HOW WARSAW FELL

On October 2nd at 8 p.m. Warsaw fell after 63 days, after the most heroic resistance and after one of the most desperate battles of this war.

In the face of such great suffering and sacrifices, the whole world paid tribute to the Polish capital. Speaking on behalf of Great Britain, Mr. Churchill said in the House of Commons—October 5th, 1944—"I am sure that I am expressing the feelings of the House as well as of the Government, in paying tribute to the heroic stand of the Polish Home Army and the civilian population at Warsaw. Their resistance to overwhelming odds, under inconceivable conditions of hardship, came to an end on October 2nd after a fight which has lasted sixty-three days...." "In the battle for Warsaw, terrible damage has been inflicted upon that noble City, and its heroic population has undergone suffering and privation unsurpassed even among the miseries of this war...." "At such a moment, I wish to express our respect for all those Poles who fell and suffered at Warsaw and our sympathy with the Polish nation in this very grievous loss...." "When the final Allied victory is achieved, the epic of Warsaw will not be forgotten. It will remain a deathless memory for Poland and for the friends of freedom all over the world."

Into the mourning and the tributes to Warsaw paid by the whole freedom-loving world there was flung a jarring note. Reproaches, accusations and slanders were thrown at Warsaw and her gallant defenders.

We owe it to the memory of those who fell in the defence of Warsaw to refute these slanders and accusations and to place on record the truth about the Warsaw rising.

Was the Rising Premature?

During the last few days of July, Warsaw heard the sound of Russian guns coming from the Praga side of the Vistula. The Germans were seized with panic. They began evacuating German civilians and German civil authorities, leaving in the city only the army and the Gestapo. German papers did not appear. The German Radio closed down. On the 31st July, the Soviet armies approached the gates of Praga and the German army withdrew to the left bank of the Vistula.

Everything seemed to indicate that the Red Army would enter Warsaw in the immediate future. This conviction prevailed not only in Warsaw but all over the world. The London "Times" of August 1st, wrote: "Thus the first of the martyred cities of Europe to suffer the horrors of German air bombardment and National Socialist rule is also the first to see deliverance at hand." The Soviet official organ, "War and Working-Class" of July similarly forecast that Warsaw would be the first liberated city among the capitals of Eastern Europe. Most important of all Marshal Stalin, in his conversations with the Polish Prime Minister Mikolajczyk on August 2nd expressed the conviction that the Red Army would occupy Warsaw on August 6th.

During the last few days of July Warsaw experienced an increased wave of terror, the usual prelude to a German withdrawal. Once again the population of Warsaw had to face not only mass executions, murdering of prisoners and the destruction of the city, but also the threat that the whole male population would be deported for enforced fortification work.

There was no alternative but to defend themselves.

As the Germans began to withdraw, the Polish Underground Movement began to come out into the open, completely in the suburb of Praga and partially in the rest of Warsaw. In Praga the Underground Administration began to function openly; the Political Parties revealed themselves and the Polish Underground Press was published and distributed openly. At that moment, without any warning, the Germans returned to Praga.

During the whole of this time the Red Army gunfire had been heard continuously.

Under these circumstances the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Home Army, acting in consultation with the Government's Delegate—the Vice-Premier in the country—and the Council of National Unity, decided to give the order for the rising which was timed for August 1st at 5 p.m. Apart from the circumstances set out above, the decision was influenced also by the following considerations. Warsaw is an important centre of communications, perhaps the most important in Central Eastern Europe. At the moment of the outbreak of the rising, the Germans were sending four Panzer divisions and heavy reinforcements to the front in order to stop the Russian advance. The rising
was aimed at paralysing Warsaw as a centre of communications and the seizure of the four important bridges across the Vistula was intended not only to stop German reinforcements, but also to facilitate the crossing of the river by the Red Army. These aims were achieved. In the first days of the rising, the bridges of the Vistula changed hands several times. Although later the Home Army was unable to hold them, they were under constant fire and the Germans could not use them. The best proof of this is the fact that the Germans had to build several pontoon bridges on the outskirts of the town and even those bridges were several times blown up by the Polish units.

The rising was not premature. No one could have foreseen that the Soviet Armies would meet with a temporary check near Warsaw which would force them to withdraw from already occupied positions and which to a very large degree would decide the fate of Warsaw.

Was Warsaw Called Upon to Rise?

From the very beginning of the rising, all Soviet sources, whether direct or indirect, took the line that neither Moscow nor its Polish Agencies had ever called upon Warsaw to rise. To quote one example of this attitude, Mr. Jendrychowski, of the so-called Polish Committee of Liberation stated at a Press conference held in Moscow, that there were appeals of a general character, but that there had never been appeals for an uprising of the city.

For the moment we will leave aside the fact that, since the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, Moscow had continuously called for a rising in Poland and that one of their principal accusations against the Polish Home Army and the Polish Underground Movement was that of alleged inactivity. We would only emphasise that, in particular in June and July of 1944, these appeals were intensified as never before. During this period, not less than thirteen appeals calling upon Warsaw to rise, were broadcast by the Moscow radio stations and in the last few days before the rising, the appeals were broadcast four times daily. From a mass of available material we are quoting only two such broadcasts.

On July 29th, that is two days before the outbreak of the rising, Moscow radio broadcast at 8.15 in Polish an appeal to Warsaw calling on the population to rise.

"For Warsaw," announced the Moscow broadcast, "the hour of action has already arrived." The Germans will no doubt try to defend themselves in Warsaw and add new destruction and more thousands of victims. Our houses and parks, our bridges and railway stations, our factories and public buildings will be turned into defences. They will expose the city to ruin and the inhabitants to death. They will try to take away all the most precious possessions and turn into dust all they have to leave behind. It is, therefore, a hundred times more necessary than ever to remember that in the flood of Hitlerite destruction all is lost that is not saved by active effort, that by direct active struggle in the streets of Warsaw, in its houses, factories and stores we not only hasten the moment of final liberation, but also save the Nation's property and the lives of our brothers."

The following day, on July 30th, the Soviet station Kosciuszkko broadcast four times (at 3 p.m., at 8.55 p.m., at 9.55 p.m. and at 11 p.m.) in Polish a call to take up arms against the Germans in Warsaw immediately. This is what they said:

"Warsaw quivers with gunfire. Soviet armies push ahead and are already nearing Praga. They come to liberate us. The Germans pushed out of Praga, will endeavour to defend themselves in Warsaw and they will try to destroy everything. In Białystok their work of destruction was carried on for six days. They have murdered thousands of our brothers. Let us do everything to prevent this from happening in Warsaw. People of Warsaw! Take up arms! Let all the population gather around the National Council and the Underground Army of Warsaw and attack the Germans. Prevent the Germans from destroying the buildings! Help the Red Army in crossing the Vistula! Inform and show the way! The million inhabitants of Warsaw must become a million soldiers who will fight for liberation and drive away the German invaders!"

Were Allied Governments, and particularly the Soviet Government, really not informed about the rising and was there really no contact between the Command of the Home Army and the Army of Marshal Rakosowski?

The rising in Warsaw was begun in accordance with the general instructions sent to the Home Army by the Polish Government as far back as September 1943. M. Mikołajczyk submitted these general instructions to Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt at the time and he understood that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had brought them to the knowledge of Moscow. In all areas East of Warsaw these instructions had been carried out on the initiative of the regional and local commanders of the Polish Home Army. Before leaving for Moscow in July 1944, M. Mikołajczyk told Mr. Churchill that the underground forces in Warsaw were ready to follow suit. Military action—he said—might be expected at any moment, although no special instructions had been recently sent from London.

Before the end of July full details were sent to Moscow of the plans for the rising in Warsaw. The date obviously could not be fixed since this depended upon the progress of the Russian advance.

On July 31st, on the eve of the outbreak of the rising in Warsaw, the Polish Prime Minister informed M. Molotow
during their first conversation in the Kremlin that this action was to be expected soon.

On August 2nd, the British authorities forwarded to Moscow a telegram from General Bor, dated August 1st, in which he said: "As the struggle for Warsaw has begun I ask you to bring immediate assistance from the Soviet side by means of an immediate thrust from the outside."

On August 3rd, M. Mikołajczyk officially informed Marshal Stalin that the battle of Warsaw had begun. He personally approached Marshal Stalin with the request that assistance should be given to fighting Warsaw and obtained definite promises from him that Soviet liaison officers were to be sent to Warsaw.

On August 5th, a Soviet captain Kalugin, who had arrived in Warsaw and approached the Polish Command, sent a telegram addressed to Marshal Stalin. This telegram was forwarded to Moscow through the British authorities on August 8th. This is the text of the telegram:

"Moscow—Marshal Comrade Stalin. 5.8.1944.

"I am in personal contact with the Commander of the Warsaw garrison who is leading the heroic partisan fight of the nation against Hitlerite bandits. After acquainting myself with the general military situation I came to the conclusion that in spite of the heroism of the Army and the entire Warsaw population there are still needs which, if made good, would permit a speedier victory over the common foe. These needs are: automatic arms, ammunition, grenades, anti-tank weapons.

"German air force is destroying the city and killing the civilian population. Direct artillery fire on Vistula bridges in the Warsaw area, on Saska Garden, Aleje Jerozolimskie, as these are main channels of movement for the German army."

"The enemy is bombarding Okęcie and Bielany airfields."

"The heroic population of Warsaw trusts that in a few hours' time you will give them armed support. Help me to get in touch with Marshal Rokossovsky.—

Capt. Kalugin, Warsaw."

On August 9th, the British authorities forwarded to Moscow the following telegram from General Bor addressed to Marshal Rokossovsky:

"Since 1.8.44 I have been fighting the Germans in Warsaw with the help of the whole population and all military organisations united within the Home Army, as well as such organisations as the Workers' Militia, People's Militia, Polish People's Army and others who have joined us in the fight. We are fighting a strenuous battle. The Germans, to ensure channels of retreat for their troops, are burning the town and exterminating the population. At present we are still withholding the pressure of a great force of German armoured units of infantry,—we already feel, however, the scarcity of ammunition and heavy arms. A speedy relief, therefore, by your armies, Marshal, is necessary. I have in my Headquarters a Soviet officer, Capt. Kalugin. Would you forward for his use wireless and technical particulars to enable him to communicate with you and thus make it possible for me to co-ordinate our action."

Nevertheless on the following day the TASS communiqué denied that the Poles had at any time approached the Red Army Command. The liaison officer, Capt. Kalugin, promised to intervene in Moscow and sent a wireless message via London. The reply from London was: "The text of Capt. Kalugin's message has been transmitted to Moscow. Unfortunately, no reply has been received."

After the conversation with Marshal Stalin M. Mikołajczyk sent, on August 10th, the following telegram to the Deputy Prime Minister, Government's Delegate in Poland:

"Stalin promised to supply all help to Warsaw and particularly arms dropped immediately from aircraft. In order to establish contact a Soviet liaison officer must be dropped carrying ciphers. Please telegraph at once through British Ambassador Moscow the way of communicating with the Commander of Warsaw garrison and where a Soviet liaison officer could be dropped, also the way of receiving him."

On the same day a cable was sent from London to Moscow through the British military mission there giving a list of the places suggested for the dropping of arms and ammunition and a list of targets for the Soviet air force round Warsaw.

On August 12th and 16th additional information, even more detailed, was sent, again through British official channels, to Moscow.

After his return from Moscow the Polish Prime Minister telegraphed twice to Marshal Stalin with a request to speed up the promised help for Warsaw.

As Soviet help was not forthcoming, General Bor, on August 14th, sent a further telegram to the Polish Government in London:

"When on August 3rd a captain of the Red Army, Kalugin, reported to me, he was immediately received and given a place in the Headquarters. The needs of the Home Army in armaments, as well as targets for bombing in Warsaw, have been transmitted to the Soviet Command through Capt. Kalugin. Moreover on August 8th I sent via London a wireless message to Marshal Rokossovsky proposing co-ordination of our action and asking help for Warsaw. Unfortunately, so far, the telegrams of both Capt. Kalugin and myself remain unanswered."

In spite of all these efforts on the part of the Poles, aided by the British, the Soviet Command, up to September 13th, 1944, never answered the Polish initiative for establishing operational contact.

It was only during the night of September 13th (to 14th), i.e., on the forty-fourth day of the battle of Warsaw, when many districts had already been lost and the garrison
decimated and exhausted that the Soviet Command began dropping help.

In consequence, General Bor’s communiqué of September 15th, said: “We are establishing closer contact with units of the Soviet Army in Praga.”

The communiqué of September 17th reported: “In the district of Czerniaków our units recently succeeded in establishing close contact with units of the Red Army which made it possible for us to obtain Soviet artillery support.” On the same day General Bor wired that operational contact between the Command of the Home Army and the Soviet Command of Marshal Rokossovsky’s front has been established.

On September 22nd, General Bor telegraphed: “Our units have established contact with Soviet units on the Western bank of the Vistula.”

The Warsaw radio stations broadcast on the same day that the Headquarters of the Home Army had made direct contact with the Soviet army and that permanent liaison service had been established. “Soviet radio telegraphists,” said the stations, “are already working at the Headquarters of the Home Army.”

General Bor’s communiqués of September 24th reported: “At present all three main areas of Polish resistance in Warsaw have Soviet liaison officers. Permanent wireless contact is being maintained with the Soviet Command on the Eastern bank of the Vistula. Our observers often direct Soviet artillery fire. The Soviet officer from the Inner City has sent a telegram and an information communiqué for transmission to Marshal Rokossovsky.”

On September 25th, General Bor cabled: “We are preparing ourselves to repel further attacks, coordinating targets for Soviet artillery barrage.”

Even when the situation became completely desperate, on the eve of collapse, General Bor considered it his duty loyally to inform the Soviet Command. This is his telegram to the Polish Government of September 28th: “Mokotów fell on September 27th. Further fight in two separate packets becomes impossible. We have informed Rokossovsky.”

In the light of the above quoted documents there is not the slightest doubt that operational contact with the Army of Marshal Rokossovsky was established and maintained from September 17th until the collapse of the rising.

**Was effective help given to Warsaw?**

From the very outbreak of the rising assistance to fighting Warsaw became a vital necessity. The assistance needed consisted of arms, ammunition, food and medical supplies, as well as the bombing of enemy airfields and other targets and the giving of fighter protection to the city. It is only natural that the Red Army, standing at the gates of Warsaw, was in the best position to give this sort of help regardless even of strategic considerations. Unfortunately, for six weeks, in spite of the above quoted promises of Marshal Stalin and all Polish efforts aimed at establishing operational contact with Marshal Rokossovsky, the Soviet authorities not only gave no help, but until September 18th actually refused the use of Soviet bases for a shuttle service, to the American air force, thus depriving it of any possibility of giving assistance to the Polish capital. This has been officially admitted by Mr. Eden in the British House of Commons.

Under these circumstances, when Soviet authorities gave no help and the Americans could not give any owing to lack of bases—the whole burden of helping Warsaw fell exclusively on the Royal Air Force. In spite of great technical difficulties and colossal sacrifices, British, South-African and Polish crews flew several times 1,750 miles from Italian bases. Under most difficult conditions these crews had to fly from Italy to Warsaw and back again, with no possibility of landing, refuelling, etc. at a time when Soviet bases were only a few miles from Warsaw. It is not surprising therefore that casualties were very high; 133 British and South-African airmen and 105 Polish airmen perished while bringing supplies to Warsaw.

Obviously, this help could not be effective. General Bor decided to increase the Polish forces in Warsaw. On August 14th he issued an order to the units of the Home Army outside Warsaw to fight their way into the capital and, if possible, to bring food. This was repeated on the following day in a joint appeal by the Vice-Premier, the Government’s Delegate, the Chairman of the Council of National Unity and General Bor as C.-in-C. of the Home Army.

Accordingly a number of units of the Home Army marched to the relief of the capital. Some of them reached Warsaw. But the majority of them were prevented from reaching the capital by the so-called Lublin Committee of National Liberation. As was stated by the official organ of the Polish Government in London, “The Polish Daily”: M. Zymierski, pretending to hold the role of C.-in-C. of all Polish Forces, on behalf of the Lublin Committee ordered the disarming and arrest of detachments and leaders of the underground army which were marching to help Warsaw. In the Lublin district a detachment of 700 soldiers going to the relief of Warsaw was dissolved. The Local Government’s Delegate and Generals Halka, Dabrowska and Marcin were arrested and temporarily held in Majdanek (previously the notorious German camp of death), but later were deported to the East with about 200 officers and men of the Home Army. The famous 27th infantry division from Volhynia which was tactically under the command of the Soviet army* and marched on Warsaw together with the Russians, was disarmed and dissolved in the Lublin.

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* The first division of the Polish Home Army which, following the order of the Polish Government, revealed itself to the Russians and established operational contact with the Soviet forces in Volhynia.
and Otwock regions, the operational territory of General Zymierski. Units of the Home Army from the Cracow district marching to the aid of Warsaw were also disarmed. The same applied to the 9th Infantry Division. M. Zymierski did not order the Polish airmen under his command to fly over Warsaw, fight the Germans, and drop supplies, at a time when 105 Polish airmen perished bringing help from Allied bases in Italy.

The above facts are not the only expression of the activities of Zymierski and the so-called Committee aiming at preventing aid for Warsaw. Apart from them, Zymierski was the only man who had the sad courage to defend the thesis of not giving help to the fighting capital, declaring that no help could be given to Warsaw since the Poles held no areas, not even blocks, but only buildings, and thus all arms dropped by the R.A.F. had fallen into the hands of the enemy. This is untrue, because as late as August 31st, Polish forces were in control of almost the whole of the city and it was the Germans who held only widely scattered islands. Up to September 2nd, the Polish Home Army held many districts, of which nine had an area of 1 to 2 square kilometres each. The attacks were in the centre of the town were situated along the line parallel to the Vistula, which should have facilitated supplies from the air. The best proof that airborne supplies were possible and effective is provided by the fact that British, American, South-African and Polish pilots, after a long flight, were able to find the particular areas and to drop arms and ammunition. Of these supplies, 80 per cent. reached the Home Army. Of the remaining 20 per cent. not all fell into the German hands. Part simply could not be found among the ruined houses.

When, finally, after six weeks of fighting, Soviet help came at a time when the Poles had already lost many districts and the area held by them had shrunk considerably—the same M. Zymierski eloquently praised the Soviet help, declaring all of a sudden that the Red Army, in view of its proximity, was in a better position to render aid than the Allies. Forgetting his previous arguments about help for Warsaw being impossible, he put forward a new thesis, namely that help had not been given so far only because of lack of information. M. Zymierski may not have known anything about Warsaw, but information—as we have stated above—was given by Captain Kalugin as far back as August 5th and by the Polish authorities on three occasions, August 10th, 12th and 16th. It is interesting to note that M. Zymierski found it necessary to attack British help, calling it negligible.

One more inconsistency of M. Zymierski should be noted. If after six weeks of fighting, when the Home Army had already been forced to withdraw from the Old City and several other points, it was still possible to drop arms and ammunition on a reduced Polish-held area—how much easier was it to do it in the first stage of the rising when nearly the whole of the city was in Polish hands?

Unfortunately, Soviet help came too late to save the city whose fate might have been quite different had assistance been given from the beginning.

The story put forward by the "Daily Worker" of September 6th and allegedly coming from Moscow, according to which General Bor actually refused Soviet aid, is too absurd to be dealt with.

**Were there several separate groups in Warsaw, fighting each on its own?**

It is clear from all the messages from Warsaw—Polish, British and Russian (Capt. Kalugin)—that from the beginning to the end the rising was under a single command, that of General Bor and his staff. No unco-ordinated action could have lasted two months under such circumstances as those in Warsaw. The rising began and found its tragic end in an orderly manner, which would have been impossible without a unified command and perfect co-ordination.

The same radio station of the so-called Lublin Committee, which repeated, after M. Zymierski, stories about the lack of co-ordination in Warsaw—spoke several times about the common, harmonious fight in Warsaw, declaring that the so-called People's Army fought together with the Home Army and giving it to be understood that the People's Army subordinated themselves to the Home Army.

How badly the Lublin Committee became involved in its own contradictions is also proved by the communiqué of the official Press agency of the Committee, the "Polpress" of September 28th, which declared that "the two rival Polish armies, one loyal to the London Government in exile and the other organized by the Polish Committee of National Liberation, have achieved operational unity and established a joint command in Warsaw in an effort to beat back the fierce German attacks."

It is worth noting that Lublin, speaking about the alleged lack of co-ordination in Warsaw, admitted that the only communication it had had with Warsaw was through a woman who swam across the Vistula. The whole development of the situation shows that Lublin had no information either from or about Warsaw. Even after the outbreak of the rising Lublin asserted that there was no rising at all and that the whole thing was a propagandist "canard" of the Polish Government. This certainly justifies the question asked by the London "Tribune" of October 6th:

"How could anybody believe that the Committee really represented the Polish people if a struggle of such magnitude could develop without the initiative and even the knowledge of the Committee? The question must have been asked by many: was not the Committee itself a 'propagandist canard'?"
Was General Bor in Warsaw?

A statement in the Polish paper "The Polish Daily" of October 3rd declared emphatically that General Bor had always been and was in Warsaw. The same is confirmed by the British airman who was in Warsaw throughout the rising and who on September 14th interviewed General Bor in his Warsaw Headquarters. The interview was conveyed by him to the London "Times" and published in Friday, September 15th. Moreover, General Bor granted an interview to the "Daily Telegraph," as well as to the American Press. The interview was published in the "Daily Telegraph" of September 21st. Soviet liaison officers, particularly Capt. Kalugin, stayed at General Bor's Warsaw Headquarters as it is borne out by the respective telegrams.

The overriding fact is that General Bor has been taken prisoner by the Germans in Warsaw. He shared the lot of his soldiers in captivity as he had shared their lot in the fighting.

Recently German sources disclosed details about General Bor's Warsaw Headquarters. This was situated first in a Warsaw cemetery, then transferred to the former Ghetto and later to the Old Town. When the Poles had to evacuate the Old Town, General Bor and his Staff made their way through sewers to the P.K.O. Building (Post Savings Office) in the inner city, which became their last headquarters. General Bor himself, as well as all members of his staff, were wounded during the fighting.

Capitulation?

Warsaw fell after sixty-three days of superhuman endeavour. At the moment of its fall practically the whole city was raised to the ground. Under the pressure of overwhelmingly superior German forces, one district fell after another. In the last few days the district of Mokotow fell in the south of Warsaw and the district of Zoliborz in the north. Only a small part of the inner city remained in the hands of the insurgents. Soldiers of the Home Army were fighting for nine weeks without rest and in the last days without food—there had never, during the whole period, been enough food—with no light or water, with no dressings for the wounded, the city population decimated by epidemics. There were very few who had not received a wound of some kind. The losses of the Home Army amounted to 80 per cent of their original strength and were even higher amongst the officers and medical staff. Mortality among the civilian population was enormous, owing to both enemy activity and the atrocious conditions of life, diseases and increasing famine. The last dispatches from Warsaw reported the distribution among the population of the very last remnants of food. Mortality was especially high among children. The city was covered with graves both of soldiers and civilians. Over burning Warsaw there was a smell of decaying corpses. It is unbelievable how, under such conditions, people could have made the supreme effort of holding out for 63 days.

In the middle of September Zymierski declared that the German defences round Warsaw were very powerful and that the capture of Warsaw was meeting with great difficulties. On September 30th the Chairman of the so-called Lublin committee, Osobka-Morawski, stated publicly that there was no possibility of capturing Warsaw by crossing the Vistula and by a frontal assault and that the capital could be occupied only as a result of a big encircling move.

As a result of the hopelessness of Warsaw's situation, as a result of the enormous losses in soldiers and civilians, the loss of all the districts and lack of means of defence, Warsaw fell on October 2nd at 8 p.m.

From everywhere in the world there came to Warsaw words of praise and tribute. The whole world shared in the mourning of the Polish Nation. From one source only did there come an avalanche of slander and lies from people calling themselves Poles and Polish patriots.

During the whole time of the work and struggle of the Polish underground movement those people spared the Poles no insults and accusations of inactivity. Both the five years long fight against the Germans and the active help given to the Red Army since March this year, have always been passed over in silence.

The accusation of inactivity was carried to such ludicrous limits that, even on August 3rd, that is on the third day of the Warsaw rising, about which the Committee knew nothing, the bulletin No. 88 of the so-called Union of Polish Patriots in Moscow, accused General Bor of inactivity, saying "The policy of waiting and playing for time practised by the reactionary Government will yield nothing good."

When the rising had already become famous all over the world, those people still attempted to prove that there was no rising at all and that all news about it was just propaganda of the Polish Government. We cannot tell whether this is just blind fury against anything genuine Polish or whether it is just one more proof of a complete severance from the country and ignorance of events taking place there, to say nothing of inability to influence those events.

When it became impossible either to pass the rising over in silence or to keep it secret, the so-called Patriots violently attacked General Bor and the Home Army for the very fact that they were fighting, saying either that the rising was premature or that it had not been co-ordinated, or again that it had been ordered for political purposes. Every sort of argument was now used as a justification for accusing of fighting, the very same people who up till then had been accused of not fighting.

In this connection the above-quoted article of the London "Tribune" says "This has been the first time that people who pose as champions of democracy have dared to describe as a crime a rising which even according to their own statements carried with it the whole people of Warsaw. The only 'crime' of the rising was apparently
that it demonstrated the real strength of the Polish underground movement led from London and it revealed the political impotence of the patriots’ committee.”

The Lublin Committee did not stop at these cynical accusations. They went so far as to threaten General Bor with court-martial.

This propaganda reached the climax of cynicism after the fall of Warsaw on the sixty-third day of the superhuman struggle. This time the same people who considered the rising a crime and its leaders criminals, had no scruples in calling the fall of the heroic city an act of treachery, although they had admitted themselves that Warsaw could not soon be occupied and although they had done their utmost to prevent help for Warsaw.

One of the last accusations says that the Home Army has been taken prisoner by the Germans instead of fighting their way through the German lines, crossing the Vistula and joining the Red Army. This accusation is the more ridiculous if it is considered that the powerful Red Army was not able during two months, to cross the Vistula, even while the Home Army held the western bank. In the last period of the rising the Home Army was cut off from the Vistula by superior German forces. It is the limit of absurdity to expect an exhausted army with almost no arms and ammunition and no armour at all to achieve that which a great and perfectly equipped Soviet Army has not been able to achieve even up to now. Even Soviet sources admit that only a small group of 28 persons from the Home Army was able to cross the river.

The very last accusation saying that the heroic defender of Warsaw, General Bor, who for sixty-three days led the valiant fight of the garrison and the population—was collaborating with the Germans, is at once so vile and so ridiculous that it requires no answer.

**BRITISH PRESS COMMENTS**

*The Economist,* October 7th, 1944.

“The Warsaw insurrection has clearly demonstrated the extent to which the Polish political parties in the Mikolajczyk government genuinely represent their people. It has also shown how little political influence is exercised by the Soviet-sponsored National Committee. The insurgents of Warsaw have sealed their allegiance to their Government with their own blood. The rising was not confined to small military groups. Broad masses of the people were drawn into it. The Committee, on the other hand, was so surprised by the rising that at first it even denied that fighting was taking place in Warsaw. It is surely obvious that these facts have one lesson and one only for the Russians. If they really want a genuine agreement with the Polish people, they must reconsider their attitude towards the Polish Government. But will this conclusion be drawn? During the rising a crisis among the Poles in London led to the dismissal of General Soankowski, the former C-in-C, notorious for his opposition to reconciliation with Russia. The Polish President at last acquiesced in the general’s departure. At the same time he has not pressed his former demand that the extreme Nationalists should enter M. Mikolajczyk’s Government. Thus on the Polish side, a serious effort has been made to remove the genuine obstacles to a policy of agreement with Russia. Yet to the surprise of everybody, these conciliatory steps met an unworthy and obstructive reply. Various members of the Soviet-sponsored Committee of Liberation chose the occasion to launch a vituperative attack upon the Polish Government and upon the newly-appointed Polish C-in-C., the Commander of the rising in Warsaw, General Bor-Komorowski. The General was again branded as a criminal and the Chairman of the Committee, M. Morawski, threatened him with court-martial. The leaders of the Committee have apparently taken no notice of the joint British and American statement in which both Allied Governments recognised General Bor’s Army as a combatant force protected by the Allies. Does the Soviet Government endorse these threats? If so, then the result may be that an Allied Power will violate those combatant rights which the enemy has been categorically warned to respect. There is only one conclusion to this melancholy history. Either the Russians will very rightly repudiate the despicable conduct of the Committee of Liberation, or their own record will be so compromised that a dangerous wedge may be driven into Allied unity. Germany is not yet finally defeated. The war may possibly drag on for another winter. Can any Allied Power be interested in risking a deep cleavage in the Allied camp in such critical days?”

“Time and Tide,” October 7th, 1944.

“What has brought confusion into the issue that has arisen is the Polish Committee of National Liberation—the Lublin Committee. This Committee, which utters disparagement in the most violent language and acts as though it had the right to speak for Poland, has no legitimate authority, and is unsupported by any considerable section of the Polish people. It has succeeded in spreading at least one false view, viz. that the Polish people are disunited. The Polish people are on the main issue singularly united, under their legitimate government and in support of General Bor. . . .” “The violence and the contradictions of the Committee’s pronouncements and the revelation of their treatment of Home Army Units have gone far to reveal the true nature and significance of this group whose policy is rejected by the Polish Nation as a whole.”


“If the assumption (which was held by every reasonable person that, as Mr. Churchill had said he hoped would happen, M. Mikolajczyk would soon be able to return to Moscow and settle outstanding differences with M. Stalin)
is not completely dispelled, reliance on it is gravely shaken, though the completely outrageous and apparently mendacious declarations of the head of the completely negligible Polish National Committee at Lublin with their despicable strictures on the man who has been fighting for Warsaw with a tenacity and courage of the defenders of Stalingrad, have not been echoed by the Soviet Press. But the puppet administration at Lublin enjoys the patronage of the Kremlin and before its spokesman launched his attack on General Bor, or Komorowski, the head of the Polish resistance movement and the successor of Sosnkowski as Commander-in-Chief, he had been received by Marshal Stalin and presumably been apprised of the Soviet leader's views. But it would be a mistake to believe the worst till facts compel that. Lublin's vilification—there is not the smallest ground for believing that General Bor has not been constantly in Warsaw, though his headquarters were no more likely to be in the battle zone than General Eisenhower's—is no consequence whatever as long as it represents Lublin only, not Moscow. But any sign that Russia was seriously backing this body against the Polish Government in London, which both ourselves and the United States recognise unreservedly, would create a situation not as between Poland and Russia but as between Russia and her Anglo-Saxon Allies which could only be deplored profoundly. All may yet end well, but Marshal Stalin should be under no illusion as to the depth and universality of feeling on the subject in this country at any rate. The desire for a close understanding with Russia was never stronger, but the demand for justice for Poland whose troops are fighting with courage and success beside our own in Italy and Holland, is at least as strong. Reconciliation between Moscow and M. Mikolajczyk's Government would relieve immediately the strain which recent events have unquestionably imposed on the relations between this country and Russia."

"Tribune," October 6th, 1944.

"The Polish Home Army has been recognised as a combatant force by the British and American Governments. The Soviet Government has refused to grant the same recognition. Suppose General Bor is taken prisoner by the Russians or by the men of Lublin and court-martialled. A first-rate conflict between the great Allied Powers is then certain to arise. Or, to put it more accurately, the conflict over Poland may then suddenly come to a most dangerous head.

"It is quite obvious that the Soviet Government is at present firmly decided to impose the Lublin Committee on Poland. Reconciliation with the Polish Government does not seem to play any important part in its plans for Poland.

"What can we say about this? In theory, it might, of course, well be that Poland should, in the years of the war, have changed her political outlook so much that she would prefer sovietisation and incorporation into Russia to any other regime, and to her independent existence. Should this be the case then it would—from our viewpoint—be a crime to oppose the sovietisation of Poland. We would then have to say to our own anti-soviet elements that would like to use the Polish case against Russia: "Hands off Poland."

"As things are, nothing seems to indicate any such change in the popular mood in Poland. The Warsaw rising has unmasked the political futility of the Lublin Committee. And neither the Russians nor their Polish proteges speak of any Soviet revolution in Poland. Stalin himself states over and over again his desire for "a strong, great and independent Poland," so great and strong as to include huge slices of German territory. The men of Lublin appeal to the Catholic Church and speak of the freedom for private capital in Poland in terms that would almost inspire any member of the Society of Individualists with envy."

"Foreign capital—it is said—will be received in Poland with open arms." This does not look like a programme of a Soviet revolution."

"No, the "Lublin Regime" is not a victory for socialism in Poland. It is the reduction of Poland to a vassal state. The chief attribute of a vassal state is to have its government, its command and its policy dictated from outside. Woe to those in the vassal state who want to maintain their independent views and policies. Any excuse that can be found will be good enough to against them. If they happen to lead a heroic rising that embarrasses the proteges of the great "Protecting" powers, they will be stigmatised as "criminals" and threatened with punishment."

"This seems to be the real issue. Please do not ask us to show enthusiasm for such policies and to applaud the men who make them.

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