only by way of a coarse consumerism – present themselves today as never before.

Contexts: more than a 'Western' concept

Even if we can refute an attack on cosmopolitanism from those who believe it can only be a preoccupation of an elite, is there a more legitimate question that it cannot easily transcend its 'Western' origins? Are the voices of the poor, the weak, minorities and the cultural marginal being ignored – drowned by the babble of those who control or acquire privileged access to the airwaves, TV channels and printed media of the rich world? Though these questions are understandable, a number of the contributors to this volume demonstrate that they are unwarranted. It is perhaps a mere debating point to allude to the fact that many of the founders of cosmopolitanism, the Stoics in ancient Athens, were Phoenicians or Semites from the 'wrong' (non-European) side of the Mediterranean. By contrast, whereas there is no gainsaying that Kant was the crucial figure in the evolution of European ideas of cosmopolitanism, he was riddled with the racist prejudices of his age (Harvey 2000). In any case, cosmopolitanism has a much wider and more complex genealogy than that arising from either Kant or ancient Greece.

We can identify the more multifarious provenance and spread of cosmopolitanism by alluding, for example, to Arab and Muslim cultures. As Zubaida (this volume) shows, the Abbasid court of the eight and ninth centuries mixed Islam with Persian culture and statecraft. Arab Spain ('al-Andalus') married Greek and Jewish philosophy with Arab science and medicine. Later, during the zenith of the Ottoman Empire, Middle Eastern cities, especially Istanbul, Cairo and Alexandria, became celebrated cosmopolitan milieus. For Van der Veer (this volume) cosmopolitanism was embedded in what he calls 'colonial modernity' where the imperial mission joined evangelical Christianity in its encounters with the colonized peoples. However, such interactions were by no means unidirectional. Religious leaders like Swami Vivekananda saw Hinduism as the pinnacle of universal spirituality and Theosophists like Madame Blavatsky and Annie Bessant supported his claims. Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, Shinto, Confucianism, Taoism and Jainism also preached a universal message. In short, as Van der Veer avers, a popular, nineteenth-century cosmopolitan consciousness based on universal spirituality emerged quite different from the secular rationalism of the western European Enlightenment.

Also discrete from European cosmopolitanism were the attempts by Chinese philosophers to find the enriching and elevating elements of alien discourses that could then be adapted for local use. Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Moism (not Maoism) as well as more familiar concepts like democracy and less familiar ones like 'supreme realization' were incorporated into Chinese systems of thinking. As Chan (in this volume) shows, Chinese cultures show a continuous process of mutation, adaptation and transformation all set within a 'moral injunction against the violence of hegemony, of making the other the same as self'. Though the ideal was harmonious adaptation, of course there were inevitable conflicts – for example between Confucian this-worldliness and Buddhist other-worldliness. None the less, the process of continuous interrogation shows a cosmopolitan consciousness and practice that is comparable to, but distinct from, Western cosmopolitanism.

Ironically, another 'exotic' variant of cosmopolitanism is presently emerging in Kant's homeland, Germany. In her analysis of how the media and advertising agencies are targeting Turks in Berlin, Ayse Caglar (this volume) demonstrates that the language and culture has shifted well beyond a narrowly ethnic construction. Broadcasting is in Turkish, but not Turkish as Turks would know it. 'Playful and creative' sets of crossovers between German and Turkish have generated a new language. Instead of reinforcing the idea of an original homeland, replete with nationalism and an attachment to the land, the *city* (in this case Berlin) has intervened to create and 'unmoored' or 'unbound' identity. These 'weak', multiple and deterritorialized attachments are what Caglar understands as cosmopolitan openings, ties and spaces.

We can see in these examples that western cosmopolitanism has itself become decoupled, even derailed, from any notion of a unilinear heritage stemming from the Enlightenment. Even in western and white settler societies (Canada is represented in this volume in Hiebert's chapter), the arrival of visibly different transnational migrants in sufficient numbers and with distinct heritages has led to new syncretic, creolized or hybridized cultures, some of which are the seedbeds of an incipient cosmopolitanism distinct from the Enlightenment tradition.

There is one final issue we must clarify in this discussion of the 'contexts' of cosmopolitanism – namely whether we are engaging in a contradiction in terms in qualifying the concept of cosmopolitanism. The word in itself implies universality. To talk, therefore, of a Western, Islamic, Arabic, Ottoman, colonial, Chinese or European

cosmopolitanism seems to imply recognition of difference or, indeed, cultural relativism. This is not what we intend. In refuting the notion that cosmopolitanism is exclusively 'Western' we have had to show that the idea can find fertile soil in many cultures and many contexts. The idea itself remains universal though the language, idiom and form in which it is expressed may differ. Again, the locale in which cosmopolitanism finds a friendly home may change over time. Athens in the ancient world and Istanbul and Venice in the early modern period gave way to cities like Paris, Berlin and London in the modern period. Nowadays Singapore and the Republic of Ireland are important cosmopolitan places and settings.

Practices: between, within, beyond the state

Because this volume either alludes to or covers in detail so many experiences of cosmopolitanism, it is difficult to be entirely comprehensive in summarizing the varied practices described. One, perhaps somewhat schematic, way of classifying the diverse practices involved is to advance a trichotomy, distinguishing between inter-state, intra-state and ultra (beyond)-state practices.

Inter-state practices

The first category takes in writers such as Held (1995a and this volume), Kaldor and Linklater (this volume) who have been preoccupied mainly with new 'international', 'transnational', 'supranational' or 'global' – the choice of vocabulary implies subtly different positions – institutions that are replacing or paralleling the nation-state system. Held's starting point is to examine how the neat coincidence between nationalism, the modern nation-state and political community is gradually being subverted by the evolution of global cultural movements and communications. As the nation-state system evolved, a political community and a national identity emerged out of the military and bureaucratic requirements of statehood itself. Social relations became embedded in this political community. Held argues that while the 'globalists' can present convincing evidence of the leap in global connectivity and cultural pursuits, national cultures remain robust and capable of adapting and reinterpreting foreign imports. Cosmopolitanism therefore becomes a means whereby national and global cultures can be mediated, where dialogues can be initiated and transboundary issues resolved by those who can see above their national parapets.

   These processes of mediation and dialogue can be seen as a 'civilizing process' (Elias 1982), an expression usefully reintroduced in Kaldor's contribution to this volume. For her, legitimate authority and the management and prevention of conflict must replace the callous disregard for civilian life and the old rules of engagement characteristic of the 'new wars' of the late twentieth century. However, the Westphalian nation-state system cannot do this alone – global, regional and local layers of authority have also to become activated. It is this necessity that dictates a cosmopolitan approach. Cosmopolitan law (human rights laws, the Geneva Convention, the Law of War) need to be evoked to protect civilians and to save lives. Whereas 'old' wars were (at least in theory) meant only to target the enemy's infrastructure and armed forces, new wars destroy lives and livelihoods and create the pathetic streams of refugees whose images haunt our TV screens. Only by respecting the claims of 'global justice' can human dignity be restored. Nor is this plea entirely theoretical. A 'global civilizing process' can be seen, for example, in the humanitarian aid workers who have risked their lives to save others. As Kaldor pointedly asks, 'Can their experience offer a moral basis for future forms of cosmopolitan governance?'

A number of Kaldor's preoccupations are echoed in Linklater's (this volume) specific attention to 'cosmopolitan harm conventions' (CHCs). These are laws or conventions that protect individual or substate communities from the evils perpetrated by states (like war, conquest and other forms of damage caused by aggressive states in pursuit of their trade, investment, environmental and political interests). Though there are undoubted limitations in the practice of such 'global' or international law, occasioned partly by the fact that many of the drafters and implementers of such laws are in the rich world, Linklater argues that CHCs are both evidence and part of the process of developing a post-national world. In the post-national world human (as opposed to state) security is also considered, as are universal human rights. Globally governed environmental spaces (a 'global commons'), the increasing evolution of regional identities and a notion of world citizenship also mark this phase of cosmopolitanism. Only a rash person would suggest that state laws will be supplanted by CHCs, but they certainly both parallel and limit state sovereignty.

Intra-state practices

We have already referred to a number of ways in which nation-states have been transformed in recent years by transnationalism, globalization, regionalization and by the increasing number and variety of international migrants demanding entry. We must, of course, remember that a number of important nation-states (the USA, Australia, Canada and Argentina among them) are 'nations of immigrants' (Freeman and Jupp 1992). However, even if this task was never entirely achieved, the rationale of admitting more immigrants was historically predicated on the assumption that they would conform to existing mores or create a new, distinct national identity – American, Australian, and so forth. As the limits of this form of social engineering became apparent, goals retreated. Hyphenated Americans (like Polish-Americans or African-Americans) became acceptable, the first half of the appellation signifying a continuing or reinvented ethnic identity, the second a loyalty to the new nation-state. However, this formula, as well as comparable attempts to create 'multicultural' social policies in Australia and Canada, never satisfied the old 'monocultural' nation-builders on the one side, or addressed the increasing fragmentation of ethnicities on the other.

This all too quickly describes the contested intellectual territory into which a number of key commentators, some represented in this book, stepped. David Hollinger's (1995) account of *Postethnic America* created one of the most important interventions. His contribution to this volume sharpens the distinctions between those advocating multiculturalism and those advancing cosmopolitan ideas. If we take for the purposes of this argument the synonymy between 'pluralism' and 'multiculturalism',[2] Hollinger shows that while both perspectives favour tolerance and diversity, pluralism accepts ethnic segmentation as normal while cosmopolitanism makes a decisive break with the celebration of 'communities of descent' in favour of individual choice and multiple affiliations. As an intra-state practice, cosmopolitanism does not recognize cultural segmentation. It assumes complex, overlapping, changing and often highly individualistic choices of identity and belonging.

In the face of critique, Hollinger concedes that his notion of 'postethnicity' does not easily apply to black Americans; nor is the story that simple when it comes to distinguishing between immigrant groups, indigenous peoples and national minorities (some of whom, like the Quebecois or the Basques have attributes of a nation). Bauböck (this volume) makes a similar point in his distinction between transborder national minorities, indigenous minorities and immigrant minorities. Like Held

(discussed above) he is concerned with how the shape of political community is transformed by unusual or recalcitrant alternatives to nativism, seeing this as a moment when state-based notions of citizenship have to yield to the new realities. The state, he surmises, will have to yield to multicultural demands, devolve regional power (in multinational states), recognize some element of self-determination by indigenous peoples and grant some degree of dual citizenship for certain transnational migrants. This can be conceived as an intra-state set of cosmopolitan practices and one that will provide a major problem for the politicians to solve. Already in states like Germany (especially in Bavaria), Australia, France, the USA (especially after 11 September), the UK and Austria the politicians who are espousing 'one-nation' ideologies are getting re-elected or gaining in popularity. In the face of economic necessity, economic immigration is often conceded – asylum seekers are fiercely resisted – but immigrants are told to *conform*. The battle lines are being drawn up between the mono- and multi-culturalists and between nationalist and cosmopolitan views of the future.

Ultra-state practices

In our earlier work we have written a great deal about how migrants, ethnic diasporas and other transnational communities have either revived or created global ties that have largely escaped their national locations and affiliations (Cohen 1997; Vertovec and Cohen 1999; Vertovec 2000b). In association with Shirin Rai one of us has considered how those active in global social movements also orient their politics and identities toward agendas outside their resident nation-states (Cohen and Rai 2000). Finally, with the help of yet another colleague, Alisdair Rogers, the current authors have launched a journal, *Global Networks,* with an editorial statement that includes the following passage (Rogers et al. 2001: 1–2):

> We see global networks as constituted by dynamic and flexible types of connection between individuals, groups or organizations that span the world. The structure of such global networks conditions the interactions, strategies and identities of their members. These networks have burst across territorial borders, rupturing the degree of cultural and economic self-sufficiency once experienced by nations. The cumulative impact of these interconnections has meant that societies, along with their cities and regions, have tended to spread outwards so as to merge and become coextensive with other societies. This has vast implications for the way we understand the world and how it is governed. … The once clear-cut separation between the domestic sphere of national life and the external or international sphere has largely broken down. Transnational processes present profound challenges and opportunities to states, corporations, cities and territorially based actors of all kinds. People and firms, places and communities, can be switched in and out of the global circuit board. For those who are beneficiaries of global corporatism or have cosmopolitanism preferences this erosion of the world we have known is to be welcomed.

In short, without repeating previous arguments *in extensio* we have strongly argued that transnational ethnic, religious and even virtual communities, global social movements and global networks have already massively subverted state structures by going around and beyond them. Important as these social changes are, they do not necessarily constitute cosmopolitanism. Faith communities (like some militant sections of Christianity, Hinduism, Islam or Judaism) can be narrowing, rather than

broadening, despite working in a transborder fashion. Right-wing movements drawing on Nazism and Fascism have been revived through global connections. And global networks (as we now all know) can promote terrorism, crime and the drugs trade. In a similar way Beck (2001) warns against 'a possible cosmopolitan fallacy':

> The fundamental fact that the experiential space of the individual no longer coincides with the national space, but is being subtly altered by the opening to cosmopolitanism should not deceive one into believing that we are all going to become cosmopolitans. Even the most positive development imaginable, an opening of cultural horizons and a growing sensitivity to other unfamiliar, legitimate geographies of living and coexistence, need not necessarily stimulate a feeling of cosmopolitan responsibility. The question, how this might at all be possible, has hardly been properly put so far, never mind investigated. Actually cosmopolitization is about a dialectics of conflict: cosmopolitization *and its enemies* (Beck 2001, emphasis in original).

Its enemies remain and sometimes gather strength. Nationalism, along with a paradoxical combination of postmodern relativism (which celebrates identity) and fundamentalism (which celebrates exclusivity) are all reactions to the ultra-state practices of transnational communities, movements and networks. Transnational practices are, in short, a necessary but insufficient condition for the growth of a successful cosmopolitanism. Conviction, enthusiasm, organization and action are all needed to ratchet up a set of cosmopolitan practices to a new level. Only then can cosmopolitanism have a serious chance of superseding the old foci of loyalty.

The futures of cosmopolitanism

We need now to return to the primary purpose of this book. We have suggested the revival of the term 'cosmopolitanism' has been marked by a considerable degree of conceptual and theoretical diversity, even confusion. So our first task was to provide a full conspectus of views on the nature, definition and prospects for cosmopolitanism as well as a clarification and explication of different cosmopolitan traditions. This task has been addressed in a number of ways, for example by advancing new analytical frameworks and challenging old assumptions and representations.

Indeed, much literature surrounding the recent revitalization of the term has been produced precisely to displace the aloof, globetrotting bourgeois image of cosmopolitanism in order to propose more progressive connotations. To do this, various writers have employed a range of adjectives to modify or refine the term (cf. Harvey 2000). Such qualified notions include 'discrepant cosmopolitanisms' (Clifford 1992 and 1998), 'exclusionary cosmopolitanism' and 'inclusionary cosmopolitanism' (A. Anderson 1998), 'rooted cosmopolitanism' (Cohen 1992), 'oppositional cosmopolitanism' (Schein 1998a and 1998b), 'eccentric or ex-orbitant cosmopolitanism' (Radhakrishnan 1995) and the seemingly strange hybrid notion, 'cosmopolitan communitarianism' (Bellamy and Castiglione 1998). We have generated a similarly long list when discussing the contexts in which cosmopolitanism, old and new, arises.

While the trend towards positively reappropriating notions of cosmopolitanism is to be welcomed for its socially and politically transformative potential, practically all the recent writings on the topic remain in the realm of rhetoric. There is little description or analysis of how contemporary cosmopolitan philosophies, political projects, outlooks or practices can be formed, instilled or bolstered. In short, there are

few recipes for fostering cosmopolitanism (Vertovec 2000a). One important exception has been Nussbaum's (1994: 4) call for 'cosmopolitan education'. Such an educational agenda, forming the basis for shaping attitudes as well as institutions, would have among its goals to appreciate how common ends are variously instantiated in many cultures, to imagine vividly 'the different' based on a mastery of facts, and to stimulate in every person an overall 'process of world thinking'. In addition to the educational system, the fostering of cosmopolitanisms (that is cosmopolitanism understood through each rubric above and through their combination) is a process that would need to be located among a number of intermediary institutions in public space, including journals, conferences and political discussions (cf. Delanty 2001). The media, in their variety, also represent obvious sites for stimulating cosmopolitan awareness and highlighting cosmopolitan practices. To date, this has mostly been addressed through media structures and programmes surrounding the presentation of cultural diversity or multiculturalism.

This lacuna, this lack of a political programme, is only briefly and imperfectly addressed (though at least it is recognized!) in Beck's (1998) three-page 'Cosmopolitan Manifesto', a conscious reference to the Communist Manifesto of 1848. Despite the undeveloped nature of its political project, we none the less are of the view that only a cosmopolitan outlook can accommodate itself to the political challenges of a more global era, marked by overlapping communities of fate, multi-layered politics and new identity formations. Unlike political nationalism, cosmopolitanism registers and reflects the multiplicity of issues, questions, processes and problems that affect and bind people together, irrespective of where they were born or reside. The theory and practice of cosmopolitanism have at least the potential to abolish the razor-wired camps, national flags and walls of silence that separate us from our fellow human beings.

Notes

1. Older dictionaries prefer the term 'cosmopolites', which indeed is clearer and more elegant, but 'cosmopolitans' has passed into general use and here we use the terms interchangeably.
2. The differences would need to take into account not only the 'pluralism' used by Hollinger in the sense commonly understood in the USA, but also the more complex Caribbean, Dutch, colonial and African uses (M. G. Smith 1969). This is an unnecessary diversion here.

References

N.B. The references for this chapter can be found in the publication referred to at the top of this online version.