With its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2024, Russia brought war back to Europe. Many hoped the madness would end in a few hours, days or, at most, weeks. Yet after two and half years peace is not in sight. Alina Nychyk asks when peace might come and what it could look like.

Dr Alina Nychyk

Zurich University of Applied Sciences

School of Law and Management

Regularly visiting friends and family in Ukraine, I see different individual motivations to leave the country or stay, to join the army and fight or not. In Sumy, a city 30 km from Russia, some live with their children to an accompaniment of frequent air raids and shootings. They are afraid to go abroad because “No one is waiting for us there”.

Some of my educated young friends, having opportunities to stay abroad, have decided to return to Ukraine to work for NGOs, the government and universities, hoping that they will bring victory closer. Others join the army. Others flee the shootings and search for opportunities abroad. Recently, a few of my male friends told me they are frightened of being conscripted and that any peace is better than war. They do not want death for them, their wives and their small children. When and how will this war end?

What peace do Ukrainians want?

If asked, Ukrainians would say they want to live peacefully on their lands, to have freedom in domestic and foreign policies and a decent standard of living free from corruption. Due to its geopolitical importance, the lands of Ukraine have attracted conquests over the centuries and the independent country kept certain connections to empires its lands belonged to. Not only culturally, but also economically those living in eastern Ukraine were more connected to Russia, and those in western Ukraine to EU states. Consequently, Ukrainians had diverse opinions on who to integrate with and this was used in recent decades by political forces inside Ukraine as political capital.

Euromaidan changed the political class into a pro-Western one, and Russia could not accept losing control over Ukraine. Russia annexed Crimea and fuelled pro-Russian rebels in Donbas (for an analysis EU-Ukraine-Russia relations in the first year of the Russian-Ukrainian war, see this article and this article). At that moment, many Ukrainians became convinced that friendship with Russia was no longer possible. Yet only after Russia’s full-scale invasion, one can speak about the final divorce between Ukrainians and Russians in Ukrainians’ minds – now, the vast majority of Ukrainians in all regions would vote for joining the EU. Ukrainians want independence in their foreign policy and Russia does not accept this.

Ukrainians want their country back. According to public opinion polls conducted by the Kyiv Institute of Sociology, in the first year and a half of the large-scale war, over 80% of Ukrainians refused any territorial concessions to Russia and were ready to fight until the liberation of the whole country, including Crimea and Donbas. Yet, this number decreased from 80% in October 2023 to only 55% in May 2024. Today 32% of Ukrainians will accept Russian occupation of some of the country’s territories if it brings peace sooner. However, even if some Ukrainians in the Ukraine-controlled territories are ready to leave parts of Ukraine to Russia, what about the people living in the occupied territories? There are numerous reports about Russians taking over Ukrainians’ property, Russians torturing and murdering Ukrainians, not even speaking about the absence of democratic freedoms and liberties under occupational Russian rule.

The majority of Ukrainians are still ready to fight to reclaim the country up to its borders as agreed in 1991, but a substantial decrease in this number reveals fatigue, frustration and declining hopes of victory among Ukrainians. Yet even if the Ukrainian population and politicians were to agree to stop the war and accept the current line of demarcation between the two armies, there is no guarantee that Putin would accept this. Even if he signs a peace agreement, there is no guarantee that Russia will follow it and not attack Ukraine again in the coming months or years. That is why Ukraine has been searching for reliable security guarantees from foreign partners. So far, the only seemingly reliable option for deterring further Russian aggression is Ukraine’s accession to NATO, even if it is not realistic at the moment. Ukrainians want peace, but the question is how to convince Russians to agree to peace.

Who is winning?

Ukraine’s recent incursion into Russia’s territory was a surprise to many. It has destroyed Putin’s promise of stability and safety for his population (at least for Russians in the occupied regions). It challenges the idea of Russia as a superpower that everyone is afraid to provoke. Yet probably the biggest advantage is the boost to Ukrainians’ morale. In a long-lasting war, Ukrainians continue to lose their loved ones, homes and belongings. The incursion into Russian territory shows the Ukrainian Army’s abilities and strength. The Kursk operation also takes attention away from Ukraine’s current loses in eastern Ukraine.

From another perspective, the Kursk incursion carries certain risks. The core issue is that, while occupying Russian territories, Ukraine is losing its own territories in the east. For instance, Russian troops are close to Novohrodivka and Pokrovsk. Ukrainian troops used in the Kursk operation could have been more useful for defending these towns. So far, the Russians have not transferred their troops en masse from Ukraine’s territory (the main goal of the operation). Russia’s main strike forces remain in Donbas.

Will Ukraine’s hold on Russian territories become Ukraine’s bargaining chip in future peace negotiations? So far, Putin rejected such a possibility and the shelling of the Sumy region increased substantially. A few Ukrainian towns near the border, e.g. Hlukhiv, are now subject to compulsory evacuation. Recently, Russia has started its counter-offensive in the Kursk region.

There are, as well, some possible advantages to Putin resulting from Ukraine’s attack. He can use this in his internal purges and ideological mobilisation. Ukraine may hope that ‘bringing war closer to the Russians’ will convince them to protest against the war and Putin, but it may have an opposite effect. This operation also changes the war from a Russian invasion of Ukraine into a war on both countries’ territories.

The war has exhausted both countries. Russia has larger resources and an authoritarian system with a powerful propaganda machine. Ukraine is fighting for its survival. Ukraine is struggling to hold on to its territories in Donbas, while dreaming of liberating the whole of Ukraine. More modern Western weapons and the removal of restrictions on their usage will help Ukraine.

For now, neither country will give up fighting. The mad Russian dictator cannot lose the war and risk losing power. He cannot be trusted as a partner in any agreements. Ukrainians want peace, but they also want freedom and their country back. The possibility of sustainable peace is not in sight. Yet in our fast-changing world, new better options may arise. Hopefully sooner rather than later.

Alina’s new book about Ukraine’s foreign policy in relations with the EU and Russia during the first year of the war (2014-2015), Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia and the EU. Misperceptions of Foreign Challenges in Times of War, 2014–2015 (Columbia University Press) is available now.

Views and opinions expressed on the blog do not necessarily reflect the views of the Warwick Ukraine-Belarus Hub.