In February 2024 the Lukashenka regime's actions and rhetoric towards its neighbours became markedly more aggressive. It began military drills and combat readiness checks, sparking discussions about the possibility of Belarus’s direct participation in the Russo-Ukrainian War or its invasion of Lithuania.

 

Pavlo Rad, Ukrainian Prism

 

In February 2024 the Lukashenka regime's actions and rhetoric towards its neighbours became markedly more aggressive. After a period of relative calm, groups of migrants are trying to illegally cross Belarus’s borders into Poland, Latvia, and especially Lithuania. Trade wars and border crossing closures have soured relations between Vilnius and Minsk. Lately, the Lukashenka regime began military drills and combat readiness checks, sparking discussions about the possibility of Belarus’s direct participation in the Russo-Ukrainian War or an invasion of Lithuania.

 

Fight against Belarusians abroad

Since 2020 a large number of Belarusians fled their country and settled in Lithuania. The Lukashenka regime has been disrupting their lives by different means. A new wave of military drills and combat readiness tests is aimed at the internal destabilisation of the neighbouring state by utilising a shift in Lithuanians’ attitude towards Belarusians. Thus, since 2023, Belarusian intelligence has probably been spreading narratives among Lithuanians related to the presence in the country of supporters of the ideology of Litvinism, a branch of Belarusian nationalism that claims the historical heritage of Lithuania. These operations, coupled with other external factors, such as Belarus's role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, recruitment of Lithuanian citizens by the Belarusian KGB, and the infiltration of intelligence service agents into the country, resulted in a more negative attitude towards Belarusians and a growing perception of them as a threat.

 

The possibility of the beginning of renewed hostilities provokes growing anxiety and dissatisfaction among the Lithuanians. Moreover, for part of the population, it may not be clear how the Belarusian diaspora will behave in the event of an invasion by the Lukashenka regime. At the same time, the actions of the authorities in Minsk are not limited in their objectives: they include a wide range of interests.

 

Part of Russia’s psychological and information operations

It is possible to say that, shortly before the beginning of any new phase of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Russian Federation uses Belarus as a source of possible threats. Thus, the first half of last year passed in similar conditions with the Belarusian and Russian Air Forces conducting joint flight training, the transfer of “Iskander-M” missile complexes to Belarus, and the nature of exercises being changed from defensive to offensive. The unusual public announcement of the deployment of tactical weapons was a cherry on the cake for Moscow. As later became clear from leaked Pentagon documents, the Russians managed to convince Ukrainian intelligence of the possibility of a second offensive being launched from Belarus.

 

Lukashenka’s aggressive rhetoric is aimed mainly at Belarus’s Western neighbours. At the same time, the Kyiv authorities have been accused of deploying saboteurs on the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the recruitment of Belarusians for this purpose. These factors, coupled with constant exercises, in particular mobilisation training and statements about preparations for war, probably serve as tools of pressure on society and the military-political leadership both in Lithuania and Ukraine and to some extent in Poland.

 

No need for direct involvement in combat

It is not entirely clear why the Kremlin would need the direct participation of the Belarusian military in the war. To push back Ukrainian forces, it is sufficient to carry out a series of provocations on the border, to accumulate a more or less sufficient number of forces at the Belarus-Ukraine border, or to do both of these things together. The transformation of Belarus into a war zone is currently disadvantageous both for Lukashenka, who like any autocrat is primarily guided by the logic of preserving his regime, and for Russia.

 

This is due not only to the fact that, in the event of direct participation in the war, Belarusian defense enterprises will automatically become a target of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and therefore their ability to supply the necessary components to the Russian Federation will be undermined, but also to the fact that against the background of attacks on Russian refineries, the Kremlin was forced to increase imports of Belarusian petroleum products to prevent shortages.

 

Also, the start of hostilities on the territory of Belarus potentially affects the interests of the People's Republic of China, for which it is important to maintain a certain stability at least in this part of the region. In the case of the involvement of the Republic of Belarus in the war, there will be serious threats to the railroad transit of Chinese goods through Belarus that may lead to the loss of this route - not a tragic scenario, but one that is quite harmful for Beijing.

 

Threats should not be underestimated

Despite the combat readiness checks and active movement of the Belarusian military, there are no signs of the formation of units to carry out offensive actions. Moreover, there are major doubts about whether Lukashenka's army is capable of conducting serious operations without the direct support of the Russian Federation.

 

The most plausible reason for the development of the most negative scenario may be related to a desire in Moscow to open a northern front against Ukraine or to commit aggression against one of the Baltic states. As February 2022 showed, Lukashenka has little influence on his ally’s decision-making processes in matters of war and peace.

 

If Russia manages to achieve serious successes in south-east of Ukraine, as well as free up a sufficient number of forces and means to start a new campaign, then the escalation of the situation and transformation of Belarus into the bridgehead for new Russian offensive actions could be a real scenario.