Philosophy » Past Equality and Welfare Events

23/09 3pm-4:30pm: Talk: Primitive Promises

Rachel Harrington — Sat, 08 Jun 2019 17:56:36 GMT

When: 3pm - 4:30pm, Mon, 23 Sept '19

Alessandro Salice (University College Cork) Primitive Promises

26/09-27/09: Self-knowledge and judgement in early modern philosophy

Rachel Harrington — Mon, 23 Sep 2019 07:43:04 GMT

When: Thu, 26 Sept - Fri, 27 Sept '19

Where: Cowling room (Social Sciences S2.77)

Programme

Thursday 26^th September

10.30 – 12.00

Maria Rosa Antognazza (KCL) ‘Knowledge and the first person’

12.00 – 1.30

Ioannis Evrigenis (Tufts) ‘The Fly on the axletree: Hobbes on self-knowledge and judgment’

2.30 – 4.00

Mark Philp (Warwick) ‘Godwin and Wollstonecraft: deliberation and self-knowledge '

4.30 – 6.00

Ursula Renz (Klagenfurt/Warwick) ‘Rousseau's solution to a Rousseauean problem’

7.15 Dinner (Radcliffe house)

Friday 27^th September

9.00 – 10.30

Mario De Caro (Roma Tre/Tufts) ‘Machiavelli's naturalism’

10.30 – 12.00

Guy Longworth (Warwick) ‘Descartes on how the mind is better known than the body’

12.00 – 1.15

Johannes Roessler (Warwick) ‘Judgement and self-understanding in Montaigne’s Essays’

04/10: Workshop on Expression and Self-Knowledge with Dorit Bar-On and Lucy Campbell

Rachel Harrington — Mon, 23 Sep 2019 07:47:11 GMT

When: Fri, 04 Oct '19

Expression and Self-knowledge

Warwick University, Friday 4^th October 2019

Humanities H0.03

Programme

11.00 – 12.30
Lucy Campbell (Warwick)
‘Self-knowledge: expression without expressivism’

12.30 – 2.00

Dorit Bar-On (University of Connecticut)
‘No ‘How’ Privileged Self-Knowledge’

3.00 – 4.30

Cristina Borgoni (Bayreuth University)

‘Primitive forms of first-person authority and expressive capacities’

07/10 2pm-4pm: WMA Graduate Research Seminar

Rachel Harrington — Sat, 19 Oct 2019 20:08:01 GMT

When: 2pm - 4pm, Mon, 07 Oct '19

Where: H4.22/4

Reading: Soteriou, M. 'Cartesian Reflections on the Autonomy of the Mental'. [pdf]

14/10 2pm-4pm: WMA Graduate Research Seminar

Rachel Harrington — Fri, 22 Nov 2019 09:47:39 GMT

When: 2pm - 4pm, Mon, 14 Oct '19

Where: H4.22/4.

Readings:

Week 2: Soteriou, M. 'Cartesian Reflections on the Autonomy of the Mental'. [ pdf]

Week 3: Eilan, N. 'On the Paradox of Gestalt Switches: Wittgenstein’s Response to Kohler'. [ pdf]

Week 5: Roessler, J. 'The Silence of Self-Knowledge'. [pdf]

Week 7: Campbell, J. 'Sense, Reference and Selective Attention' [pdf]

28/10 2pm-4pm: WMA Graduate Research Seminar

Rachel Harrington — Fri, 22 Nov 2019 09:47:39 GMT

When: 2pm - 4pm, Mon, 28 Oct '19

Where: H4.22/4.

Readings:

Week 2: Soteriou, M. 'Cartesian Reflections on the Autonomy of the Mental'. [ pdf]

Week 3: Eilan, N. 'On the Paradox of Gestalt Switches: Wittgenstein’s Response to Kohler'. [ pdf]

Week 5: Roessler, J. 'The Silence of Self-Knowledge'. [pdf]

Week 7: Campbell, J. 'Sense, Reference and Selective Attention' [pdf]

11/11 2pm-4pm: WMA Graduate Research Seminar

Rachel Harrington — Fri, 22 Nov 2019 09:47:39 GMT

When: 2pm - 4pm, Mon, 11 Nov '19

Where: H4.22/4.

Readings:

Week 2: Soteriou, M. 'Cartesian Reflections on the Autonomy of the Mental'. [ pdf]

Week 3: Eilan, N. 'On the Paradox of Gestalt Switches: Wittgenstein’s Response to Kohler'. [ pdf]

Week 5: Roessler, J. 'The Silence of Self-Knowledge'. [pdf]

Week 7: Campbell, J. 'Sense, Reference and Selective Attention' [pdf]

25/11 2pm-4pm: WMA graduate research seminar

Rachel Harrington — Fri, 22 Nov 2019 09:49:54 GMT

When: 2pm - 4pm, Mon, 25 Nov '19

Where: S2.64

28/11: London-Warwick Mind Forum: London

Rachel Harrington — Mon, 23 Sep 2019 15:19:27 GMT

When: Thu, 28 Nov '19

The forum will take place at LSE, London. The event is free and does not require registration.

CFA details and updates about the event will be published here: https://lwmindforum.wordpress.com/.

For further info, email: m.corrado@warwick.ac.uk

07/12 10am-08/12 11am: MindGrad 2019

Rachel Harrington — Sat, 30 Nov 2019 15:46:46 GMT

When: 10am, Sat, 07 Dec '19 - 11am, Sun, 08 Dec '19

Where: MS.03

MINDGRAD 2019: OURSELVES AND OTHERS

Warwick Graduate Conference in the Philosophy of Mind

7th-8th December 2019, University of Warwick (UK)

Invited speakers:
Dr Stina Bäckström - Södertörn University
Professor Matthew Boyle - University of Chicago
Professor Jane Heal - University of Cambridge
Dr Joel Smith - University of Manchester

08/01 3pm-5pm: WMA Graduate Research Seminar - Reading Michael Ayers' Knowing and Seeing

Rachel Harrington — Thu, 12 Dec 2019 16:46:35 GMT

When: 3pm - 5pm, Wed, 08 Jan '20

Where: S1.39

29/01 3pm-5pm: WMA Graduate Research Seminar - Reading Michael Ayers' Knowing and Seeing

Rachel Harrington — Thu, 12 Dec 2019 16:46:51 GMT

When: 3pm - 5pm, Wed, 29 Jan '20

Where: S1.39

19/02 4:10pm-6pm: CANCELLED: WMA Graduate Research Seminar - Reading Michael Ayers' Knowing and Seeing

Rachel Harrington — Wed, 25 Mar 2020 10:03:24 GMT

When: 4:10pm - 6pm, Wed, 19 Feb '20

Where: S1.50.

04/03 3pm-5pm: WMA Graduate Research Seminar - Reading Michael Ayers' Knowing and Seeing

Rachel Harrington — Thu, 12 Dec 2019 16:47:09 GMT

When: 3pm - 5pm, Wed, 04 Mar '20

Where: S1.39

09/03: Workshop with Richard Moore

Rachel Harrington — Thu, 14 Nov 2019 13:23:36 GMT

When: Mon, 09 Mar '20

Details TBC

18/03 3pm-5pm: CANCELLED: Bart Geurts: First saying, then believing

Rachel Harrington — Wed, 25 Mar 2020 10:05:13 GMT

When: 3pm - 5pm, Wed, 18 Mar '20

First saying, then believing: the pragmatic roots of folk psychology

Bart Geurts, Nijmegen

Cowling room, 18th March, 3 pm

24/03: POSTPONED / Enquiry Workshop

Rachel Harrington — Thu, 12 Mar 2020 14:17:15 GMT

When: Tue, 24 Mar '20

Where: S2.81

New date TBA

Speakers: Alex Geddes (Southampton); David Jenkins (Tel Aviv); Barney Walker (Warwick).

30/03: CANCELLED: On being a Believer: Workshop with David Hunter

Rachel Harrington — Wed, 25 Mar 2020 09:55:53 GMT

When: Mon, 30 Mar '20

Workshop with David Hunter on his forthcoming book On being a believer.

Further info TBA

Contact: Johannes Roessler

14/04-15/04: CANCELLED: Knowledge and Belief Conference

Rachel Harrington — Mon, 16 Mar 2020 10:10:40 GMT

When: Tue, 14 Apr - Wed, 15 Apr '20

Where: MS.04, Zeeman Building, University of Warwick

Day 1

12:15 Lunch and Coffee

13:00 Guy Longworth (Warwick)

14:30 Coffee

15:00 Eva Rafetseder (Stirling)

16:30 Tea

17:00 Katalin Farkas (CEU)

18:30 Wine Reception

19:15 Conference Dinner

Day 2

10:00 Johannes Roessler (Warwick)

11:30 Coffee

12:00 Rachel Dudley (CEU)

13:30 Lunch and Coffee

14:15 Simon Wimmer (Warwick)

15:45 Tea

16:15 Paul Silva (Cologne)

17:45 Workshop Closes

16/04 9am-10:45am: CANCELLED: Katalin Farkas: The Unity of Knowledge

Rachel Harrington — Mon, 16 Mar 2020 10:10:58 GMT

When: 9am - 10:45am, Thu, 16 Apr '20

Katalin Farkas, CEU

16th April 2020, Cowling Room

Contact: Lucy Campbell

27/04 10am-11am: CANCELLED: Conference: The Cultural Origins of Human Mind-Reading

Rachel Harrington — Thu, 16 Apr 2020 13:27:54 GMT

When: 10am - 11am, Mon, 27 Apr '20

The Cultural Origins of Human Mind-Reading

27th April 2020

Contact: Richard Moore

Speakers: Richard Moore, Cecilia Heyes, Paula Rubio Fernandez, Steve Butterfill.

06/05 2pm-3pm: Commitment lab meeting

Rachel Harrington — Tue, 05 May 2020 14:09:59 GMT

When: 2pm - 3pm, Wed, 06 May '20

Contact: Matt Chennels

08/05 11:30am-1pm: The Communicative Mind reading group

Rachel Harrington — Tue, 05 May 2020 10:20:14 GMT

When: 11:30am - 1pm, Fri, 08 May '20

Contact: Richard Moore

08/05 2pm-4pm: Truth and Truthfulness Webinar: Chapter 2: Geneology - All Students Welcome

Rachel Harrington — Tue, 05 May 2020 14:39:00 GMT

When: 2pm - 4pm, Fri, 08 May '20

Where: By Zoom

Text: 'Truth and Truthfulness' by Bernard Williams (2002)

11/05 11:30am-1pm: WMA WIP Daniel Vanello "Moral understanding, moral individuality, and the irreplaceability of the individual” via Teams

Rachel Harrington — Tue, 05 May 2020 14:17:00 GMT

When: 11:30am - 1pm, Mon, 11 May '20

Daniel Vanello: "Moral understanding, moral individuality, and the irreplaceability of the individual”

Abstract: The paper tackles a fundamental puzzle about our moral understanding. On the one hand, we take it as a requirement of our moral understanding that its content be generalisable. On the other hand, we give moral significance to particular relationships we enjoy only with a select few. The puzzle has been widely discussed in debates between impartialists and partialists, in particular regarding the status of special obligations. Although I tackle the puzzle of moral understanding by remaining within a framework familiar to the debate between impartialists and partialists, I focus on a less discussed topic: moral individuality and the irreplaceability of the individual. To this effect, I set up a debate between Bernard Williams, David Velleman and Raimond Gaita. I argue that both Williams and Velleman fail to give an account of the irreplaceability of the individual. I then argue that Gaita’s work allows us to diagnose both Williams’ and Velleman’s failure. I also argue that it provides us with an understanding of the irreplaceability of the individual and of moral individuality that explains both why we give special moral significance to our particular relationships and that at the same time is generalisable, thus furthering our understanding of the puzzle.

Contact: Lucy Campbell

13/05 2pm-3pm: Commitment lab meeting

Rachel Harrington — Tue, 05 May 2020 14:09:59 GMT

When: 2pm - 3pm, Wed, 13 May '20

Contact: Matt Chennels

13/05 4pm-6pm: Philosophy Department Colloquium: Richard Moore: 'The Communicative Foundations of Propositional Attitude Psychology'

Rachel Harrington — Wed, 06 May 2020 12:28:13 GMT

When: 4pm - 6pm, Wed, 13 May '20

Where: By Zoom

Speaker: Richard Moore

The Communicative Foundations of Propositional Attitude Psychology

Abstract:

According to a widely held dogma, a developed propositional attitude psychology is a prerequisite of attributing communicative intent, and so a developmental prerequisite of natural language acquisition. This view is difficult to reconcile with developmental evidence, which shows not only that children do not develop propositional attitudes until they are four years old (e.g. Rakoczy 2017), but also that this development is parasitic upon natural language acquisition (de Villiers & de Villers 2000; Lohmann & Tomasello 2003; Low 2010), and that it recruits brain regions that do not exist in infancy (Grosse-Wiesmann et al. 2017). Against the received view, and building on my work on minimally Gricean communication (Moore 2017a), I sketch a developmental trajectory to show how propositional attitude psychology could be both invented and learned through communicative interaction. I finish by considering the conditions in which cultural tools for mental state representation might first have been developed in human history; and the extent to which our early human ancestors might have lacked propositional attitudes. The goal of the paper will not be to show that strong nativism about human mindreading must be false, but that there is no reason to take it for granted in considering the origins of the modern human mind.

15/05 11:30am-1pm: The Communicative Mind reading group

Rachel Harrington — Tue, 05 May 2020 10:20:14 GMT

When: 11:30am - 1pm, Fri, 15 May '20

Contact: Richard Moore

15/05 2pm-4pm: Truth and Truthfulness Webinar: Chapter 3: The State of Nature - A Rough Guide

Rachel Harrington — Tue, 05 May 2020 14:40:27 GMT

When: 2pm - 4pm, Fri, 15 May '20

Where: By Zoom

Text: 'Truth and Truthfulness' by Bernard Williams (2002)

20/05 2pm-3pm: Commitment lab meeting

Rachel Harrington — Tue, 05 May 2020 14:09:59 GMT

When: 2pm - 3pm, Wed, 20 May '20

Contact: Matt Chennels