The bloody May days in Berlin, the white terror loosed under social-democratic leadership and social-democratic slogans against the traditional mass demonstration of the proletariat, and the Magdeburg Congress of the S.D. Party which passed the social-chauvinist defence programme—these events, occurring more or less together, indicate a certain maturity in the development of social-fascist tendencies in Germany. They justify us in speaking no longer of the growth of the leading reformist circles in the direction of fascism, but of definite and conclusive signs of fascism in German reformism as a whole. It is, however, incorrect to see fascist development in Germany only in the growth of social fascism. There is also (as the Landtag elections in industrial Saxony and in agrarian Mecklenburg, and the communal elections in Coburg-Bavaria show) a great advance in the National-Socialist Party, which is openly and consciously fascist (an increase in votes of 100 to 150 per cent. in one year) and which is recruited chiefly from the petty bourgeoisie and (in connection with the chronic difficulties of coalition government, expressing the general crisis of parliamentarianism) there is also a definite revival in the activities of the various defence organisations, from the Wehrwolf to the Reichsbanner.

German fascism is advancing in three partially separated columns, each active in a different sphere. It would therefore be wrong to expect to find all the signs of fascism fully developed in one of them—the social-fascist column. It is true that in this article we are not dealing with German fascism in general, but only with social-fascism; still, we must point out its general connections which will give us a basis for the limits within which we may expect similarities to Italian fascism.

It may be objected that in such a broad conception of fascism, fascism loses its specific content, that the totality of these “three columns” is nothing more nor less than the bourgeois reaction, and that it is not worth while seeking fascist elements in each of them.

This alternative, put forward by the conciliators—the denial of social-fascism, or the obliteration of all differences within the bourgeois reaction, is false. There are a number of factors which are common to all forms of German fascism and which, taken together, differentiate fascism from other forms of bourgeois dictatorship. As distinct from a purely military dictatorship (which in recent times, it is true, tries to strengthen its position—and with a fair amount of success—by creating fascist support for itself) all forms of fascism are based upon broad mass organisation whose activities are contrasted with the failure of bourgeois parliamentarianism and which—otherwise the masses could not be won for fascism—use a certain “anti-capitalist” phraseology, and refrain from appearing openly as representatives of capital.

Fascism is differentiated from the terror exercised against the working class by a parliamentary democracy (a terror which in its outward manifestations may be just as brutal as fascist terror) in that it justifies its terrorist actions, not from the formal standpoint of the “will of the majority,” but by the particular weight of the interests it represents. To bourgeois democracy it opposes the “organic membership of society” by the co-operation of various group organisations—fascism does not deny class contradictions; it merely maintains that they can be overcome within the framework of “common interests.” In this way it seeks to organise the anger of the masses at the bankruptcy of parliamentarianism in a manner which involves no danger to the rule of finance capital, and, when bourgeois democracy fails, tries to utilise that anger for the maintenance of bourgeois class rule in other forms. For the working class movement, the particular danger of fascism lies in its use of demagogy as well as terror, lies in the fact that it awakens among the workers the illusion that the dictatorship which it is anxious to establish, or has succeeded in establishing, is not the rule of their class enemy, but the result of their own work.
In this sense, of course, fascism is the general tendency of the development of bourgeois democracy in the period of capitalist decline. The growth of internal and external contradictions necessarily leads to an intensification of the white terror against the proletariat and also makes the parliamentary democratic form of bourgeois class rule less and less useful for finance capital. On the other hand the increasing difficulties and working class revolt which is drawing more workers into the struggle, necessitate the creation of bases of support within the working class, support which is won by the corruption of the labour aristocracy. The smaller this aristocracy becomes, because of growing economic difficulties, the closer, by way of compensation, grows its connection with finance capital. For this limited group to fulfil its duty of binding the greatest possible number of workers to the policy of finance capital, it must convince them that the tendencies in the development of imperialism — increasing monopolisation and trustification, State capitalism, the enrolment of members of the labour aristocracy in the executive organs of bourgeois class rule — are means of overcoming "the bad side of capitalism." This is but a paraphrase of the fascist ideal of the "organic state," of "structural democracy." The organisational concentration of the national economy by means of State capitalism in the interests of finance capital appears as the "supersession of private capitalism," and the use of degenerate working class elements to suppress their class comrades as the "participation of the working class in the management of industry." These basic elements of fascist ideology will, in the conditions of the third period, develop to a greater or lesser degree all over the imperialist world. It is therefore of the greatest importance to deal with the growth of general fascist tendencies in those organisations where this course of development is in most glaring contradiction to their past history and where, consequently, the new state of affairs is most sharply expressed.

II.

The objective social basis of reformism generally is the corruption of the labour aristocracy (which in certain circumstances may be very great and in some countries even form the majority of the working class) rendered possible by the imperialist extra-profits of the bourgeoisie. The question then arises: does the development of reformism to social-fascism correspond to a change in its social basis, to a change in the type of corruption. This is true of countries such as Germany. Before the war, and during the first period of prosperity after inflation, the skilled groups of workers were fairly well off, and reformism rested on the basis of this prosperous position of certain, generally highly qualified crafts, but in the period of capitalist rationalisation this state of affairs has undergone change. The special position of these highly-qualified workers was lost as a result of the growing mechanisation of labour. Statistics show a lessening in the gap between the wages of skilled and the wages of unskilled workers, despite the growing wage differentiation within the working class as a whole (cf. the statements on pages 167 et seq. in the report of the C.C. of the C.P.G. to the Twelfth Berlin Congress). The explanation of this apparent contradiction is not far to seek: capitalist rationalisation draws large masses of badly paid workers (practically women and juveniles) into the process of production and depresses the wages of the working masses, while on the other hand it creates well-paid positions for a limited group, a group which by no means coincides with the skilled working class, but includes also semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Individual workers who either act as foremen, or whose rate of work determines that of their fellow workers, must, in rationalised undertakings working on the transmission belt system, be urged to more intense activity in the interests of capital by means of higher wages, wage premiums, etc.

This gives rise to a new and quite peculiar anti-proletarian attitude on the part of the new labour aristocracy. The compositor or mechanic who in former times had a good position by virtue of his professional knowledge, thought himself to be somewhat better than other workers, he had more to lose than his chains and, in his principles, he supported capitalist society. In accordance with this attitude he was a reformist and Bernstein, who proclaimed the peaceful development of capi-
talism into Socialism, was his prophet. Beyond that, however, this labour aristocrat was united with all his professional colleagues as against the employer, fought with them for better conditions of labour and therefore had a certain understanding (even were it only expressed in benevolent neutrality) for the struggles of other groups of workers against their exploiters. To-day, the man who has first place at the transmission belt and who receives higher wages in payment for driving his fellow workers to quicker work (from which they gain not even a temporary advantage) this man is an enemy to them. The old sort of labour aristocrat may have had no proletarian class-consciousness, but only a craft outlook, but the labour aristocrat of to-day is bound by no tie whatever to his colleagues; he is bound by many ties to the employer by whom he is bribed. His object is not common advance—even of his craft alone—but personal advance, if possible, out of the community of factory workers, among whom he is an outlaw, and into the category of “employees,” each one of whom, he thinks, “carries in his knapsack the marshal’s stuff” of advancement into the bourgeoisie.

It is not only in the factory that this movement of the new labour aristocracy out of its own class and into the middle class is taking place. The number of posts which they can fill is limited; but the machine of bourgeois oppression is growing greater. Thousands of social-democratic workers are getting employment in State and local government bodies, the “fortresses of the working class,” in the police, etc. A few reach to the height of minister or police president, the highest levels of the pyramid, and are accepted in the society of the bourgeoisie. They are only few, but why shouldn’t a parish councillor one day become a great minister? Those who have climbed to this height influence the way of thought of the whole. The desire for personal social advancement assumes the form of an effort to obtain positions in the State or party machine, and in the mass organisations which are closely associated with the State and in the consciousness of the reformist official there are many bridges leading to the State machine). A wide labour bureaucracy arises, rooted below in the mass organisations and reaching above to all branches of the State apparatus; this bureaucracy serves as an excellent means of imposing the will of finance capital on the workers influenced by the reformists. However illusionary the experiments in industrial democracy may be from the point of view of changing the order of society, they have the very real effect of employing thousands of workers (there are over 40,000 in the co-operatives alone, besides the “labour bank” and various industrial undertakings) in conditions which are better than those of the mass of the workers, provided, of course, that they show themselves willing tools of their party, that is, actually, of finance capital. The greater that social-democratic influence in local bodies grows, the more do local undertakings, employing their thousands of workers, assume a social-democratic character.

The character of German social-fascism is determined by this new type of corrupted labour aristocrat. Since the economic situation of German capitalism no longer allows for the corruption of whole craft groups to a greater or lesser degree, groups including millions of German workers, only a limited number can be bribed with the decreased extra-profits; but they are corrupted more intensively. This state of affairs develops its own ideology, in which personal advance into the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie, and the hope of future advance into the bourgeoisie, is considered as the advance of the whole class, and these in their turn try to bind the workers to the bourgeoisie. Faced with their peculiar position in the rationalised process of production, faced with the fact that the general position of German capitalism does not permit of concessions even to craft groups, they deliberately repudiate every idea of class struggle, even in its craft forms, replacing it by the conscious glorification of common interests, both economic and political. This is just what fascism does, and the further this process develops, the more do the organisations involved assume a typically fascist character.

III.

As we stated at the beginning, we cannot expect to find all the elements of fascist ideology developed to an equal degree in German
social-democracy. After the Magdeburg Congress their presence may all be affirmed, but only in unequal degrees and with unequal definiteness. The element most prominently developed in German social-democracy is the fascist economic programme. It is clearer and stronger than in the openly fascist organisations, whose economic ideas are exhausted in misty thoughts about the “expropriation of the banking and financial masters.” Social-democracy has this advantage over other fascist tendencies in Germany that, with regard to carrying on anti-capitalist demagogy, by which fascism hopes to win the workers, it was in its origins a really anti-capitalist organisation. It was not necessary to work out a new form of social-demagogy; it was enough to develop the old ideology (in doing which even the appearance of continuity was as far as possible maintained, the better to deceive the workers) in such a way that it could be used to deceive the masses. Two factors are essential to every fascist ideology as far as its industrial programme is concerned (and this is true internationally); firstly, a struggle against one section of the capitalists; this, because it is deliberately aimed at only one section is always a sham fight); and secondly, the putting forward of demands which—apparently directed against the capitalists—are actually serving the interests of finance capital.

In Germany, the first condition is fulfilled in most obvious fashion by the National Socialists who adopt anti-semitic slogans and differentiate between “creative” (i.e., industrial capital) and “parasitic” (i.e., bank and trading capital), the latter alone being responsible for the bad sides of capitalism. This primitive differentiation is enough to win over the petty bourgeoisie—this being the specific task of the declared fascists—who do, in fact, feel the weight of bank and trading capital. Social-democracy, which has to face a working class trained for many years in the ideas of Socialism, could do little with such slogans. It is the industrial capitalist whom the worker feels to be his natural enemy; and the old appeal of social-democratic coalition policy to bank and trading capitalists, who were regarded as “reasonable,” as opposed to “scoundrelly” capitalists and who (or whose democratic party) were for a time the chief object of social-democratic coalition policy, has become pointless because of the monopolist development of German capitalism, because of the practically complete amalgamation of banking and industrial capital. In its agitation now, reformism simply draws a distribution between “reasonable” and “unreasonable” capitalists, according to their readiness to enter into coalition with the social-democrats, to support a “democratic-pacifist” government policy, and to use more refined methods of arbitration as the exploitation of labour power increases. The special capacity of social-democracy for government, its appropriateness for carrying out a fascist economic policy in Germany, lies in avoiding discrimination against certain dominant sections of the bourgeoisie. Even the large landowners who were long described as wicked capitalists in social-democratic agitation, and who are not quite in favour to-day because of their reluctance to enter into a coalition, were reorganised as vital components of the national economy, in the agrarian programme of the 1927 Kiel S.D. Congress, and the “community” must preserve the vitality of that economy. Recently (June, 1929) the social-democratic members of Parliament have been very actively trying, in co-operation with the national Junker members, to establish a State monopoly in grain trading. According to social-democratic ideology to-day, the capitalist may be fought with the weapon of the “community” only when he does not submit to “common interests,” i.e., to the will of finance capital. In his speech at the Hamburg T.U. Congress, and in his memorandum submitted to the Congress, Naphtali declared that the replacement of free competition by monopolist organisation was proof that “capitalism can be bent before it is ripe enough to be broken,” and that “the advance of monopolist capitalism indicated the victory of Socialist tendencies over this ‘bent’ capitalism.”

This brings us right up against the positive side of the fascist economic programme, the side which, as stated earlier, is most clearly expressed in the S.D.P. — that of economic democracy. The Hamburg T.U. Congress in September,
1928, expressed these ideas definitely (cf. article in Unter dem Banner des Marxismus, German edition, Vol. III, No. 2. Industrial Peace and Economic Democracy.1. The fundamental idea was expressed by Nölting in a speech at the Frankfurt T.U. Delegate Conference on 1 November, 1928:

"The worker must be placed where industry is really carried on, that is, on the management of monopolies. The introduction of workers into the control of monopoly management is the meaning of economic democracy. This change sometimes takes place without any activity on the part of the State, which assumes the right of control and supervision. The worker has a part in this control because in a democracy the popular will is decisive. What is new about it is this—that representatives of workers’ organisations should be placed by the State in part control of monopoly organisations."

In both cases the road to the “worker’s voice in the control of industry” lies over the bourgeois state, and, quite logically, Tarnov said at the Hamburg Congress that making economic democracy their central slogan would bind the trade unions “still more closely to the democratic state.” The other aspect of this ideology is the reunification of the “obsolete” method of class struggle against the employer, its place being taken by a “worker’s voice” on the supervisory council, guaranteed by the bourgeois state. This was expressed, in a primitive but objective fashion, by a delegate to the Hamburg Congress, who said: “The class struggle has moved from the street to the negotiating room.”

The social-fascist theory of economic democracy is the modern form, corresponding to the present situation of finance capital, of the old revisionist thesis of “development into Socialism.” The reformists continually emphasise—to avoid the reproach of having surrendered their Socialist aims—that their economic democracy is not in contradiction to Socialism, but is “Socialism in the process of becoming.” This argument, seized upon eagerly by the left, only makes the betrayal of Socialism more obvious. For economic democracy, as preached by the reformists, is nothing but the developing process of the monopolisation of industry, plus the growing importance of State capitalism in monopoly capitalism, plus the emolument of the labour aristocracy into the bourgeois machine of exploitation and oppression. These are not figments of the imagination, but the real tendencies in the development of German, as of every other, imperialism. The reformists mean something very real by economic democracy. The treachery lies in this, that the strengthening of the bourgeois apparatus of oppression and the increasing enrolment of workers, estranged from their class, to fight their own class comrades, is put forward as an achievement. To “retain the aims of Socialism” seems therefore to mean the proclamation of capitalism to-day as “Socialism in process of becoming,” and the tendencies in its development as Socialism already achieved. These ideas were expressed in the resolution passed by the Hamburg Congress, which states:

“The democratisation of economy leads to Socialism... The change in the economic system is not an aim of the distant future, but a process which is developing from day to day. The democratisation of economy means the gradual elimination of the rule based on the possession of capital and the transformation of the leading economic bodies from bodies serving the interests of capital to those serving the community. The democratisation of economy takes place gradually with the structural changes in capitalism which are becoming increasingly obvious. There is no doubt that development is leading from capitalist private industry to organised monopoly capitalism.”

This programme is differentiated from any fascist declaration only by its terminology, only by the fact that, in deference to a working class brought up in Socialist traditions, a Socialist label is stuck on to the bottle. The contents are unadulterated fascism: the elimination of individual interests by means of greater organisation (individual interests being called “capitalist interests” by both reformists and fascists, because for them capitalism as a whole is not capitalism at all) in favour of the “interests of the community,” the State playing a leading part in the change. We cannot ask more of the social-
democrats, and it would be childish to base the recognition of the presence of social-fascism on the surrender of the word Socialism. For the bourgeoisie, the specific value of social-fascism consists in the fact that the fascist programme is preached with a Socialist phraseology, just as the specific value of the Hakenkreuzers (a fascist, anti-semitic organisation—Ed.) for the bourgeoisie (including its Jewish members) lies in their fascist programme preached with an anti-semitic phraseology. With the formula of economic democracy, German reformism, becoming social-fascism in the process, found the idea best adapted to its nature whereby to win over the largest possible number of workers to support its own desertion into the other class camp and the advancement of certain corrupted working class elements into the petty bourgeoisie, binding them, in this way, to the bourgeoisie. The consequence of this was drawn by Dittmann at the Magdeburg Congress in his speech on the defence question (a question also affected by these ideas, for they form the basis of social-chauvinism) when he said:

"We are no longer living under capitalism; we are living in the transition period to Socialism, economically, politically, socially."

And:

"In Germany we have ten times as many Socialist achievements to defend as they have in Russia."

Whence follows, naturally, the results of this defence, particularly against the Russians, so backward in Socialism. Whether this form of society, to be defended against the proletarian dictatorship and real Socialism, is called Socialism or corporate economy (as Italian fascism calls it) is merely a difference in the form of agitation.

IV.

While the union of reformist organisations with the machinery of oppression, and the ideology of economic democracy which expresses this union was being worked out in recent years, there seemed to be an important—and for international fascism a characteristic—sphere in which fundamental differences between fascist and reformist ideology were apparent: this was the conception of the State, which was invoked to establish order in industry and to enforce agreement between the classes. On one side the glorification of bourgeois democracy, on the other an assertion of its bankruptcy and the deliberate preaching of dictatorship as a higher State form; closely allied to this, fascism proclaimed the "sacred egoism" of one's own country as the highest rule of conduct in international affairs, while social-democracy indulged in pacifist phrasemongering. The differences were never so great as they seemed to be. Polish fascism and the military dictatorship in Jugo-Slavia, began their activities under the slogan of protecting and defending democracy, or of suspending it temporarily only in order to re-establish it more firmly later on. It was only during the course of the dictatorship that dictatorship was declared, more or less openly, to be the highest form of State organisation. Even in Italy, before the present state of affairs was reached, there were various stages in the exercise of constitutional rights and various corresponding ideas as to the "ideal" type of national state. The ideas at the first of these stages did not differ greatly from the demands of German democrats and social-democrats for a "strong leadership in democracy," and were anything but anti-parliamentary. The rattle of the sword, as recent years have shown, is but an occasional tactical manœuvre in fascist dictatorships as well as in democratic States; it is not the normal, which in both cases consists in the justification of armaments by an appeal to the necessities of "defending peace," "protecting the frontiers," etc.

If, in those countries where it is to a large extent based upon organising the petty bourgeoisie against the proletariat, fascism has developed an open anti-parliamentary and anti-pacifist ideology only very gradually, so that it is not complete even to-day—and in any case this development has occurred almost entirely after the seizure of power—it would be quite stupid to expect German social-fascism to fulfil its task of winning democratic and pacifist masses for war and dictatorship by publicly renouncing a democratic and pacifist ideology. Social-fascism's work on behalf of the bourgeoisie consists in trans-
forming this ideology in such a way that it can be used in the propaganda for a fascist dictatorship, and for this purpose such a renunciation would be the worst possible method. This is the real reason why the group concerned with the Socialist Monthly—which has for many years declared that parliamentary democracy is bankrupt, and has advocated a "structural democracy" based on economic corporations, after the style of fascist syndicates, joking maliciously about pacifist ideology and openly sympathising with Italian fascism—why this group, although leading trade unionists and prominent persons like Severing and Wissel belong to it, and although it has fairly correctly foretold social-democratic tactics on all internal matters, cannot guide the development of social-fascist theory, but can only influence it from outside. In an industrial country such as Germany, the task of social-democracy consists in preparing and organising the fascist dictatorship by spreading ideas—if possible "Marxist" ideas—calculated to mislead the greatest possible number of workers, and not in openly and honestly expressing its treachery to the old principles. The Magdeburg S.D. Party Congress was particularly significant because it took a definite step in guiding this democratic pacifist ideology into fascist channels. After German social-democracy had declared the rule of the bourgeoisie to be "Socialism in process of becoming," it was only right and proper that the social-democrats should solemnly announce their duty of defending that rule against all internal and external foes.

The real idea behind the replacement of bourgeois democracy by fascist dictatorship was expressed by Wels (S.D. leader) in a famous speech, in which he said that the dictatorship is at first established in the interests of a later "re-establishment of democracy," and that the parliamentary crisis is recognised to be only of a temporary character.

Actually, it is clear that the longer the fascist dictatorship lasts, the smaller becomes the possibility of a return to democracy, and that once in the stream of "managing the dictatorship" (which has its own internal logic, wherein one measure gives rise to another) the theory to justify this management will be found and based on "Marxist" principles (if this word has not been entirely discarded, as its spirit was long ago), as that the social-fascist dictatorship is the highest form of democracy, from which it would be senseless to return to lower forms. It is significant of the real spirit of the entire social-democracy that the lefts accepted Wels' famous statement not in a critical manner, but as an indication of the party's growing militancy.

Should the social-fascist dictatorship be established in Germany, it will differ from the Italian brand in its efforts to use with greater care extraordinary force, which is a part of every fascist dictatorship and which is employed both in the form of "emergency measures" (which, nominally only temporary, outlive their legal limits) and in the form of the employment of "private" and "irresponsible" force exercised by organisations formally unconnected with the State. Since German fascism finds its chief support in social-democracy (as was to be expected from the structure of the country) which must have an ideology to cling to, State emergency measures will be the dominating form. Severing's speech in the Reichstag on June 27th indicated this. After the rejection of the law for the protection of the republic, he declared that the Government was prepared to use the emergency clause 48 of the Reich constitution (a year ago the social-democrats protested against the use of the same clause to bridge over certain legal gaps). The actions of the Coalition Government are very greatly accelerating the development of the required ideology. There is also a good deal of preparation for the use of extra-legal force in the activities of the Reichsbanner, which will certainly be extended as the difficulties of the German bourgeoisie come to a head. The dominant feature (as is to be expected considering social-democracy's special function) is the tendency to make social-fascist organisations and their terrorist acts a part of the mechanism of the State apparatus. At the last conference of the leaders of the Reichsbanner, where the May Day struggles were discussed, the question of establishing connections between that organisation and the Reichswehr and Schutzpolizei (semi-military
official bodies) was the principal item considered. It was stated there that they were only a hair’s-breadth off from doing so; this may be an exaggeration in actual fact, but it was an exaggeration designed to facilitate the ideologic and organisational preparation of social-fascist terrorist groups for the coming class struggles.

Wels—as any avowed fascist might have done—referred to the strength of the reformist organisations as a special justification of reformism’s claim to exercise the fascist dictatorship in Germany. Actually, reliance on mass organisations outside the State apparatus is part of the nature of any fascist dictatorship, and gives it (from the bourgeoisie’s standpoint) an advantage over the traditional forms of military dictatorship. Ideological and organisational unity and the exclusion or violent elimination of any anti-fascist tendency, are the essential conditions for the usefulness of an organisation as a pillar of fascist dictatorship. The greatest practical advance of German social-fascism at the present time is probably the progress of the trade unions and other mass organisations controlled by the reformists, along this road. It is impossible to enter into all the details of the reformist offensive directed to splitting all these bodies. Since we are dealing mainly with the ideology of German fascism, we must be content with pointing out that the measures responsible for splits and exclusions have undergone change in the last year or two. Previously Communists were excluded because they “brought politics into the trade unions” by expressing their ideas, and violated the “neutrality” of the nominally unpolitical mass organisations; now “neutrality” has disappeared even from the official statements. The connections of these bodies with the “trade union party” are openly proclaimed and Communists are excluded, not because they introduce politics, but because they carry on a definite, anti-social democratic policy and fight against the “trade union party.”

At Hamburg Tarnov pointed out that the programme of economic democracy would necessarily bind the unions more closely than ever before to the party working for that programme in the State. Objectively, these ties are nothing new, but their open admission indicates great progress in the development of these organisations towards fascism, because it prepares the minds of the members for the part which, according to Wels, these bodies will play in the coming dictatorship. The Reichsbanner bore typically fascist features from its very foundation, but the May Days, for the first time for many years, witnessed the trade unions acting as promoters and exponents, and finally as defenders of the white terror used against the working class (they justified the prohibition of the demonstration as necessary to “protect their meetings,” and declared that “the interests of the community must be protected from a minority of disturbers of the peace”). This fact both implicitly and explicitly affirms the social-fascist character of their actions.

The political objection of social-fascist arming, and the chief purpose for which the bourgeoisie requires this social-fascist development, is the coming imperialist war. In this sphere Magdeburg showed great progress in the development of fascism. So much has been said and written about the social-democratic programme of defence that little further is necessary. Nor, after what has been said above, need we explain the necessity (from the standpoint of the special functions of social-fascism) of coupling pacifist phrases with the imperialist reality and why this in no way prejudices the fascist character of the programme. Its fascist character is, on the contrary, intensified by the “concessions” made immediately before the Congress, to the critics within the party. The original statement on the necessity for an army (and therefore of the coming war) stated that, in view of the “fascist and imperialist powers” threatening the German republic with counter-revolutionary intervention and new wars (according to Hermann Müller’s thesis submitted to the Congress there is no such thing as German imperialism) a defensive force was necessary “to protect the self-determination of its (the German republic’s) people,” while the text finally adopted runs: “To protect their neutrality and the political, economic and social achievements of the working class.”

Externally, this seems to indicate a weakening of the avowedly nationalist ideology (the German people’s right to self-determination),
actually it is a further development of typical social-fascist ideology, which developed, not by simply adopting nationalist phrases, but by basing and justifying dictatorship and war on the special interests of the working class. In the coming war the question will be not so much of making propaganda for the war, as of having at the Government's disposal organisations to defeat the revolutionary proletariat and to maintain the war industries, Levi, a “left winger,” in his pamphlet on the subject, expressly emphasised the particular capacity of the working class to further a war “in its own interests,” because of their control of military supplies and their strong organisation. In thus planning the future rôle of the organisation (in which work left and right share) German social-fascism is carrying out the main object of its development. If the organisations are to be maintained as an effective force, their fascist work must be based upon “the interests of labour.” The idea of the nation is not surrendered, but sharply underlined by laying emphasis on the special interests of the working class in the war conducted by and for the bourgeoisie. This assures the bourgeoisie of organisational support from among its one real enemy, the working class.

Magdeburg brought the ideological development of German social-fascism to a certain provisional conclusion. In its counter-revolutionary activities social-democracy will cast off the last “shackles” of its past—and also thousands of workers which it has misled in the past—and, by virtue of its position, will become the strongest counter-revolutionary force in the country, attracting to itself the labour aristocracy and numerous petty bourgeois elements. Every step on the road to social-fascism means accelerating and extending the next steps, as it affects the social structure of the party, repulsing workers and attracting the petty bourgeoisie. If German social-fascism is to be useful to the bourgeoisie it had necessarily to develop out of a “proletarian” ideology, but every step in this development takes it further from the starting point. Democracy and pacifism, two years ago important planks in reformist propaganda had, at Magdeburg, changed from slogans of action (or at least things to be defended) into petty beautiful “distant objects” to assure which, for the time being, war and dictatorship must be accepted as part price of the bargain.

The new elements that have come into the party will start with the “provisional” justification of war and dictatorship and will, in practice, reach their ideological justification, will reach a hundred per cent. fascism (which the leaders have done long ago). Magdeburg clearly announced the participation of German social-democracy in the anti-Soviet war. While Breitscheid, referring to the May struggles, talked of the “impermissible interference” of the Soviet Government in German home affairs, Wels declared German capitalism to be a higher form of Socialism than that in Russia, and Crispien referred clearly enough to the necessity, in the end, of intervention.

The campaign for the imperialist war of intervention against the Soviet Union, together with the greater use of the State machine in the class struggles during the autumn and winter, will bring with it the next great steps in the development of social-fascism.