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# Neoliberalism, Governance and the Integral State

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*Dr Jonathan S Davies  
Reader in Critical Policy Analysis  
Institute of Governance and Public Management  
Warwick Business School  
University of Warwick  
Coventry CV4 7AL*

*Tel: +44(0)2476 522091*

*E-mail: [jonathan.davies@wbs.ac.uk](mailto:jonathan.davies@wbs.ac.uk)*

## **Abstract**

Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian perspectives have been very influential in contemporary urban studies. Though these approaches differ in very significant ways, they have in common that they understate the strategic and coercive functions of the contemporary state. The Gramscian theory of the integral state, by contrast, asserts that the relationship between coercion and consent is inherently dialectical in the epoch of capitalist political economy. Exploring the relationship between state and civil society through the lens of the integral state can contribute to explaining the roll-forward of 'authoritarian high modernism' in the governance arena and provide a template for comparative studies of different configurations of urban governance in the age of crisis and austerity.

## Introduction

This paper develops an ‘orthodox’ Gramscian perspective on urban governance, drawing on Thomas’s (2009) Marxist reading of the theory of the integral state. The paper argues that this concept, rarely deployed in mainstream or critical urban studies, can contribute to a more rounded understanding of urban state-civil society relations than the more popular Foucauldian or neo-Gramscian perspectives, which downplays the coercive role of the contemporary state – the three perspectives are summarized in Table 1. The central advantage of the integral state thesis is that it recognizes the state as a strategic and coercive actor situated in a dialectical relationship with civil society, understood as the terrain of struggle for *both* hegemony *and* domination. To facilitate cross-national comparison, the paper sketches a heuristic based on re-reading contemporary literatures through the lens of the integral state.

The paper begins with a sympathetic critique of the Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian approaches to urban governance. It then prefaces the Gramscian perspective by highlighting the empirical case for understanding the state as a strategic coercive actor, in contrast with the more distributed perspectives on power and the changing form of the state in the Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian viewpoints. The paper then elaborates the theory of the integral state, grounded in classical Marxism, before finally exploring how these alternative background assumptions might ground a heuristic predicated on the claim that all configurations of urban governance will embody the dialectics of coercion-consent, in some form and that these dialectics will always render progressive reforms precarious in a crisis-prone capitalist political economy. Table 2 summarizes varieties of urban governance deriving from this argument.

## **Foucauldian Urban Studies**

Foucauldian theory has influenced urban studies for a decade or more, furnishing the field with powerful insights into the cultivation of governance rationalities through mechanisms such as networks and partnerships. Foucault was very much a product of his time, his thought situated in a milieu where Stalinism dominated left politics and its counterpart, structuralism, dominated left scholarship - notably for urbanists in the early work of Castells (1977). Foucault's work can be understood, in part, as a fierce reaction to structuralist essentialism (Bevir, 2010), or what E.P. Thompson memorably condemned as 'diabolical and hysterical materialism'. In the fields of urban studies, governance and public policy, Foucauldian research on neoliberal governmentalities offers potent insights into the enrolment and regulation of citizen subjectivities. Swyngedouw (2005: p. 1992), for example, sees urban governance, as a 'a particular rationality of governing ... combined with new technologies, instruments and tactics of conducting the process of collective rule-setting, implementation and often including policing as well'. Importantly, he interprets the shift towards networks as part of a general shift from formal to informal means of governing (2005: p. 1997). The theory of governmentality thus expounds the age of 'soft power'.

Arguably, the varieties of neoliberal governance are among the most mature and sophisticated expressions of soft power in modernity. Carroll's (2009) study of the World Bank's Kecamatan Development Programme in Indonesia is a good example. The programme is designed, among other things, to strengthen local government and community institutions and enhance good local governance. In Carroll's account, it has been very successful in cultivating both positive attitudes towards state-civil society

network governance and competitive norms and practices. Carroll (2009: 449) argues: ‘the KDP, drawing upon the political technology of “participatory development”, constitutes a distinctly different and temporarily effective delivery device for extending capitalist social relations and the institutions that the development orthodoxy posits should accompany such relations’. In a recent lecture, Harvey commented (anecdotally) that many citizens in Baltimore, facing foreclosure on their homes, do not blame the system or the crisis but themselves, as individuals, for overburdening themselves with debt. Such attitudes are very striking examples of governmentality – the peculiarly neoliberal ‘commonsense’ that the borrower must bear the risk of default rather than the lender. The recuperative power of soft governance technologies in fostering entrepreneurial governmentalities should not, therefore, be understated. As Cammack put it (2010: 276) they pose ‘a considerable analytical and existential challenge to advocates of other more radical forms of politics.

The power of Foucauldian analysis is evident in studies of urban public participation, conceived as a medium for constructing neoliberal political rationalities (Newman, 2005). For example, in a study of community development in Oaxaca, Mexico, Walker *et al* (2008), explore the Fundacio´ n Comunitaria de Oaxaca, an NGO administering funds from sources such as the Inter-American Development Bank. They found that communities were ‘normatively structured’ as learners and entrepreneurs (2008: p. 534) and that the programme sought to denude ‘civil society of any dissident consciousness, ‘rescripting it as the social realm in which communities are improved through human capital acquisition’ (2008: p. 539). Their study symbolizes the archetypal neoliberal governmentality, although they found that it was contested at the grass-roots level. The power of the Foucauldian account is therefore that it cast new light on the distinction between domination, which

suppresses the power to act, and an art of government that is reflexive on the beliefs, desires and actions of those governed (Rose, 1999: p. 27).

In the political context of the 1960s and 1970s, Foucault sought to decentre, or de-structure power, and it is here that the approach is arguably vulnerable to criticism for over-compensating structuralism by representing power as swarming and without agency (Jessop, 2007: 146). Accordingly, Foucauldian governance research tends to neglect 'governmentalization' or 'statification', the prevalence of strategic and tactical state interventions in producing governmentalities and compensating for the limits of governmentality. For example, some Foucault-influenced accounts of urban governance foreground 'the state' as the agent of citizen acculturation without adequately conceptualizing it as a causal actor (e.g. Macleavy, 2009). Foucault himself (1991: p. 103) defined governmentality as 'the tactics of government', 'at once internal and external to the state', but this only begs the question of what theory of the state is in play. Thus, Foucauldian research proffers valuable insights into the production of governance rationalities, but inadequately conceptualizes the relationship between disciplinary and regulatory power (Joseph, 2010: p. 21).

Towards the end of his career, Foucault himself recognized this problem. He commented that 'power relations have been progressively governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions' (Foucault, 1982: p. 793). Moreover, the State is the 'point of strategic codification of the multitude of power relations and the apparatus in which hegemony, meta-power, class domination ... are crystallized' (Foucault, cited in Jessop, 2007: p. 153). Jessop (2007: p. 142) rightly sees this repositioning as the move towards a 'tactical alliance'

with Marxism, Foucault himself remaining opposed to it but with a degree of convergence in the underlying analysis. Foucauldian insights therefore need reinforcing with a theory that brings the state back in as a strategic coercive actor, emerging as the condensation of past struggles for hegemony, as part of a theory of structure and contradiction that better synthesizes governmentality with state and market power and resistance.

### **Neo-Gramscian Urban Governance**

In urban studies, Taylor's work (2007) is suggestive of one way forward from Foucault, invoking metagovernance theory as the means of bringing the state back in. For example, she sees network governance as a 'new arena for social control' where 'the rules of the game [are] still very much dictated by government' (2003: p. 190). Metagovernance theory, particularly in the hands of Jessop, perhaps its most influential exponent, draws from a rich vein of neo-Marxist, regulationist and neo-Gramscian theory. As Bevir and Rhodes (2010) point out, no sooner than the 'first wave' of governance theorists had de-centred the state, positing the rise of the network and the decline of hierarchy, 'second wave' metagovernance theorists, like Jessop, had re-centred it. Bang (2003: p. 108) defines metagovernance as 'managing the complexity, plurality and tangled hierarchies found in prevailing modes of coordination ... and the judicious mixing of market, hierarchy and networks' to deliver optimal outcomes. Metagovernance theory therefore posits a state that is still capable of acting strategically, but its role today is more reflexive, that of the coordinator, 'inter-scalar mediator, bricoleur, medium of democratic anchorage and legitimacy and institutional entrepreneur' (Davies, 2011: p. ??). Metagovernance arguably accords analytical priority to the rise of the network as the medium of social coordination, but without declaring hierarchies redundant.

Metagovernance theory is influenced by regulationist and neo-Gramscian theory. Like Foucauldian governmentality, these approaches also signalled a break from the structuralist orthodoxy – and with it, from classical Marxism. Schwartzmantel (2009: 12), for example, comments that Gramscian analysis today must recognize that ‘the idea of a cohesive movement based on the working class belongs to “old style politics” which have no purchase in a more diverse society, in which different identities and movements compete for people’s attention’. Neo-Gramscian metagovernance theory therefore represents a distinct critique of structuralism. It conceives of governance as a ‘complex ensemble of institutions, organizations and forces operating within, orientated toward or located at a distance from the juridico-political state apparatus’ (Jessop, 1997: 52). The roll-out of local economic governance networks in the 1980s and 1990s was identified in urban geography as part of a political project, the attempt to cultivate a new ‘scalar fix’ in the aftermath of Fordism (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). The notion of the attempted scalar fix was influenced by both Regulation Theory and neo-Gramscianism. It signified the urban as an important locus of the struggle for hegemony, not least through the medium of economic development and other forms of governance network.

As the orchestrator of a complex ensemble, the nation state does not necessarily concede power, but has to exercise power differently than in the Fordist epoch. The construction of hegemony is precarious because of the de-traditionalization and fragmentation unleashed by neoliberalism. With the upward aggregation of power at the supra-national scale and the devolution to sub-national units of a range of responsibilities for economic development, the nation state was arguably squeezed in a global-local dialectic (Harding, 1994). As Jessop (2003: 101-102) put it, metagovernance heralds the



purported shift towards a networked mode of co-ordination of political and economic activity, to 'overcome the limitations of anarchic market exchange and top-down planning in an increasingly complex and global world'. This is the essence of the claim that we have moved from the Keynesian Welfare National State to the Schumpeterian Workfare Post-national Regime (Jessop, 2002).

Thus, while neo-Gramscian analysis accords the state a role that, formally, Foucauldian analysis does not, both accounts see power as de-structuring and rescaling, emphasizing the dissolution of class, the changing form of the nation state and consensus over coercion and conflict. This paper develops a critique of de-structuring from a Marxist-Gramscian perspective. The basis for the critique is that within the broad literatures on urban governance, there is a significant disjuncture between conceptual frameworks that emphasize soft power and wide-ranging empirical research, which points to the incremental roll-forward of disciplinary state power – 'governmentalization'. If so, then the phenomenon – the roll-forward of what Moran calls 'authoritarian high modernism' in the face of claims about the rise of networked power - requires a conceptual re-think. Drawing on Thompson's recent exegesis on Gramsci (2009), the paper suggests that an 'orthodox' reading of Gramsci's conception of the integral state as the dialectics of coercion, consent and resistance casts new light on the problem of 'statification'.

### **The Governmentalization of Urban Governance**

The empirical reference point for re-stating the disciplinary function of the state is the avalanche of commentaries, across the social sciences, which point to the roll-forward of hierarchy. At the macro-scale, thinkers such as Cammack (2010), Klein (2007) and Zizek

(2009) offer salutary reminders of the state violence that often accompanies neoliberalization – from the Pinochet Coup in Chile to Thatcherite suppression of the miners' strike and, at the level of class-based Kulturkampf, the provocation of the fiscal crisis in New York in 1975. Naomi Klein's 'Shock Doctrine' depicts neoliberalism as being 'midwifed by the most brutal forms of coercion, inflicted on the collective body politic as well as on countless individual bodies' (2007: p. 18). Klein's is a powerful reminder of the coercive power invested in the roll-out of neoliberalism(s). Friedman (1999) famously celebrated the relationship between marketization and violence:

Markets function and flourish only when property rights are secured and can be enforced, which, in turn, requires a political framework protected and backed by military power ... Indeed McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the designer of the US Air Force F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies to flourish is called the US Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

While imperialist adventuring (unlike the asymmetric warfare of terrorism) is still largely the preserve of the nation state and alliances of nation states, the exercise of disciplinary power is also a key function of urban governance. City governments, together with other local and sub-national agencies have considerable coercive and surveillance power at their disposal (e.g. Coleman, 2004). At a rather more mundane level, the disciplinary power of the state plays out in the network governance institutions often heralded as displacing, or arising alongside hierarchy as the 'new ingredient' in the 'mix' (Lowndes, 2001: p. 1962). Sensitivity to spatial and temporal differences is an essential and defining feature of urban analysis, but the-by-now familiar trend towards the

governmentalization of network governance is reported widely internationally and across the social sciences. Davies (2011: chapter 3) explores the argument that the day-to-day politics of governance networks symbolize the extension and not the retreat of disciplinary power in some depth. For example, Hall's review of the literature in Sweden (2009: p. 527) found that 'governance networks seem to perpetuate, rather than replace, older political and social power structures' with networking marginal. Guarneros (2008) discovered that network governance in Mexico institutionalizes elite power. Strikingly, she argued that the role of government in these institutions make Rhodes' 'premise of self-governing irrelevant' (2008: p. 1032). In South Africa, the ANC began its first term by promising a participatory revolution. However, 'partnership' gradually came to mean 'people's organisations co-operating in government processes, programmes or practices rather than meaningful alliances based on equality' (Panos, 2000: p. 30). Perhaps most disappointingly, Baierle (2010: p. 72) concludes that Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre is now 'only a faint memory of a promise of democratic transformation that astonished the world'.

The UK, as a global exemplar and mentor for the network governance movement also exemplifies the continuing governmentalization of urban governance over a long period. Much of the research arising from the ESRC Local Governance Programme (Stoker, 1999, 2000) found that roll-forward hierarchies, not networks, were the norm (see Davies, 2000 for a review). The LGP was a commentary on the Tory years, but little changed during 13 years of New Labour except the rhetoric. Again, government promised local devolution, but local political autonomy was further curtailed (Davies, 2008) and by 2010, New Labour had achieved the unlikely distinction of centralizing more power than its Thatcherite predecessors. Marinetto (2003: p. 600) aptly concluded that any detailed examination of the

central architecture of the British state demonstrated ‘further centralization rather than the haemorrhaging of power and authority’ from the state’. What is important about these perspectives is that the state remains a strategic actor in urban affairs, utilizing a mix of soft and hard governing technologies – but with the latter perhaps becoming more prominent. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the arguments pertaining to urban governance are also found on a much broader intellectual canvas. Thompson (2003: p. 187), for example, argued that policy networks across the UK, Europe and the USA have been squeezed in a ‘pincer movement’ between roll-forward hierarchies and markets, perhaps even ‘heralding the demise of the policy network paradigm’. More recently, Bell and Hindmoor (2009) concluded that network governance is a governmental control strategy. They maintain that ‘states have not been hollowed out’. Rather, ‘the exercise of [hierarchical] state authority remains central to most government strategies’. Cammack also rejects the view that neoliberalism signified the rollback of the state (as opposed to the rollback of welfare). He (2010: p. 270) argues that as a key agent of neoliberalization the World Bank ‘necessarily took the view that the state had to be an active agent of change rather than a passive conduit for uncontained market forces’. It stated that competitive markets ‘cannot operate in a vacuum—they require a legal and regulatory framework that only governments can provide’. Hence, ‘it is not a question of state or market: each has a large and irreplaceable role’ (World Bank, 1991: p.1). As Friedman and Klein remind us, the exercise of coercive power is one of those roles.

The literature is replete with arguments of this kind and the important thing about them is that they draw attention to a significant problem with theories predicated on trends towards dispersion and the rise of soft power. It is entirely feasible that today, states and local states exercise disciplinary power in inverse proportion to its effectiveness, and that disciplinary power is less effective today than in the past. These are empirical questions that require proper historical benchmarking. But, the possibility that hierarchical power is less effective than it was 50 years ago cannot disguise the fact that any shift towards distributed or networked urban governance has been wildly exaggerated, as some of its earlier advocates now recognize (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010; Stoker, 2011). For present purposes, the question posed by the seeming intractability of hierarchy in the age of the ideology of networks is to explain the relationship between 'hard' and 'soft' power in the roll-out and contestation of urban neoliberalism. The paper argues that reviving an 'orthodox' interpretation of Gramsci's theory of the integral state provides a way forward.

### **Marxist Political Economy and the Gramscian Integral State**

Space precludes revisiting the myriad debates on Gramsci's legacy in any detail (e.g. Cox, 1994; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). The paper instead concentrates on recent developments in the orthodox Marxist interpretation of Gramsci and applies them to the analysis of neoliberal urban governance. Jessop (2009: p. 80) defines 'governance', in neo-Gramscian terms, as 'the coordination of natural and social relations characterised by complex, reciprocal interdependence'. This emphasis on complexity, reciprocity and uncertainty distinguishes the neo-Gramscian from the Marxist-Gramscian approach, which foregrounds the dialectical nature of social relations. In his debate with the Marxist, Jonathan Joseph (2002), Jessop (2003: p. 138-9) comments:

Whereas Joseph tends to take structural totalities for granted ... I question the feasibility of totalization practices and argue that they can succeed only relatively, precariously, and temporarily within specific socially constituted spatio-temporal fixes that displace and defer many contradictions, crisis-tendencies, and conflicts to marginalized places and spaces within and beyond the boundaries of this fix and/or into the future.

As Jessop intimates, orthodox Marxism is distinguished methodologically by the idea that the different domains of the social world (e.g. states, markets, civil societies) constitute a dialectical or contradictory totality (Callinicos, 2007). The notion of a dialectical totality does not 'privilege' either top-down or bottom-up analysis, but rather requires a constant analytical movement between the two positions. Underpinning this framework is the idea that capitalist modernity is 'totalizing' and that the domains of capitalist society are internally related. The existence of one is the condition of the existence of the other and the demise of one heralds the demise or fundamental transformation of the other. This perspective derives from Marx's empirical analysis of the rapacious and profoundly contradictory nature of capitalism and the relationship between states and capitals. In the Marxist dialectical or contradictory totality, states depend on capital for their existence, and capital requires the state, the extra-economic sphere, to attempt to secure its reproduction (failure is an ever-present likelihood in dialectical accounts).

However, the relationship is not one of strict reciprocity in classical Marxism. The neo-Gramscian and regulation approaches might be described as 'weakly dialectical', suggesting that the structural coupling between state and capital is sufficiently loose for states to be able to deliver progressive reforms under pressure from electorates and civil

society activism and steer the economy around episodic crises – ‘the relative autonomy of the state’. Orthodox Marxism, however, posits a strongly dialectical theory of capitalism based on the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (TRPF). This notion remains profoundly controversial, not least within Marxism itself, but Harman (2009) rebuts the plethora of critics arguing that they exaggerate counter-tendencies (of which there are many) and understate declining profits. He argues, contrary to the mainstream, that a fall in profit rates preceded every major crisis of capitalism, including the current one. The relative analytical dominance of capitalism in the social system ultimately depends on this framing of crisis. The more crisis prone it is held to be, the greater its dominance in the contradictory totality. As Jessop (2007b: 79) put it, ‘the system with the highest tendency to fail with the most significant consequences for other systems that will gain primacy’, because it perturbs other systems more than they perturb it. This claim is at the root of the idea that states and capitals are locked into a relationship of structural interdependence, in which the tendency to structural accumulation crises privileges capital (Ashman and Callinicos, 2006). If classical Marxism is correct that the capitalist system tends to age as it becomes global and universal, then the room for political manoeuvre by progressively-minded regimes will tend to diminish, on a non-linear path, over time.

In addition to its capacity to destabilize other systems that are not themselves inherently crisis-prone, there are three key reasons for the structural bias towards capitalism in the state-capital relationship. First, and most obviously, states depend on revenues deriving from capital accumulation. Second, and more contingently, capitalist and state elites have class-cultural affinities (Miliband, 1968). Recent developments in Marxist state theory point to a third, pivotal explanation – the homology between the objectives of

capitalists (profit) and political leaders and elite state managers (territorial power in the international state system) (Harvey, 2005). Profit and territorial power are distinct imperatives and the one can clearly inhibit the other, particularly when imperialist adventures go wrong. However, the structural relationship between them is homologous rather than dialectical. Callinicos (2007) argues that as capitalism developed, the profit and territorial imperatives became structurally entwined and states practicing capitalism gained strategic advantages in the world system – including the military capacity to exploit other states. Access to investment and markets in the global economy has always been, and remains, spatio-temporally uneven and vulnerable to economic fluctuations, meaning that economic competition is fierce. But what Harvey (2005: p. 31) calls the inherent asymmetry of ‘spatial exchange relations’, or uneven spatial development, also means that geo-political competition remains fierce. States have to engage in competition for markets, in order to their secure territorial power, both sovereign domestic power and relative power within the international system. Callinicos uses this analysis of uneven development and geopolitical competition to support his argument against neo-Gramscians, that the emergence of a global ruling class tends to weaken nation-state antagonisms, and to assert that despite rising economic interconnectedness, the international state system is still ‘irreducibly plural’ and conflictual. It also provides a powerful explanation for why states tend to behave like ‘collective capitalists’, reinforces the underlying structural entanglement of states and markets and supports the notion that the system constitutes emergent, emerging totality rather than a precariously coupled ecology of autopoietic systems.

This understanding of contemporary political economy drives the orthodox Gramscian conception of the bourgeois integral state, elaborated by Thomas (2009).



Hegemony is defined by Gramsci (1971: pp. 181-2) as the unity of economic and political goals, and 'intellectual and moral unity ... on a "universal" plane'. Comprehensive hegemony is active assent for the goals of a historic bloc, seeking to secure the conditions for capital accumulation and the exercise of territorial power. However, Gramsci also emphasized that hegemony is a constant struggle and that 'pure' hegemony is unattainable. The theory of the integral state is the basis for understanding why ideal-typical hegemony is, characteristically, unattainable and thus why coercion is always the necessary counterpart of hegemonic consent.

The theory of the integral state brings civil society within the dialectical totality, situating it in a dialectical relationship with the capitalist state. For Gramsci (1971: pp. 262-3), the integral state is 'political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion', where 'political society' denotes the coercive power of the state. Civil society is the 'terrain upon which social classes compete for social and political leadership or hegemony over other social classes'. In liberal theory, civil society is the domain of private voluntary association (Tocqueville, 1994). In the Habermasian worldview, it is the public sphere and the wellspring of democratic vitality, a once pristine 'lifeworld' incrementally encroached by the instrumental rationalities states and markets. Laclau and Mouffe (2001) in their post-structuralist reading of Gramsci interpret it as an autonomous sphere where the ideological 'war of position' is fought out in discourse conflicts. Like Habermas, Laclau and Mouffe see civil society as the source of counter-hegemonic politics, but without the possibility of any 'suture' in the form of a rationally motivated consensus.

In the orthodox Gramscian worldview, by contrast, civil society is understood as an extension of the capitalist state. Under capitalism, the state penetrates, organizes and

mobilizes civil society to a far greater extent than under any preceding mode of production. In Marx's (1871) florid language: 'The centralized state machinery ... entombs (inmeshes) the living civil society like a boa constrictor', through institutions such as the media, organized religion and schooling. The formal-ideological autonomy of civil society is curtailed by the dialectics of force and consent and the impossibility of developing 'pristine' public spaces under capitalism, either today or at the dawn of Bourgeois society. For example, a radical civil society movement might successfully campaign for a living wage or a Tobin Tax or even (rarely) prevent a state from going to war. It might have the most radical anti-capitalist ideas. However, its practical autonomy is limited by two factors: it does not control the means of production, distribution and exchange and the coercive power of the state imposes structural limits on transformative action.

Thomas argues (2009: p. 137) that hegemony is guaranteed 'in the last instance, by capture of the legal monopoly of violence embodied in the institutions of political society', the decisive moment of coercive power against civil society in revolt. However, the theory of the integral state is very different from the theory of 'relative autonomy', relating coercion and consent dialectically and immanently. As Thomas put it in a later passage (2009: p. 163), hegemony and domination are 'strategically differentiated forms of a unitary political power'. This means that neither coercion nor consent is never entirely absent from a governance configuration. The question is rather which term of the relationship is the most prominent in any spatio-temporal and scalar conjuncture. In other words, coercion is situated in a dialectical relationship with consent (coercion-consent) and includes not only shock-doctrine violence, but the every-day compulsion of juridical enforcement, surveillance, the carceral state and routine, petty-fogging bureaucratic control-freakery.

Just as consent ranges from passive and grudging to active and enthusiastic, so compulsion is a continuum from bureaucratic impediment to all-out war. Consequently, the dialectics of coercion-consent operate as much in the interstices of the state-civil society interface as at the grand scale. In the integral state consent is partly '*constituted by a silent, absent force*', the threat of violence, without which 'the system of cultural control would be instantly fragile, since the limits of possible actions against it would disappear' (Anderson, 1976: p. 43, original emphasis). In other words, hegemony is *always* mediated by the exercise of disciplinary power and the shadow of hierarchy.

To the extent that the exercise of soft power secures the active consent of civil society, a state of hegemony exists. To the extent that it cannot, hierarchy emerges from the shadows. The reason why the relationship is dialectical, meaning that comprehensive hegemony is an inherent improbability, is found in the Marxist conception of the state-capital relation, described above. As a system prone to accumulation crises, capitalism tends to generate expectations among subordinate classes as the condition of consent to it, which it cannot fully meet (Anderson, 1976: p. 29). Hence, contradictions accumulate, consent tends to be fragile and universal assent is never achieved. Moreover, as capitalism is constantly uprooting and reinventing traditions, technologies and practices, the nature of hegemonic ambition itself has to change. In Gramscian vernacular, the term 'passive revolution' refers to significant moments of struggle and transformation within capitalist states. The shift to neoliberalism is a good example of a spatio-temporally uneven movement to carry out transformation by non-revolutionary means (Callinicos, 2010: p. 492). The ability of a dominant bloc to carry out passive revolutions successfully is pivotal for continued capitalist development. In a passive revolution, old practices and dispositions

have to be unlearned and replaced with new ones, fostering a new ‘second nature’ (Fontana, 2002: p. 163). Thus, hegemony is always a struggle and never complete and particular hegemonies have limited space-time utility for accumulation, meaning that they are periodically challenged from the top-down as well as through bottom-up counter-hegemonic mobilization. The remainder of the paper considers the implications of analyzing neoliberal urban governance through the lens of the integral state.

	<b>Foucauldian</b>	<b>Neo-Gramscian</b>	<b>Orthodox Gramscian</b>
<b>Totality</b>	Totalities are reifications	Sceptical towards theories of totality – social structures loosely coupled	Contradictory totality
<b>Social Structure</b>	Post-structural analysis of power	Reciprocal structuration/Strategic Relational Approach	Exercises emergent causal power in stratified reality
<b>Contradiction</b>	No necessary structural contradiction	Structural contradictions softened by globalization and the decline of the working class	Strong, particularly under capitalism
<b>State-capital conjuncture</b>	‘State’ and ‘capital’ are reifications	Relative autonomy	Structural interdependence of state and capital
<b>Civil Society</b>	Distributed, multi-faceted, de-categorized	Relative autonomy	The bourgeois integral state and the dialectics of coercion-consent
<b>Privileged actors</b>	Power resides in the interstices of networks	Global <i>nebuleuse</i> and social movements	Capitals, states and classes
<b>Organized Network Governance</b>	Networks emblematic of neo-liberal governmentality	Rise of networks in a ‘mix’ with states and markets.	Networks as hegemonic strategy of states and markets in neoliberal passive revolution
<b>The Integral State</b>	Emphasizes consent through governmentality	A complex ensemble. Tends to emphasize consent through social regulation	A dialectical totality. Coercion always the condition of consent

**Table 1: Three Theories of Contemporary Governance**

### **An Orthodox Gramscian Perspective on Urban Governance**

The account of the bourgeois integral state developed above asserts that the nation state still has a pivotal role in the construction of hegemonies and hence that any

account of the struggle for hegemony at the urban scale must be framed by multi-scalar analysis including the coercive, disciplinary and distributive functions of the nation state, its organizing position within a supra-urban hegemonic bloc and the economic and political modernization strategies that it brings to the urban scale. However, we must also juxtapose the Gramscian perspective with a Lefebvrian commitment to exploring the politics of everyday life. Specific practices of urban governance at the state-civil society interface can be understood as the micro-politics of the integral state in action. In Kipfer's (2002: p. 131) reading of Lefebvre, daily life is the key to reproducing hegemony, as it is saturated by routine, repetitive and familiar practices. However, it is replete with contradictions too. Idealized representations of everyday life in capitalist culture are utopian promises for playful, non-alienated future. However, '[c]ontradictions emerge because these promises are denied by the very regressive forces of commodification that spread them' (Kipfer, 2002: p. 133). Neoliberal urban governance can be understood similarly as the spatio-temporally variable day-to-day politics of the integral state and the dialectics of consent-coercion. Cammack (2004: p. 190) maintains that the neoliberal rationale for urban governance is to 'equip the poor for their incorporation into and subjection to competitive labour markets and the creation of an institutional framework within which global capital accumulation can be sustained, while simultaneously seeking to legitimize the project through participation and a pro-poor agenda'. Thus understood, it will be mediated by a variety of strategic state projects, operationalized by different scalar configurations of coercion-consent, the dialectics of 'hard' and 'soft' power. The remainder of the paper considers a possible framework for exploring varieties of urban governance comparatively through the lens of the integral state.

First and foremost, the notion of urban governance as the integral state is intended to stimulate urban inquiry that focuses far more attention on coercion and struggle than the mainstream governance and policy literature has done in recent years (see Bourdieu, 1995; Wacquant, 2008 for sociological research on urban state and market violence). If we consider urban governance as occurring within a contradictory totality characterized by chronic instability, vast concentrations of power and wealth and ever-intensifying competition at every interstice, then it behoves us also to consider the possibility that institutions and practices are structured by and confront these conditions, rather than subsisting in isolation or autonomy from them. This perspective does not exclude focusing on conventional state-civil society relations, such as partnerships and governance networks, as these too are terrains of struggle and, particularly in Western Europe, important components of the neoliberal hegemonic apparatus for 'social inclusion' (Geddes, 2006). In fact, the degree of enrolment of civil society activists to these institutions may form an important part of the explanation for how the urban resistance is recuperated (or not) and what form particular local hegemonic struggles take.

Table 2 highlights six possible forms of the integral state to stimulate cross-national comparison. In reality, specific forms are likely to mix and compete rather than existing in pure form. One interesting comparative task is to explore the juxtaposition of types. Which forms are most prominent, which secondary forms serve as ideological justifications for the dominant ones? Which ones clash? Each of the non-counterfactual types draws on examples from the urban governance literature. However, the ultimate goal of research is not to assign cases to or across heuristics – these are only helpful if treated as suggestive of possibilities. The challenge is to explore the conditions in which different configurations of

the integral state develop in concrete urban governance arrangements and how they are related to national hegemonic strategies.

### *The Flawed Hegemonic Archetype*

The typology foregrounds the flawed hegemonic 'type', as this is arguably the dominant form of urban governance arrangement in the UK and across parts of Europe. The 'flawed hegemonic model' focuses on the 'governmentalization' or 'statification' of the participatory mode of governance, discussed above, positing a dialectical relationship between the post-hegemonic theory of networks and governmentalization in practice. Davies (2011: p. ?) argues that the network governance movement is itself part of the hegemonic ideology of neoliberalism, arising from the juxtaposition of neoliberal entrepreneurialism and the modernization strategy of informational capitalism, which privileges networking as the model form of sociability in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Gramsci (1971: 133) argued that if a hegemonic project is to achieve hegemony, it must successfully link its political struggle with a programme of economic reform. According to Davies, adapting Boltanski and Chiapello (2006), the network has fulfilled a vital part of this role for Western neoliberalism in the aftermath of the social conflagrations of the late 1960s. He claims that the network became 'the visionary regulative ideal of neoliberalism' and thus rephrases Lowndes formulation above (2001: p. 1962), arguing that 'networks became the favoured ideology of markets and states in a crisis-ridden context that was ... strategically selective towards the "new spirit of capitalism"'.

If this is theoretical juxtaposition of neoliberalism and the ideology of networks is correct, then the urban-local network governance movement promoted by international

organizations, governments, agencies and NGOs might fruitfully be conceived as a terrain in the struggle for hegemony – the attempt to enrol civil society activists into what Davies (2011) calls the ‘connexionist disposition’, that of the reflexive, entrepreneurial networker. Geddes (2008:p. 207) rightly argues that despite their ‘variable geometry, it is clear that local and regional partnership is becoming hegemonic across the whole of the EU’. However, Davies (2007, 2009), Newman (e.g. Clarke and Newman, 2007) and others (e.g. McKee, 2009) draw attention to the relative ‘ungovernability’ of citizen-activists in participatory governance mechanisms and Davies (2007) argues that this ungovernability is an important part of the explanation for the roll-forward of ‘creeping managerialism’. In other words, the governmentalization of urban governance, the tendency for network coordination to degenerate into hierarchical coordination, derives, at least in part, from the failure of networks to cultivate the dispositions envisioned by the neoliberal hegemonic project: connexionist civil society activists capable of energetically solving policy and management problems through a de-politicized discourse. In other words, to the extent the ‘connexionist disposition’ fails to take root, we see the incremental roll-forward of managerialism, or coercion-lite, a relatively subtle reconfiguration of the integral state towards hierarchy.

### *Hegemony by Exclusion*

The theory of the Growth Machine (Molotch, 1976) and Urban Regime Theory draw attention to a different kind of urban governance arrangement, ‘hegemony by exclusion’. In Stone’s (1989) account, American city officials and down-town market elites use their superior resources to pre-empt the governing agenda to the exclusion of citizens and lower class interests, creating stable governing regimes with relatively impermeable boundaries.



The regime and growth machine archetypes are instances of 'hegemony by exclusion'. As Davies and Pill (2012) found in Baltimore, there has barely been any attempt to construct inclusive governing networks, other than those led by private foundations. Whereas in the UK, the network of organized governance networks is very dense, in Baltimore it appears not to be. However, this does not mean the terrain of hegemonic struggle has been vacated for *laissez faire*, only that it is organized differently. Here, the combination of the carceral state, ghettoization and the strong culture of church-inspired voluntarism combine with market discipline and operate as alternative hegemonic mechanisms (Harvey, 2005: p. 50). Gramsci argued that *laissez faire* is illusory under capitalism (1971: pp. 159-60).

Thus it is asserted that economic activity belongs to civil society, and that the State must not intervene to regulate it. But since in actual reality civil society and State are one and the same, it must be made clear that *laissez-faire* too is a form of State "regulation", introduced and maintained by legislative and coercive means. It is a deliberate policy, conscious of its own ends, and not the spontaneous, automatic expression of economic facts. Consequently, *laissez-faire* liberalism is a political programme ... to change the economic programme of the State itself ... the distribution of the national income.

If the more 'inclusive' form of neoliberalism associated with the flawed hegemonic archetype fails, or states no longer have the resources to deploy expensive soft control technologies, then the drift to self-help and coercion is likely to continue, mediated to a greater or lesser extent by urban resistance. Hegemony by exclusion is best understood as a form of economic, spatial and symbolic violence against the poor, where hegemonic actors

do not see the potential, need or possibility of organizing a more inclusionary enrolment strategy.

### *The Hegemonic Interregnum*

Stone (1989: p. 236) further points out that regime-building and maintenance is difficult and suggests that governing regimes are rare. Governing inertia or non-governance is possible at any scale, if no social force proves capable of organizing the requisite leadership associated with a hegemonic project or outright domination. Loopmans' (2008) study of gentrification in Antwerp highlights the alternation of hegemonic and non-hegemonic phases in urban governance. He demonstrates how, in the latter, alternative potential hegemonic strategies competed for leadership in an interregnum where no clear policy trajectory could be pursued. Non-hegemonic governance is thus a further archetype, presenting the theoretical opportunity for counter-hegemonic forces to organize in a leadership vacuum.

### *The Counter-Hegemonic Archetype*

The counter-hegemonic archetype might take a number of forms, including movements that seek to engage and transform the state (insider strategies) and those that seek to oppose it more directly, either through distributed forms of struggle or more traditional class-based coercive resistance. The English Community Development Projects of the late 1960s and 1970s are an instance of the first kind. The CDPs were set up in a small number of deprived urban areas in the late 1960s (Geddes, 2009). In a famous report *Gilding the Ghetto* (CDP, 1977), they developed a critique of the regeneration philosophy underpinning the programme and instead elaborated a critique of capitalist political economy. A number of junior state managers 'went native' in developing a very public

critique of the programme they were meant to be implementing, highlighting both the potential heterogeneity of the state as well as its limits when the programme closed in 1978.

Distributed, or networked-outsider resistance is the preferred mode of organizing of the leaders of the 'no global' movement. Just as the network society is a powerful regulatory ideal for neoliberalism, theorists like Hardt and Negri (2000), see networking as the organizing principle of post-proletarian resistance. Here, struggle can swarm, swamp or flow around structures of power and create new emancipatory practices without confronting the structures of power – themselves perceived as undergoing profound transformation.

Class-based coercive resistance, by contrast, recognizes the possibility that the real decline in the political power of the working class during the neoliberal offensive is reversible (e.g. Callinicos, 2007: p. 306). The increasing propensity for militant working class action globally – from Beijing to Athens to Paris - is evidence of this. These struggles often have an important urban locus, as in Athens and Paris, but are oriented to national and international rather than urban transformations. As mentioned above, given the configurations of capital and coercive power at the national, international and transnational levels, urban counter-hegemonic movements will almost certainly have to link up and rise to the national and international scales if they are not to be defeated. From the perspective of resistance, the urban, the extra-urban and the supra-urban cannot easily be disaggregated.

At higher geopolitical scales, the Bolivarian revolutions arguably pose something of a challenge to the analysis of the integral state developed above. In a neoliberal world, these revolutions are a source of inspiration on the left. Both eschew direct confrontation with

capital and instead try to maintain a popular coalition, effectively a moment of dual power. In Bolivia, this compromise entails a non-aggression pact with the wealthy 'autonomy' movement in the rich eastern provinces of Bolivia, which, naturally, enjoys the support of the United States. In other words, the Bolivarian revolution is predicated on a theory of the relative autonomy of both state and civil society, in which the dialectics of the integral state can be dissolved or contained to such a degree that incremental progress towards socialism is possible. Bolivarian power is also networked power. For Postero (2010: p. 23):

Bolivia's new "multitude" formations are not as rigid as previous union-style formations but rather bring together people and groups in "affiliational relationships" and "assembly-style democracy." In contrast to traditional forms of association, which control and mobilize their members, they suggest, these forms maintain their power through moral authority, relying on participants' commitment to the cause. This is the new plebeian Bolivia.

Perhaps the most famous victory for this distributed form of organizing was in the 'Cochabamba water wars' where the World Bank and the Bolivian government were defeated in an attempt to privatize the municipal water supply by the coalition of forces that later became part of the 'Movement Towards Socialism', elected to power under the leadership of Evo Morales in 2005 (Geddes and Guarneros, 2010).

However, the sustainability of this arrangement is a source of constant scrutiny and scepticism on the left and some argue that the Bolivian and Venezuelan models are in retreat (see Geddes conference paper for a review). Lopez Maya (2010) argues of Venezuela that its inability to radicalize and undertake more substantive redistributive measures is eroding the social base of the revolution. Much like the critique of the

degeneration of participatory budgeting in Brazil, she argues that participatory reforms are losing momentum and that the regime is losing interest in bottom-up mechanisms, instead favouring the institutionalization and homogenization of participatory structures; what she sees as 'recentralizing tendencies of the state and the concentration of powers in the president' (2010: p. 125).

There is, therefore, a question mark over whether the attempt to extend social, political and economic rights through civil society movements and the bracketing of the structural power of capital is always vulnerable to a Pinochet-style counter-offensive, if it is not first defeated by other means, or succeeds in transcending the dual power arrangement. It is of dictatorship that the Gramscian theory of the integral state warns 'in the last instance'. As Thomas (2009: p. 452) warns, if subaltern classes do not develop their own hegemonic apparatus capable of challenging the 'political society' of the 'bourgeois integral state', they will remain 'subaltern to its overdeterminations'. The Bolivarian revolutions are thus a very important test of both the orthodox Gramscian conception of the integral state and neo-Gramscian and autonomist theories based on more distributed conceptions of political and economic power.

#### *The Comprehensive and Post-Hegemonic Archetypes*

The heuristic allows, finally, that post-hegemonic and comprehensively hegemonic networks could emerge, thereby refuting the central arguments of this paper. In the post-hegemonic worldview, that associated with upbeat postmodernist accounts of governance (e.g. Lash, 2007; Thoburn, 2007), flexible structures of collaboration form and dissolve, bringing together a fluid plurality of interests to debate and pursue an assortment of goals that are likely to be in constant flux.

Crouch (2011) rightly argues that neoliberalism remains a powerful hegemonic doctrine, despite the disastrous economic crisis it has unleashed. In the ideal-typical comprehensively hegemonic form of neoliberalism, governmental and non-governmental actors achieve practical mastery of the demands, tasks, conventions, dispositions and symbols of neoliberal connexionism (Bourdieu, 1984). They are at ease in the company of others, capable of advocating and contributing vigorously to their networks. They happily channel the expressive drive into a post-political discourse of resource mobilization and problem solving (Geddes, 2006).

	<b>Flawed urban Hegemony</b>	<b>Urban exclusion/ Domination</b>	<b>Counter-hegemonic urbanism</b>	<b>Hegemonic Interregnum</b>	<b>Urban Hegemony</b>	<b>Post-hegemonic urbanism</b>
<b>Actors</b>	Managerialist elites, 'ungoverned' civil society activists	Informal alliance of local business elites, politicians and administrators	Social movements, Re-emergent class conflicts	A variety of actors struggle for leadership. Growth agenda tends to win.	Neoliberal enthusiasts – politicians, administrator, business leaders and civil society activists	Network enthusiasts of all dispositions
<b>Governance characteristics</b>	Inclusive. Roll-forward hierarchies in light of governance failure.	Exclusive and elite-focused. Control through and market discipline.	Project-oriented resistance	Inertia, fragmentation, struggle, non-governance	Adaptive, homogenous, inclusive network: post-pluralist, post-political	Adaptive, heterodox, inclusive network: pluralist and/or democratic
<b>Struggle</b>	Contested governance institutions 'from within'	Balkanized/ Ghettoized. E.g. favelas, townships and U.S. style spatial segregation.	High and project-oriented	Variable	Very low	Everywhere and nowhere
<b>Integral State Form</b>	Roll-forward authoritarian high modernism (coercion-lite)	Carceral urbanism, high surveillance, symbolic violence against the poor, discipline through markets	High coercion, high resistance – potential for spatial-scalar generalization of struggle	Variable/contested	Hierarchy in the shadow, high levels of social assent	The Integral state is a category error
<b>Examples</b>	Organized governing networks	Urban Regimes, Growth Machines, Clientelism.	The right to the city movement The Bolivarian revolutions Mass strikes	Policy and leadership interregnum in Antwerp	Counterfactual	Counterfactual

**Table 2: Urban Governance and the Integral State (adapted from Davies, 2011)**

Given the preceding analysis, the comprehensively hegemonic and post-hegemonic types are treated as counterfactual, despite the seeming intractability of neoliberal doctrine, but are included in a heuristic that remains open to alternative categorizations based on empirical inquiry.

## **Conclusion**

The Foucauldian, neo-Gramscian and orthodox Gramscian approaches to contemporary urban governance are differentiated, ultimately, by the strategic and coercive role accorded to the capitalist state, and its urban counterpart in the orthodox model. The Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian models furnish us with powerful insights into the control strategies of neoliberalism, but the orthodox Gramscian view proceeds from a very different perspective on state-civil society relations. It maintains that every configuration of the state-civil society interface will manifest the dialectics of the integral state in some form, and that these dialectics cannot be dissolved, or bracketed sustainably, short of the comprehensive transformation the relations in question – the dissolution of the international system of capitalist states and of bourgeois civil society. In other words, however urban governance arrangements might vary, they cannot completely dissolve the antagonisms deriving from, and tendentially aggravated by, the crisis-prone nature of capitalist political economy.

Neo-Gramscians, MacLeod and Goodwin (1999: p. 716), recognize that the ‘fundamental contradictions of capitalism can never be *fully* contained’, but their model, like Jessop’s, assumes that these contradictions will never be fully realised in the manner suggested by Marx’s TRPF or Rosa Luxemburg’s dialectics of ‘capitalism or barbarism’, meaning that a degree of relative autonomy can be maintained for states and civil societies.

Whether this perspective, or the more weakly dialectical approach, is the best one for understanding urban governance today, in the face of strategic and coercive state power, is the crux of the question posed by the structural crisis of Western capitalism today.

Ultimately, the veracity of the strong and weak dialectical accounts of 'governance as hegemony' can only be resolved through empirical observation, but this paper argues that framing research from the standpoint of the dialectics of the integral state is likely to cast new light on contemporary struggles over urban governance, their variations, limits and emancipatory potentialities. This is a key task for critical comparative urban studies in a seemingly intractable crisis conjuncture.

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## References

Sorry – I didn't quite get around to this. To follow with redraft in due course.