322/2017 Lorenzo Casaburi and Rocco Macchiavello
Failures in saving markets can spill over into other markets: When producers are saving constrained, trustworthy buyers can offer infrequent delayed payments a saving tool and purchase at a lower price, thus departing from standard trade credit logic. This paper develops a model of this interlinkage and tests it in the context of the Kenyan dairy industry. Multiple data sources, experiments, and a calibration exercise support the micro-foundations and predictions of the model concerning: i) producers' demand for infrequent payments; ii) heterogeneity across buyers in the ability to supply low frequency payments; iii) a segmented market equilibrium where buyers compete by providing either liquidity or saving services to producers; iv) low supply response to price increases. We provide additional evidence from other settings, including labuor markets, and discuss policy implications concerning contract enforcement, nancial access, and market structure.
Culture and Development