How too much talk about peace talks is harming Ukraine

Anastasiia Kudlenko

Research Fellow, IGSD, University of Warwick

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Anastasiia Kudlenko argues that US president Donald Trump's promotion of peace talks has not only failed to bring peace to Ukraine, it has in fact undermined Ukraine's defence in several ways. Trump's goal is not so much peace as the normalisation of US relations with Russia, she says, and points to policies that will help to strengthen Ukraine's resilience.

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Much ado about nothing

Despite all the loud proclamations[i] and promises[ii], President Trump's return to the White House has neither stopped the Russo-Ukrainian war, nor delivered a ceasefire. Nonetheless, in just over four months back in office, Mr Trump has put peace talks between Moscow and Kyiv firmly on the agenda, yet it remains to be seen to what effect. First came a proposal of a partial ceasefire, accepted by Ukraine in March 2025[iii], and rejected in practice by Russia, despite Vladimir Putin claiming[iv] he would agree to a 30-day moratorium on striking energy infrastructure if certain conditions were met, including addressing the root causes of the conflict. Russia's continued and, from the end of May, intensified strikes on Ukraine, however, speak much louder than any of the Kremlin's claims.

Under American pressure, Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on 15 May for the first time since direct talks broke down in March 2022. While President Zelensky travelled to Istanbul, Putin sent in a low-level delegation that negotiated an exchange of prisoners of war with the Ukrainian side, but failed to deliver any breakthrough in the peace process[v]. This spurred Mr Trump to have a two-hour long call with Putin on 19 May[vi], which both presented as a success, although in reality it did not achieve anything new. If anything, it gave Putin an opportunity to mock the process by promising to prepare a "memorandum" on a "possible future peace". The choice of words here is not coincidental, as noted by Andreas Umland[vii]: Russia (alongside the USA and United Kingdom) had already signed the Budapest memorandum[viii] with Ukraine in 1994, pledging to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and inviolability of its borders, and to refrain from the use or threat of military force in exchange for Ukraine giving up the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world. All of these assurances were broken in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and instigation of conflict in the East of Ukraine and invalidated further with the full-scale invasion of the country on 24 February 2022.

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The unspoken side of the peace talks

While more talks were held in Istanbul and conversations continue about new rounds, there is no indication they can bring about lasting peace to Ukraine. On the contrary, overemphasis on the talks in the last several months has been harmful to Ukraine in at least four ways.

First, the talks gave Russia a new powerful platform for spreading misinformation and blatant lies about Ukraine and the war. To a great extent, in this respect Russia was helped by the new US administration that repeated some of the claims Russia had been making since the start of the invasion, including putting the blame for it on Kyiv[ix] and questioning the legitimacy of President Zelensky. To initiate the talks, President Trump chose to exert pressure on Zelensky over Putin, calling the former a dictator[x]. Unlike Putin, however, Zelensky was elected in free and fair elections, which have been the norm in Ukraine since the Orange Revolution of 2004[xi]. And although the Ukrainian constitution prohibits elections during martial law, Trump's inflammatory language, combined with Russian hostile commentary, which at one point included a suggestion for placing Ukraine under a UN administration[xii], captured media attention. In such an environment, Zelensky's government was placed on the back foot and forced to constantly put out fires not just on the battlefield, but also in the international information space.

Second, and linked to the first point, the flurry of activity and uncertainty around the US-backed Russia-Ukraine peace talks has created confusion in Ukraine, disturbing the civilian-military cooperation. According to General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, now Ukraine's Ambassador to the United Kingdom, but at the start of the invasion and until February 2024, Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s armed forces (UAF), Ukraine managed to survive the full-scale invasion first and foremost due to the will and resilience of the Ukrainian people[xiii]. My research on resilience[xiv], which can be broadly defined as a process of self-organisation in times of crisis, has demonstrated the importance of the whole of society mobilisation in response to the war[xv]. What is more, the UAF remain highly dependent on donations and support of the civilian population. These donations are often organised by volunteers, some with a large social media following, others working on a smaller local scale, in response to direct requests of the military. In the past few months, however, volunteers have found it challenging to fulfil the incoming requests reasonably quickly, and many, like a popular blogger and volunteer Ihor Lachenkov[xvi], have blamed the constant noise around the peace negotiations. The continuing Russian attacks on the civilian population, both militarily and via various propaganda channels, have also been contributing to simmering tensions in Ukraine, which Russia is eager to exploit further, to sow division.

Third, the guessing game on the future development of the peace talks and theatrics surrounding them have been redirecting attention from the situation in Ukraine. Although major Russian attacks, like the largest air attack on Ukraine since the start of the invasion on 24-25 May, are reported[xvii], daily strikes on civilians and crimes against Ukrainian prisoners of war barely warrant any attention. Of course, those, who follow the war closely, whether policy makers in the EU or Ukrainian refugees around the world, understand the gravity of the situation on the ground, yet the general public outside of Ukraine remains largely ignorant. Nonetheless, they constantly hear about the peace talks between Ukraine and Russia. In the long run this might create an issue when, for example, European policy makers will need to persuade their electorate to continue or even strengthen the support they provide for Ukraine, especially as the US is unlikely to offer more assistance. Some subtle changes in the language used by the US administration in condemning the Russian attacks on Ukraine are also worth mentioning. Mr Trump's occasional outbursts at Putin, such as on 26 May, when he called him "absolutely crazy"[xviii], aside, American officials' comments on recent escalations are notable for the absence of putting any blame on Russia. They often contain calls for immediate ceasefire and stopping the bloodshed, but they do not directly call on Russia to do so[xix]. These changes are made to portray both sides as equally responsible for the continuation of the fighting, ignoring the fact that Ukraine has no other choice but to defend itself. As a popular Ukrainian saying goes, "If Russia stops fighting, the war will stop, yet if Ukraine stops fighting, it will be the end of Ukraine".

Fourth, the constant buzz about the peace talks legitimises a peace process without a substance. Achieving peace is every Ukrainian's dream and goal, but for this peace to materialise the peace process needs to fulfil certain criteria. Back in March, Timothy Snyder offered five tests to determine whether the US-sponsored peace talks qualified as real[xx]. These included:

1. International law: are both Ukraine and Russia and their legal boundaries the starting point of the discussion?

2. Invaders: is the USA comfortable recognising Russia as the invader and the actor that began the war?

3. Pressure points: will Russia face negative consequences if it does not fully engage with the process?

4. Paper vs reality: is Russia capable of honouring a peace agreement if it violated numerous previous agreements with Ukraine?

5. Ceasefire vs peace: can a ceasefire bring a meaningful peace without security guarantees to Ukraine?

Looking at the development of the peace talks so far, the answer to all the questions is "no", meaning that the process, started by Washington is not aimed at bringing peace to Ukraine. As Snyder put it, "it seems, in fact, designed to create the conditions for a broader and a longer war by excluding, exploiting and harming Ukraine, strengthening Russia, misconstruing the basic reality of the war, ignoring international law, and denying the need for any structure at all beyond the verbal assurances"[xxi].

What next?

If the process, started by Mr Trump, is not a real peace process, but an exercise, designed to normalise relations with Russia and disadvantage Ukraine, then what is there left to do for Ukraine and its allies? Walking away from the talks is out of the question, given how easy it would be to blame it for their failure. Kyiv therefore has to continue engaging with Russian diplomats, yet it is crucial that it also works to strengthen its partnerships with European allies, while looking for new ways to engage with states of the Global South that have so far either preferred neutrality or shown more favour to Russia.

Working on the premise that the US is reducing its role in the European security overall and in the Russo-Ukrainian war in particular, it is vital for Ukraine to have other strong partners on its side. While international cooperation is important, it is nothing without domestic determination to defend Ukraine, for which nurturing resilience is imperative. For this to happen, Zelensky’s government needs to ensure Ukraine is fulfilling requirements within membership negotiations with the EU, one of the key aspirations of Ukrainians, linked to the idea of the ‘good life’, central to resilience, while also safeguarding people’s rights and freedoms, some of which have been restricted since the start of the invasion.

For European allies, this means a greater role in providing military and financial assistance to Ukraine, while simultaneously working on strengthening their own defence systems and preparing their societies for the possibility of a larger war closer to home if Russia is appeased. More work needs to be done on exerting pressure on Moscow, both via sanctions and complete refusal of Russian fossil fuels, the sale of which has been financing the Russian war machine. It is necessary to continue collecting evidence of the Russian war crimes, which could add pressure on Russia, but also show the Ukrainian society that its sacrifices have not been in vain.

Finally, support to Ukraine should neither be treated nor presented to the public as charity or a waste of resources but as an investment into the safety and security of Europe. We need to have more conversations outside of policy circles and academia on how the Russo-Ukrainian war is affecting countries around the world and how its outcome may shape the future of Europe and the world order.

In 2024, at the Munich conference, President Zelensky said "Do not ask Ukraine when the war will end. Ask yourselves, why is Putin still able to wage it?". This remains true today. For this war to end and not spread further, Ukraine requires more support and Russia – more pressure, not vice versa.

Image: Photo by Peter Steiner 🇨🇭 1973 on Unsplash