Discussion of "AMM Designs beyond Constant Functions"

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Disclaimer: The views expressed here are all mine and not necessarily of the Bank for International Settlements.

## Summary

► An interesting paper on AMM trading mechanisms

- $\blacktriangleright$  Key result: LP chooses impact functions  $\rightarrow$  marginal rate/price discovery
- Arithmetic liquidity pool (ALP) vs geometric liquidity pool (GLP)
  - ▶ ALP: Marginal rate and LP inventory are additive
  - ▶ GLP: Marginal rate and LP inventory are multiplicative
  - ▶ No round-trip arbitrages (front-running/sandwich attacks)
- Second result: LP's optimal strategy in ALP and GLP
- Last-but-not-least result: constant functions (CFM) are a special case of ALP in which LP's strategy is sub-optimal

► Key concepts:

- $\blacktriangleright \text{ Marginal rate } Z \implies \text{mid-quotes } m$
- ▶ Shifts around marginal rate  $Z \pm \delta \Longrightarrow$  bid and ask prices p (ie  $\delta \Longrightarrow$  half spread s )

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- ▶ Consider a two-period model:  $Z_0, x_0, y_0$ , LT buys  $\zeta$  unit of Y
  - ► Cartea et al:  $dZ_t (= Z_1 Z_0) = \eta(\cdot), \quad dy_t = -\zeta, \quad dx_t = \zeta(Z_0 + \delta)$

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  - Translating to MM:  $m_1 = m_0 + \eta(\cdot)$
  - ▶ Foucault, Pagano and Roell (2013) Chapter 3.5:

$$m_1 = m_0 + \underbrace{(\mu_1 - \mu_0)}_{\Delta \text{Expected value}} + \underbrace{
ho \sigma q}_{\text{Inv cost}}$$

CFMs as a special case

**Cartea et al:** level function  $x = \varphi(y)$  and marginal rate  $Z = -\varphi'(y)$ 

$$\blacktriangleright \Rightarrow \eta = \varphi'(y_0) - \varphi'(y_1) \text{ and } \delta = \varphi'(y_0) - \frac{\varphi(y_1) - \varphi(y_0)}{y_1 - y_0}$$

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► Translating to MM: 
$$m_1 = m_0 + \underbrace{(\varphi'(y_0) - \varphi'(y_1))}_{\text{Change of } \frac{dx}{dy}}$$

• Compared to Foucault et al (2013):  $m_1 = m_0 + (\mu_1 - \mu_0) + \rho \sigma q$ 

 $\Delta E$ xpected value Inv cost

CFM is not optimal!

▶ Optimal liquidity provision with price-sensitive LT

- LT arrival intensity  $\lambda$  decreases in the spread  $\delta$ .
- ▶ LP maximizes expected wealth subject to inventory risk
- Optimal spread

 $\delta^* = \mathsf{Round}\mathsf{-trip}$  trade  $\mathsf{profit} + \mathsf{adj}$  for  $\mathsf{inv}\ \mathsf{cost} + \mathsf{impact}\ \mathsf{component}$ 

price impact ?

- What is  $\eta^*$  in  $m_1 = m_0 + \eta$ ?
- ▶ What is the size of the round-trip trade?

## Comment 2: Informed trading

- ▶ The impact function  $\eta$  aims to allow LP adjusting mid-quote, enhancing price discovery
- But  $\eta$  is still a function of y only (?)
- $\blacktriangleright$  The no-round-trip-arbitrage is achieved by widening the spread  $\delta$  ...
- ▶ ... which is possible because LT arrival intensity is deterministic?
- ▶ In addition, what if LT are informed? How adverse selection is addressed?

- ▶ Exposition: the current draft is pretty cryptic
  - Consider lightening up notation
- ▶ I find the result that CFM is not optimal very interesting and relevant
  - ► Consider more numerical exercises to highlight the inefficiency

## Concluding remarks

- ▶ This paper provides a rigorous analysis on AMM trading mechanism
- ▶ It is more of a Math- or CS-oriented paper, with an application in Economics
- Overall the paper provides a lot of interesting findings
- Entrepreneurs interested in building DeFi apps should definitely read this paper
- Economists can also learn a lot from the paper