Week 2 - Seminar 1

1. The first "seminar" will be a little non-standard. As you will not have attended many lectures but will have had been lectured on the rationale behind experimental economics and had look at what makes a "good experiment" for the first seminar you will be asked to consider what it is like to be a subject in an experiment and to see things from both perspectives.

2. You are considering using to use a within-subjects design or between subjects design. Briefly outline the advantages and disadvantages of each.

3. You are considering running a multiple round experiment using the same subjects to play the same game multiple times, to gather as much data as possible. What might cause you to reconsider?

4. When running a laboratory experiment that involves strategic interaction how does a "strangers" design differ from a "perfect strangers" design?

5. What are the key steps in an experimental design?

6. How can you ensure you have "enough" or "strong" statistical power?

Week 2 - Seminar 2

1. Describe the experimental design *in Chou, Eileen, Margaret McConnell, Rosemarie Nagel and Charles R. Plott (2009) 'The control of game form recognition in experiments: understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person guessing game.' Experimental Economics 12(2), 159–79*. Report their findings.

2. Report the key findings of the following paper by *Camerer, Colin F., Anna Dreber, Eskil Forsell, Teck-Hua Ho, Jürgen Huber, Magnus Johannesson, Michael Kirchler, Johan Almenberg, Adam Altmejd, Taizan Chan, Emma Heikensten, Felix Holzmeister, Taisuke Imai, Siri Isaksson, Gideon Nave, Thomas Pfeiffer, Michael Razen and References 405 Hang Wu (2016) 'Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics.' Science 351(6280), 1433–6*

3. What are the key conclusion of the following paper Camerer, Colin F., (2015) *'The promise and success of lab–field generalizability in experimental economics: a critical reply to Levitt and List.' In Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology, ed. Guillaume R. Fréchette and Andrew Schotter (New York: Oxford University Press), 249–95*

4. Provide a definition of a loss aversion and an index to measure it.)[Hint: *'Loss aversion under prospect theory: A parameter-free measurement', Management Science 53(10), 1659–1674.*]

Week 2 - Seminar 3

1. *Explain what a proper scoring rule is, give an example.*

2. Describe the experimental design of *Offerman, T., Sonnemans, J., Van de Kuilen, G. & Wakker, P. P. (2009), 'A truth serum for non-bayesians: Correcting proper scoring rules for risk attitudes', The Review of Economic Studies 76(4), 1461–1489.,* and discuss its key findings.

3. Describe the experimental design of *Keren, G. & Roelofsma, P. (1995), 'Immediacy and certainty in intertemporal choice', Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 63(3), 287–297.,* and summarise its key findings.

4. Read *Baucells, M. & Heukamp, F. H. (2012), 'Probability and time trade-off', Management Science 58(4), 831–842,* and describe their five preferences patterns in section 2 . And provide an intuition for their Probability Time Trade-off (PPT) model (section 3.1) in *Baucells, M., Heukamp, F.H. Common ratio using delay. Theory Decis 68, 149–158 (2010).*
(for this question It's enough to read the introductions and the specified sections)

Week 2 - Seminar 4

1. Describe the experiment design by *Bó, P.D., 2005. Cooperation under the shadow of the future: experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games. American economic review, 95(5), pp.1591-1604.* and discuss its key findings.

2. Discuss the main finings of Dal Bó, P. and Fréchette, G.R., 2018. On the determinants of cooperation in infinitely repeated games: A survey. *Journal of Economic Literature*, *56*(1), pp.60-114.

3. *Describe the experimental design of Nagel, R. (1995), 'Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study', The American economic review 85(5), 1313–1326. And discuss its key findings.*

4. *Consider System 1/System 2 hypothesis raised by Kahneman (2003) – also known as the 'thinking-fast-and-slow' hypothesis.*

How do incorporate System 1/System 2 hypothesis in your experimental design (e.g., the beauty contest game Nagel, R. (1995) that allows analyse subjects behaviour using System 1/System 2 hypothesis) .