646/2022 Oliver R. Browne, Ludovica Gazze, Michael Greenstone, Olga Rostapshova

New technologies allow perfect detection of environmental violations at near-zero marginal cost, but take-up is low. We conducted a field experiment to evaluate enforcement of water conservation rules with smart meters in Fresno, CA. Households were randomly assigned combinations of enforcement method (automated or in-person inspections) and fines. Automated enforcement increased households’ punishment rates from 0.1 to 14%, decreased water use by 3%, and reduced violations by 17%, while higher fine levels had little effect. However, automated enforcement also increased customer complaints by 1,102%, ultimately causing its cancellation and highlighting that political considerations limit technological solutions to enforcement challenges.

Culture, Behaviour and Development

National Bureau of Economic Research

https://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30816