Philosophy » Research Seminar in Post-Kantian European Philosophy, 2019/2020

04/03 4pm-5:45pm: Departmental Colloquium - Lidal Dror (Princeton)

Stephen Houlgate — Thu, 26 Feb 2026 08:58:15 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 04 Mar '26

Where: S0.18

What’s Wrong with ‘Conceptual Amelioration’?

Conceptual amelioration aims to make the world a more just place by ameliorating our concepts. I offer three arguments against this enterprise as currently practiced, to show how social philosophy aimed at producing social change can be better practiced. First, ameliorators often fail to provide plausible stories to vindicate their claims about how conceptual amelioration will unfold in our non-ideal world. Second, ameliorators’ focus on postulating meanings of ‘concepts’ risks distracting from important normative theorizing about justice. Third, ameliorators tend to overstate the importance of conceptual change for social change. The upshot is that, since such projects tend to be done poorly on their own terms and to evince excessively idealistic views of social change, we should reconsider how to engage in such projects. Drawing on these criticisms, I argue that conceptual amelioration should be conducted in service of ideology critique.

17/06 4pm-5:45pm: Departmental Colloquium - Paul Faulkner (Sheffield)

Stephen Houlgate — Mon, 13 Oct 2025 07:41:04 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 17 Jun '26

Where: S0.18

06/05 4pm-5:45pm: Departmental Colloquium - Lea Cantor (Cambridge)

Stephen Houlgate — Mon, 13 Oct 2025 07:40:36 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 06 May '26

Where: S0.18

21/01 4pm-5:45pm: Departmental Colloquium Daisy Dixon (Cardiff)

Stephen Houlgate — Mon, 13 Oct 2025 07:39:57 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 21 Jan '26

Where: S0.18

26/11 4pm-5:45pm: Departmental Colloquium - Jennifer Marušić (Edinburgh)

Stephen Houlgate — Mon, 13 Oct 2025 07:39:41 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 26 Nov '25

Where: S0.18

15/10 4pm-5:45pm: Departmental Colloquium - Adrian Alsmith (KCL)

Stephen Houlgate — Mon, 13 Oct 2025 07:38:21 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 15 Oct '25

Where: S0.18

11/06 4pm-5:45pm: Departmental Colloquium - Katharine Jenkins (Glasgow)

Stephen Houlgate — Tue, 22 Apr 2025 11:42:20 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 11 Jun '25

Where: S0.18

Week 8, 11 June - Katherine Jenkins (Glasgow): Ephemeral Women: On structural injustice and “being real”

This talk explores the ways in which structural injustice can give rise to a particular kind of vexed relationship with reality. I argue that members of the oppressed groups frequently find that the way the world seems to them is not reflected in collective practices (I focus here on the case of women in the face of widespread sexual violence), and that this experience is philosophically interesting. It can, I suggest, give rise to a felt sense of dislocation from the world, or of not being quite “real”, and I consider what this feeling might tell us about the metaphysics of gender under structural injustice. To help me explore this, I turn to fiction, specifically to not–quite–human feminised figures that are found in speculative fiction generally and in the film Blade Runner 2049 in particular. Whilst the film received some criticism for its portrayal of women, I argue that a feminist reading is available. On this reading, the film’s treatment of some of its feminised figures in fact captures important truths about the vexed relationship with reality that women come to have under structural injustice.

30/04 4pm-5:45pm: Departmental Colloquium - Kate Kirkpatrick (Oxford)

Stephen Houlgate — Tue, 22 Apr 2025 11:41:53 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 30 Apr '25

Where: S0.18

Week 2, 30 April - Kate Kirkpatrick (Oxford): The Myth of Recognition in The Second Sex

Since Eva Lundgren-Gothlin’s Sex and Existence and Nancy Bauer’s Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy, and Feminism, several philosophical interpreters of The Second Sex have shared the assumption that The Second Sex is Hegelian and that “the Hegel question”—namely, the debate about whether and to what extent Beauvoir’s account of woman as the Other is indebted to Hegel’s Master/Slave dialectic—is best answered by reading Beauvoir through “French Hegel”, and especially through the reading of Alexandre Kojève. This paper argues on historical, textual, and conceptual grounds that Beauvoir’s philosophical and political project in The Second Sex is better characterized as anti-Hegelian, sharing methodological and political commitments with the “turn to the concrete” and “French Marx”. Moreover, reading Beauvoir as a "French" Hegelian theorist of recognition overlooks her suspicion—a longstanding suspicion in French philosophy—of what she calls the "myth" of recognition itself.

21/05 4pm-5:45pm: Departmental Colloquium - Des Hogan (Princeton)

Stephen Houlgate — Mon, 24 Feb 2025 10:30:47 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 21 May '25

Where: S0.18

12/03 4pm-6pm: Colloquium - more info to follow

Stephen Houlgate — Thu, 16 Jan 2025 12:12:08 GMT

When: 4pm - 6pm, Wed, 12 Mar '25

Where: TBC

15/01 4pm-5:45pm: Departmental Colloquium - Saira Khan (Bristol)

Stephen Houlgate — Tue, 17 Sep 2024 11:16:54 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 15 Jan '25

Where: S0.18

20/11 4pm-5:45pm: Departmental Colloquium - Alex Voorhoeve (LSE)

Stephen Houlgate — Tue, 17 Sep 2024 11:16:32 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 20 Nov '24

Where: S0.18

09/10 5pm-6:45pm: Departmental Colloquium - Richard Pettigrew (Bristol)

Stephen Houlgate — Tue, 17 Sep 2024 11:16:07 GMT

When: 5pm - 6:45pm, Wed, 09 Oct '24

Where: S0.18

12/06 4pm-5:45pm: Philosophy Department Colloquium - Sarah Fine (Cambridge)

Stephen Houlgate — Mon, 10 Jun 2024 14:47:20 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 12 Jun '24

Where: S0.18

28/02 4pm-5:45pm: Philosophy Department Colloquium - Andrew Huddleston (Warwick)

Stephen Houlgate — Mon, 26 Feb 2024 12:04:55 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 28 Feb '24

Where: S0.18

Andrew Huddleston will present a paper on Nietzsche with the title: ‘What is This Thing Amor Fati?’.

17/01 4pm-5:45pm: Philosophy Department Colloquium - James Stazicker (KCL)

Stephen Houlgate — Mon, 15 Jan 2024 11:38:08 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 17 Jan '24

Where: S0.18

Dear Colleagues,

You are warmly invited to the first Departmental Colloquium of Term 2, which will take place at 4pm, Wednesday 17 January, Room S0.18.

Speaker: James Staziker (KCL)

False measures in the science and philosophy of consciousness

According to a widespread contemporary view of the mind, consciousness plays less of a role than was traditionally assumed: much of perception, decision and action occurs independently of our conscious experiences. I will criticise one central line of scientific support for this view, which measures consciousness by a subject’s capacity to identify and discriminate their experiences and actions. This style of measurement underestimates consciousness, and is not justified even if we grant that, necessarily, subjects are aware of their own conscious experiences. In search of a better measure, I look to philosophical accounts of the first-order, demonstrative thoughts most immediately related to conscious perception and action. But here we find the same problem: our best philosophical account individuates these thoughts by subjects’ capacity to discriminate their experiences. I trace the problem to broadly Fregean criteria for individuating thoughts, propose a related solution, and discuss implications for the science of consciousness.

Their next colloquium will take place on 28 February with Kate Kirkpatrick on ’The Myth of Recognition in The Second Sex’.

I hope to see you on Wednesday!

Best,

Andrew

22/11 4pm-5:45pm: Philosophy Department Colloquium - Joachim Aufderheide (KCL)

Stephen Houlgate — Thu, 16 Nov 2023 09:43:36 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 22 Nov '23

Where: S0.19

Abstract

All of Aristotle’s ethical writings allocate a central place to theoretical philosophical thinking (theōria). Noting the differences both in detail and in spirit, scholars have speculated about the treatises’ relative composition and Aristotle’s philosophical development more generally. However, any kind of judgement about the relationship between these texts requires an account of the place and role of theōria in each text taken on its own.

Setting aside the well-known account of the Nicomachean Ethics, I provide such an account for the Protrepticus, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Magna Moralia by considering two questions: 1) What is theōria? And 2) What role does theōria play in the ethical theory of each of these treatises? I argue that the treatises agree broadly on what theōria is. It belongs to theoretical philosophy and has to do with knowledge of causes, nature, and truth. The EE and the MM do not say much about the nature of theōria; the Protrepticus proves to be more informative because it aims at putting the contemplative way of life on the map — in contrast to a more practical approach, associated with Isocrates.

Of the three texts, the Protrepticus has most to say about the nature of theōria. It presents theōria as the contemplation of nature and truth, understood as knowledge of causes. I shall argue that this knowledge is purely theoretical, despite the argument in ch. 10 that theōria provides the greatest benefit for human beings. The other two treatises, operating with a similar conception of theōria, also maintain a firm distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge. However, both argue, in different ways, that we cannot fully understand practical virtue without considering theōria because the former is for the sake of the latter. In the course of explaining how each of the treatises subordinates practical to theoretical wisdom, I shall argue that the EE widens the remit of theoretical thinking to include some aspects of politics, whereas the MM operates with a less developed account that does not stress the importance of knowledge of causes.

01/05 4pm-5:45pm: Philosophy Department Colloquium - Andrew Stephenson (Southampton)

Stephen Houlgate — Mon, 17 Jul 2023 09:45:10 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 01 May '24

Where: TBC

01/11 4pm-5:45pm: Philosophy Department Colloquium - Robyn Waller (Sussex)

Stephen Houlgate — Mon, 17 Jul 2023 09:38:51 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 01 Nov '23

Where: TBC

11/10 4pm-5:45pm: Philosophy Department Colloquium - Rory Madden (UCL)

Stephen Houlgate — Mon, 17 Jul 2023 09:37:12 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 11 Oct '23

Where: TBC

10/05 4pm-5:45pm: CANCELLED: Philosophy Department Colloquium

Stephen Houlgate — Mon, 20 Mar 2023 09:52:05 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 10 May '23

Guest Speaker: Matt Boyle (Chicago)

08/03 4pm-5:45pm: WMA Talk

Stephen Houlgate — Tue, 21 Feb 2023 09:39:06 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 08 Mar '23

Where: S0.17

Guest Speaker: Giulia Martina’s (University of Tübingen)

Title: “Smelling Things”, which was co-written with Matt Nudds.

Giulia is a former Warwick PhD student and currently a post-doc at the University of Tübingen. She recently had a very nice paper on smell accepted in Mind and Language (https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12440).

08/02 4pm-5:45pm: Philosophy Department Colloquium

Stephen Houlgate — Thu, 02 Feb 2023 09:28:39 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 08 Feb '23

Where: S0.17/online

Speaker: Ian James Kidd (Nottingham)

Talk: Philosophical Misanthropy

Abstract: This paper rejects the standard model of misanthropy as hatred of humankind and offers an alternative. I propose that misanthropy be understood as a negative, critical verdict on the collective moral condition and performance of humankind. The misanthrope sees humankind as suffused with a variety of failings that are entrenched and ubiquitous. Such a verdict can be expressed - emotionally, and practically - in a range of stances, of which four are prominent across the Western, Indian, and Chinese traditions. I describe this pluralistic conception of misanthropy, explain these four misanthropic stances, and conclude by noting a predicament in which certain misanthropes can find themselves.

Best,

Andrew

18/01 4pm-5:45pm: Philosophy Department Colloquium

Stephen Houlgate — Wed, 11 Jan 2023 13:19:02 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 18 Jan '23

Where: S0.17/online

Guest Speaker: Robert Simpson (UCL)

Speaker: Robert Simpson (UCL)

Talk: The Chilling Effect and the Heating Effect

Abstract: Chilling Effects occur when a restriction on speech deters lawful speech, because of people’s uncertainty about the risks of incurring costs related to the restriction. I propose that, contrary to an orthodox account of this phenomenon, individual-level deterrence of speech sometimes intensifies discourse, at the group-level, rather than suppressing or subduing it. The deterrence of lawful speech may, somewhat counterintuitively, trigger a Heating Effect. This hypothesis offers us a promising (partial) explanation of the relentlessness of public debate on topics for which there is, simultaneously, evidence of people self-censoring, for fear of running afoul of speech restrictions. It also helps to identify and rectify two shortcomings in existing theoretical accounts of the Chilling Effect – in how they (i) explain the relation between individual- and group-level discursive phenomena, and (ii) characterize the distinctive objectionability of inadvertent speech deterrence.

23/11 4pm-5:45pm: Philosophy Department Colloquium

Stephen Houlgate — Thu, 17 Nov 2022 11:02:15 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 23 Nov '22

Where: S0.17/MS Teams

Guest Speaker: Béatrice Longuenesse (NYU)

Talk: 'Conflicting logics of the mind: Lessons from Kant and Freud.’

Professor Longuenesse is visiting the Department while giving the Isaiah Berlin lectures in Oxford. Her talk at Warwick will be the first lecture from the series.

02/11 4pm-5:45pm: Philosophy Department Colloquium

Stephen Houlgate — Wed, 26 Oct 2022 13:12:14 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 02 Nov '22

Where: S0.17/MS Teams

The Colloquium will be in-person, with an online option for those who can't be on campus. Please contact Andrew Cooper to receive the Link.

Speaker: Dirk Meyer (Oxford)

Talk: Dialectics in Chinese Philosophy As Seen From *Mìng xùn

Abstract: In this paper I shall look at the structure of dialectical argument in early China by reference to a recently obtained, fourth century manuscript text, titled *Mìng xùn. The text has a close counterpart in the received text Yì Zhōushū (Leftover Documents of Zhou). It is therefore generally understood as belonging the tradition of Shū (Documents), one of the core foundational classics of early China. I analyse the strategies bysq which meaning is produced in *Mìng xùn and suggest that the text develops the argument in a dialectic manner. In it, the philosophical premise seeks to test itself continuously to avoid becoming doctrine, and thus philosophically void. My choice of a Shū (Documents) text as an example of philosophically relevant meaning construction in early China challenges current methodology, which anachronistically considers zǐ-type literature (the Masters) as a disciplinary equivalent to Philosophy in ancient Greece. I argue that since philosophically relevant activities are a non-disciplinary praxis in early China, the articulations of this praxis are also not genre specific but found across the foundational literary texts of China.

12/10 4:15pm-6pm: Philosophy Department Colloquium

Stephen Houlgate — Fri, 07 Oct 2022 09:23:13 GMT

When: 4:15pm - 6pm, Wed, 12 Oct '22

Where: S0.17/MS Teams

The first Colloquium will take place at 4:15-6:00pm, Wednesday 12 October in S0.17. The meeting will be in-person, with an online option for those who can't be on campus Note the slightly adjusted start time of 4.15pm for the first Colloquium.

Speakers: Susana Monsó (UNED) & Eze Paez (Pompeu Fabra)

Talk: Why death still harms animals who only half get it: Ethical implications of the minimal concept of death (w/ Eze Paez)

Abstract: In a series of recent works (Monsó 2021; 2022; Monsó & Osuna-Mascaró 2021), I have defended the idea that the concept of death is not circumscribed to the human species, but rather that many animals can understand death, at least to some extent. The core of my argument is the idea that the ‘minimal concept of death’ (‘MCoD’) requires little cognitive complexity and that the cognition required for it is fairly common in the animal kingdom. However, the MCoD refers to the capacity that an animal has to understand what has happened when another has died, but does not indicate that the animal has any notion of her own personal mortality. As such, it is not immediately obvious what ethical implications follow from it. Indeed, accounts of the prudential badness of death that make it dependent on an individual’s concept of death hinge on the ethical importance of having an awareness of one’s own future death (e.g., Cigman 1981; Belshaw 2012, 2015; Rollin 2015), so the presence of an MCoD in animals might not alter the extent to which death is thought to directly harm animals.

In this talk (developed together with Eze Paez), I will show that, contrary to this first impression, the deintellectualised account of the concept of death that I have defended does modify how we ought to think about the badness of death for animals, even in those cases in which animals do not develop a notion of death as something that will inevitably befall them. I will develop this argument in three steps. First, I will summarise my theory regarding the distribution of the MCoD in nature. Second, I will give an overview of different accounts of the badness of death and how they relate to individuals’ understanding of death. Lastly, I will show how the truth of my analysis would entail that, even on the most stringent and demanding accounts, death harms many more animals than is often presupposed.

14/06 4pm-5:45pm: Philosophy Department Colloquium

Stephen Houlgate — Wed, 03 Aug 2022 12:22:46 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 14 Jun '23

Where: TBC

Guest Speaker: Ursula Coope (Oxford)

24/05 4pm-5:45pm: Philosophy Department Colloquium

Stephen Houlgate — Wed, 03 Aug 2022 12:21:56 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 24 May '23

Where: TBC

Guest Speaker: Joseph Schear (Oxford)

15/06 4pm-5:45pm: CANCELLED: Department of Philosophy Colloquium

Stephen Houlgate — Mon, 13 Jun 2022 07:48:26 GMT

When: 4pm - 5:45pm, Wed, 15 Jun '22

Guest Speaker: Rachael Wiseman (Liverpool)

Title: TBC